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E N C L O S U R E

State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee Special Studies
and Evaluations

PROBLEM

1. To determine the responsibilities and functions of a psychological warfare agency, taking into account the related functions and activities of other government agencies, with a view to recommending a suitable organization within the Government for the discharge of these functions in time of war.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that:

a. Certain of the duties of the existing Committee of Three will be assumed by the National Security Council; and that there will be a continuing need for a coordinating agency composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, War, Navy and Air.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue with duties substantially as at present and will continue their existing status as the principal professional military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

c. Active military aggression by an enemy or enemies will be initiated against the United States without a declaration of war.

d. Active aggressive psychological "warfare" will be initiated against the United States both from without and within prior to the beginning of active military aggression by an enemy or enemies.

e. The time interval that may be available between the public declaration of a state of emergency by the President and the beginning of the war may be of the order of a few hours or at the most a few months under the most favorable conditions.

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. A National Security Council, has been established for close and continuous coordination on a high level within the Government of domestic, foreign and military policies. It is composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and certain other members who the President may designate, subject to the terms of the National Security Act. The function of the Council is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies, to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate effectively in matters involving the national security.

4. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.) was established 30 April 1947 as the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), charged with preparation of policies, plans and studies for immediate and continuous employment of national psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President). The Subcommittee shall have authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare, to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which might suddenly arise.

5. No national wartime organization for psychological warfare other than the SWNCC P.W.C. under the terms of SWNCC 304/1/2/ has been established.

6. Government agencies involved during "wartime", in activities related to psychological "warfare":

a. The Executive and the executive agencies of the Government are primarily involved in the conduct of psychological "warfare" operations.

b. The Department of State, the Armed Forces and the National Intelligence Authority have a primary

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interest and responsibility in the direction and support of a psychological warfare agency of the Government; and contain resources which can be made available to the agency's use.

7. The Armed Services have been charged with responsibilities related to training, organization and equipping forces capable of employing psychological "warfare" methods, techniques and facilities. The Armed Services require (a) policy and strategic guidance; (b) to be apprised of the character and extent of their contribution of effort to the national psychological warfare effort.

8. The Department of State, the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Group operating within their current limitations of appropriated funds and allowed personnel are not in a position to make any substantial operational contribution to a national psychological "warfare" effort in time of war or threat of war without a significant redeployment of personnel and other operating resources from current and projected operations.

9. The Department of State, the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Group are at this time functionally organized to provide intelligence in support of preliminary pilot studies and planning.

10. In time of war or threat of war, as determined by the President, the implementation of psychological warfare plans and directives in actual or projected military theaters of operation will be the responsibility solely of the theater commanders concerned.

11. In World War II the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations was adversely affected by procedural delays and deficiencies of integration and coordination in organization. At the termination of combat operations and with the demobilization of psychological "warfare" personnel and the transfer of psychological "warfare" agencies to peacetime activities, no advantage was

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taken of the lessons learned in World War II or no measure taken to resolve personnel and methods into an integrated and coordinated organization for psychological warfare in time of war.

12. The existing Government agencies which are engaged in disseminating information to the people of the United States include: Bureaus and offices of Public Information of the War and Navy Departments, the Division of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Office of Public Information of the Army Air Forces and the Public Relations agencies of the various Government departments.

13. The Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs in the Department of State is charged with the performance of informational activities "which consist of or are concerned with informing the people of other nations about any matter in which the United States has an interest". (Executive Order 9608, 31 August 1945) The operational potentials of this agency capable of being applied to support the psychological warfare operations of the Government in time of war have been reduced by budgetary limitations for 1948.

14. No psychological warfare specialist reserves exist within the Armed Services or the Department of State.

15. Executive Order 9621 (20 September 1945) provided for the termination of the Office of Strategic Services, effective 1 October 1945, and for the transfer of its intelligence functions to the Department of State and the War Department.

16. The effective conduct of psychological warfare requires:

- (1) Orientation with national policy;
- (2) Coordination with military, political and economic policy;
- (3) Formulation of psychological warfare plans and policies;
- (4) Procurement and training of personnel, organizing and administering, procurement and distribution of supplies

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and equipment; evaluation and analysis of appropriate intelligence for the purpose of directing psychological warfare activities; preparation and distribution of psychological warfare material; constant evaluation of results; research in and development of new psychological warfare methods, techniques, equipment and instruments.

17. So-called "black" psychological warfare involves activities in wartime which are related to the following:

(1) Special type operations conducted by the Armed Forces, such as deception, demolition, behind-the-lines reconnaissance and patrolling, Commando type operations, and counter-intelligence activities.

(2) Secret and subversive operations of the type performed by special OSS units in World War II.

(3) Secret intelligence and counter-intelligence operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(4) Specific employment of conventional weapons of war, such as air or naval attacks, for specific psychological warfare objectives.

DISCUSSION

18. The National Security Act establishes the National Security Council as the primary advisory body to the Chief Executive on matters pertaining to the national security, replacing the informal Committee of Three, comprising the Secretaries of State, War and Navy previously performing this function. Since the national security involves the integration of military, political, and economic policy, it therefore appears essential that there be the closest and most intimate connection between the direction of psychological warfare and the National Security Council.

19. The report of the Committee of the Senate on Armed Services (Senate Report 239 - 5 June 1947) stated in part:

"World War II crowned the American effort with overwhelming success. At the same time, the projection

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of this vast effort into almost every field of civil and governmental endeavor disclosed certain fundamental weaknesses in our security structure which should be remedied while their details are fresh in mind. For instance, our slow and costly mobilization, our limited intelligence of the designs and capacities of our enemies, our incomplete integration of political purpose and military objective, and finally, our prodigal use of resources, all demonstrate convincingly that our national existence would be imperiled were we to ignore the costly lessons of war and fail to recognize our national security structure so as to prevent the recurrence of these defects.

"In looking to the future, it is apparent from the potentialities implicit in scientific developments, that the world is entering an era in which war, if it comes, will be fought at speeds and accompanied by devastations that stagger the imagination. Consequently, in order at once to guard our safety and support our efforts to promote and maintain the peace of the world, it is essential that this country move without delay to provide itself with the best organization for security which can be devised."

20. The translation of national policy into the overall strategic plans for military, political, economic and psychological warfare operations requires complete coordination, to avoid conflicting processes or objectives, and to insure that the total resources are employed to a furtherance of the national objective. The balance of effort as between these several operations is dependent upon the changing situation.

21. The President may within his powers issue instructions to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense which would without a public declaration of a state of emergency set in motion limited psychological "warfare" operations.

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22. The SWNC Subcommittee is described in the Charter (SWNCC 304/1 - 304/2) as "an agency of SWNCC charged with preparation of psychological warfare policies, plans, and studies for employment in time of war, (or threat of war as determined by the President.) The Subcommittee shall have authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which might suddenly arise". This section of the Charter must be understood in the light of section d. of the problem (To recommend) "a peacetime organization for keeping psychological warfare in a ready-for-mobilization status." Analysis of the elements involved in these predications of purpose indicate a breakdown into the following:

- a. The subcommittee is responsible for plans and policies which presumably might need to be placed in instant operation and implementation, without previous preparation or warning; requiring likewise, the instant deployment of psychological warfare personnel.
- b. Neither SWNCC nor the subcommittee have authority over any appropriated funds in the measure essential to carrying out these purposes.
- c. Activation of psychological warfare subsequent to secret instructions by the President to the State, War and Navy Departments would depend largely on provision from the Executive Emergency Funds.
- d. A public declaration of emergency would conceivably be followed by a request for and Congressional appropriation of funds for essential purposes arising out of the emergency.
- e. No forces exist in the Executive Departments nor is there any provision for adequate training of psychological warfare personnel. Such provision would require:

- (1) A training school

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- (2) Recruitment policies and measures
- (3) A training period of anywhere from three months to a year.

f. Formal designation by Executive Order of a Central Psychological Warfare Agency, as planned by the subcommittee, will require immediate appropriation of funds for its activities. The history of congressional action on similar appropriations does not augur the speed in implementation which global total warfare will require.

g. The possible "absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare...in any war emergency which might suddenly arise" draws attention to the need of establishing close coordination now on a tentative basis in the present state of the Subcommittee's studies with respective staff sections of the Armed Forces and Central Intelligence Group which are concerned with psychological warfare.

23. The formulation of psychological warfare plans and policies in accordance with national policy and in coordination with military, political and economic planning, requires the existence of a policy and planning body which to be effective must be under the authority and direction of a single responsible head who is at the same time responsible for the functional operations of the agency. It is considered that the individual so charged will report directly to the National Security Council, and to the President. This policy and planning body must include representatives of State Department, Armed Forces, Central Intelligence Agency, who are qualified to participate both as individuals and representatives of their respective organizations.

24. In time of emergency there is an inevitable tendency towards the creation of new government agencies to deal with each new problem that arises. Since the field of interest and activity pertaining to psychological warfare is extremely broad, this tendency must not be permitted to prevent the close coordina-

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tion of effort required. This danger can be averted only by the carefully planned organization of an executive agency with power to act. Coordination of planning and implementation is not sufficient. Many of the specialist activities involved are common to the needs of the State Department and the Armed Forces. Some are foreign to the peacetime or wartime capabilities of these and other departments. These specialist techniques and operations include the following:

a. Analysis by equipped personnel of the emotional and ideological vulnerabilities of enemy peoples as well as those in neutral areas which may become occupied territory, either by the enemy or by American forces. Such morales analysis should include cultures (including literacy and language data), history, political, social, and economic background and current development, military and naval development, and geophysical data.

b. Determination of propaganda instruments and methods suited to particular propaganda targets and to desired objectives.

c. Formulation of propoganda content coordinated with national policy.

d. Analysis of enemy psychological warfare methods, instruments, propaganda content and activities and determination of means to counter such activities.

e. Translators, artists, educators, writers, photographic and printing specialists, and radio technicians, with skills applicable to the special problems of psychological warfare.

f. Separation must always be kept clearly in mind between information and intelligence. Specialists in various foreign fields, such as historians, anthropologists, publicists, may supply both; but the mere professional title of any observer of the contemporary social scene of any country should not necessarily qualify him to draw

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interpretative conclusions on which important tactical or strategic psychological warfare projection may be based. Authoritative students of the first rank of various world societies are few and these often differ in their conclusions. Due consideration must be given to the generally accepted principle among anthropologists that racism as regards homo sapiens is an untenable principle, but that peoples develop accordingly to their physical, spiritual, and ideological climate. Tactical specialists of this kind cannot be expected to be useful by themselves, even bringing their best knowledge and experience to the central psychological warfare organization. A training course will be essential to relate their abilities to these special purposes.

25. A central psychological warfare agency in Washington, within the framework of relationships outlined herein, can function smoothly and efficiently as an entity, with clear horizontal divisions and clear vertical channels of responsibility established. This simplicity and clarity, so essential to efficient operations, is more difficult to achieve in theatres of operations, wherein the military commander is solely responsible for psychological warfare operations. In World War II the solution to this problem varied from theatre to theatre-- in some it was never solved. A constant obstacle to a consistent and reasonable solution has always been the combined impact of over-enthusiasm for and reactionary non-acceptance of the value of psychological warfare. The present JCS have indicated their awareness of the importance of psychological warfare in relation to national security. There would appear to be no longer any necessity for "selling" psychological warfare as a part of the Subcommittee's task. The reasonable working arrangements which were developed in several instances in World War II are variously adaptable to the future problem. No organizational solution, however, can replace the essential requirement for the "right man in the right place".

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26. It is impossible to anticipate what government agencies may be created for what purposes in the event of war, but it is the opinion of the Subcommittee that it's plans for organization should leave no gaps in respect to the essential functions involved.

"Black" propoganda and activities in World War II were in a large part carried on by the Office of Strategic Services; "White" propoganda was the responsibility of the OWI.

Under Executive Order 9621, 20 September 1945, the functions of the Office of Strategic Services were transferred to the Department of State and the War Department. It is the opinion of the Subcommittee that in the event of war, as determined by the President, initial planning and direction of "White" and "Black" propoganda should lie within the authority of the central Psychological Warfare organization, with due consideration of the authority of the theatre commanders in areas of action, and the services of existing agencies to which certain activities of OSS have been transferred. It is clear, nevertheless, that the total subject of "Black" propoganda will need to be organized in the planning of the Subcommittee on a functioning wartime basis under the central Psychological Warfare agency. Such planning must obviously include insofar as possible the preservation of available skills in discoverable personnel, and the continuance and maintenance of techniques in properly established and coordinated training. Since the wartime obligation of the functions of sabotage and subversion, "Black" propoganda, and conspiracy are nowhere now assured within the framework of the Government, special study will be required to ascertain how these functions may be made available to the national Psychological Warfare Organization.

27. The task of overcoming the enemy's will to resist is inseparable from that of maintaining at a high level the will to victory of the American people. These two tasks do in fact represent the offensive and defensive objectives towards the

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attainment of which psychological warfare makes its essential contribution. These offensive and defensive aspects require close integration to ensure that progress towards one objective is not at the expense of the other.

Two important aspects must be carefully considered in any study of the domestic side of the psychological warfare problem.

(1) Propaganda for home consumption is repugnant to the American tradition and the American people.

(2) The experience of World War II indicates that within the limits of security sensibly interpreted honest information on the progress of a war which draws on all the resources of the United States must not only not be withheld from the public but must be imparted in such a regular manner as to maintain confidence in its integrity.

In wars such as are now envisaged in the future, global and total, in which not only all the energies of the domestic population will be drawn upon but in which the domestic population will itself be a target, every means must be employed to retain the confidence of the domestic population and its trust in the truthfulness of information it receives. This is completely opposite to the method of dictator countries, which provide their domestic populations only with such information as may stimulate or maintain the will to war. It is on the other hand an essential part of the institutions which the American people would be defending in time of war.

28. From the standpoint of information, SECURITY, is primary among the realistic aspects of total warfare, especially in relation to the changed geophysical position of Continental America. Security considerations, however sensibly administered, result in something less than a free press. The care with which security is administered will play a considerable part in obtaining public understanding of its necessity and faith in the trustworthiness or releasable information.

In the very nature of future war, Government agencies will

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become the only source of releasable information about the war. Voluntary censorship of news and radio, which was successfully carried out in the main in World War II, would be subject in any future war to conditioning and limitation in the event of attack upon or occupation of any part of Continental United States. In such an event information pertains not only to security but equally to the conduct of psychological warfare; particularly in the sense that all American information would not only be important to an enemy's own conduct of its war activities, but would be of significance in subversion of the enemy by the psychological warfare agency of the U.S. Government.

It is clear that the weapons of psychological warfare are not always discriminate. Information broadcast to the American people will be picked up by the enemy. A broadcast under an American signature for enemy consumption will always possibly reach the American public.

These facts were recognized in the Executive orders establishing the Office of War Information (13 June 1942, 10 March, 1943). (Appendix)

What they point to is that the careful direction and planning of psychological warfare, which is the essence of such a process, requires unity of guidance, direction and control, and full coordination in all its operations at the planning-policy level.

29. In the event the continental U.S. or a part thereof became a zone of combat it is to be expected that psychological warfare activities within such zone would be the responsibility of the commander. The national psychological warfare organization would function in the normal way, i.e., by providing facilities, personnel, material, and expert assistance and advice. In any event, there will be organization within the U.S. for purposes of civil and internal defense. It is impossible to predict the nature and extent of responsibilities of various existing agencies for these purposes. It is contemplated, however, that the relationship between the psychological warfare organization and such

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agencies would be similar to that between it and theater commands.

30. Precedent exists in the Government for the harmonious working together of both civil and military agencies and civil and military personnel in a common enterprise. The organization of a psychological warfare agency should be flexible enough to permit the continuing of these relationships. However, in theatres of operation a military status of practical operating personnel may be desirable. Problems of difference in status, pay and training between civilian and uniformed personnel enter into consideration of the matter. It is further complicated by necessary rigidity of military organization, which might tend to limit essential freedom of action in particular instances. A possible solution in part might be to give military status to all but policy personnel in a theatre of operation, which would thus assist in solving questions of supply, logistics, etc. But the problems of command in connection with psychological warfare organization in the field and its relation to the central organization at home are of such a nature that an effective satisfactory solution must rest on a special study of the problem in all aspects by the Subcommittee.

CONCLUSIONS.

31. The National Psychological Warfare Organization to be established under the terms of SMCOC 304/1 - 304/2 should be under the single control and direction of a Director appointed by the President from military or civil life and be responsible to the National Security Council.

32. The Director of the National Psychological Warfare Organization should be the Chairman, with power of decision, of a planning and Policy Board upon which should sit representatives of the departments of the Armed Forces, the Department of State and such other government agencies whose participation may be found necessary or desirable.

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33. The necessary authority, strategic guidance, information, and resources of manpower, funds, facilities and materials should be provided the National Psychological Warfare Organization to enable its proper functioning in the achievement of national aims and military objectives in time of war or threat of war as determined by the President.

34. The National Psychological Warfare Organization should merge into a national effort activities and operations related to psychological warfare, using already established agencies to perform their appropriate functions.

35. The National Psychological Warfare Organization will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the Federal Program of Radio, press, publications, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information, and all other foreign propaganda activities, in time of war, or threat of war as determined by the President.

36. The National Psychological Warfare Organization will in time of war be charged with all phases of planning, development, control, and coordination of all psychological warfare activities both domestic and foreign and with the coordination therewith of all domestic and foreign information policies of the U.S. Government.

37. The global strategic nature of psychological warfare will necessitate centralized policy control of all domestic and overseas information agencies.

38. The National Psychological Warfare Organization will have access to and be provided with intelligence available to the government and should have made available to it from the monitoring and analysis agencies foreign information which it may require in the furtherance of its assigned functions.

39. Within established theatres of operations or in specifically designated operational areas within the continental

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U.S. the implementation of psychological warfare plans and directives during war or threat of war as determined by the President should be the responsibility solely of the theater commander concerned. A special study shall be made by the Subcommittee to determine the possibility of placing under military control with regard to status, responsibility, pay, privileges and promotion of such personnel of the psychological warfare organization who are employed in mounting operations in projected theatres of operation. All psychological warfare combat teams will be composed of personnel having military status.

40. The short time interval available for transitional activities between the public declaration of a state of emergency by the President (or the other significant events which may presage imminent war) and the beginning of war, will adversely effect the mobilization of facilities and personnel for wartime implementation of psychological warfare plans; a special study will be required to ascertain how most advantageously this gap may be bridged.

41. A specialist reserve corps should be established within the Army and Navy Reserve Corps.

42. Rosters and files descriptive of personnel as related to loyalty, qualification and suitability for placement should be maintained and available to the Subcommittee to include:

a. Trained civilian personnel on duty in the Department of State.

b. Personnel on duty in World War II in the Army, Navy, OWI, OSS and other activities which directly participated in psychological warfare.

c. Personnel trained in such activities subsequent to b. above.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

43. It is recommended that:

a. The conclusions above should be approved for planning purposes.

b. The War and Navy Departments be requested to consider a specialist reserve corps in the Army and Navy Reserve Corps.

c. The Department of State be requested to maintain files on experienced civilian personnel for this activity.

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A P P E N D I X

In the Executive Orders establishing the Office of War Information, the Director was empowered to:

a. Formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government.

b. Coordinate the war informational activities of all Federal departments and agencies for the purpose of assuring an accurate and consistent flow of war information to the public and the world at large.

c. Obtain, study, and analyze information concerning the war effort and advise the agencies concerned with the dissemination of such information as to the most appropriate and effective means of keeping the public adequately and accurately informed.

d. Review, clear, and approve all proposed radio and motion picture programs sponsored by Federal departments and agencies; and serve as the central point of clearance and contact for the radio broadcasting and motion picture industries, respectively, in their relationships with Federal Departments and agencies concerning such Government programs.

And -

8. The Director of the Office of War Information and the Director of Censorship shall collaborate in the performance of their respective functions for the purpose of facilitating the prompt and full dissemination of all available information which will not give aid to the enemy.

9. The Director of the Office of War Information and the Defense Communications Board shall collaborate in the

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performance of their respective functions for the purpose of facilitating the broadcast of war information to the peoples abroad.

The revised Executive Order of 10 March, 1943 stated:

(1) The Office of War Information will plan, develop and execute all phases of the Federal program of radio, press, publications and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information.

Under the authority thus vested, the Director of OWI issued a regulation to the heads of all Executive Departments and Agencies (No. 7 - 17 May, 1943) in which it was stated the Director would disapprove any release which (a) is deemed to be confusing to the public; (b) contains statements believed not to be in accordance with the facts; (c) omits facts which need to be stated in order not to be misleading to the public. The Regulation stated further that it was "not to be construed to require the issuance of information which is deemed to be of aid and comfort to the enemy."