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...Taiwan Straits. Shortly
...Korea showed the intention
...pressing on toward the Yalu
...cause of this, the Chinese gov-
...United States government that
...United States troops crossed the
...toward the Yalu River. This
...ited States through the Indian
...government disregarded this
...did indeed cross the 38th
...Yalu River.

...only take the action of volun-
...of resistance against the
...s not taken until four months
...forces in the Taiwan Straits
...over Taiwan, and not until
...of the 38th Parallel and ap-
...made many statements during
...is act of aggression against
...de. Moreover, he could not
...the stationing of United States
...thermore, Truman failed to
...ough the Indian Ambassador.
...ons an armistice was at last
...troops had withdrawn con-
...United States troops are still
...will not withdraw. Moreover,
...ing Taiwan with its land, sea,
...ates Navy and Air Force are
...Isn't this the best proof that
...tinues to pursue policies of
...? It is not necessary to cite
...ry bases maintained by the
...ny aggressive military pacts
...target. China, on the other
...road, and the treaties it has
...are all treaties of peace and

...mitted these acts of aggres-
...force to settle disputes with

...the United States? No! I declared already during the Bandung
Conference in 1955 that the Chinese people were friendly to
the American people and the Chinese government was willing
to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States
government to discuss existing disputes between the two coun-
tries, though the two countries had not recognized each other
and had no diplomatic relations. This proposal of ours re-
sulted, through the good offices of Britain, in ambassadorial
talks between China and the United States which started
August 1, 1955, in Geneva.

"In order to create a favorable atmosphere China released,
before the talks began, eleven so-called 'prisoners of war,' fol-
lowing the mediation of Krishna Menon and UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld's visit to Peking. Why are they
referred to as so-called 'prisoners of war'? Because they were
not captured on the Korean battlefield. With the exception of
a few who chose, of their own will, to stay behind, all prisoners
of war captured on the Korean front were repatriated after the
armistice. Later, among those who stayed behind, some returned
also of their own will. But the eleven so-called 'prisoners of
war' were on a United States plane which intruded into China's
air space, and were captured after their plane was hit. Both
China and the United States had declared that the Korean War
was restricted to Korea and did not extend to China. This plane
was shot down in China. So China did not recognize them as
'prisoners of war.' Nevertheless, China released them—to create
a favorable atmosphere for the ambassadorial talks at Geneva.

"That was the end of the so-called 'prisoners of war' issue.
"Besides the so-called 'prisoners of war,' however, there
were two other categories of United States nationals in Chinese
prisons. First were United States citizens, guilty of such crimes
as sabotage and espionage, or who had in other ways violated
the laws of China. Since 1955, we have released twenty-five
such United States criminals when their terms were fully served
or were granted clemency and released ahead of time for good
behavior. One of the twenty-five chose to remain in China after
his release. Of this category only three are now still serving
sentences in China.

"There are two United States nationals in Chinese prisons
of another category—a very special one. They are airborne

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Communist China
edited by Franz
Schurman and Orville
Schell p. 223
as excerpted from
The Other Side of
the River by Edgar
Snow

secret agents sent by the United States to China, namely, the
very famous Downey and Fecteau. Allen Dulles of the United
States Central Intelligence Agency could give you all the de-
tails, but perhaps he wouldn't want to give the information in
such detail as we would. In early 1955, when Hammarskjöld
came to Peking to discuss the question of the United States
nationals in Chinese prisons, even he found it inconvenient to
bring up their case for discussion. These two were in no way
related to the Korean War, but were on a mission of pure
espionage and secret-agent activity. If you are interested, I
could show you some portions of the notes of my talks with
Hammarskjöld for your reference. The notes have never been
published.

"Five years have elapsed since the start of the Chinese-
United States talks in August 1955. At the very outset, we pro-
posed that disputes between China and the United States, in-
cluding the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan
region, should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without
resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States blocked
all news of this proposal, but China later published it. Why did
[John Foster] Dulles reject it? Because Dulles realized that
reaching such an agreement implied that the next step would
be discussions on how and when United States armed forces
were to withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.

"We hold that the dispute between China and the United
States in the Taiwan region is an international question; whereas
military action between the Central Government of New China
and the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan is an internal ques-
tion. The United States has maintained that the two questions
are inseparable. We hold that they can and must be separated.
Since it has been possible for China and the United States to
hold ambassadorial talks in Geneva and Warsaw, talks can also
be held at the same time between the Central Government of
China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The former is an interna-
tional question while the latter is an internal question. Parallel
talks can be conducted and solutions reached separately.

"In the talks between China and the United States, agree-
ment on principle must after all be reached first before con-
crete issues can be settled. The two points of principle on which
agreement should be reached are:

"(1) All disputes between
States, including those in the
Taiwan region, should be
settled through peaceful nego-
tiations, without resorting to
the use or threat of force.

"(2) The United States
armed forces should be
withdrawn from Taiwan and
the Taiwan Straits. The
specific steps on this
matter for subsequent
agreement ceases to pertain
China and of resorting to
logical conclusion will
be reached.

"This is the crux of
United States. The active
policy toward China have
China's. In this respect, the
Democratic Parties aim at the
probably be opposed not only
the Kuomintang in Taiwan
fore such an approach would
of Sino-U.S. relations it would
be impossible to find a solu-
tion."

"We believe that a solu-
tion will probably be found; it is only
a matter of time. The United States
point: if the United States
sion and the threat of war are
We do not believe that they will
allow their government in-
terfere. There is no conflict of basic
interests between China and the United States
prevail."

I asked Chou whether it
been the topic of discussion for
ambassadorial talks held at Warsaw.

THE PREMIER: Yes,
by China at the end of 1955
forward in the autumn of 1955.
QUESTION: Does the
the question of the time
from Taiwan?

(1) All disputes between China and the United States, including the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force; and

"(2) The United States must agree to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. As to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, they are matters for subsequent discussion. If the United States government ceases to pursue the policy of aggression against China and of resorting to threats of force, this is the only logical conclusion which can be drawn.

"This is the crux of the dispute between China and the United States. The activities and direction of United States policy toward China have been aimed at manufacturing 'two Chinas.' In this respect, both the Republican and the Democratic Parties aim at the same thing. . . . This scheme would probably be opposed not only by Mainland China, but also by the Kuomintang in Taiwan and the Chinese in Taiwan. Therefore such an approach would lead nowhere, but in the solution of Sino-U.S. relations it would tie things up in knots.

"We believe that a solution to Sino-U.S. relations will ultimately be found; it is only a question of time. But there is one point: if the United States does not give up its policy of aggression and the threat of war against China, no solution is possible. We do not believe that the people of the United States will allow their government indefinitely to pursue such a policy. *There is no conflict of basic interest between the peoples of China and the United States, and friendship will eventually prevail.*"

I asked Chou whether the two principles he spoke of had been the topic of discussion for a long time in the Sino-American ambassadorial talks held at Warsaw.

THE PREMIER: Yes. The first principle was put forward by China at the end of 1955. The second principle was put forward in the autumn of 1958 at Warsaw.

QUESTION: Does the second principle include as well the question of the time and manner of the withdrawal from Taiwan?