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DEVELOPMENTS IN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

by

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(INTELLIGENCE)

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Gentlemen, intelligence is divided into three kinds, as you know: human, military and divine. The human is practiced outside of the government; the military, in the War and Navy Departments; and, of course, the State Department takes the balance of the field.

I said to the General and the Admiral on the way up here that I sometimes wondered whether it was any good to have good intelligence. We did a job over in MIS for the Air Forces and the Navy back in the June of 1945 which had to do with the Korean transportation system. And we recommended that the Sachun River bridge be knocked out, and then that there be a series of bombings of north-south rail lines with the objective of depriving southern Korean industries and railroads of coal, all of which came from northern Korea. We had practically perfect information on the subject. But the war ended before the second stage of the operation. And shortly after war ended, we divided up Korea with the Russians. It never occurred to anybody to say, "Uncle Joe, we want southern Korea--but with the coal from the north." So, Uncle Joe closed off all the lines and we didn't have any coal; we had to get some ships and carry it from Japan. This is a good case of having your intelligence and not making use of it. That is one of the big problems--not only to get it but to make use of it.

The current subject, a central intelligence agency, has been brooded about and talked about a good deal and has become one of those subjects on which families have been broken up--brothers cease to speak to brothers; and fathers, to sons. I get a lot of letters from people all over the country advocating various kinds of intelligence organizations.

There are two extremes. In the first place, it is generally conceded that something ought to be done about intelligence, just as something ought to be done about a lot of other things. There is a school of opinion of which a certain general, a great friend of mine, is one exponent--which school holds the view that there ought to be a central place with a lot of people, into which all foreign information, whatsoever it may be, will flow--where it will be, as the Army says, "processed"--and out of which will come all the information that is needed to run our foreign affairs, and to plan for the Army and the Navy, and for the other governmental organizations that have to do with the preservation of peace and the satisfaction of international relations.

I happen not to be an exponent of that theory. My observations indicate to me that intelligence must be conducted on the operating level. Take the State Department, for example. The man who needs intelligence day in and day out is not the Secretary of State. He (the Secretary of State) needs intelligence when he needs it. But the man who needs good information day in and day out is the man who answers the cables, the man who writes the notes for the ambassadors to deliver, the fellow whose actions from day to day create situations that may -- and frequently do-- circumscribe and determine your foreign policy. You finally, after pursuing a course of action, are left with only two choices, let's say, whereas at the outset you might have had ten.

Intelligence is not an abstract thing. There is no such thing as intelligence in the abstract. Intelligence is the sum total of information that you need to have to solve a problem. You who have had experience using intelligence in the theaters in connection with actual operations know that.

The deficiencies of intelligence are fairly simple deficiencies. If you analyze how we were situated at the beginning of the war, our difficulties were fairly simple. We didn't have any maps, for example. We just had never gone in for the business in this government of collecting maps of various parts of the world. Secondly, we thought we knew a lot of things -- that weren't so.

You know you can give an intelligence picture in two different ways. You can go to the Bureau of Mines and you can get a map that will show you the mineral resources of the world; and they will be your facts on which you are going to base some decision let's say. But Mr. Boggs, the head geographer of the State Department, made a different kind of a map of the mineral resources of the world. He made a map in three tones--black, dark grey and light grey--of the mineral resources of the world, designed not to show what they were but how good the information we had in this government was about mineral resources. In other words, for the United States you put black, because we think we know pretty much all about it; and where you have fair information, but not very sure, you put dark grey; and where it is "lousy", you put light grey--and most of the earth was in light grey. So, in dealing with intelligence you not only have to know

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I don't think the Army, nor the Navy, nor the Department of Agriculture, nor the State Department, nor the Department of Labor, can go out of the intelligence business--nor anybody else--who needs foreign information. They have all got to do their jobs. For that reason and for a lot of other reasons I am opposed to superimposing on all the existing intelligence agencies another one which is going to do their whole job. And living as we do in an imperfect world, we ought to know that Congress isn't going to give anybody the money to do such a thing. Or if Congress does give them the money, they are going to be darn sure to take the money away from everybody else--from G-2, ONI.

*Benton* I had the experience of testifying before a Congressional committee a couple of weeks ago about the need for foreign information and why they should give us the money. One of the members of the committee said, "I don't understand why you need all this business. Can't the FBI get all this information for you in foreign countries?" Bill Bennett was testifying down there and he said, "We need to have an information program in foreign countries, particularly", he said, "in Latin America, in Brazil." Mr. Bennett said, "I have a report that the French are putting on a half-million-dollar information campaign over the next year; the British are spending somewhere around \$300,000; the Russians are in there, and it looks like they are going to spend a lot of money. "But", he said, "I don't want to lay too much stress on this particular report, because I haven't been able to authenticate it." An hour or half an hour later when Bill had finished his testimony, one of the Congressmen said to him, "Mr. Bennett, how long have you been in the State Department?" And Bill had to admit he had only been there 30 days. "His fellow said, "I thought you must be a newcomer because you said you weren't able to authenticate this report from Brazil." He said, "I should think that would be the easiest thing in the world to do--in fact, I would be surprised if your ambassador isn't sending you in that information from week to week." We had to pass the Foreign Agents Registration Act in this country to have any remote idea what foreign countries are spending here--and the idea that the ambassador can get that information by asking in Brazil is so utterly naive that it is incredible.

If you reject the idea of an agency which is going to sit on top of everybody else and do all their work, the question then is "hat should you have? That depends somewhat on how you analyze our difficulties, what you consider the intelligence processes to be.

My experience indicates to me that the key operation in intelligence is what (for want of a better word) you call the research operation that is performed here in Washington, or wherever the headquarters may be, on the incoming information. Of course, we need more information--at least, it is nice to have as much information as you can get--but the information itself is useless unless somebody can sit down and work on it and get out of it the truth--determine what is right, get the answers to whatever your operating problems may be. So, the thing you want to do in intelligence here in Washington in my view is to stimulate that part of the operation, encourage those people to do a better job at it, and spread it around among the agencies of the government so it is done by the fellow who is best qualified to do it.

When you come to talk about a central intelligence agency of a practical nature, the first question you have is How are you going to get the money to run it? Having lived through three Congressional hearings, and also for other reasons, my own view--and this is also the view of the State Department-- is that you should not have an agency with a separate budget which will be up there for everybody to shoot at. You ought to have an agency which is an inter-departmental one, the money and personnel being supplied by the participating agencies.

Then when you come to that point, you have to decide what department is going to furnish the man who is the head of it. And it was my view when I was in the Army, and it is my view at the present time, that that man should be a State Department official. The State Department is responsible for your foreign policy; it does more things to effect your foreign policy. After all, the Army and Navy would have preferred to have the war with Japan occur about six months after it did, but that was impossible because of the foreign policy pursued by this government. When we cut the Japanese off from oil, when we cut them off from scrap iron, when we did various other things and then impounded their funds, we created a situation which made war inevitable. And the time that the war was not the making of the Army and Navy, but of the making of the State Department. So, the ultimate responsibility for foreign intelligence should be put where the ultimate responsibility for foreign policy resides, not, to be sure, as a single responsibility, but as (you might say) a responsibility of leadership and a responsibility of seeing that the jobs get done.

How does that organization work with the Army and Navy and with the other departments of the government? Obviously it must work very closely. I think now the time has come to unveil the chart. (I lived at G-2 long enough so I can't do anything without a chart anymore).

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This (indicating) is a tentative organizational chart for an intelligence-coordinating agency. The name (National Intelligence Authority) is the Army-Navy's title. The authority which is ultimately responsible is a Cabinet committee. The Secretary of State is chairman, and there are the Secretaries of War and Navy.

There is a certain division of the intelligence field that to my mind is very important, and that is the division between intelligence in the positive sense and security or counter-intelligence. The security organizations of the government in addition to the armed services are the numerous agencies of the Treasury Department, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Customs, etc., and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is not only a domestic police organization but now operates in certain foreign countries.

The division between security and intelligence is one that deserves a lot of thought because there is something in the field of counter-intelligence that captivates the imagination and becomes a disease. Both the Army and Navy have suffered from that disease in the past to such an extent that when the President back in 1941-'40 or '41--thought it would be nice to get the Army, Navy and FBI together to see what could be done about intelligence, they got together and they devoted themselves to nothing whatever except domestic security, and the security, of course, of Hawaii, etc. They paid no attention to the affirmative side of getting information about the world that you might need if you were going to fight a war. We were pretty close to war in those days, and as you look back on the record it seems incredible that that should have happened. There seems to be a tendency for people who get into the security business to concentrate on that business to the exclusion of what is certainly much more important.

One of the main proponents of this central agency idea in fact proposed that there be two authorities at the top instead of one, that you give the intelligence responsibility to these three people (State, War and Navy) and put another authority to deal with security, giving them (intelligence and security) for coordination purposes a common secretariat. I think that is a bit cumbersome and probably not desirable.

This scheme (shown on chart) calls for having an official of the State Department as the Executive Secretary of this agency. And I think, perhaps, if I read you the prospectus of his proposed powers, that might be quicker than trying to extemporize on it:

"Under the supervision and direction of the Executive Secretary, the Secretariat shall (a) plan the Authority's program and make recommendations to the Authority for carrying it out; (b) act as the executive for the Authority in carrying out such a program and all operating plans approved by the Authority including any centralized operations conducted under the Authority; (c) omitted by Colonel McCormack; (d) develop and document all other procedures that exist; (e) provide the authority and committee for secretarial service, the maintenance of files and other services."

The first objective of this organization is to look at the whole field of intelligence and adopt a program. What do we need? What haven't we got?

The Army and Navy and some of the other agencies have just become conscious of the fact--maybe they became conscious of it some time back, but it has expressed itself now in an attempt to get up an organization--that our knowledge of the rare metals and their location throughout the world is very poor. That is one of the objectives of this plan to find out where we have good information and where we don't have good information.

It is proposed that the machinery of this agency (Executive Secretary) will be inter-departmental committees. I don't like the word "committee" and I know all the things that are bad about committees.

Let's take political intelligence. That is a very important field. Our political intelligence has not always been good; sometimes it has been very bad. The State Department the War Department and the Navy Department are all engaged in that activity. G-2 of the War Department puts out a weekly political analysis of the countries of the world--one publication on Europe, the Middle East and Africa; one on the Far East and one on Latin America--and they are pretty good books; they have some good people over there. The Navy does a somewhat similar thing only in a slightly different way. The Office of Strategic Services, now under the State Department, the Research and Analysis Branch (of OSS) gets out a bi-weekly political analysis of various countries of the world. And within the State Department, daily, weekly, semi-monthly and monthly publications of various kinds are produced.

One of the functions of this committee (Political Intelligence Committee) would be to try to set up an organization which would unify those activities and reduce the number of people in them, because all of the three agencies are under pressure to reduce personnel and that pressure is going to be increased as the "economy move" gets underway.

That committee (Political Intelligence Committee) would pay attention to what kind of reporting we get, and they would find, for example, that our ambassadors are not all equally qualified in political reporting; they would find that the staffs of our ambassadors and attaches are not all adequate to do the job. They would consider what type of information that you need of this kind you could get from American business firms in various parts of the world. For example, I suppose that our banks in foreign countries could produce a good deal of information for us, and that sort of thing.

I will skip the Military Intelligence committee.

Next, we have a committee which is called the Sociological Intelligence Committee which generally deals with the subject of the peoples of the world. You can open up the world almanac and find the population of any country in the world stated there but the range of error in the population statistics, is very considerable. You don't really know what the population of China is; you only have a vague guess. You know what the population of the United States is in a general way. The subject of populations and migrations is a very important one--populations pressures on food supplies, etc. That is the sort of thing this committee would give its attention to.

You will notice in addition to the three-State, War and Navy,- you have the Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Federal Security Agency. You may wonder why some of those are on there. Federal Security Agency is interested in welfare and has numerous international ramifications. The Department of Labor, likewise. As to the Department of Agriculture, I might give you an illustration of two things: First, what that Department does; and, second, what sort of thing we have in mind here.

When Mr. Franklin O'Lier wanted to get a group to do a morale survey of Germany to find out what had been affected in the day bombings, night bombings, area bombings, various types of operations, he looked around to see what sort of people we had in the government who could do public-opinion surveys--the Gallup poll type of thing. He found that the Department of Agriculture has been in the business a good deal longer than Dr. Gallup; and they are doing the work all the time and have a large organization to do it. So, he simply lifted--borrowed--from the Secretary of Agriculture this unit that went over to do the job.

Right today we have a very serious need for information about what the German people are really thinking. What are their reactions? How are they affected by their present situation? What are they likely to do? We haven't any agency to do the job right at the moment. But the Department of Agriculture wants to do the job; they are prepared to do it. They happen to be about the richest department of the Government. I will give you some statistics that rather appeal to me. The State Department, not including what it got from the OSS and OWI, has doubled in number during the war and has 4,000 people. The Department of Agriculture suffered a drastic decline during the war on account of the draft and various other things; they are down to 85,000 people. They have 8,000 in Washington. One of the things we'd like to do is make a little use of that 85,000 people. That doesn't include the 265,000 part-time employees.

Dr. Lichter, who is the head of this survey business over there, is all "Steamed-up" about intelligence. He has gotten into it for the first time and he now appreciates this very important field. Well, we say, let's make use of him and his facilities. There are lots of other things they can do in that department for us. In the field of scientific intelligence, for example, on certain phases of that, they have a great deal to contribute.

You have a Committee on Foreign Transportation and Communications. You all know the importance of that; every military man knows the importance of transportation and communications. There is an affirmative side to this-- and to all of this (all committees), actually. You write a program; you say "This is what we want." That may involve in the case of (let's say) the rare metals doing some geological surveys (say) in Alaska, Canada, South America, China, or wherever it may be. Recommendations as to what you have to do in order to solve the problem is a very important part of this machinery.

Next, Biographical Records Committee. That is a very interesting subject--biographical records. You rather assume that somewhere in the government you can get information on anybody that you want to know about in foreign countries, if he is at all prominent person. But back on the day after our landings in North Africa I had to find out the name of the chairman of the German Armistice Commission. I tried the MIS; I tried the Navy; and I tried the OSS; and I tried the State Department. The best I could do was that the State Department had a list of all the Germans in Morocco but

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the file was lost. Then a day later I located in the bowels of the Pentagon building (now of the Munitions Building) a military attache report of the previous spring that gave down at the bottom, "Wulich, Chairman KIA". The file of the State Department turned up in OPD and there was also a list, but it had "Bulich, Chairman General KIA." To my sorrow, after consulting all the German Army books back to before the last war I discovered there had never been an officer in the German Army with either name. After a couple of days of hard work on the part of three people, we finally found a book that had in it an appendix that was entitled "General Officers on Detached Service"; down at the bottom of it, it said Hans Wilhelm von Wellich, Chairman, KIA. What do you suppose the book was? It was the first edition of the G-2 German order of battle.

Also, I went into the G-2's office one day. He threw a paper at me and said, "Ever hear of this guy?" It was a paper from the chief of the British Imperial Staff to General Marshall, referring to an Italian, obviously a general, by the name of me. Attached to it was a note from the Italian expert, General Strong (colon, paragraph) "There is no such general in the Army.", possibly what the name could be and several versions were given of it. I had a girl by that time who had set up a Who's Who department. Not finding anybody else interested in it, I set it up myself. And I called her in and said, "Ever hear of this?" And she went out and five minutes later came back with a card which said me (stating given name), service with mounted troops in the last war, professor at the Italian Military Academy up to the time when he in July of that year had been decorated by Mussolini with the highest military decoration. And what do you suppose he was? He was the Italian G-2. He was the chief intelligence officer of the general staff.

A few experiences like that lead me to believe that you need to have order in this business. You need to do a systematic job of collecting names and keeping biographical records. The Navy has a good section on it; the Army has a good section on it; the State Department has a small one, and it is just the inherited one from the OSS.

After all, everything that happens in the world happens in terms of people. That is what the world consists of. And it is surprising how much you can get out of a cable or report if you know about the bird they are talking about or the writer of the report that you can't get if he is just a name and you know nothing more about him.

The principal mission of this committee (Biographical Records) is to find out how to coordinate the activity of those other people. The Navy used to have 180 yeomen doing this kind of work and the Army has 200 people in the Who's Who section, and there is a good deal of duplication of effort. I think it is pretty clear the service to the government could be improved by setting up some kind of machinery whereby you would either have one operation serving all--which I think is probably not the answer--or have the kind of coordination we had between two units in the Army, for example, that did the job where the sources were divided up; and one exploited one set of sources and the other, another set, and made their records in duplicate and exchanged copies. All sorts of devices like that, bringing in the departments that have specialized interests in people abroad--Labor, in the labor union people; Commerce, in people engaged in trade, etc.

Of course, the importance of the Economic Intelligence Committee is obvious. Right now we ought to have a fully developed program for getting the kind of information that you need to do bombing--that kind of a gloomy attitude toward the future, but obviously you all know it is essential. We had physically in this country when the war started almost all the information that we used to bomb Japan. But it took two and a half years to dig it out, put it together and get it in usable form. We don't want to have to do that again if we have another war.

Next, the Geographic Intelligence Committee. The need for that is obvious. I suppose if you take the fields of intelligence and study them, you would say our geographic intelligence in the beginning of the war was probably the most deficient of all. You all may have heard General Vandegrift say, as he said so often, that he went into Guadalcanal without a map of the island, that he knew nothing about what the island consisted of. He had an article from the Encyclopedia Britannica on the ship which had some information on the Solomon Islands and he had hydrographic charts; beyond that he had nothing.

There are many facets to geographic intelligence. For example, let's say the mapping of China. China has never been mapped in the sense we know modern mapping. I tried to find out recently what progress was being made. The objective we have had all along through the war was to do the kind of photography you need for mapping--aerial photography. I found that General Chennault has been able to do about 100 miles from the coast up the main parts of China, from (say) Hangchow to Shanghai. The rest is yet to be done. I inquired of the Army and they said "General MacArthur has a direc-

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tive to do it, apparently he can't do it." I haven't looked at that directive, but I have seen and looked an enough directives to General MacArthur to know it says something like this; "You are hereby directed to take aerial photographs of China for mapping purposes. You will do this when it suits you--and if your digestion is good and you feel in a nice mood. And if you don't do it, it's all right." This kind of a committee (Geographic Intelligence Committee) would tell General MacArthur to get up off his tail and do something about it.

Also, the subject of meteorological intelligence falls into this category. That is extremely important to those of you in the air forces now. When the war came along the weather bureau was not equipped to serve the air forces. They had to do their own job. They did a lot of very interesting things and made a lot of progress. For example, they went back and carded the weather. They had IBM (International Business Machines) Company devise machines to assist them in the carding of the weather. So, they have the weather carded back to the beginning of the century. If you have a weather pattern today and want to find those similar patterns which existed in the past, you punch the proper buttons and out comes the card. There is a lot of progress that can be made in weather. We don't know all the answers yet. The Russians, for example, have done a great deal of polar weather research--polar weather research that we haven't done yet. And there is a fellow connected with the Radio Corporation of America who has some ideas about weather signs that are very interesting and should be exploited. All that sort of thing falls under your Geographic Intelligence Committee.

There are many ramifications of weather. You all know you have to get your own weather stations; you have to find out what observations they can make. You have to locate them properly. You wouldn't locate a weather station outside of San Francisco so that it would always be foggy every day all summer, because it would give you a false notion of what the weather was in that general region. You have to locate your stations properly; you have to find out what kind of observations they can make; you have to find out at what altitude observations should be taken. You have to devise means for exchanging weather information with other countries. If they won't exchange it, you have to listen to their weather broadcasts. And if the weather broadcasts are not in the clear, you have to try to read the code. That is just one of many ramifications of this whole intelligence subject.

Next, the Committee on Scientific and Technological Intelligence. In this scientific and technological intelligence you have got the atomic bomb and a lot of other things. "What about the atomic bomb? How are you going to find out when the Russians go in for the atomic bomb? and what they do? I am not going to try to give you the answer to that question right here today, but I might say this: that I am told by a man I consider to be the best Russian expert I know, the man who is head of the Slovanic Institute at Columbia University, that it is his opinion if the Russians went in for an atomic bomb project on the scale of ours (let's say), a two-billion-dollar project, you would be able to observe the effect in their standard of living. Better watch the standard of living! which takes you back here again (Economic Intelligence Committee). And above all these coordinating committees you have a master coordinating organization (Executive Secretary).

The next committee here is the Committee on Acquisition of Foreign Library Materials. Here is an interesting committee. That sounds like an easy thing to get--foreign library material and foreign publications. Strangely enough, it is a very difficult thing to do. In the first place, the publications of foreign countries--some of them-- are not run quite like those in the United States. You could subscribe to them, but you don't always get them. Some you can't subscribe to; you have to find a way to buy those. You have not only the periodicals and that sort of thing, but you have the publications of scientific organizations. For example, one of these fellows said the nice thing he liked to get was the report of the Italian Agricultural Institute. You would think that is a very good organization, that has been running for a long time, and you would think our Department of Agriculture would have gotten around to getting their report. Well, getting their reports was an extremely complicated thing, because they were privately circulated. However, it was done by arrangements to give them a quid pro quo.

This organization (Committee on Acquisition of Foreign Library Materials) by the way has been running for three years and is largely responsible for the fact that we have in this country now pretty darn good coverage of the press of the world during the war which for historical purposes is very important.

The last committee on here (Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committees) is called the Committee on Recruitment and Training. You all know we apparently haven't learned anything about what you need to do when you send a person out as a military attache or as a naval attache. I won't speak for the Navy because I don't know what they are doing. But I know in the Army they pick them in the same way they used to. They give them 30 days to learn how to make a budget; how to make out a finance report, and other things; that is all they know when they go out. It is about time we started doing a little more than that. It is about time not only for these fellows but for corresponding people in the State Department. That

goes for the State Department, too. The fellow who is going to be an ambassador comes in for 30 days and gets briefed. The "Briefing" consists of 30 days of the people wanting to know him entertaining him at dinner or lunch. It is about time we had an organization that determined what kind of people you need in this field of activity and get the right people for it and give them a course of instruction; then follow what they are doing and tell them how to do their job better. Devise training programs.

I regard that organization (Committee on Recruitment and Training) as one of very great importance in this whole intelligence picture because you need particular kinds of animals to do intelligence work--and that goes not only for the collecting of information; it goes also for the research that you have to do on it to turn it into something.

Coming to the subject of security (Interdepartmental Security Coordinating Committees), I think the names of the committees will give you about all I can tell you about them, except for one (Committee on Security Policy). Travel, Control, Physical Security--plans ports and harbors, etc.; Security Investigations; Information Security--security of military information, classified information, etc.; Communications Security, which I am sure you all understand; Economic Security Controls, which title is borrowed from the State Department organization and the Treasury Department organization that are trying to prevent the Germans from getting into Latin America, and all that sort of thing; and the Committee on Censorship Planning.

That Committee (Committee on Censorship Planning) is suggested by Mr. Byron Price who says that we learned a lot during the war about censorship. We learned the techniques and we learned a lot of things about secret-writing and secret-inks and all that sort of thing. We have got a lot of equipment and it shouldn't all be thrown away. So, he suggests, and the Bureau of the Budget suggests, that a committee be set up which will have the job of planning for censorship if, as, and when you may need it. And, of course, the subject of planning has infinite possibilities in this subject.

Committee on Security Policy; that is a countermeasures committee under a fancy name. Their job is to determine what to do about the security problems that are caused by other fellows trying to get into your intelligence organizations, etc.

Over here (Centralized Activities --such as SI and CE under Director of Special Activities) you come to the much-debated subject of secret intelligence and counter-espionage. Who should do those jobs and to what extent you ought to do them is a very serious question. Counter-espionage is not so difficult because it is recognized, I think, among the governments of the world that counter-intelligence activities are legitimate. And where we have the FBI or the X-2 branch of the OSS operating, they operate under State Department cover--but the cover doesn't cover them so far as other governments are concerned. I mean, for example, the Swedish government knows who our counter-intelligence people in the Stockholm embassy are--and, as a matter of fact, they have used them for the purpose of conveying information to this government. That isn't quite so much of a problem.

But the secret intelligence is a problem, and it is especially a problem because everybody has a different idea of what it is. What is secret intelligence? Well, you have seen the cartoon of that girl sitting on a park bench with all the different children of different races and ages--maybe you don't know that cartoon, a very good one anyway--and beneath the cartoon is the comment: "That is X-37; in her day, one of our most effective agents." The people who talk about secret intelligence mean a lot of different things.

You ought to have your intelligence collection so set up that anybody who is doing the job for you in foreign countries doesn't have a label on him--so you don't put "Intelligence Officer" on the front of his coat.

But from that point, the point where you buy information, where you employ paid informers, you have a lot of problems. The secret intelligence agencies of different governments--and I know a good deal about the British; something about the French and a little something about some of the others--get most of their results short of the fellow under the bed. They get their results largely from open sources with which, however, it may be difficult to make contact.

The head of the OSS secret intelligence in Istanbul told me he had come to the conclusion that he had not done any secret intelligence during the war. He thought he had, but when it was over he decided he hadn't. The reasons for that were, he stated, first, that the best information he got he got from sources where the secrecy of the operation didn't make much difference; and, second, the fellows that he thought were his secret agents were known to the Turkish Government and everybody else in Istanbul--so, he didn't do any secret intelligence.



Without going into that discussion further--unless you fellows have some questions on that subject--it seems to be the view of everybody that no one department should take that responsibility. I think the War Department would be willing to take it, but prefers not to. The State Department doesn't want it. And I don't know about the Navy, but I guess they don't want it either. That is the one kind of operation where there seems to be the general opinion that if you are going to do it, put it under some fellow who reports to this centralized authority.

When you get all finished with this chart, you ask the question, What are the intelligence agencies going to be doing in the meantime? Well, there is certain work that the Army must do, which G-2 must do; the Army Service Forces must do some, the technical parts especially. And so on with the Navy. Those organizations should be encouraged to do the best job they can and should concentrate their personnel on the things they can do best. And State Department doing principally the political and economic intelligence (let's say); and the specialized intelligence in fields that fall under these boxes (on chart) being done either by the agency best equipped to do them or by a joint agency, bossed (let's say) by one of the constituent agencies as the Navy, for example, ran the technical air intelligence during the war, Japanese air intelligence, the technical side, with contributions of Army personnel. Similarly in your weekly political reporting, it would be my hope that out of this committee's (Political Intelligence Committee's) recommendations there would be a joint State-Army-Navy group which would sit in the State Department and actually serve the needs of the whole government in weekly political reporting and also on the more important political studies, studies of particular subjects, etc. In other words, as a result of this central agency and the participation of all these people (Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committees) in it, the whole field of intelligence would be covered, and in each of the subjects of it there would be somebody definitely responsible for it. It is easy to put forth an estimate of the capabilities of the enemy if you know all the particular things that go into the estimate. Our difficulty in the past has been that fellows used to write estimates of the enemy capabilities and they didn't know much; they just knew the things that were on the surface and therefore their estimates weren't very good.

The plan does not prohibit other central operations under this agency (Interdepartmental Intelligence). You might centralize Biographical Records, etc. But every time you talk about centralizing something, the fellow that proposes it is usually somebody who doesn't know about the field. A fellow has opinions on every subject in the world except the one he works most closely with, therefore he knows all the pitfalls and he is more careful about his opinions and he doesn't formulate them so readily.

One of the favorite subjects for centralizing is photographic intelligence, and always the suggestion is made by somebody who has never worked in photographic intelligence. During the war here in Washington the Air Forces had a PI section which was supposed to serve everybody. They couldn't serve everybody except in the most superficial way because a picture is another one of those things in life out of which you get what you have put into it. I remember one time I heard in the Air Forces that the 20th Air Force had taken some picture of Mukden. We had spent a lot of time locating the factory of the Manchurian Aircraft Company because it was difficult since all the maps of Mukden were in Chinese and all the addresses of this company were in Japanese nobody could get over from one language to another. We finally succeeded in finding a business directory of Mukden giving the Chinese address and we knew where this factory was. So, we went for the picture and up with it came an interpretation; it said "Aircraft assembly and engine plant. On the field there are about 50 bi-planes." We knew what was being made there; we knew it was the Type 2, Advance Trainer. Well, the news that the Japanese were giving their advance training to their combat pilots in planes was so staggering that it seemed it ought to be checked. And also the news that they were making engines there was a bit staggering, too. I called in a fellow who knew about such things. He said, "I can't tell what the planes are. Let me get some other pictures." Of course, they weren't bi-planes; they were regular trainers. And he took one look at the factory and said, "There are no facilities for testing blocks, and therefore no engines are being made there."

I had quite a number of photo-interpreters, as you use them as a tool to find answers. The Army and Navy worked very successfully against the Japanese shipping, with the aid of a couple of very good photo-interpreters who made a great contribution.

When you had the Joint Target Group and others doing the target work, they had an awful lot of photo-interpreters; but in every case the fellow who dealt with the picture either had enough information to put into it to get something out of it, or else he went and found the information or went to the experts. Whenever we had pictures of the plants that we thought might be ethyl fluid in Japan we sent them to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey to find out if it was.

So, this idea that you can take an operation like photo-interpretation and get a lot of guys and call them photo-interpreters and they can serve everybody is to my notion an unworkable idea.

Maybe the Biographical Records can be centralized. And yet when you begin to talk to people, you find that their objectives in connection with biographical records are so different you wonder whether you can have any central operation of that kind.

In any event, this (the National Intelligence Authority) is the proposal that is being made by the Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and Navy today.

Another thing happening today is a much sadder thing. We have in this government a thing called the Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service. It is an enormous source of information. It is particularly a source of information about the people in other parts of the world. I can give you many illustrations of its usefulness, but I have one favorite story. During the activities of the 20th Air Force against Japan it became desirable to find out where they were making their ethyl fluid. We had learned by that time, or at least MIS had the opinion by that time, that we had made a great mistake in the war against Germany in not knocking out their only two ethyl plants. In the United States we only had two and didn't build another because it takes two or three years to build one. Knowing that, we figured it would be a very nice thing to hit these one or two plants the Japs might have. On good evidence we came to the conclusion that the main plant was a joint enterprise of the Mitsubishi Lead Company and the Nippon Soda Company. You would have a general idea where that would be located--near to a source of salt, etc. But there were a good many places where it might be and every lead we pursued proved to be fruitless until one day one of the boys digging through some back numbers of the Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service weekly publications telling about the Japanese broadcasts. And he came upon an award of the Emperor, or the announcement of an award by the Emperor, of very high decorations to two chemists, and the two chemists were one connected with the Mitsubishi Lead Company and one connected with the Nippon Soda Company. There is nothing in the world for which you use soda and lead except tetra-ethyl lead, and it rather intrigued him. And the Japanese had been kind enough in the broadcast to give the town where these two gentlemen lived and worked --Koriyama. So, they sent the boys up there to take some pictures. They took the pictures and sent them back here and we sent them up to the Standard Oil. In the meantime, General Lemay, who is a fellow who acts quickly, decided he would take a shot at the place anyway because it wasn't very big and there were only two or three possibilities of what this ethyl plant may be. By the time the report came back from the Standard Oil Company, we got a telegram back from the bombing saying, "If Ethyl was where you said she was, she ain't there no more."

That is only one of a great many illustrations I can give you of the usefulness of this Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service; it arises from the fact that all governments have to talk to their people these days and in talking to them they have to use facts; they can't use baloney all the time; it has to be mainly true even though the emphasis is wrong. All the information about the Balkans has actually come from radio broadcast since the war ended. You can listen, for example, to what is sent in by Russian correspondents, let's say, and what comes out of Moscow; that is one little trick in this field of activity.

Well, yesterday, the Congress in its wisdom knocked out the appropriation of this very useful body and as of today it is being liquidated--going out of business--unless before nightfall the State Department, which is already insolvent, can find some way of bailing this outfit out. That is the way I expect to spend the rest of my day.