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The Lost Crusade

America in Vietnam.

By Chester L. Cooper.

Foreword by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman.
559 pp. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. \$12.

By RONALD STEEL

There are some subjects about which it is hard to assume an air of enlightened detachment. One is, or at least used to be, religion. Another is sex. And one is surely the Vietnam war. Over the past 20 years (yes, 20, for it was in May, 1950, that Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the United States would aid France in its struggle to subdue the Communist-led Vietminh) there have been passionate denunciations of America's role in Indochina and (although with increasing rarity) fervent justifications.

The hawks told us we were defending the Free World, holding the line against aggression, protecting a brave people, making the world safe for democracy—you name it. The doves were aghast at our support of self-seeking autocrats and incompetent generals, or our systematic devastation of Vietnam, or the toll wrought on our own society—name it again. The issue long ago became a moral one. The lines have become so tightly drawn and the arguments so familiar that even to launch discussion of the subject seems redundant. Operation Total Victory has now given way to Operation Face-Saving. Nixon's so-called Vietnamization plan, for all its loopholes and booby-traps, is designed to ease us out the back door of a war that cannot be won, that the American people are fed up with, and that no one is quite sure how we ever go into.

We are now in the "I must have been really drunk last night to have done that" stage of the war, the morning-after when it is hard to remember how we ended up where we did, or what possibly could have been on our minds along the way. It is a moment when we want to listen to someone who was there when it happened, but remained sober through it all. It is time to demystify the war, and perhaps no one is better equipped for the task than Chester Cooper, an old Asia hand whose service in government stretched from the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina right through to the present impasse in Paris. Perched high in the upper strata of the foreign-policy bureaucracy, he was there when the whole thing happened, and

Mr. Steel is the author of "Pax Americana," and of a forthcoming book of essays on interventionism and cold war diplomacy.

like a true professional he tells it the way he saw it, a foreign policy uncluttered by moral issues, a Vietnam without tears.

Some may find such an approach insensitive, but diplomats are not paid to be indignant. They are professionals whose job it is to carry out, or occasionally impede, policies made higher up. The policy-makers, those who orchestrated our interventions in Vietnam and elsewhere have not been consumed by indignation or carried away by paroxysms of moral fervor. They were sober men conducting a foreign policy which, however aberrant it may now seem, was based on very real principles: the division of the world between Communists and non-Communists, and the determination to preserve existing ideological boundaries—by force of arms where need be. Vietnam was a logical result of that policy. It became important only because that was where the policy finally broke down.

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Continued

Attempting an Historical, Subtle View of Vietnam

It has taken a quarter century since World War II to begin to produce definitive examinations of the origins and meanings of that conflict. The same time span doubtless will be required to do the same for what most Americans call the Vietnam War but what, in reality, is most likely to take its place in history as the second Indochina War.

Books about Vietnam have hardly been in short supply thus far, but too many of them have been passionate expositions of the American effort, either pro or con, and too few can claim any subtlety let alone qualify as history. Thus it is with pleasure that one can report Chester L. Cooper's *The Lost Crusade* is an important contribution to the historiography of what has become America's longest and most divisive war.

The sweep of Cooper's account is total—from the fullest account yet of President Roosevelt's aborted efforts to prevent Indochina's return to France after World War II down to President Nixon's "incursion" into Cambodia three decades later. The book as history, however, is uneven; others have told much more of many past periods and it is far too soon to fix the Cambodian affair in proper context.

Where *The Lost Crusade* shines is when Mr. Cooper is writing about his own par-

THE LOST CRUSADE: America in Vietnam. By Chester L. Cooper. Foreword by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman.

(Dodd, Mead; 559 pp.; \$12)

Reviewed by Chalmers M. Roberts

The reviewer is a staff reporter on *The Washington Post* who has been writing about the Indochina War since 1954.

ticipation. He was not a principal actor, but he has been deeply involved in many twists and turns, most especially in the ill-fated 1967 efforts of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to do a deal with visiting Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin while a suspicious Lyndon Johnson fussed back at the White House. The bulk of this account is appearing Sunday in *The Washington Post Outlook* section.

Mr. Cooper's credentials include, in his 25 years in government service with the OSS in the China-Burma-India theater, with the CIA as an analyst and intelligence estimator, and attendance at both the 1954 Geneva and 1962 Laos conferences plus the SEATO founding conference of 1954. He was on the National Security Council planning board, was an Asian affairs aide to McGeorge Bundy in the White House and, to cap it, was an assistant to W. Averell Harriman during Harriman's period as Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam peace negotiator.

He went into Vietnam a hawk and emerged years

later a dove, but he denies such an oversimplification though his shift of views is evident enough. He came out with "no nostrums and no ready answers" but with a clear belief that "the fruits of Vietnam (win, lose or draw) are likely to be sour." And like many others he concludes, with some hope, that perhaps this bitter experience will teach Americans that their foreign policy "will have to be based more on an appeal to reason and self-interest than to emotion and righteousness" and thus perhaps the lost crusade "may provide us with something of value after all."

Maybe. Yet what is distressingly clear from so much of Mr. Cooper's book is less the false starts and abortive efforts to find a way to peace, so often depending on hazy or misunderstood "signals" from the Communists, as the shocking inability of American officialdom to understand the people they were dealing with.

McGeorge Bundy, he writes, "came out reeling from a two-hour session with a leading member of the Buddhist hierarchy. His razor-sharp mind just couldn't cut through the ooze of generalities. Two cultures and two educational backgrounds did not directly conflict but rather slid past one another."

Cooper's book probably will be most valuable to those future historians for its vignettes, those insights into how the American system of dealing with the problem really worked

rather than the official versions so far produced and still to come, most notably that of President Johnson. One sees Ambassador Harriman cut off from key information: What did Johnson and Kosygin say to each other at Glassboro? Why did the Joint Chiefs of Staff want Mr. Johnson to approve "a raid on the one juicy target left in Hanoi" at the moment support was growing to end all bombing north of the 20th parallel?

A great deal previously published has been omitted by Cooper, which tends to throw the book off balance. In some cases he deliberately holds back on what he surely knows—he barely touches on his CIA connections and that agency's role. But Mr. Cooper is honest enough to concede that the American correspondents in Saigon in 1964-65, so castigated by official Washington, turned out to be more right than the government.

The very title, *The Lost Crusade* is a judgment yet to be affirmed in history—depending, of course, on one's view of the crusade itself. Cooper would like to see the United States emerge with something, though whether that would fit Richard Nixon's prescription of "peace with honor" is something else again. Says Cooper of his own suggestions for a new Saigon government: "If this adds up to a 'coalition' so be it."

Mr. Cooper has contributed to our understanding of what happened; he would be the first to say, however, that the total story has yet to be written.

12 OCT 1970

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THE SPY RACE IN THE SKY

Global spying by U. S. and Russia was never more extensive than in today's shaky world. To meet the need: novel, eye-opening techniques.

Latest friction between U. S. and Russia in the Mideast and Cuba is shedding new light on the spying techniques of the two superpowers, demonstrating how closely they watch each other.

For example:

- After U. S. Navy reconnaissance planes from the Azores spotted a Soviet

task force en route to Cuba, other spy planes started a continuous watch. In late September, Russians were photographed unloading machinery which experts took to be the start of a permanent Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos.

- American U-2 planes flying along the Suez Canal from Cyprus are able to report to President Nixon the movement of Soviet-built missiles before the Kremlin itself gets the information relayed from its men on the ground.


- When the Russians test-fired their multiple-warhead missiles into the Pacific in August, the U. S. photographed the re-entry in color. It is doubtful that the Russians were able to do so.

- When the U. S. first test-fired its latest submarine missile, the Poseidon, off Cape Kennedy recently, Russian ships were on hand to monitor the trajectory and to try to recover some of the launch debris.


- If the Russians begin construction of a new missile site deep inside the Soviet Union, the Pentagon knows about it within a matter of days. Russia keeps a similar watch on the U. S.

How is all this done?


The U. S. watch is maintained by an astonishing array of cameras, sensors and electronic monitors planted in the earth, submerged in the oceans, or orbiting through space aboard spy satellites.



A huge Titan III booster rises from Cape Kennedy, Fla., to station a nuclear-detection satellite 55,000 miles in space.




The controversial U-2 spy planes, still on active duty spotting Soviet missiles in the Suez truce zone and Russian fleet build-up off Cuba, take photographs similar to the one below, made during the Cuba missile crisis of 1962.



—Photos: Wide World, United Aircraft Corp.

Air Force cargo planes equipped with "skyhooks" snatch spy-satellite capsules from air by the method shown here.



The watchers move in a world not only of satellites, ships and manned airplanes, but also unmanned aircraft. They use remote seismic sensors to discover underground atomic explosions, sound-detection systems on the oceans' floors to spot the passage of submarines, and over-the-horizon radars capable of "seeing" around the world.



Benefits. Thus, when the U. S. and Russia sit down in Helsinki November 2 for the third round in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, each will have excellent knowledge of what is in the other's arsenal.

U. S. officials make the point that should the negotiators agree to a ceiling on strategic weapons, it will be remote surveillance that will check whether either side is cheating.

What a surveillance system can do, these officials say, is make it possible for the superpowers to limit armament costs—and thereby reduce arms budgets—without fear that a "cheater" will develop a massive superiority and subject the other to nuclear "blackmail."

Each device in the surveillance system has its own special mission. For example, to cover hour-to-hour developments along the Suez, the U. S. called on the U-2 reconnaissance plane that many thought was outmoded after one was shot down over Russia in 1960.

For another kind of mission, the U. S. has just put into orbit a spy satellite designed to "hang" 22,300 miles over Southeast Asia, watching for missile launchings in Red China and Russia.



Gemini V astronauts, with hand camera, photographed Kenyan airfield from over 100 miles out.

The need for specialized intelligence, say American officials, has never been greater. Crisis in the Mideast, Russia's race for nuclear superiority, developments off Cuba have all put a new strain on the American spy system.

"Collection" cost. This year the U. S. will employ 136,114 persons and spend 2.9 billion dollars gathering strategic intelligence. That was given in a public accounting to Congress.

Knowledgeable sources estimate the Soviets will employ about 150,000 persons and spend around 3.5 billions doing the same thing.

These figures are the tip of a very large iceberg: Billions more will be expended in peripheral activities, and in laboratories devising more ways to collect information more quickly and accurately.

To the question of whether the effort is worth the costs, U. S. officials reply in essence:

Without it, the world would be a far more unstable place, with both sides reduced to dangerous guessing in an age when the flight time of a hydrogen warhead between the two countries is only 30 minutes. As of now, neither can make a move of broad military significance without the other's being in position to make a countermove almost immediately.

Efficiency, the sources say, borders on the incredible.

One official declares: "When Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird reports to the nation that the Russians have 67 anti-ballistic-missile sites around Moscow, he doesn't mean 66. He is speaking precisely, from precise information."

Satellites of vastly improved efficiency over early models make that possible.

When the U. S. launched its latest

August it was at least the 263rd sent aloft since November, 1961, to collect military information.

In that same period, the Russians have launched at least as many.

Once or twice a month a secret satellite is launched into polar orbit from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The Russians make similar launches from Tyuratam near the Aral Sea.

These satellites whirl around the world once about every 90 minutes at altitudes of 86 to 114 miles, carrying cameras of such high resolution that they can discern on the ground an object the size of a basketball.

At the end of 8 to 12 days, these satellites eject a capsule, containing thousands of photographs, which eventually floats to earth via a parachute. The U. S. recovers its capsules near Hawaii while they are still in the air, using an airplane equipped with a "skyhook." The Russians vary their capsule-landing patterns.

A Russian satellite in polar orbit will appear over the various regions of the U. S. about 40 times in the course of a flight lasting 100 hours.

Infrared devices. Cameras are not the only instruments carried aloft. There are infrared sensors able to differentiate between the rays given off by a blast furnace and those of a missile at launch. The sensors can locate a truck at night, or tell whether crops are healthy or diseased by measuring heat radiation.


Far out in space—55,000 miles—so-called Vela satellites are in orbit. Three of them are always on station searching for concentrations of gamma rays, X rays, neutrons and large electrified fields which would indicate the explosion of an atomic bomb in the atmosphere.

In addition, there are satellites to map terrain, enable ships to locate their positions, allow military men to talk to the "other side" of the world, and report on global weather.

As the spy satellites pass over their homeland, they transmit their findings to computer receiving stations on the ground.

Computers are a vital element in the information network. Even though there are more than 1,800 man-made objects traveling in space, the moment a new one appears on a radar screen a computer will analyze its trajectory and flash a warning.

Also in the spy family are the "Fer-



"Ferret" ships, such as U.S.S. Pueblo, captured off North Korea, monitor code transmitters worldwide.

THE SPY RACE

[continued from preceding page]

"ret" satellites which monitor radio and radar emissions, determine their location, power and transmission frequency. With precise information of this sort, electronic engineers can figure out methods of jamming enemy transmitters and confusing their receivers.

In a discussion of the precision with which satellites operate, one source said:

"Let's put it this way: If a car is parked in downtown Washington for 24 straight hours—and the Russians are flying—they would be able to notify President Nixon of a parking violation."

Says another official:

"The Russians have become so sensitive to our satellites, they are roofing their submarine-construction pens to try to keep us from knowing how many boats they are working on and what type."

Rocket clues. From another source, commenting on how spy satellites are able to tell so much about the number of rockets Russia has in place:

"You just don't build a missile and stick it in the ground overnight. First, you have to dig an enormous hole. You have to clear an area, build roads, install communications, pour concrete and then haul in a missile that fits the hole. All that takes about a year. When we spot a missile we know from its size just about what it can do because at one time or another we built one similar. Its size gives a clue to what kind of warhead it can carry. We know about warheads from our tests and from monitoring theirs.

"When the Russians shot those 3-in-1 multiple warheads into the Pacific in August, we had people hanging around with gadgets and cameras. That's how we photographed the re-entry of the warheads in color. The key to this business is research. We don't like surprises

because they could be dangerous."

Sea sentries. While satellites glean most of the strategic intelligence, a vast array of what Washington calls "other means" also is employed.

There is, for example, a vast network of underwater detection devices, linked to land by cable, which tells the U. S. or its allies when a Soviet submarine is passing through any one of the narrow straits leading from Russia into the oceans.

If a Soviet submarine approaches the East Coast and passes a sensor line, located at a classified depth, the U. S. Navy knows it immediately.

A worldwide network of seismic stations—the latest are in Norway and Alaska—tries, with only marginal success so far, to keep track of underground atomic tests in the Soviet Union.

On any given day, a 2,100-mile-per-hour reconnaissance plane—the SR-71—may streak along the edges of Siberia or approach Murnansk, taking photographs from nearly 100,000 feet, while also testing Russian radar capabilities.

Again, on any given day, American-supplied U-2s, flown by Nationalist Chinese pilots, may take off from Formosa for a leisurely flight above 60,000 feet over Lob Nor in Red China's Sinkiang Province. Their mission is to see whether the Communists are preparing to explode an atomic device or launch a missile. It was through such a mission that Red China was found to be working on an A-bomb before 1964.

By and large, the U. S. does not now fly U-2s over nations that have modern missiles and are likely to use them. The planes are too slow.

From time to time, supersonic drones—unmanned aircraft equipped with television cameras or other sensors—streak over Red China or North Vietnam looking for anything unusual.

Finally, there are "Ferret" ships and airplanes which have the mission of sailing or flying along the coasts of unfriendly nations to make tape recordings of short-range military-radio broadcasts, especially those in code. Cryptographers learn to "break" codes by the repeated appearance of symbols in hundreds of messages.


The Pueblo, which was captured off North Korea in January, 1968, with 83 men aboard, was such a ship. The Navy plane shot down by the North Koreans in April, 1969, with the loss of 31 lives was on a similar mission.

From the U. S. viewpoint, this massive effort produces an extraordinarily accurate picture of what is going on in the world militarily, especially in the Soviet Union. It permits an almost precise assessment of the damage that potential enemies can inflict on the United States and its allies with strategic weapons.

Intelligence experts, making that point, are quick to note, however, that collecting information is only part of the game.

One authority explains:

"While we know their capabilities—and the Russians know ours—neither is ever certain of the other's intentions. For that we would need a good spy right inside the Kremlin."



—NORAD Photo

SALT after Suez Missile Cheating

By ROBERT KLEIMAN

Moscow's violation of the missile standstill along the Suez Canal has thrown a somber shadow across all aspects of Soviet-American relations. But in preparing for the third round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), which opens in Helsinki four weeks from today, the White House insists that it remains "cautiously optimistic." And recent press briefings have emphasized fundamental differences between the cheating at Suez and violations of a SALT agreement.

At Suez, 100 mobile missiles, moved in virtually overnight, altered the tactical military balance before they were detected. But it takes 18 months to construct an SS-9 ICBM silo; the Russians would have to construct many hundreds over many years to change the strategic nuclear balance. Satellite photos at monthly intervals would detect this in time for the U.S. to react.

Moreover, SALT does not depend on Soviet good faith but on the Soviet self-interest in curbing missile competition, stabilizing the nuclear balance and holding down defense expenditures. Violations would be deterred by

Moreover, SALT does not depend on fear of matching "countermeasures" and resumption of the arms race.

Nevertheless, when all this is said, it is evident that the Administration's cautious optimism about SALT has reason now to be more cautious and less optimistic than before. A greater wariness in Congress and within the Administration undoubtedly will force American negotiators to bargain harder over the fine print in any SALT treaty. The difficulties in achieving agreement, already formidable before Suez, undoubtedly will be magnified.

One difficulty is that both governments have paid lip service to a com-

Cautious Optimism— But More Cautious, Less Optimistic

plete prohibition of antiballistic missiles (ABM). But both have now signaled a preference for an American suggestion of "limited" systems covering large regions centering on Washington and Moscow.

Since the U.S.-proposed 100-interceptor system would be more modern than the present obsolete 64-interceptor Moscow system, the Russians would want to match it. That could trigger a qualitative ABM race. And infinitely complex negotiations over the size, number, characteristics and locations of radars and interceptors could make agreement impossible.

Other difficulties facing the SALT negotiators are Russian insistence on limiting American tactical bombers in Europe capable of reaching the U.S.S.R. and American insistence on a ceiling of 250 on the giant Soviet SS-9 ICBM's. A first detailed Soviet proposal at Helsinki is expected to respond more or less favorably to Washington's plan to limit long-range missiles and bombers globally to under 2,000, roughly the current level.

The MIRV multiple warhead missile, the chief lever now in the arms race, remains the main challenge to SALT. Each government would like to halt the other's deployment, but neither seems willing to stand up to its military on the issue.

The United States a year ago took the position that a high-confidence MIRV deployment ban would require on-site inspection. That impeded discussion with Moscow. Now, ironically,

the Nixon Administration's prestigious verification panel, after lengthy study, has concluded that no practicable amount of on-site inspection would add assurance to a MIRV deployment ban. Moscow, meanwhile, has reacted coolly to American probes about another control method — a halt in development and reliability flight-testing; the U.S. has shown a one-year lead.

A high Soviet diplomat, however, recently denied to a visitor that Moscow was not interested in a combined MIRV test-and-deployment ban. "Try us! Tell them to try us!" he said.

Several key State Department, Pentagon and White House officials recently expressed the view in private that a Soviet proposal to halt MIRV deployment and flight-testing without on-site inspection would be accepted by President Nixon — after a bloody inter-agency struggle.

Why doesn't Mr. Nixon put this proposal to the Kremlin himself? One reason may be that the President is unwilling to overrule the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a proposal Moscow might then reject. Is the same true in Moscow? Or are both sides playing the old diplomatic game of "onus-putting?"

Meanwhile, with deployment starting, both MIRV and ABM may get beyond SALT's effective control. Some Senators and former Presidential science advisers are urging a brief mutual moratorium on testing and deployment of ABMs and MIRV missiles to avoid this.

Otherwise, in expressing "cautious optimism" about SALT in the wake of the Suez missile crisis, the White House may find it has been whistling its way past the graveyard of its hopes.

Robert Kleiman is a member of The Times Editorial Board.

British Spying

A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH SECRET SERVICE. By Richard Deacon. Taplinger. 440 pages. \$7.95.

To this reviewer's knowledge there is only one other book-length treatment of the subject here discussed, Mildred G. Richings' "Espionage: The Story of the Secret Service of the British Crown" (1934). Though a serious-minded effort, that work is marred by various deficiencies, and in any event runs only through the reign of Edward VII, who died in 1910. The publication of Deacon's title, therefore—he is an English biographer of John Dee, the confidential agent for Elizabeth I, and evidently an intelligence alumnus in his own right—gave every promise that those deficiencies would be remedied. Well, the author has at least brought his topic up to the 1970s.

In so doing he has, alas, grossly neglected his responsibilities. For a narrative beginning at the reign of Henry VII (1485-1509) the author's bibliography is almost laughably inadequate. The chapter annotation at rear is riddled with citations either imprecise or outdated.

In a volume ostensibly designed for general consultation the index is nominal, with almost no topical entries, and betrays an over-all skimpi-ness. There are 30 illustrations, but many of them are poorly reproduced, and all of them are insufficiently captioned. From time to time the author throws out unsupported or unelaborated generalizations, e.g., "... the Dutch are . . . highly vulnerable as secret agents." It is, finally, difficult to understand how any writer could transform such

an inherently glamorous subject into dull reading, but Deacon's flat, at times awkward, style has managed to turn this trick.

Let it be conceded, nevertheless, that what Deacon has given us is, after all, a fresh survey of an important field. The mere coverage involved is daunting, and would require the expertise of a seminar of scholars properly to evaluate. Moreover, as one approaches recent times official secrecy in all nations enjoins anything better than an informed guess as to the workings of their intelligence organizations. Deacon has appraised Britain's modern period with due breadth (and some first-hand knowledge), treating the counter-espionage, Security, and military branches impartially.

—CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS.

OCTOBER 1970

Government Network


As the American empire expanded in the post-war period, the U.S. government created and staffed an immense network for administering it. By one piece of legislation, the National Security Act of 1947, the various branches of the military, and new Air Force, were placed under a centralized Department of Defense with the power to draft in peacetime. The Act also formed the National Security Council (NSC) and gave unprecedented powers to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Together these well funded agencies erected the apparatus of the Empire: instruments for intelligence collection and military intervention that formed the backbone of America's heralded rise to the status of "World Power".

That power depends in no small part on the government's ability to know what people and other governments throughout the world are planning and doing. As the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations observed in a study on the "Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy," American policy abroad is "predominantly concerned with the internal affairs of other countries. ...there is no country in the world whose changing internal power structure is irrelevant to U.S. foreign policy." Keeping tabs on the internal political and economic situation in every country in the world is a vast and delicate enterprise. Its maintenance is essential for the ability to predict political events and covertly intervene when necessary on the Empire's behalf.

The Central Intelligence Agency performed the critical task of conceptualizing and coordinating the vast network of interlinked research and intelligence agencies. In 1969, the Federal government spent \$33.3 million for social and behavioral research on foreign areas and international affairs. In 1967, the same government agencies spent \$40.6 million in contracted research that drew on virtually every major academic center in the nation and many abroad. These millions are only a fraction of what it takes to keep the Intelligence and Defense Agencies alive. Moreover, each of these government complexes--the Defense agencies and the intelligence community--support secret research for which figures are not available.

The actual attention Africa receives from U.S. government-sponsored research is greater than the figures lead us to believe. In 1969, only 11% of all the government research funds allocated to out-house work (research not conducted in government agencies) was directly about Africa. But Africa cannot be isolated from the larger international context. American research on Europe, for example, has to consider Africa as well, and Africa's economic underdevelopment is often researched in the context of international economic and political problems. In this way, research about Africa is often hidden under different names.

The activities of U.S. Federal agencies clearly illustrate how an imperialist government collects and analyzes data about Africa to form its varied strategies of intervention. The scope of the research and action programs carried out by these agencies, which are coordinated with varying degrees of bureaucratic "efficiency", present a picture of formidable U.S. impact on Africa countries.



CIA headquarters, Langley, Va.: All the info's here.

CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency is not an "Invisible Government". It is an integrated part of an indivisible system. It plays a critical and central role in overseeing all government and private area research. The CIA had its hands in generating social science research about Africa in the United States and in creating American agencies which can covertly operate as extensions of American policy in Africa:

The CIA's own research program, staffed by approximately 30,000 employees, is the most extensive information gathering and evaluation program in the world. At least 80% of its research utilizes overt sources: eg., newspapers, radio-monitoring, research papers, and contacts with "private citizens." That material is fed into and retrieved by a highly advanced automated computer system, especially developed for this use by IBM. That computer is able to deal with 200,000 such open sources every month.

The CIA has on its staff more Ph.D.'s than several major universities combined, and far more than any other government agency. Its role in social science research has never been publicly revealed, although it is known that many contracts go through the External Research Division of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is now headed by Ray Cline, a past deputy director of "the Agency".

The CIA's information gathering intelligence activities are paralleled by its cloak and dagger type activities. These include electronic espionage, reconnaissance (U-2 planes) and spy networks. The CIA's covert action program aims to be able to manipulate the internal political situation in any "target" country. Such manipulation could include assassinations, coups, and even para-military operations aimed at containing revolutionary efforts. In a more "positive" situation, the CIA often is directly involved in advising chiefs of state, shaping local institutions, or managing a country's economic development program. The CIA's program of subsidies to various "non-profit" organizations is central to this strategy.

In most countries, the CIA bases its activities in the American Embassy and places them under the minimal control of the local Ambassador. CIA personnel, often political officers in the Embassy, are integrated into the coordinated "multi-agency country-team", often in leadership positions. This means, quite simply, that the CIA often directs the overall thrust of U.S. penetration, seeking to fashion a "strategy of cumulative impact." Such a strategy aims at creating or reinforcing pro-western institutions which collectively shape a country's political and economic development.

worked to rationalize foreign aid as a policy weapon. A network of organizations ---teachers, students, cultural program associations, trade unions, etc.--were founded or subsidized through various conduits. Many of these sought to co-opt important African leaders and act as non-official channels of American influence.


Many of the organizations active in Africa which have direct links to the CIA have been exposed in newspapers and magazines: African-American Institute (AAI), American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), Congress of Cultural Freedom, International Student Conference, World Assembly of Youth, Peace with Freedom, Inc., African American Labor Center. The CIA as well helped to organize the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, East African Publishing House, Jomo Kenyatta Educational Institute, Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, and Milton Obote Foundation. As a matter of caution, not conscience, the CIA has also had a hand in subsidizing African liberation movements, or splinters from such movements. CIA money has helped finance nationalist parties or back individual African politicians friendly to the United States. Some of the organizations once funded by the CIA folded when their links were exposed; others have had their funding picked up by the Ford Foundation or other national and international agencies. In many cases, individuals oozed from a CIA payroll to a Foundation payroll; in all cases, the source of the funding was less important than the nature of the task.

THE CIA AND AFRICAN STUDIES

It should not be surprising that it was the CIA which played the crucial role in stimulating interest in African affairs in the United States. In the late fifties, the political handwriting on the African wall was quite visible to Washington's super sleuths even if the State Department seemed blinded by its racist loyalty to its British and French allies. In 1954, it was the CIA that put the African American Institute on a solid financial footing, in close cooperation with the American Metal Climax Corporation, the African mining concern whose Chairman became the AAI's big angel. In that year, when Boston University launched its own African Studies program, William O. Brown left the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence to head it up. As the nation's chief central intelligence agency, the CIA understood that generating information and contacts in Africa was a priority if the U.S. was to be assured access to the Continent's "emerging" political leaders and economic resources.

In late 1956, Max Millikan, the economist who took a leave of absence from M.I.T. to become a deputy director of the CIA, and then returned to direct that university's CIA-subsidized Center for International Affairs, invited a former State Department employee Arnold Rivkin to develop and direct an African Research Program at M.I.T. Rivkin worked out a "suitable research" design with fellow professor, Walt Rostow, an intelligence officer and close advisor to Lyndon Baines Johnson, now in exile with that war criminal in Texas. Rivkin's assignment was to forge policy proposals within the context of a broader "free world" framework. Standard procedure at the M.I.T. center at that time was the practice of publishing books in two versions, one classified for circulation within the intelligence community, the other "sanitized" for public consumption.

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The CIA offers liberal vacation, insurance and retirement benefits. Assignments are both in the United States and overseas. Salaries are commensurate with training and experience. The work is classified and U. S. citizenship is required.

If you are presently in military service and are about to be separated, inquire about opportunities for men with training in CIC, CID, ONI, OSI, Communications, Electronics, Logistics, Photo Interpretation, Foreign Languages, Special Forces, and other specialties who may qualify without a college degree. For further information write, enclosing résumé, to: Director of Personnel, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C. 20505.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6

While the CIA was "inspiring" university African Affairs programs, it was also getting its own African Intelligence division organized. In August, 1958, the Committee of Africanists selected by the Ford Foundation to "survey the present condition and future prospects of African Studies," had a rare direct interview with the CIA to assess its need for personnel. According to their report, the Agency said it would need "a constant staff level of something like 70 people specializing in the African area; they particularly desire those who have training in economics, geography, or political science. They are, however, prepared to train a man if they can get a person whom they feel is suitable for their type of work." Their type of work, indeed! The CIA still recruits for new personnel on the campuses (see the enclosed ad if you are looking for a job!). The State Department, interestingly, only projected a need for fifty officers over the next 10 years. By 1961, according to State Department Advisor Vernon McKay, "the professional staff of the Africa office declined from twenty-three to fifteen when certain long range research activities were transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency" (Africa in World Politics p. 296).

The CIA continues to shape and monitor all government sponsored research on Africa through its participation in the Foreign Area Coordination Group and its close links with the State Department Intelligence Agency. It has access to all other academic output through the willing cooperation of many scholars -- who register their work with the State Department--or through close and overlapping ties with such agencies as the Ford Foundation and its academic front committees. As well, many individual scholars have ties with the CIA or its front groups. L. Gray Cowan, for example, the 1969-1970 President of the African Studies Association, was known to have liaisons with one Willard Mathias, a high-level CIA functionary. Mathias was a visiting fellow in 1958-1959 at Harvard's Center of International Affairs. His topic of study: Africa, of course. Cowan has also been a long time member of the African-American Institute's Board of Directors. And on and on.

The close ties between the CIA and so many African Studies programs suggests more than the insidiousness of the former or the submissiveness of the latter. What emerges is more of a symbiotic relationship; a game in which the players wear different uniforms but play by the same rules. LOOK editor William Attwood, the one time ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, inadvertently offered some clues about the CIA's attractiveness to many scholars in his memoirs, The Reds and Blacks. On his return to the U.S., Attwood recalls, "I put in long hours answering questions for roomfuls of people at CIA (pipes, casual sports jackets, and yellow pads) and State (cigarettes, dark suits and white notebooks)". Academics prefer those pipes and yellow pads every time.

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THE INTELLIGENCE
ESTABLISHMENT

by Harry Howe Ransom

Harvard University Press, 309 pp., \$9.95

Reviewed by Miles Copeland

"The intelligence operation," a Central Intelligence Agency instructor tells his pupils, "is in two parts: first, attaining the objective; second, concealing the fact that the objective has been attained. Usually we must also conceal the fact that we have made any efforts to attain the objective." In other words, when an espionage operation is successful the victim goes on about his business in happy ignorance of the fact that his secrets are known to the CIA. When a "political action" operation is successful the government against which it was conducted seems to have disintegrated or come to an end solely through natural causes.

"And if there is any danger at all of failure," the CIA instructor continues, "it is almost always better to leave the problem unsolved rather than risk failure or discovery." Theoretically, there should "almost always" be no failures.

But there have been failures: the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 incident, and one or two others. Taking into account the CIA's policy towards caution, it would seem reasonable to assume that for every failure there have been, say, ten or more successes. Reasonable people may be forgiven for suspecting the CIA of having brought about the downfall of Nkrumah and Sukarno, of having installed the military junta in Greece, of having thrown out Sihanouk. And, since the CIA—not only because of its bloopers but because of official admissions by its senior members—is known to have a capability for "political action," can the public be blamed for believing that the capability is activated now and again?

Reasonable or not, the public does so believe; the public's thirst for stories about international political intrigue being what it is, there has inevitably been a flood of trashy speculations purporting to reveal the true inside story. One of them, an encyclopedia of misinformation called *The Invisible Government*, stayed on the best-seller lists for several weeks. Others, notably some three or four books by Washington columnist Andrew Tully, have been less successful in sales but have made substantial contributions to the popular notion that the CIA is a law unto itself, that it freely interferes in the internal affairs of

sovereign nations, and that it overthrows anti-American governments, even democratically elected ones, to install anti-communist governments—with a special preference for non-democratic anti-communist governments.

Fortunately, such books have been weak in logic and unclear in rhetoric, and the mere fact that they have come under the heading of sensational journalism has tended to rob them of credibility. But one wonders. A *Washington Post* editorial writer spoke for many of us when he said, "It is obviously impossible for anyone who is not himself deep inside the intelligence community to write a comprehensive book about it, but won't someone please at least give us a basis for using common sense to judge what he hears?"

Harry Howe Ransom has provided such a basis. *The Intelligence Establishment* supplies exactly the background we need to understand why we must have an "intelligence community," what we can expect of it, and where its real dangers and weaknesses are. The late Allen Dulles, while he was director of CIA, used to keep a copy of Mr. Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security*, on a shelf behind his desk. Richard Helms, the present director, would be well advised to do the same with *The Intelligence Establishment*, which has been revised and enlarged from the earlier book. Although it is far from complimentary, at least the book sets forth the faults with which Mr. Helms is trying to grapple rather than the non-existent ones of which the Agency is accused. *The Intelligence Establishment* is, in fact, the only up-to-date serious study of the organization and effectiveness of our country's intelligence system.

Why have an "intelligence community" at all? This question, which seems so absurd to those who are members of it, has in fact been asked by Congressmen and journalists to whom "intelligence" connotes spies, saboteurs and political activists, and it deserves an answer in depth; even those who understand "intelligence" in its proper light do not often appreciate exactly why it is indispensable. Whether he gets it from the newspapers, from briefings by his subordinates or reports from consultants, any chief-of-state or president of a large corporation or head of any other kind of organization must have intelligence in order to fulfill his responsibilities. The primary function of the CIA has been to coordinate the whole intelligence system, consisting of some ten competing intelligence organizations

that, in the words of Allen Dulles, "it gives our Government's top policy makers exactly the information they need, no more and no less, in order to make the right decisions."

"Information"—or "raw information," as intelligence analysts call it—may be good or bad, accurate or inaccurate, relevant or irrelevant, timely or out of date; "intelligence," on the other hand, is information that has been evaluated, correlated, boiled down to manageable dimensions, and put into reports which can be quickly and easily read. CIA's main function is to supervise the process. No one who understands management can question the assertion that some one agency must have this function; few question that it should be the CIA.

"A 'pure' doctrine of intelligence," says Mr. Ransom, "demands that intelligence officers 'present the facts' and play no role in policy choice." But he goes on to show how those who decide what facts to present are in a special position of influence. Indeed, "a 'pure' theory of decision making insists that if 'all the facts' are known, the optimum choice becomes apparent." (President Eisenhower used to insist that "all the facts" pertinent to a particular problem be presented to him in a report no longer than one page; he would then make his decision. A wag on his staff used to say, "If I could get in a position to write these one-page reports I could run the country.") It is this position of influence, rather than the occasional embarrassments we suffer from exploded clandestine operations, which draws Mr. Ransom's attention. Espionage and "special operations" services can cause occasional embarrassment, but they are dangerous only when under the direct control of an agency which can influence, if not actually make, policy.

With the eye of a management expert, as well as of a political scientist, Mr. Ransom sees a vast intelligence bureaucracy, topped by the CIA, which has grown up in great confusion over its purpose and functions, with the effect that "the government does not always know what it is doing in the intelligence field." He gives us the historical development of intelligence, including a chapter on British intelligence and our use of it as a model (the author spent a whole year in Britain gathering material), and then he gets down to how intelligence relates to decision making at top levels of our government, how the breakdown of decision-making responsibility at these levels results in the proliferation of

petition and how solving the problem of confusion can produce an overly powerful central intelligence authority—and, of course, how any overly powerful central authority, by the nature of things, becomes inefficient and sometimes counterproductive while putting itself beyond the reach of effective governmental controls.

Because of their demonstrable inaccuracies, such books as *The Invisible Government* scare only the innocent and uninformed. Mr. Ransom's book will enlighten anyone, from the reader with a sophisticated understanding of how governments work to an intelligent innocent who knows only what he reads in the newspapers.

Miles Copeland, who helped organize the CIA, disclosed in "The Game of Nations" how it has operated in the United Arab Republic.

VANDALIA, OHIO
CHRONICLE
SEP 3 1970
WEEKLY - 5,398

CIA stays undercover

By CHARLES W. WHALEN,
JR.
U.S. Congress,
Third District

The activities attributed to America's intelligence agencies — most notably the Central Intelligence Agency — have generated much heat during the last several years but very little light.

There have been fears that this Nation's intelligence organizations may have tended to exceed their authority in performing their missions as information-gathering security instruments.

As we all know, there has been considerable speculation that unauthorized foreign adventures have been undertaken which have gone beyond the objectives desired by our government.

The fact that these reports or rumors are neither confirmed nor denied merely adds fuel to the fire. Further, I must say, even as a Member of Congress, that I do not know whether these reports are true.

An overview of the Nation's intelligence operations by the Congress certainly is in order. There is, at present, only a limited provision made for this requirement, however. Two armed services subcommittees — one in the Senate and one in the House of Representatives exercise limited intelligence oversight.

In view of the questions that persist about our national intelligence effort, this oversight should be broadened.


The Constitution empowers and directs the legislative branch, the Congress, to oversee the formulation and regulation of our foreign

To insure that questions concerning the actions of our intelligence agencies are answered, I believe that an annual accountability to the Congress should be established. To achieve this goal, I have introduced a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence. Joining with me in this bipartisan effort are Senators Eugene McCarthy and Mark Hatfield and Congressman Donald Fraser.

The Committee would be composed of seven Senators, appointed by the President of the Senate, and seven Representatives, appointed by the Speaker of the House. Two of the House Members would be from the House Foreign Affairs Committee and two of the Senators from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Similarly, two members from each body would be from their respective Armed Services Committees.

This joint committee would have the authority to coordinate and review the function of the nation's big intelligence agencies. These include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the intelligence departments of the military services.

The Joint Committee would conduct hearings and assemble information with the intent of assisting as well as monitoring intelligence operations. One of the key objectives, as stated in the resolution, would be to "insure that a minimum number of covert activities are in process and that they



PATRICK J. McGARVEY
Associate Editor

Highlights:

- 1—America's spy apparatus involves no less than 10 Federal agencies.
- 2—Their functions are reviewed with an eye toward uncovering problem areas.
- 3—The duplication of effort, while necessary to a degree, seems to have outgrown its rationality.
- 4—The impact of sophisticated intelligence collection systems such as satellites is far-reaching and worrisome.
- 5—An impartial review of the national intelligence structure might improve this vital segment of Government.

Additionally, the remarkable advances in technology which have afforded the U.S. Government the use of such devices as satellite-borne cameras, electronic impulse sensors and infrared and microwave receivers have injected the necessity for having a wide variety of technical specialists operating in terrain once occupied by the lone wolf spy.

In this article on U.S. intelligence, it is hoped that an understanding of what the "community" is can be conveyed. Who, in other words, is in the spy business in the U.S. Government and why. What they produce in the form of finished reports may also help shed some light on basic yet largely ignored problems within the community, such as the enormous duplication of effort and the cumbersome bureaucracy.

At the top of the pyramid sits the President. Directly beneath him is his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—a group of men from outside Government set up by President Kennedy on May 4, 1961 in an attempt to avoid getting railroaded into another Bay of Pigs fiasco. Their charter says they are to "conduct a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the CIA and other executive departments or agencies in the foreign intelligence


INTELLIGENCE, when used in the context of espionage, seems to be a virility symbol for most Americans—one that immediately equates the profession to such allegedly masculine ventures as murder, coup-plotting, intrigue and a dash of illicit lovemaking.

Their minds somehow entangle the violence of pro football, the screen antics of James Bond and lingering WWII memories of parachuting behind enemy lines with an exaggerated sense of "duty, honor, country."

The contrast between the Hollywood version and the actual profession of intelligence is stark. In a word a career

in intelligence is "dull." "Bureaucracy," "conformity," and "paper-mill" are more meaningful power phrases to an intelligence professional than "power-play," "clandestine operations" or even "spy."

The sole reason behind all U.S. intelligence efforts is what comes out as the finished product—the report that informs the President of developments abroad vital to U.S. interests. And there are today considerably more people engaged in the complex intelligence community processing, analyzing and reporting on the flow of paper than there are collecting it.



fields." The charter is still in the process of being worked out through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the director. At the next level sits the National Security Council (NSC) which plays an important overseer role in intelligence matters. They are privy to CIA and other agency programs and activities and theoretically, insure that these blend with broad foreign policy objectives.

Under the NSC and directly responsive to it is the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), which is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms. You will note that his title is not the Director of Central Intelligence Agency.

Known in town as "the DCI," Helm's responsibilities are far broader than merely running the CIA.

A CIA booklet sent to curious inquirers describes Helm's duties this way: "The DCI is responsible for coordinating the foreign intelligence activities of the United States. He is chairman of USIB which advises and assists him in this coordinating role. The deputy director of CIA is a member of the board representing CIA. The other board members are heads of the intelligence organizations of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, plus representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI." The four service intelligence chiefs, it should be added, sit in as observers on these meetings and are not without a great deal of influence.

Acting in consultation with USIB the DCI makes recommendations to the NSC concerning the intelligence structure of the Government as a whole, to insure that each element is functioning properly, in the national intelligence effort.

Primary Duties of The CIA

With equal status the six USIB members and the four service observers, then, operate under the chairmanship of the DCI as a corporate body. Each of these agencies has slightly different intelligence functions to perform.

The responsibilities of the CIA are:

- To advise the NSC in matters concerning intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies that relate to national security.
- To make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities.
- To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established on August 1, 1961 by Secretary McNamara. The chain of command runs from the secretary of Defense through the assistant secretary of Defense for Administration

Staff to the director.

The DIA controls DOD intelligence resources and reviews and coordinates those intelligence functions assigned to the military departments. They also service the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense.

The National Security Agency (NSA), the codebreaking arm of the intelligence structure, was established by Presidential directive in 1952 as a separately organized agency within the Defense Department. NSA has two primary functions, a security mission of monitoring secure U.S. communications and an intelligence information mission which involves manning listening posts the world over for monitoring the communications of other nations and processing this into usable intelligence for other components of the community.

The State Department's intelligence activities are carried on in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The bureau conducts a coordinated program of intelligence research and analysis for the Department. They produce intelligence studies and spot reports essential to foreign policy determination and execution for the secretary of State.

Who Produces Intelligence?

The Atomic Energy Commission is a consumer and producer of intelligence in the critical national security field of nuclear energy. Accordingly it is represented on the USIB by an intelligence division expert. They provide technical guidance to CIA and other members in collecting nuclear intelligence information. The AEC, in turn, becomes a producer of intelligence when it processes information on nuclear energy and develops estimates on the atomic weapons capability of foreign powers.

The FBI is a major member of the national intelligence community, yet its direct role in the production of positive foreign intelligence is limited. Their counter intelligence operations often turn up information of value to positive intelligence.

The community as a whole puts out a wide variety of reports daily, weekly and on an ad hoc basis. Most important are the National Intelligence Estimates which project the thinking of the community's experts into the future on specific foreign situations of national security concern. They are thoroughly coordinated throughout the community before going to the President or NSC. They may, and frequently do, embody dissenting views.

CIA's Daily Word

Each day the CIA prints a top secret document to be disseminated to the President. It skims the cream of

overnight developments and reports on only the "hot" items. This is also a coordinated report requiring agreement by all other agencies.

DIA, NSA and State also put out daily summaries for their worldwide customers in embassies and military bases abroad. They are not coordinated with other agencies and generally go into more detail than CIA's daily.

On a weekly basis CIA produces for the President and his Cabinet what amounts to a top secret *Time* magazine exploring the past week's developments more analytically and placing them into the broader context of political, economic, social, military and diplomatic reality.

The economic and scientific research areas of CIA, DIA and NSA produce daily weekly and special reports of a more detailed technical nature for the use of the variety of experts working within the community. These same elements also put out quarterly, semi-annual and annual wrap-up studies on such diverse topics as Soviet foreign aid, prospects for the Chinese rice crop, Soviet missile and radar defenses, French aircraft production—you name it.

The community also produces bed-rock studies on a continuing basis on every conceivable aspect of basic intelligence such as geography with detailed studies on ports, landing beaches and urban areas the world over. Other areas such as a nation's industry, receive close scrutiny and basic political, demographic, social, economic and military data are also closely followed and reported on regularly.

This great outpouring of reports serving the various users of intelligence has created an atmosphere wherein customer demands require that agencies duplicate the work of others. For example, a military commander in Honolulu serviced by DIA must be appraised not only of the military facts of life in Asia but also the political and economic facts.

The result has been that DIA, of necessity, broadened its expertise into these areas, despite the fact that both CIA and State had experts watching and reporting on Asian political and economic developments.

The State Department, to further illustrate the point, finds that to realistically discuss the arms limitation talks and Vietnam it must cultivate its own experts in Soviet military capabilities and Asian Communist military intelligence.

CIA, too, which has no real charter to get deeply involved in military intelligence found itself required to divert several hundred people into this subject to keep DIA and State from assessing enemy capabilities and intentions.

Unequal Slicing of Intelligence

The argument that a certain amount of duplication of effort is "necessary to generate sufficient diversity of opinion" is offered as the first salvo in rebuttal to this criticism. And, it is a sound argument—diversity on many of these issues is needed to get a balanced appraisal. But, the argument doesn't seem to stand up too well under a detailed examination of how the intelligence pie is shared. Professionals call the constant interagency disputes "professional incest," wherein intelligence officers produce finished intelligence for other intelligence officers to rebut.

Aside from the formal organization of each of the agencies there is a corporate phalanx of intelligence officers working on several dozen intelligence committees in Washington.

This has come about over the past 20 years because of the enormous technical strides this country has made in sophisticated intelligence collection techniques.

The natural result was the establishment of a series of committees manned by specialists to oversee the collection and requirements and priorities of usage of these systems.

Perhaps the one collective fault of the committee approach—which, by the way, is used extensively in the daily coordination required for the production of reports going to the administration's operating officials—is that it diffuses responsibility to a point where it is difficult for the individuals involved in such work to feel a vital involvement in their craft. Moreover, it has a tendency to blunt initiative and results, in what is called "intelligence to the least common denominator."

In the *Pueblo* case, for example, it would be extremely difficult today to point to any particular person in the Washington intelligence community and state that he made the final "go" decision, yet several committees passed on the mission.

The committees seem to get caught in the tremendous swirl of paper that surrounds the management of say, a satellite recon program or the production of a National Intelligence Estimate.

Almost imperceptibly they can become impersonal paper mills, at times seeming more interested in getting the paper on to its next destination than with the fundamental issue at stake such as the risk for the *Pueblo* or an estimate concerning Soviet intentions in the missile field.

The entire community has been in a constant state of flux during the past 20 years, reorganizing and adapting to new problems as they arose with, frankly, remarkable agility. On balance

the community has served the Nation heralded while only its failures receive headlines.

This is not to say, however, that its skirts are entirely clean. We all, for example; are well aware of the Israeli attack on the USS *Liberty*, the *Pueblo* seizure and the shootdown of the US EC-121 reconnaissance plane off the coast of North Korea. And, while each of these incidents can be "rationalized and explained," perhaps, collectively, they are symptomatic of some basic problems of management within the intelligence community.

There is room for improvement. There is, for example, a seeming need for the professionals to step back from the firing line and take a look at the community as it now exists as it nears its 25th birthday. Perhaps some streamlining or realigning of functions is in order. Perhaps the management skills available in industry could help. Considering the diversity of talents and functions in the intelligence community today, it approaches conglomerate stature. Perhaps the Congressional committees which maintain a fragmented and seemingly disjointed surveillance of the Nation's intelligence activities could better realign themselves to play a more effective role.

The "Second-Oldest" Profession

The craft of intelligence, an ancient activity, has been with man since the dawn of time. The Bible records that Moses was instructed to send intelligence agents "to spy out the land of Canaan."

In the sixth Century B.C. Sun Tzu, a Chinese military theorist, wrote in *On the Art of War*: "... what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge."

The Mongols of the 13th Century had a well organized intelligence system which prompted one authority on the period to write: "... whereas Europe knew nothing of the Mongols the latter were fully acquainted with European conditions down to every detail not excepting the family connexions of the rulers."

The history of intelligence is filled with descriptions of its shortcomings. Shakespeare put a plaintive query into King John's mouth when he wrote: "O, where hath our intelligence been drunk? Where hath it slept?"

Spies themselves have always been suspect. In 1428 a Bavarian Duke in-

structed his men on the eve of a military expedition: "Whoever wants to wage war well must look for good intelligence, but you must not trust them (the spies) and not tell them what you intend to do on the strength of their findings."

In 16th Century England Queen Elizabeth had a well-maintained intelligence apparatus. It was the personal domain of her State Secretary Sir Francis Walsingham. He developed the art of using his personal fortune to maintain agents in all European capitals. His motto was: "Knowledge is never too dear."

The creation of an institutionalized and systematically organized intelligence service is credited to Frederick the Great. Under him the Prussians carefully developed an intelligence system as a vital general staff function.

Late in the 19th Century, Europe had become a vast network of spies and counterspies. Few hotels and restaurants did not have secret agents operating in disguise. "The whole continent began to look like the stage of a comic opera," one historian wrote.

An accelerating military technology and the competitive war plans of Continental powers required an increasing amount of information. Much of it was of a technical nature. Captain Dreyfus was wrongfully accused of transmitting to the Germans the design of a new artillery recoil mechanism, for example.

By the dawn of the 20th Century all the great powers, with the notable exception of the United States, began to develop elaborate intelligence systems.

U.S. Intelligence . . . You've Come A Long Way Baby

Although the Confederacy supported many spies its intelligence service was even less well organized and poorly coordinated than that of the Union.

When the U.S. entered WWI Army intelligence was a tiny section buried within a division of the general staff, consisting of two officers and two clerks.

Intelligence was clearly neglected in the decades between the two world wars. Army and Navy intelligence hobbled along in those years, rarely attracting the most promising officers and receiving only meager Congressional appropriations.

In the military the intelligence section became a dumping ground for officers unsuited for command assignments, an attitude which lingers in today's military.

With a more aloof and independent foreign policy the U.S. relied chiefly on its diplomatic agencies and military attache system for intelligence in the 18th and 19th Centuries.

According to its own official history the U.S. Army was "slow to recognize the importance of military intelligence and backward in its use in the solution of military problems."

During the Civil War, Allan Pinkerton, a famous detective, was hired as chief of intelligence for McClellan's Union Army. Pinkerton and his men, adept at snaring bank robbers, possessed little competence in military intelligence. His estimates of Confederate troop strength were greatly exaggerated, a fact which bolstered McClellan's excessive caution in the Peninsula Campaign.

Eisenhower described the War Department's intelligence at the outbreak of WWII as "a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning."

The State Department, too, was poorly equipped to gather intelligence in 1941. Dean Acheson testifying to Congress in 1945 described their techniques as "similar to those used by Ben Franklin in Paris." In 1909 State had four persons working in intelligence; by 1922 it had risen to five; and, by 1943 to no more than 18.

Pearl Harbor provided the impetus for the development of a centralized intelligence community. There was no joint intelligence mechanism at the national level to evaluate, analyze and disseminate the available information.

In February 1942 with the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint Intelligence Committee was set up with representatives from the services, the State Department and Bill Donovan's recent creation, the OSS.

The wartime intelligence services amidst much confusion, duplication and interagency conflict sometimes measured up to the high standards set by combat forces, such as the Navy's codebreaking at Midway which led to the location and defeat of Japan's carrier force, the identification of the German missile center at Peenemunde, and Allan Dulles' political apparatus in Eastern Europe.

At the end of WWII it was evident to the President and Congress that permanent changes were required in national intelligence organization. This resulted in, first, the creation of the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 by Executive Order, and, finally, the establishment of the CIA in 1947 under the National Security Act.

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CIA Spooks Require Faith

By Robert Hunter

A Washington free-lance writer, Hunter has been teaching at the London School of Economics. The following is excerpted by permission from the British Broadcasting Corp. magazine *The Listener*.

IN THE Ashenden stories, Somerset Maugham put a human face on the British Secret Service. No matter that the Hairless Mexican killed the wrong man; this bumbling helped soften the image of a ruthless and ever-competent machine dedicated to doing His Majesty's dirty business, and made everything right.

Not so with the Central Intelligence Agency. No humor here; just the sense of a sinister and heartless manipulation of the democrats of a hundred countries, designed to support the new imperialism of those sons-of-Britain, the Americans.

What is myth and what reality? Since it was organized from the post-war remnants of the old Office of Strategic Services, the CIA has certainly had its fingers in many political pies, and has been accused of myriads more. Mossadegh fell in Iran; a Guatemalan coup replaced a left-wing regime; America was humiliated at the Bay of Pigs; a private American air force has fought the Laotian war, and Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia.

These events, which have all, rightly or wrongly, been attributed to the CIA, are the glamorous side of the business. But most of what the agency does is far more prosaic. It is basically an organization of fact-gatherers: academics who never teach a class; pedants who rarely parade their nuances in learned journals—and never with the CIA's imprimatur.

It has many of the world's most skilled linguists, the most patient archivists, the cleverest analysts of isolated data and, surprisingly, some of the most liberal people, politically, in Washington. Indeed, if the American government ever does come to accept that the Soviet Union is not preparing to launch a nuclear attack and that China is not populated with madmen, it will probably be because the CIA has succeeded in putting across its estimate of the situation.

The Iceberg's Tip

THIS, OF COURSE, is a rosy view. Like any great, sprawling institution, the CIA does suffer from a great deal of intellectual myopia, the compromises of expediency, and the political philosophy dominating the coun-

try at any moment. And if anything, its reporting is usually dull, tedious, banal and sometimes dead wrong, as anyone will testify who has been privileged—or compelled—to read the Daily Digest and other classified reports that circulate about the government.

This part of the CIA—the part that is styled "overt"—is quartered in a large building across the Potomac from Washington, unmarked and unobserved. But the 8,000 or so particularly gray-faced men and women who work there are only the tip of the intelligence iceberg. It has been estimated,



By Bob Burchette—The Washington Post

Richard Helms, the ebullient director of the gray-faced CIA.

for example, that more than 100,000 people are actively engaged in the one function of gathering and interpreting information about Soviet military capabilities.

The CIA budget, too, is immense, although not one item appears anywhere in the compendia of federal expenditures, there is no congressional debate and few people know its true magnitude. By conservative estimates, more than \$1 billion of CIA money is hidden under other categories and another \$2 billion is spent on similar activities by other agencies—such as the National Security Agency—whose existence is never formally acknowledged.

Yet despite the secretive nature of the "intelligence community," many CIA officials lead surprisingly public lives. Unlike the heads of MI5 and MI6, the CIA's chief of intelligence is a familiar figure at diplomatic

receptions; the agency has a listed phone number, and the day has long passed when junior employees went through the absurd ritual of telling people whom they met at Washington cocktail parties simply that they worked for "the government."

Another Department

ALL THIS is straightforward enough, and is hard to fault in any government. It is true that Francis Gary Powers did help disrupt the summit conference in 1960 by having the ill-luck to be shot down over Russia in his U-2 aircraft. But those reconnaissance flights, and the reconnaissance satellites later sent aloft by both Russia and America, have helped to slow down the arms race and to inspire mutual confidence that the other side is not building some new super-weapon in secret.

Few people who take seriously the problems of running a government and a reasonably enlightened foreign policy would question the role that the CIA shares with other agencies in gathering and interpreting information; but they do argue against the operational responsibilities that shelter—under the same roof—what is popularly called the "department of dirty tricks."

There is considerable justice in the view that the same bureaucrats who carry through policy should not have the right to gather the information needed to judge their actions. And since the ill-starred adventure at the Bay of Pigs, there has been a much greater effort throughout the American government to end this overlap of authority. President Kennedy reactivated his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and all the bureaucratic strings were pulled much tighter.

Ironically, however, the test of intellectual purity has not been applied as rigorously to the CIA's competitors. The Defense Department and its many military offshoots also devote large resources to knowing the enemy, and there is far less concern to see that responsibility for information and action are kept separate. The Vietnam war is an excellent example of this. The blunders that have occurred in that war from bad espionage involve the military more than they do their civilian counterparts at the CIA.

continued

BUT IN ALL, it is fair to say that very little if anything that is done by the CIA today goes contrary to the wishes of the President and his immediate advisers. Many people think that it is bad enough that the President can sometimes act in secret and with considerable impact, but it is necessary to separate this concern about American behavior in general from perennial worries that the CIA, as the established villain, will run amok.

Again, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, it suited President Kennedy and his hagiographers to emphasize the bad advice given by the CIA. Here was a recognized scapegoat whose involvement softened criticism of executive decisions. Surely, the argument ran, even the President could not be expected to be proof against the agency's machinations?

This incident illustrates what may be the most important fact to bear in mind about the CIA: What it actually does or does not do is far less important than what it is *believed* to do. Like a belief in religion or witchcraft, in other times, belief in the potency of the CIA provides a point of stability in a disorganized world.

It is far easier to accept that evil is being done consciously than to understand it as the simple product of human failings. Good intentions gone awry are far harder to tolerate than the knowledge that a conspiracy is truly afoot. One doesn't have to be paranoid to gain a certain comfort from suspicions of conspiracy; and the few times that the CIA actually does gain direct publicity—almost always when a job has been bungled—merely confirm them.

The political impact of this desire to believe in the CIA's skulduggeries is considerable—however many thousands or millions of conscious agents one must assume to exist for the agency to be involved in all the actions attributed to it. This was made quite clear recently on BBC Television's "Line-Up," when Michael Dean interviewed Andreas Papandreu, the most publicized leader of the Greek resistance-in-exile.

Papandreu recounted in some detail the nature of the CIA plot to overthrow the democratic government in Athens and install the colonels, and completed his narrative with quotations from a top-secret meeting of the American National Security Council.

Perhaps this is all true. But even if it is, what does it say for the strength of Greek political life and institutions? Must we believe that every Greek of political influence is employed by the Americans?

in developing their political institutions that an order from the CIA—or whatever—could indeed produce what we see in Athens today?

Deliciously Sinister

THE EFFORT by many Greeks today to pin most if not all of their troubles on the Americans is only one example of the force exerted by the conspiracy theory of history. Indeed, there is a certain appeal in the truly sinister and secret operation that is lacking in the more obvious one.

Everyone knows that Air America, which forms the backbone of the anti-communist air war in Laos, is directly financed by the CIA. Yet this knowledge has never produced an outcry, or even much interest, largely because the whole affair is conducted with minimum secrecy and maximum routine and boredom.

Compared to the killing of Che Guevara—widely believed to be the work of the CIA—the fighting in Laos is far more important in terms of current politics and lives lost, but it is totally lacking in those elements that make for a basic confrontation between good and evil. For the purposes of theater and the politics that depend on it, Guevara's death symbolizes this kind of confrontation perfectly. Indeed, his life and work would be incomplete unless he had been killed in this or some similar way.

This sense of the conflict between good and evil was also present in the most celebrated instance of CIA involvement in Great Britain: the funneling of money through the Congress for Cultural Freedom to the magazine *Encounter*. The hue and cry from that affair have subsided, but the moral issues that were raised have still not been adequately settled.

A number of authors, and some individuals who had helped with the editing in entire innocence of the secret source of funds, were horrified to discover who had actually been making possible the publication of their views. These men and women had written what they believed, and were in no way influenced by the character of their ultimate benefactor. Can it be said that they were suborned?

Likewise, do articles written for a magazine that has been compromised by the CIA have no value? Do they lose the significance which the authors thought they were imparting to their work when they produced it?

This is not really a question about the nature of the sponsoring institution—whether one that serves the ends of a government, or one like the great foundations that give out money amassed by devious means in the past.

done. At heart, it is a question of man's striving to secure the right to know what forces are shaping his life, to know how far he is a free agent.

A Guidepost Warped

THE ANGER directed at the CIA was not eased by the irony of the CIA's choice of what is considered at least by Americans to be a left-of-center publication. If anything, it intensified this anger, particularly on the part of those who needed to measure their own radical progress against their image of CIA activities.

There was also a sense that the bargain with the devil had been unfairly struck. It is one thing to sell one's soul willingly; it is quite another to do so, even if the temporal payment is made, without being able to share in the awareness of complicity with evil. To be used by a capricious god may be tolerable if everyone is in on the secret, but what could be worse than to be denied the sweetness that comes from the knowledge of sin?

Perhaps this is the way an agency like the CIA must operate, and certainly this fresh evidence of duplicity only reinforced the comforting belief that conspiracy does, indeed, abound. As such, the CIA has a value in the realm of drama, in the realm of the morality play, whatever its impact on the world's policies.

26 JUL 1970



Wright in the Dayton Daily News

"There he is again."

The Secret Team and the Games It Plays

L. FLETCHER PROUTY

"The hill costumes of the Meo tribesmen contrasted with the civilian clothes of United States military men riding in open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and pistols. These young Americans are mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA contract to advise and train Laotian troops." Those matter-of-fact, almost weary

L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force colonel, is now vice president of a Washington, D.C., bank. While in the Air Force, he was a liaison man with the Secret Team. His article is from The Washington Monthly.

sentences, written late in February by T. D. Allman of the Washington Post after he and two other enterprising correspondents left a guided tour and walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe a situation that today may seem commonplace to anyone familiar with American operations overseas, but that no more than 10 years ago would have been unthinkable.

To take a detachment of regular troops, put its members into disguise, smuggle them out of the country so that neither the public nor Congress knows they have left, and assign them to clandestine duties on foreign soil under the command of a nonmilitary agency—it is doubtful that anyone would have dared to suggest taking such liberties with the armed forces and foreign relations of the United States, not to say with the Constitution, to any President up to and especially including Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Indeed, the most remarkable development in the management of America's relations with other countries during the nine years since Gen. Eisenhower left office has been the assumption of more and more control over military and diplomatic operations abroad by men whose ac-

secret, whose very identities as often as not are secret—in short a Secret Team whose actions only those implicated in them are in a position to monitor.

How determinedly this secrecy is preserved, even when preserving it means denying the U.S. Army the right to discipline its own personnel, not to say the opportunity to do justice, was strikingly illustrated not long ago by the refusal of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide witnesses for the court-martial that was to try eight Green Beret officers for murdering a suspected North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the Army to drop the charges.

The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency and who react to those data when it seems appropriate to them with paramilitary plans and activities, e.g., training and "advising"—a not exactly impenetrable euphemism for "leading into battle"—Laotian troops. Membership in the team, granted on a "need to know" basis, varies with the nature and the location of the problems that come to its attention.

At the heart of the team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council, most notably the chief White House adviser on foreign policy. Around them revolves a sort of inner ring of presidential staff members, State Department officials, civilians and military men from the Pentagon, and career professionals in the intelligence services.

And out beyond them is an extensive and intricate network of government officials with responsibility for or expertise in some specific field that touches on national security, think-tank analysts, businessmen who travel a lot or whose businesses (e.g., import-export or operating a cargo airline) are useful, academic experts in this or that

profession, and, quite importantly, alumni of the intelligence service—a service from which there are no unconditional resignations.

Thus the Secret Team is not a clandestine super-planning board or super-general staff but, even more damaging to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a bewildering collection of temporarily assembled action committees that respond pretty much ad hoc to specific troubles in various part of the world, sometimes in ways that duplicate the activities of regular American missions, sometimes in ways that undermine those activities, and very often in ways that interfere with and muddle them.

One source of the team's power is the speed with which it can act. The CIA's communications system is so extraordinarily efficient, especially by contrast with State's, that the team can, in a phrase that often gets used at such times, "have a plane in the air" responding to some situation overseas while State is still decoding the cable informing it of that situation.

A few years ago, for example, while the strongest member of an Asian government that the United States was strenuously supporting (call him Marshal X) was lying sick in a Tokyo hospital, word came that a group of discontented young officers was planning a coup in his absence. In a matter of hours, thanks to the team, Marshal X was on his way home in a U.S. Air Force jet fighter; he arrived at his office in plenty of time to frustrate the plotters.

The power to pull off feats like that is more than operational power; it is in a real sense policy-making power. In this particular case it was the power to commit the United States to the protection and support of Marshal X.

Another source of the team's power is its ability to manipulate "need to know" classifications. One way to make sure that there is little opposition to your proposed activities is to tell those who might oppose

them what those activities are, even men with high-ranking policy-making jobs and the appropriate top secret clearances often are kept in the dark about team plans. Thus Adlai Stevenson, ambassador to the United Nations, was not informed about the Bay of Pigs invasion plans until the very last minute when rumors about it began to appear in the press; and even then Tracy Barnes, the CIA man sent to brief Stevenson, gave him a vague and incomplete picture of the operation.

"Need to know" also can be bent in the other direction in order to secure the support of potential allies and further those allies' careers. Members of the Secret Team who favored the election of John F. Kennedy over Richard Nixon played a very special role in the 1960 election campaign.

Vice President Nixon presided over the National Security Council and therefore knew in detail the plans for the Bay of Pigs operation. Sen. Kennedy, as an outsider, was presumed not to know those highly classified details. However, he did know. In his book, "Six Crises," Mr. Nixon wrote that Sen. Kennedy was told about the invasion by Allen Dulles during the traditional CIA briefing for candidates; but there was more than that to the story.

A former staff member from the office of the secretary of defense recalls that during the summer of 1960 he went to the Senate Office Building to pick up and escort to the Pentagon four Cuban exile leaders, among them the future commander of the Bay of Pigs invasion team, who had been meeting with Mr. Kennedy. Those men were supposed to be under special security wraps, but certain CIA officials had introduced them to the senator, thus making sure that he knew as much about the invasion as Mr. Nixon—if not more, as the result of a personal relationship that the Vice President did not have with the Cuban refugee front and the Americans who were secretly helping it.

When the candidates appeared on television together during the crucial campaign debates, Mr. Nixon, abiding by security restrictions, limited himself in his discussion of the government's plans for Cuba. This official control did not apply to Mr. Kennedy. He could and did advocate overthrowing the Castro government.

Mr. Kennedy's election was a big boost for Secret Teamwork, but an earlier and bigger one had been the appointment of Allen Dulles as director of the CIA in 1953, after two years as deputy director. At that time the agency was not permitted by the National Security Council to build up a big enough force of men and materiel to permit it to carry out operations on the

In other words, whenever the CIA wanted to do anything on a large scale it had to secure assistance from, and therefore share authority with, other agencies, chiefly the Departments of State and Defense. Slowly Dulles changed these conditions. One way he did it was to give intelligence activities intellectual and social credibility by surrounding himself with men from industry, finance, and academia.

Of course Dulles did not increase the CIA's influence as much as he did just by image building. He was an organizer and a clandestine operator of great ability, and between the end of the Korean war and the election of John Kennedy, he had begun building the team—with the CIA usually calling its signals, of course—and it had had a number of substantial successes.

Overthrowing the Mossadegh government in Iran was one; overthrowing the Arbenz government in Guatemala was another—although perhaps from a connoisseur's point of view the latter operation was a bit on the blatant side. Perhaps the most brilliant of all was the spectacular building up of Ramon Magsaysay from obscure army captain to president and national hero of the Philippines. This latter feat was mostly organized by Col. Edward G. Lansdale of the CIA, via the Air Force, a public relations genius of the old selling-iceboxes-to-Eskimos school.

Lansdale conceived the idea of making Magsaysay into the savior of his country from the Communist Huks by recruiting, and paying with CIA funds a few bands of Filipino soldiers who, every night or so, would put on peasant clothes, invade some villages with much ado, and then allow themselves to be driven out again by the intrepid forces under Magsaysay's command.

All of which, perhaps it need be emphasized, is not to say that Magsaysay was a faker or a figurehead; on the contrary, it is a mark of Lansdale's skill he chose as the central figure in his hero-making exercise a man with the attributes of a genuine hero.

The Army Special Forces had been formed after World War II. In event of a Russian invasion, the 10th Special Forces in Germany were to be sent into Eastern Europe to create and sustain partisan movements behind the lines. With a small headquarters and reserve unit maintained at Fort Bragg, N.C., the Special Forces in 1960 consisted of only 1,800 men, poorly equipped and inadequately trained.

The President read Mao and Che Guevara and told the Army to do likewise. Then he instructed the cooks and clerks and bakers and the rest of the immediate establishment.

guerrilla operations. After a visit to the training center, Mr. Kennedy, over opposition from the Army bureaucracy, revived the Special Forces, and training centers were organized in Panama, Okinawa, Vietnam, and West Germany.

The CIA is most adept at working in and around and through all levels of the U.S. government. No one, not even the majority of agency personnel, knows the full extent of agency manipulations within the governmental structure. The agency can obtain what it desires in any quantity, and often for no cost.

During the depression years of the 1930s, Congress passed a law which was known as the Economy Act of 1932 and, as amended, is still on the books. This act, whose purpose is to save money and discourage needless spending, permits an agency that needs material to purchase it at an agreed price from another agency by an accounting off-set without spending "new money." For example, the Department of Agriculture can buy surplus tractors from the Army at a price agreed upon by both parties, even if it is only a dollar each. (Since most such equipment is declared surplus, whether it is or not, by the selling agency, the price usually is low.)

By means of authority of this kind, the CIA has learned how to "buy" from all agencies of the government, primarily from the Department of Defense, a tremendous amount of new and surplus equipment—and to take over bases at home and abroad for its own use without appearing to have spent substantial funds and many times without the selling party knowing the true identity of the buyer.

With these hidden sources of supply, the CIA often can build an arsenal and support clandestine operations in some foreign country without the Department of Defense, much less the Department of State, ever knowing it—though presumably Defense could find out if it took the trouble.

It was the CIA's power and freedom to move forces and equipment quickly without the usual review by proper authority that made possible the first entry of troops and equipment into South Vietnam in the early 1960s. In order to mount a certain operation it considered important, the CIA needed 24 helicopters, and it obtained White House permission over strenuous objections from the Pentagon to have them sent to Vietnam.

Sending 24 helicopters anywhere automatically means sending 400 men as well, counting only pilots and gunners and mechanics and the cooks and clerks and bakers and the rest of the immediate establishment.

If the intention is—and the intention always is—to give those 24 helicopters real support, then it involves sending 1,200 men. Moreover, the statistics are that, in any helicopter squadron, because of maintenance servicing requirements, only half the machines will be operational at any one time. So if 24 operational helicopters are needed, 48 will have to be sent, which means 2,400 men.

But if you're sending a supporting force involving 2,400 men, then the support for them—PXs, movies, motor pools, officers' and enlisted men's clubs, perimeter guards to protect all this, and so on and so on—becomes really extensive, and thousands more men get attached to it. And so it goes. "Twenty-four helicopters" can, in fact did, ultimately mean a full-scale military involvement.

In sum, during the last decade the White House's National Security Council apparatus and the CIA—particularly its operational side which now has nine overseas employees to every one on the intelligence-gathering side—have grown enormously both in size and in influence. More and more foreign-policy decisions are being made in secret, in response only to immediate crises rather than in accordance with long-range plans, and all too often with very little consultation with professional foreign policy or military planners.

More and more overseas operations are being conducted in secret, and ad hoc, and with very little control by professional diplomats or soldiers. And the one organ of the government that, on behalf of the people that elected it, should be monitoring these goings-on, is today as ignorant as the public—because Congress submitted to secrecy on a grand scale years ago when it authorized the CIA.

It is hard to imagine how or when the Secret Team can be brought into the open and made publicly accountable for its actions.

THE QUICKSILVER TIMES
23 June 3 July 70

C.I.A.

Training center

Psssst!

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created in 1948 to improve and coordinate American intelligence operations, now involves hundreds of thousands of people and hundreds of millions of dollars--all undisclosed. Primarily established to counter the emergence of the Soviet Union as a threat to U.S. world domination, the "Agency" has been caught actively involved in clandestine operations throughout the world and, indeed, within the borders of the United States itself. Infiltrating student, labor, protest, and professional groups in and out of the United States, the Agency, as a secret arm of U.S. imperialism, has become the staunchest foe of all liberation movements.

Unlike the handful of books and articles exposing the C.I.A. in the past, this article is not an attempt to show C.I.A. fallibility or to level a broadside attack on its many activities. Instead, the topic here is the secrecy and complicity used locally in Washington D.C. to support C.I.A. operations.

Across M Street from some of Georgetown's most chic shops, and only a couple doors away from Washington's most famous French restaurant lies a major C.I.A. training center. Located at 3222 M Street, NW, the training center receives dozens of trainees and instructors daily. With casual observation, you can watch the numerous out-of-state cars enter the training center's open air parking lot around the corner on Wisconsin Avenue, just south of M Street; it's marked "private property" despite the fact that the property is government financed. Or, if you're more patient, you can catch a glimpse of these public servants leaving the front door still wearing their identification cards and photographs pinned to their chests.

Directly behind the M Street Building rests an old red warehouse on Grace Street. This building has just recently been purchased by the

Government Services Administration, acting as a front, and quietly turned over to the C.I.A. for use as an extension of the training center. Sure nice to see at least one business booming during the recession.

About four doors to the east of the 3222 address on M Street is an enclosed parking lot, painted to match the main building.

Payroll accounting for the C.I.A. is done every other week on a five-state area basis. The payroll for the District plus Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and North Carolina amounts to roughly \$800,000, with occasional "special deposits" upping the total. Computed in a special accounting office in Arlington, Virginia, the payroll then travels a curious route before entering the pockets of our dedicated public servants.

Specifically, in Washington, the C.I.A. payroll travels from the accounting office to the Arlington Trust Company. At this point, the payroll is "re-deposited" by the bank into the account of American University (other universities are used in other areas).

In the meantime, using blank American University checks, the C.I.A. fills out and sends payroll checks to their employees, thus using American University as a cover for at least a sizeable portion of their payroll system. Special deposits, mentioned earlier, involve people who receive payment under different names each time, thus avoiding W-2's, taxes, and other official records.

Although barely touching the sur-

institutional complicity, this article should serve as a lesson for those people who would deny that Amerika has in fact an existing network of fascism which permeates all of American life in both public and private institutions.

So, the next time you're visiting Georgetown, perhaps you will want to visit some of our public servants at the C.I.A. training center--or maybe use their parking lot. After all of these years of seclusion, it may very well be they will welcome all the attention the public can give them. They're lonely people.

uncovered

SANTA ANA, CAL.

REGISTER
JUN 17 1970

E - 90,087

S - 129,439

Trust Can't Be Bought

"For the world as a whole, the CIA has now become the bogey that communism has been for America," writes England's historian, Dr. Arnold Toynbee, in the New York Times. "Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it."

Let's pursue this and see ourselves as others see us. Dr. Toynbee is author of "The History of Civilization." He has lectured at Stanford University on several occasions as a visiting professor from England.

Dr. Toynbee observes: "Our phobia about CIA is, no doubt, as fantastically excessive as America's phobia about world communism; but, in this case, too, there is just enough convincing evidence to make the phobia genuine. In fact, the roles of America and Russia have been reversed in the world's eyes. Today America has become the world's nightmare."

"Like communist Russia, America has committed atrocities in the cause of truth and justice as she sees them. We believe that American fanaticism, too, is sincere. This makes it all the more alarming. . .

"Would I rather be a Vietnamese who is being 'saved' by the American Army, or be a Czech who was being 'saved' by the Russian army?"

"Of course, I would rather be the Czech. The number of lives taken and the amount of devastation caused by the 1968 Russian military intervention in Czechoslovakia were small, measured by the standard of America's record in Vietnam."

Dr. Toynbee asks what America is doing about her problems. "As we see it, she is failing to deal with them and this is the most terrifying feature of American life today," he says.

He says the outside world watched "with growing anxiety" as America gets involved in entangling alliances, and also asks the question: "Is there no hope of reconciliation on America's home front?" He answers that an American officer two years ago said "mothers of America won't like" more Vietnams, and concludes:

"The mothers of America have still to go into action. . . I believe this is a battle the Pentagon cannot win. In the mothers of America I do still see some hope for the world."

Experienced American travelers, particularly those who have the knack of talking to some of the common people in the countries they visit, recognize some truth in what Dr. Toynbee is trying to tell us. We've stationed armies around the world to assure us that the world will be the kind of a world we want. We have spent billions upon billions of dollars to "help" the underprivileged, if they would hold elections and choose their officials in the American way. Only they most often don't know what freedom means, and officials are willing to "put on the America show" in order to get the money.

Buying the world's friendship just doesn't work. We've got to earn the trust and friendship of the world, rather than try to buy it. We talk to ourselves about our noble hopes and aspirations, but we've got to solve our own problems before the world will respect us and be our friends.

TOLEDO, OHIO
BLADE

JUN 16 1970
E - 176,688
S - 200,492

AID And The CIA

FINALLY, the American people have a frank admission from a top government official that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) does, indeed, wear the cloak of at least one other federal agency in at least one country to wage undercover guerrilla warfare.

John A. Hannah, director of the Agency for International Development (AID), last week publicly acknowledged that CIA agents have continued to use the U.S. foreign aid mission in Laos since 1962 as a cover for recruiting and training guerrilla fighters in that formally "neutral" country.

The former Michigan State University president said that CIA operatives have masqueraded as field workers of AID — posing as rural development workers. In addition to guerrilla actions, they also have monitored enemy movements and have acted as ground controllers for U.S. air strikes on Laos from Thailand and other bases.

Mr. Hannah is a 1969 appointee to the office, but he is not innocent of federal operations in this connection. He was president of MSU when it agreed to train South Vietnamese police officers for the Ngo Dinh Diem regime — and that program turned out to be run by the CIA.

But now Mr. Hannah concedes that the AID role in Laos, plus its war-related activities in Vietnam, "might" have an adverse effect on AID programs to other nations. "It certainly has not helped . . . It distorts the role of AID," he said in expressing hope that his agency could "get rid of this kind of operation."

We should think so. The American foreign aid program has been under fire for years from critics in and out of Congress — but for quite different reasons. But to use an aid mission as a covert means of engaging in paramilitary actions assuredly discredits the agency and could likely plant seeds of widespread mistrust in American intentions elsewhere.

As for the CIA — in this modern-day world every major power must maintain an intelligence-gathering agency. Only through such far-flung and diverse listening posts can a government protect against surprise, or use such information for direction through other official channels to head off events deemed contrary to our national interest.

But the CIA, as has been documented by critics of American foreign policy, has not been content to confine its role to that of information-gathering. It has been accused of initiating, directing, and engaging in political or military coups in numerous trouble spots of the world. And, if charges are accurate, it has sometimes done so without the knowledge or consent of others who bear final responsibility. In some instances it has been accused of countering highest government directives through use of its own hidden funds.

This assumption of independence that at times appears to surmount rather than follow policies of administrations present and past has raised serious questions about the unrevealed power of the CIA.

An open society such as America is, at best, uneasy with the existence of an agency engaged in clandestine work. The necessity of a CIA is beyond challenge. But if its revealed involvement in the AID program is any measure of its conduct, not only will it cloud the integrity of other American agencies and organizations; it will discredit the legitimacy of the CIA itself.

DETROIT, MICH.
NEWS

E - 592,616

S - 837,086

JUN 1 1970

Work of CIA hampered by 'leper' image

By COL. R. D. HEINL JR.
News Military Analyst

WASHINGTON — The Agency for International Development (AID) is a cover for the CIA in Laos and wishes it weren't.

Since 1962, according to its administrator, John A. Hannah, the mission in Vientiane has maintained a "rural development" division which is in fact a CIA front for training individuals and units in counter insurgency and other military skills.

Expressing the hope that the relationship between AID and CIA could be severed by legislation now pending, Hannah expressed distaste for working with the CIA. "Our preference is to get out of this kind of operation," he said.

If Hannah succeeds in divorcing AID and CIA, his agency will then make common cause with the Peace Corps, which has always held itself off-limits to the murky—but vitally necessary—game of intelligence.

THE ATTITUDE taken by Hannah, as well as by two former Peace Corps directors, Sargent Shriver and Jack Hood Vaughan, and the present director, Joseph H. Blatchford, is that their agencies are or ought to be too pure to dirty their hands with intelligence matters. It infers that such work should be left to the CIA which, in the inference, comes through as a crew of amoral tricksters and warmongers.

The increasing desire of various agencies of the government to turn their back on the CIA (AID and the Peace Corps are not alone) hinders and obstructs the CIA in performing crucially important functions on which the survival of the United States literally depends.

Like Hannah's AID and Blatchford's Peace Corps, Richard Helm's CIA is a statutory agency of the United States, provided for by Congress and paid for from the public treasury. Whether or not given individuals, or even other government agencies, applaud the kind of work CIA sometimes does, the fact remains that CIA business is government business—no less than AID business—and usually a good bit more important.

Yet the stance of AID and the Peace Corps suggests that there is a kind of *pousse-cafe* stratification of government functions: some at the top above-board, pure, disinterested, moral in the Wilsonian

view of international relations being suitable and "respectable." Others in the dark depths disingenuous, amoral if not immoral, covert, and selfishly pro-American, being "disrespectable."

Obviously, AID would not want its acronym tarnished by disrespectful associations inside our government—and that is why Hannah withdraws the hem of his garment.

IN ITS EARLY DAYS as Col. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (OSS), during World War II, our pre-CIA intelligence organization planted representatives at any point in the governmental structure where results could best be attained. Since World War II was a patriotic, "moral" war, no objections were raised. Nor, for the same reason, during the Korean War, was there any tendency on the part of U.S. government agencies to shun CIA.

It is only because of the domestic unpopularity of Vietnam and a simplistic view of government and its interests and their defense, that organizations like AID and the Peace Corps conclude that they should be allowed to refuse government business that some internal opinion disapproves.

This notion—that government agencies paid for by the taxpayer can pick and choose the kind of work they take in—is a philosophical sibling to the doctrine so popular in intellectual and even some judicial circles: that people enjoy the "right" to choose which wars they will fight and which they will sit out.

As a practical matter, it hardly requires a manpower expert to recognize that the "right" of selective service (in which the individual selects his own wars), means that the day the bugle blows will never be the day for a lot of high-minded young men to go to that particular war. Strictly on principle, you understand.

IN THE SAME WAY, if various government agencies acquire the discretion to cold-shoulder the CIA for the sake of venience, or because agency officials are lukewarm on a particular tenet of defense or foreign policy, then some fine morning when the President

needs an answer badly, the CIA may not be able to produce.

Such a situation would be pleasing in Moscow, Peking, Cairo, Damascus, and very likely in Berkeley or Cambridge, but perhaps not so much so to high-minded, decent men like Hannah, who has served as an assistant secretary of defense and should know better.

Before he disdains the CIA and its work, Hannah might look back to an earlier American, Nathan Hale, who, when reproached in 1775 by a friend for "dirtying himself" by spying within the British lines, replied: "Every kind of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honorable by being necessary."

DOTHAN, ALA.
EAGLE

E - 28,355

S - 30,344

JUN 10 1970

High Level Decisions

That the American people aren't always fully informed of what their government is doing to and for them has been underscored twice in recent days. Whether the government should maintain such secrecy is another question.

A heavily censored summary of a Nov. 9, 1967 agreement between the United States and Thailand—made public in a 310-page transcript of hearings conducted by a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee—revealed that the United States has secretly paid Thailand more than \$200,000,000 to send 12,000 troops to fight in Vietnam.

Under the agreement, the United States absorbed the costs for sending a Thai combat division to Vietnam and maintained and improved the defense capability of Thai forces remaining at home. Absorbing the costs for the combat division included equipping the division, providing logistic support, paying overseas allowances, assuming the expenses of preparing and training, and distributing a muster-out bonus. Improving the capability of forces on duty at home came through a modernization program which involved an increase in the military assistance program by \$30,000,000 for the years 1968 and 1969.

At almost the same time this agreement was disclosed, John A. Hannah, head of the United States' foreign aid program, revealed under questioning on a news program that the program is being used as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency activities in Laos. Hannah emphasized that he disapproved of the CIA's use of his organization and added that Laos was the only place where this is being done and that such activity was deemed in 1962 as in the

national interest.

Whether the government should act in this fashion brings to mind an article by the United Press International of several months ago. The article dealt with a book by William J. Bards, a former official of CIA. In the book, Bards said that the people's right to know is a basic element of a free and self-governing society. "If a people are to rule themselves," he went on, "they must be adequately informed to know what they are doing" but "in a world such as this, complete openness and candor on the part of any government is impossible."

Bards agreed that "the government must as a general practice conduct an honest dialogue with its citizens" and argued that "there are situations when it seems to even the most intelligent and conscientious statesmen that the price of telling the truth, or not lying, is greater than can be borne."

Situations in which government officials may have "not only the right but the obligation" to lie, according to Bards, are:

1. To mislead an enemy about wartime operations.
2. To protect covert intelligence activities in peacetime.
3. To avoid a financial panic when currency devaluation is pending.
4. At times such as the Cuba missile crisis, when officials fear that telling the truth might lead to the danger of nuclear war.

The sad part of the foregoing, of course, is that public officials are only human and could be hard put not to use the obligation to lie for reasons other than security. And, too, there's always room for honest error, but error nevertheless.

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POST-DISPATCH
MAY 24 1970
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S - 558,018

'The World's Nightmare'

There were never more than suspicions, generated by patterns of the past, that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had anything to do with the deposing of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia last March 18. The possibility of CIA participation was promptly discounted by American and neutral sources, and now it is reported from Phnom Penh that Communist East Bloc intelligence agents have concluded the CIA played no part in the coup.

This is gratifying, but why should the CIA be so automatically suspect throughout the world? A recent commentary by the eminent British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, bears on the subject:

For the world as a whole, the CIA has now become the bogey that Communism has been for America. Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it. Our phobia about the CIA is, no doubt, as fantastically excessive as America's phobia about world Communism; but in this case, too, there is just enough convincing evidence to make the phobia genuine. In fact, the roles of Russia and America have been reversed in the world's eyes. Today America has become the world's nightmare.

Is that what has happened to the American dream? This may be only one man's opinion but it is the opinion of a leading world citizen whose profession is the evaluation and analysis of historic events. Professor Toynbee, who has lived in America, in the Middle West, and who has a good understanding of America, believes that "the most terrifying feature" of American life today is America's failure to deal with its domestic problems, and he rightly thinks the fate of the world will be profoundly affected by whether America manages to deal with them.

Isn't it about time that Americans assumed the responsibilities that go with pre-eminent world power, and start exercising the constructive leadership of which they are capable?

STATOTHR



Robert Hunter on the CIA

—Is it a department of dirty tricks,
or an organisation of fact-gatherers?
Did it underwrite the seizure of power
by the Greek Colonels?



In the Ashenden stories, Somerset Maugham put a human face on the British Secret Service. No matter that the Hairless Mexican killed the wrong man: this bumbling helped soften the image of a ruthless and ever-competent machine dedicated to doing His Majesty's dirty business, and made

Richard Helms, Director of the CIA

everything right. Not so with the Central Intelligence Agency—or the CIA as it is everywhere known. No humour here; just the sense of a sinister and heartless manipulation of the democrats of a hundred coun-

tries, designed to support the new imperialism of those days. What is myth and what reality? Since it was organised from the post-war remnants of the old Office of Strategic Services, the CIA has certainly had its fingers in many political pies, and has been accused of myriads more. Mossadeq fell in Iran; a Guatemalan coup replaced a left-wing regime; America was humiliated at the Bay of Pigs; a private American air force has fought the Laotian war; and Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia. These events, which have all, rightly or wrongly, been attributed to the CIA, are the glamorous side of the business. But most of what the agency does is far more prosaic. It is basically an organisation of fact-gatherers: academics who never teach a class; pedants who rarely parade their nuances in learned journals—and never with the CIA's imprimatur. It has many of the world's most skilled linguists; the most patient archivists; the cleverest analysts of isolated data; and, surprisingly, some of the most liberal people, politically, in Washington. Indeed, if the American government ever does come to accept that the Soviet Union is not preparing to launch a nuclear attack and that China is not populated with madmen, it will probably be because the CIA has succeeded in putting across its estimate of the situation.

This, of course, is a rosy view. Like any great, sprawling institution, the CIA does suffer from a great deal of intellectual myopia, the compromises of bureaucracy, and the political philosophy dominating the country at any moment. And if anything, its reporting is usually dull, tedious, banal, and sometimes dead wrong, as anyone will testify who has been privileged—or compelled—to read the Daily Digest and other classified reports that circulate about the government.

This part of the CIA—the part that is styled 'overt'—is quartered in a large building across the Potomac from Washington, unmarked and unobserved. But the eight thousand or so particularly grey-faced men and women who work there are only the tip of the Intelligence ice-berg: it has been estimated, for example, that more than a hundred thousand people are actively engaged in the one function of gathering and interpreting information about Soviet military capabilities. The CIA budget, too, is immense, although not one item appears anywhere in the compendia of Federal expenditures; there is no Congressional debate; and few people know its true magnitude. By conservative estimates, more than \$1,000 million of CIA money is hidden under other categories, and another \$2,000 million is spent on similar activities by other agencies—such as the National Security Agency—whose existence is never formally acknowledged.

Yet despite the secretive nature of the 'intelligence community', many CIA officials lead surprisingly public lives. Unlike the heads of MI5 and MI6, the Director of Central Intelligence is a familiar figure at diplomatic receptions; the Agency has a listed phone number and the only time I passed when junior employees went through the absurd ritual of telling people

whom they met at Washington cocktail parties simply that they worked for the government.

All this is straightforward enough, and is hard to fault in any government. It is true that Francis Gary Powers did help disrupt the Summit Conference in 1960 by having the ill-luck to be shot down over Russia in his U-2 aircraft. But those reconnaissance flights, and the reconnaissance satellites later sent aloft by both Russia and America, have helped to slow down the arms race and to inspire mutual confidence that the other side is not building some new super-weapon in secret.

Few people who take seriously the problems of running a government and a reasonably enlightened foreign policy would question the role that the CIA shares with other agencies in gathering and interpreting information; but they do argue against the operational responsibilities that shelter under the same roof—what is popularly called the 'department of dirty tricks'. There is considerable justice in the view that the same bureaucrats who carry through policy should not have the right to gather the information needed to judge their actions. And since the ill-starred adventure at the Bay of Pigs, there has been a much greater effort throughout the American government to end this overlap of authority. President Kennedy re-activated his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and all the bureaucratic strings were pulled much tighter.

Ironically, however, the test of intellectual purity has not been applied as rigorously to the CIA's competitors. The Defence Department and its many military offshoots also devote large resources to knowing the enemy, and there is far less concern to see that responsibility for information and action are kept separate. The Vietnam War is an excellent example of this; but if anything, the blunders that have occurred in that war from bad espionage—including President Nixon's current venture in Cambodia—involve the military more than they do their civilian counterparts at the CIA.

But in all, it is fair to say that very little if anything that is done by the CIA today goes contrary to the wishes of the President and his immediate advisers. Many people think that it is bad enough that the President can sometimes act in secret and with considerable impact; but it is necessary to separate this concern about American behaviour in general from perennial worries that the CIA, as the established villain, will run amok. Again, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, it suited President Kennedy and his hagiographers to emphasise the bad advice given by the CIA: at least here was a recognised scapegoat whose involvement softened criticism of executive decisions. Surely, the argument ran, even the President could not be expected to be proof against the Agency's machinations?

This incident illustrates what may be the most important fact to bear in mind about the CIA: what it actually does or does not do is far less important than what it is believed to do. Witchcraft in other times, belief in the potency of the CIA provides a point of

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stability in a disorganised world. It is far easier to accept that evil is being done consciously than to accept that it is the product of human failings. Good intentions gone awry are far harder to tolerate than the knowledge that a conspiracy is truly afoot. One doesn't have to be paranoid to gain a certain comfort from suspicions of conspiracy; and the few times that the CIA actually does gain direct publicity—almost always when a job has been bungled—merely confirm them.

The political impact of this desire to believe in the CIA's skulduggeries is considerable—however many thousands or millions of conscious agents one must assume to exist for the agency to be involved in all the actions attributed to it. This was made quite clear recently on BBC Television's *Line-Up*, when Michael Dean interviewed Andreas Papandreu, the most publicised leader of the Greek resistance-in-exile. Mr Papandreu recounted in some detail the nature of the CIA plot to overthrow the democratic government in Athens and install the Colonels, and completed his narrative with quotations from a top-secret meeting of the American National Security Council.

Perhaps this is all true. But even if it is, what does it say for the strength of Greek political life and institutions? Must we believe that every Greek of political influence is employed by the Americans? Or were the Greeks so lax in developing their political institutions that an order from the CIA—or wherever—could indeed produce what we see in Athens today?

Mr Papandreu is an astute politician of a sort. He knows that, as in the case of 'Who killed Kennedy?', it is impossible to prove a negative; to show that Oswald did it alone, or that the Americans were not rigging everything in Athens. And he knows that nothing is easier to believe in than the existence of the organised plot. But it seems a bit narrow to look no further, and to deny that the Greek Left bore any responsibility for what happened in April 1967, whatever the role of the CIA, or of Mr Walt Rostow in the White House, or of the Nato military command.

The effort by many Greeks today to pin most if not all of their troubles on the Americans is only one example of the force exerted by the conspiracy theory of history. Indeed, there is a certain appeal in the truly sinister and secret operation that is lacking in the more obvious one. Everyone knows that Air America, which forms the backbone of the anti-communist air war in Laos, is directly financed by the CIA. Yet this knowledge has never produced an outcry, or even much interest, largely because the whole affair is conducted with minimum secrecy and maximum routine and boredom. Compared to the killing of Che Guevara—widely believed to be the work of the CIA—the fighting in Laos is far more important in terms of current politics and lives lost, but it is totally lacking in those elements that make for a basic confrontation between good and evil. For the purposes of theatre and the politics that depend on it, the CIA is a perfect kind of confrontation perfectly. Indeed, his life and work would be incomplete un-

less he had been killed in this or some similar way. and evil was also present in the most celebrated instance of CIA involvement in this country: the funnelling of money through the Congress for Cultural Freedom to the magazine *Encounter*. The hue and cry from that affair has subsided, but the moral issues that were raised have still not been adequately settled. A number of authors, and some individuals who had helped with the editing in entire innocence of the secret source of funds, were horrified to discover who had actually been making possible the publication of their views. These men and women had written what they believed, and were in no way influenced by the character of their ultimate benefactor. Can it be said that they were suborned?

This is an old dilemma, put recently in a new guise by Kurt Vonnegut. In his novel *Sirens of Titan*, he reveals that the whole of human history has been engineered by the planet Tralfamadore in order to flash signals of comfort and hope to a messenger stranded on a moon of Jupiter many eons ago. The architectural marvels of each civilisation have spelt out simple sentences in an alien sign language. But does this negate all of human effort? Likewise, do articles written for a magazine that has been compromised by the CIA have no value? Do they lose the significance which the authors thought they were imparting to their work when they produced it? This is not really a question about the nature of the sponsoring institution—whether one that serves the ends of a government, or one like the great foundations that give out money amassed by devious means in the past—but of the secrecy with which it is done. At heart, it is a question of man's striving to secure the right to know what forces are shaping his life, to know how far he is a free agent.

The anger directed at the CIA was not eased by the irony of the CIA's choice of what is considered at least by Americans to be a left-of-centre publication. If anything, it intensified this anger, particularly on the part of those who needed to measure their own radical progress against their image of CIA activities.

There was also a sense in which the bargain with the devil had been unfairly struck. It is one thing to sell one's soul willingly: it is quite another to do so, even if the temporal payment is made, without being able to share in the awareness of complicity with evil. To be used by a capricious god may be tolerable if everyone is in on the secret; but what could be worse than to be denied the sweetness that comes from the knowledge of sin?

Perhaps this is the way an agency like the CIA must operate; and certainly this fresh evidence of duplicity only reinforced the comforting belief that conspiracy does, indeed, abound. As such, the CIA has a value in the realm of drama, in the realm of the morality play, whatever its impact on the world's politics.

Perhaps this is the way an agency like the CIA must operate; and certainly this fresh evidence of duplicity only reinforced the comforting belief that conspiracy does, indeed, abound. As such, the CIA has a value in the realm of drama, in the realm of the morality play, whatever its impact on the world's politics.

PUBLIC IMAGE OF CIA DISTORTED, WRITER SAYS

[Article by M.L.: "What the CIA Is"; Florence, Il Mondo, Italian, 17 May 1970, p 47

Washington -- A few evenings before he was named director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) in 1966, Richard McGarrah Helms, one of the most outstanding career officers of the American espionage service, was invited to dinner by the President of the United States. Democratic Senator Eugene McCarthy was among those invited. During dessert, McCarthy, who had heard of the imminent appointment of Helms, asked him about the French wine being served: "Do you think 1953 was a good year for this Chateau d'Yquem?" Helms said he knew nothing about it. Then the Senator pointed to some yellow roses on the table and asked Helms if he could identify the variety. Helms said he knew nothing about roses.

"Well, then," McCarthy said sarcastically turning to President Johnson, "James Bond would have been able to give better answers."

The episode was recalled several days later by Johnson himself when he nominated Helms as Chief of the American intelligence service. Johnson added that the anecdote did not decrease the esteem in which Helms was held

but served only to demonstrate how widespread, even among senators, was the absurd concept of directors of the intelligence service as cloak and dagger men, equally at ease among the most refined social affairs and bloody intrigue.

Johnson added, "I only know diligent officials at the CIA. So far, I have never met a person like 007."

The "Shadow" Bureaucrats

The official position of the American government is to consider those in the intelligence service as bureaucrats like any others, and the CIA as just another government agency. When one talks about the CIA's tasks with Washington executives, they inevitably point out that the activities of the intelligence service consists to a very large degree of the simple collection and analysis of information data which are then put into reports in the form of National Intelligence Estimates (periodical) or Special National Intelligence Estimates (special reports), for the use of the President of the United States.

Washington officials do not deny that the CIA sometimes is involved in "special" operations abroad -- those known as "black operations" in espionage jargon -- but they deny that they represent an important part of the CIA's work. They deny flatly -- and this is the polemical reply -- that there are cases in which these operations may take place without the knowledge of the American government itself. They point out that any operation involving the CIA abroad beyond the simple collection of information must be authorized by a special committee of the National Security Council, which is the organ that brings together the civilian and military leaders of the

nation under the chairmanship of the Chief Executive.

This view of the CIA as a simple organization of disciplined officials at work on the detached investigation of political situations and the decoding of cryptograms is certainly sweetened and onesided. Equally exaggerated, however, is the view that the CIA is always involved in and responsible for any important political change taking place in any nation in the world. If the CIA really possessed these attributes, it would be an organization of unheard of efficiency and unlimited means. In truth, it is not the first and does not possess the others.

This does not mean that the image of the CIA in its function as an omnipresent, omnipotent agency for evil is not the most widespread both in the United States and abroad. It is so deeprooted that nothing can change it. An example of this was seen in the removal of Sihanouk from Cambodia.

When Counsellor Henry Kissinger gave Richard Nixon the story of the coup d'etat, the first person the President wanted to see was Richard Helms. Nixon asked whether the CIA had had any hint of what was about to happen in Cambodia. Had it, perhaps, contributed in some way?

As in other circumstances of the same kind, Helms replied that the CIA was taken completely by surprise by the events. Naturally, it had been in contact with clandestine Cambodian groups opposing Sihanouk but had no ties with army circles that had organized the coup. Senator Mike Mansfield, head of the democratic opposition in the senate, who went to the White House that same evening to get a report from the President on the situation, was able to assure newspapermen the next day: "I can tell you that this time the CIA played no part in the event." Such a precise statement, coming not

from an administration spokesman but from an authoritative member of the opposition, should have nipped in the bud the hypothesis concerning the CIA's co-responsibility. This was all the more true since the Cambodian events did not seem to have resulted in any visible advantage for the CIA or for American policy.

In the days following, Jack Anderson, colleague of the deceased Drew Pearson, a "columnist" who specialized in unveiling behind-the-scenes stories, investigated the matter and arrived at the same conclusion: the CIA had not been involved.

All this did not serve to wipe out the very widespread conviction that the CIA was responsible for Sihanouk's overthrow. The American press of the new and old left continued in fact to present it as the only incontrovertible act in the Cambodian situation.

Abroad, the conviction that the CIA is always present everywhere is still more widespread. In Bolivia, an anti-American leftist newspaper Jornada, went so far as to distribute to its readers -- mostly semi-literate and superstitious Indians -- an amulet "for protection against the CIA machinations." In France, on a more sophisticated level, the newspaperman Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber gave his word that the CIA today is capable of controlling without exception all the levers of the Greek government. A few days after the statement by Servan-Schreiber, one of the deans of world journalism, Cyrus Sultzberger of The New York Times noted at Paris that the CIA to which his French colleague referred must really be the Greek Military Intelligence Service, KYP, which in its English version is called, even in Greece itself, Central Intelligence Agency or CIA. Members of this CIA are

almost all the Colonels who govern Greece and this was known from the beginning. This explanation was not accepted by Servan-Schreiber, nor was it reported by all the European newspapers.

The CIA has its own agents in almost all American embassies abroad -- exactly like the Soviet KGB and the GRU or the British MI5 or the French SDECE, or the intelligence services of all the other nations which can afford them. Their job is to collect information from as many groups as possible and to keep in contact with as many forces as possible, including those which are clandestine. For these reasons it can be said that the CIA has some influence on political life in all these nations. Instead, if we speak only of the "intervention of the CIA" only in those cases in which, after a deliberate activity intended to provoke a certain political change, that change is actually carried out, it must be asserted that "CIA intervention" takes place in certain countries and in certain situations. They do not take place in other nations and in other situations.

From Persia to Laos

Examples of intervention expressly authorized by the American executive were the overthrow of Mosadeq in Iran in 1953, the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the catastrophic Cuban expedition of 1961, decisive intervention for the settlement of the Congolese civil war in 1964 and the arming of Meo guerrillas in Laos beginning in 1968.

Examples of important foreign changes in which the CIA, even though it was naturally present on the scene, did not have a determining part were the installation of dictatorship in Pakistan, the seizure of power by the Colonels in Greece, the rightist coup d'etat in Brazil. An extreme case is

represented by Indonesia. The CIA (which unsuccessfully organized a revolt against Sukarno in 1958) was neither the promoter nor the organizer of the bloody anti-communist repression of 1969 following the ouster of Sukarno but despite this it supported him with ample means. In a reverse situation, this same thing obviously would have been done by the Soviet KGB or the Chinese news agency Hsinhua which notoriously is a screen for the intelligence activities of Mao's China.

What means does the CIA really possess? How does it function? Who are its officers? It is impossible to get information on these points from official sources. In brief, this is the substance of an interview we had with Joseph Goodman, Assistant Director of the CIA:

Question: How many men does the CIA have in the United States and abroad?

Answer: I'm sorry, but I cannot answer that question.

Q.: Roughly, what is your annual budget?

A.: Given the nature of our work, we do not give out information of that kind.

Q.: How many positions does the CIA have abroad?

A.: No comment.

Q.: Who is presently head of the Planning Division?

A.: We give no details either about the offices of the CIA, nor who heads them. However, I can tell you that the Director of the CIA is Richard Helms.

The Planning Division is the most notorious of the CIA departments, because it is concerned with "black operations." Only a colossal mistake

by the White House some time ago made it possible to learn that it was directed by Desmond FitzGerald well-known New England gentleman and scholar. He was the first husband of Marietta Tree who was a close collaborator of Adlai Stevenson and is the mother of the famous model Penelope Tree. FitzGerald, Helms and all the other executives of the CIA were invited to the White House for a ceremony. The protocol office published and ingeniously released to the press, including the Soviet press, the list of those invited along with their titles. In addition to Helms and FitzGerald, they were: Albert Wheelon, Director of Research; Laurence Houston, General Counsel; Jack Smith, head of Cryptography; Cord Meyer, Chief of the Office for relations with trade unions and student organizations; William Colby, Chief of the Asia Department; J. C. King, Chief of the Latin American Department and Bronson Tweedy, Chief of the European Department.

Cigars Loaded with Dynamite

FitzGerald died shortly afterward in 1967 of a heart attack. Who replaced him? And are all the others still at the same jobs? Perhaps there will be no way of knowing this until the CIA officials again go to a ceremony at the White House.

Information on what is happening in the CIA occasionally is leaked to the press through some anonymous official of the department of State because of the ferocious antipathy between the two organizations, or through the initiative of some internal faction of the CIA itself which seeks to damage another faction. It is obvious that information of this kind, disclosed for purposes of denigration, point up the failings of the CIA rather than its successes. Thus, it is difficult to get an impartial picture from them.

It was information of this kind, for example, that made it possible to learn that a CIA official had seriously submitted to his superiors a plan to blow Fidel Castro's head off by giving him cigars loaded with dynamite while he was in New York in 1960 for the United Nations Assembly. Other deliberate leaks, circulated by the faction of CIA career officials who are in permanent conflict with the "political" appointees in the government, made it possible for the public to learn that Admiral Raborn, Director of the CIA until he was succeeded by Helms, had asked in a meeting of his employees what the meaning of the word "oligarchy" was.

According to sufficiently reliable information on the number of persons who work for CIA, the figure is 15,000 employees, of whom 10,000 are in the American headquarters. (It is a gigantic building which looks like a hospital hidden among the fields and forests of Langley, Virginia). The remainder are in foreign countries. Administrative funds hidden in various ways in the Defense Budget amount to \$1.5 billion per year. This is equal to at least five times what the CIA, founded in 1947, had available in the first years of its life when because of the hostility of Congress its resources were so impoverished that in order to carry out certain operations its officials were obliged to resort to private charity.

Among the cases of this kind is that of a substantial contribution collected one evening in March 1948 by some CIA officials who were members of the prestigious Brook Club of New York. The money was to be used for a CIA campaign in Italy to influence the elections of that year in an anti-communist direction. The episode, reported at that time by two American newspapermen Thomas Ross and David Wise, has never been denied.

M. L.

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The Secret Team and the Games They Play

by L. Fletcher Prouty

"The hill costumes of the Meo tribesmen contrasted with the civilian clothes of United States military men riding in open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and pistols. These young Americans are mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA contract to advise and train Laotian troops." Those matter-of-fact, almost weary sentences, written late in February by T.D. Allman of *The Washington Post* after he and two other enterprising correspondents left a guided tour and walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe a situation that today may seem commonplace to anyone familiar with American operations overseas, but that no more than 10 years ago would have been unthinkable.

To take a detachment of regular troops, put its members into disguise, smuggle them out of the country so that neither the public nor the Congress knows they have left, and assign them to clandestine duties on foreign soil under the command of a non-military agency—it is doubtful that anyone would have dared to suggest taking such liberties with the armed forces and foreign relations of the United States, not to say with the Constitution, to any President up to and especially including Dwight D. Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remarkable development in the management of America's relations with other countries during the nine years since Mr. Eisenhower left office has been the assumption of more and more control over military and diplomatic operations abroad by men whose activities are secret, whose budget is secret, whose very identities as often as not are secret—in short a Secret Team whose actions only those implicated in them are in a position to monitor. How determinedly this secrecy is preserved, even when preserving it means denying the United States Army the right to discipline its own personnel, not to say the opportunity to do justice,

was strikingly illustrated not long ago by the refusal of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide witnesses for the court-martial that was to try eight Green Beret officers for murdering a suspected North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the Army to drop the charges.

The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency and who react to those data when it seems appropriate to them with paramilitary plans and activities, e.g., training and "advising"—a not exactly impenetrable euphemism for "leading into battle"—Laotian troops. Membership in the Team, granted on a "need to know" basis, varies with the nature and the location of the problems that come to its attention. At the heart of the Team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council, most notably the chief White House adviser on foreign policy. Around them revolves a sort of inner ring of Presidential staff members, State Department officials, civilians and military men from the Pentagon, and career professionals in the intelligence services. And out beyond them is an extensive and intricate network of government officials with responsibility for or expertise in some specific field that touches on national security: think-tank analysts, businessmen who travel a lot or whose businesses (e.g., import-export or operating a cargo airline) are useful, academic experts in this or that technical subject or geographic region, and, quite importantly, alumni of the intelligence service—a service from which there are no unconditional resignations.

Thus the Secret Team is not a clandestine super-planning board or super-general staff but, even more damaging to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a bewildering collection of temporarily assembled action committees that respond pretty much ad hoc to specific troubles in various parts of the world, sometimes in ways that duplicate the

activities of regular American missions, sometimes in ways that undermine those activities, and very often in ways that interfere with and muddle them. For example, when serious border troubles broke out along the northern frontiers of India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan in 1962, the CIA brought in U.S. military equipment and manpower, including Special Forces (Green Beret) troops, to train Indian police, despite the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already sent to New Delhi for the same purpose a special team, headed by General Paul Adams, founder and commanding general of the U.S. Strike Command. The CIA operators practically ignored General Adams and Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith in proceeding with their plans, and there is no evidence that the U.S. Congress ever knew the CIA was in the picture at all.

One source of the Team's power is the speed with which it can act. The CIA's communications system is so extraordinarily efficient, especially by contrast with State's, that the Team can, in a phrase that often gets used at such times, "have a plane in the air" responding to some situation overseas while State is still decoding the cable informing it of that situation. A few years ago, for example, while the strongest member of an Asian government that the United States was strenuously supporting (call him Marshal X) was lying sick in a Tokyo hospital, word came that a group of discontented young officers was planning a coup in his absence. In a matter of hours, thanks to the Team, Marshal X was on his way home in a U.S. Air Force jet fighter; he arrived at his office in plenty of time to frustrate the plotters. The power to pull off feats like that is more than operational power; it is in a real sense policy-making power. In this particular case it was the power to commit the United States to the protection and support of Marshal X, even though many officials who dealt with Marshal X's government on a workaday basis regarded him as the most obnoxious member of it. Calling back "a plane in the air" is not an easy thing to do, and the Team knows and benefits from this fact.

Another source of the Team's power is its ability to manipulate "need to know" classifications. One way to make sure that there is little opposition to your proposed activities is to fail to tell those who might oppose them what those activities are; even men with high ranking policy-making jobs and the

appropriate Top Secret clearances often are kept in the dark about Team plans. Thus Adlai Stevenson, ambassador to the United Nations, was not informed about the Bay of Pigs invasion plans until the very last minute when rumors about it began to appear in the press; and even then Tracy Barnes, the CIA man sent to brief Stevenson, gave him a vague and incomplete picture of the operation.

"Need to know" also can be bent in the other direction in order to secure the support of potential allies and further those allies' careers. Members of the Secret Team who favored the election of John F. Kennedy over Richard Nixon played a very special role in the 1960 election campaign. Nixon presided over the National Security Council and therefore knew in detail the plans for the Bay of Pigs operation. Senator Kennedy, as an outsider, was presumed not to know those highly classified details. However, he did know. In his book, *Six Crises*, Nixon wrote that Kennedy was told about the invasion by Allen Dulles during the traditional CIA briefing for candidates; but there was more than that to the story, it appears.

A former staff member from the Office of the Secretary of Defense recalls that during the summer of 1960 he went to the Senate Office Building to pick up and escort to the Pentagon four Cuban exile leaders, among them the future commander of the Bay of Pigs invasion team, who had been meeting with Senator Kennedy. Those men were supposed to be under special security wraps, but certain CIA officials had introduced them to Kennedy, thus making sure that he knew as much about the invasion as Nixon—if not more, as the result of a personal relationship that Nixon did not have with the Cuban refugee front and the Americans who were secretly helping it. When the candidates appeared on television together during the crucial campaign debates, Nixon, abiding by security restrictions, limited himself in his discussion of the government's plans for Cuba. This official control did not apply to Kennedy. He could and did advocate overthrowing the Castro government. Nixon's frustration and anger at Kennedy's tactics were evident on the TV screen. Many observers believe that that confrontation over Cuba was one of the moments during the debates when Kennedy scored most heavily—and of course most observers credit Kennedy's performance during the debates with his narrow victory in the election.

That Kennedy's connection with the Cuban refugees before his election was anything but casual or fortuitous was demonstrated more than two years later in the Orange Bowl in Miami, before a national television audience, at a welcome-back celebration for the ransomed prisoners from the Bay of Pigs. At one point during the ceremonies, the President walked over to the group of returnees and threw his arm around the shoulders of one of them. If those watching thought he had chosen his man at random, they were mistaken. The Cuban he embraced was his old friend from the summer of 1960, Manuel Artime, the commander of the invasion brigade.

Kennedy's election was a big boost for Secret Teamwork, but an earlier and bigger one had been the appointment of Allen Dulles as Director of the CIA in 1953, after two years as Deputy Director. At that time the agency was not permitted by the National Security Council to build up a big enough force of men and materiel to permit it to carry out operations on its own. In other words, whenever the CIA wanted to do anything on a large scale, it had to secure assistance from, and therefore share authority with, other agencies, chiefly the Departments of State and Defense. Slowly Dulles changed these conditions. One way he did it was to give intelligence activities intellectual and social credibility by surrounding himself with men from industry, finance, and academia.

The CIA always had been a haven for Ivy League people and Dulles made it even more so. It was not unusual to find the Director, perched on a hassock in his living room, wearing a V-neck sweater and tennis shoes, with a racquet on the floor beside him, discoursing on the latest cables from his agents around the world to a similarly clad group of disciples, many of whom may not have known that meanwhile back at the office workaday CIA officials were wrestling with such mundane problems as how to introduce Special Forces men into Bolivia and Colombia, or whether it would better serve the interests of the United States to dispose of a certain counterspy with poison or a garrote.

Particularly useful to Dulles in his empire building were businessmen and educators who traveled frequently, and therefore were well qualified to assist in the collection of information from

old man." The fact that a number of such volunteers ended up serving time in communist prisons never seemed to deter new ones. In Dulles's view the information these people provided, although often helpful, was the least of their value; they were influential men who, because they had put in some time as "Agents," would always have a soft spot in their hearts for the Agency.

Of course Dulles did not increase the CIA's influence as much as he did just by image building. He was an organizer and a clandestine operator of great ability, and between the end of the Korean war and the election of John Kennedy, he had begun building the Team—with the CIA usually calling its signals, of course—and it had had a number of substantial successes. Overthrowing the Mossadegh government in Iran was one; overthrowing the Arbenz government in Guatemala was another—although perhaps from a connoisseur's point of view the latter operation was a bit on the blatant side. Perhaps the most brilliant of all was the spectacular building up of Ramon Magsaysay from an obscure army captain to the President and national hero of the Philippines. This latter feat was mostly organized by Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the CIA, via the Air Force, a public relations genius of the old selling-iceboxes-to-Eskimos school.

Lansdale conceived the idea of making Magsaysay into the savior of his country from the communist "Huks" by recruiting, and paying with CIA funds, a few bands of Filipino soldiers who, every night or so, would put on peasant clothes, invade some villages with much ado, and then allow themselves to be driven out again by the intrepid forces under Magsaysay's command. Not infrequently after such an episode, the stage "Huks" and the loyalists would rendezvous in a nearby grove or field and reenact the evening's performance to the accompaniment of much hilarity and beer. All of which, perhaps it need be emphasized, is not to say that Magsaysay was a faker or a figurehead; on the contrary, it is a mark of Lansdale's skill that he chose as the central figure in his hero-making exercise, a man with the attributes of a genuine hero.

Dulles was as adept at domestic as at overseas manipulation, and, during the Eisenhower years, when the CIA was being partially restrained, he recruited to the Team a number of frustrated young Army officers who were chafing against very nearly the same restraints. After Korea, Mr. Eisenhower and the Republic

cans had vowed "never again" when it came to committing American troops to battle in "brushfire" wars, especially on Asian soil, and turned to reliance on nuclear weapons as the core of American defense policy. This meant to the CIA that it could not get the troops it often would have liked to have to further its plans. It meant to the Army that the Air Force would receive the lion's share of professional opportunities and glory and, beyond the eternal matter of service rivalries, that by declining to fight any battles smaller than nuclear ones, America was giving up its capacity to influence any events smaller than apocalyptic ones. Such bright and eloquent generals as Matthew Ridgeway, James Gavin, and particularly Maxwell Taylor argued this case vigorously. Their notion was that it was essential for the United States to have a special counter-insurgency force prepared to put out brushfires around the world. Obviously, Dulles shared this view, if indeed he hadn't been one of the first to advance it. Kennedy, the activist, also agreed, and so it is no wonder that many leading members of the Secret Team favored him over Nixon, the Vice President in a non-activist administration—though probably himself less of a non-activist than his boss. By the same token, it also is no wonder that the Secret Team, especially by gaining control over the Special Forces, fared well after Kennedy's election. For when the action came, under Kennedy, it was the Special Forces which got the first call.

The Army Special Forces had been formed after World War II. In event of a Russian invasion, the 10th Special Forces in Germany were to be sent into Eastern Europe to create and sustain partisan movements behind the lines. With a small headquarters and reserve unit maintained at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Special Forces in 1960 consisted of only 1,800 men, poorly equipped and inadequately trained. William Pfaff, a consultant to the Hudson Institute and a member of the Special Forces reserves, described them as being "composed of self-consciously uprooted men, emotionally and intellectually detached from the mainstream of civilian society but also from that securely bland and sentimental Southern institution, the American Army itself." Under the rubric of counter-insurgency and nation-building, these men soon became CIA mercenaries.

Arthur Schlesinger, in his book *A Thousand Days*, recounts that President Kennedy "made anti-guerrilla instruction a personal project." After reading Colonel Lansdale's report on guerrilla operations in Vietnam (where Lansdale had been busily and quite successfully helping Ngo Dinh Diem become a savior of his country à la Magsaysay), Kennedy asked his special assistant Walt Rostow, fresh from the CIA-run Center for International Studies at MIT, to check into what the Army was doing about counter-guerrilla training. The President read Mao and Che Guevara and told the Army to do likewise. Kennedy instructed the Special Forces to expand its anti-guerrilla operations. Lansdale and his associate, Samuel Wilson, wrote new texts on counter-insurgency for Fort Bragg. After a visit to the training center, Kennedy, over opposition from the Army bureaucracy, revived the Special Forces, and training centers were organized in Panama, Okinawa, Vietnam, and West Germany. "In Washington," writes Schlesinger, "Robert Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor, and Richard Bissell pushed the course. Roger Hilsman, drawing on his wartime experience in the hills of Burma, and Walt Rostow, analyzing the guerrilla problem as part of the pathology of economic development, carried the gospel to the State Department."

Fort Bragg and the regional centers were opened to foreign trainees. Ostensibly, the foreign officers represented the uniformed services of their countries, but actually some of them were hand-picked by their nations' intelligence organizations and then had to be approved by the CIA. Under the guise of military aid programs, these men attended the Special Forces School at Fort Bragg. Officers came from over 60 countries, representing, among others, such surprising nations as South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, the Netherlands, Jordan, Bolivia, Sierra Leone, and Haiti.

A Green Beret-CIA team trained the Bolivians who captured Che Guevara. They have trained Iranian police, Chinese forces on Taiwan, King Hussein's elite paratroops in Jordan, and troops in South Korea. The CIA-Green Beret team has undertaken special training missions in Liberia and in the Congo. And currently Green Berets are advising the troops of Haile Selassie in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea. Under somewhat similar Army-sponsored programs

the CIA provided for the training of a number of Tibetans. A *Washington Post* reporter who visited Fort Bragg in the summer of 1969 wrote that the Special Forces "anticipate endless 'insurgencies' in the underdeveloped countries of the world—from Africa to Latin America. And they are counting on American intervention in many of these situations." "In a way, we're a kind of Peace Corps," the training director of the Green Beret center explained.

After the Bay of Pigs, which some people vainly hoped would end large-scale, paramilitary CIA clandestine operations, President Kennedy appointed a board of inquiry to review the fiasco. Its members were Admiral Arleigh Burke, Allen Dulles, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and General Maxwell Taylor. General Taylor, dissatisfied with the role the Eisenhower Administration had assigned to the Army, had retired from the service after his tour as Army Chief of Staff to write *The Uncertain Trumpet*. While serving on the board of inquiry, he became close friends with Robert Kennedy. Dulles and Bobby Kennedy recommended him for the post of Special Military Advisor to the President, and the President later named him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In those posts, by playing the game with the CIA, especially with respect to Vietnam, Taylor was able to preside over a major rebirth of the Army. The Vietnam build-up, whose beginning was engineered by the CIA, ultimately meant the abandonment of Eisenhower's exclusive reliance on Strategic Air Command and missile strategy in favor of the policy Taylor wanted—of developing a capacity to meet brushfire situations with conventional ground forces, Army forces naturally.

The most important respect in which Taylor played the Secret Team game was to acquiesce in giving the CIA operational control of the Green Beret forces in Vietnam and Laos. The CIA took full advantage of this unprecedented situation, which saw the agency in control of those forces at least through 1963, by using it to stimulate inter-service rivalries. The rivalries led to an increase in

the build-up, and the build-up led to more power for the Secret Team. Because of the favored position of the Army's Green Berets, the other services thought it would be wise for them to have Special Forces of their own in Vietnam. The Air Force had a number of specialized aircraft and crews left over from the Bay of Pigs operation; these were organized into the nucleus of Special Air Warfare units and hurried to Vietnam to work with the CIA.

Not to be outdone by the Army and the Air Force, the Navy created special units known as SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) teams and sent them to Vietnam to work with the Agency. Since the Navy did not have the kind of small boats required for some of the action there (and perhaps because President Kennedy had been a PT-boat man), the Navy ordered a flotilla of PT-boats from Norwegian ship-builders and had them delivered directly to Vietnam to join other small boats which were transferred from the U.S. Coast Guard—all to support potential clandestine naval activities and to keep up with the other services in the favor of the Agency.

Such actions resulted in a considerable clandestine build-up of forces in Vietnam long before the official escalation took place. And of course, once those forces were there something had to be done with them.

For example, the Air Force contribution consisted of units of C-123 medium transport aircraft. However, there already were plenty of medium transports in Vietnam—Caribous, under Army control, that had been flown there via the Atlantic, not having enough range to cross the Pacific. Consequently, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara had a squadron of C-123's converted at considerable cost to become defoliant sprayer aircraft. It may be too much to say that the defoliation program would never have been undertaken if those C-123's hadn't been sitting idly in Vietnam, but there is no doubt that their presence gave the program considerable stimulation.

The CIA is most adept at working in and around and through all levels of the U.S. government. No one, not even the majority of Agency personnel,

knows the full extent of Agency manipulations within the governmental structure. The Agency can obtain what it desires in any quantity, and often for no cost. During the depression years of the 1930's, Congress passed a law which was known as the Economy Act of 1932 and, as amended, it is still on the books. This act, whose purpose is to save money and discourage needless spending, permits an agency that needs material to purchase it at an agreed price from another agency by an accounting off-set without spending "new money." For example, the Department of Agriculture can buy surplus tractors from the Army at a price agreed upon by both parties, even if it is only a dollar each. (Since most such equipment is declared surplus, whether it is or not, by the selling agency, the price usually is low.) By means of authority of this kind, the CIA has learned how to "buy" from all agencies of the government, primarily from the Department of Defense, a tremendous amount of new and surplus equipment—and to take over bases at home and abroad for its own use without appearing to have spent substantial funds and many times without the selling party knowing the true identity of the buyer.

This method of budgetary by-passing works something like this: The Agency creates an Army unit for some minor purpose which the Army and the Defense Department are willing to agree to. The unit is listed on the Army roster as, say, the 1234 Special Supply Company, Fort Wyman (fictional name), New Jersey. This small and inconspicuous unit is mostly manned by regular Army personnel but will have a few Army personnel who are actually CIA employees with reserve status, and a few CIA career employees. It can serve as a supply receiving point for holding Agency material prior to overseas shipment. After 1234 has been operating for a time and appears to be a bona-fide Army unit, not only to the rest of the Army personnel at Fort Wyman but also to the real Army people who are serving with it, it will begin to requisition supplies of all kinds and amounts from the Army. This procedure continues for a time, then the unit will begin to requisition in a normal manner items from the Navy and the Air Force. Cross requisitioning is acceptable practice in all services today. The Navy and Air Force will charge the Army for the items transferred and the Army, having records on the validity of the unit, will honor the charges. It is easier

for the CIA to requisition Air Force items using an Army or Navy unit than an Air Force unit, because the services monitor their own units more carefully than those of another service. Therefore, the CIA keeps a number of service units on tap at all times. With these hidden sources of supply, the CIA often can build an arsenal and support clandestine operations in some foreign country without the Department of Defense, much less the Department of State, ever knowing it—though presumably Defense could find out if it took the trouble to scrutinize carefully the activities of its various 1234's.

It was this power and freedom to move forces and equipment quickly without the usual review by proper authority that made possible the first entry of troops and equipment into South Vietnam in the early Sixties. In order to mount a particular operation it considered important, the CIA needed 24 helicopters and it obtained White House permission over strenuous objections from the Pentagon to have them sent to Vietnam. Sending 24 helicopters anywhere automatically means sending 400 men as well, counting only pilots and gunners and mechanics and cooks and clerks and bakers and the rest of the immediate establishment. If the intention is—and the intention always is—to give those 24 helicopters real support, then it involves sending 1,200 men. Moreover, the statistics are that, in any helicopter squadron, because of maintenance servicing requirements, only half the machines will be operational at any one time. So if 24 operational helicopters are needed, 48 will have to be sent, which means 2,400 men. But if you're sending a supporting force involving 2,400 men, then the support for *them*—PX's, movies, motor pools, officers' and enlisted men's clubs, perimeter guards to protect all this, and so on and so on—becomes really extensive, and thousands more men get attached to it. And so it goes. "Twenty-four helicopters" can, in fact did, ultimately mean a full-scale military involvement.

The CIA also knows how to get research and development contracts it initiates transferred to the Department of Defense when it comes time to make quantity purchases of the new equipment, and then, once DOD has spent the money, requisition that equipment back through outfits like 1234. Something very much like this happened with the M-16 rifle, which, as the result of the

Team's machinations, is now a standard infantry weapon. The reasons the CIA first wanted the M-16 developed are obscure, though perhaps one of them is that it is a "NATO caliber" piece and therefore does not rely on American-made ammunition, and perhaps another is that it is small and light and therefore suitable for use by guerrillas and counter-guerrillas. In any case, a decision was made that the M-16 was needed in quantity by the CIA for certain operations in Asia, and Fairchild, the aircraft company, was given a research and development contract. At the time, the CIA was unable to elicit any interest at all in the project from the Army, which was fighting a rear-guard action against Secretary McNamara's decision to close its venerable Springfield Arsenal; it refused to look at a weapon that had not gone the Army Ordnance route. However, the CIA was able to push the M-16 through the office of the Secretary of Defense, over the head of the Army, and then induce the Air Force to put in a procurement order for 60,000 of the M-16's. Not long after the Air Force received delivery of the 60,000 rifles, they vanished mysteriously somewhere overseas.

The CIA is careful to maintain close relations with industry. It has been especially friendly for many years with Lockheed Aircraft, which developed the U-2 spy plane, and many other military contractors. The CIA was involved with the support of the Helio Corporation of Bedford, Massachusetts—a firm that produces a Short Take-off and Landing plane that has been very important to CIA-Green Beret operations over the years in Laos. (The founders of the firm are two former professors, Arthur Koppen, who used to head the aeronautics laboratory at MIT, and Lynn Bollinger of the Harvard Business School. Bollinger flew into Laos with early Green Beret teams which had established contacts with the Meo tribes.) Some plants manufacture equipment solely for the Agency; they are, of course, provided with elaborate covers.

The Agency's operatives appear in the organizations of many other government agencies. A visitor to the overseas office of a Military Advisory Group that presumably has a staff of 40 might find a hundred men working in the MAAG compound; these are CIA people whose salaries are paid by the Agency so that budget reviews in Washington will not re-

veal their existence. These people are in addition to the large number of military personnel carried on its budget for the ostensible purpose of cross-training; and this does not count the Special Forces troops that may be attached to the Agency in certain countries. Sometimes the official military may be unaware of the activities of supposed members of its own MAAG groups or other military organizations. In similar fashion, as revealed by *Los Angeles Times* reporter Jack Foisie, the CIA is using the State Department's AID program as a cover for clandestine operations. In Laos, the number of agents posing as civilian AID workers totals several hundred. They are listed as members of the AID mission's Rural Development Annex. There is also a Special Requirements Office in the AID compound which provides supplies for CIA clandestine operations.

The military aid given to a foreign country is carefully tailored by military planners and is related to what is given to other countries in the region. However, a foreign air force chief of staff, for example, may wish to have a squadron of modern reconnaissance aircraft for his country's use. He contacts the local CIA station chief and explains that he would employ these aircraft on missions of interest to the Agency. The Department of Defense might have turned down the request, but the local commander will press his claim with the CIA. The Agency might want to have the added services and will take the request to the Agency headquarters in Washington, and the country will get the squadron of modern reconnaissance fighters. Such a scenario is not unlike very recent transactions that have taken place between the U.S. and Taiwan.

In sum, during the last decade the White House's National Security Council apparatus and the CIA—particularly its operational side which now has nine overseas employees to every one on the intelligence-gathering side—have grown enormously both in size and in influence. More and more foreign-policy decisions are being made in secret, in response only to immediate crises rather than in accordance with long-range plans, and all too often with very little consultation with professional foreign-policy or military planners. More and more overseas operations are being conducted in secret, and ad hoc, and with very little control by professional diplomats or soldiers. And the one organ of

government that, on behalf of the people that elected it, should be monitoring these goings-on, is today as ignorant as the public—because Congress submitted to secrecy on a grand scale years ago when it authorized the CIA. It is hard to imagine how or when the Secret Team can be brought into the open and made publicly accountable for its actions. ■

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The Transparent Mask

SECRECY has always been an obsession with government agencies; and rarely has it been practiced with such vigor as in Washington. But the larger federal agencies and departments, under pressure from the press and Congress, have relaxed the secrecy vigil in recent years. It only remains to inform some of the smaller "attached" services about the new rules.

The Federal Broadcast Information Service is a case in point. The FBIS has the job of monitoring foreign broadcasts. It makes translations of these broadcasts available to the press corps. Any newspaperman, including reporters from the Soviet Union, can have these translations, since they are little more than handouts.

In the past, the FBIS — which is administered by the Central Intelligence Agency — has required that correspondents not publish the name of the monitoring service. Since the handouts carry the BIS initials, the CIA, as the parent agency, must have thought it absurd to continue with this secrecy; and recently, the warning against use of the service's name was dropped. A CIA spokesman said "it's no secret we

monitor everything that falls freely in the air," so why pretend otherwise?

Apparently, the CIA underestimated the paranoia of its monitoring service. An FBIS official declared last week that there was no change in the policy of forbidding identification of the service in connection with the translations. He added that the ban would be re-imposed just as soon as the FBIS could convince the CIA that such secrecy is necessary.

It is just this sort of ridiculous "secrecy" that makes a laughing stock of the entire federal establishment. Obviously, there must be a restriction on certain kinds of government information. This goes for the Internal Revenue Service as well as the intelligence and regulatory agencies. But when a small bureaucratic enclave such as the FBIS behaves so childishly, the whole pattern and practice of restricting information is demeaned, causing the average citizen to suspect that the entire federal system is engaged in lies and evasions and deception at his expense.

And then the same federal officials who allow such absurdities to continue wonder why millions of Americans consider them the foe.

SEATTLE TIMES
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Charter Airline Resents C. I. A.

By ARNOLD ABRAMS

TAIPEI, Taiwan — Having their company dubbed the "C. I. A. Airline" riles some executives of Air America, the private charter firm whose bases happen to be in Southeast Asia's better war zones.

They insist their firm is no different from any other charter airline. "We are willing to carry cargo anywhere in this region for any customer

who can pay," says one executive.

But Air America has just one customer: the United States government. And it primarily services the Agency for International Development and Central Intelligence Agency.

NEVERTHELESS, executives at the firm's subsidiary offices here emphatically deny that Air America is

(Arnold Abrams is The Times' correspondent in Southeast Asia.)



an "arm" of the C. I. A.

"Our customer gives us an order and we fill it," says a spokesman. "That's all there is to it. We carry cargo. We don't ask questions."

Those cargoes can be quite exotic: ranging from arms and ammunition to rice bags, live pigs, special agents, troops, refugees and opium, the chief cash crop of Meo hill tribesmen in Laos.

One recent order involved ferrying several hundred Thai "volunteers" into Laos to help defend the besieged C. I. A. stronghold at Long Cheng, about 100 miles north of the capital.

A VARIED Air America fleet of about 170 planes carries cargo from bases in South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines and Japan.

In Taiwan, the firm owns the largest aircraft maintenance and repair facility in Southeast Asia. It did \$8 million worth of repair work last year on United States aircraft operating in Vietnam.

The repair facility, which employs 3,700 workers, is on property owned by Air Asia, a subsidiary of Air America. The property adjoins Tainan airbase, a center of American intelligence activities on Taiwan.

Not surprisingly, the nature of many Air America missions often leads to bizarre incidents. This firm, for example, may be the only private charter company in the world to have

downed an enemy plane.

It happened somewhere over Northern Laos in January, 1968. The battle started when an Air America crewman looked out the open door of his helicopter and saw a Russian-made Antonov 2 — an obsolete, single-engined aircraft — cruising by.

THE CREWMAN grabbed a carbine and fired a full clip at the Communist craft, presumably part of the diminutive North Vietnamese air force. The enemy plane plummeted to earth.

Company officials in Taipei do not confirm or deny the "kill"; they just wink. "I could give you factual stories a lot more implausible than that," says one.

Many of Air America's approximately 600 pilots and crewmen are former United States Air Force personnel flying for reasons ranging from purely mercenary to wildly romantic.

Both needs can be satisfied with Air America: the money is good (some pilots earn over \$25,000 a year) and adventure is plentiful.

Air America is owned by a holding company, the Pacific Corp., with offices in Washington, D. C.

THE BOARD chairman is Felix B. Stomp, a retired admiral who was commander-in-chief of United States Pacific forces before retiring from military service in 1958.

The airline's origins go back to 1941, when the late Gen. Claire Chennault organized the Flying Tigers, a paramilitary group supporting Chiang Kai-shek's forces against the Japanese.

The Flying Tigers gained fame and some fortune during World War II, when they flew supplies into China over the Burma "hump."

After the war, Chennault founded Civil Air Transport, forerunner of Air America and still operating as a cargo carrier in Asia.

CAT planes piloted by former

Flying Tigers, supplied the Nationalists during the Chinese civil war. When Chiang fled the mainland in 1949, CAT followed him to Taiwan. Air America was established 10 years later.

United States withdrawal from Vietnam already has cut back Air America operations there, but company officials do not seem unduly worried.

"THERE'LL STILL BE plenty of business in Southeast Asia," says one executive.

The C. I. A. label will continue to rankle, however.

"Air America does not engage in espionage and is not part of the C. I. A.," says John A. Bottorff, regional director of Air Asia, "and I frankly resent being considered some kind of secret agent or spy."

Bottorff, 47, handles public relations as part of his Air Asia duties. He is a veteran hand who came to this region in 1944 as a United States government employe with a specialized function.

That function? He was an intelligence agent — with the O. S. S., forerunner of the C. I. A.

Label

CIA Capers

COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE AND 20TH CENTURY DIPLOMACY. By Richard W. Cottam. University of Pittsburgh, 1967.

THE CIA HAS BEEN back on the front pages lately with tales of its full-scale "secret army" in Laos and its role in the assassination of a suspected Vietnamese double-agent. These are the exploits which capture the headlines while at the same time tending to mystify and obscure the critical and integrated role which covert action has come to play in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy.

Now, a recent and relatively unknown book by a political scientist who appears to have had some intimate associations with the CIA allows us to detect more clearly than ever before some of the overall strategic notions which inform these CIA maneuvers. From insights developed during two years of service at the American Embassy in Iran—and most likely, therefore, with the CIA—Richard Cottam, now a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, has come up with a theoretical model intended to help the U.S. government manipulate more effectively the politics of foreign countries.

With what appears to be a combination of personal bitterness and academic arrogance, Cottam's study argues that the thrust of U.S. competition with other powers "whether recognized as such or not, is to be found primarily on the levels of political warfare, economic warfare, and psychological warfare." His central complaint is that the government, particularly the CIA, is not sophisticated enough to successfully use these tools to influence global political trends in "a direction favorable to Western objectives." Obsessed with the need to insure America's long-run hegemony in the world, Cottam offers his solution to what he regards as the dangerous lack of a focused long-range strategy for American foreign policy.

Radicals should treat his book as a captured enemy document, offering, as it does, a glimpse into the tactical arsenal of covert action strategies and big power political engineering. Although his concepts are camouflaged by the elusive and dense jargon that typifies political science, the academic "cover" for this scholarly policy memorandum is thin and digestible.

COTTAM'S ARGUMENT centers around the need for continuing U.S. interference in the internal affairs of countries around the globe. He makes short work of those fuzzy-headed politicians who use "ethical" arguments to avoid the realization that the protection of U.S. interests requires more than simply a policy of intervention in moments of crisis. "Overturning a regime is the easy part of political engineering," he writes. "Creating a stable, popular, and ideologically compatible regime is infinitely more complex and seems at this stage to be beyond the theoretical competence of the United States. Yet the probability remains that the United States will be increasingly involved in operations that can be described as competitive interference and that a failure to perform well in these operations could be decisive."

Developing the competence necessary for such a task, says Cottam, requires a new and more systematic approach to policymaking. First, he calls for institutional changes to allow a more effective integration of covert and overt diplomacy. Once the institutional apparatus is in order, Cottam would have it make use of systematically developed "situational analyses" to guide the shaping of strategy. Present bureaucracies, he says, are unable to produce usable objective studies; as a result, strategists are crippled by reliance on distorted intelligence and simplistic policy options. Cottam proposes to remedy this by making greater use of academic and non-academic specialists who "need not necessarily understand the manipulation potential of their work."

More specifically, he states: "The suggestion here is that the academic area specialist can play a significant role in the policy formulation process without departing from his scholarly standards and without becoming involved in specific policy recommendations. The role he can play is that of constructing situational analyses that have operational relevance. But in most cases that relevance will not be apparent to the lay reader."

The "situational analysis," which avoids the sterility of most ideologically loaded, cold war-infected area studies, aims at diagnosing strategic institutions and members of the political elite in the "target" country. In the dry language of political science: "The type of opera-

proposed here calls for a tightly constructed frame within which attitudinal and perceptual trends can be categorized and evaluated." Cottam's hope, of course, is to introduce techniques to improve the administration and control of the American empire.

Cottam argues that the long-range goal of preserving American hegemony requires a well-balanced strategy, oriented primarily towards "the greatest possible effect in altering long-term trends in a direction consistent with policy objectives." This notion of trend alteration is paramount; it involves "reinforcing some trends, redirecting others, and reversing some." The trends which Cottam sees as significant in this respect are: (1) Trends in power potential rating; (2) Trends producing or encouraging mass participation; (3) Trends in elite relationships, public, political and bureaucratic; (4) Trends in relevant sections of elite and mass value systems, perceptions and attitudes.

These are the categories of information needed by policymakers in order to successfully influence developments in any given country or area.

COTTAM BELIEVES THAT the significance of U.S. power must be evaluated in terms of its leverage over specific issues or areas. Effective diplomatic strategy can have many faces: a passive lever might be a threat; a more active one could range from the withdrawal of aid or, failing everything else, to direct military intervention. This type of approach provides a precise way of estimating the target country's "tolerance for interference," as well as helping to measure U.S. impact. Such a leverage system allows policymakers more control over their own machinery and minimizes the possibility of working at cross purposes with other agencies or policy objectives.

It is this thinking which leads Cottam to criticize the war in Vietnam. He believes in the need for intervention but thinks that in this case the government has made a mess of it. In his view, the correctness of any one intervention must be determined in the context of our global objectives. "The impact of American policy in Vietnam on every other aspect of American foreign policy," he writes, "has been so great as to threaten a systemic change." And that is frightening to one whose basic objective is to defend and rationalize an international status quo.

Cottam's views makes more sense when viewed against the backdrop of the intense interdepartmental feud which has raged in Vietnam ever since the military replaced the CIA as the dominant force on the scene. Cottam's views on the war echo the sophisticated corporate liberal argument that the political costs of the war—particularly the increasing polarization at home and abroad—now require its liquidation. Predictably, those views motivated Cottam to an active and prominent position in the Pittsburgh area McCarthy campaign in 1968.

One of his complaints about Vietnam is that the political engineering job has been so half-hearted: Rather than the U.S. controlling Saigon, as is widely believed, the corrupt generals actually control us; despite the major investment of men and material, the U.S. lacks complete decisive leverage on the Saigon government. Cottam does not confine his illustration of this point to Vietnam but fills it out most completely in the case of Iran, the country that served as his operational and intellectual stomping ground. (In addition to his "foreign service" work there, he has also written a historical account of Iranian nationalism. He is dismayed by U.S. policy there—not because, as the radicals think, U.S. imperialism has too much control in Iran, but because we don't have enough!)

While all appearances and statistical data would argue that Iran is practically a dependency of the U.S., Cottam contends that, in actual fact, this country's allegiance to the Shah's despotic regime has actually *decreased* U.S. leverage there. "Since August 1953," he writes, alluding to the CIA-engineered coup which toppled Mossadegh, "the impact of American policy has been quite substantial in influencing trends in a direction viewed unfavorable." As a result, the U.S. has over-identified itself with a regime which uses the U.S. as much as the U.S. uses it. In the long run, Cottam fears, this policy will threaten U.S. hegemony because it ties us too tightly to a regime against which pressures for change are beginning to mount. Already the growing movement of opposition to the Shah is characterized by a deeply-based anti-Americanism and an "attraction" to revolutionary communist ideologies. If these trends continue, the U.S. might be confronted with "overt political rebellion" which would require "interference on the most audacious level as in Guatemala, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and South Vietnam."

"audacious" interventions, replacing them with more sophisticated political engineering. Rather than inextricably tying ourselves to the Shah, he believes the U.S. should protect its long-range options through a policy of "more critical" support. We could support the Shah, for instance, without wholeheartedly backing the hated secret police. We could provide more covert help to acceptable elements within the opposition, particularly to Iranian students who might otherwise be radicalized. To implement such a policy change, Cottam suggests several types of diplomatic probes which could tip the Shah off to U.S. intentions without completely alienating him. This scheme, similar to some of the backstage maneuvers in the Vietnam negotiations game, offers insights into the common techniques of U.S. policymakers.

Speaking of the "second phase" of a much more complicated scenario, intended to mystify public understanding, Cottam explains: "The second phase could take advantage of the separation of powers in the United States. In this action, a junior Democratic Senator who had criticized the government policy of supporting right-wing dictatorships could be utilized. He could be informed by a State Department representative that the government would not only *not* resent his airing his views but would even welcome a public statement from him evaluating his support of the Shah's regime. There is no reason whatever for the Senator to say anything he did not believe. The optimum hope would be for the Senator to accept the necessity of working with the Shah, but to argue that unless the Shah engages in basic political reform any support of his regime would be useless. This is a much stronger probe and reactions from official and non-official groups could be anticipated."

NEO-COLONIALISM IS the fragile strategy underlying the American empire. By centralizing the intelligence about nations and peoples who are little-known to most Americans, the CIA has managed to coordinate the multi-level penetration of the Third World on behalf of American corporate interests. Through a variety of covert instruments, the CIA has provided the institutional network through which the Empire is administered. Throughout the Third World, CIA strategists seek to forge a "strategy of cumulative impact"; one in which many different instruments, overt and covert,

official and non-governmental, reinforce each other in order to skew development in favorable directions.

The foundations on which this system rests, however, are beginning to crack. Throughout the world, the "modernizing elites" which U.S. strategists worked so hard to groom are either proving unable to manage the contradictions in their own societies, or are being forced to return to repression as the principal technique of control. They are caught in the squeeze between institutionalized trends towards more inequality between rich and poor countries, and the needs of their own people. As revolutionary movements develop throughout the Third World, the U.S. is forced to reinforce those repressive regimes in order to maintain its control.

These trends, accompanied by the military defeat being suffered by the U.S. in Vietnam, suggest that political polarization between the U.S. and the people of the Third World will continue. This may mean that policymakers will be forced to rely even more on Cottam's nifty bag of covert "tricks." On the other hand, his proposals may have been rejected because they are too threatening to existing bureaucratic structures, or unworkable given the concrete forces with which the U.S. must now contend. Perhaps that is why Cottam published his ideas in book form rather than submitting them as an internal memorandum. In either case, Cottam's candid call for more refined techniques of international manipulation by the U.S. offers valuable insights into imperialist political thinking.

—DANIEL SCHECHTER
AFRICA RESEARCH GROUP

15 Mar 1970

Senate Feels Role for CIA In Need of Some Protection

By WILLIAM THEIS

Chief, Sunday Advertiser
Washington Bureau

Analysis

WASHINGTON — Is the public debate over the Central Intelligence Agency's military role in Laos jeopardizing its primary information-gathering assignment in this big — still bad — world?

Has the time been reached when Senate and other critics of the Laotian involvement should more carefully define their terms and targets?

Should somebody, perhaps

even the President, help clear confusion in the public mind about CIA operations, without compromising its vital tasks?

★

The feeling in the Senate today is that the big intelligence agency, created after World War II to improve this important and largely secret function of government, should not be

carelessly, perhaps inadvertently damaged.

CIA director Richard Helms, a career official, has made staunch friends on Capitol Hill by his candor and cooperation. Most lawmakers recognize that some clandestine operations are necessary and that such operations don't remain secret if talked about.

But, remembering the CIA-run Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, those most concerned are determined to make sure the agency is not misused.

Finally, there appears to be some feeling that formal or informal limits or guidelines should be adopted in the CIA-Laos debate.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield, an Asian expert long concerned about U. S. involvement in Laos, is one who thinks "some terms ought to be defined."

★

The Foreign Relations committee man is quick to defend the fundamental role of the CIA, while regretting its apparent military operational assignment in Laos.

"I have great faith in Dick Helms," Mansfield said. "Not to criticize clandestine operations as such, it is too bad they are being undertaken in Laos. They represent a counter-effort against counter-forces which have stayed in Laos regardless of the Geneva Agreement."

Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), also a Senate Foreign Relations Committee member, said he had found Helms and the CIA "completely candid."

He reflected an understanding in the Senate that the civilian agency has been performing essentially a military task on orders of the National Security Council.

Helms briefed members of the Foreign Relations Committee Friday in a closed session on CIA activities in Laos. Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) told reporters that the use of CIA members in the U. S. foreign aid program in Laos was a long-standing policy established by the National Security Council.

Fulbright, speaking for himself, said the policy was laid down before Helms took office.

Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) said that the Foreign Relations committee has been "having trouble getting certain information." One thing that is "not acceptable," said the former World War II officer, is "natural without a reason."

Javits also said he felt that the ground rules affecting CIA activities should be disclosed except when the "paramount national interest" is involved.

Mansfield points out that the North Vietnamese have long had forces in the northeastern areas of Laos, along the Ho Chi Minh trail, along which the Communists move troops and material into South Vietnam. And he notes that because the U. S. has been bombing that area, both countries have in effect been ignoring the 1962 Geneva Accord.

What some senators do not say, but what is generally accepted as fact, is that a small group of their colleagues who constitute a CIA "watchdog" subcommittee have been informed all along about the agency's Laotian role.

And the CIA's training activity in the struggle to keep Laos from being overrun by the Communists has been widely reported in news dispatches.

the mysterious Project Phoenix

by ERWIN KNOLL

A DOCUMENT filed with the U.S. District Court in Baltimore in behalf of a young Army lieutenant seeking release from the service as a conscientious objector. . . .

An unusual press conference conducted by the commandant of the Army's intelligence school. . . .

A startling speech delivered by a self-styled "country lawyer" who visited Vietnam last summer. . . .

These are among the fragments that are suddenly drawing attention to Project Phoenix, a mysterious "advisory program" jointly operated by the U.S. Army and the Central Intelligence Agency to help the Saigon government attack the Vietcong "infrastructure" in South Vietnam.

Established in 1967, Project Phoenix has been officially described—on those rare occasions when it has been officially described at all—as a scientific, computerized, intelligence operation designed to identify, isolate, capture, or convert important Vietcong agents. In one of the few public accounts of Phoenix issued by the American mission in Saigon, it was claimed a year ago that 8,600 blacklisted suspects had been "captured, killed, or welcomed as defectors" in a nine-month period. More recently the Pentagon has claimed a total "bag" of 30,000 Vietcong suspects.

Among the strong supporters of Project Phoenix in the Nixon Administration is Henry A. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, who is known to believe the program can play a crucial role in destroying the Vietcong opposition during the period of American military withdrawals from South Viet-

nam. Emissaries from Kissinger's White House office have carried encouraging reports on Phoenix to Capitol Hill.

Despite the pervasiveness of the Phoenix operation—American "Phoenix advisers" are assigned to the forty-four provinces, most of the 242 districts, and all the major cities of South Vietnam—American news dispatches have made only scant mention of the program. Two articles in *The Wall Street Journal*—in September, 1968, and March, 1969—indicated that Phoenix teams occasionally step outside the bounds of due process and conventional warfare to achieve their results. Reporting from Saigon last summer on the "semipolice state" maintained by President Nguyen Van Thieu, Richard Dudman wrote in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*:

"Critics say the Phoenix system often is abused. Huong Ho, a member of the National Assembly from Kien Phong Province, says police often pick up someone on the street, order him to denounce a wealthy citizen as a Vietcong agent, arrest the rich man, and then release him on payment of 25,000 or 50,000 piastres in ransom.

"Ngo Cong Duc, a deputy from Vinh Binh Province in the Mekong Delta, says that malicious informants and sometimes actual Vietcong agents supply names to the Phoenix blacklist, getting around the Phoenix system of cross-checks by reporting a person through several different agencies.

"U.S. officials contend that necessary flexibility makes some abuses inevita-

ble. The mission's report says that a person arrested is taken before a military field court 'if the evidence and the testimony add up to a legal case.' But it notes that 'such legally admissible evidence may be impossible to obtain if most of the witnesses and the evidence are beyond the court's reach in enemy territory.'

"If the case against the suspect is nevertheless conclusive, he is detained,' says the report. 'Under Vietnamese law, such a man may be detained without judicial charge up to two years, and that detention period may be extended if the detainee's freedom would constitute a threat to the security of the nation.'

When Dudman filed his report last July, he wrote that the Phoenix blacklist of Vietcong suspects had been refined "to eliminate mere rank-and-file and leave only the Vietcong leaders—members of the newly elected village and hamlet 'liberation committees' and such officials as political, finance and security chiefs in the shadow government." The new, refined list totaled 70,000 names.

That American military advisers are lending their good offices to a system susceptible to such abuses as blackmail, false arrest, and detention without trial can hardly be expected to arouse massive indignation at this stage of the sordid Vietnam adventure. But the most recent allegations about Project Phoenix raise a much larger question—particularly in view of the disclosures about the massacre of Vietnamese civilians at Songmy. American officials, from President Nixon down, have described Songmy as a "deplorable but isolated incident." How isolated and to what extent deplored? Project Phoenix, it has been charged, is a concerted, deliberate program of torture and assassination.

Francis T. Reitemeyer, twenty-four years old, of Clark, New Jersey, had a degree in classical languages and philosophy from Seton Hall University and was studying for the priesthood at Immaculate Conception Seminary when he enlisted in the Army in 1967. He was commissioned a second lieu-

ERWIN KNOLL is the Washington editor of *The Progressive*.

tenant, and was assigned from October 18, 1968, to December 6, 1968, to the Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland, where he was trained to be a "Phoenix adviser." When he received orders for Vietnam, he applied for discharge as a conscientious objector and retained a Baltimore ACLU attorney, William H. Zinman, to carry his appeal through the courts. On February 14, 1969, Zinman filed in Reitemeyer's behalf a "proffer," or offer to prove certain facts in connection with the appeal. The proffer stated in part:

"Your petitioner was informed that he would be one of many Army officers assigned as an adviser whose function it was to supervise and to pay with funds from an undisclosed source eighteen mercenaries (probably Chinese, none of whom would be officers or enlisted men of the U.S. military) who would be explicitly directed by him and other advisers to find, capture, and/or kill as many Vietcong and Vietcong sympathizers within a given number of small villages as was possible under the circumstances.

"Vietcong sympathizers were meant to include any male or female civilians of any age in a position of authority or influence in the village who were politically loyal or simply in agreement with the Vietcong or their objectives. The petitioner was officially advised by the lecturing U.S. Army officers, who actually recounted from their own experiences in the field, that the petitioner as an American adviser might actually be required to maintain a 'kill quota' of fifty bodies a month.

"Your petitioner was further informed at this Intelligence School that he was authorized to adopt any technique or employ any means through his mercenaries, which was calculated to find and ferret out the Vietcong or the Vietcong sympathizers.

"Frequently, as related by the lecturing officers, resort to the most extreme forms of torture was necessary. On one occasion, a civilian suspected of being a sympathizer was killed by the paid mercenaries, and thereafter decapitated and dismembered, so that the eyes, head, ears, and other parts of the decedent's body could be and in fact were prominently displayed on his front lawn as a warning and an inducement

to other Vietcong sympathizers, to disclose their identity and turn themselves in to the adviser and the mercenaries.

"Another field technique designed to glean information from a captured Vietcong soldier, who was wounded and bleeding, was to promise medical assistance only after the soldier disclosed the information sought by the interrogators. After the interrogation had terminated, and the mercenaries and advisers were satisfied that no further information could be obtained from the prisoner, he was left to die in the middle of the village, still bleeding and without any medical attention whatsoever. On the following morning, when his screams for medical attention reminded the interrogators of his presence, he was unsuccessfully poisoned and finally killed by decapitation with a rusty bayonet. The American advisers, who were having breakfast forty feet away, acquiesced in these actions, and the death of this soldier was officially reported 'shot while trying to escape.'

"Another field instructor suggested that the advisers would not always be engaged in such macabre ventures, and cited an incident on the 'lighter side.' The instructor recounted the occasion when a group of advisers together with South Vietnamese soldiers surrounded a small pool where a number of Vietcong soldiers were attempting to hide themselves by submerging under water, and breathing through reeds. The advisers joined the South Vietnamese soldiers in saturating this pond with hand grenades; at this juncture, the instructor remarked to his students, which included your petitioner, 'that, although this incident might appear somewhat gory, while you listen to it in this classroom, it was actually a lot of fun, to watch the bodies of the Cong soldiers fly into the air like fish,' as the hand grenades exploded in the pond. This instructor was subsequently described by another instruc-

"Project Phoenix, it has been charged, is a concerted, deliberate program of torture and assassination."

tor as 'one who no longer cared whether we win or lose, as long as we have a war to fight.'

"The petitioner was officially instructed that the purpose of the 'Phoenix Program' to which he was assigned was not aimed primarily at the enemy's military forces, but was essentially designed to eliminate civilians, political enemies, and 'South Vietcong sympathizers.' Your petitioner was further informed that the program sought to accomplish, through capture, intimidation, elimination, and assassination, what the United States up to this time was unable to accomplish through the conventional use of military power. . . .

"Your petitioner was warned that loss of the war and/or his personal capture by the enemy could subject him personally to trial and punishment as a war criminal under the precedents established by the Nuremberg Trials as well as other precedents such as the Geneva Convention.

"Your petitioner sincerely urges that this kind of activity was never envisioned by him, whether concretely or abstractly, as a function and purpose of the United States Army, before and even after he entered the service. . . ."

Lieutenant Reitemeyer was never called to testify on the allegations in his proffer. His case—and a parallel appeal for conscientious objector status from another student at the Army Intelligence School, Lieutenant Michael J. Cohn—were heard by Federal Judge Frank A. Kaufman, who ruled on July 14 that the two men had demonstrated they were entitled to discharge as conscientious objectors. The Army filed notice of appeal, but withdrew it last October. The case is closed.

Lieutenant Reitemeyer's allegations received only brief and cursory notice in the media when his proffer was filed with the court a year ago. Press interest was revived after the Songmy

affair erupted into headlines. The first detailed account of the Reitemeyer case appeared on December 11 in an article in *The Village Voice* by Judith Coburn and Geoffrey Cowan, who also reported on a visit they had paid to Fort Howard, a rugged, isolated tract on the grounds of a Veterans Administration hospital near Baltimore. Fort Howard has a mock Vietnamese village that serves as a training adjunct to Fort Holabird's intelligence school.

"As we walked around the edge of the fence toward the concrete bunker we could hear the sound of voices," Miss Coburn and Cowan wrote. "There were brutal shouts a few dozen yards away: 'You get his arm, I'll get his leg. You get the other one.' Then, there were anguished, indistinguishable shouts, then the sound of a woman's voice, and a child's. It wasn't a veterans' hospital, we decided, and quickly headed back down the road." The two reporters said they "got the runaround" when they attempted to ask questions at Fort Holabird about the Phoenix training program.

On December 12, however—the day after *The Village Voice* article appeared—Colonel Marshall Fallwell, the commandant of the intelligence school, opened the closely guarded gates of Fort Holabird to the press. His purpose, he said, was to deny Reitemeyer's "wild allegations" and "bring some reason" into the public discussion of Project Phoenix.

The intelligence school graduates 9,000 Army men a year, of whom only "a small percentage" are assigned to Project Phoenix, Colonel Fallwell said, although almost the entire class of forty-nine second lieutenants to which Reitemeyer and Cohn belonged was destined for the Phoenix program. The commandant said he had conducted an "informal review" of Reitemeyer's charges that terror tactics and assassination were taught at Fort Holabird. "It just isn't done," he said. "We know precisely what the individual instructor is supposed to get across and how he is supposed to get it across. He is supposed to follow that script."

Some instructors may stray from their carefully prepared material to tell "war stories" to their students, Colonel Fallwell acknowledged, but the kind of instruction described by Reite-

meyer would be "completely against the Geneva Convention, the Universal Code of Military Justice, and Department of the Army regulations."

As for the training exercises at Fort Howard, "almost every Army post has a Vietnam village," Fallwell said. Instructors at the intelligence school "draw up lists of individuals with known or suspected Vietcong sympathies in that village," he continued, and students "plan and mount an operation for seizure of that village" and interrogation of its occupants. Members of the school's staff play the role of villagers.

A Pentagon spokesman also offered some comments on December 12. Both Reitemeyer and Cohn, he told reporters, were dismissed from the intelligence school for academic failure. What's more, Reitemeyer had given the Army a sworn statement on December 6, 1968—three months before his proffer was filed in the Baltimore court—in which he had denied that he was receiving training in assassination techniques. The statement had been requested, according to the Pentagon spokesman, after reports were received that Reitemeyer had told a girlfriend he was being trained in murder.

"I am not being trained in any po-



Mauldin in Chicago Sun-Times

"There's a tough bunch. Under the VC they survived liberation, orientation, and taxation. From us they took defoliation, interrogation, and pacification."

litical assassination," said the statement attributed to Reitemeyer by the spokesman. "I never told [her] that I was being trained to be an assassin, nor that I was to be in charge of a group of assassins."

Students at the intelligence school are required to execute a pledge that they will not disclose details of their training. Reitemeyer is reported to be traveling in the West, and I could not reach him for comment.



George W. Gregory, who practices law in Cheraw, South Carolina, knows nothing about the intelligence school at Fort Holabird. He knows a little bit about Vietnam, which he visited last August as the attorney for Major Thomas E. Middleton Jr. of Jefferson, South Carolina, one of the eight Green Berets charged with the murder of a suspected South Vietnamese double-agent. The charges against all eight were abruptly dropped for the official reason that their trials would compromise American intelligence operations in Vietnam. While representing Major Middleton, Gregory learned a few things about Project Phoenix, and on December 19 he discussed some of his findings at a luncheon of the Atlanta Press Club.

Phoenix, Gregory told the Atlanta newsmen, is a program "where you infiltrate the Vietcong and exterminate" those in the "infrastructure." Quite often, Americans must do their own killing because the Vietnamese, he said, are "half-hearted" about the Phoenix work. When he was in Saigon, Gregory observed, "the smart money was going Uncle Ho so the Americans had to do their own dirty work."

When the Green Berets were charged with murder, Gregory recounted, Americans in the Phoenix program sought out military lawyers in Saigon "in droves" to inquire about their possible vulnerability to similar charges.

I called Gregory in Cheraw to confirm press reports of his Atlanta speech and ask for more details. He said he heard about the assassination phase of Project Phoenix both from "people who were in on the deal" and from Army lawyers whose advice had

been solicited. "I said to myself, 'My God, this is quite relevant to my situation,'" Gregory told me. "How can they charge my people [the Green Berets] when they are ordering other people to do these things?"

Gregory said he had questioned a CIA agent whose name he recalls as Chipman about the assassinations carried on under Project Phoenix, and the agent replied, "Certainly I know all about it." But on the stand, the agent added, "I would have to claim executive privilege."

Gregory professed to be surprised at press interest in his Atlanta speech. "I'm just a country lawyer," he told me, "but everybody knows about Phoenix in Saigon, and I just figured you all knew about it in Washington."

Well, we don't know, but there is a chance we may find out. In response to urgings from William Zinman, the ACLU lawyer in Baltimore, and queries from the press, several Senators have begun looking into Project Phoenix. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is preparing for a new round of hearings on the Vietnam war, is known to be giving active consideration to the possibility of taking public testimony on Project Phoenix.

Meanwhile, those who still have faith can draw comfort from the assurances offered by Dennis J. Doolin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian Affairs, who says Phoenix makes every effort "to capture and reorient former members of the VCI [Vietcong infrastructure] toward support of the government of Vietnam and to obtain information from them about the VCI." A counter-terror campaign, he adds, "obviously would subvert and be counterproductive to the basic purpose of pacification in reorienting the allegiance of all the South Vietnamese people toward support of the government of Vietnam."

How is this "basic purpose of pacification" served by the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, the burning of villages, and the forced relocation of their occupants? Doolin is right, of course, in suggesting that tactics of counter-terror would be "counterproductive." The dark allegations about Project Phoenix make no sense. Is there any aspect of the American effort in Vietnam that does?

Intelligence gathering only

CIA curbs its Viet

arms-and-aid role

By Daniel Southerland
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been gradually cutting back its involvement in a number of paramilitary and pacification operations in Vietnam. The agency is concentrating more and more of its efforts here on its traditional role of intelligence gathering.

The U.S. Embassy, the U.S. military command, and the agency itself appear to agree that the shift is in the right direction and will permit the CIA to do a more effective job in the intelligence field.

In the early stages of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the CIA was used to carry out a number of tasks which required great flexibility and a capacity for swift funding and action which neither the State Department nor the Defense Department appeared to possess.

It is no secret that the CIA controlled the operations of U.S. Special Forces troops working with montagnards watching the infiltration routes in the central highlands of South Vietnam in the early 1960's, funded and helped train the Vietnamese Special Forces in their early years, and later did the same for the black-pajama-clad Vietnamese Rural Development (RD) cadre, who now are more than 40,000 strong in the countryside.

Phaseout gradual

Several years ago, the agency started giving up whatever control it had over the Special Forces. Last year, it got out of the training program for RD cadre at Vung Tau and stopped being their paymaster in the provinces.

More recently, the CIA has started cutting back its involvement in other programs which it helped develop in Vietnam.

Among them is the Phoenix program, a two-year-old, nationwide effort which pools information from half a dozen U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence agencies with the object of identifying and capturing Viet Cong political agents.

According to American advisers, the program is not doing so well as it should be for a variety of reasons, including a lack of leadership and interest on the part of the Vietnamese.

Phoenix operations, which range from a single policeman going after a single agent to hundreds of troops surrounding whole villages, are aimed at destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure, or "phantom government."

The chief American adviser in the program remains a CIA man, but the CIA has in most places withdrawn its men from the role of coordinators on the U.S. side of the effort in the 44 provinces. It has turned over the financing of Phoenix operations to the U.S. Army.

The CIA has also been yielding its control over the provincial reconnaissance units (PRUs), one of the main arms of the Phoenix program. The PRUs specialize in night raids into enemy territory aimed at capturing Viet Cong agents. Under the CIA, they have been paid better than most regular troops.

Demands exceeded capacity

The CIA still advises agencies involved in the Phoenix program, but its involvement has noticeably diminished and is more indirect.

Informed sources say the CIA will also give up control over its "census grievance" network in the villages and hamlets, which provides a flow of information to the province level that circumvents the Vietnamese chain of command.

"When we came into Vietnam in a big way, there were a number of revolutionary concepts involved in fighting this kind of war which our conventional government and army machinery were unable to handle," said a well-informed source.

"When the PRUs were set up for instance, there was a need for mobile reconnaissance units not subject to all the pressures of the Vietnamese apparatus," he said. "The U.S. Army was not in a position to issue them weapons. The agency was more flexible.

"But the larger these programs became, the more they came under people's control, and the more the Vietnamese became capable of running them," the source said.

"As these programs became less novel and more routine, the CIA became less suitable to run them."

'Bad experience' charged

After the CIA had gotten such programs moving, the U.S. mission and the U.S. military command wanted more control over them, the source said. It appears the CIA was more than happy to relinquish command.

"This has been a bad experience for them," the source said. "In some cases, their reputation has suffered. The CIA likes being independent, but here they've been

ning programs whose policies they could not completely control.

"With programs reaching into each province, they were forced to recruit people from outside the agency to do some of the jobs for them, and this diluted the professionalism of their own people. Many of the outsiders were a lot less dedicated to their jobs than the professional CIA men. And a lot of the professional people resented being taken away from their traditional intelligence-gathering role to do other jobs.

"The agency has gone through a large personnel and budget cutback," he said. "It would prefer to preserve most of its resources for its classical intelligence role."

Data reputation solid

Despite its dispersal of talent and resources, the CIA has enjoyed the reputation here of frequently providing Washington with more-realistic reports on political, military, and economic developments than do the political section of the U.S. embassy, the U.S. military command, and the U.S. aid mission. In some cases where other agencies appeared to have been unduly optimistic, CIA analysts came up with cautious and pessimistic assessment which later proved more accurate.

There were times several years ago when the CIA appeared on some levels to be working at cross purposes with the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. military command. Today, however, these relationships appear for the most part to work rather smoothly.

Although there seems to be general agreement on the wisdom of the shift in CIA activities, not everyone is happy with the cutback.

A U.S. Army officer complained to a reporter that it was going to be harder to get good and fast material support in the Phoenix program now that the Army is in charge of the logistical side of Phoenix operations.

Flexibility praised

And a civilian pacification official—he is not a CIA man—said:

"It is unfortunate that the CIA is the only organization in Vietnam with the flexibility and imagination needed to sustain special operations where we have had to bring a lot of people in quickly. The only reason they got involved was that they were the only ones with the flexibility to respond."

The CIA does continue to offer advice to the Vietnamese police, and the police agencies are the backbone of the Phoenix program.

Although Saigon government officials have denied it, there is good reason to believe the CIA last year helped the police uncover an espionage ring that reached all the way into the Presidential Palace. The subsequent trial in November resulted in the conviction of 41 persons, including a former special assistant to President Thieu.

SECRET (When Filled In)

Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000080002-6			DOCUMENT
HQ	CIA	Press	DATE: 1970-1971/1972
Global	DCI	Public image	
	White House	Media	
	Congress	Security	
		Public relations	CLASS.: None
		History	NO.:
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)			LOCATION: HS/HC-950
File of unclassified press clippings about CIA arranged in chronological order.			

ABSTRACT

The source of this material is the clipping service maintained by the Assistant to the Director for Public Relations. These items included editorial comment about CIA as well as reports of events not the subject of individual files in the Historical Staff.

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