

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

By

THE HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES\*  
Washington, D. C.

[29 Aug. 1960]

(Editor's Note: Mr. Dulles was introduced by Mr. George D. Gibson, Chairman of the Section, who made the following remarks:

We are signally honored today by the appearance, in person, of the Director of the CIA. In coming here he wants to make it clear that he has no purpose to enlarge or modify the statement that Mr. Barnes has made, which remains the principal description of the work for CIA. To the contrary, such words as he may add are only to attest his warm regard for the American Bar Association, and for the aims and members of our Section.

You may be interested to know that our distinguished speaker served for ten years in the Foreign Service before he even thought of studying law, and then he took his degree with his left hand, so to speak, while at the same time serving as head of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State.

Since that time, he has followed the Scriptural injunction of not letting his right hand know what his left hand is doing. Indeed I am sure that there are many other Scriptural injunctions that he has followed as well.

After nearly twenty-five years of legal practice with Sullivan & Cromwell, he came down to Washington—incidentally, I wonder why it is that New Yorkers always come down to Washington—to investigate the CIA, but as it turned out, the CIA investigated him instead and has never been willing to let him go.

I present to you a modest, loyal, fearless and brilliant director of the CIA, one of the great defenders of America, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles.)

Thank you very much, Mr. Gibson, for your charming remarks. I have, I think, even a deeper interest in this gathering and in the Bar. I feel I have a little sort of residuary interest, and one can never tell when that residuary interest may blossom into a direct interest.

I want to keep my position with the Bar and with you, ladies and gentlemen of the Bar, as warm as possible.

CHAIRMAN GIBSON: You have a tenancy for life.

MR. DULLES: I have kept up the payment for all the dues that I can find, and they are quite considerable, from your Association to the City Bar Association, the County Lawyers Association and all

*American Bar Association*

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the others. So I am in good standing, I hope, as far as the legal community is concerned, even though some of the business that I am engaged in may have an extra-legal tinge.

I do want you to know, though, that I have such a high degree of respect for the law that I have quite a large legal establishment, and they tell me what I can and cannot do legally. Then I do what I think is in the national interest!

I always hesitate to speak on the same platform with Bobby Cutler. We have done it two or three times before. I think he is one of the most pungent, one of the most delightful, and one of the most respected speakers that we have here in Washington. I unfortunately didn't get here to hear his speech. I thought he was going to speak second. I had an idea of what Mr. Barnes was going to say, but I didn't know quite what General Cutler would say. You reversed the order, so I missed hearing what he had to say. We had dinner together the other night, and he told me a few things about his most important work.

I have no speech, and as Mr. Gibson and Mr. Steadman have understood, when you did me the honor of asking me to speak here at this meeting, I had other and very different plans. I expected to be far away from here looking over some of the activities of the CIA in the foreign field. Man proposes and God and the Senate and Congress disposes. When they decided to return, I thought I had better be back here, because you never can tell what can happen to legislation that may deeply affect one's own operations, unless one is closely watching developments. So I returned, and meanwhile Mr. Barnes had been working on his talk for you this morning.

I might add to what he has said one or two words. I feel that in our work, because of the broad sweep of it, that we have to turn from Laos today, to Cuba, to the Congo, to the offshore islands, to the Dominican Republic. We are in an age of the eruption of new problems. We are in an age where nations are being born almost before we know their names or their geography. We are in an age where the government has never faced as before a complicated complex of problems.

Unfortunately, it falls upon the United States, apparently, to settle them all and settle them all quickly. That is hardly possible.

Intelligence and the operations related to intelligence of course play a role, I believe an important though modest role, in that whole complex of problems. As Mr. Barnes has pointed out, we draw up the estimates of the facts, and that is somewhat easier to do than to meet the problems of the Department of State as to what you do about it. It is quite simple for us to say we have a problem in Cuba, to analyze that problem I hope with reasonable accuracy, and then to pass that paper on to the members of the National Security Council, where Bobby Cutler was and served so effectively for so many years, to the

State Department, and say, "Now, this is your problem. We have told you the facts. It is up to you to handle those facts."

We try to go a little beyond that and be at least sympathetically helpful in any way we can, in marshalling the assets of this government and the assets of our allies toward the settling of these problems. But we are going to have them with us for a long while and many more. We are in an age of change.

I wanted this morning to speak of one or two problems which are foremost in our minds at the moment from the intelligence angle. Because of the breadth of these problems, we have to concentrate as much as we can. One of the most difficult problems we face in getting the intelligence we need for our national security is the problem created by the secrecy surrounding Soviet military preparations. They are sealing off great areas of the Soviet Union in which they are building up their nuclear, their missile and aircraft production. In fact, 25% of the great land mass of the Soviet Union is a barred area. Foreigners are not allowed in. And those areas aren't the Great Northern Tundras where you wouldn't want to go very much even if you were allowed in.

It is very essential for our defense that intelligence should be able to report to some extent what is going on in these barred areas. There has been a good bit of publicity about that since the first of May, and I won't go into the details of that. But that was not a program lightly assumed, and the risks were known and weighed against the need of our national security. How can we prepare without knowing whether the danger is from bombers, with their nuclear cargoes, whether it is from guided missiles, also with nuclear warheads, and in what degree does it have a vast effect on our own military programs, and it is vital to direct our own military defense efforts toward the nature of the possible attack so as to be prepared with our defense of the proper kind in the proper places, and with the proper timing.

As you know, for a long time we had the problem between aircraft and missiles. Seven or eight years ago, it seemed that the major threat to us would be the Soviet heavy bomber, with the back-up of a very large number of medium bombers; and then along came the guided missile, on which they had been working actively since the days following the war and have carried on tests, many, many hundreds of tests of their short- and medium-range missiles before they started to bring into production and have ready for use their intermediate, their long-range missiles, and had those spectacular tests which they advertised in the Pacific, wherein they showed their ability to send a missile with, we believe, good accuracy to a distance of over seven thousand nautical miles. That was done in order to advertise to us a certain part of their potential for their own purposes of negotiation and pressure.

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The duty to try to penetrate this secrecy and security of military preparations by the United States falls upon the CIA working in coordination, and I may say a very happy and effective coordination, with the military services. We are doing our best, and we propose to continue to do what we can to build up the body of that information.

The second major problem is to properly analyze Soviet intentions. What are their short-term tactics, and what is their long-term strategy? In my opinion—and I think this opinion is shared by the American Bar Association (I know of their work in this field)—there can be no doubt as to their ultimate aims. All Communist leaders, from Lenin and Trotsky to Krushchev, through Stalin, have proclaimed them. It is the ultimate triumph of the Communist system. It is the "We will bury you" theory that Khrushchev has pronounced. Not a physical burial, he says, all at one time, but he will slowly take over the world for Communism.

On these basic objectives, there has been no change over the last forty years. The menace of subversive Communism directed from Moscow and from Peiping, chiefly from Moscow—debates among the two over the ideology of the movement at the present time—has not changed. It is very different from any other menace, I think, that the world has faced.

We have seen all kinds of movements going back to the early days, from the days of Alexander on. There have been military dictators, military leaders, who have sought to take over great areas. Hitler tried to break out from what he thought was a pressure on him and find his place in the sun. But all of those leaders in the past have had limited aims, whereas the aims of international Communism are unlimited. They are world-wide. I do not believe that they can be or would be satisfied by any partial agreement. They will take what they can get, and then they will move on from there.

Lenin and Stalin talked, and Stalin practiced in the immediate post-war period, aggressive pressure. It was pressure short of all-out war, although it led to war in Korea, led to the Berlin blockade earlier, the pressure on Greece, Turkey and Iran.

Krushchev now is preaching a somewhat different doctrine. Despite the fact that today Khrushchev's military position and the military position of the Soviets vis-a-vis the United States is better than it was in the Stalin days because in the Stalin days the Soviet Union had no atomic weapon until the very latter part, and then only a very few, and the long-range missile was not even tested. But even so, Krushchev believes that he needs time. He wants time to build up his economy—the seven-year plan that carries through 1965. He wants a sound economic industrial base. He wants time to complete his missiles. Now I am not saying that there will be war when he

has done this, but in the meantime, in preaching coexistence, despite the belligerencies of many of his actions since the break-up of the Summit Conference and after—despite that he still insists that coexistence in his aim. But with coexistence, and despite his preaching of it, he is trying to carry forward the interests of the Communist world by every political, economic and subversive means that he can use. He is showing that in Cuba today, he is showing that in the Congo and in many other parts of the world, wherever he finds what he considers a weak spot, a spot where he can through the preaching of extreme nationalism weaken the United States, there he moves in with military equipment, with economic aid, with vast numbers of technicians, and tries to build strong points for Communism.

We must expect this form of activity to continue. We must gird to meet it. We must analyze it and over the next ten years I believe that this is likely to be the major threat we will face. One cannot ever let down one's military preparation, because if one did at any time, then there might be a change. But if we keep up our military guard, if we continue to persuade Khrushchev of the tact, as I believe he is persuaded today, that if he took the risk of war he would receive unacceptable damage—if we ever let that conviction fall, then we might face more. If we keep up our military preparations, then I feel that the danger we are facing is more in the political, economic and subversive side in the newly emerging nations, who are so susceptible to the blandishments of the Kremlin.

And in conclusion, I would like to emphasize one other point: in order to meet the threat of Communism, I think far more should be done than is being done today to build up our knowledge of what it means. I have spent some time recently in connection with a little talk I made to the Veterans of Foreign Wars last week in studying the curricula of our colleges and universities, and I have been reading some books on the study of the Russian problem, and I am rather shocked to find that while one can learn almost everything, it is not easy to get a course covering a full background of the sweep of the Communist movement beginning with its history of 1848 and Karl Marx, and particularly the last forty years.

There are many, many colleges—Harvard, Columbia, California and Stanford, the University of Washington and others—where there are admirable advanced courses, graduate groups who are studying this. But we don't get it nearly soon enough in our schools and colleges. And yet while we can learn all about the Renaissance, and we can learn all about the conquests of Caesar and Napoleon and others in our history, we don't really get the background we ought to get and our children ought to be getting as they come along, because this is a danger that may face our children and our grandchildren.

It is high time that we should learn far more about it than we know today.

I know that the Bar Association has taken the lead in this general field, but I think a new study ought to be made. I am not suggesting that in our schools we should have a great propaganda machine. Let the facts be told of the story of the Communist movement over the last forty years and its background. Let those facts speak for themselves.

As I said the other day to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, that will be in itself an indictment of the system and will build up in this country a people who will be able to give their government better support in trying to meet this menace which we face today, and which is likely, as I say, to be faced by our children and grandchildren, unless we are more effective in meeting it than we have been so far.