READING, PA.
EAGLE
NOV 21 1971
E - 48,419
S - 85,704

Gen. Eaker: Military Affairs

Dangers Seen in the U.S. Intelligence Reorganization

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER, USAF (Ret.)

A release from the White House Nov. 5 announced a drastic reorganization of the whole U.S. intelligence community.

Gen. Eaker

The reasons given for the big shake-up were "to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. foreign intelligence community."

The reorganization provides four new boards or committees including a director of central intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency director, Richard Helms, takes on this job in addition to his duties as CIA director.

There is a National Security Council intelligence committee with Henry Kissinger, the President's principal national security adviser, as chairman. There is a net assessment group within the National Security Council (Kissinger shop) and an intelligence resources advisory board which Helms also heads.

The U.S. intelligence board is "reconstituted," according to the White House release, and Helms' deputy at CIA is chairman.

It is generally believed that the White House was unhappy with the sometimes conflicting estimates of enemy military strength supplied by the U.S. intelligence community. There were also charges that the military deliberately overestimated enemy strength to get increased defense appropriations, and that intelligence was costing too much, about $5 to $6 billion annually. The intelligence apparatus needed therefore to be streamlined, reduced in size and cost and military influence curtailed, according to this view.

There is no doubt but that the reorganization does greatly reduce military influence in the intelligence apparatus. Of the 30-odd members of the four new layers, boards or committees at the highest levels on the intelligence totem pole, only three are military men.

The two men who now are clearly dominant in the intelligence community are Richard Helms and Henry Kissinger. The former wears three hats in the new setup and the latter two hats plus the all-important responsibility of personally determining what the President sees.

No defense leader, civilian or military, active or retired, so far as I know, questions the ability or loyalty of either Helms or Kissinger, but sound organization should not be based on personalities since they are always transient and sometimes fallible.

Strangely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who by law are designated as the principal military advisers to the President, are eliminated, for all practical purposes, from intelligence evaluation.

The whole purpose of foreign intelligence is to observe adequately and assess accurately the military strength of other nations and thus evaluate the hazards to our own security. The U.S. Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the intelligence agencies of the armed services are best qualified by education and experience for sound advice in these areas.

The intelligence apparatus has not been streamlined and reduced in size and cost. Instead, all the new layers, boards and committees now will have to be manned. A minimum of 500 top-level intelligence people eventually will be found in or serving these new echelons, considerably increasing the overall cost of intelligence. These new agencies. if used. also will create delays and make intelligence less responsive to the decision makers.

Rather than streamlining the apparatus, the new organization further fragments the intelligence community by adding the four additional advisory or administrative echelons.

The new system also increases the possibility that intelligence estimates and foreign assessments can be doctored to support decisions previously made rather than the other way around.

It would be safer and sounder for presidents to get, as they did in earlier times, the daily intelligence summaries from the defense department, the state department and the CIA uncensored by any intermediary. The President's principal national security adviser might well digest these estimates and assessments but he never should delay their presentation nor alter their meaning.

THE ECONOMIST
20-26 Nov 1971

Spies get together

There is one secret that the intelligence fraternity in Washington has not been able to keep under cover: its own lines of communication have become badly scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of the worst discrepancies and overlaps President Nixon has announced a reorganisation of the multiple branches of the secret service under the direction of Mr Richard Helms, the present and very able head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr Helms will now head the new United States Intelligence Board and will co-ordinate the activities and the budgets of the various intelligence networks—the first time that anyone has had power to do this. The board will be directly responsible to the National Security Council. At the same time two new panels will be set up within the NSC. One, under the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger, the chief of the council, will analyse all the intelligence reports. (In the rush to collect raw facts their interpretation has often been neglected.) The other will compare the strength of the Soviet forces as a whole with those of the United States.

The tangles within the intelligence world go back beyond the crisis over missiles in Cuba. On numerous occasions the many military spies—the three services have their own intelligence networks and then the Department of Defence has still another—have come up with assessments that differ from those of the civilian agencies such as the CIA and the intelligence division of the State Department. Although the CIA has a hawkish image in foreign eyes, it is generally the military men who have over-estimated the resources available to the other side, partly in an effort to boost support in Congress for their own defence budget. Furthermore, relations have been strained recently between the CIA, which gathers information from abroad, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which manages surveillance at home.


Richard Helms: master-spy

This year the confusion has been more noticeable than most. The abortive commando raid a year ago to free prisoners of war from the deserted camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam caused acute embarrassment. Then the Pentagon papers revealed that there had earlier been some serious discrepancies between military and civilian information on the war in Vietnam. And now there is a struggle brewing over the extent of the reported build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union at a time when the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms are reaching a crucial stage.

Congress, which has always been suspicious of the secrecy surrounding the intelligence world, has also been prodding the President. The conservatives in the Senate, led, rather surprisingly, by Senator Ellender, who used to be the spies' best friend, want to cut the money that goes on military intelligence; in the age of expensive satellite spies about $5 billion a year is spent on this out of an annual intelligence budget of around $6 billion. The liberals, on the other hand, claim that Congress has too little control over the intelligence networks; in particular they feel that the CIA has too great an influence on foreign policy. What, they ask, is the CIA doing in Laos? It will be no consolation to these critics that Mr Kissinger will now have greater authority over spying. As a presidential aide he is not responsible to Congress.

THE MIAMI HERALD

Laird Sees Intelligence Merger Soon

HONOLULU — (AP) — Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said Saturday that the Pentagon is ready to carry out quickly President Nixon's new orders to consolidate federal intelligence-gathering operations.

"I believe the Department of Defense will be able ultimately to reduce costs because of these actions," Laird said in Honolulu for a stopover while he was flying from Saigon to Washington after surveying the Vietnam situation for Nixon.

DEFENSE officials said the consolidations should save millions of dollars through elimination of duplications and reductions in staff but they said it is too early to estimate accurately how much costs will be cut.

The full extent of defense intelligence operations in their various forms never has been disclosed publicly, but a hint of their magnitude can be gleaned from an estimate that they involve about 150,000 people and about $3 million a year.

Laird's statement came a day after the White House announced a reorganization of the wide-ranging intelligence apparatus of the government, giving Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms "an enhanced leadership role" and coordinating authority.

IN HIS statement, Laird appeared to be backing up the generals' and admirals' view that each armed force must have its own intelligence arms.

Recalling streamlining proposals by his own blue-ribbon defense panel, Laird said "we have paid particular attention to intelligence, including the need to maintain the intelligence capabilities of the four armed services."

Even before the White House acted, Laird had created a new assistant secretary of defense slot which he said "will increase civilian supervision of intelligence matters in my office."

The new post is held by Dr. Albert C. Hall, until recently a vice president of an aerospace company.

BUT LAIRD never has followed through on a recommendation by the blue-ribbon panel that would have stripped command of foreign intelligence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Pentagon authorities said that Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Hall rank as co-equals.

The Defense chief said that establishment of a National Cryptologic Command, to handle all code-cracking and communications intelligence, "will proceed in an orderly manner." And he said his staff is working on establishment of a Defense Map Agency and an Office of Defense Investigations.

CARBONDALE, I
SO. ILLINOISAN

E - 20,063 OCT 4 1971
S - 28,219

Congress would like to know

What does the CIA do?

By Jack McWethy
Congressional Quarterly
Washington

Since Congress created the ultra-secret Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, a growing number of members have been itching to find out more about what their creation does.

The push is on again this year, with impetus being provided by disclosures that the United States is involved in a clandestine war in Laos that Congress didn't know about.

More than a dozen bills have been introduced this spring and summer aimed at removing some of the legal blinders Congress put on itself with respect to the CIA. Some would allow the legislative branch to share more fully in the agency's intelligence information.

In the last two decades, nearly 200 bills have been introduced aimed at easing the tension between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA. Not one bill has passed and only two have been put to a vote. As a result, the CIA remains a mystery even to the body that voted it into existence.

The agency is so secret that some members of Congress who are supposed to know about CIA activities — members of the four highly select intelligence oversight subcommittees — did not know how deeply the CIA figures in the continued existence of the Royal Lao government. CIA oversight is supposed to be conducted by subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Much to the irritation of some members, the CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee not only keeps its business with the agency a secret, but also keeps the subcommittee's membership a secret from other members of Congress.

Explanation of Secrecy

Paul Wilson, staff director of the House committee, told Congressional Quarterly the membership was a secret "because that's the way it's always been."



The late Allen Dulles, former CIA director

Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services CIA oversight subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on U.S. commitments abroad, had to send two staff members to the jungles of Laos to find out how extensive the CIA program was in that supposedly neutral country.

"In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos," Symington told a closed session of the Senate June 7.

Nine senators, including Symington, sit on one of the two Senate subcommittees designed to provide legislative oversight of the CIA.

"The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Despite Symington's claims to the contrary, Braswell told Congressional Quarterly: "The budget is gone into more thoroughly than people (on the committee) would admit. It's just reviewed in a different way than, say, the State Department's budget is."

Braswell said the budget review was at times conducted by a "very select group . . . more select than the five-man subcommittee."

Carte Blanche Authority

Although the CIA was established in 1947, it was not for another two years that Congress granted the agency carte blanche to operate without [illegible]

The 1959 law exempted the CIA from all federal statutes requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. To the CIA director, the law granted the authority to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds."

The Senate Appropriations Committee has a five-man subcommittee with the primary responsibility of reviewing the CIA budget, a figure which later is hidden in the accounts of other government agencies.

According to William W. Woodruff, the one-man staff of the Appropriations oversight subcommittee, the senators discuss more than just the CIA when its director, Richard Helms, testifies.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff said. He said Helms also provided the subcommittee with budget estimates for all government intelligence operations, including those not specifically under the jurisdiction of the CIA.

While the House Appropriations Committee veils its oversight operation in secrecy, the House Armed Services Committee just formed a new subcommittee to deal with all aspects of intelligence.

For the last seven months Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of Armed Services, used the full committee to weight CIA testimony.

"To say the committee was performing any real oversight function was a fiction," said freshman committee member Michael Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrats. The new subcommittee will be under the direction of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich.

No Quilting Society

"I find it very difficult to believe the oversight committees could not obtain some pretty accurate information on how much of that CIA money was going into Laos," commented Sen. Jack Miller, R Iowa, during the Senate's June 7 closed session.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright D Ark., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, retorted: "It has been said that we all know

continued

about what the CIA is doing. I have been on the CIA oversight committee and I have never seen any detailed figures (on Laos) whatever."

Even Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee and its oversight subcommittee, admitted during the closed session that some of the information contained in Symington's classified staff report was new to him.

Stennis added, however: "If we are going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we cannot run it as a quilting society or something like that."

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868

SEP 26 1971

Confidential Report Urges More Secrecy In CIA Spying

By RICHARD DUDMAN
Chief Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Sept. 25 — A confidential report being circulated in Washington and Boston urges that the Central Intelligence Agency improve its secrecy in peneterating private institutions at home and abroad.

The document proposes also that the CIA direct its covert operations particularly at Africa, Asia and Latin America and make wide use of agents other than Americans.

The report is a summary of a panel discussion on intelligence and foreign policy conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York Jan. 8, 1968.

Copies of the document are being circulated in this country and Europe by a group of radical scholars in Cambridge, Mass., as "a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of the Central Intelligence Agency" and "a fair warning as to the direction of the agency's interests and efforts."

Leader of the 1968 discussion was Richard M. Bissell Jr., a former CIA deputy director who was in charge of the U-2 spy plane program in the late 1950s and the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. He left the Government in 1962 and is a vice president at United Aircraft Corp.

Others in the group were the late Allen W. Dulles, who had been the CIA director; Robert Amory Jr., who had been the deputy CIA director for intelligence; Thomas L. Hughes, then director of intelligence and research at the Department of State and now president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Meyer Bernstein, director of international affairs for the United Steel Workers of America. Former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon was chairman.

The document, reporting Bissell's review and appraisal of the CIA's covert operations, said: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected.

"We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of 'cut-outs.' CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected."

Bissells presentation, as reported in the summary, referred frequently to exposes in the previous year of the CIA's penetration and financing of the National Student Association, and other private organizations, including trade union organizations overseas.

"If various groups hadn't been aware of the source of their funding, the damage subsequent to disclosure might have, have been far less than occurred," the summary said.

"The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied."

Other documents, obtained in early 1969 by the Post-Dispatch, showed that the U.S. Agency for International Development had picked up the tab for certain overseas programs that had been financed secretly by the CIA. These became known as "CIA orphans" after the secret financing was disclosed.

The change apparently grew out of a 1967 order by President Lyndon B. Johnson prohibiting any further hidden subsidies to private voluntary organizations. He promised to consider a proposal that the Federal Government establish "a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support."

As a result, AID funds have been used to finance in part certain international labor programs handled through . . . the AFL-CIO.

One member of the 1968 panel, not identified but apparently Bernstein, the Steelworkers officer, was quoted as saying that it was common knowledge even before the exposes of 1967 that there had labor programs.

Persons in international labor affairs were dismayed, he said, over public disclosure of this CIA support. He said that "certain newspapermen compounded their difficulties by confusing AID with CIA."

The summary continued, quoting the same speaker: "Since these disclosures, the turn of events has been unexpected. First, there hasn't been any real trouble with international labor programs. Indeed, there has been an increase in demand for U.S. labor programs and the strain on our capacity has been embarrassing. Formerly these common labor unions knew we were short of funds, but now they all assume we have secret CIA money, and they ask for more help."

Citing labor union in British Guiana as an example, he said they were "supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before."

In the summary of Bissell's presentation, the report said the United States should make increasing use persons other than American citizens who "should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff.

"The desirability of more effective use of foreign nationals increases as we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia and Africa, where the conduct of United States nationals is easily subject to scrutiny and is likely to be increasingly circumscribed," the summary said.

Bissell was reported to have suggested that the CIA could use foreign nationals increasingly as "career agents," with a status midway between a classical agent in a single operation and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations.

At another point, the account of Bissell's presentation asked the question "From whom is a covert operation to be kept secret?"

"After five days, for exemple, the U-2 flights were not secret from the Russians, but these operations remained highly secret in the United States and with good reason," the summary said.

"If these overflights had 'leaked' to the American press, the USSR would have been forced to take action.

"On a less severe level, the same problem applies to satellite reconnaissance. These are examples of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public of both sides. 'Unfortunately, there aren't enough of these situations'."

Returning to covert financing of private organizations overseas, Bissell said that such pro-

continued

grams as arranging visits by potential political leaders to the United States were more effective if carried on under private auspices than if supported officially by the U.S. Government.

"They do not need to be covert, but if legitimate private entities such as the foundations do not initiate them, there mey be no way to get them done except by covert support to 'front' organizations.

"Many propaganda operations are of declining effectiveness. Some can be continued at slight cost, but some of the larger ones (radio, etc.) are pretty well 'blown' and not inexpensive. USIA (United States Information Agency) doesn't like them, although they did have a real justification some 10 to 15 years ago as the voice of refugees and emigres, groups which also have declined in value and in the view of some professionals are likely to continue declining in value."

Bissell told the Post-Dispatch by telephone that he did not recall details of the 1968 panel discussion but assumed that the reference to radio propaganda operations was to Radio Free Europe and similar broadcasting and other enterprises that have been financed covertly by the CIA.

In his discussion of covert operations, Bissell was quoted as saying that in some countries the CIA representative "has served as a close counselor (and in at least one case a drinking companion) of the chief of state.

"These are situations, of course, in which the tasks of intelligence collection and political action overlap to the point of being almost indistinguishable," the account said.

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
16 Nov 1971

The CIA and the clumsy craneman

New York, November 15

The weekly magazine "Newsweek" claimed today that the American Central Intelligence Agency had played an important part in bringing about the downfall 10 years ago of Antoine Gizenga's Stanleyville Government in the Congo — now the Zaire Republic.

The CIA's rôle in the affair involved the exposure of Soviet smuggling of arms disguised as Red Cross packages, and the theft of Soviet funds destined to pay Gizenga's army, the magazine said.

The account which "Newsweek" said was previously unpublished, recounted how Gizenga made a bid for leadership of the former Belgian Congo in 1961.

He had attended the Prague Institute for African Affairs and spent six weeks in Russia, and was seen by Washington as "Moscow's new man in the Congo," the magazine said. He broke away from the Congolese Government, which had the backing of the United Nations, set up a regime of his own in Orientale Province, armed 6,000 troops with smuggled Russian guns and paid them with Soviet funds.

The White House authorised covert operations to stop him, and the CIA was informed by friendly European agents that a Czech ship was bound for Port Sudan with a cargo of guns disguised as Red Cross packages for the relief of refugees in the Congo.

"Newsweek" went on: "A direct appeal to the port authorities to inspect the crates would never work, the CIA's man in Khartum realised. The Sudanese would have to be faced with public exposure of the contraband.

"Appropriate arrangements were made on the wharfs before the Czech ship docked. 'If my memory serves me right,' a former CIA man says, 'it was the second crane load. The clumsy winch operator let the crates drop and the dockside was suddenly covered with new Soviet Kalashnikov rifles.'"

On the incident involving the soldiers' pay, "Newsweek" recalled that by late in 1961 Gizenga's troops were growing restive as their arrears mounted. An appeal was made to Moscow, and Soviet intelligence delivered $1 million in US currency to Gizenga's delegation in Cairo.

The CIA learned that one third of the money was to be delivered by a courier who would take a commercial flight to Khartum, wait in the transit lounge to avoid a Customs search, and then take another plane to the Congolese border.

"When the Congolese courier arrived in Khartum and settled into the transit lounge, his suitcase between his knees, he was startled to hear himself being paged and ordered to proceed immediately to the Customs area," the magazine went on.

"After a moment of flustered indecision, he took the bag over to a courier and left it unobtrusively near some lockers before leaving for Customs. At that point a CIA man sauntered out of the men's room, picked up the suitcase, and headed out the back door where two cars were waiting with motors running."

"Newsweek" concluded: "Not long afterward, Gizenga's Government fell. It was said that his troops suffered from shortages of arms and were upset because they hadn't been paid." — Reuter.

MONESSEN, PA.
VALLEY INDEPENDENT
DEC 28 1971
E - 18,086

Review of intelligence

YEARS AGO, then Sen. Eugene McCarthy used to come down hard once in awhile on what he viewed as excessive secrecy about the Central Intelligence Agency's budget and operations. Though there was considerable sentiment favoring closer surveillance of the CIA, and a greater degree of accountability to Congress, nothing much came of McCarthy's efforts.

Despite his attempt to shed some light on how much money the CIA spends, and to force disclosure of such information as could be revealed without hurting the national security, the agency remained essentially hidden from the public. The size of its budget continued to be concealed in appropriations for other governmental functions. Watchdog committees set up by both House and Senate presumably were privy to quite a bit of information, but most of Congress as well as the general public was kept in the dark.

That period is recalled by the current effort of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, to extract more public information about the CIA and other intelligence groups. The situation is basically unchanged today: no one who is telling seems to have any clear notion of what the CIA budget amounts to, though estimates range from four to six billion dollars annually.

The approximate size and extent of CIA operations remain hidden from the public, which also gets only fragmentary (and often disquieting) hints as to the CIA's role in foreign policy decisions and implementation.

For the past several months Nedzi has been chairman of a group set up by the House Armed Services Committee to oversee intelligence operations. Inquiries thus far, he said the other day, have led him to conclude that from the standpoint of national security "more can be made public than is being made public."

This is the heart of the matter. No responsible person suggests that the operations of the CIA or other intelligence agencies ought to be made an open book to the public — and, by extension, to other governments. Intelligence work is by its nature secret, and would quickly be undermined by excessive disclosures.

The public which is served by intelligence agencies and which foots the bill for them, however, has the right to general information about how big they are and how much they spend — and above all, about how well they stay within carefully defined limits of their proper function.

Congressional review of the situation with this in mind would be a sound step in the public interest.

TAB

Book on World War II Spies Draws British Inquiry

By HENRY RAYMONT

One recent crisp fall morning a lean, youngish man with an Oxford accent walked into the offices of the David McKay Co., a publishing house at Third Avenue and 47th Street, and asked to see the company's president, Kenneth L. Lawson.

He was shown into Mr. Rawson's office, a spacious wood-paneled room with floor-to-ceiling bokshelves and an imposing grandfather's clock, and identified himself as the deputy director general of the British Information Service.

"I am here at the instruction of the Foreign Secretary," the visitor told the publishing executive across a large mahogany desk stacked with manuscripts and papers. "We understand that one of your forthcoming boks may violate Crown copyright. That is, we feel it contains material that is confidential and rightly belongs to Her Majesty's Government."

Mr. Rawson, a cheerful, graying man of 60, was unperturbed as he crushed a cigarette in a heavy pewter ashtray. He had been expecting the call. Within the vistor's reach, but concealed by an overflow of paper, were the galley profs of the book in question—Ladislas Farago's "The Game of the Foxes," a detailed account of German espionage in Britain and the United States during World War II.

The veteran publisher — he has headed McKay for 21 years —knew that the Home Office had already asked the book's English publisher whether it contained any material from the records of Sir John Masterman, the provost of Worcester College, Oxford, who was the wartime deputy chief of M.I.5, Britain's counterespionage agency.

He also knew that the British authorities had been told that the British edition would be reproduced precisely from the original McKay edition, due to be published here next January.

"I understand your Government's position," Mr. Rawson told his caller. "But having read the manuscript I don't feel there are any real security issues and, quite frankly, I believe that 27 years after the war the public is entitled to get to read this fascinating story."

The story referred to by Mr. Rawson is how the British intelligence service "turned around" the top 12 German agents in Britain in order to feed false information to the German High Command, an effort that ended by leading the Germans into assuming that the main thrust of the Allied invasion of June, 1944, would concentrate on Belgium rather than Normandy.

Farago Names Agents

This deception, celebrated as one of the most successful intelligence coups of the war but never told in its full detail, became known as Operation Double-Cross, or, as the intelligence community prefers to call it, XX.

Mr. Farago, a Hungarian-born writer who became an expert in German and Japanese codes during the war when he was chief of research and planning in the Office of Naval Intelligence, has reconstructed the operation by cross-referencing British security information with the Abwehr archives found by the United States army in a cave in the Thuringian forest.

He is known to have worked closely with Sir John, who immediately after the war wrote an exhaustive secret report analyzing the effectiveness of M.I.5 in Opration Double-Cross.

It was the assumption that some material from this report might have found its way into "The Game of the Foxes" that sent the British Government seeking the content of the book. The issue inside the Government was set off by a decision of the former security chief, now a respected 80-year-old Oxford don, to let the Yale University Press publish the full report.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 SEP 1971

Toward a Stable Peace: III

By W. W. ROSTOW

AUSTIN, Tex.—What's wrong with the United States?

If the possibilities of movement toward stable peace are real, and the risks of chaos and increased violence also real, why is American political life fixated not on these great hopes and dangers but on just how rapidly we can pull back or pull out from Asia and Europe?

I believe there are two major reasons.

The first I call the Tocqueville Oscillation, to recall his famous explanation of why democracies have such difficulty in conducting a steady foreign policy. Historically, in this century, we have only acted abroad with unity and purpose in the face of a clear and present danger to the balance of power in Europe or Asia or to the effort of a major power to emplace itself to the south of us in this Hemisphere.

Between times we tended to lapse into a moralistic isolationism. For a half century we have first tempted a sequence of ambitious aggressors, then, when they had succumbed, we took up arms against them. We are in danger of doing it again, as some American leaders are bowing their heads to the neo-isolationist onslaught.

The grand question, then, is: Can America for the first time make the responsible, steady, and energetic pursuit of stable peace the focus of its foreign policy rather than await situations of mortal danger before we react convulsively, as in the past?

The answer is now inextricably linked to how we handle our economic policy at home and abroad. Until President Nixon's wage-price freeze, we had been living with a corrosive combination of inflation and unemployment. It weakened every private and public institution, undermined our balance of payments position, and put in question our capacity to carry our responsibilities in the world. The actions taken thus far merely recognize the situation and buy a little time. They have plunged our society and the world community into a crisis from which we must now extricate ourselves.

Most economists agree what we ought to negotiate with our partners as we reconstruct the international monetary and trade system:

- An upward revaluation of the yen and the Common Market currencies;

The Principal Question Is: What's Wrong With the U.S.A.?

- A definitive shift from the dollar as a reserve currency to greater reliance on the Special Drawing Rights, or "paper gold," created by the International Monetary Fund;
- Greater flexibility in exchange rates, over a narrow range, accompanied by more explicit international rules of the game for deficit and surplus nations;
- A sharp movement toward more liberal trade, including a revision of agricultural policies in Japan, the Common Market, and the United States;
- A concerted effort by the rich nations of the world to enlarge the flows available for the development of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

This is the kind of result we ought to seek in the international economic conference that must surely come.

But it is a pipe dream unless we convert the wage-price freeze into what I have called a social contract. Unless we demonstrate a capacity to organize ourselves for the long pull to relate wage to productivity increases, our negotiators will be met with well-deserved skepticism. This means that labor leaders must find ways of assuring that the wage-productivity link will not operate inequitably. Then the labor leaders require guarantees that labor restraint will not be exploited to permit excessive profits. To make this kind of social contract—and make it stick—requires that we put aside conventional political slogans and work together. Our greatest asset is that, in his heart, every serious labor leader and every serious business leader knows this is required to deal with the wage-price problem; and that to deal with it is in the interest of his constituency. But the highest order of statesmanship will also be required in Washington.

I do not believe we can come to this kind of responsible consensus while behaving irresponsibly abroad. I do not believe we can act steadily and responsibly abroad if we fail to reconcile steady growth and price stability. We must find our way to common cause in foreign as well as in domestic policy.

The key to that reconciliation is the perception that the great things to do abroad consist in working steadily, patiently and actively toward a stable peace men have not known since 1914.

That is the victory potentially within our grasp. That is the goal that could and should reunite us. In a nuclear age we have no right to wait for another Pearl Harbor or a Cuba missile crisis in reverse: in an age of a trillion-dollar gross national product we have no right to stumble about like a helpless giant. I do not believe it is America's destiny to collapse in a heap, to drop by the wayside when the nearly visible next stage of the journey could be so much more hopeful for us and for all mankind.

This is the last of three articles by W. W. Rostow, adviser to President Johnson.

NEW YORK TIMES

21 SEP 1971

Toward a Stable Peace: II

By W. W. ROSTOW

AUSTIN, Tex.—A great question evidently still exists in Moscow which we should understand and discuss candidly:

Should the Soviet Union complete the SALT negotiations and bring the strategic arms race in offensive as well as defensive missiles to a formal close on the basis of parity, somehow acceptably defined to both parties? Or should it go forward on the basis of current momentum and try to achieve strategic superiority over the United States in some meaningful sense?

There are, technically, two ways in which the Soviet Union might achieve superiority. First, a sufficiently massive build-up of strategic forces, offensive and defensive, so that a Soviet first strike might be undertaken against the United States so powerful that we could only inflict in a second strike a level of destruction which the Soviet leaders judged acceptable; that is, the United States would be destroyed as a viable power, whereas a viable Soviet State would survive. Such an insane enterprise is most unlikely; but it is conceivable.

The second sense in which Soviet superiority might be achieved would be what might be called a reverse Cuba missile crisis; that is, against the background of a substantial Soviet strategic advantage over the United States, Moscow might try to force Washington to back down in a major confrontation in a particular area; for example, the Middle East.

The likelihood of such a dangerous adventure is increased somewhat by belief that our statistical strategic advantage played a large role in President Kennedy's stand at Berlin and in the Caribbean in 1961-62. I do not believe it did. It gave President Kennedy small comfort, if any, to know that more of America than Russia would survive a nuclear exchange. He accepted some risk of nuclear conflict because there was a good chance that Moscow would not risk nuclear war to expand its power if it found the United States redoubtable in defense of a vital interest. Nevertheless, some Soviet leaders may believe—and some Americans do believe—that the numbers mattered greatly in 1961-62.

But the critical question, in my view, is not merely the estimate in Moscow of the strategic numbers, but the image of American will. I know what it took to bring about the Test Ban Treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the beginning of the SALT talks. They happened because we combined strength with a candid recognition of legitimate Russian security interests.

I believe the greatest danger to the SALT talks lies in our projecting to Moscow the image of a nation engaged in unilateral disarmament, or a nation so confused about its role and purposes that a reverse Cuba missile crisis might be worth the try.

Much the same kind of balance between hope and danger exists in the Middle East.

After many years of frustration the balance of feeling in the Arab world has begun to shift marginally toward moderation: the *fedayeen* made their bid last year but were defeated in Jordan; a new, more temperate Government emerged in Damascus; and President Sadat of Egypt has talked to his people about the primacy of education and other tasks. And he is apparently trying to assure that Egypt can be truly independent, rather than the pawn in the imperial game of a great power.

But all these events, as we know, were framed by a massive expansion in the Soviet navy and a kind of latter-day Mahanist effort to expand Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean area as far to the East as Singapore.

There must be great temptation in Cairo and Moscow to try again, to succeed against Israel in the 1970's after the failures of the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's. The balance is close between another bloody crusade, on the one hand, and, on the other, an acceptance of Israel and a turning to the modernization of Arab societies.

And we are the critical margin. If American military strength in the Mediterranean (and capable of projection into the Mediterranean) weakens—if American political life projects an image of hasty, irresponsible withdrawal from responsibility in Europe and Asia—the balance could tip, in Moscow and Cairo, away from pursuit of a firm Middle East settlement toward another desperate try to reverse the course of history.

The policy and posture of America bear also on policy in Jerusalem. Any likely Middle East settlement will involve much more explicit American guarantees and a larger American role in the Middle East than the fragile settlement of 1957. Israel must clearly withdraw, in such a settlement, from the bulk of the territory it now occupies. Its willingness and ability to do so depends greatly on the credibility of American strength and will. It is not surprising, therefore, that Israelis follow with great attention the American performance in Asia and Europe—and the temper of our political life—as they study the peace proposals laid before them by the American Government.

There are, then, three great possibilities before us, none certain, all endangered by the isolationist slide in American political life: a settlement in Asia; a SALT agreement, and a settlement in the Middle East.

This is the second of three articles by W. W. Rostow, adviser to President Johnson.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM	Today Show	STATION	WRC TV NBC Network
DATE	September 21, 1971 7:00 AM	CITY	Washington, D.C.

AN INTERVIEW WITH PHILIP J. KLASS

HUGH DOWNS: In May of 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, then head of Russia, was discussing United States photo-reconnaissance flights over Cuba with former Senator William Benton. Khrushchev offered to trade secret pictures with the United States, saying, "I can show you photos of your military bases taken from outerspace. I'll show them to President Johnson, if he wishes." And then he added, "Why don't we exchange such photos?"

The Soviet leader's remarks about aerial observation by the Soviet Union and the United States is reported now in a book called "Secret Sentries In Space," which is the first detailed report on the extent and sophistication of such spies in the skies as they are called.

Its author is Philip J. Klass who's Senior Aviatics Editor for Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine. We want to welcome Mr. Klass to "Today".

PHILIP J. KLASS: Thank you.

DOWNS: I've mentioned that Cuban overflights there, because this was one of the two incidents that you suggested

-- aerial observation may have prevented a war in these cases.

KLASS: Yes.

DOWNS: Could you tell us a little bit about the two?

KLASS: May I begin a year earlier -- actually just ten years ago this month? There was a very severe war crisis over Berlin, because Khrushchev had issued an ultimatum that he would sign a peace treaty with the East Germans by the end of 1961. At that point in June of '61, when we met with President Kennedy in Vienna, or prior to that time -- there had been the feeling in the highest councils of government that there was a severe missile gap, that the Russians might have up to 400 ICBM's, which would be capable of striking and devastating the US.

Fortunately, on January 31st of 1961, just after President Kennedy had taken office, we launched the first of our "search and find" reconnaissance satellites. This is a satellite that's designed to make a complete survey of the Soviet Union, taking photographs from an altitude of about 100 miles and transmitting those pictures down by radio so that we can quickly recover them and analyze them.

And so, by the summer of 1961, as the Berlin crisis grew hotter and as Khrushchev thought that he could threaten the US, President Kennedy began to get intelligence from these satellite photos that the Russians instead of having several hundred ICBM's, actually had -- well, at that time in the summer of '61, we thought they had maybe as many as 50. And by September, just ten years ago, by September of '61, President Kennedy knew that the Russians only had 14 ballistic missiles -- 14 ballistic missles, and so he was able to stand firm.

And in fact, I believe that in early October, President Kennedy in a meeting with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union -- Gromyko -- that he actually showed Gromyko photographs taken by our satellites and said, "We not only know how few missiles you have, but we know where they are located in case war breaks out and we have to destroy them."

And so, I believe that just ten years ago, these satellites played a very influential role.

DOWNS: I wonder why Khrushchev was anxious or willing to trade such photos?

KLASS: Well, this happened several years later, and as we know, Khrushchev was a very curious and interesting man. He had a great sense of humor.

And by 1963, the Soviets themselves had developed the same sort of capability as the US had. And for example, in the first, oh, starting about 1961, the Russians opposed what they called the American spies in the sky. But by 1963 they had begun to develop -- they had launched their satellites -- reconnaissance satellites. They'd recover the whole satellite to get the film.

DOWNS: Oh, now in your opinion, is their system of doing the same thing, watching things by surveillance, by satellite as sophisticated as ours?

KLASS: I don't believe that it is. It's hard to know, but the US was more advanced in terms of high altitude reconnaissance for aircraft., so we had a head start on them. I don't mean to suggest the Russians are not as smart as we are.

DOWNS: Is this photographically or in the aerospace...

KLASS: Well, I would say photographically that we are probably ahead of them. So they rely primarily on satellites that stay up for eight to twelve days and take photographs; and then they return the whole satellite. We have two types. We have the radio type -- which I called the search and find -- which takes pictures, transmits them down by radio. They are not high resolution, they are sufficiently good, we can sort out the...

DOWNS: By the number of lines in it...

KLASS: We can see objects, perhaps a foot or two feet or three feet. We can resolve that small. And then when we find something that arouses our curiousity, we send up another type of satellite.

DOWNS: What -- to get more detail on it?

KLASS: To get with a longer focal-length lens that takes photographs and actually returns the film via capsule. And in fact -- may I use this model here?

DOWNS: Sure.

KLASS: This is a model of the Agena spacecraft, built by Lockheed, which is used for both types of satellite functions -- that is, the radio transmission and the recoverable type.

DOWNS: What the size of that, approximately?

KLASS: Well, this is roughly 30 to 40 feel long.

DOWNS: I see.

KLASS: Now, a new generation was just launched on June 15th, which is called "Big Bird" -- is actually 50 feet long. But in the recoverable version, this capsule, after it has taken -- used up its film, photographed all of the curious sights that have been discovered earlier, this capsule is in effect kicked out of orbit and comes down with its own parachute, which I don't have here in the model -- parachutes down and is recovered near Hawaii by aircraft as they -- as it's parachuting down, the aircraft fly by and snag the capsule and haul it in. Or if they fail to do that and it falls in the ocean, then it has some flashing lights and radio beacons and then they drop frognet. But the record is very good. They're now catching and have for some years caught most of them.

DOWNS: Right. Are these solar energy cells or something like that?

KLASS: Indeed, you are correct. That's exactly -- the spacecraft carries its own batteries, but these are used to recharge it. And this is one of the things that limits the life -- the consumable; that is, how much film it can carry and how much electric power.

DOWNS: All right. Now, it is your belief, and of course, the thesis of your book, that the great powers being able to do this surveillance, that it reduces the kind of suspicion that you think might trigger a big war?

KLASS: Indeed. I think that these are the most stabilizing -- one of the most hopeful developments on the horizon. I think that they have indeed stabilized relations between the US and the Soviet Union because it enables each to know what the other is doing in strategic weapons.

DOWNS: Now, obviously, this technique can't photograph the surface of the earth in great detail over...

KLASS: Yes.

DOWNS: ...any country. Wouldn't that stimulate the development of techniques for hiding things? I am thinking now of the underground silos and things of that sort. Will its usefulness be limited eventually, or is it impossible to mount a large missile campaign that won't show from the surface?

KLASS: Well, the fact of the matter is, Hugh, that to dig -- while a missile solo could be camouflaged, as you suggest, once it was dug, still the digging and construction of it is something that takes many weeks and months, and so what you first detect is roads being built in the wilderness of Siberia, let's say.

DOWNS: Oh, yes.

KLASS: And then construction crews and...

DOWNS: So the work going on would be...

KLASS: So the work going on gives it away. It's really much more difficult, though, to discover submarines. Again, we can see them as they are being built, as they are being launched. Where they are after they take off with their load of missiles and they are submerged that we cannot detect at the present time.

DOWNS: Yes, yes. Yes. What do you see as the future of it, now with China gaining in the sophistication of these techniques? And in effect, three powers of major size, all with surveillance of each other. Do you think that large-scale war can be staved off?

KLASS: Indeed I do, and although -- China, as you know, has launched two small satellites, neither one of them large enough to do the reconnaissance job. But in my book, I predict that by 1975, and certainly by the end of the decade, that China will have the same sort of reconnaissance capability.

DOWNS: It's a fascinating idea. "Secret Sentries In Space." That's the name of this by Philip Klass. The story of satellites that have been and that are being deployed and that will be in the future, and it details it very well.

Thank you so much, Mr. Klass.

KLASS: Thank you, Hugh.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
21 SEP 1971

Eisenhower Approval of U-2 Flights Claimed

He Personally Reviewed Plans of Missions and Sanctioned Risks, Daniel Ellsberg Says

NEW YORK (UPI)—President Dwight D. Eisenhower personally reviewed the flight plan of all U-2 spy missions over the Soviet Union and it was he who decided the ill-fated flight of Francis Gary Powers was "worth the risk," Daniel Ellsberg said Monday.

Ellsberg, the former Defense Department analyst who leaked the Pentagon papers on the Vietnam war to the press, said in an interview in Look magazine that he learned of Gen. Eisenhower's personal involvement in the U-2 flights when preparing an early study of the decision-making process in crises.

The shooting down of Powers' U-2 reconnaissance plane by the Russians in 1960 shortly before a planned summit conference between Gen. Eisenhower and then Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev strained U.S.-Soviet relations and prompted Mr. Khrushchev to cancel the conference.

"Most Americans assumed that Eisenhower had not known of the flight, certainly in detail," Ellsberg said.

But, Ellsberg said, in the course of his study he learned differently from "the man who was in charge of the U-2 program from beginning to end, who had left the CIA at that point."

"He said that President Eisenhower went over the flight plan of every U-2 flight over Russia in the greatest detail, which usually occupied no less than four or five hours.

"He said the questions that President Eisenhower asked forced him to justify every reconnaissance objective assigned to the flight and to weigh it against the precise marginal risks on each leg of the flight.

"In fact, he said that on the specific flight where Powers was shot down, they were well aware that there were SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) in that area that were becoming operational.

"There was already a risk, and they had to balance that leg of the flight against the desirability of covering those objectives," Ellsberg said. "President Eisenhower made the decision that it was worth the risk."

NEW YORK TIMES

20 SEP 1971

Toward a Stable Peace: I

By W. W. ROSTOW

AUSTIN, Tex. — The only victory worth seeking is a stable peace rooted in the principles of the United Nations Charter. In the name of peace, the questions posed in the current debate on foreign policy are: How fast and how much should the United States pull back from responsibility in the world? How many troops can we pull out of Asia or Europe? How far can we cut the military budget, or the foreign aid budget?

I believe we are debating the wrong questions. The right question is: What must America do to play its part in moving from where we are to reasonably stable peace?

I believe this is the right question, because underlying forces offer more chance than at any time since 1945 — and, perhaps, since 1914 — for the attainment of reasonably stable peace. But the movement is not certain. There are also powerful forces at work making for disruption and violence, of which the most dangerous are those pushing the United States toward excessive withdrawal from responsibility.

What, then, are the bases for hope?

First, there is the diffusion of power away from Moscow and Washington.

This diffusion has continued over the past generation, gathering momentum, in particular, after the Cuba missile crisis.

That crisis persuaded men in many parts of the world that the Soviet Union was not as dangerous as it had been over the previous fifteen years and, therefore, they could act with greater independence of Washington, as well as of Moscow. The missile crisis also brought Moscow's split with Peking into the open and intensified it.

American policy did not oppose the diffusion of power. We tried to help organize it in constructive ways. Since the Marshall Plan, we threw our political influence, as well as our economic resources, behind the desire of nations to fashion their own destinies. And we have moved in recent years — under President Johnson's leadership and now President Nixon's — to the active support of regionalism in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Western Europe.

American policy did not oppose the diffusion of power. We tried to help organize it in constructive ways. Since the Marshall Plan, we threw our political influence, as well as our economic resources, behind the desire of nations to fashion their own destinies.

For Moscow the diffusion of power has meant that the Communist vision of a world led by the Soviet Union has receded. Along its Chinese frontier and in Eastern Europe grandiose hopes have changed to anxieties. In the developing continents nations increasingly march to their own beat. Soviet policy has moved in the direction of a conventional concern for Russian security. That is what the nonproliferation treaty is about. But other events raise warning flags: the Middle East since 1967 and the Soviet failure to honor its commitment to the Laos accords of 1962 should remind us that this doctrine has not been accepted fully.

A second major force which could lead us in the direction of stable peace is the decline of the aggressive revolutionary romantics. In Asia this roster included Mao, Ho, Kim, Sukarno; in the Middle East, Nasser; in Africa, Nkrumah and Ben Bella; in Latin America, Castro.

Some of these are gone and the fate of others — and their policies — is still to be determined. In general, however, they encountered three forces which have tended to frustrate them.

First, they encountered that nemesis of all expansionists: other people's nationalism.

Second, they encountered the resistance of those who have not wished to see the regional balances of power upset.

Third, their relative neglect of domestic welfare gradually reduced political support at home for policies of expansion.

The most dramatic example is the trend of events and policy in Peking.

We have observed a truly extraordinary passage of history since Mao, a few weeks after the first Sputnik was launched in the autumn of 1957, proclaimed in Moscow that the East Wind was prevailing over the West and that the Communist party of the Soviet Union should lead the Communist world in a great offensive.

Since that moment of euphoria, we have seen the failure of the Great Leap Forward; the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split and the build-up on both sides of the Russian-Chinese border; the failure of the Peking-Jakarta movement against Southeast Asia of 1965, and the failure of the Cultural Revolution.

After two years of economic decline and near political anarchy, in 1967 the tide began to turn in Peking toward more rational domestic and foreign policies. Behind Ping-Pong diplomacy and the Nixon visit lay several years of slow economic recovery, the gradual political triumph of the Chinese military and technocrats, and the quiet resumption of normal diplomacy with other nations in the non-Communist world.

As Peking now looks at the world around it, including the Soviet divisions on its frontiers and the economic momentum of Japan and much of non-Communist Asia, it is inclined to regard the United States less as a mortal enemy than a force capable of maintaining a livable balance in its region, as it turns to its long-neglected tasks of economic and social development.

Taken all together, then, it is not beyond the range of possibility that we might see in the years ahead:

- A Soviet Union which has accepted its role as a great nation state among many and is prepared, while advancing its interests, to work toward stabilizing a world environment as potentially dangerous to Russians as to others.
- A transition to moderation in Pyongyang, Hanoi, Cairo, and Havana equivalent to that which has already occurred in Jakarta, Algiers, and Accra.
- The emergence of a Peking on the Asian and world scenes prepared to concentrate China's energies on modernization, while leaving its neighbors alone.

Under those circumstances, the world community would still be a lively place, for the forces at work on the planet are inherently volatile; but it might begin to approximate the relative order and balance envisaged when the United Nations Charter was drafted.

This is the hopeful possibility which the performance of American society will either help bring to pass or destroy in the time ahead.

This is the first of three articles by W. W. Rostow, White House adviser to President Johnson, and author of "Politics and Stages of Growth."

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Sept 1971

E. VLADIMIROV

Imperialist Intelligence and Propaganda

IN OUR DAYS, the role of propaganda and intelligence as major foreign policy instruments of the imperialist states is growing all the time. B. Murty, an American professor, emphasises that the functions of camouflaged ideological coercion and subversion of world law and order are being carried out by means of propaganda.[1] In effect, Murty recognises the close connection between propaganda and intelligence.

The intelligence agencies do not, of course, conduct their propaganda activity openly, but they possess the necessary means to promote ideological subversion abroad and render it more effective. A network of secret agents and paid informers, bribed newspaper and magazine publishers, corrupt politicians and adventurers, to whom the intelligence service assigns the role of "charity workers" and "educationalists"—all this makes it possible for the intelligence service to exercise anonymous control in spreading propaganda and disinformation.

Richard Helms, the head of the CIA, stated in a memorandum to the government, that the psychological warfare must be placed fully under the control of the US intelligence service. Psychological warfare, he stressed, is a sphere of government activity which must be dealt with only by professionals acting in secret. An American professor, Ransom, who for a long time took part in the military research programme of Harvard University, holds that the role of the CIA in undertaking political and psychological subversive acts has increased so much that it has become a major instrument of political war, and has far exceeded the functions determined by the law on the establishment of the CIA.[2]

Some bourgeois scholars call this process "politicising" the intelligence service. "The agent influencing political affairs abroad is becoming a central figure," wrote Bergh, a West German expert on intelligence.[3]

In this way, a kind of an organisationally independent sphere of so-called unofficial propaganda is forming. In the opinion of Western specialists and politicians, this type of propaganda has a number of advantages over the official one. A report "The American Image Abroad", submitted to the American Senate in 1968 by the Republican Coordinating Committee, stresses that the material being spread by non-governmental agencies is accepted in foreign countries with greater trust than that put out by the government. In view of this, the committee recommended the government to encourage by every possible means the American organisations issuing information and propaganda material for foreign countries.

A vivid example of the kind of unofficial propaganda directed against the USSR and other socialist countries is the activity of Radio Free Europe, officially an independent organisation, but virtually controlled by the US authorities.

Speaking in the US Senate in January 1971, Senator C. Case said that 1,642 employees of Free Europe and about 1,500 professional workers of the Liberty radio station were maintained by the CIA. These subversive centres make use of 49 transmitters bought with CIA money. The American intelligence service expends annually over $30 million on these radio saboteurs. Hundreds of millions of dollars have travelled from the US state treasury to the accounts of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for over 20 years. As for the assertions that they are financed from "private donations", it transpires that these donations do not even cover advertising expenses on appeals to the American public for money.

The US intelligence agencies secretly subsi-

---

[1] See B. Murty, *Propaganda and World Public Order. The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion*, New Haven—London, 1968, p. 11.

[2] See H. Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1970, pp. 94, 239.

[3] H. Bergh, *ABC der Spione*, Pfaffenhofen, 1965, p. 83.

continued

dise many newspapers, magazines and publishers at home and in other capitalist countries. The American press has reported that the CIA finances the Frederick Praeger publishing concern, the Newspaper Guild, an association representing the American newspaper owners, the *Houston Post, Soviet Survey* and also other publishing groups and publications.

To carry out acts of sabotage and ideological subversion, the US intelligence agencies are trying to enlist the services of citizens from other countries. The above-mentioned report to the Senate recommends using them on a wider scale in foreign policy propaganda in favour of the USA.

The same methods are also applied by Israel, which widely employs the services of Zionist organisations in many countries for propagandist undertakings. We can cite, as an example, the so-called centre on documentation in Austria. The centre was officially registered as an organisation for the collection and dissemination of information about Nazi crimes against the Jews. But, in actual fact, as an instrument in the hands of the Israeli and other imperialist intelligence services, it has conducted propaganda against the USSR and other socialist countries. It organised a provocative broadcast over the West German TV network, in which defectors from Poland took part.

It is clear from the American press that the CIA uses various charitable and scientific funds to secretly finance many national and foreign organisations and to direct subversive activity abroad, including anti-communist propaganda. There were about 40 such mediatory funds in 1967 and 1968, including the Ford Foundation, which has enormous financial resources and widespread international contacts. Moreover, the CIA also sets up fictitious funds, some of them having a semi-legal status. When American correspondents wanted to know for what purpose these funds are used, it emerged that some of them were never actually where they were supposed to be according to the official documents. These fictitious funds were receiving money from the CIA and transferring it to the accounts of other funds, which in their own name were supplying certain organisations with money under the guise of assistance. These operations were frequently described by them as subsidising charitable work.

The American intelligence service finances a number of cultural, youth and other public organisations of various political orientation, most of which advertise themselves as politically neutral. Their international contacts are useful to the intelligence agencies for carrying out disguised disruptive activities in international and foreign progressive organisations. The National Student Association, with affiliations in 300 American universities, can be cited as one of them. According to its president, Eugene Groves, over 90 per cent of this organisation's budget was supported by the CIA between 1952 and February 1967. Groves stated that the CIA sent its agents to educational establishments of the socialist countries through this organisation. Under the guise of probationers, they went to youth forums and festivals where they carried on anti-communist propaganda and committed other subversive acts. On realising that the NSA had been used as a screen for CIA activity for 13 years, the overwhelming majority of its members condemned the NSA leadership and demanded an immediate break with the CIA.

The CIA also finances a number of trade-union organisations which are assigned to carry on disruptive activity in the international working-class movement. The closest contacts with the CIA are maintained by the leadership of the AFL-CIO. Denouncing these contacts, an American trade-union leader, V. Reuther, said that Meany, Lovestone and certain other trade-union bosses had been allowing the CIA to use this organisation as a screen for its underground operations. In his book *CIA and American Labor*, published in New York in 1967, G. Morris shows that annual allocations to the American trade unions reach $100 million.[4] A considerable part of them goes to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions whose main task is to exercise political influence in other countries and carry on subversive activity against the World Federation of Trade Unions.

The intelligence agencies supply funds to some scientific establishments and information centres dealing with the selection, preparation and dissemination of propaganda materials. They include above all the universities and colleges which study the USSR and other socialist countries in Europe. For example, a number of professional employees of the Russian Institute at Columbia University in the USA are working hand in hand with the CIA. The Institute on Studying the USSR, set up in Munich in 1950 with the help of the CIA, is actively cooperating with the intelligence service in working out propaganda hostile to the USSR and European socialist countries.

---

[4] See George Morris, *CIA and American Labor. The Subversion of the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy*, New York, 1967, p. 158.

"Sovietologists" and "Kremlinologists" are supplied by the intelligence service with espionage material and other special information for books and propaganda articles. Thus, in preparing one such work, 20 employees of the Russian Research Centre at Harvard University went to Munich, where they spent a year interviewing former Soviet citizens and trying to wrest from them information of the required political character.

The exposure of certain of the CIA's backstage financial operations caused such a violent reaction in the USA, that President Johnson had to appoint in 1967 a special commission, headed by N. Katzenbach, Under-Secretary of State, to investigate the CIA's ties with American public organisations. Director of the CIA, R. Helms, was also included in its membership. The commission was forced to admit the existence of a system involving American public organisations in subversive activity on an unprecedented scale. It confirmed that this system was built up on US government instructions.

A great role in the activity of the imperialist intelligence agencies is assigned to the ideological infiltration of the socialist countries, the aim being, as Western bourgeois specialists assert, the gradual and imperceptible ousting of socialist ideology by the imposition and inculcation of bourgeois views. In order to achieve this, the propaganda and intelligence services are trying, in addition to widespread radio broadcasts on the socialist countries, to derive benefit from personal contacts between foreigners and citizens of the socialist countries. These tactics were used by them during the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In particular, special groups for conducting propaganda during their trips across Czechoslovakia were formed out of students from Heidelburg, Stuttgart and other universities. As admitted by the West German *Wirschaftsmagazin,* tourist groups visiting the socialist countries include persons who have been specially trained to carry out subversive anti-communist activities.

For the purposes of propaganda and ideological subversion, the intelligence service scrapes together and subsidises its own subversive groups from those hostile to socialism. These groups include such émigré organisations as the People's Labour Union, and organisations of Ukrainian, Baltic and other nationalists. International anti-communist subversive centres such as the Assembly of the Captive Nations and others are maintained by the CIA.

In 1968, the American, British and West German intelligence services sent their agents to Czechoslovakia, including those who had been earlier exposed in espionage activity. Radio Free Europe also established direct contacts with counter-revolutionary and revisionist elements operating at that time in the mass media.

The employment of revisionist and anti-Soviet conceptions in order to undermine the socialist countries and the international communist and working-class movements has become a major element in the contemporary political strategy of imperialism. The bourgeois press willingly propagandises works by modern revisionists. Moreover, Western ideological centres put into circulation a great deal of their own "stylised" products, which in form and content are close to those of the Right and "Left" opportunists.

In this context, the recommendations given as early as 1958 by W. Daugherty and M. Janowitz, US experts on questions of "psychological warfare" are of interest. They believe that "the propagandist must feel himself into the mind of enemy ... our propaganda to Russia should be done on the supposition that we are talking to communists."[5]

Exposing the disruptive activity of foreign centres engaged in ideological subversion and espionage, *Pravda,* the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, wrote in January 1970: "The commentators of Radio Free Europe have replaced their anti-socialist vocabulary with a terminology hitherto employed only in communist propaganda. The fact that they have begun to speak allegedly from the positions of the communist parties and of patriotically-minded citizens cannot conceal the real essence of their schemes—to do away with the socialist system in this or that country of Eastern Europe."

Intensive ideological penetration is also being carried out by imperialists in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. A USIA employee in India, A. Goodfriend, wrote that Americans do their best in the developing countries to rear social strata, the representatives of which would be indigenous "in blood and colour, but American in taste, in opinion, in morals and intellect".[6]

Imperialist propagandists are trying to influence the army officer corps, state employees, and the intelligentsia of the developing countries, since these strata play an active part in the political and ideological life of their coun-

---

[5] See W. Daugherty, M. Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook,* Baltimore, 1958, p. 41.

[6] A. Goodfriend, *The Twisted Image,* New York, 1963, p. 94.

continued

tries. Such, in particular, is the background of the US programme of leaders and programme of specialists, envisaging a systematic impact on political and public figures, the intelligentsia, and students in the developing countries.

The intelligence services do not confine themselves to "unofficial" propaganda. They directly influence state propaganda agencies by supplying them with provocative and disinformational material for dissemination and publication.

The elaboration of the concepts and principles of foreign policy propaganda, the preparation of propaganda material, and the evaluation of its effectiveness are also carried out with the help of the political intelligence service.

In his book *The Strategy of Persuasion,* Arthur Meyerhoff, an American specialist, writes that in order to start a propaganda campaign, one should possess a vast quantity of information, including that collected by the intelligence service. He recommends thorough study of the psychological and ideological requirements and inclinations of the population, and also of the factors obstructing the West in its propaganda activities.[7]

Under the pretext of carrying out sociological research the American intelligence service collects copious data on the political situation in the Latin American, African and Asian countries. The materials obtained by the intelligence agencies are used to plan and wage a "psychological warfare" on these countries.[8] These were the aims pursued by Project Camelot, which was carried out by US intelligence service in the 1960s for "studying the revolutionary potential" in Chile. Similar operations (Simpatico and Job-430) were also carried out in other Latin American countries. The American intelligence service planned to carry out mass polls among different strata of the population in the Latin American countries to estimate the strength of anti-imperialist sentiments there. Acting on the instructions of the intelligence service, sociologists, politicologists and other specialists who had come from the USA to Latin American countries under the guise of rendering "aid", were to distribute questionnaires and assess public opinion.

In the socialist countries, the intelligence and propaganda services are trying to make secret contacts with hostile elements ready, for a miserable fee, to supply them with "raw material" for ideological subversion. These people pick up various kinds of rumours and juggle with facts. Sometimes they are themselves the authors of malicious and slanderous lampoons on the socialist system, and these are secretly forwarded to the West and published in the bourgeois press.

Very frequently the intelligence agencies of the imperialist states apply the formula: "If the facts and events necessary for anti-communist propaganda do not exist, they should be organised." For this purpose, fictitious tourists are sent to the socialist countries with an assignment to scatter instigating leaflets and shout provocative slogans with the aim of attracting the attention of people nearby and causing as much of a disturbance as possible. As a rule, bourgeois newspaper, radio and TV correspondents "happen" to be on the scene of the provocation, taking notes, photographing and filming so that an act of hooliganism can be presented as a "move in defence of freedom and democracy".

Sometimes, a private talk with a writer or a public figure from a socialist country is set forth as an "evidence" from communist countries. Questions are put in such a way as to prompt the interlocutor to utter views which suit the imperialists, and then, after being "slightly edited" the talk is used for subversive propaganda purposes. For instance, F. Hardy, an Australian writer who visited the USSR in 1968, was engaged in this kind of activity. The sequel to his talks with some writers was the publication of anti-Soviet articles in the *Sunday Times* and other newspapers.

Subversive propaganda, carried on with the active participation and often under the control of the intelligence agencies, is in the service of imperialism's aggressive foreign policy. The merging of foreign policy propaganda with the intelligence service and the spread of subversive ideological activity by the imperialist states, carried out with the application of the means and methods of secret warfare, are instrumental in aggravating international tension.

However, the very fact that, in its propaganda campaign against socialism and the national liberation movement, imperialism is forced ever more frequently to resort to the services of intelligence and its secret agents, is eloquent testimony to the weakening of its ideological positions.

---

[7] See A. Meyerhoff, *The Strategy of Persuasion,* New York, 1965, pp. 149-152.

[8] See *Congressional Record,* Aug. 25, 1965, pp. 20921-20927.

CQ On the Issues

CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on a staff report. *(Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660, 1268)*

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? *(Secrecy fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1785)*

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees—Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago.

The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress. *(Congress and the Nation Vol. I, p. 306, 249)*

THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men—on two committees—hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

continued

CIA Oversight Subcommittees

Four subcommittees have the official function of monitoring Central Intelligence Agency programs and passing judgment on the agency's budget before the figures are submerged in the general budget.

Senate. Armed Services Committee, Central Intelligence Subcommittee (reviews CIA programs, not the budget)—John C. Stennis (D Miss.), *Stuart Symington (D Mo.), Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.), Peter H. Dominick (R Colo.) and Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.);

Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Operations Subcommittee comprised of the five ranking members on the Defense Subcommittee—Allen J. Ellender (D La.),* John L. McClellan (D Ark.), Stennis, Milton R. Young (R N.D.), Margaret Chase Smith (R Maine);

Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 was invited by Stennis and Ellender to send three members to any joint briefings of the Appropriations and Armed Services oversight subcommittees. The three members were J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.), George D. Aiken (R Vt.) and Mike Mansfield (D Mont.). There have been no joint meetings in at least the last year. However, CIA Director Richard Helms did appear once in March before a Foreign Relations subcommittee.

House. Armed Services Committee, Intelligence Operations Subcommittee (created in July)—Lucien N. Nedzi (D Mich.),* William G. Bray (R Ind.), Alvin E. O'Konski (R Wis.), O. C. Fisher (D Texas), Melvin Price (D Ill.), with *ex officio* members F. Edward Hebert (D La.) and Leslie C. Arends (R Ill.).

Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Operations Subcommittee—membership undisclosed. Believed to be the five ranking members of the Defense Subcommittee headed by committee chairman George Mahon (D Texas). Also would include Robert L. F. Sikes (D Fla.), Jamie L. Whitten (D Miss.), William E. Minshall (R Ohio), John J. Rhodes (R Ariz.).

* *Indicates subcommittee chairman.*

The role of the Armed Services Committee is not to examine the CIA's budget, Braswell said, but rather to review the programs for which the appropriated funds pay.

"The budget is gone into more thoroughly than people (on the committee) would admit," Braswell explained. "It's just reviewed in a different way than, say, the State Department's budget is." The committee's chief counsel said the budget review was conducted by a "very select group...more select than the five-man subcommittee."

In the June 7 closed session of the Senate, Jack Miller (R Iowa) said, "I find it very difficult to believe that the oversight committee could not obtain some pretty accurate information on how much of that CIA money was going to Laos."

Symington's reply: "There is a war going on in Laos and money is being spent in heavy quantities about which the Senate knows nothing. I am a member of literally all the committees involved. Each time we go into Laos and believe we have uncovered the last leaf of what has been and is going on, we find later that it is not true."

Foreign Relations. Since the CIA never has been recognized officially as an agency involved in making foreign policy, the operations of the agency have not regularly been scrutinized by the Foreign Relations Committee. The Armed Services Committee reviews the agency's program annually because threats to the United States, against which the CIA guards, traditionally have been military in nature. The Appropriations Committee checks on the CIA's budget because the committee examines all money requests of government agencies; the CIA provides valuable intelligence on Pentagon programs about which the committee has an interest. The Foreign Relations Committee was a newcomer into the circle of CIA-knowledgeable committees.

In the spring of 1967, secret CIA aid for student activities became the cover story for *Ramparts* magazine. The national press picked up the story and soon it became widely known that the CIA had been contributing money to the National Student Association (NSA) and other tax-exempt foundations and was playing more than a casual role in jockeying CIA personnel into leadership positions in the various organizations.

The response in Congress to the NSA story was the introduction of seven bills in one month—all aimed at allowing Congress a closer look at the CIA. One proposal, sponsored by former Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D Minn. 1959-71), would have involved an investigation of the CIA by a select committee armed with subpoena power. A proposal to set up a similar oversight and investigating committee had been killed in 1966 on a procedural ruling regarding committee jurisdiction. With the new series of embarrassing CIA revelations, the McCarthy proposal posed a threat to the long-standing oversight system.

Don Henderson, a Foreign Relations Committee staff member, said that in an effort to undermine support for the McCarthy bill, the Foreign Relations Committee was invited to send three members to all CIA joint briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The original members were J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.), Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) and Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R Iowa), who was replaced by George Aiken (R Vt.) when Hickenlooper retired in 1968.

Woodruff, counsel for the Armed Services Committee, said that the committee had not met jointly on CIA business with the Appropriations Committee for at least one year. "Maybe it's been two years," he said, "I'm not sure."

CIA Director Helms, however, appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee for a special briefing on Laos in March.

"I have known," Fulbright told the Senate during the June 7 closed session, "and several (other) Senators have known about this secret army (in Laos). Mr. Helms testified about it. He gave the impression of being more candid than most of the people we have had before the committee in this whole operation. I did not know enough to ask him everything I should have...."

THE HOUSE

Two committees in the House acknowledge that they participate in oversight of the CIA—Armed Services and Appropriations. The Armed Services Committee has

continued

a five-man subcommittee reviewing the programs of all intelligence organizations. The Appropriations Committee refused to say who on the committee reviews the CIA budget.

Armed Services. A new subcommittee formed in July has filled a hole on the committee that has been left since F. Edward Hebert (D La.) reorganized the Armed Services Committee and abolished the CIA Oversight Subcommittee that had been run by the late L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the committee until his death Dec. 28, 1970.

Hebert's plan was to democratize the committee by allowing all to hear what the CIA was doing instead of just a select group of senior members. Freshman committee member Michael Harrington (D Mass.) said that Hebert was making an honest attempt to spread the authority, but the full committee CIA briefings were still superficial. "To say that the committee was performing any real oversight function was a fiction," Harrington said.

When Helms came before the full committee, Harrington asked what the CIA budget was. Helms said that George Mahon (D Texas), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, had instructed him not to reveal any budget figures unless Armed Services Chairman Hebert requested the information. Hebert said "no" according to Harrington and the budget figures remained a mystery.

As in the Senate, the House Armed Services Committee is responsible more for what the CIA does than how much it spends, according to the committee's chief counsel, John R. Blandford. The Armed Services Committee does not meet jointly for CIA briefings with the Appropriations Committee or with the Foreign Affairs Committee, Blandford said.

The new subcommittee, responsible for reviewing all aspects of intelligence operations, was put under the leadership of Lucien N. Nedzi (D Mich.)—a leading House opponent of the Indochina war and critic of Pentagon spending. Hebert said he chose Nedzi "because he's a good man, even though we're opposed philosophically." Hebert's predecessor as committee chairman, Mendel Rivers, regarded the oversight subcommittee as so important he named himself as subcommittee chairman. Nedzi said that Hebert had placed no restrictions on how the subcommittee should be run or what it should cover.

When Hebert took over as chairman of the full committee and abolished the CIA Oversight Subcommittee, there were 10 members of the subcommittee. One of the original 10 left Congress in January, one died, Hebert and Leslie C. Arends (R Ill.) currently serve as ex officio members, four have been renamed to the subcommittee and two members have been bumped—Charles E. Bennett (D Fla.) and Bob Wilson (R Calif.). Both Blandford, the subcommittee's new staff man, and Harrington said that the new subcommittee was formed because the full committee hearings were too unwieldy, not because Hebert wanted Bennett and Wilson off the subcommittee.

Appropriations. In interviews with two staff members of the House Appropriations Committee, Congressional Quarterly learned that the membership of the committee's intelligence oversight subcommittee was confidential. When asked why the membership was a secret, Paul Wilson, staff director, said: "Because that's the way it's always been." Ralph Preston, a staff man for the Defense Subcommittee, said the information was a secret, but admitted that more members than just Chairman Mahon were responsible for reviewing the agency's budget.

Intelligence Reorganization

The Central Intelligence Agency was created as the clearinghouse of intelligence information gathered by the various government agencies responsible for espionage, code-cracking and other forms of intelligence work. The CIA was intended to loosely coordinate operations of all the different intelligence-gathering groups.

The plan as originally conceived has not worked to total satisfaction. *The Washington Post* reported Aug. 16 that the White House, which ordered a study of ways to consolidate the far-flung intelligence-gathering operations of all branches of government, was looking for ways to cut at least $500-million and 50,000 employees from the estimated $5-billion and 200,000 employees currently representing what is believed to be the total intelligence program.

The Post reported that Allen J. Ellender (D La.), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, has forced the Administration to look into budget-cutting plans by threatening to slice a piece of the appropriation from the White House request.

Rep. Harrington said he has requested the composition of the subcommittee and has been refused the information. "I'm just sure the CIA committee consists of the five ranking members of Mahon's subcommittee on defense," Harrington said. Other sources indicated that Harrington's conclusion was correct.

Quality of Congress' Oversight

Because most members of Congress have not been aware of what the CIA was planning until long after the agency had already acted, more than one Senator or House member has made embarrassing statements out of line with fact.

Former Sen. Wayne Morse (D Ore. 1945-69), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, took the Senate floor April 20, 1961—five days after the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion—and said: "There is not a scintilla of evidence that the U.S. government has intervened in the sporadic rebellion which has occurred inside Cuba. That rebellion has been aided from outside by Cuban rebel refugees who have sought to overthrow the Castro regime."

Four days later Morse admitted: "We now know that there has been a covert program under way to be of assistance to the Cuban exiles in an invasion of Cuba and that assistance was given by the United States government. We did not know at the legislative level, through the responsible committees of the Senate, what the program and the policies of the CIA really were."

The Morse speech, delivered nine days after the Bay of Pigs invasion, was the first mention in either the House or Senate of U.S. involvement in the invasion attempt. *(Congress and the Nation Vol. I, p. 127)*

continued

Four Approaches to Change

Although more than a dozen bills and amendments relating to greater legislative control of the CIA were introduced in the Senate and House prior to Aug. 6 (summer recess), four basic approaches to altering the present system of oversight have emerged.

- In every Congress since 1953, a resolution has been introduced which sought to establish a joint committee on intelligence operations and information which would include members of key committees from both the Senate and House. From the 83rd to the 92nd Congress this type of resolution has been introduced, referred to committee and killed by lack of action.
- The approach adopted by Sen. George McGovern (D S.D.) in S 2231 was aimed at gaining a single-sum disclosure of the CIA budget to be voted on by the House and Senate as a line budget item annually.
- A proposal which sought to provide Congress with more intelligence information without either limiting CIA activities or disclosing the agency's expenditures was introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.). The bill (S 2224) requested that the two Armed Services Committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee be provided with regular and thorough CIA briefings with information and details included in the briefing which would be similar to the data provided the White House.
- The approach adopted by Senators Frank Church (D Idaho) and Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and Rep. Herman Badillo (D N.Y.), among others, has been to sponsor proposals aimed not at learning more of what the CIA knows, but at limiting the agency to information gathering rather than military and para-military operations. *(Radio Free Europe, p. 1850)*

While explaining the details of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, former Sen. Millard E. Tydings (D Md. 1927-51) said in a May 27, 1949, floor speech: "The bill relates entirely to matters external to the United States; it has nothing to do with internal America. It relates to the gathering of facts and information beyond the borders of the United States. It has no application to the domestic scene in any manner, shape or form."

Committee investigations into tax-exempt foundations in 1964 produced an informal report issued by Rep. Wright Patman (D Texas) labeling the Kaplan Fund as a conduit for CIA money. The fund described its purposes in its charter as to "strengthen democracy at home." Patman later agreed to drop the committee investigation saying, "No matter of interest to the subcommittee relating to the CIA existed." *(Congress and the Nation Vol. I, p. 1780)*

In the spring of 1967, another example of domestic CIA programming emerged as it became known that the National Student Association was receiving money from the CIA and that the agency had been involved in manipulating the leadership of the student organization.

Laos. The most recent case study of Congress lacking knowledge about CIA activities has been in the series of revelations which came from the June 7 closed Senate session briefing on Laos requested by Symington. *(Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660, 1268)*

Three times during the two-hour session, Symington, a member of the Armed Services subcommittee on CIA oversight, said that although he knew the CIA was conducting operations in Laos, he did not know how extensive the program was.

"Nobody knows," Symington said, "the amounts the CIA is spending while under orders from the executive branch to continue to supervise and direct this long and ravaging war (in Laos)."

Minutes after Symington said that in all of his subcommittees—which included the Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee under the chairmanship of John C. Stennis (D Miss.)—there was "no real knowledge about what is going on in Laos." Stennis took the floor and said: "The CIA has justified its budget to our subcommittee and as always they have come with expenditures right in line with what they were authorized expressly to do....They (CIA) have told us from time to time about their activities in Laos."

"It has been said that we all know about what the CIA is doing," Fulbright retorted. "I have been on the CIA oversight committee and I have never seen any detailed figures (on Laos) whatever. Often the briefings are about how many missiles the Russians have. When we ask about specific operations, they say they are too secret; they can only report to the National Security Council, which means to the President. There is a lot I did not know about, specifically in Laos."

Stennis said that the secret report on CIA activity in Laos, compiled by Foreign Relations Committee staff members, contained some information he was not familiar with, information he had not been told in his capacity as chairman of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

"I think we all know," Stennis said, "that if we are going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we cannot run it as a quilting society or something like that. But their money is in the clear and their forthrightness, I think, is in the clear."

Sen. Miller criticized Symington for saying the Congress was appropriating money blindly: "We should not leave the impression that the Senate somehow or other has been helpless in this matter. We are all mature individuals and we know what we are doing. We have appropriated a lot of money for the CIA. If we have done so, knowing the CIA is an executive privilege agency, I think we have done so with our eyes wide open. Maybe we should change that. That is something else.

"But let us not say the Senate has been hoodwinked or leave the impression we have been mislead and have not known what is going on. I think we may have lacked information on the specifics, and the Senator (Symington) is pulling out information on specifics, but the Senators who voted on these appropriations for the CIA voted for them with our eyes wide open, knowing what we were doing. Maybe we should change it. It is something for future debate."

"I would be the last to say he (Miller) had been hoodwinked," Symington commented, "or that any other member of the Senate had been hoodwinked. But I have been hoodwinked, and I want the Senate to know this afternoon that that is the case." ✓

BALTIMORE SUN

20 AUG 1971

Washington Couple

Friedman Cryptology Collection Given To Virginia Research Library

Lexington, Va. — An important and extensive private collection of cryptologic material has been given to the George C. Marshall Research Library in Lexington.

The gift was made by the late Lt. Col. William F. Friedman, who died in 1969, and Mrs. Friedman, of Washington. Colonel Friedman and his wife have been widely acclaimed in the field of cryptology since World War I.

The Friedman Collection "will be a tremendous addition to the library's holdings," said Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, foundation president and former director of the National Security Agency from 1965 to 1969.

Dedicated in 1964, the Marshall Research Library is closely associated with nearby Washington and Lee University and the Virginia Military Institute and has become the national memorial to the World War II Army chief of staff and author of the Marshall Plan of aid to postwar Europe. The library's museum has been open to the public since the dedication.

One of the library's primary projects is the publication of a multivolume biography of General Marshall being written by the library's director, Dr. Forrest C. Pogue.

3,000 Items

Approximately 3,000 items are in the Friedman Collection now being prepared for use by future researchers in the field. The material ranges from Colonel Friedman's first publications on cryptography in 1916 and research papers allied with their assignments for the U.S. government to books in various languages, pamphlets, technical papers, periodicals, microfilm, slides and newspaper clippings.

For almost half a century, Colonel Friedman was regarded as this country's most eminent cryptologist. In congressional hearings on the Pearl Harbor attack, he was identified as leader of the group of U.S. Army cryptologists who solved the Japanese diplomatic cipher and built a machine which automatically deciphered these important communications. For his wartime work, he was awarded the highest civilian honors given by the government.

In 1944, he received the War Department's Commendation for Exceptional Civilian Service; in 1946, the Medal for Merit; and in 1955, the National Security Medal for "distinguished achievements in national intelligence work." In a rare action, the U.S. Congress in 1956 awarded him $100,000 as partial compensation for the commercial rights of his inventions held secret by the government.

Born in Kishinev, Russia, September, 24, 1893, William Frederick Friedman was brought to Pittsburgh in 1893, where he became a naturalized citizen. After graduating from Cornell University with a degree in genetics, Colonel Friedman served as director of genetics research at Riverbank Laboratories in Geneva, Ill. While there, he met Miss Elizabeth Smith, who became Mrs. Friedman. Miss Smith was at that time conducting research on the claim that Sir Francis Bacon had written the works of Shakespeare. Mr. Friedman also became interested in this controversy and his talents were diverted from genetics to cryptology.

Before the war broke out in 1917, Riverbank Laboratories volunteered the services of its unique group of cryptographic personnel, including Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, who trained the first class of Army cryptographers, to the U.S. government. During World War I, Lieutenant Friedman served in Army Intelligence. In 1921, his long government career began with the Signal Corps. He was chief cryptanalyst with the War Department from 1921 to 1947 when he became chief cryptologist for the Department of Defense.

In the 1950's, he was also a special assistant to the director of the National Security Agency and from 1955 until his death in 1969, he served as a consultant for the Defense Department.

While her husband was working for the War Department, Mrs. Friedman was employed by the Treasury Department unscrambling the codes and ciphers used by rum-runners during Prohibition. Her skills led to the capture of smugglers and the breakup of opium smuggling rings. She was selected to establish cryptographic communications for the International Monetary Fund and served the IMF as a consultant. From 1924 to 1942, she was chief of the Treasury Department's cryptographic section and a research analyst with the Navy Department from 1942 to 1946.

Shakespeare Questions

The Friedmans' interest were not limited to their government work. They continued their study of the Bacon-Shakespeare question and after several years concluded that there exists no proof that the author was other than Shakespeare. Their article, "The Cryptologist Looks at Shakespeare," was awarded the $1,000 Folger Shakespeare Library award in 1955 and was published by the Cambridge University Press as "The Shakespearean Ciphers Examined" in 1957.

In their collection, the Friedmans have included books and essays of the other major points of view on the Bacon-Shakespeare controversy, as well as those who support Shakespeare.

Also of great interest to the Friedmans was the science of archaeology. Many aspects of this study are represented in the collection. Among these are: the ruins of Europe and Scandinavia, Linear A and B of Crete, Stonehenge and Easter Island. The development of Western civilization is studied through the Aztecs, Incas and some North American Indians; however, the largest amount of material is about Mayan culture.

In the Friedman Collection, there are several hundred items relating to cryptography, cryptanalysis, secret writing and signalling, radar, telephony and telegraphy. To supplement the technical side of cryptography, the collection contains dictional works whose plots involve spies and codes, as well as popular books on cryptographic games for children and a set of the official publications of the American Cryptogram Association.

The Friedmans also gave the library valuable code books used in the Union Army during the Civil War and rare books on the subject of cryptography dating from the 1500's.

There is a large amount of material concerning Pearl Harbor and the controversy over who was to blame for the "Day of Infamy."

Roger Bacon

Of particular interest is a copy of the Voynich Manuscript which has been the subject of intense research for some years. Thought by some to be the work of Roger Bacon, the medieval monk and scientist, the manuscript has never been deciphered. Colonel Friedman and many others have attempted solution, including the late Rev. Theodore C. Petersen of Catholic University, Washington. Father Petersen bequeathed to the Friedman Collection his workbooks and color copies of the manuscript.

The third section of the collection is devoted to literature, particularly the works of James Joyce and Gertrude Stein. Colonel Friedman believed that the works of the authors composing the "cult of unintelligibility," were really of a cryptographic nature, since the authors deliberately attempted to conceal their true meanings.

Once the material has been integrated with the Marshall Library's holdings, it will become an important addition to the Lexington research facility.

NEWSWEEK
2 AUG 1971

HOAXES:

The Buckley Papers

They read like a conservative's answer to the Pentagon papers—fourteen pages of top-secret government documents urging, among other propositions, a bellicose "sharp knock" strategy for winning the Vietnam war fast and an exemplary nuclear drop off Haiphong Harbor. Enticingly labeled "The Secret Papers They Didn't Publish," this latest glimpse into the Washington policymaking process was served up last week in William F. Buckley Jr.'s National Review, accepted as fact—at least briefly—at the highest levels of government and republished by newspapers and wire services all across the country. The only trouble was it wasn't so. The day after the papers appeared, Buckley himself proclaimed the whole thing an elaborate hoax that he and his jolly staffers had fashioned "*ex nihilo*"—out of absolutely nothing.

The nuclear proposal was the biggest [illegible] the Buckley papers, but not the only [illegible]. The "documents," variously attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk and retired Adm. Arthur Radford, among others, also proposed closing Haiphong and Sihanoukville harbors, destroying North Vietnam's dikes, thermal power plants and rail links to China and "neutralizing" China's Hainan Island. All of which, Buckley insisted, was kidding on the square—a hoax designed to show "that the Pentagon and the CIA are not composed of incompetents . . . [and] that forged documents would be widely accepted as genuine provided their content was inherently plausible." Blandly Buckley added: "We admit that we proceeded in something of an ethical vacuum."

Denial: What not even Buckley reckoned on was the credulity of his audience—including principal characters in his "papers." Of the authors named in the series, only Daniel J. Boorstin, now director of Washington's National Museum of History and Technology, flatly denied he had authored the paper attributed to him. "I can't verify that I wrote any such memorandum," Rusk told newsmen. "It's entirely possible that I did." Fumbled former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow: "All I can say is that the memo expresses my views. I don't know for sure if and when I wrote it."



Conrad © 1971, Los Angeles Times

'We admit that we proceeded in something of an ethical vacuum'

The authenticity of the papers was hardly questioned—by the government or the press. Forewarned by Boorstin's denial, The New York Times ran a cautiously worded report on page 4. But several newspapers front-paged the story, the TV networks played it straight, the Voice of America broadcast it overseas and both United Press International and Associated Press moved it nationwide—with AP later finding itself forced to break in on its own straight-faced follow-up story on the papers to move a bulletin on Buckley's confession. The Justice Department, battle-weary after its vain attempt to suppress the first batches of Pentagon papers, said it would investigate this set, too. But at least one high-ranking Pentagon official declared the documents authentic ("There must be some counter-leakers"), another conscientiously wrote the comment "Good!" beside the nuclear "drop" proposal. The gist of Buckley's "secret" even reached all the way to the President, as part of his daily White House news digest.

Gag: The mileage was considerable for a gag hatched only two weeks before, at a Review dinner at Buckley's elegant New York apartment. According to his sister Priscilla, National Review's managing editor, Buckley broke into a discussion of the Pentagon papers with a puckish, "Hey, gang, what if . . ." Within 24 hours the project was under way. Five staffers, including Buckley, did the writing. A decoy cover went to press; the real cover, bannering the papers, was substituted only at the last moment. Buckley himself did the final pencil editing, and, after letters of warning had been sent out to 6,000 friends of the magazine, flew off to California to wait for the fun to begin. He chanced to be on the telephone to his office when The New York Times's managing editor, A.M. Rosenthal, called him to ask about the National Review pseudo-secrets. "Tell Mr. Rosenthal that I'm hiding with Daniel Ellsberg," Buckley instructed his secretary gleefully. "I'm sure he knows where to find me."

To be sure, not everyone was laughing. A number of critics sharply questioned the propriety of telling the world that the U.S. had contemplated the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam—or, for that matter, of joking about nuclear weapons at all. But Buckley, as usual, had a ready answer. "Any intelligent person who reads this," he told NEWSWEEK's Tom Mathews, "is going to say to himself, 'If Dean Rusk didn't disavow these papers, if Admiral Radford didn't, and if the Defense Department didn't, there must be something in them that's serious'."

NATION

Why Not?

Sen. John Sherman Cooper, long known and admired for his good common sense, has offered a good common-sense proposal to the Congress, namely, that the National Security Act of 1947 be amended to require the Central Intelligence Agency to keep the "germane" committees of the Congress "fully and currently" informed by means of "analyses in regular and special reports" incorporating the intelligence gathered by that agency.

The argument for the proposal is clear enough: Congress is entitled to the same information that the executive receives in order to pass considered judgments on matters pertaining to its responsibilities. And why not? Surprisingly, the existing legislation does not specifically bar dissemination of CIA-gathered intelligence to Congress, but neither does it require that Congress be informed. So, by a familiar bureaucratic process, the practice developed of using this intelligence to brief the executive, leaving Congress out in the cold to scrounge around and get what intelligence it could. This is one of the principal causes of the exclusion of the Congress from deciding on when to start wars and when to end them. Of course it retains the power of the purse, but few members of either House are courageous enough to stop a war by withholding funds—it leaves them open to the accusation that they are letting down "our boys," which can prove fatal at election time.

Under the Cooper amendment, CIA information would have limited Congressional circulation. It would be made available to the Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, whose members could pass along pertinent portions to other legislators and staff members working on national security matters, subject to the normal security requirements.

Note, in contrast, how the CIA reports are used under the present arrangement. The President, for his purposes, leaks a CIA report to, say, *The New York Times* on, say, the POW proposals of the North Vietnamese Government. Does the President call in the reporters and tell them candidly that here is a CIA report of general interest which I am divulging to all of you? He does nothing of the kind—he would rather play the leaking game. That is one reason why the executive prefers to hoard the information and withhold it from the Congress: he wants to be able to leak it when it serves his purpose to do so.

The damaging effects of this system are obvious. The Congress and the public are denied information on which vital decisions are based. The denial applies not only to military information but substantially to all data except what the executive chooses to share, which is always what will benefit him politically by enhancing his image and making him look, if not infallible, at least pretty close to it. The effect is to multiply errors as well as to hide them. The executive lacks the benefit of valuable feedback from the public and the press.

Senator Cooper has taken an important first step to limit the secrecy factor which bedevils our foreign relations. His remedy would broaden support for foreign policy and save us from involvement in another Indochina mess.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERIC
29 JULY 1971

MARIANNE MEANS

Congress Wants CIA Briefings

CIA officials are very concerned about a new Senate move to require their secretive agency to give detailed global intelligence to congressional committees on a regular basis.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled hearings this September on a controversial measure that would greatly expand the number of senators who have access to classified CIA evaluations and information.

The bill, proposed by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., would require the CIA to brief the full Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on a routine schedule, similar to the system under which the agency briefs top foreign policy officials of the executive branch.

ALARMED CIA OFFICIALS view the proposal as potentially jeopardizing their clandestine operations around the world. There are 110 congressmen on those four committees, and that's a lot of people to keep a secret. Consequently the CIA's three congressional liaison agents are trying quietly to have the measure killed.

The Senate however, is in a mood to expand its influence over Presidential foreign policy-making, and better intelligence is a vital tool toward that goal. The measure already has considerable supporters, including Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, and Sen. Stuart Symington, the only senator on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

The CIA now reports only to five special subcommittees of the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Those groups are concerned primarily with the CIA budget and operations. The CIA does not regularly brief Fulbright or other congressmen whose major interest is in the field of foreign policy.

SENATE LEADERS COMPLAIN that they are asked to authorize and fund Presidential decisions that may result in U.S. soldiers going into combat but are told little more than the general public about the information and analyses that prompted those decisions. Cooper, a long-time opponent of the war in Vietnam, introduced the bill in the wake of the Pentagon Papers. He was angry to discover from the papers that the CIA had warned President Johnson full-scale bombing of North Vietnam might not frighten Hanoi into giving up.

CIA officials fear that congressmen privy to intelligence secrets will not be able to resist the temptation of leaking — and perhaps misinterpreting — snatches of information that serve their own political purposes or can get them publicity. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular has long had a reputation for being a sieve.

But congressmen retort, justifiably, they are no worse at keeping secrets than the White House itself. It is common practice for White House and State Department officials to leak classified documents and secret foreign intelligence when it suits their purpose. For instance, the administration recently surfaced intelligence warnings of new Soviet missile sites to help generate support for military budget items.

Even so, the administration keeps reasonably tight control over the number of officials who have access to CIA intelligence and who have permission to leak selected secrets at the appropriate moments. Congress has no such control over its members, and the odds that an individual congressman might make a grievous error in judgment about what is safe to make public are not inconsiderable.

NATIONAL REVIEW
31 JUL 1971

The Missing Memoranda
1962-1966

THE SECRET PAPERS They Didn't Publish

The Makers of the Indochina War:

Strategy and counter-strategy from highly classified documents not published by the New York Times *and the* Washington Post, *leaked to* NATIONAL REVIEW

October 1964: The Air Force and the CIA: Who Says A, Must Say B

In early September, 1964, President Johnson appointed a special inter-departmental, inter-agency committee, referred to as OVERLOOK, to review the record of US activities in, and in relation to, Indochina from 1950 (the date of US recognition of Bao Dai, the first active intervention in the Indochinese conflict). The committee was instructed to submit its report and conclusions to the NSC prior to the end of the month, in conjunction with the new policy directives under discussion and due for decision in the first week of October. It was the normal practice of such committees, special or standing, as it was of the NSC, JCS, etc., to reach final agreement on a single report through discussion and, when necessary, compromise of any divergencies in viewpoint. In the case of OVERLOOK, however, two members—not named, but identified as from the Air Force and CIA—declined to endorse the report, and insisted on submitting a "minority" document, not so much disagreeing with the approved text as adding a further section. It is not clear whether this appendix was ever actually placed before the NSC or seen by the President.

1. As in numerous other reports, memoranda and recommendations drawn up since 1951 for JCS, NSC, SD, the President, various ad hoc committees, etc., the report of OVERLOOK fails to accept the implications of its own data and analysis, and therefore cannot serve as a correct guide for policy and plans.

2. From 1950 on, the nature and significance of US interest in Southeast Asia have been repeatedly stated, without essential dispute. E.g.:

Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy, 8 Nov 1961: ". . . The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatrick and I . . . are inclined to recommend that we do commit the United States to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military action. . . . If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. . . ."

Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy, 11 Nov 1961:

a) UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

. . . The loss of South Vietnam to

continued

Communism would involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Vietnam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation with the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Vietnam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty. . . .

> October 1964: "The US accepted the commitment to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. To make good on that commitment, the JCS (and other relevant agencies) have periodically proposed military, para-military, political, psychological, etc. measures.
>
> "Invariably the measures actually approved have been drastically scaled down, in both quantity and quality, from those proposed. In every case the reduced measures have failed to achieve the assigned objectives. This failure was predictable, and was in fact in a number of instances predicted, but no conclusion was ever drawn for future operations. On the contrary, the failures were rationalized, and the same process repeated at the next stage."

The loss of South Vietnam would not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of South Vietnam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration. . . .

b) THE UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communist [sic].

Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 13 Jan 1962; transmitted to President Kennedy 27 Jan without endorsement:

. . . MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

a. *Early Eventualities*—Loss of the Southeast Asian mainland would have an adverse impact on our military strategy and would markedly reduce our ability in limited war by denying us air, land and sea bases, by forcing greater intelligence effort with lesser results, by complicating military lines of communications and by the introduction of more formidable enemy forces in the area. Air access and access to 5,300 miles of mainland coastline would be outflanked, the last significant United Kingdom military strength in Asia would be eliminated with the loss of Singapore and Malaya and United States military influence in that area, short of war, would be difficult to exert.

b. *Possible Eventualities*—Of equal importance to the immediate losses are the eventualities which could follow the loss of the Southeast Asian mainland. All of the Indonesian archipelago could come under the domination and control of the USSR and would become a Communist base posing a threat to Australia and New Zealand. The Sino-Soviet bloc would have control of the eastern access to the Indian Ocean. The Philippines and Japan could be pressured to assume, at best, a neutralist role, thus eliminating two of our major bases in the Western Pacific. Our lines of defense then would be pulled north to Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan, resulting in the subsequent overtaking of our lines of communications in a limited war. India's ability to remain neutral would be jeopardized and, as the bloc meets success, its concurrent stepped-up activities to move into and control Africa can be expected. . . .

A memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson on "South Vietnam," 16 Mar 1964, and an NSC Action Memorandum (22) on "United States Objectives in South Vietnam," 17 Mar 1964, restate the analysis and objectives, and stress the added fact that the United States commitment to date "accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of United States capacity to help a nation to meet the Communist 'war of liberation.' "

> "The enemy will be able to adjust and adapt to our incremental escalation, no matter how high an absolute level it reached, so long as the pressure is increased only by slow and gradual steps. . . ."

3. Based on these premises, the US accepted the commitment to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. To make good on that commitment, the JCS (and other relevant agencies) has periodically proposed military, para-military, political, psychological, etc. measures.

4. Invariably the measures actually approved have been drastically scaled down, in both quantity and quality, from those proposed. In every case the reduced measures have failed to achieve the assigned objectives. This failure was predictable, and was in fact in a number of instances predicted, but no conclusion was ever drawn for future operations. On the contrary, the failures were rationalized, and the same process repeated at the next stage.

5. What has been at issue here has been, at bottom, a basic conflict between two strategic concepts: a) the strategy of what the Secretary of Defense has termed "graduated response," or what might be designated "incremental escalation"; b) the strategy of

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AFTR—Technical Research Vessel
ARVN—Army of (South) Vietnam
Chicom—Communist China
CINCPAC—Commander in Chief, Pacific
CPC—Communist Party of China
DD—Destroyer
DRV—Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam
ELINT—Electronic Interceptor
GNVN—Government of (North) Vietnam
GVN—Government of (South) Vietnam
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
LST—Landing Ship, Transport
MSF—Mine Sweeper, Fast
NLF—National Liberation Front
(in South Vietnam)
NSC—National Security Council
NVN—North Vietnam
PRP—People's Revolutionary Party
(in South Vietnam)
PTF—Patrol Boat, Fast
P3-A—Patrol Aircraft
SD—Secretary of Defense
SEA—South East Asia
SS—Submarine
SU—Soviet Union
SVN—South Vietnam
S2—Anti Submarine
[illegible] Chief, West Pacific

Cont

what the JCS has termed "the sharp knock," or what might be designated "quantum escalation."

6. The strategy of graduated response has been followed, in practice, to date. It has failed at each stage to achieve its immediate or promote its longer-term objective, and is thus proved deficient by experience. Its inadequacy can readily be demonstrated by general considerations. As the JCS has pointed out, the slowly increasing pressures of the "graduated response" strategy deprive the US of the military effects on the enemy of surprise and shock, and enable him to adjust to the slow quantitative and qualitative increase of pressure. There is no reason to predict that this situation could change in the foreseeable future. The enemy will be able to adjust and adapt to our incremental escalation, no matter how high an absolute level is reached, so long as the pressure is increased only by slow and gradual steps.

> "The internal conflict cannot be resolved without knocking NVN out of the war."

7. The liquidation of internal conflict in SVN, and the consolidation of a viable, self-sufficient non-Communist regime able to stand on its own feet politically, militarily, and economically is necessarily a long-term process (cf. Malaya). It does not, however, require a major American military presence. But the internal conflict cannot be resolved without knocking NVN out of the war, since it is NVN (with the backing and support of the USSR and the Chicoms) that commands and controls the internal SVN struggle, and is the primary source of arms, supplies, training, regroupment, and, to an increasing extent, personnel. To succeed in the long-term task of the liquidation of the internal subversion, NVN must be compelled to stop, or reduce to a minimum level, its intervention in the south. This can be done only by a "sharp knock" or succession of knocks delivered with a force and suddenness to which NVN cannot adjust and adapt, and which will present the GNVN with a prospect in face of which it will choose to give up its objective of taking over SVN, in preference to risking its own destruction.

> "Demonstration drop of nuclear device . . . followed by use of nuclear bombs and devices where militarily suitable."

8. The conclusion follows that the US must abandon the strategy of graduated response and shift to the "sharp knock" (quantum escalation) strategy in relation to NVN. This will mean adoption of one or more, as necessary and in rapid succession, of the sharply escalated measures that have been proposed and studied, and for which contingency plans have long existed. E.g.:

a) Closing of Haiphong and Sihanoukville harbors, and blockade of NVN and Cambodian coast.

b) Rapid destruction of all NVN thermal power installations.

c) Destruction of rail lines linking NVN and China.

d) Destruction of Red River dikes and irrigation systems, thus of primary NVN food source.

e) Neutralization of Hainan.

f) Demonstration drop of nuclear device, as projected (cf. memorandum from Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman JCS, to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, 26 May 1954, and supporting exhibits), followed by use of nuclear bombs and devices where militarily suitable, if GNVN does not respond. . . .

9. It is of the essence of the proposed strategic shift that each operation should be massive and concentrated, to ensure a maximum psychological as well as physical effect.

10. The objective with respect to NVN would be constantly and publicly reiterated: that NVN end its intervention in SVN. It would be made clear that US operations against NVN (and NVN personnel in SVN) would cease as soon as the GNVN agreed to end the intervention, or showed in action that it was bringing the intervention to an end. There is every reason to assume that this objective so stated will present US policy in the most favorable form from the point of view of most other nations.

11. The course and nature of the conflict demonstrate that the US can achieve its declared objective only by adoption of a strategic approach along the lines herein proposed, which are moreover in keeping with US combat tradition. This has been recognized by many for some while, especially within the military and intelligence structures. There remains to draw the final, and logically inescapable, conclusion: that if, for whatever reason, it is decided to be paramountly undesirable to adopt such a strategy—and therefore as a consequence impossible to achieve our objective—the US should renounce its commitment in Southeast Asia, and withdraw as rapidly as is physically possible.

> "If, for whatever reason, it is decided to be paramountly undesirable to adopt such a strategy the US should renounce its commitment in Southeast Asia, and withdraw as rapidly as is physically possible."

December 1964: That Resistance in Vietnam Be Projected As Part of a Global Strategy, Or It Will Be Rejected by Our Allies

This planning memorandum, originating in the office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security, was circulated by the Secretary of Defense to a number of high-ranking officials in the Pentagon, in the last week of December, 1964.

TO: OSD
FROM: ISA

RE: International repercussions of projected overt armed intervention in SVN

1. The public meaning of US armed intervention in VN can be established only in a global rather than a merely regional context. Whatever we say or do will be interpreted by the world either as a US betrayal of one of its

continued

allies, or as a US act of aggression, alternatively, as an act of loyalty — treaty obligations and a justified reaction to Communist aggression.

2. The global context is established by two historical facts: the global nature of the Communist threat, and the global system of Free World defenses against it. The Communist threat is global because the Communists speak and think of their ultimate goal in terms of all mankind; also because each nation falling victim to Communist expansion is seen by other nations not as having been brought into this or that sphere of regional influence but rather as having been subjected to totalitarian dictatorship. This fate is understood by all other still free nations as one potentially threatening them, too, so that any particular Communist takeover is experienced by all free nations as a bell that tolls also for them.

3. In response to Communist aggression, the US and its allies have created a system of treaties, both collective and bilateral, of which SEATO is an integral part. While the treaties are not made legally dependent on each other, they are linked by the common factor of political stamina that results from the US commitment to the defense of nations exposed to Communist invasion and subversion. The prospect of US help enables each of these exposed countries to sustain its will to be free rather than to hop on the Communist bandwagon "while there is still time." If any of the exposed nations felt it necessary to look on future Communist rule as a foregone conclusion and reminded itself, either from observation or past experience, how hopeless is any internal opposition to an established totalitarian regime, a rapidly increasing number would hasten to join up today rather than tomorrow. In this interdependence of US commitment and the political stamina of exposed nations, the obligation of the US under the various defense treaties is like an international litmus paper: so long as the US stands by its obligations, the exposed countries will dare to feel secure; once the US fails an ally, the coloring of the paper will change, and every one of our allies will come to feel exposed, alone and ultimately doomed.

4. US global resistance to Communist expansion stems not from an arrogant desire to play policeman all over the world but from the simple calculation that not only our national security but also world peace are bound up with the resistance of the exposed nations to Communism. Each new nation to fall under Communist rule swells the total resources at the disposal of that enterprise. Czechoslovakia is today Soviet-occupied, which means that its arms and machines go wherever Moscow desires them to go. If Europe and Southeast Asia should fall under Communist control, the Communist bloc's power resources would so overbalance ours that our hope for survival would come to rest wholly in the potential use of our nuclear weapons.

> "Since 1968 we have followed a policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, and have in fact projected a significant distinction between Asian Communism and Russian Communism. If we were to continue this line, we would bar ourselves from presenting the conflict in Vietnam as part of a global threat of Communism and our own action as an integral element in a global system of resistance to Communist expansion. To engage in military action in what would then appear as a purely 'Asian' war would mean to risk not only the loss of the only justification for our action, but also the rise of a hostile 'Asianism' resenting our 'white' presence there."

5. If SVN should be allowed to fall to Communist insurgency while we are present but merely looking on, the first countries to draw obvious conclusions for themselves would be the divided ones, Germany and Korea. The effect of that event in SEA has been designated the "domino theory." That term suggests something like an automatic or mechanical effect of the fall of SVN on its neighbors. Actually, the effect would consist of a radical re-assessment of the world situation and of the chance of anti-Communist resistance in areas contiguous to Communist-dominated territory, setting in motion strong psychological and political forces favoring a yielding to Communism as the "wave of the future." This effect would not be confined to SEA but would also occur Europe, the northern tier of the Middle East, and even in parts of LA. One could expect NATO's seams to loosen or even burst; all other parts of our alliance system would be critically examined by our allies, with a strong disposition to pull out and look for alternative shelters.

6. If, on the other hand, we intervene massively in Vietnam, given the global context of our commitments, repercussions may result from the geopolitical character of this particular theater which might be looked upon as the wrong place. One could expect that some of our NATO allies, who rallied strongly in view of the fall of Czechoslovakia, would not consider the fall of SVN as a direct threat and would take a dim view of our action there. They might even conclude that our commitment in SEA takes away from the attention we can give to European security.

7. The same considerations would have applied to Korea. In that case, we obtained not only the consent but the active participation of a goodly part of our allies. We succeeded in this because we based our intervention in Korea not on regional strategic motivations but on global ones: both the global threat of Communism, and also the desire, within the UN framework of collective security, to punish "aggression" in the abstract. The Korean experience should warn us not to present the conflict in Vietnam in a mere regional context but continuously to emphasize its global significance. In a merely regional context, our intervention there would also look to many as if it were an act of imperialism.

8. It follows that the most important

> "In this interdependence of US commitment and the political stamina of exposed nations, the obligation of the US under the various defense treaties is like an international litmus paper: so long as the US stands by its obligations, the exposed countries will dare to feel secure; once the US fails an ally, the coloring of the paper will change, and every one of our allies will come to feel exposed, alone and ultimately doomed."

continued

repercussion of our intervention in Vietnam is bound to occur in our own relations with the Soviet Union. Since 1963 we have followed a policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, and have in fact projected a significant distinction between Asian Communism and Russian Communism. If we were to continue this line, we would bar ourselves from presenting the conflict in Vietnam as part of a global threat of Communism and our own action as an integral element in a global system of resistance to Communist expansion. To engage in military action in what would then appear as a purely "Asian" war would mean to risk not only the loss of the only justification for our action, but also the rise of a hostile "Asianism" resenting our "white" presence there.

December 1964: An Eminent Private Citizen Is Consulted: Keep Your Eyes on the Soviet Union

Private Communication to the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, signed "DA" (Dean Acheson?).

December 14, 1964

The honor of being asked for my opinion on an overt military intervention in Vietnam with combat units is highly appreciated. I am returning the classified documents and other materials which you so kindly put at my disposal. You could not expect me to pass on the military aspects of the projected policy. I shall confine my remarks to a few ideas about the political aspects.

1. The military potential of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces is bound to remain small except for outside aid. The Chicoms can supply light weapons, food and some fuel. Most substantial aid would come from the Soviet Union. Without Soviet help our operations could be kept in a very low key.

2. Soviet aid alone could raise the level of warfare to the point where both its scope and duration would turn into a problem of first magnitude, both internationally and on the homefront. Our relations with the Soviet Union and our chances of minimizing Soviet aid to North Vietnam are therefore of vital importance in the entire picture.

3. Since 1963 we have been engaged on a course of accommodation with the Soviet Union, to the point where we have accorded quite differential treatment to Communism in Russia as distinct from Communism in China. We have publicly stated that the Cold War is ended and that we consider the Soviet Union a power wholly committed to the cause of peace.

4. If we were to engage our military forces in Vietnam and at the same time to cling to this line of accommodation with the SU, we would find ourselves in an extremely weak diplomatic position vis-à-vis Soviet aid to Vietnam. We would be compelled practically to ignore that aid and would be deprived of diplomatic leverage for its reduction.

5. Even more serious consequences could result on the homefront, and in relations with our European and Asian allies. If we make a significant distinction between Communism of Moscow and Communism of Peiping, and call the first one our friend and the second our enemy, the impression must result that in Vietnam we are not fighting Communism but rather China, or, what is even worse, the Liberation forces of Vietnam. It will be impossible then to make sense of this war, for we have no urgent direct national interests that would bid us go to war against Vietnam, or even China. Vietnam, like Korea, is a far-away place, and the only way in which US armed intervention there can be justified is in terms of the global threat of Communism.

> "My considered opinion is that as long as we are unwilling to discontinue the policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, we should not involve our forces in overt fighting in Vietnam. . . . We should put the blame for a breakdown of the pattern of agreements and cooperation on the shoulder of the Soviet Union and hold out the prospect of returning to that pattern in the same measure in which Soviet aid to Vietnam will be reduced."

6. If we continue the course of accommodation with the Soviet Union, we would also feel ourselves inhibited from taking military steps that would keep Soviet aid from reaching North Vietnamese forces, e.g. closing ports of entry to Soviet ships.

7. My considered opinion is that as long as we are unwilling to discontinue the policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, we should not involve our forces in overt fighting in Vietnam.

8. If the decision, however, should be made in favor of overt intervention in Vietnam, I urge very strongly that we make it clear to the Soviet Union that we are doing so in response to a Communist violation of the status quo in SEA, that we would react with equal determination to a violation of the status quo in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere, and that we cannot have one policy in Europe and another in Asia. We should put the blame for a breakdown of the pattern of agreements and cooperation on the shoulder of the Soviet Union and hold out the prospect of returning to that pattern in the same measure in which Soviet aid to Vietnam will be reduced. As programs and policies adopted since 1962/3 are being dismantled one after the other, we should do this in close consultation with our NATO allies and with flanking operations in the UN.

9. The overriding purpose of this shift in our policy to the Soviet Union should be a double one: a) to minimize Soviet aid to Vietnam, and b) to keep before the eyes of the world and of our people the meaning of this war, which is the containment of Communist imperialism.

Continued

July 1964: 'The Structure and the Objectives of the 'National Liberation Front'

Excerpt from Confidential Memorandum prepared by Douglas Pike and Frank Trager at the request of Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy, July, 1964.

1. The widespread impression exists that the conflict-process in Vietnam is a civil war on the traditional model among and/or between contending local factions. This is an illusion. Unless the fundamental novelty of the Vietnamese situation is understood, no general support for the war on the part of the American public can be anticipated. The authors of this memorandum would like to put particular stress on the factor of novelty.

2. The familiar term Viet Cong, a contraction of Viet Nam Cong San, meaning Vietnamese Communist, is imprecise. In itself, the term Viet Cong is a barrier to the understanding.

3. The so-called Viet Cong actually consists of three interlocking but distinct elements: 1) the People's Revolutionary Party, or Communist Party of Vietnam, 2) the Liberation Army and 3) the National Liberation Front, comprised of some twenty or more socio-political entities.

4. One aspect of the "novelty factor" concerns the history of the National Liberation Front, or NLF. Unlike previous "fronts," such as the Popular Front of the 1930s and '40s, the NLF structure came into being in 1960 before there were any entities for the "front" to, so to speak, front for. When it was founded on December 20, 1960—incidentally, in Hanoi pursuant to a decision taken at the 15th meeting of the Lao Dong (Communist Party) Central Committee in May, 1959—it was correctly considered a phantom entity, existing only on paper. Gradually, however, the paper design was fleshed out.

5. A key factor in the fleshing out of the paper skeleton of the NLF was the announcement, early in 1960, of Soviet support for so-called "national wars of liberation." This meant that dissident factions within any underdeveloped nation would have maximum Soviet support when they could mount an insurgency. In effect, the policy of supporting "national wars of liberation" was a Soviet declaration of war against the US, in the sense that the Soviet Union was saying that it would employ its full military and political resources to upset the balance of power in vital sectors of the world.

6. Returning to Vietnam, the military-political thrust there must be fully understood. Let us take each of the three interlocking elements separately.

7. The National Liberation Front, or NLF, consists of administrative and functional elements.

a) The administrative structure is in essence an alternative government. It is hierarchical in nature, with the NLF Central Committee at the apex. Lines of command run down through intervening administrative committees to administrative groups operative at the village level. This is the administrative central nervous system of the National Liberation Front.

> "A key factor in the fleshing out of the paper skeleton of the NLF was the announcement, early in 1960, of Soviet support for so-called 'national wars of liberation.' . . . In effect, the policy of supporting 'national wars of liberation' was a Soviet declaration of war against the US."

b) The functional units comprise such groups as the Workers' Liberation Association, the Women's Liberation Association, the Youth Liberation Association, the Student Liberation Association, the Cultural Liberation Association (school teachers. librarians, etc.), the Patriotic and Democratic Journalists' Association, as well as externally-oriented groups such as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee. This structure is disciplined and subject to tight control by the NLF Central Committee.

8. Until January, 1962 the Communist Party of South Vietnam [illegible] the Southern Branch of the Vietnam Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong). At that time it changed its name to the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, with tighter organizational control by the DRV Communist hierarchy in Hanoi. The PRP is not the only political element in the NLF, but it is the dominant one. The PRP is described as "t[illegible]" of the NLF, the "engine of the revolution," the "vanguard." It has "fraternal ties" with Communist parties elsewhere.

9. The NLF, dominated by the PRP, thus constitutes a partly indigenous southern structure, an alternative government, with chain-of-command relations to the DRV hierarchy in the North.

10. The Liberation Army of the NLF consists of two elements, a Full Military Force and a Paramilitary Force. The former is usually referred to as the Main Force, sometimes as the "hard hats" (because of the fibre-board Viet Minh helmets worn), and consists of some 75-80,000 regular troops. The Paramilitary Force, or guerrillas, about three times that number, is comprised of both men and women. The Paramilitary Force itself consists of two types of guerrilla: a) the classic guerrilla band, operating in a remote area, and b) the Local Guerrilla, a part-time fighter who may work by day and carry out guerrilla actions at night.

11. The objective of all three elements described above is political power. The political goals are identical to those of Communist parties elsewhere. The NLF is most accurately understood not as an indigenous South Vietnamese phenomenon but as an administrative arm of the DRV extending itself South through political-military pressure and organization.

12. NLF popularity was at its pinnacle in 1962-63, but since that time has dropped precipitously. NLF village cadres have increasingly exhibited paranoiac behavior with regard to the possible presence of "spies." Prisoners freed by allied troops from NLF jails have told harrowing stories of "justice" in the villages. Villagers can now [illegible] according to NLF

continued

directives. The villagers resent the "thought reform sessions," the increasing tax levies and the conscripting of young men into the Liberation Army. Of local supporters of the NLF, it is certain that a very high proportion should be classified as unwilling supporters. The secret of continuing NLF strength in the countryside is efficient organization, plus the poor communications with the central government characteristic of Vietnamese society at its present stage of development.

13. No certainty exists as to how the NLF would behave if it succeeded in wresting power from the Saigon government. Based on its current administrative structure, it would be expected to establish a totalitarian structure closely linked with that of DRV. Based on experience elsewhere, a struggle might be anticipated within the emerging NLF regime between guerrilla elements, or some of them, and the central apparatus. Given the disposition of power within the PRP, dissident guerrillas and other dissident elements might be expected to lose this struggle. The central apparatus would have the political and military backing of the DRV government in Hanoi.

> "NLF village cadres have increasingly exhibited paranoiac behavior with regard to the possible presence of 'spies.' Prisoners freed by allied troops from NLF jails have told harrowing stories of 'justice' in the villages. Villagers can now be shot on the spot according to NLF directives."

14. The authors of this memorandum would now like to move beyond the descriptive into the projective.

a) Clearly, the first question must be: What will be the fate of the non-Communist government of South Vietnam if the United States does nothing? The answer here is plain. The established NLF organization, controlled by the Communist North and backed by the Soviet Union and Communist China, will make the country ungovernable. The techniques for accomplishing this are well-known.

b) Suppose the United States pursues the course of protracted conflict, shoring up the Saigon regime, but at the same time providing enough muscle for the Saigon regime to make significant progress against the NLF?

It must be clear here that the DRV can match US input in such a way as to neutralize it. Diversionary attacks will be carried out at various points to tie down the US forces. Meanwhile, the protracted conflict will be inconclusive.

15. From the above, one conclusion seems inescapable. The conflict in the South cannot be successfully concluded unless the North is definitively prevented from sustaining its political and/or military structure in the South.

August 1966: A Former Ambassador Reminds the Secretary of State Of the Historical Uses of National Liberation Fronts

Private letter from Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, Ambassador to Vietnam 1957-1961, to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, dated August 10, 1966.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Our presence in Vietnam and our commitment to the objective of keeping South Vietnam from falling to the Communists are continuously assailed by the charge that we are in fact preventing a people from achieving its unity and the National Liberation Front from carrying out an essentially patriotic job. Is there no way of making clear to the world that national liberation is a cause that Communists have exploited repeatedly to establish their rule?

You know that in Vietnam two movements for gaining national liberty have existed since the early Thirties: one Communist and the other nationalist. You remember, of course, that during the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia there also emerged Mihailovich and Tito, a genuinely nationalist and a Communist liberation movement; in that case, the British and we backed the wrong horse, as it turned out later. At present, the Communists still maintain sleeper liberation movements in Malaysia and the Philippines, after the nationalistic forces beat them in the struggles of the Fifties. Incidentally, a specially instructive case is Byelorussia, where the Communists first created a national liberation movement, then got into power with the help of it, and finally crushed it with much bloodshed. It seems that national liberation is a game in which many players can participate, and with different motives. The actual term "National Liberation Front" seems to have been the exclusive property of Communist organizations in Greece, Yemen, Venezuela and other places.

> "A specially instructive case is Byelorussia, where the Communists first created a national liberation movement, then got into power with the help of it, and finally crushed it with much bloodshed."

The Communists have long ago embraced the principle that there are certain "holy" causes to which people will flock, and that these causes can and must be put at the service of the Communist strategy. Since 1949, they have skillfully exploited the "peace" movement. Even earlier, they put the strong pulling power of "anti-fascism" before their wagon, and "national liberation" as well as the peasants' hunger for land have been their special mounts ever since Lenin's days.

A Communist-run National Liberation Front is nothing but a special branch of Communist military, paramilitary and administrative machinery that uses and misuses the patriotism of honest people for its ultimate partisan purposes.

In this day of "accommodation" with the Soviet Union, has it become diplomatically impossible to remind the world of these truths?

Sincerely yours,
Elbridge Durbrow

continued

June 1964: A Summary of What Is To Be Expected from the Soviet Union

Memorandum of Special CIA Task Force on Soviet Posture in the event of US Armed Intervention in SVN.

(Requested by White House in May, 1964. Delivered and filed June 12.)

SUMMARY

Probable reaction of SU to open military intervention by US armed forces in SVN:

1. The Soviet Union presently operates under the strategy formulated by various Party documents published in November, 1957, December, 1960, and November, 1961 (Tab. I). These documents contain the Party's official appraisal of the world situation and strategic directives for the present period. They resemble similar documents previously adopted in 1920, 1928, 1935, each of which was held binding until the adoption of its successor.

2. The present strategy commits the SU to avoiding an all-out nuclear conflict with the West, also to avoiding "local wars" which might lead to a general conflict, but on the other hand to taking "a most positive attitude" toward "national liberation wars" and "popular uprisings." (Khrushchev's speech, Jan. 6, 1961, Tab. II.) This pattern, called "peaceful co-existence," is meant to be accompanied by sharply intensified "ideological struggle." It envisages great internal tensions and pressures occasioned in Western countries by ongoing "national liberation wars" and looks on them as opportunities for Communists to enter into coalitions with Social Democrats, pacifists, progressive and liberal forces, and others generally opposed to present Western policies, and through such coalitions to obtain control of this or that Western government.

3. The strategy thus has a military and a political dimension, the latter being a design to help Communists achieve what they call "peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism," which in turn depends on Communist governmental control attained without the cost of civil war. The takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 has convinced Soviet leadership that the way into governmental power with the help of a general leftist coalition is feasible and in general the surest way to a Communist triumph. They are not likely to jeopardize their great expectations in this regard for anything less than an international emergency.

4. The Soviet Union might break this entire policy pattern if it were faced by a direct military or political threat to its home base. Overt US intervention in Vietnam, however, will rather confirm the Soviet adherence to the present strategy. Not even a US military victory in SEA is likely to provoke the Soviet Union to a direct nuclear threat against the US, or to the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Vietnam theater.

5. The resort to serious diversions (Berlin? Middle East? LA?) would lie athwart the main line of the new strategy which aims to make Communists acceptable to potential coalition partners. One may assume, therefore, that even in the presence of overt US military action in VN, the Soviets will be disposed to play the game of "accommodation" as they have done since 1962/3.

6. One should assume that for reasons of political exploitation Moscow is interested in the longest possible duration of a war in VN. The SU is likely to furnish Hanoi with substantial arms, escalating its [illegible] proportionately to the rise of our [illegible] pressures, and enabling Hanoi to go beyond guerrilla warfare to "stage III"—conventional warfare—which according to Maoist principles is alone suitable for bringing a war to a victorious conclusion.

7. Only a war of long duration will enable Soviet propaganda to exploit the situation fully with a view to the eventual developments of domestic politics mentioned under (2). The goal of a Soviet propaganda campaign of long duration would be to identify the US government and its allies in SVN with imperialism, racism, militarism, fascism and aggression, and to alienate the US government from the people.

8. The Sino-Soviet conflict will contribute to keeping Soviet aid to the DRV vigorous but inconclusive. A DRV victory attributable mainly to Chinese help can be as little in Moscow's interest as a DRV defeat attributable to insufficient Soviet aid. Moscow is presently in no position to deny Peiping strong influence in the area and, for ideological reasons, will not withhold a certain amount of practical cooperation with China, in regard to the DRV.

June 1964: A Summary of What Is To Be Expected from Communist China

Memorandum of Special CIA Task Force on Chicom Posture in event of US Armed Intervention in SVN.

(Requested by White House in May, 1964. Delivered and filed June 7.)

SUMMARY

1. China intervened in the second phase of the Korean war when the North Korean army was on the point of being annihilated; her intervention eventually served to save North Korea and establish the cease-fire line near the 38th parallel. It should be assumed that China is likely to intervene directly in the Vietnam war only if and when the forces of the DRV are on the point of total defeat.

2. Even then, the situation now is

continu

not what it was in 1951. Internal events in China have put severe limitations on the regime's ability for external action:

a) The CPC is deeply split between the adherents of Mao and the regular Party apparatus; Mao, who still has charismatic leadership, has nevertheless been put on a siding.

b) Widespread disaffection prevails in the countryside as evidenced by the 29 issues of *Kung-tso T'ung hsün* (the *Red Army Bulletin*) which recently fell into our hands (Tab. I).

c) The Sino-Soviet split compels the Peiping regime to count on the possibility of a military conflict with the Soviet Union, which automatically puts a two-front prospect on any military venture in the South.

d) Chinese production has been distorted and severely set back by the "great leap forward."

e) Peiping has reflected its awareness of all of these limitations in a stance of great caution, as evidenced by her reticence in the Indian war, and vis-à-vis Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

3. The Chicoms are obviously interested in a protracted duration of any war in Vietnam in which the US would be involved. China will seek to keep this war going by a steady flow of substantial supplies, short of committing her own forces to a potential clash with US armed forces. China would draw advantages from a long war not only as she exploited the war in a propaganda campaign against the US, but also in the weakening of Hanoi and Hanoi's increasing dependence on China. The dependence could not be greater if Chinese troops were dispatched to the DRV since these troops would rather awaken the Vietnamese memory of past Chinese domination.

4. The likelihood of a Chinese commitment of troops to the SVN theater is further reduced because of the flanking threat from Taiwan, to which Chicom communications and transport lines would be exposed, especially when the US Seventh Fleet and Okinawa-based aircraft and installations are taken into account.

December 1963: The CIA Makes Psychological Assessments, Advises against 'LTW'

11 December 1963

TO: Secretary of Defense
Pentagon

FROM: Head,
Division of Psychological Assessment
CIA

RE: Psychological Evaluation of Warfare Involvement in Southeast Asia

BACKGROUND:

The US has a treaty obligation in Indochina. The wisdom of the commitment rests on the belief that US security interests, global and in the Pacific, will be gravely threatened if the US does not maintain a policy of containment. If the Administration holds this is no longer true, we recommend all troops and advisors be withdrawn from Vietnam. If this belief is still held, we emphatically recommend immediate massive escalation of the war effort. While it is not our function to prepare the form this will take militarily, it is our duty to advise on the psychological consequences of war on both the Vietnamese people as well as on the American public. These we feel will prove critical.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The psychological warfare division recommends Short Term Warfare (STW) which will reduce loss of life for both the US, the ARVN, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Long Term Warfare (LTW) will yield a no-win posture, thousands of deaths, and will have serious effects on our, as well as Saigon's, political institutions.

DISCUSSION:

A. *Effects on Vietnamese*

Long Term Warfare (LTW): The Vietnamese have already been subjected to a prolonged conflict. Killing, pillage and all the rest is already a commonplace occurrence. Yet, the conflicts to date are small in size and specific in damage. They have in a sense adapted to this continuing nuisance.

LTW with continual American troop and armory movements, bombing, search and destroy missions will have a disastrous effect on the Vietnamese population. At the present the alternatives for allegiance for the Vietnamese farmers are not compelling. The Viet Cong demands are contrary to their traditional values, and the Saigon government has not been convincing in its agrarian programs. In the long run troop movements criss-crossing this population will only find the Viet Cong ahead, if not by assent then by terror. Additionally, of course, there will be a great toll on the landscape and environmental resources of the country if LTW takes place.

> "Long Term Warfare (LTW) will yield a no-win posture, thousands of deaths, and will have serious effects on our, as well as Saigon's, political institutions. . . . Gradual, slow escalation of the war over a period of years does not create in the Vietnamese people a sense of purpose or destiny. It will only create horror and depression. . . . The Administration should not start the Vietnamese operations if they see the war as an LTW affair."

More specifically, the threat or presence of war has obvious ill effects on a population. For those who understand the ideological issues and are committed to them, the war is viewed as a necessary evil and the concomitant tragedies are endured with relatively little psychological harm. Clearly, this is a relatively small part of the Vietnamese population. The majority live with a day-to-day philosophy and passively accept and prefer peace and quiet as a way of life over freedom. Prolonged war will alienate this population and tend to make them incorrigible. Also the ravages of war will tend to disrupt this segment of the population more than any other.

Short Term Warfare (12-24 months): The objective of war is to win and to do so as quickly and with as little loss

continued

of life, property and societal stability as possible. This objective can only be achieved by a quick "In and Out" move. Gradual, slow escalation of the war over a period of years does not create in the Vietnamese people a sense of purpose or destiny. It will only create horror and depression. With a quick and purposeful strike involving bombing and possible invasion of the North, the Vietnamese will respond with clarity and determination.

B. *American Public Opinion*

LTW: It would be an error to assume a protracted conflict in Southeast Asia would be supported by the American people. Any move on the part of the US will be criticized by a large vocal minority. This minority will grow with time, for it is in the nature of the American people to wish not to be or seem to be belligerent. When it appears there are ambiguities in our purpose (and this state of affairs will surely emerge in a war effort only abstractly involving American interests), public opinion will disengage their support gradually and completely.

It is the attitude of those about to go into the armed forces or of normally liberally minded youth which will turn aggressive. As their anxiety about the faceless war grows, their hostility towards the American government and its institutions will become more intense. They will observe they are acting aggressively towards their own government and its policies—an attitude that they are not historically comfortable with—and to explain these actions they will conclude that all government policy is bad and its officers corrupt and immoral. This kind of attitude development process is well understood, and it works like clockwork.

As a result the Administration should not start the Vietnamese operations if they see the war as an LTW affair.

STW: If the American public were prepared for the events in and around an STW operation they would overwhelmingly support the effort. Opinion would have to be shaped as carefully as it has been done in the past (See TOP SECRET-Sens. 1987439—ROSEVLT—WW2). There would still be serious criticism of the policy but it would remain minor if the entire event was over within 12 to 24 months.

September 1962: Consultant to CIA Examines US Antiwar Potential

The following memorandum ("Some Observations on the Psycho-Political Dimension of the Vietnam Conflict: Enemy Operations and Internal Dissidence"), dated 12 Sep 1962 and routed pro forma to the Director, CIA, was presumably prepared by a covert CIA consultant (not identified except through the designator 02.731).

1. Communist doctrine understands psycho-political operations to be a major weapons system, and potentially, at least in certain instances, the decisive weapons system. In the Vietnam conflict, the US has the capability of bringing to bear in the local theater an overwhelming preponderance of conventional—not to speak of nuclear—weapons. This fact dictates, for the Communists, a high priority for the psycho-political system, since in this capability the Communists possess superiority. In terms of total strategy, psycho-political operations offer the potential of outflanking the enemy, that is, the US.

2. It is with respect to psycho-political operations that the essentially global nature of the conflict is most unmistakably apparent. In routine day-by-day activities of the Communist-ruled nations and Communist organizations, there are divergences and disputes: cf., most conspicuously, the Sino-Soviet disputes, as well as the factional and ideological fissions between and in local Communist parties and front organizations. But in a struggle defined as against the leader of world imperialism, a united front of all Communist elements, governments as well as nongovernmental organizations, automatically tends to sharpen up. The psycho-political campaign is, in sum, both global and unified. (A tight command structure and continuous liaison are not required, since the shared ideological foundations and historical goals assure, for the most part, a sufficient coordination.) The psycho-political campaign is carried forward by and from Moscow, Peiping, Warsaw, Havana, Hanoi and even Belgrade, together with all Communist parties and satellite organizations, Moscow-oriented, Trotskyite, Maoist, revisionist, adventurist, etc. This has been demonstrated throughout the past decade of comparatively low-profile struggle in Indochina, and will become more strikingly apparent when—as has become probable—the struggle is escalated.

3. From the point of view of Communist conflict management, psycho-political operations constitute one dimension or mode of their total war. Within their global framework, Indochina and territorial [illegible] active local theaters or fronts. The US thus should consider itself engaged in a two-front (in the larger and long-term sense, global) war. It is probable that the enemy regards territorial US as the main front.

4. Among primary objectives of Communist psycho-political operations are, and will be, the following:

a) *Global, long-term*: Weakening of the relative power position of the US; promotion of discords between US and other nations, especially allied nations; promotion of anti-US attitude in less developed nations; all as subordinate to long-term objective of defeat of US and thereby achievement of Communist global hegemony.

b) *Indochinese theater, specific*: Popularization of image of US as invading imperialist aggressor, anti-masses, anti-Asian, white racist, fascist, protector of local landlords, grafters and exploiters, etc.; presentation of Saigon government (so long as under anti-Communist leadership) as tool of US imperialism, corrupt, murderous, etc. (cf. current operation re President Diem); use of all opportune means to drive wedge between Saigon government and US; utilization of US personnel (civilian and military) as carriers, conscious or unconscious, of Communist psycho-political initiatives.

[illegible] *long-term*: Utiliza-

cont'

tion of Indochina conflict situation as opportunity to advance in long-term campaign to maximize potential fissions and splits within US social structure, and to promote division between government and people.

d) *US theater, specfic*: Maximum exploitation of antiwar sentiment, spontaneously present under the prevailing climate of opinion, in relation to a conflict of this nature (far-off, not obviously related to direct national interest, drawn-out and frustrating, etc.); transformation of antiwar sentiment into a dissident, to the extent possible a subversive, movement against the US government and social order; atrocity propaganda; sympathetic stories and reports of VC and NVN; continuous anti-Saigon government propaganda.

5. Within the US theater (as global) the longtime fellow-travelers, sympathizers and dupes of the Communists —including those who have remained covert—have automatically lined up in a de facto united front. Some of them are already finding their way to Hanoi, forming committees, etc., and establishing active contact with their similars in other countries—in many cases reviving old acquaintances from numerous Communist-controlled conferences sponsored by the World Peace Council and other international fronts. However, in the present situation the "antiwar movement"—assuming that the Vietnam conflict is to be protracted and expanded—extends potentially far beyond the circles with which the Communists and/or fellow travelers have in the past been able to establish active contact. If the conflict is long, protracted and frustrating, it is safe to predict that an antiwar movement formidable in size and intensity will develop from many sectors of the population: the youth (with the additional motivation of fear or hatred of the draft); the intellectuals; the clergy; the media; the left wings of the major parties; in due course, political figures either influenced by ideological considerations or feeling that antiwar is the wave of the electoral future.

> "In the present situation the 'antiwar movement'—assuming that the Vietnam conflict is to be protracted and expanded—extends potentially far beyond the circles with which the Communists and/or fellow travelers have in the past been able to establish active contact. If the conflict is long, protracted and frustrating, it is safe to predict that an antiwar movement formidable in size and intensity will develop from many sectors of the population. . . . If the antiwar movement reached a sufficiently broad and developed level—as it would probably do if the conflict is sufficiently drawn out—this would mean that the Communists would be in a position of psycho-political leverage from which they could exercise a considerable degree of control over the US political process, at least with respect to Indochina."

6. This antiwar sentiment and the mass antiwar movement into which it has already begun to develop has historical, psychological and moral roots not overtly related to Communism or the Communists. The Communists and their allies, in the US and globally, will not exercise direct control over its development and all of its activities, though they will over some. But, objectively considered, the antiwar movement will constitute a receptor for the Communist psycho-political operations: it will be, in a general way, in resonance. This means that Hanoi, the Communist apparatus in the US, and global Communism will be able to use the antiwar movement as a transmitting mechanism through which their ideas, slogans and proposals of the moment can reach and influence the broad US public in a "denatured" form, stripped of the taint of a too obviously Communist or enemy (Hanoi) origin. If the antiwar movement reached a sufficiently broad and developed level—as it would probably do if the conflict is sufficiently drawn out—this would mean that the Communists would be in a position of psycho-political leverage from which they could exercise a considerable degree of control over the US political process, at least with respect to Indochina.

May 1954: CINCPAC Considers Nuclear Demonstration Drop Outside Haiphong

An early memorandum dated 26 May 1954 from Admiral Arthur W. Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, entitled "Studies with Respect to Possible US Action Regarding Indochina," had included the recommendation (3.a), "Employing atomic weapons, whenever advantageous. . . ." The text of the following cable from Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, then Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff—though carefully obscured in spite of its ultra-secret designation—indicates that the proposal to make one or another use of nuclear weapons remained alive within the military as well as at least one section of the intelligence communities.

12 Feb. 1965
FROM: CINCPAC
TO: JCS
SUBJ: LIGHTNING
A. YOUR 210114Z
B. CINCPAC 211002Z (GENSER)
C. OPPLAN 65-34K

REF A REQUESTED STATUS OF CINCPAC COMMENTS ON REF C. REF B FURNISHED COMMENTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF REF C WITH EXCEPTION OF ANNEX NOVEMBER AND CINCPAC'S OVERALL ESTIMATE OF FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF REF C ON DRV. THIS MESSAGE COMPLETES CINCPAC'S VIEWS ON PROPOSED OPERATION.

CONCUR IN GENERAL APPROACH CONTAINED IN ANNEX NOVEMBER WITH EXCEPTION OF POSTDROP AIRBORNE MONITORING REQUIREMENTS. GIVEN PROBABLE PRESENCE OF GVN UNITS OPERATING IN GULF NORTH OF 17TH PARALLEL AT DROP TIME, AND HIGHLY VARIABLE UPPER ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS PRE-

Continued

VAILING THIS TIME [illegible] AT LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL PLATFORMS REQUIRED. PLATFORMS SHOULD HAVE CAPABILITY OF INITIATING COMMUNICATIONS WITH GVN UNITS AFTER DROP TO ADVISE OF PREDICTED FALLOUT PATTERNS, IF ANY. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON TWO PROPOSED SITES FOR DEMONSTRATION DROP SKETCHY AT BEST. HOWEVER, BELIEVE ALTERNATIVE SITE A PREFERABLE. WHILE VISUAL IMPACT OF DROP WILL BE SINGLE MOST DRAMATIC DIMENSION, SITE A OFFERS PROBABLE SUBSTANTIAL AUDIO DIMENSION AS WELL, GIVEN REDUCED DISTANCE FROM HAIPHONG. TOTAL POPULATION AND CIVILIAN/MILITARY RATIOS AT BOTH SITES BELIEVED ROUGHLY EQUAL.

CINCPAC BELIEVES THAT REF C OFFERS SINGLE BEST POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO A FAVORABLE, DECISIVE AND SPEEDY END TO PRESENT CONFLICT. POLICY OF GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE HAS NOT YIELDED ANY DISCERNIBLE RESULTS TO DATE, NOR IS THERE GROUND FOR BE[illegible] SINCE EACH US STEP IN PROGRAM OF GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE CAN BE ANTICIPATED BY ENEMY, WHO CAN TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES IN ADVANCE TO MINIMIZE EFFECTS OF THESE STEPS. GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE SCENARIO GUARANTEES DRV ABILITY TO PREPARE ITSELF MILITARILY, ECONOMICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT STEP. BY ITS VERY NATURE, THIS POLICY GIVES THE ENEMY OUR WAR PLANS IN ADVANCE.

CINCPAC BELIEVES ENEMY STAYING POWER IN VN CONFLICT CONSISTENTLY UNDERESTIMATED. GIVEN POLITICAL DICTATORSHIP IN DRV, ENEMY STAYING POWER PROBABLY SUPERIOR TO US. A LONG DRAWN OUT CONFLICT WILL WORK TO ENEMY'S ADVANTAGE, NOT OURS, AND POLICY OF GRADUATED MILITARY RESPONSE PRACTICALLY GUARANTEES AN EXTENDED CONFLICT.

CINCPAC CONCURS THAT INCREASED RISK [illegible] CHICOMS AND USSR WILL RESULT FROM SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF DEMONSTRATION DROP. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS PRIMARY CRITERION FOR DETERMINING SCOPE AND NATURE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SE ASIA, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT WITHDRAWAL IS PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION. I BELIEVE OUR CURRENT STRATEGIC POSTURE SUFFICIENT TO DETER ANY RASH ACT BY EITHER CHICOMS OR USSR, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY NOT BE CASE FIVE YEARS FROM NOW.

TOTAL IMPACT OF A SUCCESSFUL HIGH ALTITUDE DROP OFF HAIPHONG HARBOR ON DRV LEADERSHIP IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE DIRECTLY. HOWEVER, CINCPAC FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO VISUALIZE ANY OTHER COURSE OF ACTION FOR US IN PRESENT CONFLICT WHICH WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO (A) BRING DRV TO CONFERENCE TABLE, (B) ENABLE US TO SETTLE CONFLICT ON FAVORABLE TERMS FOR OURSELVES AND GVN, AND (C) SAVE LIVES OF AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN.

Summer 1966: Joint Chiefs Assess the Feasibility and Productivity of 'Passive' and 'Active' Blockades of Cambodia and North Vietnam

In the summer of 1966, apparently in response to a request by the Secretary of Defense or Assistant Secretary McNaughton, the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyzed the requirements of a "full-blown" blockade of North Vietnam and Cambodia. Up to this point, only a blockade of the South Vietnamese coastline had been attempted, under the fairly successful Market Time program, and a blacklist of merchant ships which traded with North Vietnam had been established in order to reduce the availability of transport to the North Vietnamese.

The Joint Chiefs have reviewed the force requirements, possible command structures, and probable impact and effectiveness of alternative DRV blockade options. We find that, to be effective, any blockade will have to include the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville and any other potential deep- or medium-draft Cambodian offloading points. The following discussion is predicated on the assumption that Cambodia will be included in any blockade effort. We further assume that it will be desirable to retain the option in blockade of permitting certain selected ships to pass through (for example, those carrying foodstuffs for domestic NVN consumption). We wish to make clear that while we believe a full-blown blockade to be a *necessary* condition if DRV support of forces in SVN is to be terminated, a blockade, by itself, will not be *sufficient* to do the job alone.

Two basic options, or some combination, are open to blockade planners:

1. *Passive blockade.* A passive blockade would be confined to measures which avoid any face-to-face US/DRV or US/Communist bloc confrontation on the high seas or in DRV territorial waters. Measures to be taken in such a blockade would include (but not be limited to) aerial, surface and subsurface mining of all DRV and Cambodian ports and approaches thereto, placement of obstacles such as sunken concrete-laden barges and LSTs in harbors and approaches, utilizing SVN naval forces to intercept, board and inspect any ships which request permission to pass through blockade (or attempt to run it), and a greatly expanded U.S. intelligence effort to detect potential blockade runners and discriminate between ships carrying permissible (if any) cargos from those carrying contraband.

> "No blockade will be 100% effective in denying outside material support to enemy forces in SVN. . . . Road transport of material from China through DRV to SVN can probably be reduced to 50 tons a month, considering expected losses in transit. Given minimal Soviet and Chicom sustained airlift capability, air leakage should be inconsequential."

2. *Active blockade.* An active blockade would involve the overt participation of US naval and air forces in the interception, boarding, inspection and engagement (if necessary) of any ships which attempted to run the blockade. An active blockade would include most of the elements of the passive blockade option as well.

Leakages. No blockade will be 100% effective in denying outside material support to enemy forces in SVN. Leakages can be expected consisting of material produced in DRV and shipped overland to SVN as well as supplies which enter into DRV overland from Chinese border. However, sustained and concentrated aerial bombardment of Lao Kay and Lang Son rail links to China can reduce rail leakage to minimal amounts. Road transport of material from China through DRV to SVN can probably be reduced to 50 tons a month, considering expected losses in transit. Given minimal Soviet and Chicom sustained airlift capability, air leakage should be inconsequential.

Force requirements

1. *Passive blockade.* Considerable reinforcement of mine warfare forces in WESTPAC would be required: a) a minimum of two additional MSF divisions; b) additional surveillance capability; c) one squadron of P3-As or two squadrons of S2s, with land-based support requirements; d) augmentation of intelligence assets, including one additional AFTR and two airborne ELINT platforms. One on-station and one reserve SS would be of considerable value. MSFs will need surface combatant support when carrying out operations in hostile environment. At least one DD division will be necessary for this mission. Further material and logistic support will need to be furnished to SVN navy units engaged in intercept and inspection duties.

2. *Active Blockade.* In addition to assets needed to support passive blockade, two additional divisions of DDs and two divisions of PTFs would be required. Air cover of US intercept and inspection operations can probably be tasked to Yankee Team carrier.

Command Structure

Experience gained in Market Time operations suggests the need for a single over-all authority to exercise command and control of any full-blown blockade effort. Given the potential sensitive political problems arising in the carrying out of any blockade, and the need for immediate, high-level response to developing situations, it is suggested that the command and control element in charge of blockade operations be directly subordinate to CINCPAC.

Potential Problems

In addition to the international political problems discussed elsewhere in this memorandum, certain operational problems arising out of any blockade can be foreseen. These include: detonation of mines by ships carrying permissible cargo, with resulting international complication. . . . As we have discovered from Market Time ops, Hainan Island will play a crucial role in any attempts to evade a blockade. Accordingly, any blockade line and intelligence collection program will have to be designed to insure maximum detection of transshipments from Hainan. . . . Coastal traffic between China and NVN will probably be best countered via a passive barrier in the Mon Cay vicinity on the NVN/Chicom border. Active operations in this area will be difficult to carry out and subject to substantial risk of active interference from NVN or Chicom naval forces.

Probable impact of and international repercussions from full-blown blockade operation lie outside scope of request.

June 1963: A Prominent American Academician Analyzes US Cultural Impatience with Protracted and Treacherous War

Summary of draft memorandum "Protracted Conflict and American Historical and Societal Character," from the Committee of Historians and Cultural Anthropologists, prepared by Professor Daniel Boorstin of the Dept. of History, University of Chicago, to President John F. Kennedy, June 30, 1963.

In accordance with your request of May 30, 1963 the full Committee met June 7-12 in Chicago to review the problem of protracted conflict in the context of American historical experience and from the perspective of current societal values. These conferences and a review of relevant data issued in the following tentative conclusions.

1. In the abstract, a prolonged conflict in Vietnam, characterized, when necessary, by increasing pressure upon the enemy applied in minimal increments, would appear both rational and prudent. It would appear to avoid the extremes of both defeat and large-scale, possibly nuclear, warfare.

2. However, serious objections to such a course exist on the grounds of the American historical experience as that has shaped the habits and expectations of Americans at the present time. Some of the basic points are:

a) American society is achievement-oriented. The American expects his efforts to issue in definite, even measurable results. When his efforts fail to produce such results he becomes embittered and, often, irrational. (See Appendix A: Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Cultural Goals and Institutional Norms"; also, Merton and Rossi, "Reference Group Theory and Social Mobility.") It should be pointed out that the expectation of definite and/or measurable results does not exist in societies where a different conditioning has prevailed. In such non-achievement oriented societies, the individual is often content to go from day to day for long periods of time sustained by other kinds of values built into the culture.

> "American society is achievement-oriented. The American expects his efforts to issue in definite, even measurable results. When his efforts fail to produce such results he becomes embittered and, often, irrational."

b) American society is "progressive" in the sense that effort is expected to produce not only tangible results but a general improvement in the over-all state of affairs. When such improvement is not forthcoming, dysfunctioning, both individual and systemic, is likely to result. (See Appendix B: John A. Clausen, "The Sociology of Mental Illness"; Albert K. Cohen, "The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior.")

c) American society is individualistic and contractual in significant respects. This means that the individual is less content to subordinate his own satisfactions for the good of the larger social

Continued

entity than he is in other societies, and this reluctance increases exponentially in the absence of the rewards noted in a and b. (See Appendix C: William J. Goode, "The Sociology of the Family"; Georg Simmel, "Conflict and the Structure of the Group.") The failure of the group to produce such expected rewards characteristically results in rebellious behavior directed at the group, as well as the "de-legitimizing" of said group.

d) The factor of time pervades American socio-cultural value systems to an unprecedented degree. (See Appendix D: H. Werner, et al., "Rhythmic Activity and the Perception of Time"; J. A. Dyal and T. A. Holland, "Discrimination Reaction Time as a Joint Function of Manifest Anxiety and Intelligence"; and H. C. J. Duijker and N. H. Frijda, "National Character and National Stereotypes.") In all areas of his daily life, Professor Mead noted, the American is conditioned to an environment of speed, to a high degree of automaticity and to efficiency in a wide variety of social and economic relations. This produces "impatience" when time expectations are not satisfied. (See Appendix E: P. E. Meehl, "Schizotaxia, Schizotypy and Schizophrenia.") Professor Cottrell observed the relationship between time in American life generally and time as a factor in mass American entertainment, as in professional football, hockey, boxing, etc., where the clock is a key element in the total experience. Professor Cottrell pointed out that American sport, relative to sports in other socio-cultural contexts, makes little provision for "stalemate"; and further, that the mass American sporting heroes are the "knock-out" puncher, the "home run" hitter, and the professional quarterback who "throws the long bomb." He persuaded the other conferees that these were important clues to American cultural-emotional patterns.

e) In contrast to other cultures, Americans exhibit a very high boredom coefficient. This is related to the time factor discussed above. Several conferees felt that a "protracted conflict" would, among other effects, produce widespread boredom, apathy etc. Professor McLuhan made the point that television, even the televised news, is from one perspective *entertainment*. No audience, he said, would tolerate the same show night after night indefinitely.

f) American society is increasingly technological. The American lives in an environment where technological power is characteristically brought to bear to achieve specific results in a short period of time. This conditions his expectations generally. It is worth noting that the young—i.e., those who would bear most of the burden of the war—are precisely the segment of the population *most* conditioned by the post-World War II environment of technological efficiency.

3. The wars fought by the United States since the industrial revolution have been relatively short (contrast the Thirty Years War, the Hundred Years War, the extended conflict between England and France between 1688 and 1815, the Peloponnesian War and many other earlier conflicts, not to mention the most pertinent of all, the war that has been waged by Vietnamese against each other, the Japanese, the French and the Americans for the last half-century). The American wars have been characterized by the concentrated application of power and the sudden "breakthrough." The American military services are a reflection of the larger American society and its ethos, and nothing in the historical experience of either would seem to make it easily adaptable to protracted conflict. (See Appendix F: R. A. Katzell, "Contrasting Systems of Work Organization"; Robert M. Gagne, "Military Training and Principles of Learning"; also Milton Jensen, "[illegible] and Non-Adjustive Reaction to Basic Training in the Air Force.")

4. The "Report of the Subcommittee on Southeast Asia" emphasized the contrast between the American and Vietnamese socio-cultural context, viz. whereas the prevailing value structure in America is *negative* as regards protracted conflict, the prevailing value structure in Southeast Asia is *positive*. In the case of each factor, a) through f), the Vietnamese is better adapted to this kind of warfare than the American.

5. *Conclusion:* It was the conclusion of the Committee that on these and other grounds specified at length in the Report that from a social-anthropological-historical perspective the waging of a protracted conflict in Vietnam is contra-indicated.

February 1965: Notes by Secretary of State on Conference Resulting in Decision not To Ask for Declaration of War

Handwritten note by Secretary of State summarizing the results of a high-level departmental meeting at which the advisability of seeking a declaration of war had been discussed, dated Feb. 10, 1965.

The following reasons pro and con were adduced during the meeting:

a) Decl. of war against NLF (The National Liberation Front created by Hanoi as the ostensibly South Vietnamese framework for the North Vietnamese effort) is out of question; it would elevate that entity to the dignity of a state and would preclude any ultimate political success of our action.

b) Decl. of war on North Vietnam unadvisable because of the mixture of Southern subversive and Northern military and paramilitary operations; also because of consistent denial of Hanoi that its troops are operating in the South.

c) Precedent of Korea as an undeclared war.

d) For a short term effort, Tonkin Res. is sufficient, decl. of war would become desirable only if war were to last for years. In view of sharp actions proposed by Joint Chiefs, including active blockade, cutting Ho Chi Minh Trail, and exerting diplomatic and economic pressures on SU, one must anticipate rapid attrition of aggressive potential of DRV by late 1966, and conclusion of overt military operations. After that only mopping up operations.

e) Commitment of US troops by Pres. without declaration has ample precedents (over 100 times?).

f) Decl. conjures up prospect of use of atomic weapons which we do not want even to suggest.

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

22 JUL 1971

A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

Kennedy's Private War

Ralph L. Stavins

The article that follows is part of *The Planning of the Vietnam War*, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, including Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.* In their introduction to the study, the authors write:

"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin conceived the idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on finding out who did the actual planning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a half-million troops into South Vietnam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create millions of refugees in the area.

"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Canta Pian, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, and Brian Eden, conducted more than 300 interviews in the course of this study. Among those interviewed were many Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the national security bureaucracy, and officials, military and civilian, who carried out the policy in the field in Vietnam.

"A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, including informal minutes of meetings, as well as portions of the official documentary record now known as the "Pentagon Papers." Our information is drawn not only from the Department of Defense, but also from the White House, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency."

The study is being published in two volumes. The first, which includes the article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in May, 1972.

I

At the end of March, 1961, the CIA circulated a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in South Vietnam. This paper advised Kennedy that Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of discontent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems were closely connected. Of the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted:

> Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in the city.

The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be supporting them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule:

> There has been an increasing disposition within official circles and the army to question Diem's ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls.

The CIA referred to the attempted coup against Diem that had been led by General Thi in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and the non-Communist opposition.

> The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non-Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials and oppositionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt.

In view of the broadly based opposition to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlikely that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to, or whether it was to consist of an intensified counterinsurgency program, something the people would not support, it had become painfully clear to Washington that reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:

> a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.
> b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which will prevent Communist domination of that country.

continued

---

*The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows.

The Gilpatric Task Force

Gilpatric organized an Interdepartmental Task Force with representatives from State, Defense, CIA, the International Cooperation Agency, the US Information Agency, and the Office of the President, with Brigadier General Edward Lansdale as operations officer. Their report was to be completed in one week.

The final version, "A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam," was submitted to Kennedy on May 6. The victory plans recommended by the Gilpatric Task Force called for the use of US ground troops and a bilateral treaty between the US and the GVN. Both proposals stood in direct violation of the Geneva Accords, but were required because "it is essential that President Diem's full confidence in and communication with the United States be restored promptly."

Diem suspected that the United States was wavering in its commitment to the GVN on several grounds, some rational, such as the negotiations for a Laotian settlement, others irrational, such as his belief that the US had played a role in the attempted coup of November, 1960. But it was Diem's suspicions, not the justification for them, that compelled Washington to give serious consideration to using ground troops and to signing a treaty with the GVN, even though Diem's policies were demonstrably bankrupt and the suggested remedies violated international law. The feeling was beginning to take hold in Washington that if the US took over the job, Diem's policies would not matter. This belief was to be reinforced during the crisis in the fall of 1961, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommended that the United States simply take over the machinery of government in the South, should ground troops be introduced into the combat theater.

Circumventing international law was viewed by the Kennedy Administration as a problem far less significant than that of building support for a bankrupt GVN. Nevertheless, the question exercised the minds of officials in Washington. In his report to Kennedy, Gilpatric, for example, advanced the following argument to meet the charge that the United States was flouting the law:

> On the grounds that the Geneva Accords have placed inhibitions upon free world action while at the same time placing no restrictions upon the Communists, Ambassador Nolting should be instructed to enter into preliminary discussions with Diem regarding the possibility of a defensive security alliance despite the inconsistency of such actions with the Geneva Accords.
>
> This action would be based on the premise that such an undertaking is justified in international law as representing a refusal to be bound by the Accords in a degree and manner beyond that which the other party to the Accords has shown a willingness to honor. Communist violations, therefore, justify the establishment of the security arrangement herein recommended. Concurrently, Defense should study the military advisability of committing US forces in Vietnam.

This was the explanation that would be given to the American public: Communist violations of the Accords justified the bilateral treaty and the use of US ground forces. But would this explanation also convince official Washington of the need to deploy troops? Indeed not. In the same report, Gilpatric informed Kennedy why US troops were needed in Vietnam. "US forces are required," Gilpatric wrote, "to provide maximum psychological impact in deterrence of *further* Communist aggression from North Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union." They would also serve an additional purpose: "to provide significant military resistance to *potential* North Vietnam Communist and/or Chinese Communist action" (italics added).

The US public was to be told that Washington had a legal right to deploy troops in response to actual Communist transgressions, while privately Washington would decide to act because of "potential" Communist action. Of course, "further" aggressions from China or the Soviet Union could hardly be equated with past violations, especially since neither country had set foot in South Vietnam. Indeed, Russia had sponsored the two Vietnams for membership in the United Nations as late as 1959. "Further" aggressions from the North, such as reactivating the guerrilla apparatus in the South, an apparatus manned by Southern cadres and fed by Southern peasants, were Hanoi's delayed response to the initial transgression by the GVN, which, in collusion with Washington, had refused to consult with the North or hold elections in the South, as required by the Geneva Accords.

Thus, Washington's reason for deploying combat troops directly contradicted the explanation that would be given to the press and to Congress. Washington had decided that the way to manipulate international law was to fool the American people.

On May 11, President Kennedy, after reviewing the findings of the Gilpatric Task Force, issued a National Security Action Memorandum which contained several important decisions on Vietnam. Such memoranda, written by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, were used to convey Presidential orders to all the agencies that were to carry them out, or needed to know about them. The NSAM of May 11 stated:

1. The US objective is to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam.
2. A further increase in GVN forces from 170,000 to 200,000 is to be assumed.
3. Defense Department is directed to examine the size and composition of US forces in the event that such forces are committed to Vietnam.
4. The United States will seek to increase the confidence of Diem.
5. The Ambassador should begin negotiations for a bilateral arrangement with Vietnam.
6. The program for covert action is approved.

Gilpatric asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff their opinion on the desirability of deploying US forces to Vietnam. They recommended immediate deployment of a sufficient number to achieve the objectives set forth in the Gilpatric report. To set the machinery in motion, the Joint Chiefs added, Diem should "be encouraged to request that the United States fulfill its SEATO obligations. . . . Upon receipt of this request, suitable forces could be immediately deployed."

Vice President Johnson was dispatched to Vietnam to shore up Diem's confidence in the US commitment by "encouraging" him to request US ground troops. Referring to Diem as "the Winston Churchill of the Orient," Johnson asked him to make this request. But much to Washington's chagrin, Diem told Johnson that he did not want foreign troops on Vietnamese

continued

soil, except in the event of overt aggression. Moreover, he pointed out, the presence of US troops would contravene and nullify the Geneva Accords. The semblance of legality could be preserved, he added, if American troops were channeled, as "advisers," through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), which had been in South Vietnam since the mid-Fifties.

After Johnson's visit, Diem sent a letter to President Kennedy expressing gratitude for Johnson's offer of assistance. "I was most deeply gratified by this gracious gesture by your distinguished Vice President, particularly as we have not become accustomed to being asked for our own views as to our needs," he wrote, concluding with the reminder that "we can count on the material support from your great country which will be so essential to achieving final victory." Material support, not US troops, would be furnished by Washington; otherwise Diem would make himself even more vulnerable to the Communist charge that he was a colonialist.

During the summer of 1961, when the situation in Indochina deteriorated, Diem changed his mind and requested a treaty and troops from the United States. On October 1, the recently appointed Ambassador Nolting reported that Diem wanted a bilateral defense treaty with the US; on the thirteenth, Diem requested ground troops. These requests coincided with the conclusion of Defense Department and JCS studies, both of which advised the President to dispatch US troops to Vietnam, as well as with the announcement of a forthcoming "fact-finding mission" to Vietnam by two White House advisers, General Maxwell Taylor and Walt W. Rostow.

The Defense Department's study of the Viet Cong movement produced the discovery that the men and material originated in the South, not the North. The Department found that although the level of infiltration from the North was increasing, the "vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local origin." If Hanoi was not furnishing the troops, was it at least furnishing the supplies? "There is little evidence of major supplies from outside sources," the Defense Department study found, "most arms being captured or stolen from GVN forces or from the French during the Indochina war." The North had given moral support to the insurgents, but little else. What should the United States do?

Having determined that the Viet Cong movement was local in origin, the Defense Department recommended that 11,000 US combat troops and 11,800 support troops be deployed to Vietnam for the purpose of sealing the border against any possible future infiltration from the North. But, the Department added, these troops would be insufficient to establish an anti-Communist government in the South. "The ultimate force requirements [for that purpose] cannot be estimated with any precision," the Department stated. "Three divisions would be a guess."

The Joints Chiefs of Staff, in their reply to Gilpatric, reasoned that the North would rely still further upon a policy of infiltration if SEATO and US troops were deployed in the South. The Joint Chiefs speculated that it would be uncharacteristic of the North to respond with an overt invasion of the South, but in the event that it did, the US would have to send in three divisions. If China threw its weight into the struggle, then six US divisions, or a total of 205,000 men, would be required, and the use of nuclear weapons would become a distinct possibility.

The CIA took the Viet Cong threat less seriously than the Defense Department did, and identified the non-Communist (perhaps one should say anti-Communist) South as the immediate danger to Diem. The agency wrote:

> Most immediate threat to Diem is not a military takeover by the Communists but the mounting danger of an internal coup by disgruntled military and civilian members of the government who are critical of Diem's leadership. These critics hold that Diem's heavy hand in all operations of the government is not only hampering the anti-Communist military effort but is steadily alienating the populace.

Should a SEATO task force be dispatched to Vietnam as an alternative to US troops—one of the contingency plans circulating in Washington at the time—the CIA, like the Joint Chiefs, discounted the likelihood of a Northern invasion. Hanoi's strategy, the CIA believed, would be "to play upon possible SEATO weariness over maintaining substantial forces." Once this weariness became evident, "the Asian members would soon become disenchanted and look to the US to do something to lessen the burden and to solve the problem." Whether this something would be a sizable number of US ground troops, as favored by the Joint Chiefs, or the use of nuclear weapons, as contemplated by Admiral Felt, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific forces (CINCPAC), was left undecided.

If the CIA analysis was correct, the US faced the possibility of a major war on the Asian mainland for the purpose of defending the narrow base of the Diem regime against its own people. Even the anti-Communist opposition in the South was rapidly being transmuted into part of a Communist monolith, located either in Moscow or Peking.

Nevertheless, some advisers began to argue for war. William Bundy, who had recently changed positions from the CIA's Far East expert to Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Defense Department, echoed Walt Rostow's belief that the fall of 1961 was the "now or never" period for the US. If America acted promptly and aggressively, Bundy argued, there was a 70 percent chance that it would "clean up the situation." There was a 30 percent chance that "we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of war." Having weighed the options, Bundy concluded that a pre-emptive strike was advisable, and recommended "early and hard-hitting operations."

The Taylor-Rostow Mission

On October 11, 1961, President Kennedy authorized the Taylor-Rostow mission to Vietnam. Its purpose was to examine the feasibility of dispatching US troops; Kennedy specifically recommended that the mission look into the question of troop requirements. One option would be to send fewer US combat troops than the 22,800 identified in the Defense Department plan, but enough to "establish a US presence in Vietnam." A second dispensed with US combat forces entirely, and envisioned a stepped-up version of what is now called the "Vietnamization" program. According to this plan, the United States would increase its training of Vietnamese units and furnish more US equipment, "particularly helicopters and other light aircraft, trucks, and other ground support transport."

Two days after Kennedy announced the Taylor-Rostow mission, Diem, who had heretofore refused to "request" US combat troops, met with Ambassador Nolting and asked that the US government provide South Vietnam with the aid that had been secretly discussed when the Taylor-Rostow mission was being planned. Vice President Thuan, speaking for President Diem,

continued

requested an additional squadron of AD-6 fighter bomb[illegible] contract pilots for helicopters, transport planes to be used for non-combat operations, and US combat units to be introduced into South Vietnam as combat-trainer units.

Diem had changed his mind. Originally ashamed to be dependent upon a US presence and afraid to scuttle the Geneva Accords, he set aside these considerations once it became clear that a neutral Laos was about to emerge from the negotiations then under way. According to Diem, a neutral Laos would be useful to the Communists. They could then cross the western border at will, infiltrate into the South, and crush him. The terrain in Laos was more difficult to defend, and the Communists were strong enough there to strike a final blow. Laos, he argued, had been used to trap the Americans into conceding South Vietnam.

Having enticed the Americans into a settlement that made it look as if the Americans had lost nothing, the Communists could concentrate all of their energies on seizing South Vietnam. To counter this strategy, Diem wanted some immediate assurance that the US would remain committed to the South. Such assurance would require a bilateral treaty and the presence of US combat troops. Only this would dissuade the North from pursuing a militant policy and convince those elements in the South that were still loyal to Diem that a Laotian settlement was not the death warrant for the GVN.

The Kennedy Administration had discovered that it was impossible to avoid war. The only question was where and when. If Laos was not settled quickly, the US would have to pour in troops, with small chance of success. But to negotiate a neutral Laos meant that US troops would have to be deployed to South Vietnam, thus increasing the likelihood of a direct confrontation. Washington had painted itself into a corner—either war in Laos now or war in Vietnam in the future. Kennedy chose the latter.

The Taylor-Rostow mission stopped at Hawaii on the way to Vietnam and discussions were held with Admiral Felt, head of CINCPAC. Rostow asked about contingency plans in the event that open warfare broke out with the North. One question in particular concerned the use of nuclear weapons. Felt replied, "Plans w[illegible] assumption that tactical nuclear weapons will be used if required and that we can anticipate requests being made for their use if action expands into a Phase 4 situation." (Phase 4 involved a North Vietnamese and Chinese invasion of the South.)

Once in Vietnam, Taylor and Rostow explored ways of introducing US ground troops. They had decided that Diem needed them to preserve his rule, but they also recognized that such a course would damage America's image as a peacekeeper. The general and the professor wondered how the United States could go to war while appearing to preserve the peace. While they were pondering this question, Vietnam was suddenly struck by a deluge. It was as if God had wrought a miracle. American soldiers, acting on humanitarian impulses, could be dispatched to save Vietnam not from the Viet Cong, but from the floods. McGarr, the Chief of MAAG, stated that Taylor favored "moving in US military personnel for humanitarian purposes with subsequent retention if desirable." He added, "This is an excellent opportunity to minimize adverse publicity."

Taylor himself viewed the flood relief task force more ambitiously. It would be the most efficient way to deal with world opinion, assuage Diem's fears, and allay Kennedy's reservations. World opinion would be swayed by humanitarian considerations. The colonial stain would not unduly tarnish Diem's image because the flood relief program clearly was not intended to "take over the responsibility for the security of the country." Finally, and perhaps most important, Taylor's plan contained a built-in excuse to withdraw—a feature intended to overcome Kennedy's objections. The President, it was well known, believed that it was far more difficult to remove troops than to introduce them. Taylor wrote to Kennedy, "As the task is a specific one, we can extricate our troops when it is done if we so desire. Alternatively, we can phase them into other activities if we wish to remain longer."

Having invented a scheme that would enable the leaders in Saigon and Washington to placate their respective constituencies, Taylor then turned his attention from his preoccupation with politics to the military consequences. He recommended that the President deploy 8,000 ground troops and acknowledged that most of them would be used for logistical purposes. Such a token gesture could not be [illegible]ected to have great military significance, but it surely ran the risk, as Taylor put it, of "escalating into a major war in Asia." Even if this danger did not materialize, the initial commitment would make it "difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce." Once the blood of a single American soldier had been spilled the President would assume the role of Commander-in-Chief and would be obliged to discharge his constitutional duty to protect the troops in the field.

This obligation made it unlikely that troops would be removed and far more likely that additional troops would be sent over. The technical device of a built-in exit might be superseded by the political reality of a built-in escalation. And with the DRV and the Viet Cong committed to a policy of attrition, the United States would then be locked into a long struggle at the edge of the Communist world.

Such a struggle would take place, unfortunately, at a time when "the strategic reserve of the US forces is presently so weak that we can ill afford any detachment of forces." Taylor, in effect, told Kennedy to dispatch a few thousand combat troops which could not turn the tide of military battle, which invited a major war, provoked an indefinite and indecisive conflict, and depleted the US reserve. Why should Kennedy do this? Because, as Taylor said, "I do not believe that our program to save South Vietnam will succeed without it."

The symbolic gesture of stationing a few thousand US troops would save South Vietnam, Taylor argued, because it would inform the Communists of the "seriousness of the US intent to resist" and would raise the "national morale" of the South. Taylor predicted that the North would back down if the United States exhibited a fixed resolve to defend the South. That resolve had to be conveyed in the form of a clear message to Hanoi that the United States would take offensive action against the North if it did not stop supporting the Viet Cong. A small task force was a harbinger of greater devastation. The North would desist once it understood this message because, in Taylor's words, "North Vietnam is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to lay off South Vietnam."

continued

The small task force, along with other forms of US-G[illegible] cooperation, not only would alarm Hanoi, but in the South it would "reverse the present downward trend, stimulate an offensive spirit and build up morale." As Rostow commented to Diem at this time, "That secret of turning point is offensive action."

The purposes of discouraging the North and encouraging the South became the strategy that was to be relied upon throughout the Vietnam war. The same arguments that were advanced for the first time in 1961 were repeated in 1965 when Washington made the decision to embark on Operation Rolling Thunder. By the summer of 1965, however, lifting Southern morale was no longer viewed as necessary to win the war. The decision to send in the first 500,000 combat troops was justified solely by the need to convince the Communists that the United States was serious.

The strategy has remained surprisingly constant, guiding American policy for the better part of a decade. The architects of the strategy, Taylor and Rostow, did not envision the small task force of 8,000 men as the "final word." It was simply the first lesson they planned for the leadership in Hanoi.

By its major premise—that Hanoi would back down only if it *knew* the United States was prepared to attack North Vietnam directly—the strategy entailed a built-in escalation. Events had to follow in a monotonous but natural order: increase the size of US support troops in the South; institute covert operations against the North; threaten to bomb the North; bomb the North; pour US combat troops into the South as rapidly as possible; invade Cambodia; invade Laos... invade the North? destroy the North? etc.

The strategy required not only that the United States make it known that it would attack the North directly, but also that the United States not obliterate the North. To threaten to destroy the Communist regime in Hanoi would risk a direct encounter with China or Russia, a risk that the national security managers wished to avoid. They did not want to fight a nuclear war. They wanted to fight a safe war. The strategy therefore demanded a combination of escalation and moderation.

America would exercise its power in a deliberate and calculated manner in order to hold Hanoi hostage. The term "Hanoi" here is to be taken literally: [illegible] Vietnam, indeed all of Indochina, was to become a target. One could say that US strategy was to kill the people while preserving the Hanoi government. Once surrounded by devastation, isolated, and abandoned by her socialist allies, Russia and China, Hanoi would be left with no choice but to submit to a "moderate" but triumphant America.

Although the creation of the task force was its most far-reaching recommendation, the Taylor-Rostow report urged the President to adopt a number of other measures. These were mainly of a military and administrative nature. The report recommended that the personnel in the Military Assistance Advisory Group mission be increased from 1,103 to 2,612. Moreover, US aircraft, consisting of several helicopter companies, and US crews for supporting or operational missions were to be introduced no later than mid-November.

The combat troops, the increase in the size of MAAG, and the use of US aircraft and crews were all violations of the limits on troops and armaments set by the Geneva Accords. The International Security Agency, reviewing the legality of these recommendations, noted that the additions to MAAG, although a violation of international law, could not easily be proved: discussions between the International Control Commission, which was charged with enforcing the Geneva Accords, and the Embassy could be extended for months, during which time the value of the increase in MAAG's size would be realized.

The use of US helicopters was of a more serious nature, requiring some groundwork to pacify Congress and the press. But combat troops could not so easily be disguised. Their only justification would be their subsequent success, not prior propaganda, and the International Security Agency viewed them with deep skepticism. It predicted that the North would respond by infiltrating 15,000 men, which would in turn require three US divisions to offset them. Thus an indefinite war of attrition would be ensured.

The "Limited Partnership"

The administrative recommendations of Taylor and Rostow were designed to place a number of Americans on four specific levels of the South Vietnamese bureaucracy. First, Americans would work as high-level government advisers. Taylor envisioned "a limited number of Americans in key minis[illegible]." This would mean that US advisers would, in effect, become cabinet officers in the Diem government. Next, "a joint US-Vietnamese Military Survey, down to the provincial level, in each of three corps areas" would engage in a number of tasks, including intelligence, command and control, the build-up of reserves for offensive purposes, and mediation between the military commander and the province chief. The other two functions would be border control operations and "intimate liaison with the Vietnamese Central Intelligence organizations."

The ostensible purpose of giving Americans critical roles in government was that "Vietnamese performance in every domain can be substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese." Taylor designated these administrative changes as representing a "shift from US advice to limited partnership." The concept of "limited partnership," in fact, meant that the GVN had been negligent in reforming itself in the past, and suggested that the only way to reform the GVN in the future would be for the US to take it over. With US ground troops in the field, US aircraft controlling the skies, and US civilian personnel administering the cities and provinces, Vietnam would be reformed. Only Washington's own people could fulfill Washington's wishes.

The administrative changes meant that the national security managers had decided that the most effective mechanism for processing reforms through the GVN was for America to take over the government. They were also beginning to understand that the surest way to take over a client state was to introduce ground troops who would ultimately become responsible for the defense of the country. Under such circumstances, the native leader no longer serves as a puppet but rather, in the manager's words, as a "platform" upon which the American military and administrative personnel would be able to operate. Reduced from a leader to a

continued

platform, the local ruler of the client state is robbed of the last vestiges of his political life. His value to the mother country is no longer measured by the speed and economy with which he is able to bring about the changes suggested by Washington (the core of his bargaining power).

Since the local leader is no longer the source of change, he is not expected to do anything; he is merely expected not to undo anything. The mother country is less interested in gaining than in not losing. That desirable feature of leadership, charisma, gives way to banality. The worth of the leader is now measured by the number of followers he does not lose, the number of riots that do not occur, the number of battles that are not fought.

The leader's role in his own country is purely custodial. His task is to hold things together. To the degree that he performs this function, he has built the platform upon which the troops from the mother country may enter. His obligation to the mother country is to serve as the official greeter of the foreign troops. He is a janitor at home and a master of ceremonies abroad.

The problem with Diem was that he was unable to play a custodial role at home or a ceremonial one abroad. By 1961, he was beginning to lose his followers faster than the United States could increase its personnel in Vietnam. Were this inverse ratio to continue, the moment would come when there would be no platform for American troops to walk on. But this was not clearly perceived in Washington in 1961. When it did become obvious in 1963, Diem was dispensed with. Whereas Ambassador Durbrow had toyed with the idea of eliminating Diem because he was not a reformer, the Kennedy circle would remove him because he had been abandoned by the last of the faithful. Diem's failure to reform would be the alibi for, not the cause of, his downfall.

What was obvious in 1961 was that Kennedy was alarmed about Diem's public image in America. From the point of view of the President of the United States, the local leader must be palatable to the American people if American troops are to be ordered to Vietnam. One explanation for Kennedy's decision to veto the recommendation of all of his senior advisers to send [illegible] Vietnam [illegible] Diem lacked the image that would qualify him to receive American ground troops. In a discussion of "the famous problem of Diem as an administrator and politician," Taylor suggested three choices that were available to Washington.

The first was to "remove him in favor of a military dictatorship which would give dominance to the military chain of command." The second was to "remove him in favor of a figure of more dilute power who would delegate authority to act in both military and civilian leaders." It was this option that foreshadowed the need for a local leader who could retain a rapidly diminishing constituency, so that the largest number of US troops could be sent. Once the need became apparent, the second choice was axiomatic. Washington would then require someone to perform custodial services in Vietnam and act as an official greeter for American troops, roles played by General Khanh in 1964 and General Thieu after 1965.

In 1961, however, Taylor opted for the third choice. He wished to retain Diem in order "to bring about a series of *de facto* administrative changes via persuasion at high levels . . . using the US presence to force the Vietnamese to get their house in order in one area after another." In considering the first two choices, Taylor raised the prospect of a coup, but rejected it because "it would be dangerous for us to engineer a coup under present tense circumstances, since it is by no means certain that we could control its consequences and potentialities for Communist exploitation." In other words, the United States had not yet taken over enough of Vietnam to guarantee the irrelevance of the new leader.

The Taylor-Rostow report had a profound influence on Washington's policy toward Vietnam. The report fashioned the strategy of combined escalation and moderation. By establishing the principle of "limited partnership," a euphemism for American control, it resolved the conflict between the need for efficient prosecution of the war and the need for administrative reform. The previous aim of reform had been to broaden the base of the government to include elements of the loyal opposition. The new focus was on the pace at which American troops entered the field and American bureaucrats [illegible] government. [illegible] came to mean turning the reins of government over to the Americans. Once Americans took over, they could manipulate the concepts of warfare and welfare according to their own priorities. The battle between these concepts would be waged within the American establishment, with the pacifiers making feeble attempts to reform the military. Reform ultimately came to mean less indiscriminate killing instead of greater citizen participation. Finally, the report defined the qualities of the ideal leader that America would need in Vietnam after it stationed its troops in the field and its bureaucrats in office—qualities that were to be found eventually in the middling leadership of Thieu.

The Recommendations of McNamara and Rusk

While the Taylor-Rostow report was circulating in Washington, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk were writing their own recommendations for Vietnam policy. McNamara picked up the thread of Taylor's strategic analysis and Rusk pondered the need for an American seizure of the Vietnamese bureaucracy.

Rusk believed the President should carefully weigh the decision to send in US troops against Diem's unwillingness to "give us something worth supporting." Diem's failure to trust his own commanders and his obstinate refusal to broaden the base of government made it unlikely that a "handful of American troops can have decisive influence." Rusk noted the vital importance that US policy attached to Southeast Asia, but he cautioned against "committing American prestige to a losing horse." His recommendations, however, also presumed a seizure of the internal bureaucracy, the process described by Taylor as "limited partnership." Rusk directed the State Department to draw up a list of expectations "from Diem if our assistance forces us to assume *de facto* direction of South Vietnamese affairs."

While Rusk was elaborating on Taylor's report from the civil side, McNamara accelerated the recommendations from the military side. He accepted the strategy recommended by Taylor, but criticized him for not putting enough muscle behind that strategy. In McNamara's view, the 8,000-man task force would help Diem but would not "convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we

continued

mean business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively. We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle."

Since the aim of the strategy was to make the enemy know that the United States would attack directly if it did not disengage itself from the Southern struggle, McNamara concluded:

> ...the other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear warning commitment to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam.

McNamara presumed that the other side would attack, not withdraw, in spite of the presence of US troops and a clear statement of intent. The US would then reply with 205,000 men, or six divisions. Public opinion in America, McNamara believed, "will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually."

What is striking about the recommendations by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense is that each, within his particular domain, went beyond the suggestions made by General Taylor. Whereas Taylor spoke of a limited partnership between the GVN and the United States government, Rusk operated on the assumption of a "*de facto* direction of South Vietnamese affairs."

With respect to military policy, Taylor boldly conceived a strategy that could well lead to genocide, but he was rather timid in applying it. He wanted to avoid the impression that the US would send its troops into actual combat, and urged the flood relief idea upon the President as a cover to preserve a peaceful image. McNamara, however, not only was willing to embrace the need for 8,000 combat troops, but seemed to be devising a pre-emptive strategy by calling on a second-strike capability of six divisions as a response to the Northern invasion that would be touched off by the initial force.

While Taylor saw the flood relief task force as a humanitarian cover to avoid a larger war, McNamara viewed it as a way to provoke the North into that larger war. Taylor, moreover, counseled the President on the importance of a peaceful image for domestic public opinion. At best, Taylor reasoned, the American public would have to be led to accept a gradual involvement. McNamara, on the other hand, believed that America would much more likely support a firm hand.

Taylor either eschewed war altogether by projecting such logical incompatibilities as a bold strategy and a quiescent task force, or equivocated by never pulling out or pushing in. McNamara, just recovering from his personal revulsion at the possibility of a nuclear holocaust over Berlin, seemed to be willing to prosecute a large conventional war. In view of the advanced state of US technology, such a war, if carried on for years, could produce effects amounting to nuclear devastation.

Kennedy's Decision

In spite of the agreement among his senior advisers that ground troops should be dispatched, Kennedy refused. He could have cited many reasons to support his decision. One was that the introduction of US combat forces in Vietnam would cripple the discussions for a negotiated settlement in Laos. Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador, had told Rusk on November 7 that "the introduction of US troops would not only complicate the situation, but make it impossible to get anywhere on Laos." A week later, Ambassador Alphand of France told Rusk that further escalation would undermine the Geneva negotiations and compound the risk of "mass intervention" by the Soviet Union. Alphand also reminded the Secretary of "difficulties for the West of fighting in Vietnam."

Rusk, however, took this to mean that Europe and America might have to part ways. Rusk explained that it "would be difficult for US opinion and friendly countries to accept a repetition of Laos in Vietnam." Southeast Asia, he concluded, was "more important to the United States than to Europe." Indeed, "if the loss of Southeast Asia was at stake, and Europeans did not agree with our policies, there might have to be a divergence."

Rusk's attitude demonstrates a fundamental shift in the direction of American foreign policy. Hereafter the national security managers, except for George Ball, were to reject the need for a multilateral response and affirm the will to proceed alone in Asia. The first sign of this shift occurred on January 19, 1961, just before Kennedy's inauguration when, during discussions with the President-elect, Eisenhower told him, "It is imperative that Laos be defended. The United States should accept this task with our allies, if we could persuade them, and alone if we could not. Our unilateral intervention would be our last desperate hope in the event we were unable to prevail upon the other signatories to join us."

Kennedy's advisers wholeheartedly supported Eisenhower's position, but had to wait for Johnson to apply it to Vietnam, not Laos. Kennedy himself, in 1961, seemed to be more impressed with the arguments advanced by the British and French ambassadors than with Eisenhower's position or with Rusk's acceptance of it. Kennedy, it could be argued, was yet to be persuaded that US foreign policy was destined to go it alone in Asia. In addition to shattering the Laotian settlement, the dispatch of troops to Vietnam at a time when the Berlin crisis could again erupt increased Kennedy's "expressed concern over a two-front war." This does not mean, however, that Kennedy was willing to preside over the liquidation of the fledgling American Empire in Southeast Asia. The fear of a two-front war, according to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., would have to be weighed against the fear "that an American retreat in Asia might upset the whole world balance."

Other factors must be considered to explain Kennedy's veto of combat troops. One way to understand the President's motives is to recall the decisions he made and try to discover what light they shed on decisions that he did not make. We do know, for example, that Kennedy sent troops to Vietnam, referring to them as support troops, though their combat role was extensive. Therefore, we can conclude that Kennedy saw the need to disguise their combat function. We also know that the number sent during his administration ultimately doubled the initial figure of 8,000 recommended by Taylor and Rostow. Therefore, Kennedy saw the need to introduce them into Vietnam gradually instead of at one stroke. Finally, we know that Kennedy began a campaign of covert activities against North Vietnam—a campaign that marked the switch to direct offensive actions but was disguised so that Washington could publicly disavow its own role.

continued

Kennedy's policy toward Vietnam, then, was to accelerate the war while denying that he was doing it. His policy was to prosecute a private war. He was willing to go it alone in Asia, but not to admit it. He disregarded the counsel of his advisers only to the extent that they preferred a public war.

The President, clearly, did not believe that the American people would support him in his decision to escalate the level of combat. This does not mean that Kennedy thought the American people would have been opposed to a war in Indochina under any circumstances. It simply means that in 1961 the American public would not support a war whose ostensible purpose was to preserve the Diem regime. The war would be repulsive because the leader was odious. In 1963, when the self-immolation of protesting Buddhist monks became a daily event, Diem's image abroad deteriorated and became incompatible with the American presence. The American people could resign themselves to an indefinite war, but not when the character of the regime, personified by Diem, Nhu, and Madame Nhu, was so obnoxious. Washington concluded that Diem would have to be eliminated before the war could be escalated.

While Diem was too repellent to be given American combat troops, he was not pliable enough to accept American bureaucrats. Rusk, as we have seen, presumed that America would undertake a "*de facto* direction of South Vietnamese affairs." The Taylor-Rostow report had anticipated a "limited partnership" between the GVN and the United States government. Diem quickly dashed these hopes. Vice President Thuan told Ambassador Nolting that Diem's "attitude seemed to be that the United States was asking great concessions of GVN in the realm of its sovereignty, in exchange for little additional help." When Nolting pressed Diem directly on the need for a close partnership, Diem informed him that "Vietnam did not want to be a protectorate."

By word and deed, Diem demonstrated that he would no more broaden his decision-making councils to include Americans than he would do so to include other Vietnamese. To turn over the internal bureaucracy to the Americans, Diem had told Ambassador Kenneth Young, would "give a monopoly on nationalism to the Communists." The only conditions under which Diem would accept a US directorate were the dispatch of US combat troops and a bilateral treaty. If he was certain that the Americans would openly defend him, then he could afford to come out openly as their puppet. But Washington would not openly defend Diem because he did not seem worth defending in public.

In these circumstances Kennedy made the decision not to send in combat troops, or rather, to fight a private war. In a National Security Council Action Memorandum on Vietnam, NSAM 111, Kennedy, observing widespread criticism of Diem's regime, stated that US support would be conditional upon whether real reforms were instituted by Diem. The President said:

> Rightly or wrongly his regime is widely criticized abroad and in the US, and if we are to give our substantial support, we must be able to point to real administrative, political, and social reforms and a real effort to widen its base that will give maximum confidence to the American people, as well as to world opinion that our efforts are not directed towards the support of an unpopular or ineffective regime, but rather towards supporting the combined efforts of all the non-Communist people of the GVN against a Communist takeover.

In the next clause of the NSAM, however, Kennedy made the decision to send US troops and informed the American ambassador that these troops should be seen as the equivalent of combat forces.

> It is anticipated that one of the first questions President Diem will raise with you after your presentation of the above joint proposals will be that of introducing US combat troops. You are authorized to remind him that the actions we already have in mind involve a substantial number of US military personnel for operational duties in Vietnam, and that we believe that these forces performing crucial missions can greatly increase the capacity of GVN forces to win their war against the Viet Cong.

US firepower and US troops would be immediately sent to Vietnam without the necessity for any "real administrative, political, and social reforms." What was desirable was that Diem's image be improved.

In the next clause of the memorandum, Kennedy dispensed with the need for the GVN to widen its base . . . towards supporting the combined efforts of all the non-Communist people of the GVN against a Communist takeover." Kennedy admonished the ambassador:

> You should inform Diem that, in our minds, the concept of the joint undertaking envisages a much closer relationship than the present one of acting in an advisory capacity only. We would expect to share in the decision-making processes in the political, economic and military fields as they affected the security situation.

Reform, to Kennedy, ultimately meant that Diem needed an attractive image in America, and that Washington needed to seize the bureaucratic machinery in Vietnam. If neither was forthcoming, Diem would be eliminated, and a "genuine and real" puppet put in his place.

II

The private war required dispatching US combat troops to Vietnam to perform "operational duties" and withholding that fact from the American public. The troops were put under the jurisdiction of the newly organized Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), but their combat role was disguised. The public was told that US personnel would only "advise" the South Vietnamese army.

Another component of the private war was the initiation of covert activities. Begun in the spring of 1961, only six weeks after John F. Kennedy had assumed the Presidency, these continued without interruption up to the launching of Operation Rolling Thunder in February, 1965, the beginning of the overt war by Lyndon Johnson.

In March, 1961, Kennedy instructed the national security agencies to "make every possible effort to launch guerrilla operations in Viet-Minh territory at the earliest possible time." He directed the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the CIA to furnish plans for covert programs against the North both in the near-term and in the "longer future periods." Two months later, Kennedy approved the program for covert actions that had been proposed by the Vietnam Task Force, a group working out of the State Department, then under the leadership of Sterling Cottrell. Cottrell had accompanied Taylor and Rostow on their mission to Vietnam in the fall of 1961 and had urged

continued

the President not to introduce combat troops into the South [illegible] 1961 he recommended that the President use South Vietnamese troops for commando raids and sabotage in North Vietnam and Laos.

The President agreed. One hundred days after he was elected President, he ordered agents to be sent into North Vietnam who were to be resupplied by Vietnamese civilian mercenary air crews. Special GVN forces were meanwhile to infiltrate into Southeast Laos to locate and attack Communist bases, and other teams trained by the Special Forces were to be used for sabotage and light harassment inside North Vietnam. Finally, Kennedy ordered flights over North Vietnam to drop leaflets. Two days after Kennedy authorized the Taylor-Rostow mission and before the mission arrived in Vietnam, the President ordered guerrilla ground action, "including the use of US advisers if necessary against Communist aerial resupply missions in the vicinity of Tchepone, Laos." In December, immediately after he shelved Taylor's proposal to deploy 8,000 combat troops in the South, Kennedy adopted a CIA-sponsored program to recruit South Vietnamese personnel for the purpose of "forming an underwater demolition team to operate in strategic maritime areas of North Vietnam."

By the end of 1961, the private war consisted of covert operations directed against North Vietnam and Laos, and the concealed use of US air and ground combat personnel against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Each element of the private war increased in tempo and intensity throughout 1962 and 1963. By the time Kennedy was assassinated, the United States had 16,500 troops in South Vietnam pretending they were not fighting, and the Special Forces were executing a host of covert programs in North Vietnam and Laos.

During its thirty-three months in office, the Kennedy Administration managed and directed an illicit war. By sending an additional 1,000 troops to Vietnam in 1961, Kennedy broke through the MAAG ceiling and violated the Geneva Accords. Speaking to Rusk at a National Security Council meeting in November, 1961, Kennedy defined the Presidential manner proper to breaching international laws: "Why do we take onus, say we are going to break the Geneva Accords? Why not remain silent? Don't say this ourselves!"

The Accords, of course, had been [illegible] but the decision to conceal violations—and the developing war—from the American public was new. That the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, and attempted coups in various parts of the world had also been covert enterprises does not diminish the special significance of the Vietnam undertaking. Here, for the first time, covert activity no longer crystallized into a single event, as with the Bay of Pigs. In Vietnam, the "black stuff" became the usual way of doing business; the war itself was covert. Nor does it suffice to say that the U-2 flights were stretched out through time. The purpose of these flights was spying; they were repetitions of a single act; and they were placed under the jurisdiction of the CIA, an agency restricted to covert acts. In Vietnam, several covert programs were put together to create a pattern of warfare, not spying, and these programs were instituted and managed by the government.

Room 303

In 1962 and 1963, two agencies in Washington managed the Vietnam war—the 303 Committee and the Special Group Counter-Insurgency (SGCI).

The 303 Committee, taking its name from the room number at the Executive Office Building where it met once a week, came into being as a direct consequence of the egregious blundering at the Bay of Pigs in the spring of 1961. Kennedy, appalled by the military incompetence shown by the fiasco and embarrassed by the public image it created, was determined to make sure that the covert activities of the CIA did not contradict US foreign policy and that they were not beyond the capabilities of the military.

Thereafter, CIA programs had to be cleared in advance. This was the task of the 303 Committee, whose jurisdiction came to include every important covert program conducted anywhere in the world, including Vietnam. The membership of the Committee included the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Intelligence of the CIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. During the Kennedy years, these offices were held, respectively, by Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Richard Helms, and Mc[illegible]rge Bundy. The chairman of the [illegible]rge Bundy, who had been given his choice between chairing the Special Group Counter-Insurgency and the 303 Committee.

To the extent that Vietnam was a covert war in 1962 and 1963, the 303 Committee managed the war. It did this by approving and revising the programs that defined American covert participation in the war. At least four major programs were authorized and supervised by the 303 Committee—Operation Farmhand, the training of the Montagnards, DeSoto patrols, and 34a operations.

Operation Farmhand was the first covert program approved by the 303 Committee for Vietnam. Under this program, South Vietnamese personnel were airlifted into North Vietnam in the spring of 1961, to "commit sabotage, spy and harass the enemy." Trained by the army's Special Forces, who were themselves detached and put under the control of the CIA, the commandos were invariably arrested as soon as they landed in the North. In many instances, personnel would have to be conscripted to accept an assignment. Frequently, they would show up drunk or fail to appear at all. In the field, the program was a total failure, but, strategically, it informed the North that direct measures would be taken against it.

The second major program authorized by the 303 Committee was the training of the Montagnards in South Vietnam, who had managed to preserve their ethnic identity over the centuries. These local tribesmen, whose loyalty never extended beyond their own clan, were as opposed to the encroachments of the GVN as they were to the solicitations of the Viet Cong. Because they inhabited an area that bordered an infiltration route from North to South, the CIA believed that they could be trained as a force of warriors to be used in attacks against the Viet Cong.

The CIA felt that the bonds among ethnic minorities could be easily nourished and exploited; that nomadic tribes, rather than landed peasants, could be made into warriors and be moved more easily from one assignment to another. As warriors, the Montagnards took their orders directly from the CIA, in return for which they were liberally paid and promised autonomy from the GVN. The GVN neither consented to nor complied

continued

By the end of 1963, 30,000 local tribesmen had been armed and trained. The Special Forces carried out this work for the CIA. Eventually, the Montagnards were formed into units known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). They were used for various types of operations, and were noted primarily for their bravery, brutality, and terrorism. CIDG units were used to repress the Southern peasantry as well as for armed incursions into the North. As soon as the program showed some success, the MACV, attempting to break the autonomy of the Special Forces, removed the program from the CIA and placed it under its own jurisdiction.

CIA training of the Montagnards in South Vietnam had its counterpart among the Meo tribesmen in Laos. The Meo, too, were a local clan whose latent warrior tendencies and antipathy toward central rule were carefully nurtured by the CIA. By training and paying the Montagnards and Meo tribesmen, the CIA, in effect, created a force of warriors directly under its command. The conflict between the local tribesmen and the central government, fostered by the CIA, ran parallel to a larger conflict among American officials—a conflict between the Special Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Just as the local tribesmen were promised their autonomy from the central government by the CIA, so the Special Forces had been established as an autonomous force, to take their commands directly from the President, circumventing the Joint Chiefs. As the Indochina war proceeded, the local tribesmen were eventually reduced to subservience by the central government, and the Special Forces were taken over by the Joint Chiefs. The "guerrillas" within the client state and the "guerrillas" within the American imperial state were broken and absorbed by the client and imperial government, respectively.

But to develop a guerrilla force within the imperial power, an idea originated by the CIA, is a structural change that may prefigure the imperial army of the future. For the conflict between the Special Forces and the Joint Chiefs, on the one hand, and the local tribesmen and the central government, on the other, reflects a larger conflict between the client state and the imperial power. The United States has encountered grave difficulties in developing effective and loyal armies within its client states. Neither the Royal Laotian Army nor the ARVN has been able to hold its own against the people's army, the Viet Cong, and the Pathet Lao. It was as a direct result of this difficulty that the CIA attempted to build armies of local tribesmen.

These guerrilla armies were an astonishing success when compared to the regular armies of South Vietnam and Laos. When the Joint Chiefs set out to break the autonomy of the Special Forces, they were fortuitously putting under their command a guerrilla army of local tribesmen which they were able to use as the new imperial army. With this one stroke the Joint Chiefs resolved some of the difficulties of relying both upon a client army and upon troops conscripted in the US. Neither American boys nor South Vietnamese boys wished to fight in a people's war. What could be better cannon fodder to use against the people than a pre-people, that is, clansmen? The courage of the local tribes and the technology of the imperial power were combined to do battle with large numbers of Asian people and the guerrilla organizations they were supporting.

The third program begun by the 303 Committee was the use of DeSoto patrols. Originated in 1962 and approved by the President, this program authorized US destroyers to operate along the border of mainland China and the North Vietnamese mainland, to listen to the "military and civil activity of the Asian Communist bloc." In addition to listening, the patrols were ordered to stimulate the radar of the enemy so that the position and type of radar could be identified.

After the DeSoto patrols were approved by Kennedy and the detailed policy for using them was formulated by the 303 Committee, the program was submitted for implementation to the Joint Chiefs, who then put the program under the jurisdiction of the Joint Center for Intelligence at their headquarters in Washington. The Ops Center, as it was called, drew up the tentative schedules and forwarded them to CINCPAC in Hawaii. CINCPAC selected the precise dates for the DeSoto patrols and sent orders to the Seventh Fleet. Copies of these orders were also sent to MACV in Saigon. The question of who selected and kept track of the DeSoto patrols was to assume critical importance in the Gulf of Tonkin incident of August, 1964.

CINCPAC plan 34a, drawn up in the fall of 1963 as an annex to the entire CINPAC plan for Southeast Asia, was the covert plan directed against the North. It consisted of two parts: psychological operations and hit-and-run attacks. The latter included amphibious raids by the Vietnamese in areas "south of the Tonkin Delta having little or no security." This was subsequently expanded to include the use of Swift torpedo boats to shell the Northern mainland and kidnap Northern personnel. Plan 34a, too, was assigned by the 303 Committee to the Joint Chiefs for implementation.

The Special Group for Counter-Insurgency

The second agency in Washington that managed the private war between 1961 and 1963 was the Special Group Counter-Insurgency (SGCI). Organized in response to Khrushchev's speech on wars of national liberation, the SGCI was created by President Kennedy in NSAM 124, issued in late 1961. The SGCI, like the 303 Committee, met once a week. In fact, its members included those on the 303 Committee, or their delegates, and met in Room 303 at the Executive Office Building immediately after the Committee adjourned its meetings. Members of the 303 Committee would complete their discussions, sign the orders for the covert programs, and then call the SGCI to order, invite in additional deputies, and turn their attention to the problems of counterinsurgency.

Nevertheless, there were substantial differences between the 303 Committee and the SGCI. The 303 Committee managed the covert operations of the United States government in every area of the world. The programs themselves generally originated with the CIA, although other agencies of government, such as the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the State Department, did submit proposals, many of which were put into operation. The only requirement for a 303 hearing was that the program be significant and covert. When a program was put into operation, it generally used the services of the Special Forces.

The SGCI, on the contrary, never managed covert operations, had only a limited relation to the CIA, and did not employ the services of the Special Forces. It dealt exclusively with the

continued

overt programs of the US government in any nation around the globe that was deemed to be threatened by insurgency. These programs were under the special jurisdiction of the several national security agencies, including the Defense Department, AID, the State Department, USIA, and the CIA. The purposes of SGCI were to coordinate the overseas programs of the national security agencies, eliminate duplication of effort, and ensure that those programs relating to counterinsurgency were completed. The SGCI supervised the overseas programs of each of the national security agencies.

A counterinsurgency doctrine technically known as "The Overseas Internal Defense Policy of the USA" was written in 1962. President Kennedy adopted it as the official policy of the US government in NSAM 182. The main premise of the doctrine was that the counterinsurgents should help themselves, but a saving clause was added to the doctrine instructing: "where necessary, introduce US troops."

Thus the 303 Committee was largely responsible for the unofficial policy of the US government toward Vietnam during the private war—the covert activities in North Vietnam and Laos, and the disguised use of US combat troops within South Vietnam. The SGCI, on the other hand, was in charge of the official policy—the policy that was reported in the press and otherwise made known to the American public.

The official policy consisted of a strategic plan which, consistent with the counterinsurgency doctrine, called upon the GVN to defend itself, to win its own war, and to employ Americans as teachers. There were three parts to the plan:

1) The US government officially accepted Diem as the premier of South Vietnam, and all aid was channeled through him.

2) The strategic hamlet program was devised as the principal means of defending the South against further encroachments by the Viet Cong. Strategic hamlets were supposed to help organize the rural peasants into larger territorial units in order to increase their capacity to defend themselves and to weed out Viet Cong.

As envisioned by the planners, the hamlets were to expand like an oil blot, dense in the center, blurred at the perimeter. Ideally, a second hamlet would not be built until the first was satisfactorily organized and properly defensible. Diem's brother, Nhu, was placed in charge of the program and built the hamlets in total disregard of the oil blot theory. Instead of securing one hamlet before proceeding to the next, Nhu was interested in increasing the number of hamlets, with the result that none was secure. When Diem was assassinated in 1963, thousands of strategic hamlets collapsed overnight.

3) The ARVN was to be built into a powerful army that could take the offensive against the Viet Cong and regain the territory then held by the Communists. The ARVN, trained by MACV and working in conjunction with the strategic hamlet program under the charismatic leadership of Diem, would, it was anticipated, extend the national sovereignty of the GVN throughout South Vietnam.

The national security agencies of the US government devoted all their efforts to this strategic plan. Their programs were supervised by the SGCI and their projects were completed under the direction of a special agency, which ostensibly possessed a blueprint of victory.

The countries under the jurisdiction of the SGCI included Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Iran, and a half-dozen Latin American countries. Vietnam and Laos were at the top of the list. By the end of 1962, entire meetings were devoted to Vietnam alone. The SGCI mainly reviewed weekly reports furnished by the Vietnam Task Force. In time, however, these reports, prepared by Sterling Cottrell and Ben Wood, were considered too meager, and other national security agencies, such as the Pentagon, AID, and the CIA, began to supply supplementary reports on Vietnam.

The reports, whether from the Task Force or the other national security agencies, were discussed at the opening of each meeting. Then, expert witnesses who had just returned from Vietnam would brief the Special Group. Some of the witnesses who regularly appeared before the SGCI were John Richardson, the CIA station chief in Vietnam; General Victor Krulak, the Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA); William Jorden, a former *New York Times* reporter and the author of the two white papers on Vietnam; Ted Sarong, the Australian attaché; Robert Thompson, the British expert on counterinsurgency and moving force behind the strategic hamlet doctrine; and one Walton, an ex-marine and head of the police safety division in Vietnam.

The highlights of the [illegible] SGCI deserve consideration, since they show the information guiding official Washington during the private war as well as the reaction to that information.

The Viet Cong

The year 1962 has been referred to as the optimistic period in Vietnam. The insurgency was coming under control, and McNamara was persuaded that the US had turned the corner in Vietnam and that American boys would be returning home. On May 3, 1962, Sterling Cottrell reported to the Special Group that the US had "reached the bottom" in Vietnam. Cottrell, it should be recalled, was the head of the Vietnam Task Force, had accompanied Taylor and Rostow on their mission to Vietnam, and had opposed their advice on the question of ground troops. He supported a low-keyed approach to Vietnam and clearly had a stake in the continuation of the current Vietnam policy.

General Lyman Lemnitzer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, reported on May 17, 1962, that the defense build-up was going well. The military seemed unanimous in believing that US policies were having benign effects. On May 31, Cottrell informed the SGCI Group that the GVN was increasing the number of strategic hamlets at an "ambitious and uncontrolled rate."

On June 20, however, John McCone, director of the CIA, warned that the Viet Cong were beginning to fight in larger units. They were using heavier weapons, he added, to wipe out strategic hamlets before help could arrive. On November 5, the Task Force told the Group that Viet Cong forces were as strong as ever. They were able to recruit many new personnel, even though their morale had begun to slip. Cottrell added that the "situation was still in balance."

In 1963, the US tried again to document its charge that the Viet Cong were being aided by heavy infiltration from the North. One task confronting the Special Group was to determine the accuracy of the charge. On January 17, 1963, the Task Force decided that infiltration was less seri-

continued

ous than had [illegible]ught. It explained that lo[illegible]ent and local supplies were [illegible]ished to the Viet Cong in th[illegible]; the insurgents had little need t[illegible] dependent upon the North for either. Taylor, complying with "higher" orders, said it was important to get information on Northern infiltration and authorized William Jorden to go to Vietnam to study the question thoroughly. Washington was becoming embarrassed over the fact that it was increasingly committing itself to intervention in a civil war.

On April 5, 1963, a famous meeting of the Special Group was held, in which Jorden, after spending three months in Vietnam, reported that "we are unable to document and develop any hard evidence of infiltration after October 1, 1962." Evidence prior to that date strongly indicated the absence of infiltration. At the same meeting, Robert Thompson attempted to counter Jorden's pessimistic appraisal of Viet Cong activity by forecasting that "US forces are adequate. By the end of the year, troops can begin to be withdrawn."

A State Department representative on the Special Group summed up in one sentence the observations of the US army officers who returned from Vietnam in 1962: "If free elections were to be held in South Vietnam in 1962, Ho would get 70 percent of the popular vote." Because of Ho's popularity, he added, wholesale supplies in the South and ready recruitment of personnel were available to the Viet Cong. Only a trickle of supplies in addition to the original covert apparatus had been furnished by the North. The State Department official pointed out that all insurgents receive some outside help. "There has never been a case of an isolated insurgency. Not even the US War of Independence was an isolated insurgency."

This same official was one of the authors of the counterinsurgency doctrine of the US government. He contrasted the doctrine of the Communist Party with that of the US on the question of the necessity of outside help for an insurgency, noting that Communist doctrine

> . . . emphasizes the fact that the insurgency should be homegrown, and that major communist powers, especially China, do not pour in masses of outside assistance. This enables the insurgents to retain their own independence so that they can sustain themselves over the long haul. Communist Party doctrine stands in radical contrast to the US doctrine of counter-insurgency, which demands massive support by us and which turns the counter-insurgents into our dependents, sapping their morale and capacity to fight.

He supported this comparison with evidence accumulated by the Special Group showing that all weapons captured from the Viet Cong by the US during the period of the private war were either homemade or had been previously captured from the GVN/USA. "Throughout this time," he said, "no one had ever found one Chinese rifle or one Soviet weapon used by a VC." He concluded that the weight of evidence and doctrine proved that "the massive aggression theory was completely phony."

In 1962, Michael Forrestal, a senior member of the National Security Council and a close friend of President Kennedy, confirmed these charges. Returning from a long visit to Vietnam, Forrestal and Roger Hilsman wrote a report to the President that stated that the Viet Cong had "increased their regular forces from 18,000 to 23,000 over this past year." During this period the government of Vietnam had claimed that 20,000 Viet Cong were killed in action and 4,000 wounded. "No one really knows," Forrestal wrote, "how many of the 20,000 'Viet Cong' killed last year were only innocent, or at least 'persuadable,' villagers."

Forrestal told Kennedy that "the vast bulk of both recruits and supplies come from inside South Vietnam itself." At the "very least," Forrestal concluded,

> the figures on Viet Cong strength imply a continuing flow of recruits and supplies from these same villages and indicate that a substantial proportion of the population is still cooperating with the enemy, although it is impossible to tell how much of this cooperation stems from fear and how much from conviction.

Still, Forrestal emphasized that "the Viet Cong continue to be aggressive and extremely effective." It would seem that he had answered his own question. Like many other officials and agencies reporting on the progress of the war at this time, he had discovered that the Viet Cong were actively assist[illegible] by the rural population and that they fought with dedicated spirit and great effectiveness. It should not have been difficult for Forrestal and Kennedy to see that the rural population cooperated "from conviction" because in fact it made up the Viet Cong.

Defoliation

The Special Group devoted part of its attention to some of the programs conducted in the field. As early as 1961, the defoliation program, originally called Operation Hades and subsequently accorded the euphemism Operation Ranchhand, was granted Presidential approval. Limited at first as an experimental measure, it soon became an exercise in wholesale crop destruction. The expanded program received strong financial and political support. Discussions of Operation Ranchhand in Washington were instructive, especially since they showed the bureaucrats' lack of any concern whatever for the consequences of their decisions. Indeed, what was most striking about the discussions of the defoliation program at the Special Group meetings was the absence of inquiry into the nature of the program.

No limits on the defoliation program were ever established, no results examined, no damage surveyed. Concern about the program focused on the single question of whether the South Vietnamese military had given their consent. Apparently, if the GVN recommended the program and the ARVN consented to it, bureaucratic responsibility in Washington was believed to have ceased.

The program was the brain-child of ARPA, the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency, and was placed under the command of the US Chemical Corps. It was approved by the highest bureaucrats in Washington, including Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Maxwell Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Michael Forrestal, and Richard Helms, along with a host of their deputies. But after they had approved the defoliation program, these men ignored the forced migration, sterility, and hunger that followed in its wake. Such consequences were left to the concern of the GVN. The policymakers in Washington removed every vestige of personal responsibility from their shoulders and laid it at the door of the GVN officials.

Thus, Washington was able both to authorize criminal programs and evade any responsibility for them. Maxwell Taylor summed up the concern for Operation Ranchhand in these words:

"We used it for crop destruction and foliage. It was only useful along the highways. It was not at all criminal. It was simply ineffective. The entire program was irrelevant." Defoliation was indeed irrelevant to Washington, but it was not irrelevant to the peasants who had to migrate, the women who became sterile, the children who were made hungry.

Kennedy in Control

Although the bureaucracy in Washington was not concerned with the fruits of its labor in Vietnam, the President was greatly concerned with his capacity to command the bureaucracy in Washington. In his quest for control, he introduced four structural changes in the office of the Presidency—the Special Group Counter-Insurgency, the 303 Committee, the Country Team, and the Green Berets. All of these were fashioned to meet specific defects in the execution of foreign policy, and in this sense may be viewed as *ad hoc* measures. But an extraordinary pattern emerges when the four are grouped together—an expansion of the war-making powers of the Executive to a degree never before contemplated in the history of the Republic. For the first time, total command over the several national security agencies was concentrated in the office of the President.

The SGCI was a special agency created by Kennedy to supervise the programs of the national security agencies. Kennedy selected Maxwell Taylor, then occupying a special office in the White House as the President's military adviser, to be chairman of the SGCI, and the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, to be co-chairman. The state apparatus was thus centralized by appointing a chairman and a co-chairman whom the President personally trusted and who would report directly to him.

Taylor acted as a broker among the various power blocs to ensure that the agencies responded to the President's bidding. Robert Kennedy was considered the moving force behind the SGCI. He attended every meeting and, by his personal tactics, managed to transform them into courtroom spectacles. Officers of the agencies presented their findings from a witness chair, and Kennedy would zealously and relentlessly cross-examine each witness. Witnesses were often intimidated by his ferocity. When William Jorden, the author of two white papers on Vietnam, testified about infiltration from the North, for example, he was excused prematurely in order to avoid further embarrassment at Robert Kennedy's hands. Another witness, reminded that the President's brother was simply trying to get the facts, replied that Kennedy was "guilty of over-kill." Kennedy's function, it seems, was to instill some fear into the agencies—to persuade them that they were being watched closely by the President and should act accordingly.

Defenders of the Kennedy Administration contend that the purpose of these exertions was to keep America out of an unnecessary war in Southeast Asia. The Kennedys, it is suggested, believed that the only way to avoid a deepening and perhaps irreversible commitment to Vietnam was to expose the inflated statements offered by officials who wished to draw the nation into a wider war. But these rationalizations do not hold up when it is recalled that the purpose of the SGCI in general, and Robert Kennedy's purpose in particular, was to centralize in the hands of the President control of a national state security machinery which was increasingly committed to war in Southeast Asia.

The CIA had displayed its power to make foreign policy at the Bay of Pigs, forcing the President to assume responsibility for events he had not initiated and could not control. After Cuba, Kennedy fired Allen Dulles and appointed John McCone as director of the CIA, perhaps because McCone was considered more manageable. At the same time, he created the 303 Committee to break the CIA's independent power and place the agency under his own management. From that time on, the CIA had to clear each of its programs in advance and report directly to McGeorge Bundy, the chairman of the 303 Committee and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Bundy, Maxwell Taylor, and Robert Kennedy were trusted lieutenants who took their orders directly from the President and were placed in charge of special agencies to centralize command in the national security apparatus on the President's behalf.

Not only were the 303 Committee [illegible] state apparatus directly under President Kennedy in Washington, but every effort was made to duplicate this pattern in the field. When Kennedy assumed the Presidency, one of the problems plaguing American foreign policy was the fact that each agency in the field acted as if it were a self-contained system, staking a claim against the Pentagon for its own resources, moving from one part of the globe to the next according to its assessment of where the action was, insulating itself from supervision above, and extending its imperial writ below. The armed services offered the prime examples of separate fiefdoms run wild; but the civil agencies in the field, including the CIA, State, USIA, and others, also made their own rules and circumvented all attempts at direction from above.

The CIA, for example, was assigned a percentage of all shipping to Vietnam, set up its own network of communications in the field, and had its own direct channel back to Washington. Laos simply became competitive turf for the several agencies. Each moved in with personnel and material, then sought a program first to justify its presence and second to expand its domain. Aircraft stationed in Korea were forwarded to Vietnam on Air Force orders which had not been cleared at higher levels, and when such clearance became necessary, dummy committees were created at the Pentagon to clear automatically any material requested. So far as the agencies in the field were concerned, questions of state were politically unreal. The sole reality was the national economy, which was viewed as an infinite source of supply.

The origin of Operation Ranchhand under the expert guidance of William Godell offers a classic example. ARPA appropriated surplus funds to begin the defoliation program, and then, in order to justify an increased budget, bypassed the original guidelines and expanded the program. Much as feudal warlords had waged war against each other within fledgling nations, so the modern agencies looked upon each other as rivals and tried to grab power and resources within the fledgling empire.

To cope with this problem, Kennedy, in 1961, gave US ambassadors full power to control the national

continued

security agencies in the field. Thus, [illegible] the agencies were required to clear their programs with and be supervised by the ambassadors to the countries in which they were operating. Together they were called the "Country Team," with the ambassador as captain, who received his authority directly from Kennedy and reported directly to him. Just as Kennedy had hoped to bring the national security agencies in Washington under the command and control of the SGCI, so he relied upon the concept of the Country Team to achieve the same control in the field.

The Joint Chiefs

But the Joint Chiefs of Staff—in contrast to the other national security agencies—have independent support both in Congress and in the country. Working through the chairmen of key Congressional committees, the Chiefs have automatic access to one branch of government to articulate the proposals they deem important, regardless of whether they have the support of the President or his senior advisers. Once these proposals are made public, the Chiefs can count on the right-wing constituency in the country to support them. Since the Chiefs formulate, express, and then personify the national interest on any issue concerning national security, they rival the President's claim to sovereignty. By virtue of their support in Congress, their political constituency, and their claim upon the flag, the Chiefs, unlike other government groups, can even charge the President with treason. Because of their formidable power, the President must respond to any proposal they put forward.

The President, of course, can command his own resources to persuade the Chiefs to champion his causes. But he must always bargain with them and grant them certain concessions if they oppose him or if he needs their public support. Once the state embarks on war, this uneasy balance between the President and the Chiefs gradually tips on the side of the Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the Commander-in-Chief, are presumed to know how to manage a war. The President who opposes their programs lays himself open to the charge that he is playing with American lives.

Thus, when the President expands a war on the grounds that he is protecting the lives of US troops in the field he either has, in effect, borrowed the Chiefs' argument and is announcing [illegible] accord with those of the military or he is anticipating just such a challenge by the Chiefs and is preparing his own defense. The policies of the Chiefs, moreover, invariably extend the zone of combat until victory is achieved. The Chiefs also depart from civilian leaders in being willing to wage nuclear war, if that is considered necessary to avoid defeat.

But if a war can be presented as a police action, or can proceed under cover as a private matter, then the power of the Chiefs can be sharply limited. Thus, Kennedy had an obvious stake in keeping the war private. But he was not passive. During the period of the private war Kennedy set about building the elite corps of the Green Berets. In *Kennedy*, Sorenson wrote:

> But the President's pride was still the Army Special Forces, rapidly growing to a level some five or six times as large as when he took office, although still small both in total numbers and in relation to the need for more. The President directed—again over the opposition of top generals—that the Special Forces wear Green Berets as a mark of distinction.

Kennedy wanted to carry on the Vietnam war exclusively through the Special Forces, which would enable him to seize command of the national military apparatus. He seems to have had a vision of the Green Berets as a Praetorian Guard, an elite army directly under the command and control of the President. The Green Berets represented Kennedy's attempt to curb the power of the Chiefs and institutionalize the military directly under the Presidency.

Edward Lansdale, a devout believer in the Special Forces and in the concept of counterinsurgency, was quietly assigned an office under McNamara in 1961 and given the power to keep Vietnam under Presidential control. This was a mistake. The Joint Chiefs immediately perceived Lansdale as a potential threat and they set up their own counterinsurgency agency by creating a Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA). Victor Krulak, the first "SACSA," a former Marine Corps general and an astute politician who was referred to as "the brute," undercut Lansdale at every turn until Lansdale was called a "paper tiger."

Once he gained control over counterinsurgency, Krulak was able to restore [illegible] the power of the Chiefs. The military first employed the concept of counterinsurgency as a cover to gain control over part of the plans for covert operations, then expanded it to include conventional warfare, which the military was organized to pursue. In this respect, there was an implicit accord between the military and civilian leadership.

Every one of Secretary McNamara's famous visits to Vietnam was a guided tour carefully stage-managed by the Joint Chiefs. McNamara would stop off at Hawaii and pick up a briefing book, prepared by Krulak, which contained brilliant charts and graphs displaying the progress of the war. McNamara would scan the book to obtain the information he needed for press conferences to be held in Saigon. After the trip, the information would be converted into a hard-cover volume containing references to McNamara's recent findings in Vietnam, but again written by Krulak. This book would then be handed to the President as the final report. The book had been written in advance of the trip just as the trip itself had been planned in advance.

With counterinsurgency in their pockets, the management of some of the covert operations well in hand, and McNamara under close scrutiny and partly under their guidance, the Joint Chiefs turned their attention to the thorny problem of the Special Forces. Under the supervision of the CIA, the Special Forces had been successful in training the Montagnards. In 1964, Operation Switchback was approved in Washington to break up the autonomy of Special Forces, remove them from the CIA's direction, and place them under the command of MACV.

In one stroke, the Joint Chiefs picked up control of both the Special Forces and the local tribesmen. The state had spread its power over the ancient tribes of Indochina and its own elite warriors. The central state apparatus was concentrated in the hands of the Chiefs and the President. The rest of the national security machinery received its orders from their combined command. The question left open—and still unanswered—was whether the

continued

Chiefs and the Commander-in-Chief would share that immense power equally, or whether one would make a claim against the other.

Centralization of the state bureaucracy—except for the Joint Chiefs—directly under the command and control of the President greatly enhanced the power of the President. The effects of this transfer of power were profound. Through the 303 Committee and the mobilization of the Green Berets, the President could now make the decisions on matters of espionage and military strategy. To the extent that he has control over the CIA and shares the power of the military, he is in effect both a superspy and a field marshal. The time and energy he is normally expected to devote to his duties as Chief Executive are now absorbed by these new offices. How much time Kennedy actually devoted to supervising covert activities and personally managing the activities of the Special Forces remains unclear, but it is certain they made large claims on his working day.

Though the 303 Committee and the Special Group successfully centralized the powerful government agencies under the Executive, the Green Berets and the Country Team were much less effective in centralizing the field operations. Nevertheless, the concept of centralizing the state apparatus was advanced by Kennedy and the reality almost measured up to that concept. During the thirty-three months of his Presidency, Kennedy was creating the elements of a totalitarian state structure which carried on a private war.

The fact that the war was private meant that it was not the main preoccupation of the nation, but rather the chief task of the Executive; that it was conducted not in the interests of the nation, but in the interests of the state. Indeed, one could now say that it was conducted against the interests of the nation, because it destroyed the orderly processes of government.

Would Kennedy Have Withdrawn?

American national security was never at stake. Through the Special Group, Kennedy knew well that there was no serious infiltration from the North, nor any Chinese or Soviet support for the Southern struggle. Kennedy knew therefore that the war in South Vietnam was a civil war. How was American national security threatened by the outcome of their civil war? The likely impact of a Viet Cong victory on the international interests of the United States was never systematically studied during the Kennedy years, notwithstanding the casual talk about dominoes. Whenever that issue was raised, the CIA fudged its assessment. For example, if South Vietnam went Communist, the CIA suggested, Southeast Asia would be demoralized and this demoralization might even spread to India. But what is demoralization? How is it measured? How are its consequences determined for national security? Does demoralization cause a nation to switch sides or does it cause it to attach itself ever more closely to the mother country? Would a Viet Cong victory have created a revolution in Thailand? In India? In Cambodia? In Japan?

According to INR, the intelligence branch of the State Department, "there was no serious analysis of what we could expect throughout Southeast Asia if we failed to support South Vietnam." The state was not in the least interested in determining whether the national security was at stake. One steady feature of US policy in Southeast Asia was the failure to consider why we should be there. Only in 1969 did the intelligence community attempt a detailed study of the consequences if South Vietnam were to become a Communist nation. According to INR, this estimate, prepared by the CIA and only recently made public, concluded:

> We would lose Laos immediately. Sihanouk would preserve Cambodia by a straddling effort. All of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation. Thailand, in particular, would continue to maintain close relations with the US and would seek additional support. Simultaneously, Thailand would make overtures and move toward China and the Soviet Union. It would simply take aid from both sides to preserve its independence. North Vietnam would consume itself in Laos and South Vietnam. Only Laos would definitely follow into the Communist orbit.

This estimate suggests that if the United States were defeated in open warfare by a "fourth rate nation," there would be no international consequences to US interests. Is it not then reasonable to assume that if the United States had not fought and had not been defeated, its stock of good will might have risen? The principal effect of American intervention is the carnage and devastation of Southeast Asia.

The events of the early 1960s strongly suggest, however, that had John F. Kennedy lived, he would not have pulled out of Southeast Asia. He would more likely have taken any steps necessary to avoid an ignominious defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong. In a nationwide interview on NBC television two months before his assassination, when asked whether the US was likely to reduce its aid to Vietnam, Kennedy replied:

> I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.
>
> What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

A week earlier in another nationwide interview with Walter Cronkite, Kennedy said:

> But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake.... We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to

continued

participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

Kennedy would not withdraw, but he was troubled by the prospect of public disapproval of his decision. To stay in Vietnam without arousing public opposition, he waged the war as privately as possible.

The "Brush-Fire War"

The counterargument to this interpretation of Kennedy's Vietnam policy advances the premise that Vietnam was an example of a new concept of carefully limited action in support of local allies which was officially and publicly described as "brush-fire war." Congress openly debated this policy and appropriated huge sums of money in support of it. The war, then, was a public, not a private, matter. Under Kennedy, American manpower in Vietnam never exceeded 16,000, a figure clearly within the bounds of a brush-fire war.

The problem with this argument is that there was only a handful who seriously propounded the brush-fire war doctrine in the highest councils of the state. Roger Hilsman and Robert Thompson come to mind as officials closely associated with a counterinsurgency strategy for Vietnam; but the dominant positions in the Kennedy Administration were held by exponents of conventional war, whose recommendations were withheld from the public. Walt Rostow, who publicly enunciated the doctrine of brush-fire war in behalf of the Administration in 1961, was privately recommending "offensive action" and aerial strikes against the Northern mainland. McNamara, also, called for public support of brush-fire wars and simultaneously urged privately that the US be fully prepared to use 260,000 troops in a conventional war. The public statements of the Kennedy Administration invited public support for a brush-fire war, but the private recommendations presupposed the use of heavy firepower.

This does not necessarily mean that the officials were deliberately deceiving the public. To some extent, they were also deceiving themselves. The contradiction between their public rhetoric and their private recommendations was blurred, at the time, both by their language and by the kinds of military technology available to them.

It became fashionable in the early 1960s, for example, to speak of "surgical air strikes," a phrase coined by Walt Rostow. Aerial warfare is, of course, the apex of conventional warfare. To speak of air strikes is to evoke [illegible] Hiroshima. Brush-fire war, on the other hand, is described by the rhetoric of limited hostilities, pacification of insurgents, and nation building. To talk of a "surgical air strike," then, tends to blur the distinction between conventional and brush-fire warfare. It implies that friend can be distinguished from foe when seen from the air and that conventional weapons can be used selectively to wage brush-fire war. It suggests a lower level of violence than conventional warfare, a means of protecting our friends while destroying our enemies.

When asked to comment on the feasibility of using "surgical air strikes" within the limits of brush-fire war, McGeorge Bundy called the question "naïve." "Professors know that bombs kill people," he said. Yet such naïveté helped to preserve an appearance of innocence, permitting the decision-makers to believe that they had not embarked on a course of systematic deception.

The type of ordnance financed during the Kennedy period also encouraged the policy-makers to blur the distinction between the two types of war. Preparations for both conventional warfare and brush-fire war simultaneously made dramatic advances. Within two years there was a 600 percent increase in counterinsurgency forces and a 45 percent increase in the number of combat-ready Army divisions. Hence the managers were equipping the state to fight either kind of war. This produced an element of doubt and ambiguity over which kind of war the US was fighting and would continue to fight. Since a brush-fire war signified a lower level of involvement and could be prosecuted without interfering with the normal business of everyday life, the security managers could point to the counterinsurgency preparations as consistent with Kennedy's Vietnam policy. The capability of carrying both kinds of defense could be cited as justification for both the public rhetoric and the private recommendations.

What becomes clear when one examines the over-all changes introduced by Kennedy's managers at the Pentagon is that they decided to [illegible] for waging any type of war, at any [illegible], at any time. Not only did the brush-fire and conventional capabilities make giant strides in a period of peace, but the nation's strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities were similarly expanded. Strategic nuclear weapons were increased 100 percent, and tactical weapons 60 percent. The capacity to fight any type of war was called the doctrine of "flexible response."

Not only was a conventional war anticipated and recommended within the state, but Kennedy himself authorized the first use of heavy firepower when he sent the newly armed helicopters to Vietnam in 1962. The MAAG mission, moreover, had trained the ARVN to prosecute a conventional war. Would the Americans, when need beckoned and opportunity knocked, renounce their own training, firepower, and private urgings?

The United States proceeded one step at a time, and Kennedy took the first giant step. If the Viet Cong could not be defeated at a lower level of violence, why not proceed to the next level? That was the precise purpose of flexible response. Kennedy, as we have seen, publicly stated that he would not withdraw. His policy clearly was one of gradual escalation which set the US on the course followed by Johnson, and, in revised form, by Nixon. As Maxwell Taylor said when he was asked what Kennedy would have done in Vietnam had he lived: "Far be it from me to read the mind of a dead man, but let me just say this, Kennedy was not a loser." ☐

BALTIMORE SUN

22 JUL 1971

Editor Of National Review Admits 'Secret Data' Hoax

New York (AP)—With a broad grin, William F. Buckley, Jr., editor, revealed yesterday that publication in his *National Review* of so-called secret Vietnam documents was a hoax.

Mr. Buckley said the documents were composed by editors of the magazine "ex nihilo"—out of nothing.

Intended Purpose Cited

The intended purpose, Mr. Buckley told a news conference, was to demonstrate in regard to the earlier Pentagon papers "that the Pentagon and the CIA are not composed of incompetents . . . that forged documents would be widely accepted as genuine provided their content was inherently plausible . . . that the challenge in Southeast Asia was an aspect of the global challenge to the West, not a local affair."

Later, Mr. Buckley told a reporter at his Manhattan apartment:

"If the advice given in the magazine had been followed, we wouldn't be in Vietnam today. The point is that the papers, or something like them, must have been written. Therefore, one concludes that the difficulty was not that the Pentagon and the CIA gave LBJ bad advice, but that LBJ didn't take good advice."

Mr. Buckley's revelation of the hoax came after suspicion arose when several persons listed as authors of the printed documents could not recall writing them. One flatly denied authorship credited to his name.

Not The First Put-On

It was not the first put-on staged by the 45-year-old Mr. Buckley, brother of New York's conservative Senator James L. Buckley. In 1965, William Buckley ran unsuccessfully for mayor of New York, stringing together long and little-known words, but summing up by saying that if elected he would "demand a recount."

Mr. Buckley founded the *National Review* in 1954 to further his political outlook, which he described as radical conservative.

Referring to the secret document hoax, Mr. Buckley said: "The idea arose at an editorial meeting two weeks ago. We were discussing the Pentagon papers as released and the fact they were ideologically tendentious.

I, in fact, initiated the idea. I said, 'Hey, team, what do you think about this—?' We were remarking on the point Maxwell Taylor made that the papers were fragmentary.

"Created Them"

"We reasoned that others at that time saw what was actually happening and gave appropriate advice to the government. We then created them. That step was easy for *National Review* editors."

Mr. Buckley said he had a hand in composing the false documents, but would not say who on the magazine's staff wrote what.

On July 16, Mr. Buckley went on, the magazine mailed 6,000 letters "to our closest friends and supporters of *National Review* advising them of what we were doing."

Several subscribers have been contacted but said they had not received such a letter.

"Invited Discovery"

"We mentioned a lot of people we didn't have to mention," Mr. Buckley said. "In that sense, we invited discovery. We couldn't have been surprised if within two hours after it appeared it had been called a hoax. We were more surprised than anybody at reading . . . that not even Dean Rusk had been able to deny what was printed."

Asked if the magazine planned any future capers, Mr. Buckley replied: "Maybe we should reveal the deliberations of the Central Committee of the People's Republic of China after the meeting with Kissinger."

In his news conference, Mr. Buckley said: "Co-operation from government officials was neither given nor sought."

"Those who will want to question the methods we used in order to make our demonstration may proceed to do so," Mr. Buckley's news conference statement said. "We admit that we proceeded in something of an ethical vaccum.

WASHINGTON POST
JUL 1971

Viet 'Atom' Papers Hoax, Buckley Says

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK, July 21—William F. Buckley Jr. said today that the "top secret" government documents on the Vietnam war published in his magazine, National Review, were a hoax designed "to demonstrate . . . that forged documents would be widely accepted as genuine provided their content was inherently plausible."

A subsidiary purpose, the National Review editor told a news conference, was to prove that it was "plausible" that American officials had recommended massive escalation in Vietnam, as favored by the conservative magazine.

Among other things, the false documents "showed" that high-ranking U. S. officials twice recommended use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1964-5. Headlined "The Secret Papers They Didn't Publish," the documents had been described by the magazine yesterday as "fragments" from extensive files made available to it by an unnamed informant.

Buckley was asked today if it served any useful purpose for American news services to tell the public and the world on the basis of false documents that the U. S. government had seriously considered using nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

"It seems to me quite clear that the fact we have nuclear arms suggests that they ought to be used under certain circumstances," he replied.

"If it could be demonstrated that in 1965 a demonstration drop [of nuclear weapons] outside of Haiphong might save the lives of 45,000 Americans, I would suggest that it was a reasonable suggestion for the Joint Chiefs to make."

Buckley would not say whether he has any evidence that such a recommendation was actually made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or anyone else in a high position in the American government.

"It is inconceivable to me that there is nobody in the Pentagon, CIA or White House who has the same analytical powers as a junior editor of National Review. We were proposing these things seven years ago," he said.

The conservative editor, columnist and television personality was smiling, joking and obviously enjoying the limelight of an airport press conference to announce the hoax after flying in from the West Coast.

Buckley said the documents, which took up 14 pages of the current issue of the National Review, were composed last week in the magazine's offices. He said the idea for the hoax issue sprang "full-blown in my mind" and added dryly it was "an arduous challenge" to emulate bureaucratic prose.

"Those who will want to question the methods we used in order to make our demonstration may proceed to do so," said Buckley, facing three camera crews and about 10 reporters. "We admit that we proceeded in somewhat of an ethical vacuum.

"The New York Times has instructed us that it is permissible to traffic in stolen documents. But they have not yet instructed us on whether it is permissible to traffic in forged documents," he said.

Buckley maintained that the failure of government agencies and former high officials to challenge the authenticity of the National Review papers was evidence of their "plausibility" as mere paraphrases of documents which do exist.

There were denials before the Buckley news conference. Prof. Daniel Boorstin, director of the Smithsonian's National Museum of History and Technology, told newsmen this morning that he had not written the document ascribed to him by the National Review. Repeated efforts to reach Boorstin Tuesday night, before publication of news articles on the magazine disclosures, were unsuccessful.

But several of those named as authors of fake documents—including former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Prof. Frank Trager—were unable to say Tuesday night whether the documents attributed to them were genuine.

Few if any of the officials or agencies named in the documents had seen copies of the National Review, which could not be found on newsstands in Washington Tuesday.

When copies did become available in government, officials began to say they could not find such documents in their files, but they indicated they were planning extensive searches.

The Washington Post got an advance copy of the National Review on Tuesday from the office of the editor's brother, Sen. James L. Buckley (C-N.Y.). Attached was a calling card from the senator's press secretary, Leonard Saffir. He had written on it, "A journalistic coup. Messrs. Buckley and Rusher (National Review publisher William A. Rusher) deserve Pulitzer Prizes."

Yesterday, Saffir said that he had thought the documents were genuine and that his boss did not know anything about it since he was away in California. Asked what he thought the hoax proved, Saffir said, "Maybe it highlights the gullibility of the press. Maybe it proves the press should be more probing."

At the press conference here, William Buckley appeared unconcerned about the potential impact of the hoax on the credibility of his journal, which claims 115,000 circulation. He said the "plausible" hoax enhances the National Review's reputation for analysis.

Buckley maintained his magazine's "larger purposes" excused its publication of concocted documents at least as much as the "larger purposes" of major newspapers excused the publication of authentic documents about decision-making in the Vietnam war.

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

22 JUL 1971

Santo Domingo: The Politics of Terror

Intervention and Negotiation:
The United States and the Dominican Revolution
by Jerome Slater,
with a Foreword by
Hans J. Morgenthau.
Harper & Row, 254 pp., $7.95

Barrios in Arms:
Revolution in Santo Domingo
by José A. Moreno.
University of Pittsburgh,
226 pp., $8.95

Norman Gall

> We know that many who are now in revolt do not seek a Communist tyranny. We think it's tragic indeed that their high motives have been misused by a small band of conspirators, who receive their directions from abroad. To those who fight only for liberty and justice and progress, I want to join in . . . appealing to you tonight to lay down your arms and to assure you that there is nothing to fear. The road is open to you to share in building a Dominican Democracy and we in America are ready and anxious and willing to help you.
>
> —Lyndon B. Johnson
> May 2, 1965

President Johnson's military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was as momentous as it was cruel and politically mistaken. We can see it, along with our enlargement of the Vietnam war in the same year, as part of a disastrous expansion of the powers of the American Presidency and of its sense of "global responsibilities." When a force of 23,000 US troops landed in Santo Domingo in May to reverse the course of the Santo Domingo civil war they served to rescue a repressive military establishment from an apparently successful popular revolt that was trying to restore constitutional rule. We can now see that the high priority the US gave to social progress in Latin America, an idea implicit in the Alliance for Progress, has been replaced by what appears to be an expanding and recurrent pattern of control by terror.

Professor Jerome Slater's political study of the 1965 intervention and the eighteen-month US military occupation that followed is derived from his use, on a not-for-attribution basis, of "a great number of papers, memoirs, and documents which are not now in the public domain," as well as off-the-record interviews with US and OAS officials. However, all this new material adds little or no support to the official rationale for the intervention—that the Dominican Republic was at the brink of a possible Communist takeover. Instead it provides further evidence of double-dealing and cruelty after the US troops were sent in.

Because he relies so much on classified official documents, and because of his otherwise limited knowledge of Dominican affairs, Slater tends at times to bend over backward to give credence and legitimacy to the official US view in a number of, at best, highly doubtful instances. Nevertheless, he concludes that although "there was some risk that out of an uncontrollable revolutionary upheaval Castroite forces might emerge victorious . . . the risk was not yet sufficiently great to justify the predictably enormous political and moral costs that the intervention entailed."

The effect of the intervention was to restore to power in Santo Domingo the political *apparatchiks* of the long and brutal dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-61). Of the costs Slater writes at the end of his book:

> . . . the steadily worsening political terrorism . . . has recently [1970] reached crisis proportions. Scarcely a day goes by without a political murder, a "suicide" of a jailed political prisoner, the disappearance of a political activist, or, at the very least, a case of police harassment of the political opposition. Most of the victims are Communists or Castroite radicals, PRD activists [of ex-President Juan Bosch's *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano*], or former constitutionalists, although recently even anti-Balaguerists on the right have been attacked.

While there has been a rise in leftist counter-terror, with machine-gunnings of isolated police and soldiers increasingly common, the main culprits appear to be unregenerates in the police and, to a lesser extent, the armed forces. It is not clear what [President Joaquin] Balaguer's role is in this, but although he has condemned what he calls the "uncontrollable forces" behind the violence and on several occasions has shaken up the police leadership, there is a growing feeling among moderate Dominicans that he is encouraging the rightist terrorism or, at best, has been inadequate in his response to it.

In recent years there have been more political murders in the Dominican Republic than in any comparable period during Trujillo's dictatorship, with the sole exception of the reign of terror that followed the swiftly crushed invasion from Cuba in 1959, organized by Fidel Castro.[1] The Santo Domingo newspaper *El Nacional* last December 30 filled a page and a half of newsprint with the details of 186 political murders and thirty disappearances during 1970.[2] The Dominican terror resembles the current wave of political killings in Guatemala (see my "Slaughter in Guatemala," *NYR*, May 20, 1971) in that the paramilitary death squads are organized by the armed forces and police, which in both cases over the years have been given heavy US material and advisory support. The death squads themselves are partly composed of defectors from revolutionary political factions.

The political terrorism in Santo Domingo, however, seems now to be directed not so much against well-known politicians, as is the case in Guatemala. Rather it is used to control the Santo Domingo slum population, which was the main force that defeated the Dominican military in the 1965 revolution. In the proliferating ramshackle slums and squatter settlements that spread northward from the ancient churches and plazas of downtown Santo Domingo, there is continual patrolling by uniformed military and police units, as well as by plainclothes agents on motor scooters. Each barrio has been infiltrated by government intelligence organizations. (More-

continued

over, many taxi drivers are police agents, like Haiti's Ton-Ton Macoutes.) Since much of the killing seems to be done almost capriciously by these patrols,[3] the effect of the terror has been an undeclared, all-night curfew in the slums.

On a recent visit to Santo Domingo I found that, owing to the general fear of assassination, heavily populated slum areas of the old rebel zone, whose intense street life in the past resembled New York's Forty-second Street or Tokyo's Yoshiwara district, were virtually deserted after 8 PM. Although these killings have aroused little in the way of active popular resistance, a twenty-four-hour general strike was called last November. The outlying barrio of Los Minas--a heavily PRD slum which was invaded by squatters after the Trujillo assassination in 1961 and which today has more than 100,000 inhabitants--was shut down after six residents of the barrio were murdered within a week. According to one feeble old man in the barrio who was questioned by a reporter at the time, "The situation had gotten so bad in Los Minas that the men felt compelled to stay at home and send the women out to find the day's sustenance, because their lives were not worth a piece of rotten fruit."[4]

The night before Los Minas was shut down, President Balaguer, a crafty and tenacious political maneuverer who was Trujillo's last puppet president, told a press conference at the National Palace that the strike at Los Minas

> ... is illogical and absurd because what the citizenry should do is ... associate itself with the authorities to counteract the terrorism. As I have said many times, this is a fight in which all sectors of society should participate. For if an exact version of each deed could reach me and the Government, one could establish responsibility more easily and the Government could punish these acts of terror.
>
> I have denounced the irregularities inside the police, and I have confided to many persons the purification of the police.[5] So far this has not been achieved and I completely agree with the editorial in today's [newspaper] *Listin Diario* about this: the imperious need to purify the police, so that its services are efficient and to end these criminal acts that are filling the country with blood.[6]

Political assassinations continued steadily for four years after 1966, when, with US occupation forces still in the country, Balaguer was elected to his first four-year term. In 1970, during Balaguer's campaign for re-election, the terror sharply increased. A great many voters abstained from this election after the Dominican constitution had been changed to allow Balaguer to run for a second consecutive term. Then, in the last six months of 1970, after Balaguer had begun his second term of office, new plans for police action were circulated among the intelligence and security agencies of the Dominican government, which are honeycombed with officers of Trujillo's old secret police, the SIM (*Servicio de Inteligencia Militar*). These plans were the basis for the most sustained and enveloping system of terror since the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship.

The head of the Department of Intelligence at the National Palace is Manuel A. Perez Sosa, former chief of the SIM. On August 2, 1970, Perez Sosa received a letter of resignation from one of his subordinates, Miguel A. Perez Aybar, who explained that "I have taken this step so as not to lend myself to the events that I understand will occur and will do great injury to the Supreme Government." On the same date Perez Aybar also wrote Balaguer that "I have decided to resign because I am your friend and because the plans of the Department of Intelligence are disastrous for your labor of Government, and I do not wish to be an accomplice to the murder of men who are going to be assassinated without any cause."

A few months ago a new kind of terrorist organization was organized by the police. Known as *La Banda*, it is made up mainly of former members of the Maoist *Movimiento Popular Dominicano* (MPD), the most militant party of the Dominican left, which last year tried to form a United Front of all political factions—including dissidents on the extreme right—to oppose Balaguer's re-election. The MPD is said to have carried out the kidnapping, in March, 1970, of Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, the US air attaché in Santo Domingo, by the "Unified Antireelection Command." Crowley was exchanged within sixty hours for twenty Dominican political prisoners, the most prominent of whom was the MPD Secretary-General Maximiliano Gomez, who were flown into exile. Since then most of the principal MPD leaders have been gunned down by the police, and Gomez himself died of gas poisoning last month in Brussels under mysterious circumstances.

CUBAN EXILES IN SANTO DOMINGO

According to secret Dominican government documents I obtained while investigating the political terror in Santo Domingo, the intelligence and security apparatus of the Balaguer regime has been making use of Cuban exiles.

One typewritten memorandum under the letterhead of the National Police says [see photocopy on opposite page]:

> Very courteously, you are informed that you should have ready a group of five men, since on the 25th of this month it was agreed to stage a simulated attack on the Royal Bank of Canada to discredit the movements of the left, which have been gaining strength in recent months. J. 1 says that the personnel selected for this purpose should be Cubans. The uniforms that will be used will be supplied by Lieutenant Cedano.

Another memorandum, written under the letterhead *Presidencia de la Republica* and dated April 22, 1970, gave these instructions:

> Very courteously, it is communicated that you should send Agent M.10 to the Airport of the Americas at 6 a.m. to await the arrival of the personnel of Cuban nationality that will carry out this service under your supervision.

Another memorandum, marked "Confidential" and dated July 29 1970 says:

> Very respectfully I communicate that the members of this body (CUBANS) have instructions as well as the arms they will use in their work. At the same time I inform you that P. 17 wished to return to Miami as soon as he performs the service. This should be discussed with J. 1 since it could bring problems in that the person mentioned has disagreements with the other men.



REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
POLICIA NACIONAL

SANTO DOMINGO, D. N.

Al : 00.-

Asunto : Planes relacionado al Banco The Royal Bank Of. Canada.

Muy cortesmente, se le informa que debe Ud. tener listo un personal de 5 hombres, ya que en reunión celebrada en fecha 25 del presente mes, se acordó realizar un simulado atracó al The Royal Banck Of. Canada, esta medida se acordo para poder desacreditar los movimientos de izquierda, los cuales estan tomando - fuerzas en los últimos meses.

Dice J.1 que el personal seleccionado para esto fin deben ser Cubanos. Los uniformes que serán utilizados le serán suministrado por el Teniente Cedano.

Atentamente,

R.I.-

Meanwhile, many MPD youths have been arrested and pressured into joining the police terrorist bands. On April 20, 1971, six youths who said they were members of a terrorist organization called *Joventud Democratica Reformista Anticomunista* were granted political asylum in the Mexican embassy in Santo Domingo. All but one of them were age eighteen or younger. Before taking refuge in the embassy they issued a statement to the press saying that they had been recruited by the police after they were arrested and accused of "a series of deeds that we did not commit." They identified the leader of the terrorist bands as Police Lt. Oscar Nuñez Peña, who, they said was a bodyguard of Gen. Perez y Perez, the police chief. "In this way," the youths said, "they [the police] want to get their hooks into many revolutionary militants." They said the police told them that "this is a declared war against the Communists. The bands will be organized in all the barrios of the capital and what has been done so far is an experiment to acclimatize public opinion." According to their statement, the group was given three Thompson machine guns and a car to carry out its assignment in the "April Plan" which was drafted by the police.[7]

On June 7, another member of *La Banda*, Fernando Aquino Mateo, also known as Sierra y Sierra, obtained asylum in the Mexican embassy. Before he entered the embassy Sierra y Sierra said in an interview that he had been jailed several times after fighting on the constitutionalist side in the 1965 revolution, and had been beaten up in jail so many times that he finally agreed to become a trustee at La Victoria prison, where, he said, he beat and tortured other inmates. He also said he witnessed the death by beating of Oliver Daniel Mendez Guzman, twenty, whom Police Chief Perez y Perez said had escaped from jail on May 5. The dead youth was taken from jail in a sack by a police colonel, Sierra y Sierra recalled, "I imagine that they threw him into the sea, because I have not read in the press that his body appeared anywhere."

He explained that he had joined *La Banda* after his release from jail, May 19, and had sought diplomatic asylum because he had been ordered by Police Lt. Nuñez Peña to kill Felix Alburquerque, the PRD Secretary-General of the taxi drivers' union UNACHOSIN, and Radhames Gomez, the managing editor of *El Nacional*. Before obtaining asylum Sierra y Sierra had lived in a squatter settlement called Katanga, next to Los Minas. One of his last acts as a member of *La Banda*, he said, was to arrest Juan Almonte, the PRD leader of Los Minas, under orders of a police sergeant who said that "if nobody sees us take him prisoner, we should kill him."[8]

Almonte had recently made a series of accusations of corruption in the operations of the national lottery, and had won an election held by the union of lottery ticket sellers—certified by the Labor Ministry. He had, however, been stopped at gunpoint by the old union leadership from taking over the union headquarters. In an interview shortly before his arrest, Almonte told me: "The violence in these barrios is such that even police sergeants and corporals have been killed for having become too close to the PRD. We will have a revolution soon more violent than before. Last time [in 1965] we routed the army in twenty-four-hours, and when it happens again it will take less time."

According to the testimony of the youths who obtained asylum in the Mexican embassy, the police agents who organized *La Banda* were also involved in one of the most sordid political crimes in recent Dominican history, the kidnap-murder of Santiago Manuel Hernandez, nineteen, a former MPD member also known as Mangá who had been sought by the police for several weeks. Young Hernandez was shot and critically wounded inside his father's slum shack by two police undercover agents on March 26. Two weeks later, on Easter Sunday, the day before he was to undergo surgery, he was kidnapped from his hospital bed by police agents and was found dead the next morning in a roadside canefield near the town of San Pedro de Macoris, some forty miles away.

As described to me in interviews by his mother and his parish priest, a Cuban Jesuit named Tomás Marrero, the convalescence of Mangá was a lurid nightmare that moved inexorably toward death. His mother, Sra. Mercedes Hernandez de Frías, told me that when her critically wounded son was brought to the Hospital Padre Bellini

continued

in downtown Santo Do[illegible] could be found for a transfusion, since the local blood banks said they had no blood for a wounded man until they got a police order to supply it. The emergency operation to prolong the life of Mangá was performed—with police in the operating room—by recycling the blood hemorrhaging from the patient's body into a bottle and injecting it back into him. After his recovery, police guards were stationed with machine guns inside the ward, and forbade the boy to speak with anyone.

According to his mother, Hernandez was visited every day by two police plainclothesmen who stood at the foot of the hospital bed and asked how he was getting on; she said her son whispered to her after one of these visits that they were the two men who shot him on March 26. Late each night the police would turn on all the lights in the ward and search the boy's bed, on one occasion disconnecting the rubber tube through which noxious fluids were being drained from his body. When Father Marrero, who was taking turns with members of the family in all-night bedside vigils, protested to the policemen, the priest was barred from the hospital from then on. A few days later the boy's mother overheard the police guards say, "We're going to lynch this dog."

At 7 PM, on April 11, four men entered the hospital ward with stockings over their heads and handkerchiefs covering their faces. They announced that "we are from the party and we have come to liberate you," but the boy said, "I have no party," and pleaded with his mother not to let him go. As the men were leaving the ward with her son, the mother saw that beneath their hospital smocks they wore gray police trousers and black police boots. A few days after the boy's body was found, President Balaguer attributed the murder to "a struggle between two organizations of the extreme Left."[9]

The story of Mangá's death was first told to me by Father Marrero, whom I have known since the 1965 revolution, having slept in his church in the rebel zone while interviewing some of the people who fought on the constitutionalist side. He was one of some twenty Cuban and Spanish Jesuits who came to the Dominican Republic from Cuba in 1961—after nationalization that year of the Jesuit *Colegio Belén* in Havana, where Fidel Castro st[illegible] [illegible] these priests have performed remarkable work in leading the *aggiornamento* of the Dominican church, drafting the principal church documents, organizing cooperatives, literacy campaigns, peasant leagues, and the new Catholic University Mater et Magistra in Santiago, and earning the enmity of right-wing elements of Dominican society.

During the revolution I met another Cuban Jesuit, José Moreno, author of *Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo Domingo*, who was working with Father Marrero at the San Miguel Church, running an improvised medical clinic and distributing surplus food. The food was sent by the Americans across the cease-fire lines, while negotiations were dragging on, but in barely sufficient quantities to avoid panic and starvation among what became essentially a captive population.

José Moreno has since left the priesthood and is now teaching sociology at the University of Pittsburgh's Center for Latin American Studies. His account of life inside the rebel zone during the 1965 civil war—he was doing field research for his doctorate in sociology at Cornell when the revolution broke out—is written with more intimate knowledge and greater precision than any other study of the insurrection I have seen. Moreno's is the first objective, detailed, and plausible analysis available anywhere of the real Castroite-Communist strength in the constitutionalist camp. He shows that their forces were limited to a few well-armed and well-disciplined *comandos* of resistance fighters controlled by the Communist Party and the Castroite June 14th Movement. But these were only a few groups among a great many others. As Moreno describes the process:

> A training school was set up in which navy frogmen trained the civilians in urban guerrilla tactics. To maintain the morale of the rebel organization, [Col. Ramón] Montes Arache [the frogmen's commander and the rebel defense minister] and other officers agreed to let the civilians organize themselves into commando [neighborhood militia] units. Montes Arache realized that his job was to coordinate these units scattered all over the city and to give them leadership together with logistic [illegible] strategic support. Thus, the commandos, which had originally started as a means of self-protection and an expression of solidarity among members of informal groups, became the most powerful instrument in the hands of the rebels. By the end of May there were in the city 117 commando posts in which 5,000 men lived, ate and slept together....
>
> On one hand, informal groups of people from the barrio, groups of friends and relatives from the community, or gangs of "tigers" [teen-age street gangs] evolved into commandos such as San Miguel, Pedro Mena, Pichirilo, and Barahona. On the other hand some formal organizations [political parties and labor unions] already operating in public life whose leaders decided to combine their memberships with other individuals formed such commandos as San Lázaro, Poasi, and Argentina. Both kinds of groups were numerous, and both were relevant to the revolution. The first kind relied heavily on the organizational abilities of the leader, particularly on his charisma and *machismo* [manliness and bravery]. The second kind relied heavily on the organizational structure of the parent organization.

This description, I think, should help to place the Santo Domingo revolt of 1965 alongside the Paris Commune of 1871 in the world's revolutionary traditions. Both were urban, popular uprisings that were sustained by civilian militia until they were crushed by foreign troops. Both were involved in the turbulent process of peasant migration to the cities that made Paris in the nineteenth century and Santo Domingo since Trujillo's assassination in 1961 into centers of social revolution. Moreno writes very well of the quarrels, the hunger, the demoralization as the months of negotiation dragged on under the US military occupation. But his book tends to lapse into sociological jargon toward the end, and it is regrettable that he did not instead simply let the Dominicans speak for themselves. I can testify that many of them not only can tell what the revolution was about with eloquence and clarity, but can also do justice to the incandescent inner life of the Santo Domingo slums.

continued

Professor Slater writes that "the real explanation" for the intervention "was the [US] embassy's playing on the Communist theme, compounded by the almost universal disdain and distrust for Bosch throughout the US Government." I think this is true but there are deeper explanations that are relevant both to the continuing political terror in Santo Domingo and to social conditions throughout Latin America.

Santo Domingo is one of the extreme examples of the creation of a huge sub-proletariat overnight. Its population (now 800,000) has more than doubled in the decade since Trujillo's death. It is a particularly grave case of the influx to the cities in contemporary Latin America. And it differs from European peasant migrations in the era of the Paris Commune in two important ways. First, the European urbanization process proceeded at a somewhat slower pace than in Latin America today and was sustained by a much higher degree of industrial employment.[10] Secondly, there was in Europe nothing approaching Latin America's urban squatter problem that tends to divide cities into distinct asphalt and marginal areas.[11] If the demands of those who are moving into the cities for food, jobs, and housing are in no way satisfied, they become dangerous to the regime: only terror and force will control them.

The tattered country people who came to Santo Domingo have built flimsy, clapboard shacks that sprawl away from the city's center along both banks of the Ozama River and under the Duarte Bridge. In 1965, thousands of the slum dwellers, using Molotov cocktails and small arms captured from the police, defeated elite tank and infantry units at this bridge in one of the episodes that demoralized the Dominican military and led to the US intervention.[12] This humiliation has generated in the Dominican armed forces and police an obsessive hatred and fear of the shack settlements and the dense, fetid warrens, called *patios*, of cardboard and palm-bark huts which are squeezed behind the façade of the pastel-colored wood-and-concrete houses in the interior of each city block in the *parte alta* of Santo Domingo.

The people in these slums have kept a blind and stubborn faith in their [illegible]ol, Juan Bosch—pronounced Juan Bo in the liquid, Dominican rural Spanish that sounds like a Mississippi drawl. Life stops at midday when he speaks on the radio, the slow, seductive indignation of his voice blasting into the street from every shack. In a recent radio speech Bosch asked:

> Why do you think there are armed bands punishing the poor barrios of the capital? Why are there so many political murders, so many spies, so many political prisoners, so many abuses? It is for the same reason that the country has had a large commercial deficit in recent years. It is because the country does not produce enough for all Dominicans to live at least with enough food, and besides this what is produced is badly distributed. A few have much, others have enough to live on but the great majority don't even have where to fall dead.

The economic problems of these people are immense, almost immeasurable. A survey of one marginal barrio by Santo Domingo's Urban Planning Office found that only 16 percent of employable family heads had regular work, 44 percent survived by occasional odd jobs, called *chirripa*, while 40 percent were totally unemployed. Of those working full or part-time, 93 percent earned less than $100 monthly.[13] Survival under these conditions is partly in the cash economy, partly through barter, but probably most important, through elaborate and highly codified exchanges of personal favors, like tribal or communal customs in many rural subsistence economies.

Six years after the revolution, Santo Domingo is still divided into two enemy camps: the slums of the old rebel zone, and the comfortable residential neighborhoods surrounding the American embassy. I talked to an old and wise *Trujillista* politician who these days rocks on his porch a few blocks from the embassy. "In the old days, when a fire broke out in a sugar cane field, the way to fight it was to start another fire, called a counter-fire [*contrafuego*]. In 1965 a big fire called the revolution broke out in Santo Domingo and the terror is the *contrafuego* aimed at putting it out."

One flaw of Professor Slater's book is that he treats the 1965 intervention as an isolated episode with virtually no reference to the history of US involvement in Dominican affairs: President Grant's efforts to annex Santo Domingo, which were blocked by Congress; the US Marine occupation of 1916-24; the US receivership of Dominican customs duties from 1905-1940, when Trujillo arranged for final payment of the foreign debt, one of his proudest achievements. Nor does he mention the CIA role in the assassination of Trujillo,[14] and the US military and diplomatic maneuvering to dismantle the Trujillo political apparatus (twice US warships were sent into Dominican coastal waters to block attempts to restore the dictatorship) and to establish the provisional regime that held the 1962 elections in which Bosch won by a large majority.

A major element of the US presence in Santo Domingo since the fall of Trujillo has been the intimate relationship of US advisers with the Dominican military and police.[15] After the intervention of 1965, these advisory missions expanded enormously. In 1967 and 1968 the Dominican Republic, with a population of only four million, had the largest AID Public Safety (*sic*) or police assistance program of any country outside Vietnam. The second and third largest programs were respectively in Brazil (with 90 million people) and Guatemala, the two other Latin American nations where major outbreaks of right-wing terror by paramilitary death squads have occurred in recent years.

One of the most interesting documents to appear recently on the American presence in Santo Domingo was the transcript of a taped interview with David Fairchild, who served with AID in the Dominican Republic for eighteen months in 1966-67. The interview deals mainly with the frustrations and complexities of administering the vast US aid program to stabilize the Balaguer regime. Fairchild has this to say about the AID Public Safety program:

continued

There were six positions in the Public Safety Division of AID which were CIA officials. They were CIA employees. They were paid by AID because there was no way of keeping the accounting separate without exposing them. Their location there was unknown to other members of Public Safety. I had to become familiar with this because one of my jobs was getting the positions and the budgets straightened out. They worked with the police. There were only six of them out of 20 . . . they were in intelligence, communications, management training . . . here are the figures: in fiscal '67, there were 15 [AID Public Safety officers]; in fiscal '68, there were 18, of which six, one-third, were CIA.[16]

The 1965 intervention, and all the desperate, Byzantine machinations that have followed in order to justify it, not only compounded the raw and mounting tragedy of the Dominican people, but achieved the very opposite of its stated ends. Slater writes, correctly, that "Communist, or, at least, radical and extremist strength in the Dominican Republic is far higher today than it was in April 1965, in good part because of the intervention." Beyond this, the political regime that is the creature of the intervention has proved to be a revival of the era of Trujillo, with the apprentices sitting in the sorcerer's chair and practicing his brutal powers.

President Balaguer, who was placed in power by US troops and US money, pleaded in a speech at a dinner of the American Chamber of Commerce in Santo Domingo for an increase in the republic's quota for sugar exports to the US: "We depend," he said, "in full measure on the political and economic collaboration of the Fatherland of Washington and Lincoln, and we cannot allow ourselves the luxury, taken by other countries of Latin America, of shaking off the so-called yoke of North American imperialism to accept others that are, indeed, ignominious."[17] But the Dominican sugar quota is being cut by Congress, Balaguer is running out of money, and his military and political support is beginning to desert him.

It is a pity that the PRD has provided more of an insurrectional mystique than a workable political formula for ruling the Dominican Republic. Juan Bosch remains a popular leader and a man of high principles, but his erratic character makes it doubtful that he can provide the steady leadership that the Dominican people need. Still, if political terror continues it will lead to a popular explosion more violent than that of 1965. ☐

continued

---

[1] I refer to Trujillo's killing of his own people, and thus exclude from this comparison the 1936 slaughter of some 10,000 Haitian squatters to stop the illegal migrations from Haiti to the Dominican Republic. By far the best source on the Trujillo regime is Robert D. Crassweller's excellent biography, *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator* (Macmillan, 1966).

[2] See "*Van 216 Muertos*," *El Nacional*, December 30, 1970. The writer of this summary told me that after the edition went to press four more political killings occurred in the final thirty-six hours of 1970, bringing the death/disappearance total to 190.

[3] For example, on May 16, a fifteen-year-old tailor's apprentice, Belardino Beras Ortega, who had arrived from the provinces only three months before, was detained by a navy street patrol on the Duarte Bridge for not having a license plate on his bike, and was capriciously thrown over the bridge to his death by the patrol. See "*Piden a Balaguer se Investigue Muerte Joven*," *El Nacional*, May 22, 1971.

[4] See Miguel Jose Torres, "*Transcurre sin Incidentes Paro Actividades Los Minas*," *El Caribe*, Santo Domingo, November 20, 1970.

[5] There have been eight different national police chiefs in the first five years of Balaguer's rule. In what was described as a major step to purge the police, Balaguer last January named his Defense Minister, Gen. Enrique Perez y Perez, as his newest police chief, but the paramilitary violence has continued.

[6] See "*Admite Ineficacia*," *El Caribe*, November 19, 1971.

[7] See "*Miembros de Banda Solicitan Asilo*," *El Nacional*, April 20, 1971.

[8] See "*Revelan Trama*," *El Nacional*, June 7, 1971, and "*Bosch Ve Escandalo Denunciada Trama*," *El Nacional*, June 8, 1971. On page 13 of the June 7 edition, a letter from the warden of La Victoria prison to Lt. Nuñez is photographically reproduced, saying that Sierra y Sierra "was a prisoner and squeezed the communists very hard and now they are persecuting him in the capital . . . so I hope you will give him protection for me."

[illegible] See "[illegible] *inato de Mangá*," *El Nacional*, April 14, 1971. The same edition carried a statement by National Police Chief Perez y Perez that the killing was done by PACOREDO (*Partido Comunista de la Republica Dominicana*) which is said to be controlled by police infiltrators.

[10] See "The Poor World's Cities," a survey, *The Economist*, December 6, 1969, p. 56.

[11] See Richard M. Morse, "Recent Research on Latin American Urbanization," *Latin American Research Review*, Fall, 1965, p. 56.

[12] Slater writes that "the last detachment of surrendering Cascos Blancos [riot police], having been told they were facing a Communist rebellion, pleaded for their lives by crying, '*Viva Fidel! Viva el Comunismo! Viva Cuba!*'" One of the many ironies of the revolution was that Col. Francisco Caamaño, the rebel military chieftain, had served until a few months before as chief of the police riot squad. Antonio Imbert, the last surviving killer of Trujillo, had been supplying arms to Castroite groups over the years and had actually offered his services to the rebels before being named head of an anti-Communist junta by the US occupation forces. See my article "US Aides Confirm Imbert Aided Reds," Washington *Post*, June 17, 1965.

[13] See Fernando A. Santana, *Barrios Marginados de Santo Domingo: Una Realidad para Actuar*. Study presented to the United Nations Conference on Squatter Settlements, Medellin, Colombia, February, 1970, p. 3.

[14] See my "How Trujillo Died," *The New Republic*, April 13, 1963.

[15] In his book *Barrios in Revolt*, José Moreno illustrates how this relationship functioned in the early days of the 1965 revolution, before US military intervention: "Antonio Martinez Francisco, a rich businessman, was the Secretary-General of Bosch's PRD when the revolution broke out. As a moderate, he sought mediation from the US embassy when the fighting started to get out of hand. His plea went unheard by US officials. On April 28, Martinez sought political asylum in the Mexican embassy, where he received a phone call from Arthur Breisky, Second Secretary at the US embassy, who asked him to come to the embassy to discuss important problems with [Ambassador] W.T. Bennett. Martinez agreed, and a car arrived to take him from the Mexican embassy. Inside the car he found a loyalist colonel and a CIA agent who took him at gunpoint to San Isidro [the big air force base outside Santo Domingo]. There he found the US official who had led him into the trap, as well as US air attaché [Lt. Col Thomas B.] Fishburn, surrounded by Dominican generals. He was forced to read over the radio an appeal asking the rebels to surrender their weapons."

[16] From "US AID in the Dominican Republic: An Inside View," in *NACLA Newsletter*, Vol. IV, No. 7, New York-Berkeley: North American Congress on Latin America, November, 1970. The AID Public Safety program regularly sends its officers first to Vietnam before sending them elsewhere in the world, which means that nearly all US military and police advisers in Latin America have been shaped to some extent by their Vietnam experience. However, the Public Safety programs in the Dominican Republic and Brazil have been cut back in the last two years.

[17] The speech is printed in *Listín Diario*, May 1, 1971.

WASHINGTON POST

12 JUL 1971

Congress Turns to the CIA

Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired effort to break the Executive's near monopoly of powers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the Central Intelligence Agency. This is understandable, and was to be expected, too. The agency's powers are great—or so one suspects; no one representing the public is really in a position to know. Yet because it operates under virtually absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the Defense and State Departments undergo.

The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA fall into two categories. Those in the first category start from the premise that the CIA is essentially an operations agency and an ominous one, which is beyond public control and which must somehow be restrained—for the good of American foreign policy and for the health of the American democratic system alike.

So Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent CIA from financing a second country's military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais in Laos) and to impose on the agency the same limitations on disposing of "surplus" military materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive from doing secretly what the Congress has forbidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would restrict Executive flexibility, since the government would have to justify before a body not beholden to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The advantage to the Executive would be that the Congress would then have to share responsibility for the actions undertaken. Since these actions involve making war and ensuring the security of Americans, if not preserving their very lives, we cannot see how a serious legislature can evade attempts to bring them under proper control.

Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA expenditures and appropriations should appear in the budget as a single line item is another matter. He argues that taxpayers could then decide whether they wanted to spend more or less on intelligence than, say, education. We wonder, though, whether a serious judgment on national priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be based on knowing just its budget total. In that figure, critics might have a blunt instrument for polemics but citizens would not have the fine instrument required for analysis.

In the House, Congressman Badillo recently offered an amendment to confine the CIA to gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the traditional rallying cry of those who feel either that the United States has no business running secret operations or that operational duties warp intelligence production. The amendment, unenforceable anyway under existing conditions, lost 172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a principal reason why concerned legislators despair of the status quo: Earlier this year House Armed Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the 10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated complete responsibility to himself. Congressman Badillo is now seeking a way to reconstitute the subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately overseen by the Congress.

Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's, however, lies a critical difference. Far from regarding CIA as an ominous operational agency whose work must be checked, he regards it as an essential and expert intelligence agency whose "conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to be distributed "fully and currently" to the germane committees of Congress as well as to the Executive Branch. He would amend the National Security Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the most interesting and far-reaching of the lot.

To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts—perhaps a bit too readily—that a large part of national security policy is formulated on the basis of information classified as secret. If the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available the same information on which the Executive acts—and not as a matter of discretion or chance but of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again and again put off by an Executive saying, as was said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only knew what we knew . . ." Otherwise Congress will forever be running to catch up with Executive trains that have already left the station.

The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp questions of Executive privilege and of Executive prerogative in foreign policymaking — to leave aside the issue of keeping classified information secure. But they are questions which a responsible Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper proposal will become a vehicle for debating them in depth—and in public, too.

BALTIMORE SUN

12 JUL 1971

Many In Congress Happy To Stay Ignorant Of Secrets

Some Want Information, But House Voted To Keep Status Quo

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Does Congress really want to know everything the United States government does?

On balance, the answer is probably no, despite a renewed drive in Congress to dislodge foreign policy secrets from the executive branch.

Resolution Rejected

In fact, the House last week rejected, 261 to 118, a resolution asking the State Department for documents related to U.S. bombing and CIA operations in Laos.

Representative Joe D. Waggonner, Jr., (D., La.) said during the debate: "There are some things that some people in this country had better not know for the security and future well-being of this country. Therefore, they [the administration] must keep some information from me and they must keep some information from you for the benefit of the future security of this country. It is better that information as a rule be overclassified than underclassified."

Mr. Waggonner also expressed a widely held view that some members of Congress, if given secret information, could not resist the temptation of leaking some of it "to the New York *Times* or some other whistle blower."

The debate underscored a tacit assumption long held in Congress that the country is better served if legislators—except for a select few—are not told of everything the United States has done or is currently doing in the field of foreign affairs.

Being Challenged

This assumption, however, is now being challenged, unsuccessfully in the case of the House resolution asking for more information on Laos.

But an even more sweeping bill has been introduced in the Senate by John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.), who wants to give every member of Congress regular access to all intelligence reports and analyses prepared for the executive branch by the CIA.

SENATOR COOPER
Seeks more disclosures

RICHARD HELMS
Knows all the secrets

Mr. Cooper is one of the most highly regarded members of the Senate, and this is a factor of some importance in its club-like atmosphere in which the success or failure of a bill can hinge on who its sponsor is.

But Senator Cooper—a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee—must get his bill through the Armed Services Committee, which together with the Appropriations Committee has jurisdiction over the CIA. And even without national security considerations, congressional committees instinctively resist encroachment upon their areas of competence.

The last time an attempt was made to break the Armed Services Committee's lock on the CIA was in 1966, when then Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (D., Minn.) made a comparatively modest proposal to create a special CIA committee, made up of representatives of Armed Services, Appropriations and the Foreign Relations committees.

The late Senator Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.), then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, blocked the bill from coming to a floor vote on a procedural point, effectively killing the measure.

The Cooper bill is not likely to get far in the legislative process either. Aside from the jurisdictional problems, most members of Congress appear to be ambivalent about being told too much.

Leverett Saltonstall, a Massachusetts Republican, was quoted recently as saying when he was a member of the Senate: "They [the CIA] do things I'd just as soon not know about."

Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, at least once a year gives separate intelligence briefings to small groups within the Armed Services and Appropriations committees in both houses of Congress and even to the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even though it does not have direct jurisdiction over the agency.

The annual briefings, according to congressional sources, consist of "around-the-world" assessments of the United States' military and intelligence posture. Other special briefings might deal with such topics as deployment and strength of Soviet nuclear missiles.

George H. Mahon (D., Texas), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, and F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said, as did Senate sources, that Mr. Helms has never refused to answer a question during these briefings.

Mr. Hebert said there was only one exception, when he instructed Mr. Helms not to answer a question put to him by a member of his panel.

"I took it on my own responsibility," Mr. Hebert said, adding, "and, of course, I won't tell you what the question was."

Senate sources indicate that senators, too, impose a certain amount of self-censorship during these intelligence briefings. One source said he has never heard a question pertaining to the so-called "dirty tricks" aspect of CIA operations.

"For example," he said, "we've never asked, 'Mr. Helms, how many people did you lose in your clandestine service last year?' Maybe we should ask it, but we never have."

But it is virtually impossible to ascertain precisely what even the select few who attend CIA briefings know about the agency's activities.

As Mr. Mahon, the Appropriations chairman, notes, he picks only those "who won't talk." Then, he refused to say who they are.

He said he was opposed to the Cooper bill, saying, "If you give it [CIA information] to every member of Congress it would be like giving it to the New York *Times*."

Chairman Hebert of Armed Services questioned the need to know everything.

"I don't know everything," he said, "and I'm not bitching about it."

On the other side of the issue, critics of the present system say that congress had deliberately remained ignorant to avoid responsibility.

Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said during the House debate last week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that many of us did not want to know all of the facts of our involvement in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968 or even yesterday. I think that the Congress has remained much too long in self-imposed insulation . . . We feared that more knowledge would mean more responsibility for us."

Others argued that the information the House was seeking was already well known to the enemy so it could not be withheld for national security reasons. As the House vote indicated, they represented a minority view.

For the moment, at least, the House does not want to share any more executive branch secrets.

RADIO-TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC.
3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N. W. -:- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016 -:- 244-8682

PROGRAM: ABC EVENING NEWS	DATE: JULY 9, 1971
STATION OR NETWORK: ABC TELEVISION	TIME: 6:30 PM, EDT

PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGER WOULD LIMIT CIA'S OPERATIONS

HARRY REASONER: Paul McCloskey, the Republican congressman from California, who opposes the administration's Viet Nam policies, announced formally today that he will challenge President Nixon next year. He said he will pledge to end the Viet Nam War conditioned only on the release of American prisoners. More on that from ABC's Bill Wordam, in Los Angeles. (FILM CLIP)

BILL WORDAM: There's no doubt that McCloskey is mainly concerned about ending the war, but today he revealed that he has other major differences with the Nixon administration. (FILM CLIP)

PAUL McCLOSKEY: This will not be a single issue campaign. We seek in addition to ending the war, to restore truth in government; to achieve a return to the historic Republican moral commitment to racial issues rather than the present southern strategy; and a restoration of judicial independence and excellence. We will seek to end CIA involvement in the internal affairs of other nations, and to limit that agency's operations to the field of intelligence gathering.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

9 JUL 1971

EXPOSE THE CIA?

Several attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency (Richard Helms, director) began Wednesday in the Senate.

Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) urged that CIA funds be reported in one line of the federal budget, instead of being masked as for decades past in other budget items.

Richard Helms

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced a bill to force the CIA to furnish Congress regularly with intelligence information hitherto given only to the government's Executive branch.

The Cooper proposal, it seems almost needless to say, got friendly comments from Democratic Sens. J. W. Fulbright (Ark.), Mike Mansfield (Mont.), and Stuart Symington (Mo.).

Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) promised to introduce bills to forbid the CIA to sneak money to Thailand for Thai troops fighting in Laos.

Some things which these and other CIA-baiters seem not to have learned in all the years of the agency's existence:

The CIA is a big organization engaged in the difficult, dangerous, sometimes distasteful but utterly necessary work of espionage around the world. It has to be as secret in its operations as is humanly possible if it is to be effective. And if the CIA cannot go on being at least as effective in the future as it has been in the past, then God help the U.S.A.

T. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

8 JUL 1971

CIA Report Bill Backed In Senate

By RICHARD DUDMAN
Chief Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 8 — Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.), Kentucky, has obtained strong bipartisan backing for a proposal to require the Central Intelligence Agency to report to Congress as well as to the Executive Branch.

Cooper, a moderate opponent of the Vietnam War and of the antiballistic missile system, introduced his proposal yesterday as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the CIA.

Senators Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, and Jacob K. Javits (Rep.), New York, announced their support for the measure on the Senate floor. Fulbright spoke of holding hearings on the proposal.

Symington, chairman of a foreign relations subcommittee on overseas commitments, told of difficulties he had had in obtaining full information about secret U.S. military preparations and operations abroad, including the clandestine warfare being conducted in Laos.

Symington noted that he was a member of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy committees. He said that his best information had been obtained from the last of these, attributing that fact to a requirement in the Atomic Energy Act that the Atomic Energy Commission keep Congress "fully and currently" informed.

Cooper used that phrase in his proposed amendment on the CIA. An aid said that Cooper had found CIA information generally reliable on such matters as Soviet military preparedness and the Indochina War but had noted that it was rendered only in response to specific questions.

Under his amendment, the CIA would have to take the initiative in sending Congress its analyses of problems of foreign policy and national security.

The aid said that Cooper had been considering such a measure for several years. He said the publication of the Pentagon papers had demonstrated once more the value of CIA reports and probably had broadened support in Congress for a requirement to make them available.

In a Senate speech, Cooper proposed that the CIA be required to make regular and special reports to the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees and to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Additional special reports could be requested by the committees.

Any member of Congress or designated member of his staff would have access to the information. All such persons would be subject to security requirements such as those in the Executive Branch.

Cooper said that the best information should be available to the Executive and Legislative branches as a basis for national decisions involving "vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations."

Two other Senators offered proposals relating to the CIA.

George S. McGovern (Dem.), South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single line item in the budget. Agency funds now are concealed in other items in the budget.

Three bills were introduced by Senator Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, to limit covert use of funds and military equipment by the CIA for fielding foreign troops in Loas or elsewhere without specific approval by Congress.

Case said they were designed "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the Executive Branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Meanwhile, the House rejected a proposal that the Administration be required to tell it what the military and CIA were doing in Laos.


John Sherman Cooper

By a vote of 261 to 118, members tabled — and thus killed — a resolution introduced by Representative Paul N. McCloskey (Rep.), California, that would have ordered the Secretary of State to furnish the House with the policy guidelines given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos.

The ambassador has responsibility for overseeing the clandestine military operations in Laos aimed at assisting the royal Laotian government in its struggle with the Pathet Lao.

William B. Macomber Jr., deputy under secretary of state, clashed yesterday with McCloskey over whether the Department of State was directing U.S. bombing attacks in Laos.

Macomber denied the allegation and suggested that if McCloskey wanted to pursue the issue he ought to invite an East Asia expert from the State Department to testify.

The exchange occurred as Macomber testified before a House foreign affairs subcommittee on ways to improve declassification of Government records by the State Department.

Macomber said 10 to 12 years' retention ought to be adequate to protect Government secrets while not being so long as to delay the public's need to know about operations.

RADIO-TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC.
3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N. W. -:- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016 -:- 244-8682

PROGRAM: EYEWITNESS NEWS	DATE: JULY 8, 1971
STATION OR NETWORK: WTOP TELEVISION	TIME: 6:00 PM, EDT

SENATOR PLANS LEGISLATION TO INCREASE CONTROL OF CIA

CAROLYN LEWIS: Senator Symington released a memo from the Pentagon which declares that efforts by Congress to set a money limit on U. S. military aid to Laos would intrude on the President's authority as Commander in Chief. Visibly annoyed, Symington reminded the executives that under the Constitution, it is Congress that has the power to raise and support armies. Symington's complaints of secrecy surrounding some American military operations abroad were echoed by other senators.

George McGovern charges that American Food for Peace Programs have been secretly helping the Chinese Government on Taiwan to buy votes to keep its seat in the United Nations.

Senator Proxmire made public formerly classified country by country figures on American military assistance. Proxmire calls the classification unjustified and promises to challenge such action in the future.

Senator Clifford Case plans to introduce legislation to increase congressional control over the CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency is now involved in a secret war in Laos for which Congress has not specifically appropriated money.

All this adds up to a brewing battle in Congress over secrecy in government. This is Carolyn Lewis.

NEW YORK TIMES

8 JUL 1971

Cooper Acts to Force C.I.A. to Report to Congress

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times'

WASHINGTON, July 7 — John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, one of the most influential Senators on foreign policy matters, introduced legislation today that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to give detailed intelligence information to Congress regularly.

Mr. Cooper, a Republican, said that Congress needed this kind of evaluation and analysis, now available only to the executive branch, to participate in the formation of foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the House rejected a series of resolutions demanding that the Nixon Administration provide Congress with additional information on United States operations in Laos.

Two other Senators also offered proposals relating to the C.I.A.

Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single-line item in the budget. Agency funds are now concealed in other items in the budget.

Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, said he would offer measures that would prohibit such C.I.A. activites as the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos.

Senator Cooper emphasized in a Senate speech that his proposal was not aimed at any C.I.A. operations, sources or methods, but was "concerned only with the end result — the facts and analyses of facts."

"Congress would be in a much better position to make judgments from a much more informed and broader perspective than is now possible," he said.

Senator Cooper, an aide said, had been considering the legislation for three years but disclosures in the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in Vietnam had now provided an impetus.

The aide referred specifically to C.I.A. analyses during the Johnson Administration that full-scale bombing of North Vietnam would not be effective in halting infiltration or breaking the will of Hanoi.

Senator Cooper's proposal was supported on the floor by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, the only Senator belonging to both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

Mr. Symington said that it was "no secret that we on various committees have not been entirely satisfied with the intelligence information we have obtained.

"If the proper committees are not acquainted with what we're doing," Mr. Symington went on, "how we can function properly?"

Because Senator Cooper is so influential, it seemed likel that his proposal would bethe subject of hearings and, perhaps, floor debate this year.

A measure of the respect said his views came from Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader. "Anything John Cooper says would be given the most serious consideration by me," Mr. Mansfield said.

Regular Reports Asked

Senator Cooper's proposal would require the C.I.A.tomake regular reports to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. The agency would also be required to make special reports in response to inquires by these committees.

Mr. Cooper said that the agency would have to decide for itself what information to present to hte committees, but he specified that the data woul have to be "full and current."

There are now "oversight" committees in the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committes, that review the C.I.A. budget and operations. But these committees are not concerned with the substance of the information the agency gathers.

In the House debate today, the major fight came over a "resolution of inquiry" seeking documents dealing with operations of the United States military and the C.I.A. in Laos from 1964 to the present.

The resolution, which was sponsored by Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California, was set aside by a vote of 261 to 118. Critics of the measure contended that the information was too sensitive to be given to Congress.

Following this vote, the House, without debate, set aside resolutions seeking information on bombing operations in northern Laos and on the Phoenix program, which is designed to neutralize the effect of underground Vietcong operations. The House also set aside a resolution seeking another set of the Pentagon papers that the Administration made available to Congress last week.

The supporters of the resolution were, for the most part, Democrats opposed to the war.

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108
S - 709,123

JUL 8 1971

CIA curbs pushed in Senate

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Legislation was introduced in the Senate Wednesday to require the Central Intelligence Agency to limit its covert operations, supply its estimates to Congress and disclose how it spends its money.

Thebills reflected the two-fold reaction in Congress to the disclosures of the top-secret Pentagon history of the Vietnam War: praise for the CIA's 20-year record of sound assessments and concern with its clandestine maneuverings.

None of the bills is likely to receive the approval of President Nixon. Since the CIA was created in 1947, a succession of Democratic and Republican Presidents have treated the agency as their private source of information and a vehicle for performing "dirty tricks" outside the knowledge of Congress and the people.

Ever since the United States became involved in Vietnam in 1950, the CIA has produced intelligence estimates that would have been embarrassing to the incumbent President if they had been made available to the opposition party or leaked to the public.

For example, as The Sun-Times disclosed June 26, the CIA provided an estimate in 1969 that Mr. Nixon could have withdrawn immediately from Vietnam and "all of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation."

Similar CIA estimates, revealed by The Sun-Times and other newspapers, showed that Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were consistently warned that the Saigon regime lacked broad popular support and that deeper U.S. involvement would be risky.

But the Pentagon papers also disclosed that, while the CIA's intelligence division was sounding the alarm, its plans division was conducting clandestine raids in North Vietnam and plotting first for and then against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Legislation introduced by Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) would limit such operations and the use of covert funds and military equipment to support them without specific approval by Congress.

Case said his proposal is designed "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.), only declared presidential contender, offered the bill to require disclosure of the CIA's budget and prevent its money from being concealed in appropriations for other agencies.

It is reliably estimated that the CIA spends $1 billion a year. An additional $4 billion reportedly is spent by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the code-making and code-breaking National Security Agency, and the various military units that run the spy satellite program.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky) introduced the bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 so that the CIA would be required to supply its intelligence estimates to the House and Senate committees dealing with foreign affairs and the armed services.

NEW YORK TIMES

8 JUL 1971

WHITE HOUSE ASKS WHO SEES SECRETS

Calls for Names of All Those With Authority to Handle Classified Documents

By JOHN HERBERS

Special to The New York Times

SAN CLEMENTE, Calif., July 7—The White House said today that it had ordered the compilation of a list of all persons who have authority to see top-secret documents.

Gerald L. Warren, assistant White House press secretary, said in response to questions that a confidential memorandum signed by Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, had gone to departments and agencies directing them to compile lists of those having top-secret clearance.

Mr. Warren said the memorandum, issued June 30, was part of a review of the process of classification and declassification ordered by President Nixon on Jan. 15.

He was vague about the details of the memorandum, whose existence was disclosed today in The Washington Post. But other officials said it was part of an Administration effort to reduce the number of security clearances both in and out of Government.

Pentagon Is Complying

In Washington, a spokesman said that the Department of Defense was compiling its list. The spokesman said Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird had ordered the step about three days ago.

The memorandum set this coming Sunday as a deadline for compilation of the lists, but it was considered doubtful that the departments could comply that quickly. Because of unclear regulations about security clearances, there was some doubt about the ability of the agencies to compile comprehensive lists at all.

There were indications that no one in the Government knows how many persons have security clearance and that Mr. Nixon is trying to put the entire disputed matter of classified documents under central control for the first time.

Various laws and regulations apply in departments and agencies dealing with sensitive matters. Estimates of the number of those with some authority to see top-secret documents run as high as many thousands.

Members of the armed forces the Central Intelligence Agency, the White House, the State Department, the Justice Department, defense contractors and consultants are heavily involved in security matters.

About the time the White House memorandum was drafted, Mr. Laird ordered tightened security at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, Calif., which conducts defense research on a contract basis.

Daniel Ellsberg, a former Rand employe and Pentagon official, is under indictment for alleged misuse of top-secret documents and has said publicly he passed copies of a study of the Vietnam war to newspapers.

Documents published by The New York Times and other papers carried top-secret classification.

[illegible]s 'Immediate Reductions'

The Haig memorandum says in part that "each responsible department and agency" must inititate at once "a review and screening of each top-secret and compartmented clearance presently held by individuals with a view to effecting immediate reductions of all clearances which cannot be demonstrated to meet the requirement of strict need to know."

Mr. Nixon arrived at the summer White House here last night for a two-week stay, accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers; the director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms; General Haig and other officials. He conferred at length with Mr. Helms about the latter's recent trip to the Middle East.

The Pentagon spokesman, Brig. Gen. Daniel James Jr., said that as of April, 1971 803 in the defense establishment had authority to classify material as top secret. But the department was unable to say how many had access to top-secret material.

The list of 803 began with the Secretary of Defense and went through 12 categories of descending rank.

The last category was: "commanders and deputy or vice commanders and chiefs of staff of major field and fleet commands, forces or activities, as designated by the chiefs of the military services or the commanders of the unified and specified commands concerned.

On Capitol Hill, William B. Macomber Jr., deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, told a House Government Operations subcommittee that the State Department now classified as secret 200,000 documents a year. He said the average over the last 20 years had been about 100,000 a year.

Mr. Macomber conceded, under questioning, that too many documents were classified, and remained classified for excessive periods.

Asked if the State Department had requested that the Justice Department seek injunctions against The New York Times and other newspapers to halt publication of the Pentagon study, Mr. Macomber said it had not. But said that the State Department concurred with the Justice Department because of "deep concern" over disclosure of some of the material.

Asked if a substantial portion of the Pentagon study could be declassified without harming national security, he replied: "Some of it."

He said that only about 10 to 15 per cent of the material in the 47-volume study should remain classified on the ground of national security.

MIAMI HERALD
4 JULY 1971

Chronology of Our Involvement in Vietnam

The secret Pentago papers on U.S. involvement in Vietnam are not so secret any more. Portions of them have been disclsed by the New York Times; The Boston Globe; The Washington Post; The St. Louis Post-Dispatch; Knight Newspapers; The Los Angeles Times; The Chicago Sun-Times; The Christian Science Monitor and The Associated Press, and read to newsmen by Sen. Mike Gravel (D., Alaska). The following by AP's Pulitzer Prize winner Peter Arnett reviews the highlights of the Pentagon papers, chronologically from the end of World War II to 1968, the last year of the study.

By PETER ARNETT
Associated Press Writer

The deliberations leading to critical American decisions on Vietnam are being systematically disclosed by publication of vast portions of the Pentagon papers.

The documents, memos, conference statements and situation analyses which make up the papers pinpoint the highlights of this country's Vietnam commitment with a detail never before available to the American public.

While the general thrust of American policy had been reported over the years in on-the-scene stories from Southeast Asia and Washington, from congressional debates, leaks and official statements, the specific details of decision-making were not known until the papers were made available to newspapers around the country and to congressmen.

HERE ARE SOME of the main points of the Pentagon papers as disclosed through various sources:

Origins of the War: Ho Ignored (1945-61)

The United States ignored eight direct appeals for aid from Ho Chi Minh in the first five months following World War II. Underlying the American refusal to deal with Ho was the uncertainty about helping a leader known to be a Communist.

The Truman Administration adopted the "domino principle" after the National Security Council was told early in 1950 that ". . . the neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard."

President Eisenhower was told by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1954 that the Geneva Accords ending the French Indochina war permitted America "only limited influence" in the affairs of the fledgling South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs said assisting Vietnam "was a risk not worth the gamble" and recommended that the aid earmarked for Saigon "will bring a greater return if devoted to the support of military forces in other nations."

Secretary of State Dulles successfully urged the commitment of relatively small American forces to stabilize the Saigon regime and keep the Communists out.

American Commitment Is Widened (1961-63)

The Kennedy Administration transformed the "limited risk gamble" undertaken by Eisenhower into "an unlimited commitment," with Kennedy secretly ordering 400 Special Forces troops and 100 other military advisers into Vietnam in the spring of 1961. In May of that year, he also approved programs for covert action in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Kennedy sent Vice President Johnson to Saigon to discuss with President Diem the possibility of sending in American combat troops and signing a bilateral treaty. Diem was not then interested but later in 1961 asked for both.

AFTER HEADING a military mission to Vietnam, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor in October 1961 advised Kennedy to order an 8,000-man American task force to Vietnam.

A month later Defense Secretary McNamara told Kennedy that the Taylor program should be adopted "only on the understanding that it will be followed up with more troops as needed, and with a willingness to attack Vietnam."

Three days later McNamara reversed his position and no ground troops were sent, but "Kennedy's priorities produced a broad commitment to Vietnam's defense, giving priority to military aspects of the war over political reforms."

INCREASINGLY optimistic reports of progress led to McNamara's laying plans in July 1962 to pull back all American ground forces in Vietnam over a five-year period.

The intelligence and reporting system for Vietnam during that period "must bear a principal responsibility for the unfounded optimism of U.S. policy," an optimism and assessment inaccuracy uncorrected until McNamara, in a report to Johnson in December 1963, wrote: "The situation is very disturbing. Current trends unless reversed in the next two to three months will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state."

President Kennedy knew and approved plans for the military coup that overthrew President Diem, the United States early giving its support to a group of army generals bent on removing the Vietnamese president. By supporting the coup the United States inadvertently deepened its involvement, never seriously considering an alternative policy even though at least two administration officials in 1963 recommended disengagement.

Direct United States Involvement (1964)

The Johnson Administration decided in January 1964 to step up American in-

continued

volvement in Vietnam, ordering Operation plan 34A that included South Vietnamese commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast to destroy rail and highway bridges, parachuting of sabotage and psychological warfare teams into the North, and kidnaping of North Vietnamese to obtain information.

In March, McNamara proposed South Vietnamese raids into Laos plus air attacks against North Vietnamese military and industrial targets flown by South Vietnamese but backed by an American squadron.

In May 1964, Johnson received a plan from William Bundy, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, suggesting increasing pressure on North Vietnam, culminating in full-scale bombing by U.S. planes.

In June in a Honolulu meeting, McNamara raised the possibility of using nuclear weapons at some point if Chinese forces entered the ground fighting. Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, openly argued that American commanders be given this option

The Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August may have been provoked by American destroyers patrolling near the scene of South Vietnamese clandestine attacks against North Vietnamese shore installations, attacks which the American ships were aware of. The U.S. air reprisals after the Tonkin incident were an important threshold in the war, crossed with virtually no domestic criticism."

At a White House strategy meeting in September, there was a general consensus that air strikes against the North Vietnamese were necessary early in 1965, but "tactical considerations" required a delay, particularly because Johnson was "presenting himself as a candidate of reason and restraint" in the presidential elections.

In Spite of Warning, Bombing Starts (1965)

Johnson resisted repeated urgings to bomb the North until February 1965, when strong guerrilla attacks against American positions at Pleiku led to the inauguration of the bombing campaign with the code name "Rolling Thunder."

Johnson received warnings from the CIA that the planned bombing attacks would not achieve their purpose. The tactics of grandualism in the air attacks against the North enabled the North Vietnamese to grow accustomed to the raids. The bombing was [illegible] ily ineffective within a few months, proving correct the intelligence community assessment that the measures would not cause Hanoi to cease its support of the Viet Cong insurgency in the South.

American Marine battalions ordered to Vietnam to protect the Da Nang airfield were secretly placed in an offensive role on April 1, 1965, with Johnson ordering that the new mission "will permit their more active use and that "the actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practical but in ways that should minimize the appearance of sudden changes in policy."

McNamara told Johnson that by his projections the United States might have 400,000 men in Vietnam by the end of 1966, and might have to raise the total to more than 600,000 by the end of 1967. At this time, the McNamara memo reflected a major change in American thinking: it could not get by with reinforcements for the South Vietnamese army and would have to take over the major share of ground fighting itself.

Johnson's War Waxes And Wanes (1966-67)

American military chieftains consistently told their civilian superiors that victory could be achieved only by committing 500,000 to one million troops for a period of from five to 10 years. The civilians, however, tended to disregard the estimates and to search for quicker, less costly solutions to the war.

U.S. military leaders also were constantly pressuring Johnson to expand the ground war from South Vietnam into Laos and Cambodia during 1966 and 1967, including serious discussion about using Americans to invade North Vietnam in force. But Johnson, McNamara and other top civilians in the government *steadily resisted these requests from the generals. Johnson did allow bombinb, and the covert use of force in* Laos and Cambodia.

The Johnson Administration strategists had little expectation that the bombing pauses in 1965 and 1966 would produce peace talks, but did believe the pauses would help placate domestic and world opinion.

THEY ALSO argued that North Vietnamese refusal of the tough American demands for peace talks would be a justification for an escalation of the war.

One memo described the lulls as "ratchets." This would produce "one more turn of the screw" to crack the en[illegible] to negotiations, went the inside administration argument at the time.

McNamara began giving Johnson increasingly bleak estimates of the war progress from 1966 on, telling him he was "disappointed" in pacification and that he saw "no reasonable way to bring the war to an end soon." Both men were publicly speaking confidently at the time of progress being made in the American military escalation.

McNAMARA WAS so disappointed with the military effort by 1967 that he proposed to Johnson in May of that year that the United States persuade Saigon to seek an accommodation with the Viet Cong, exploring a ceasefire and negotiating "with the non-Communist South Vietnamese who are under the Viet Cong banner" and if necessary accepting their individual participation in the government.

McNamara was fighting constantly with his generals over the war effort from 1966 onwards.

McNamara was fighting constantly with his generals over the war effort from 1966 onwards.

The last major decision in the rapid building of American forces was decided in July 1967, with "Program V" providing for an eventual force level of 525,000 Americans. At this time the U.S. military high command in Saigon again began looking to the South Vietnamese Army as the instrument to win the war. Earlier advisory efforts with the Vietnamese had failed, but with the upper level for American forces already determined, the generals had no choice.

Vietnamization Policy Is Under Way (1968)

President Johnson turned down Pentagon requests for more troops after the 1968 Communist Tet offensive swept into a score of Vietnamese cities and towns. He announced a partial end to the bombing halt, a move that prompted the State Department to send word to its allies that it probably would fail and that full-scale resumption of the air war was possible at any time.

The move was successful. Johnson decided later that year to proceed with a policy of Vietnamization similar to that later followed by President Nixon.

continued

1950: HST Made First Crucial Step

WASHINGTON — (UPI) — President Harry S. Truman made the first crucial step toward U.S. involvement in Vietnam in 1950, approving shipment of $10 million in military goods to the French in Indochina, The Washington Post said Saturday in a dispatch based on the Pentagon papers.

While the facts of the Roosevelt and Truman involvement in Indochina generally are well known, The Post said, the Pentagon report includes documentation that sheds new light on the U.S. reaction to the fall of mainland China.

"The advice added up to a risk of nuclear apocalypse no matter which course he (LBJ) took."

When Chinese Communist troops reached the borders of Indochina, The Post said, the National Security Council issued a paper calling for preparation of a program of "all practicable measures designed to protect U.S. security interests in Indochina." The United States at the same time announced its recognition of the regime of Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai.

The step of providing $10 million for the French in Indochina soon was followed by approval of the concept of furnishing an American Military Assistance Advisory Group, the newspaper said.

In another article, the Post said President Lyndon Johnson was given conflicting advice in 1964 that left him to make a decision of a "cataclysmic nature." On the one hand, Johnson was told that if the United States failed to use its power in Vietnam it could end up in a nuclear war. Other advisers told him, however, that he could trigger a nuclear war if he did intervene massively.

"The advice added up to a risk of nuclear apocalypse' no matter which course he took," The Post said.

1964: Rusk Vowed Nuclear Response

ST. LOUIS, Mo. — (UPI) — Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the South Vietnamese Premier in May, 1964, that the United States would retaliate with nuclear arms if the Communist Chinese entered the war in force, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch said.

Rusk reportedly told Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, who had seized power by military coup the previous January, that, "We would not allow ourselves to be bled white fighting them with conventional weapons."

The newspaper — in a story based on Pentagon documents — said Rusk made the comment to Khanh at a meeting on the eve of the American Honolulu conference, which took place June 1-2, 1964.

The newspaper explained, "The quoted phrase does not purport to reflect Rusk's own words. It is the language of a cablegram June 2 from the American Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, to the Department of State, describing what took place at a meeting between Rusk and Khanh May 30."

The cable said Rusk told Khanh, "Many Asians seemed to see an element of racial discrimination in use of nuclear arms; something we would do to Asians but not to westerners."

Khanh's reaction, the cable said, was that "he certainly had no quarrel with American use of nuclear arms, noted that decisive use of atomic bombs in Japan, ending the war, saved not only American but also Japanese lives. One must use the force one had; if Chinese used masses of humanity, we would use superior fire power."

The cablegram reported Rusk told Khanh he wanted to emphasize the following, among other things:

"A. Since 1945 U.S. had taken 165,000 casualties in defense of free world against Communist encroachments, and most of these casualties were in Asia.

"B. U.S. would never again get involved in a land war in Asia limited to conventional forces. Our population was 190,000,000. Mainland China had at least 700,000,000. We would not allow ourselves to be bled white fighting them with conventional weapons.

"C. This meant that if escalation brought about major Chinese attack, it would also involve use of nuclear arms."

1965: Westmoreland Reversed Posture

BOSTON — (UPI) — The defensive enclave theory calling for the military to seal off and protect small sections of Vietnam "was snuffed out" in 1965 by Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the Boston Globe said Saturday.

The Globe, continuing its series based on Pentagon papers, said while the Johnson Administration was implementing the enclave policy, Westmoreland was preparing a plea to the President which would reverse our posture from one of defense to one of offense."

On June 7, 1965, Westmoreland's "estimate of the situation," went to Johnson, the report said. The general called for more troops "as rapidly as possible" because he felt the South Vietnamese were about to be overwhelmed.

"Up to that time," an analyst said in [illegible] Washington decision-makers had been content to indulge in relatively low-key

continued

polemics about the enclave strategy and to advocate some experimentation with small numbers of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

"Washington saw that it was Westmoreland's intention to aggressively take the war to the enemy with other than Vietnamese troops, and in such a move the spectre of U.S. involvement in a major Asian ground war (was) there for all to see."

The documents said Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy fought to maintain the enclave strategy, basically a defensive posture which allows for occasional forays.

"Ambassador Taylor wanted to give the Vietnamese maximum opportunity to save themselves," the analyst said. Bundy submitted a memo to Johnson saying the enclave policy would allow the United States to "extricate itself honorably from South Vietnam."

"He did not expect a victory from such a move, but he did not expect a loss either," the papers said.

Escalation and the U.S. takeover of the land war began shortly after Westmoreland's report was given, The Globe said.

> *"Washington saw that it was Westmoreland's intention to aggressively take the war to the enemy with other than Vietnamese troops, and in such a move the spectre of U.S. involvement in a major Asian ground war (was) there for all to see."*

1966: McNamara Advocated Bombing Cuts, Coalition

NEW YORK — (UPI) — Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in October 1966 proposed reduction of bombing of North Vietnam in order to reach a political settlement of the war and seven months later urged the acceptance of a coalition government in Saigon, The New York Times' publication of the Pentagon papers revealed Saturday.

The switch of McNamara from a leading proponent of the bombing to his later position caused a policy rift in the Johnson Administration, the report said.

The Times published the seventh installment of the 7,000-page Pentagon report in Saturday editions.

According to the report, McNamara in 1966 suggested cutting down the bombing to seek a political settlement — 17 months before President Johnson made the move.

In May, 1967, McNamara suggested the Administration stop trying to guarantee a non-Communist Vietnam and accept the possibility of a coalition government which included Communist elements. He said the Communists should be changed from military opponents to political opponents.

The report called McNamara's proposals "radical."

The report said McNamara had said the drawback would be "the alleged impact on the reputation of the United States and of its President" but "the difficulties of this strategy are fewer and smaller than the difficulties of any other approach."

"While Mr. McNamara's disillusionment with the war has been reported previously, the depth of his dissent from established policy is fully documented for the first time in the Pentagon study, which he commissioned on June 17, 1967," The Times said.

The report said McNamara's position put the policymakers in three camps — that led by McNamara, called the "disillusioned doves" in the report, the military seeking wider expansion of the war; and President Johnson and other civilian leaders, seeking a middle path.

The report said Johnson's attempt to seek middle ground put him "in the uncomfortable position of being able to please neither his hawkish nor his dovish critics with his carefully modulated middle course."

The Times said the report pictures the Johnson Administration from late 1966 onward as "a government wrestling with itself as the views of some senior policymakers changed under the pressures of protracted war."

WASHINGTON STAR

18 MAY 1971

Soviet 'Budget Code' Solved, U.S. Research Gap Results

By ORK KELLY
Star Staff Writer

American intelligence has "cracked the code" of the Soviet research budget, according to the Pentagon's two top research officials.

The breakthrough last summer led almost immediately to a major reshuffling of the American military research effort, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering, and Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin, his principal deputy, said in an interview.

The interview was prompted by charges by the Federation of American Scientists that Foster trumped up a "research gap" to justify his own $7.9 billion budget request for 1972.

In a report made public at a press conference on May 6, the Federation, which includes some of the nation's best known scientists, declared: "This entire episode has been a classical numbers game featuring selective disclosure, questionable assumptions, exaggeratedly precise estimates, misleading language and alarmist non-sequitur conclusions."

Two members of the Federation's committee on research and development — Dr. George W. Rathjens, professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institut of Technology and a former defense official, and Dr. Richard Nelson, professor of economics at Yale — are scheduled to testify tomorrow on the "research gap" at a hearing of the Senate Armed Service's subcommittee on research and development, headed by Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre, D. N. H.

McIntyre has already asked the General accounting office to analyze Foster's claims.

The gap—about the equivalent of $3 billion between the United States and Soviet Union—indeed exists, revealed by the breakthrough in understanding the Soviet research budget, Foster says.

His budget request for 1972 includes an increase of slightly over $700 million over the 1971 figure of $7.1 billion. The Pentagon decision has been to parallel, but not match, the Soviet research effort.

Foster said he became concerned last summer, when Congress was "dealing pretty harshly" with research requests, that "we would not get the funding we thought we needed to meet the threat."

'Publications Normally Honest'

Over the years, he said, various attempts had been made to understand the Soviet budget well enough to tell how much was being spent on technological development of military systems.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute major effort to find the answer, Rechtin said, and "got all wrapped around the wheel." the Institute came close to deciding that the answer was impossible.

Foster said he asked the American intelligence community to give it another try.

"Soviet publications are normally honest but incomplete," Rechtin explained. "Typically, they just omit information. They put out a total science budget but they don't describe what it includes."

Foster and Rechtin gave this account of the detective work that followed:

The American analysts added up the entire Soviet technological effort and began subtracting identifiable pieces. A regional science breakdown, published once in the early 1960's — presumably by mistake — helped sort out the civilian research and development.

Space work is reasonably identifiable because it involves tests that can be seen or heard. A figure could thus be assigned to this part of the effort.

'Like Cracking a Code'

Military experts could estimate the costs of running the Soviet armed forces — how much it costs to pay the soldiers, sail the ships and fly the planes. Something was found left over — research costs.

When these things were added together, the analysts came up with an estimate of the amount going into military research, development, test and evaluation and converted that into the amount the United States would have to spend to achieve the same results.

"It was like cracking a code," Rechtin said. "When you break a code, you can go back and read all the messages you couldn't understand before. It was the same in this case."

Foster said he received the economic analysis with some skepticism. He ordered a check run on the status of more than a hundred weapons systems in 1960, 1964 and 1968. It tended to confirm the economic analysis.

The analysis showed that the Soviet and American military technology effort was roughly parallel from 1960 to 1968 — with the United States somewhat ahead.

Then, it showed, the Soviets switched their annual growth in research from space to military, a trend which has continued. At about the same time, the U.S. military technology budget dipped.

Laird Got Results

Foster said the result is that the Soviets are now putting the equivalent of $3 billion more a year into their military research than is the United States.

"This means they can double the number of programs they are working on or — what is more likely — drive the ones they are working on faster. This added effort is equivalent to all our big systems," Foster said.

Foster and Rechtin took the results of the analysis to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and his deputy, David Packard, in the late summer.

"This is not an argument for more money," Foster said. "It says, 'Look, we've got to be verv careful. We've got to try to leapfrog.' "

The decision was to concentrate the U.S. military research effort on the areas where the effort would have the best chances of a payoff.

The authors of the federation report were surprised that Foster did not accompany his warning with a request for additional billions to match what he said was the Soviet growth rate. They also said he could not possibly know how much the Soviets were putting into basic research — from which they might expect a revolutionary breakthrough.

Asked about these criticisms, Foster said the research and development budget grew about 12 percent while the rest of the defense budget rose only about 2 percent. But he said the important area to concentrate in was learning how to build weapons that might be needed.

Basic research takes up a relatively small part of his budget, Foster said. "We know how to do a Sputnik," Rechtin added. "They just put the time and effort into getting ahead."

They said the fear now is that the Soviets might be able to use their edge in technological effort to push ahead secretly on a number of weapons systems for which the U.S. has no effective defense.

Whether or not this fear is exaggerated, as the FAS contends, it seems to be taken seriously within the Pentagon. The research budget has the backing of Laird and Packard and the services have been willing to give up other things in order to finance research.

"We have melted down airplanes to keep our research going," Foster said. "We've given up planes, ships, divisions."

This year's budget, now before Congress, contains about $300 million—an average of $10 million a piece—for 30 programs Foster calls "new initiatives."

They include:

- An effort to give the Army the kind of precise weapons accuracy now achieved by the new "smart" bombs used by the Navy and Air Force.
- Research to reduce the vulnerability of the helicopter to one-fourth or one-fifth its present level.
- A major effort to provide the Navy with the kind of reliable satellite communications enjoyed by the Air Force.
- New offensive weapons for Navy ships.
- Air Force emphasis on suppressing enemy defenses.

Continued


TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORT
(Including Atomic Energy)
DOLLAR EQUIVALENT EFFORT (BILLIONS)
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
TOTAL
USSR
USSR
US
SPACE
USSR SPACE
US
*
USSR
MILITARY
US
MILITARY

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540

14 MAY 1971 S

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Sixty Minutes STATION WMAR TV

DATE May 11, 1971 10:00 PM CITY Baltimore

SWISS NUMBERED BANK ACCOUNTS CONDUITS FOR CIA MONEY?

MORELY SAFER: ...Secrecy has always been part of Swiss banking, even before income tax existed. Bankers defend the secrecy law which makes disclosure of name and bank balance punishable. They say it came into effect in 1934 as a means of protecting German Jews from Nazi fiscal and racial laws. The law did indeed protect German Jews, but it also protected Nazi officials, who also took advantage of Swiss banking secrecy when they put away millions of dollars of valuables seized from Jews in Germany and the occupied countries. Indeed, the numbers of some of the accounts could represent a pile of ashes at Auschwitz or the retirement fund of an ex-Gauleiter growing happily old in Argentina.

The big banks say they will not touch political money. But they also say they cannot hope to trace every account to its true source. But there are hundreds of small private banks, equally solvent, equally discreet, but perhaps a little less demanding of their client's credentials.

The biggest of the private banks is Julius Barr, Banker. The president, Nicholas Barr, is remarkably frank for a Swiss banker.

Supposing I was a dictator of some South American country, or shall we say Ruritania, and walked in here with two million dollars. And I said, look, I don't want this known. I want it in a secret numbered account. What would you say?

NICHOLAS BARR: First of all, usually he doesn't walk in. He comes through -- he walks in on the (word unintelligible). Quite frankly, there the answer is yes, we would take it.

SAFER: Even though the money, say, is half of the national treasury of that country?

BARR: I think it usually isn't half of the national treasury. Yes, Mr. (name unintelligible) and his famous millions. Unfortunately, we never had any of that. But usually it is smaller amounts. Yes, it goes maybe into a million or two million dollars. But half national product it isn't.

SAFER: It has been charged that Switzerland and Swiss bankers have benefitted from economic persecution in other countries.

BARR: It's true. It's true. You can turn it around. We have benefitted, but the persecuted have benefitted too. The most important wave, the last wave, the German Jews in the thirties -- we benefitted from their accounts. I think they benefitted even more in that they could put something out. And probably in the history of Swiss banking, the benefit has always been on both sides.

SAFER: Does the fact that you're now obliged to release information on numbered accounts to the United States Internal Revenue Service mean that we're seeing the end of the secrecy, the end of the numbered accounts?

BARR: There are negotiations. We do give information in cases of fraud. We do give information on everything where there is a criminal offense according to our law. We do not know foreign exchange restrictions and we do not know fiscal nonpayment of taxes as a crime. Therefore, this is something where we do not give information.

However, avoidance of taxes is one thing. Fraud is something else.

SAFER: There're a lot of reports that the CIA and the KGB use Swiss banks as a conduit to pay its [sic] agents.

BARR: I don't know. I would say they must probably be so clever that we wouldn't know that it is them. I don't think that someone would come in here and say I am the resident head of KGB or I'm the resident head of CIA. Will you act as my banker for me? Maybe, maybe not. I don't know. I would quite frankly say, probably yes, to some extent. But I trust both organizations that they do it so well that we don't know about it.

SAFER: Harry Lime (?), one of the characters in the Graham Greene novel, "The Third Man," said that under the Borgias where political murder was commonplace, where the state was almost continuously at war, Italy produced Michelangelo and Leonardo da Vinci. In seven hundred years of peace, the Swiss produced the cuckoo clock. That may be true. But Mr. Lime, one of the most nefarious characters in fiction and a profiteer of the very worst kind, would no doubt have put his money in a secret numbered bank account in Switzerland.

People from far and near, better amd worse than Harry Lime, come here for more than the magnificent mountain air of the ski slopes. So if you're very, very rich, or just like to look that way, then Switzerland, the land of yodeling and bland cheese, of smart set skiing and casual taxation, and secret bank accounts -- Switzerland is the place for you.

THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
22 April 1971

A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence

Frank Donner

I

The twentieth century has been marked by a succession of different forms of restraint on political expression: criminal anarchy statutes, sedition laws, deportations, Congressional anti-subversive probes, loyalty oaths, enforced registration. These and related measures still survive. But in recent years new, more formidable ways of responding to political and social movements on the left have emerged. The most important of these is the system of political intelligence, which is rapidly coalescing into a national network.[1]

Despite the efforts of intelligence officials to keep intelligence operations secret, reliable information about our intelligence system is steadily accumulating. We now have a clearer picture of the methods and targets of political surveillance. As a result, we can no longer seriously doubt that the main purpose of such activity is political control of dissent or that the frequently advanced justifications of law enforcement or national security are often no more than a "cover."

On March 21, 1971, a group calling itself the Citizens' Commission to Investigate the FBI mailed or delivered to a congressman and senator as well as to the Washington *Post*, *The New York Times*, and the Los Angeles *Times* a packet containing fourteen documents, selected from over 1,000 stolen from a small FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Philadelphia. The fourteen documents, all of them of recent date and undisputed authenticity, show that the FBI concentrates much of its investigative effort on college dissenters and black student groups. According to a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover such groups "pose a definite threat to the Nation's stability and security," a conclusion that he has not been able to support and that both the Washington *Post* and *The New York Tim*[redacted] challenged.

When conducting surveillance of a Swarthmore College philosophy professor regarded as a "radical," the FBI enlisted the assistance of the local police and postmaster, as well as a campus security officer and switchboard operator. In one of the documents, the FBI agent in charge of the Philadelphia bureau instructs his agents at Media that more interviews are

> ...in order...for plenty of reasons, chief of which are it will enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and will further serve to get the point across that there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox. In addition, some will be overcome by the overwhelming personalities of the contacting agent and will volunteer to tell all—perhaps on a continuing basis.

Dramatic disclosures of this sort as well as the recent Senate hearings on Army intelligence will undoubtedly help to cure the surviving skepticism about these practices. Until fairly recently even the targets of surveillance were reluctant to credit the existence of police activities which violate the most deeply held premises of their society. But political surveillance has become so obtrusive and its targets so numerous that it can no longer be easily ignored or justified. A sharper awareness of intelligence has, in turn, opened up new sources of data about a field which I have been researching since the McCarthy era.[2]

Of course dossiers, informers, and infiltrators are hardly new. But since the early Sixties, when attorneys general in the South formed a rudimentary intelligence network in order to curb the integrationist activities of students, political surveillance and associated practices have spread throughout the nation.

Surveillance has expanded largely because of the scale and militance of [redacted]st movements that erupted in the Sixties. Policy makers and officers of intelligence agencies were then faced with the need to identify and control new actors on a new political stage—no easy matter in view of the anarchic radical milieu, characterized by highly mobile and anonymous young people, who tend to be hostile to formal organization and leadership. The social remoteness of new radicals concentrated in "tribal," self-contained groups made it all the more difficult to identify them.

Most of the existing intelligence agencies at that time were no more effective than other institutions in our society. Their techniques were as outmoded as their notions of subversion dominated by an old Left composed of "Communists," "fellow travelers," and "fronts." Intelligence files were choked with millions of dossiers of aging or dead radicals. At the same time, new gadgetry—miniaturization, audio-electronics, infrared lens cameras, computers, and data banks—gave intelligence possibilities undreamed of by the most zealous practitioners of the repressive arts of the nineteenth century.

According to the herald of the "technetronic" society, Zbigniew Brzezinski, new developments in technology will make it "possible to assert almost continuous surveillance over every citizen and maintain up-to-date files, containing even personal information about the...behavior of the citizen, in addition to the more customary data." Full access to critical data, he adds, will give the undercover agent and the roving political spy greater flexibility in planning and executing countermeasures.[3]

continued

Twenty federal agencies are engaged in intelligence activities. The most important are:

—the FBI, with an estimated 2,000 agents on political investigative assignments in charge of thousands of undercover informers,

—the Army, which concededly had at one time 1,200 agents in the field, together with a huge staff operating a dossier bank of 25 million "personalities,"

—the CIA,

—the Internal Revenue Service (for several weeks in 1970 its agents requested access to the circulation records of public libraries in a number of cities in order to learn the names of borrowers of books on explosives and other "militant and subversive" subjects, a practice which it defended as "just a continual building of information"),

—the Intelligence Division of the Post Office,

—the Secret Service (where names of 50,000 "persons of interest" are on file),

—the Customs Bureau of the Treasury Department,

—the Civil Service Commission (15 million names of "subversive activity" suspects),

—the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

—the Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard,

—the Passport Division of the State Department,

—the Department of Justice Community Relations Service which feeds information into its computerized Inter-Divisional Intelligence and Information Unit,[4]

—civil rights and poverty projects sponsored by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Executive Department agencies cooperate with and are supplemented by the Congressional anti-subversive committees.

Intelligence operations are also flourishing in states and counties. A typical state intelligence agency is the Massachusetts Division of Subversive Activities which conducts investigations in response to complaints by private citizens and acts as a central repository for information about subversion. The Division's Annual Report for 1969 is revealing:

> A file is kept of peace groups, civil rightists and other such groups where, due to their enthusiasm, they might have a tendency to adopt or show a policy of advocating the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution. These files are kept up-dated by communications with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the House Internal Security Committee, Subversive Activities units in other states and decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
>
> The files in this Division have grown to such an extent that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Defense, U.S. Army Intelligence, Federal Civil Service Commission, Treasury Department, several departments of the Commonwealth, Industrial Plants and Educational Institutions now clear with this Division on security checks.
>
> Requests for investigations, or assistance in investigations, received from various police departments, Federal Bureau of Investigation, House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Subversive Activities Control Board, complied with such requests [*sic*].
>
> Members of the Division attended demonstrations conducted in the area by various groups. Note was made of the leaders and organizations participating, occasionally photographs are taken, the persons identified, and a file was made.
>
> The Division is continuing to compile and tabulate a check on new organizations in the Civil Rights area so as to be sure of any inclinations toward communist-front activities or the infiltration into these organizations of known communists or communist sympathizers.
>
> During the past year, as a result of the increased activity of the Communist and Subversive Groups in racial demonstrations throughout the country, this Division has kept a watch on these developments so as to note any trend toward that end in Massachusetts.
>
> During the past year, this Division continued to submit information relative to subversive organizations and individuals to several local police departments who are in the process, or have started, Intelligence Units within their respective departments.

Sometimes state intelligence agencies operate under concealed or obscure auspices. For example, the Ohio Highway Patrol runs an intelligence unit which claims to have recruited student [illegible] every campus in the state. According to the head of the unit, "We have actually had info[redacted] [illegible] the board of trustees [*sic*] of various dissident groups." State intelligence units are also at work in several universities in Maryland and Illinois.

Urban intelligence units ("red squads") have multiplied greatly and are becoming a standard tool in local police practice. Increasingly powerful, they operate under a variety of names (Anti-Subversive Squad, Intelligence Unit, Civil Disobedience Unit); in some cases they use a "Human Relations" or "Community Relations" cover, which is considered an efficient means of penetrating the ghetto.[5]

Black communities swarm with urban intelligence agents and informers, as do university and peace groups; invitations to young people to defect or to sell information at high prices are becoming routine. Young college graduates—black and white—are offered "career opportunities" in urban intelligence; courses in intelligence and surveillance are being taught to municipal police units and campus security police.[6]

In fact, the campus constabulary is spreading throughout the country's higher education community. Its functions are expanding to include clandestine intelligence activities such as undercover work and wiretapping and are meshed with the work of other intelligence agencies. We get a glimpse of this new collaboration in one of the recent Media documents, dated November 13, 1970.

> On 11/12/70 MR. HENRY PEIRSOL, Security Officer, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa. advised that DANIEL BENNETT is a Professor of Philosophy at that School and in charge of the Philosophy Department. He has been there about three years having previously taught at University of Mass. MRS. BENNETT is not employed and there are two small children in the family ages about 8 to 12 years.
>
> The BENNETTs reside in a semi-detached house located near PEIRSOL's residence although he does not have any social contact with them. PEIRSOL has noted that there does not appear to be anyone other than the BENNETTs residing at their home but that numerous college students visit there frequently. BENNETT drives a two tone blue, VW station wagon, bearing Penna. license [illegible] other cars

continued

in the family and no other cars normally parked in their driveway.

PEIRSOL was furnished [illegible] with the wanted flyers on the subjects and he stated he would remain alert in his neighborhood for their possible appearance. Also he will alert his sources at the college for any information about the subjects particularly any information that subjects might be in contact with the BENNETTS.

(Those who are familiar with the quality of FBI reporting will not be surprised to learn that some of this report is not true. As Professor Bennett has pointed out, he is unacquainted with the subject of the "wanted flyers," has one child not two, and owns two cars not one.)

Many of the red squads run by city police are growing so fast that they are hard put to find enough agents. The permanent intelligence staffs are frequently augmented by detectives and plainclothesmen--as. Chicago's regular intelligence unit was doubled for the SDS convention in 1969. There are also many informer recruits and trainees who report to intelligence units but are not counted as employees or officers. The official membership of Detroit's intelligence unit, which was formed in 1961, grew by 1968 to seventy members. In 1968, Boston had forty agents, New York had at least sixty-eight on its intelligence staff (ninety as of 1970) and fifty-five more line agents planted undercover; Chicago had more than 500, Houston fourteen. The Los Angeles Police Department doubled its Intelligence Division personnel from eighty-four in 1969 to 167 in 1970.

Intelligence is not a wholly public function. Political surveillance has been routinely practiced by private detectives since the nineteenth century, when objections to a political police force left the Pinkerton and Burns agencies free to engage in these activities without official competition. Today the private agencies are an important channel for political intelligence. Often they recruit employees with access to official files from government intelligence agencies and sell such information to private industry.[7]

Local and national intelligence agencies are beginning to coalesce into an "intelligence community:" For example, the young demonstrators who came to Chicago in 1968 encountered red squad operatives from their home towns. The overheated reports of these visiting local agents led Mayor Daley's office to conclude that a plot to assassinate Johnson had been hatched. The urban agents cooperated with their federal counterparts, as well as with the Army and Navy secret operatives at the Chicago demonstrations. During the subsequent conspiracy trial no fewer than thirty of about forty substantive prosecution witnesses were police agents or infiltrators associated with governmental surveillance at various levels.

The FBI plays a central role in coordinating the intelligence system; it exchanges information with other agencies, performs investigative work for intelligence groups with limited jurisdiction, and trains intelligence agents for service in other agencies. Its intelligence techniques and political standards serve as a model for local operations. It compiles albums of photographs and files of activists which are transmitted to agencies throughout the United States.[8]

Congressional anti-subversive committees have also expanded their intelligence activities beyond the passive compilation of dossiers available only to government investigative personnel. They now provide a forum for local intelligence agencies, publish dossiers, mug shots, and other photographs of subjects obtained by surveillance and supplied by police witnesses.[9] They also independently engage in intelligence activities.

III

The changing role of the police in carrying out surveillance was described a few years ago by Inspector Harry Fox of the Philadelphia police. In his Senate testimony, he said:

> Police now have become "watchdogs" and "observers" of vocal, subversive and revolutionary minded people. This function has been institutionalized in Philadelphia in a "civil-disobedience unit" composed of selected and highly trained plainclothesmen. They cover all meetings, rallies, lectures, marches, sit-ins, laydowns, fasts, vigils, or any other type of demonstration that has ominous overtones. . . .
>
> These officers know by sight the hard core men and women who lead and inspire demonstrations. They know their associates, family ties, techniques, and affiliations with organizations leaning toward Communism both on and off the Attorney General's list. They see [illegible] day out recruiting, planning, carrying signs, and verbally assaulting the principles of democracy.
>
> Yes, the police role has become one of . . . surveillance, taking photographs, identifying participants, and making records of the events. On this basis, local police are able to piece together this jigsaw puzzle and see the widespread activity of the hard core demonstrators and instigators.

This account naturally omits the harassing and "guerrilla warfare" aspects of police tactics. To the policeman, public protest is an unwelcome disruption of the tranquillity which he regards as natural and proper. His response to antiwar activities is particularly hostile because he sees himself as a beleaguered defender of "patriotic" values, which he tends to protect by abusing his power, harassing demonstrators, and intimidating suspects. His resentment and anger are provoked in the same way by the nonconformity and personal style of many young people, who are now the principal targets of heavy surveillance and who are constantly subjected to detention and arrest on flimsy charges.

Protest activities have inevitably served to draw the police into politics and to expand their intelligence functions. Especially ominous is the widening use of photographic surveillance by intelligence units. Police in communities throughout the country systematically photograph demonstrations, parades, confrontations, vigils, rallies, presentations of petitions to congressmen and senators, and related activities. The photographers attached to the Philadelphia intelligence unit, for example, cover more than a thousand demonstrations a year: Any "incident" considered "controversial" is a predictable subject for the police photographer. Protest demonstrations against the Vietnam war are automatically considered "controversial," but not those in favor. In the South, photographing integrationist protesters is given top priority.

Subjects are often photographed from as close as three to five feet. Sometimes police photographers openly ridicule the demonstrators. Children who accompany their parents are photographed as are casual bystanders and nonparticipants. To convey and conceal photographic equipment, panel trucks are sometimes used, occasionally camouflaged to look like the equipment of [illegible] station (referred to by veteran surveillance subjects as

continued

IV



NEW LEFT NOTES - PHILADELPHIA

Edition #1

This newsletter will be produced at irregular intervals as needed to keep those persons dealing with New Left problems up to date in an informal way. It is not a serial and is considered an informal routing slip. It should be given the security afforded a Bureau serial, classified confidential, but may be destroyed when original purpose is served.

The New Left conference at SOG 9/10-11/70 produced some comments:

In disseminating reports recommending for the SI it is preferable to designate and disseminate to Secret Service immediately and put the FD-376 (the buck slip to Secret Service) on the second Bureau copy.

There was a pretty general concensus that more interviews with these subjects and hangers-on are in order for plenty of reasons, chief of which are it will enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and will further serve to get the point across there is an FBI Agent behind every mailbox. In addition, some will be overcome by the overwhelming personalities of the contacting agent and volunteer to tell all - perhaps on a continuing basis. The Director has okayed PSI's and SI's age 18 to 21. We have been blocked off from this critical age group in the past. Let us take advantage of this opportunity.

In payments to informants, if the total of services and expenses to an informant is less than $300 in a lump sum payment or per month, our request for such payment is handled within division 5. If the lump sum payment or monthly authorization is $300 or more, it must be approached on a much higher level. Note: If an informant is to travel outside our division and we initially go in and request expense payment of less than $300, it can be handled simply while the services payment can be requested later based on what he has produced.

From the FBI Media documents.

"WFBI"). Surveillance photographers acquire spurious press credentials; bona fide cameramen often moonlight as police or FBI informers.[10] Supplementary photographic data are occasionally obtained from cooperating newspaper and television stations.

Photographs are sometimes covertly taken by unobtrusive plainclothesmen when a "respectable" group is involved—for example, parents picketing a school. Usually, however, policemen, sometimes in uniform, do not bother to conceal their activities: they either man the cameras themselves or direct their aides by pointing out individuals or groups to be photographed. The deterrent effect of open photography is not lost on the police but is justified on the ground, among others, that it "cools" the "subversive agitator" and prevents potential lawlessness.[11]

Photographs of individuals not already known to the police are submitted to informers and undercover agents for identification. Sometimes tentative identifications are verified by automobile license numbers which the police systematically collect at meetings and rallies and in front of the houses of "known militants." Then they ask other agencies, urban, state, and federal, to help to identify the subjects.

Once the individual is identified, his name is entered in an index. The local intelligence unit then sets out to obtain information about the subject—solely on the basis of his or her attendance at a single "controversial" event—from other intelligence sources, state and federal. In addition, the contents of the file are passed on, as Captain Drake, Commander of the Intelligence Division of the New Orleans Police Department, has explained, to "every conceivable authority that might have an interest in causing any prosecution or further investigation of these persons. . . ."

Photography describes the subject. But other techniques must also be used to obtain political data. These include interrogation of associates, employers, landlords, etc., collection of data about financial resources, bank deposits and withdrawals, and about the subject's background. Where meetings are held publicly, whether indoors or out, the speeches are monitored by portable tape recorders, a practice which is common in large cities but which also is growing in smaller communities, especially in college towns.

Wiretapping and electronic bugging are also common, in spite of judicial restraints on their use.[12] Local police specialists use these devices not only for their own purposes but also on behalf of the FBI. The 1968 Crime Control Law has authorized electronic eavesdropping in certain criminal cases; twelve states have passed similar legislation, while six others are now considering it. A variety of electronic devices is now being offered by commercial supply houses to state and local police departments to implement this legislation. Once they become available for even limited purposes, it is extremely unlikely that they will not be used for political surveillance as well.

Still, personal surveillance is necessary in those areas where technology cannot—at present anyway—replace human beings. Thus infiltration of dissident groups by informers remains a common procedure. Ironically, the Warren Court's limitations on wiretapping and bugging have themselves led to a heavier reliance on informers as a substitute. Moreover, these limitations encourage the use of informers because they can supply "probable cause" of a crime and so justify a wiretap order.[13]

Informers are indispensable to political intelligence systems. Electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping are ill-suited to the slow pace, confusion, ambiguity, and factionalism of the dissenting political activities that are the targets of intelligence. Besides, wiretaps can be circumvented once the subject becomes aware of them. Indeed, nothing can quite take the place of the classic tool of intelligence, the informer. But in addition to the moral stigma attached to informing in Western culture,[14] informers have always

continued

been regarded anyway as unreliable and treacherous observers, reporters and witnesses. Most of them become informers for money. Their income, tenure, and future usefulness depend on their capacity to produce material useful to the police.[15] Others are "hooked" because of previous involvements with the law, or are recruited for ideological reasons--either as police plants or as defectors.

Both the pressures and the inducements, along with the sense of guilt that requires the betrayer to find some justification for his betrayal, tend to produce tainted information. All too frequently it is inaccurate, highly selective, and based on sinister and unwarranted inferences. Where a literal version of a target's utterances would seem innocent, the informer will insist on stressing the connotations; conversely, where the language is figurative or metaphysical the informer reports it as literally intended. Most important of all, he seizes on the transient fantasies of the powerless–rhetoric and images not intended to be acted upon–and transforms them into conspiracies whose purpose and commitment are wholly alien to their volatile and ambiguous context.

It need only be added that the hazards inherent in the testimony of political informers are especially great in conspiracy cases. The vague, inchoate character of the conspiracy charge and the atmosphere of plotting and hidden guilt which accompanies it make it a perfect foil for the undercover agent who surfaces on the witness stand, a hero returned from the dark wood.[16]

The informer is not only a reporter or an observer, but also an actor or participant, and he frequently transforms what might otherwise be idle talk or prophecy into action. Professor Zachariah Chafee, Jr., once remarked, "The spy often passes over an almost imperceptible boundary into the *agent provocateur.*" The purpose of such provocations, as Allen Dulles wrote in *The Craft of Intelligence*, is to "provide the pretext for arresting any or all of [the group's] members. Since the agent report[s] to the police exactly when and where the action is going to take place, the police [have] no problems."

There are powerful reasons for viewing provocation as the handmaiden of infiltration, even when it is not part of a planned intelligence strategy. A merely passive, "cool" infiltrator-observer cannot hope to play more than a lowly "Jimmy Higgins" role in the target group, if he gains entry at all. In order to enhance his usefulness he must penetrate planning circles by becoming highly acti[illegible] pressure to produce results in the form of concrete evidence of illegal activity often drives the infiltrator into provocative acts, regardless of the official cautionary advice which he may be given when he receives his assignment. Such advice is routinely conveyed by the agent's "handler" for the record, as a defense against a possible charge of entrapment.

Convincing evidence of provocation has emerged in a number of recent cases.[17] But the motives of the *agent provocateur* are frequently complex and difficult to reconstruct from the materials available. The most common *provocateur* is simply a professional police agent who coldly engineers a single provocative act designed to "set up" leaders for roundup and arrest.

Another type (of which Tommy the Traveler is an example) is the ultra-rightist who becomes a spy in order to destroy the target group. He is often driven to act out his paranoid fantasies with bombs and guns when his delusions about the group's sinister goals fail to conform to reality.

On the other hand, as the FBI student informer William T. Divale has disclosed in his recently published confessions, *I Lived Inside the Campus Revolution*, a planted informer may come to share the values of his victims, with the result that his newly acquired convictions carry him far beyond the call of duty–a form of conversion characteristic of infiltrators of black and youth groups. The infiltrator's secret knowledge that he alone in the group is immune from accountability for his acts dissolves all restraints on his zeal. He does, of course, take the risk of exposure and punitive reprisal, but this possibility itself encourages him to disarm suspicion by acting as a super-militant. This almost schizoid quality of the behavior of informers seems inherent in political surveillance and has recurred throughout its history.

Many student informers who have surfaced or recanted have been revealed as operating for two intelligence agencies at the same time–usually a local and a federal one. Several informers commonly penetrate a single organization; indeed this is prescribed as sound intelligence practice, because each surveillance report can cross-check the others.[18] Attempts to recruit [illegible]ung leftists as police spies have also [illegible] common: For example, in the fall of 1969, young volunteers for the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam were solicited to become informers by FBI agents. "Will you work for us?" they were asked as they entered the elevator on their way to the Committee's office. The FBI has recently acquired official jurisdiction on college campuses, which will result in even more extensive subsidy of student informers.

As the FBI Media documents make clear, Bureau agents now have formal authority from Washington to recruit informers as young as eighteen, including those attending two-year junior and community colleges. This authorization of September, 1970, made official a practice which long preceded the issuance of the directive but was consistently denied for public relations reasons. In fact, J. Edgar Hoover repeated this denial as recently as February of this year.

Moreover, local police–especially in university communities–have lately been given special funds to hire secret informers. For this purpose at least one state, Wisconsin, has made available the sum of $10,000.[19]

V

In the past the police agencies (whether federal or local) preferred to act as the informer's "handler," "controller," or "contact." Police officers themselves only rarely resorted to impersonation, dissembling loyalties, the fabrication of false cover identities–techniques made familiar by foreign intelligence practice and regarded as abhorrent to our traditions. It was one thing to hire an agent as an independent contractor to do the dirty work of political snooping, but quite another for a public servant to do it himself.

Today, however, the police themselves often go underground. In New Orleans an intelligence division officer gained access to the Black Panther headquarters by impersonating a priest. At least six agents of New York's Special Service Division infiltrated the Black Panthers, and appeared as witnesses in their current trial.

Three members of Chicago's intelligence unit infiltrated the Chicago Peace Council. One of them, in order to enhance his credibility, exposed another to Council leaders as a policeman. According to Karl Meyer, the Council's [illegible] "At our meetings they invariably took the most militant

continued

positions, trying to provoke the movement from its nonviolent force to the wildest kind of [illegible] were," he concluded, "about our most active members." The Peace Council became suspicious of possible spies when it and other Chicago groups—the Latin American Defense Organization, Women Strike for Peace, the Fellowship of Reconciliation—suffered a number of burglaries of files and records. (Office machines and small amounts of money were also stolen but subsequently returned.)

Agents of the Chicago intelligence unit are scattered throughout Illinois, and sometimes do not report to their superiors for days or even months. Their real identities are concealed even from their colleagues. Their methods include disguises, wiretapping, and the creation of elaborate "covers," such as dummy businesses. In numerous cities, including San Diego, Houston, Oakland, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Columbus, the agent-informer is becoming a familiar phenomenon. We are moving toward the classic European model of political infiltration, in which the planted police agent lives a double life for years if necessary, clandestinely reporting to his superiors. This kind of intelligence requires skill and training; so one should not be surprised to see the emergence of schools of instruction in the deceptive arts, similar to those run by the CIA for indoctrination in foreign intelligence and guerrilla activity.

VI

At an ever increasing rate the activities of antiwar, anti-Establishment, civil rights, black militant, student, and youth groups are being recorded and compiled. Lists and dossiers are coded, computerized, stored, and made accessible to all branches of the intelligence network. Here is how Lt. George Fencl, head of Philadelphia's civil disobedience unit, describes its filing system:

> We've been acquainted with quite a number of people throughout the years we've been handling demonstrations. We have made a record of every demonstration that we've handled in the city of Philadelphia and reduced this to writing, first by report and then taking out the names of persons connected with the different movements.
>
> We have some 18,000 names and we've made what we call an alphabetical file. We make a 5x8 card on each demonstrator that we know the name and so forth that we handle. This card shows such information as the name, address, picture if possible, and a little rundown on the person . . . which group he pickets with and so forth.
>
> Also on the back of the card, we show the different demonstrations, the date, time and location and the groups that the person picketed with. We have some 600 different organizations that we've encountered in the Philadelphia area.

This new intelligence system concentrates more on compiling names than on the content of speeches or other activities. For example, a report submitted to the Detroit Criminal Investigation Bureau by two undercover agents reads as follows:

> At 8:00 P.M. on Thursday, November 11, 1965, the WEST CENTRAL ORGANIZATION held a special meeting which was comprised primarily of executives, delegates and clergy. The meeting was called for a briefing by MR. SAUL ALINSKY of the INDUSTRIAL AREAS FOUNDATION, Chicago, Illinois, who was in the Detroit area on November 10 and 11, 1965. Thirty-seven persons attended this meeting.
>
> The following persons were identified as being in attendance at the above meeting, identifications being made by surveilling officers as well as by Confidential Informant 059. [A list of twenty-one names follows.]
>
> The following vehicles were observed parked in the immediate vicinity of 3535 Grand River, occupants entering same. [There follows a list of eleven automobiles together with the names and addresses of eleven individuals who are presumably the title registrants.]

There is nothing in the report which suggests the reason for the surveillance or what took place at the meeting.

Experience with other official record systems suggests that it is only a matter of time before the intelligence now being collected by thousands of federal and local agencies will be codified and made accessible on a broad scale. Indeed, we are not far away from a computerized nation-wide system of transmittal and storage.

VII

While the recent bombings and the hunt for fugitives have supplied justification for some surveillance practices, the emerging system as a whole is [illegible] future and is justified as preventive: the security of the nation against future overthrow is said to require the present frenzy of surveillance. In cases where such an argument makes no sense, surveillance is justified on grounds that it is necessary to prevent local violence and disorder in the future.

Political intelligence indiscriminately sweeps into its net the mild dissenters along with those drawn to violence; when the national security is at stake, so the argument runs, it is folly to take risks. The quarry is pursued long before expressions or associations of radicals are likely to incubate into violent or revolutionary acts. The fear of waiting "until it is too late" conditions the intelligence mind to suspect all forms of dissent as signs of potential "subversion."[20]

Thus peaceful, moderate, lawful organizations—from the NAACP to the Fellowship of Reconciliation—become intelligence targets on the theory that they are linked to communism or subversion.[21] This lack of selectivity, a familiar phenomenon to students of intelligence, has now been abundantly documented by the Senate testimony of former Army Intelligence agents and the recent Media documents.

To equate dissent with subversion, as intelligence officials do, is to deny that the demand for change is based on real social, economic, or political conditions. A familiar example of this assumption is the almost paranoid obsession with the "agitator." Intelligence proceeds on the assumption that most people are reasonably contented but are incited or misled by an "agitator," a figure who typically comes from "outside" to stir up trouble. The task is to track down this sinister individual and bring him to account; all will then be well again.

Since the agitator is elusive and clever, one never knows who he will turn out to be or where he will show his hand. Indeed, the striking characteristic of the agitator, according to the rhetoric and testimony of the intelligence people, is not his views nor his actions but his persistence. A subject who keeps coming to meetings or rallies or is repeatedly involved in "incidents" is soon marked as an agitator[22] (more sophisticated terms: "militant," "activist," sometimes preceded by "hard core").

continued

The outside agitator is a descendent of the "foreign agitator" or the "a[illegible] of a foreign power," as he came to be called. The thesis that domestic radicals are either tools or dupes of foreign manipulation provides intelligence agencies with their most effective way of exploiting popular fears, one which is also cherished by legislators. All movements on the left—and especially groups such as the Panthers—have come under attack as agents for foreign powers.[23]

Such ideological stereotypes give intelligence a powerful bias against movements of protest from the center leftward. To be sure, a handful of ultra-rightist groups such as the Klan and the Minutemen are also under surveillance, but for political intelligence, the presumption of innocence is largely confined to the defenders of the status quo. For individuals and groups committed to social or political protest, the presumption is reversed:[24] Peaceful, nonviolent activity must be constantly scrutinized because it may turn out to be a vital clue to a vast subversive conspiracy.

VIII

While intelligence is developing new clandestine activities, it is also becoming highly visible. American political activity is plagued by an intelligence "presence" which demoralizes, intimidates, and frightens many of its targets—and is intended to do so. And it is not merely a "presence." A variety of sanctions are improvised to punish politically objectionable subjects. These include "information management" (such as inclusion on the "ten most wanted" list), press leaks, harassment, prosecution on drug charges, legislative inquisition, physical violence, the vandalizing of cars, blacklisting, the refusal to give police protection when needed, illegal searches and raids on pretexts.

One prevailing assumption of intelligence officers is that "subversion" is financed and supported by respectable "front" institutions (churches, foundations, and universities, for example) and individuals (such as lawyers). Special pressures are brought by intelligence agencies to cut off such suspected subsidies—for example, J. Edgar Hoover's attacks on white contributors to Black Panther defense funds and the listing by the House Internal Security Committee of honoraria paid to liberal and radical campus speakers.

Intelligence is thus becoming an end in itself, rather than an investigative means—a transformation all too clearly reflected in the encouragement of FBI agents to confront subjects in order to "enhance" their "paranoia," as one of the Media documents states. But its claim to be conducting a never-ending investigation into some future unspecified threat to the national security is consistently used to legitimize its expansion. Few want to shackle the police in their hunt for wrongdoers, especially those who threaten the safety of the Republic. Why should one question a "mere" investigation, even if tons of constitutional ore may have to be excavated in order to find a single subversive nugget?

IX

What are the standards that intelligence agencies must follow for selecting subjects of surveillance, for the techniques they use or the data they develop? In fact, there are no effective standards, and there are no effective authorities in this country to insist on such standards. Every surveillance unit claims its own authority to deal with "subversion" or "subversive activities," terms which mean whatever the agency wants them to mean. The head of the Chicago intelligence unit, Lt. Joseph Healy, summed up the matter when he testified at the conspiracy trial that his squad maintained surveillance over "any organization that could create problems for the city or the country." That Army Intelligence took the same view is shown by recent disclosures that it was snooping into a virtually unlimited range of civilian activity.

In most cases, the jurisdiction to engage in political intelligence activities is wholly improvised. This is true not merely of many local agencies but of the FBI itself. The authority the FBI claims it has to stalk nonconformists can be justified neither by its law enforcement powers nor by its domestic spy-catching jurisdiction. The latter, in fact, is based on an obscure 1939 directive which J. Edgar Hoover has interpreted as conferring upon the FBI the power, in his words, "to identify individuals working against the United States, determine their objectives and nullify their effectiveness." Who are these "individuals"? Those whose activities involve "subversion and related internal security problems."

The unlimited scope of their jurisdic- [illegible] and their [illegible] autonomy encourage intelligence institutions to consolidate and expand. Intelligence thus constantly enlarges its operations by exaggerating the numbers, power, and intentions of the subversive enemy.[25]

Ironically, this exaggeration is further stimulated by the need to develop some plausible political and constitutional justification for violating democratic rights. Intelligence not only continually expands the boundaries of subversion in its operations, but inevitably generates a stream of fear-mongering propaganda in its evaluation of intelligence data. A troubled period such as the present intensifies this process: the number of surveillance subjects increases greatly as the intelligence agencies circulate propaganda dramatizing their life-and-death struggle with subversion.

X

The link between drug use and political radicalism has also served to expand the scope of political surveillance. In the past, narcotics law enforcement and the policing of political crimes have drawn on similar surveillance techniques. This was so because both involve conduct to which the parties consent and both frequently leave little proof that any crime was committed. Today the "nark" and undercover intelligence operatives are frequently in pursuit of the same prey. The same agents sometimes function in both areas and political militancy is a common cover for the "nark," especially on college campuses.

Similarly, students under surveillance for drug use are frequently selected for their political nonconformity, a link manifest in the background of both the Kent State and Hobart College cases, as well as in the conviction of Dr. Leslie Fiedler of the State University of New York at Buffalo for maintaining premises where marijuana was used. The pot bust has become a punitive sanction against political dissent and the threat of prosecution is a favorite method of "hooking" student informers. Lee Otis Johnson, former head of Houston's Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, is now serving a thirty-year jail term for the sale of a single marijuana cigarette to a Houston undercover policeman.

continued

XI

Many young radicals are finding ways of evading undercover surveillance of their political activities. Intelligence inevitably generates countermeasures ("security"), driving its targets into protective secrecy and sometimes underground even though they are usually engaged in legal protest. Such furtiveness is then cited as further proof of subversion and conspiracy ("What have they got to hide?") and reinforces the justification for surveillance.

Radicals in the past few years have tried to protect themselves by rigorously checking the backgrounds of possible infiltrators, isolating a suspected agent or feeding him bogus information, giving him test assignments, banning the use of drugs, cars, and private phones, and forming affinity groups. The radicals themselves sometimes use disguises and false names. The ultimate response to intelligence is counterintelligence, including the penetration of intelligence institutions to thwart their effectiveness. Some groups are beginning to boast about their double agents, counter-spies, and pipelines to police sources. One Berkeley police officer has already complained (and not very convincingly): "I'm afraid they do a better job spying on us than we do on them."

The pilferage and circulation of the Media FBI documents seem to suggest an escalation in counterintelligence tactics. The group responsible for the action has already announced, as a follow-up measure, a planned exposure of a "first group" of FBI informers whose names appear in as yet unreleased stolen documents. This listing of a "first group" is presumably to be followed by publication of lists of others.

Such a tactic will not only create a painful dilemma for present Philadelphia area informers but may vastly complicate the FBI's problems in future recruitment. Because political spies are the keystone of the entire federal political intelligence system, the FBI goes to extraordinary lengths to shield their identities and stresses these protective practices as an inducement for recruits. A breach in the FBI security system may well scare off potential informers not only in the Philadelphia area, but everywhere--Who knows where the Citizens' Commission will strike next? The increased risk is bound to boost the price of the informers' services. At the very least, it will "enhance" among the hunters the [illegible] among the hunted.

XII

Our political intelligence apparatus has begun to exert a dangerous influence on the exercise of political power. The attempt by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce to use intelligence data to discredit and destroy a group of Los Angeles poverty agencies is a dramatic example of a spreading phenomenon. A candidate for public office learns that he has been made an intelligence target by orders of his opponent, the incumbent. A lawyer for a victim of police brutality is threatened with being disbarred as a "subversive" because of leaks in the police department's intelligence files.

Mayor Alioto of San Francisco discovers that unevaluated intelligence files compiled by federal and urban agencies, full of smears and unverified rumors, are opened up to the press for an article which threatens his political ruin.[26] A check of the California Un-American Activities Committee files discloses dossiers on many legislators, including the Senate president, with notations reflecting intensive surveillance. A courageous Chicago newsman, Ron Dorfman, who has vigorously attacked intelligence practices in that city, is confronted with a detailed dossier on himself in a session with the Illinois Crime Commission.

It is chilling enough to learn that in this country literally millions of people are systematically suffering invasions of privacy, and, what is worse, are forced to exercise their rights of free expression and assembly under the fear of surveillance. But when a secret political police begins to play an important role in political decisions and campaigns, the democratic process is in grave danger.

Nor is there much comfort in the notion that our current intelligence mania is only a transient response to a particular emergency. History—and for that matter the annals of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI—painfully teaches that once a political intelligence system takes root, it is almost impossible to eradicate it. Fear and blackmail ensure its autonomy and self-perpetuation. How many of us can be expected to challenge a system which has such power to do injury to its critics?[27]

Americans will now have to answer the question whether the risks that we face—and some of them are real [illegible]—outweigh the danger of a [illegible] secret police. One can hardly question the right of the government to inform itself of potential crimes and acts of violence. The resort to bombing as a political tactic obviously creates a justification for intelligence to forestall such practices. But the evolving intelligence system I have been describing clearly exceeds these limited ends. Before it is too late we must take a cold look at our entire political intelligence system: not to determine whether one aspect or another is repressive—whether, for example, it is possible to keep a dossier confidential—but to decide whether internal political intelligence as an institution, divorced from law enforcement, is consistent with the way we have agreed to govern ourselves and to live politically.

Eighteen cases have now been filed throughout the country, with American Civil Liberties Union support, to challenge various surveillance and filing practices by police agencies as violating constitutional rights of free expression, assembly, privacy, and the protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The constitutional issues imbedded in these cases will undoubtedly be presented ultimately to the Supreme Court. These challenges are important if for no other reason than that they will drag undercover surveillance out of the shadows.

But the political intelligence system cannot be controlled by piecemeal attacks in the courts. If our past experience is a guide, even successful litigation may leave unchecked the particular abuses involved by limiting surveillance in ways that are readily ignored or circumvented by a bureaucracy which is a law unto itself.

Political intelligence is both a symbol of a dying politics and the means of keeping it alive through powerful myths and constraints. A truly effective attack on the evils of intelligence cannot be mounted apart from the political process. A legislative investigation, more sharply focused and more searching than Senator Ervin's investigation, is vital in order to scour this area as thoroughly as Senator LaFollette's investigation scoured labor espionage in the Thirties. Such a probe could develop a fuller understanding of political intelligence and might lay the basis for dismantling a system which, if it is allowed to grow, may choke all possibility of real change in this coun-

continued

try. But it is illusory to talk of an effective investigativ[illegible] and statut[illegible] attack on the powerful intelligence system at present. The elimination of the evils of political surveillance and dossiers is yet another reason why we need a new politics. ☐

---

[1] The term "intelligence" as used in this article is adapted from foreign intelligence usage and practice. It describes a body of techniques for collecting political information about a "subject" (physical surveillance, photography, electronic eavesdropping, informers—planted or recruited "in place"—and other deceptive or clandestine practices), the product of these activities (files and dossiers), and a set of political assumptions (the intelligence mind).

[2] This article is a distillation of verified materials, many of them documentary, drawn from the files of the ACLU political surveillance project and based on the following sources: court proceedings; legislative and administrative hearings; reports by informers and police agents to intelligence units; intelligence evaluations and summaries by intelligence staff and command personnel; interviews and correspondence with subjects, informers, and intelligence officers; the files of lawyers and civil liberties groups; TV scripts, police journals and manuals, graduate theses, newspaper and magazine articles; and the responses to a detailed questionnaire.

[3] To hasten the arrival of this brave new world, federal funds allocated by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration are being channeled to state and local police units to subsidize such surveillance gear as twenty-four hour infrared lens closed circuit TV cameras which are being attached to telephone poles on the streets of American cities. Sensors and other electronic gadgetry developed for the military in Indochina are being adapted for internal intelligence use and tested on an experimental basis in a number of cities.

[4] It was on the basis of information supplied by this unit that Attorney General Mitchell was informed in a confidential memorandum that the likelihood of violence during the November, 1969, moratorium was "extremely high . . . beyond the violence which was witnessed during the Pentagon demonstration in October, 1967, the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, in August, 1968, and the demonstration in Chicago on October 11th conducted by the Students for a Democratic Society." This prophecy turned out to be unfounded.

[5] Police departments have in recent [illegible] with [illegible]tions from commissions and professional groups to develop intelligence techniques as a means of curbing crime—especially organized crime. But the intelligence units which have come into being as a result have been converted into instruments for political surveillance—especially of the ghetto.

The day and night surveillance of blacks, as a group, by these newly constituted units is considered self-justifying, very much like the surveillance of aliens in the Twenties. This is true even of small and medium-sized cities, which are rife with mounting crime and corruption, but proud of their "mod squads" and the increasing number of intelligence "inputs" to the ghetto, the "long-hair" community, and the campus.

As for the large cities, there are, according to Illinois Police Superintendent James T. McGuire, more police in the Chicago area on political intelligence assignments than are engaged in fighting organized crime. The same is true in Philadelphia.

[6] The campus has become the theater of intensive intelligence activities by undercover urban police agents and paid informers. A recent investigation by the Committee on Academic Freedom of the University of California, Los Angeles Division, Academic Senate, concludes that "there are undercover activities by governmental agencies on campus, that some of these activities are conducted by operatives of the Los Angeles Police Department and that it is unclear what other agencies, if any, are involved."

[7] A Dayton, Ohio, firm which calls itself Agitator Detection, Inc., advertises a "sure-fire method for keeping radical America out of work": "We have," the company boasts, "complete, computerized files on every known American dissident. . . . And all 160 million of their friends, relatives and fellow travelers."

A scattering of right-wing organizations and publications across the country also has access to intelligence data. For example, the Church League of America, headed by Edgar Bundy, boasts of its over 7 million cross-indexed files of political suspects, its "working relationships" with "leading law enforcement agencies," and its cooperation with undercover agents.

These organizations are prized by intelligence agencies because they share the basic intelligence assumption that the country is in the grip of a widespread subversive conspiracy. Intelligence agents and informers use the platform and publications of the far right to document this thesis with "inside" information.

[8] [illegible] FBI circulates through its own [illegible]annels a document known as the "agitator index," which is made available to local agencies. In the spring and summer of 1968 the Washington field office of the FBI compiled an elaborate collection of dossiers and photographs for use in connection with the Resurrection City demonstration.

That material was thereafter augmented and organized into an album; multiple copies were made and transmitted to the Chicago police for use in dealing with protest activity around the Democratic convention. The FBI agent who was responsible for the idea received a special commendation. Such albums of "known leftists" are now widely circulated.

[9] In a hearing last year, Chief Counsel Sourwine of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee described the subcommittee's mission in these words:

"We seek information with respect to the persons who head these subversive organizations and are active in them and who participate in them, the persons who support them: about the interconnections, the channels of authority, and the sources of funds.

"We are asking police departments from all across the country to sift their records and bring these facts here for the committee . . . by gathering all of the available information from leading police departments throughout the country, the committee hopes to be able eventually to present a picture. We are charting the organizations in each area, the persons in each area who are connected . . . and we hope when we finish we will have a picture which will show just what this country is up against."

The appendix to the volume from which this is quoted contains a series of documents from the intelligence files of the Flint, Michigan, Police Department including a "steno pad" which "was owned by one of the top members of the SDS," taken from a car in a raid which had no justifiable basis.

[10] In view of the overwhelming need for identification it is hardly surprising that informers with photographic skills are paid a bonus. Louis Salzberg, a New York photographer, received about $10,000 in the two years he served as an FBI informer. He used this money to finance a studio which sold pictures to left publications, the negatives of which were turned over to the FBI. He surfaced at the Chicago conspiracy trial and subsequently testified before the House Internal Security Committee which was also supplied with the negatives as well as with documents and correspondence taken by Salzberg from the files of the Veterans for Peace and the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee.

continued

---

[11] The importance of photography in the new intelligence scene was amusingly demonstrated during the Chicago conspiracy trial. By court order, to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process, photographers were excluded from the federal courthouse during the trial. But this prohibition unwittingly closed a valuable surveillance channel and the order was amended to permit intelligence photographers to continue to ply their trade.

[12] Attorney General Mitchell has asserted an inherent power flowing from executive responsibility for the national security (a term of enormous looseness) to disregard constitutional restraints in this area whenever, in his unreviewable discretion, an individual may be seeking "to attack and subvert the government by unlawful means." And even before the Mitchell regime, wiretapping and bugging were systematically used by the FBI in cases (such as those of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Elijah Muhammad) not even remotely linked to national security.

[13] For example, the primary basis for successful application for, and repeated renewals of, wiretap authorization orders against a group of New York City Panthers consisted of an account by an informer of a conspiracy by the Panthers to engage in the ambush and murder of policemen—a story admittedly invented by the informer, one Shaun Dubonnet; to secure leniency in a criminal case, earn a little money, and further his career as a double agent. Neither Dubonnet's substantial prior criminal record—including two convictions for impersonation—nor his repeated hospitalization for mental illness served to impair his credibility with the police.

The tips and reports of informers, frequently fabricated, provide pretexts for raids. One example of many that could be cited is the alleged tip by the undercover agent to the FBI that the Chicago Black Panthers had assembled an arsenal of guns. This led to a predawn raid in which Fred Hampton and Mark Clark were killed. Only a few guns were found.

[14] Judge Anderson tersely summed up the matter when he wrote in 1920 in the case of *Colyer* v. *Skeffington*, "A right-minded man refuses such a job."

[15] According to information from an FBI source, "informants" (as the FBI prefers to call them; "informers" is a subversive usage) submit vast quantities of data of a highly inflammatory character. The "contact" does not challenge it because he is afraid to lose the informant. Frequently he ignores this suspect material in his own reports either because he is convinced that it is incredible or that the informant would have to surface, to testify, if it became the basis for a criminal charge. This would again result in losing the informant and require the "contact" to recruit a replacement. It is infinitely preferable, I was told, to cover up for an informant even if his reports are wholly false than to be forced to go to the trouble of finding a replacement.

[16] Conspiracy is a classic vehicle for the political informer for another reason. Under conspiracy law, evidence of acts and statements of co-conspirators to bring about the purposes of the conspiracy agreement are admissible against all the co-conspirators even though, without the agreement (frequently proved by flimsy and remote evidence), it would be incompetent and inadmissible as hearsay.

The informer's tale in this way becomes binding on all of the alleged co-conspirators including individuals he has never seen or met. The conspiracy charge thus economizes on the number of informer witnesses needed to make a case. This is a highly important consideration to intelligence agencies, which are traditionally reluctant to surface informers.

The general question of the reliability of informer witnesses as well as their role in conspiracy cases is dramatized by the current conspiracy indictment of the Berrigans, which is based on evidence supplied by a prison informer, Boyd Douglas, Jr., who also inspired and arranged for a number of the "overt acts," allegedly in furtherance of the "conspiracy."

[17] Thomas Tongyai (Tommy the Traveler), an undercover agent on the campus of Hobart College (an Episcopalian school with a tradition of nonviolence), was charged by students with preaching revolution, using violent rhetoric to gain converts, and demonstrating the M1 carbine and the construction of various types of bombs. He did not deny these allegations but explained, "The best cover for an undercover agent who wanted to get into the campus was portraying the part of a radical extremist which I did."

According to Alabama Civil Liberties Union lawyers, in May of 1970 a student infiltrator for the FBI and the Tuscaloosa police on the University of Alabama campus, Charles Grimm, Jr., committed arson and incited acts of violence, which were then used as a reason for declaring a campus protest meeting an unlawful assembly, a ruling which resulted in criminal charges against 150 students. One of the attorneys contended that the agent had admitted the violent acts to him and that the FBI and local police had spirited the agent away to make him unavailable in the court cases.

William Frapolly, a Chicago police spy at Northeastern Illinois State College, was the leader of an SDS sit-in and participated in a Weatherman action which culminated in throwing the institution's president off a stage, conduct which led to his expulsion for two semesters. As the only Weatherman SDS representative on Northeastern's campus, Frapolly actively recruited young students to join the SDS Weatherman faction and to participate in the Weatherman-sponsored "Days of Rage" in Chicago in the fall of 1969. He surfaced as a prosecution witness in the Chicago conspiracy trial, where he conceded on the witness stand that during convention week he proposed a number of schemes for sabotaging public facilities and military vehicles, although his assigned duties as a marshal were to maintain order.

There are half a dozen comparable cases. The UCLA Academic Freedom Committee report which I have already cited states that its probe revealed suggestive evidence of "the presence of undercover agents as *agents provocateurs*, engaging in or precipitating the behavior they are charged with suppressing. . . ."

continued

[18] There is no optimal number of infiltrators. An FBI agent whom I recently interviewed said that at a Washington Peace Mobilization meeting in 1969, of the thirty-two individuals present, nine were undercover agents. The number of informers an FBI agent can recruit is limited only by his budget for this purpose. An informer is first used *ad hoc* and is paid a small stipend. He is known in the Bureau's records as a potential security informant (PSI) or a potential racial informant (PRI). When he proves his worth he becomes a "reliable informant," acquires a file, cover name, and is paid a fixed salary (sometimes disguised or augmented as "expenses"), which is increased from time to time as his usefulness grows.

[19] Some students are paid a fixed stipend but the practice is growing, especially in urban intelligence units, of paying them for each item of information. Houston pays them from $5 to $400, depending on the value of the information.

[20] Or, in the talismanic intelligence usage, "threats to the national security."

[21] The informer's super-militance in such groups, his proclaimed impatience with the slow pace of his associates, clothe him with the requisite credibility when he seeks ultimate entry into the more inaccessible organizations, in spite of his possible differences in social class and personal style.

[22] The special loathing with which grass-roots intelligence functionaries perceive the "agitator" is expressively conveyed in Congressional testimony presented in October, 1970, by Michael A. Amico, sheriff of Erie County, New York, who has organized an elaborate informer and surveillance system in the Buffalo area. Referring to the target groups under surveillance, he testified:

> "Many of these organizations start their meetings clandestinely by burning the American flag before they go into their rituals. It is difficult to get young undercover agents to remain disciplined to withstand, if you know the reaction, what does happen upon the burning of the flag. These are the rituals and different practices and, as said by the undercover man, orgasms are obtained by the different activities that follow because of the burning of the flag."

[23] Recently declassified Army Intelligence documents (Annex B—Intelligence—to the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan and Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan), the most revealing intelligence material in the literature, suggest that peace and anti-draft movements are foreign-directed because "they are supporting the stated objectives of foreign elements which are detrimental to the USA."

[24] It is hardly surprising that intelligence is most at home with non-crimes such as "subversion" or inchoate crimes such as conspiracy in which innocent conduct is treated as criminal because it is claimed to be enmeshed in an illegal agreement and performed with evil intent. The affinity of the intelligence mind for the conspiracy offense can be illustrated by the testimony of Detective Sergeant John Ungvary, head of the Cleveland intelligence squad, before a Senate committee. He urged that "if we had a law whereby we can charge all of them [black nationalists] as participants or conspirators . . . it would be far better than waiting for an overt act. . . ."

[25] The technique of broadening the boundaries of subversion has been developed and refined by the Congressional anti-subversive committees: first, by the application of notions of vicarious, imputed, and derived guilt; second, by a process of cross-fertilization which proscribes an organization through the individuals associated with it and the individuals through their relationship to the organization; third, by increasing the number of condemned organizations through [illegible] links to one another; fourth, by treating subversion as permanent, irreversible, and even hereditary, with the result that a dossier, no matter how old, never loses its importance nor a subject his "interest."

This technique has been ingeniously applied in a remarkable document, *A Report on the SDS Riots, October 8-11, 1969*, issued by the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission, April, 1970, and reprinted in June, 1970, by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Ostensibly concerned with the Weatherman demonstration ("Days of Rage"), this 400-page report is a virtual encyclopedia of militant radicalism among youth, replete with dossiers, photographs, personal letters, diaries, and documents relating not merely to the SDS figures with whom it purports to be primarily concerned, but to a host of other individuals and organizations about whom the Commission had col[illegible]ed intelligence information and [illegible] linked in the most tortured fashion to the subject matter of the Commission's report. This information, much of it highly inaccurate, was published purely for the purpose of punitive exposure of intelligence targets.

[26] The mayor's charges against federal agencies have not been denied. The Los Angeles Police Department has admitted supplying confidential files to the writer of the article. The coordinator of intelligence, Sergeant George Bell, stated: "I would pull the index cards and let him go over the resumés, and some of them he asked to see the copy [of the file itself]."

[27] Political files and dossiers give bureaucratic continuity to intelligence agencies and are a powerful reason for their survival in the face of the most hostile attack. When intelligence spokesmen cry, "What will happen to these valuable files which alone stand between us and a Commie takeover?" critics are usually silenced. After a motion was carried in January, 1945, to terminate the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the House reversed itself on the plea of Congressman Rankin that "these valuable records that probably involve the fate of the Nation, the safety of the American people, would be dissipated—I want to see that these papers are kept; that is the one thing I am striving for."

WASHINGTON POST

21 APR 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Adm. Moorer Aids Inter-Agency Spies

By Jack Anderson

International espionage is seldom as efficient as the inter-departmental spying that goes on in Washington.

The rivalry between some government departments is so intense that they spy on one another like suspicious spouses. The armed forces, for instance, watch each other jealously. The Central Intelligence Agency never makes a move without the Defense Intelligence Agency keeping close surveillance. And when a State Department employee enters the Pentagon he takes the same precautions as if he were entering enemy territory.

No daily document is more sensitive that "The President's Daily Intelligence Briefing," which the CIA prepares for President Nixon. It is loaded with SI (Special Intelligence) items, country by country, on long sheets tucked into a white folder with blue lettering.

To possess a copy of the President's private intelligence digest is the ultimate status symbol. Those who see it are men of consequence, indeed. But for the DIA, which is eager to know what the CIA knows, access to this exclusive document is a matter of utmost priority.

Our own spies tell us that the DIA regularly gets a copy. It is smuggled to them by Adm. Thomas Moorer, the joint chiefs' chairman, who has sufficient standing to get on the distribution list.

To make unauthorized copies of this sensitive presidential digest is akin to counterfeiting holy writ. Yet our spies have spotted a Moorer aide, who is entrusted with the admiral's eyes-only messages, furtively running off copies on a DIA copying machine.

Another supersecret document is the State Department's intelligence round-up from embassies around the world. The department guards this so jealously that it is stamped, "NODIS," which means it isn't supposed to be distributed outside State's own elite.

What they don't know, however, is that a Pentagon pigeon in their midst runs off unauthorized copies and sneaks them in a plain brown manila envelope to the joint chiefs chairman and the DIA director.

Thus do government agencies, in the best cloak-and-dagger tradition, snoop upon one another.

WASHINGTON POST

High Court Refuses to Review CIA Suit

The Supreme Court refused yesterday to review a lower court's decision that immunized a Central Intelligence Agency operative from a lawsuit for slander uttered "in the line of duty."

Over the dissents of Justices William O. Douglas and Potter Stewart, the court left standing the dismissal of a slander suit brought by Eerik Heine, an Estonian emigre, against Juri Raus, the CIA agent who said his utterances were made under orders.

Raus, employed as a federal highway engineer, accused Heine, a lecturer on the evils of communism, of being a Soviet agent. The accusation was designed as a warning to the Estonian emigre community in the United States that their ranks had been infiltrated, according to Heine, who was supported in lower courts by CIA Director Richard Helms.

The CIA's immunity defense raised controversy over the agency's proper domestic role five years ago when it was discovered infiltrating the National Student Association.

Federal law prohibits "domestic security functions" by the CIA, but the federal district court in Baltimore and the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said Raus's actions were legitimate measures to protect the secrecy of America's foreign intelligence sources.

Four votes were needed for a full hearing, which would have amounted to a re-examination of Supreme Court decisions dating back to 1959 establishing broad libel and slander immunity for key government officials in the interest of a free flow of governmental information.

BALTIMORE SUN

Fact gathering and not policy making

The CIA within democratic principles

This article is excerpted from a speech that Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, made last week to the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

By RICHARD HELMS

I welcome this opportunity to speak to you today about the place of an intelligence service in a democratic government. In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which I hope can be dispelled.

On the one hand: I can assure you that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before.

On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that our government must be kept fully informed on foreign developments, there is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency.

I am not referring to the occasional criticism of CIA's performance—the question of whether we gave advance warning of this coup or that revolt, or how accurately we forecast the outcome of an election or a military operation. By necessity, intelligence organizations do not publish the extent of their knowledge, and we neither confirm nor deny challenges of this nature. We answer to those we serve in the government.

Invisible Government

What I am referring to are the assertions that the Central Intelligence Agency is an "invisible government"—a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society, and subject to no controls.

American intelligence did not begin with the National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA. George Washington personally directed his espionage networks during the Revolutionary War. President Polk had a showdown with the Congress in 1846 about accounting for the funds he used "to employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining information." In the Civil War, the North hired the Pinkerton Agency to expand its intelligence services. The Department of State and our armed forces all have had long experience in the collection of information.

The Central Int[illegible] fore, was created not to replace, but to coordinate the existing intelligence elements of the United States government.

And may I emphasize at this point that the [National Security Act of 1947] specifically forbids the Central Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers, or any domestic security functions.

Forbids Domestic Function

A mass of detailed knowledge is required, of course, for the planning of military operations, but I would like to stress that accurate intelligence is equally essential to the planning and implementation of actions taken to forestall conflict.

When it comes to waging peace, it would be unthinkable to conclude a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union without the means for monitoring compliance.

The United States and the Soviet Union each have a wide variety of choices among systems to be developed, and these choices interact. The key to choice is knowledge—knowledge of the accuracy, reliability, and numbers of Soviet ICBM's, knowledge of Soviet progress in advanced radars for ABM's, knowledge, if you will, of Soviet knowledge of our own progress.

And second, CIA is the only one whose primary mission is to collect, evaluate, and produce foreign intelligence.

Targets Are In Totalitarian Nations

We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we cannot and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts—the agreed facts—and the whole known range of facts—relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimative function—the projection of likely developments from the facts—but not to advocacy, or recommendations for one course of action or another.

From the time this agency was created, we have had to deal with the fact that some of our most important intelligence targets lie in totalitarian countries where collection is impeded by the security defenses of a police state—for example, Communist China.

In the face of such limitations, the analytical process can often extract meaningful conclusions from a volume of fragmentary information. To do so requires ingenious minds and much pains-[illegible] instance, we have assembled a panel of experts in a broad field of specialties to devote full time to study, analysis, and reporting.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 affords a good example of how this across-the-board analysis—comprehensive in its scope and intensive in its concentration—serves the policy-maker.

The watch for missiles . . . was complicated by the fact that there were defensive surface-to-air missiles in Cuba, and to the untrained observer, one missile looks pretty much like another. In fact, some of these "missile reports" we checked turned out to be torpedoes, fuel tanks, and even industrial pipe and mooring buoys.

"Courageous Russians"

Our intelligence files in Washington, however—thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped us—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their transporters and other associated equipment, and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union. We knew what to look for.

The intelligence analysts who participate in reaching these conclusions, of course, run the gamut from some who have just begun an intelligence career to others who have devoted a lifetime of study to their specialty. To strike a more typical mean, one of the experts who enabled us to give President Johnson a correct appreciation of the Middle Eastern situation in May, 1967—just before the start of the June War—held a doctorate in Near Eastern studies, had lived for several years in Arab villages, and at the time had spent 12 years with CIA.

Almost one in three of our analysts has his doctorate. We have capabilities in 113 foreign languages and dialects. We can call on the expertise of anthropologists, chemists, metallurgists, medical doctors, psychiatrists, botanists, geologists, engineers of every variety, statisticians, mathematicians, archaeologists, and foresters. Our people have academic degrees in 293 major fields of specialization from accounting to zoology.

Pernicious And Pervasive

It is a fact that we have, as I said, no domestic security role, but if there is a chance that a private American citizen traveling abroad has acquired foreign information that can be useful to the

American policy-maker, we are certainly going to try to interview him. If there is a competent young graduate student who is interested in working for the United States Government, we may well try to hire him.

The trouble is that to those who insist on seeing us as a pernicious and pervasive secret government, our words "interview" and "hire" translate into suborn, subvert, and seduce, or something worse. We use no compulsion. If a possible source of information does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly.

We have made it our practice not to answer criticism. Former Senator (Leverett) Saltonstall (R., Mass.) summed it up pretty well when he said that in an open society like ours, it is impossible to inform the public without informing our enemies.

And so I come to the fundamental question of reconciling the security needs of an intelligence service with the basic principles of our democratic society. At the root of the problem is secrecy.

Must Take It On Faith

I cannot, then, give you an easy answer to the objections raised by those who consider intelligence work incompatible with democratic principles. The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service. I can assure you that we are, but I am precluded from demonstrating it to the public.

I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively, intensively, and continuously.

Starting with the Executive Branch, the Central Intelligence Agency operates under the constant supervision and direction of the National Security Council. No significant foreign program of any kind is undertaken without the prior approval of an NSC subcommittee which includes representatives of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

Our budget is gone over line for line by the Office of Management and Budget—and by the appropriate committees of the Congress as well.

In short, the Central Intelligence Agency is not and cannot be its own master. It is the servant of the United States government, undertaking what that government asks it to do, under the directives and controls the government has established. We make no foreign policy.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
41 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017, 697-5100

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Barry Farber STATION WOR

DATE April 5, 1971 7:15 PM CITY New York

FULL TEXT

BARRY FARBER: I'm Barry Farber. If you keep your radio fixed right where it is, you will meet the former Green Beret who raised his hand and said, "I am the one who shot that double agent."

* * *

This is a very difficult boadcast to organize. It came up in a hurry. Across from me right now are Robin Moore, author of "The Green Berets" and co-author with Henry Rothblatt, who is also here, of a novel called "Court Martial." The novel is about the case which exploded after "The Green Berets" was written, about the double, triple, quadruple agent who was eliminated, adding a new word to the English language. We've had "do in," we've had "bump off." A new synonym phrase, to "eliminate with extreme prejudice" was added to our lexicography of violence. Henry Rothblatt was the attorney who went over there to try the case that never got tried.

Now, we're joined by Robert F. Morasco, one of those accused Green Berets, who now at this point in American history says, "I am the one who shot that man on orders from the CIA." Mr. Morosco, am I misquoting you? Did you actually shoot this agent personally with a revolver?

MORASCO: Yes, I did shoot him. It was not with a revolver, it was a 22-caliber automatic pistol with silencer.

FARBER: In other words, Henry Rothblatt, that puts you in the position of having gone to Vietnam to defend Robert Morosco and others against charges that he did exactly what he now says he did.

ROTHBLATT: Well, there was no question, real serious question, that this agent was killed. There was no real serious -- although I did raise that as a technical legal question. But the facts weren't very much in dispute. It was the moral and legal issues arising from the acts that were in dispute.

FARBER: Mr. Morasco, why did you pick right now to --incidentally, I read the front-page New York Times article. It didn't say how this came about. It didn't say Robert Morasco called a press conference and said enough of this. It didn't say Robert Morasco in a press release to all the media, said, against the background of Lieutenant Cally's conviction, I just somehow felt impelled into making this revelation. How did this happen to come about right now. Why do you pick right now to tell a recoiling world that you shot the agent on orders from the CIA?

MORASCO: There are a couple of reasons. I had been thinking about this for the last 18 months, since I came back from Vietnam. I got a little more publicity than most of the other men because they said that I was the one that actually did the shooting. I have to live with this the rest of my life. The Army saw fit to classify the answer to your question, classify it secret. I never did understand that. But I felt that if the Army felt that if the Army felt that that was necessary, that I would adhere to their decision. But it was very difficult over the past 18 months to think about that and not -- and know that the people here in the United States did not know what the truth was, what was really happening.

Then Lieutenant Calley's case came out, and the revulsion of public opinion to the Lieutenant Calley verdict really started to push me. Then I saw one night on the nightly news some young boys from New Mexico who were trying to be arrested for doing the same kind of thing to a lesser or greater degree than Lieutenant Calley did and Lieutenant Calley was convicted for. They couldn't be arrested.

I still had to consider the classified information situation with the Army. But at the same time, out came a book by Robin Moore and one of our attorneys, Henry Rothblatt, called "Court Martial." And in reading through this book, I saw so much of the classified information that I was reluctant to release. I felt that it then made that classified information public domain.

But most important, I am so concerned with the direction that our country is headed. Mine may be the first case, the Green Beret court-martial, then comes Lieutenant Calley, then Captain Medina, Colonel Henderson. Who is next? I would be asking myself that question if I were a young private in the Army now.

FARBER: I'm Barry Farber. If you keep your radio fixed right where it is, we'll proceed as long as time permits. Robert Morasco, the former Green Beret, who was in an automobile accident -- incidentally, was that an automobile accident. We were all asking each other around this table on the first of the ten days you were on the critical list over in New Jersey.

MORASCO: It was an automobile mishap. Whether it was an accident or not, I guess I thought about for a long time. I have received a lot of letters suggesting that maybe it wasn't really an accident.

FARBER: Were the circumstances such that other hands could have been on the story? Or was it you losing control of a perfectly good vehicle around a bend?

MORASCO: No, I was driving at 45 miles an hour in a 50-mile zone, going north on a highway, and somebody doing 120 miles an hour going south on this divided highway, who was also drunk, jumped the divider, flew up in the air and landed on top of me, airborne, and put me in the hospital for three months and in a coma for four days.

FARBER: Robin Moore, author of "The Green Berets," whose book prompted Robert F. Morasco to tell what he told the New York Times, the headline, "Ex-Beret Says He Killed Agent On Orders of CIA." With Robin Moore, Henry Rothblatt, co-author of the book that started all this revealing "Court Martial" -- "Court Martial," a book that was born with a headline and has caused many, many more headlines since its birth. "Court Martial" is published by Doubleday.

In a minute, Mr. Morasco, I want to take you back to the shooting and then to the direction of the country.

* * *

Robert Morasco, you've told friends that the one word you don't like is "trigger man." You admit you shot this agent, but you don't like the word "trigger man." How would you explain to your grandchildren your role in this?

MORASCO: I would tell them that I served my country, I followed orders that I felt to be legal orders. One of those orders which tended to hit national prominence was killing a double agent. The word, "trigger man," a euphemism that some newspaperman, I am sure, picked up, it just seems that every time this case is referred to regarding me, I am regarded as the trigger man. And I just dislike the term.

FARBER: You say that CIA ordered the execution of this double agent. You just happen to be the man who performed the execution. Did the CIA officially order you to or was the order implied, was it written?

MORASCO: The CIA never officially does anything. They don't hand you a written piece of paper or a printed piece of paper and the top it says Central Intelligence Agency.

The orders, not only from the CIA but from the military in Vietnam are oblique but yet very, very clear, very implied yet very clear. The CIA, I want to make clear, made this order known to my superiors and then it came down the chain of command.

FARBER: And you thought it was a legal order. Were you in a kind of work -- and this is obviously not taking aim on a battlefield, this was not defending a fire post; you knew that you were going to be with a man. And, I don't know, some compulson of taste prevents me from asking you to recite the actual details. He thought he was going off on a mission. He didn't realize he was going off to be executed. Everybody would have sort of a haunting curiosity to know exactly what that scene played like in real life. Let's forget that for right now. You didn't feel guilty performing an illegal order, and the reason, according to what you told the New York Times, I think is the center, the nerve center, of the story. You said so much of this went on. This just happens to be the case in the headlines, like Calley happens to be the guy in the dock. Apparently there were a lot of these executions performed by Green Berets at CIA orders all over the place. I think you referred to execution teams or squads.

MORASCO: Executions are not commonplace, but they also are not uncommon. There are units in Vietnam that are generally made up of Vietnamese who are trained, directed, financed and equipped by the Americans, and generally by the CIA. We usually turn the dirty work over to them so that we can keep our lily-white hands clean. We want to be benevolent warriors. I don't see how that's really possible, but that seems to be the direction that we're trying to take. Eliminations, assassinations, whatever they're called today, are not at all uncommon. And you must also realize that -- you were mentioning before didn't you find this kind of unusual because it wasn't the standard battlefield type of action. Well, I was not the standard battlefield type of officer. My cover was that of an infantry officer on an A team in the Mekong Delta. But I was an intelligence officer. My mission was the collection of cross-border intelligence.

FARBER: Henry Rothblatt.

ROTHBLATT: May I give your listeners a little bit of the flavor of what took place as Robin and I have written it in "Court Martial," answer your question by the dialogue we have. Hank McKuen, the defense attorney, in this case is addressing the court on the question of proof and trying to uncover or have certain evidence of the CIA uncovered in court. And Hank McKuen says this: "This is the only explanation for General Flint's orders." Pardon, we know who General Flint is.

FARBER: And we also know who McKuen is, namely Henry Rothblatt. Okay.

ROTHBLATT: "To court-martial him for an alleged crime, which, Mr. Morasco, are you glad or sorry that Moore and Rothblatt wrote the book.

MOORE: Do you want me to start?

FARBER: Robin Moore.

MOORE: Well, I'm certainly not sorry that Bob Morasco decided to speak up, because he, I think more than any other single individual in the United States, was able to polarize the feeling. Lots of people have spoken up but nobody had -- many people may have done other things, more interesting things, even, than Bob Morasco, but his speaking up, more than any other single event, I think, since the verdict, the Calley verdict has come in, short of the President saying he was going to review it, has made people understand that it is not fair, right, American, just, or anything else, to take a guy like Lieutenant Calley and make him the scapegoat for the entire thing.

I'm known as a hawk and a rightwinger. I don't know whether I really am or not. But this whole situation is the first time I've ever found myself in agreement with people like Senator McGovern and a lot of other people. So I think it was right for him to speak up.

Now, that is my feeling about it. But I think that Captain Morasco may feel a little differently about the book I wrote. I was unable to talk to the Green Beret while I was writing that book. I only had access to Mr. Rothblatt, information that I could get, but I could not talk to the Special Forces men who were involved. Bob, who I might have been able to talk to, was in the hospital during that period of time that I was working on the book. And even if he hadn't been, I don't think he would have been in a mood to talk to me. I tried to solicit their cooperation. I sent to Colonel Rowe, or I had sent to him in a devious way, an early manuscript of the book, figuring that if there's something in it he didn't like it he could use the same channels -- this is an old Special Forces custom; you don't have to know each other, but you can form a channel -- to send back to me and say don't do it.

So I don't feel that I did anything wrong in fictionalizing with the help of Henry -- with the help of him! I couldn't have done it without Henry, because Henry was the source. I don't think I did anything wrong in writing that book. However, I think Bob has a different feeling, and he's certainly entitled to it.

FARBER: Henry Rothblatt, before former Captain Morasco speaks, if you'd like to add anything to what Robin said, that will be appropriate.

ROTHBLATT: Remember, the President of the United States intervened in the Green Beret case when my military counsel and I made motions, directed to the President to dismiss the charges. It was on our motion that this case never went to trial. The facts were never heard by the public, just as the Calley case was heard with all its grim details. A big cloud stands around these great offficers, these great Special Services officers who are accused.

This was an opportunity. It was an opportunity for Robert and I to tell the theme, and it was great for Bob Morasco to come out and say, after Calley got the short end of the vindictiveness of certain people, and saying we don't play wars that way -- Bob had the courage to come out and say this is a dirty deal to give Mr. Calley.

And I've just been looking at some of the syndicated columns in the New York Post and the editorials in the New York Post today, and I am shocked. The anti-war groups -- in fact I appeared at Notre Dame University the other night and I was on the same platform, believe it or not, with Bill Kunstler. We're totally in accord. Bill said, "The conviction of Lieutenant Calley is a shock. He shouldn't be kept in jail." My god, you wouldn't think Kunstler thinks that way. But read some of these stories. Editorial in the New York Post. "The immediate consequences of two sadly injudicious interventions , a sparing of Calley from the stockade, swiftly followed by the announcement that he will personally review and resolve the lieutenant's case, is to render academic the appeal process." This a criticism of President Nixon for interfering in the Calley case. Shocking. Because the public is forced by public opinion, as the President was forced by public opinion in the Green Beret case, to dismiss the charges, now the President is being forced by public opinion to correct this injustice, the New York Post editorial writers are shocked. The American people are not shocked. They are shocked by the injustice of the conviction.

FARBER: I don't know how shocked Captain Morasco was when he read how much -- you know, the first time we talked about your book, I said, "A lot of true words are spoken through false teeth." I didn't realize quite how many true words there were in the not-so-false teeth of your novel, "Court Martial," but Captain Morasco knows everything about it, and in a minute I want his counter-comment.

* * *

I'm Barry Farber. I am in the genial company right now of a murderer or of a man who performed a legal order in time of war. I'm sure different Americans will have different points of views, but Robert F. Morascao does not behave like a murderer. Murderers don't call the New York Times and say, "Look, these are the facts. I've thought about it for 18 months and I want the world to know."

Incidentally, Mr. Morasco, how did you get -- how did this get in the papers? Stories on page-one of the New York Times just don't happen spontaneously.

MORASCO: Well, I'm not not adept at public relations or really even know how to contact ...

FARBER: Well, you made page-one.

MORASCO: Well, I thought that -- I wanted to make this statement, and I felt that the New York Times was the one that could get my story around the best, and I just contacted them.

FARBER: You haven't sought any money for your story, have you? You haven't tried to make deals with magazines for the exclusive, or anything.

MORASCO: No, the New York Times doesn't pay five cents.

FARBER: I am aware of that.

MORASCO: I'm sure that I could have called a magazine, the main magazines that would be excited about this kind of story, and pay me well. Money is not my reason for making this story known. The reason is principle and belief in my country, what it stands for and what it was built on. And it just seems to me that, following through on what Henry said a moment ago, when he was reading from the New York Post, that there are some people who object to the President's intervention in the Calley case. Maybe my government and history teachers in my schooling were naive or were incorrect, but it was always my belief that the

President of the United States represented and was the voice of the people of the United States. I have also heard that the letters that were received were 100 to 1 in favor of -- Gallup polls have been taken. Eighty, ninety per cent of the people in the United States are for the President intervening. Now, if there is one man who happens to write for the New York Post who seems to feel differently, well, I think there is something wrong. The President represents those eighty per cent, not the man in the New York Post.

FARBER: Robin Moore and Henry Rothblatt, co-authors of "Court Martial," not just two free-lance writers who said, "Let's write a book and call it "Court Martial." Robin Moore, the closest thing to a Green Beret who was never actually a member. He joined the Green Berets, wrote "The Green Berets," and has been known as the unofficial voice of the Green Berets to the council of nations and to screens and books, magazine articles, to everybody in the world.

Henry Rothblatt is the attorney who responded to the case erupting into publicity about the annihilation, destruction, the eliminating with extreme prejudice of the triple, double, or quadruple agent. Their book is "Court Martial. And I have to say this. My stomach has not felt the same since reading the opening chapter of "Court Martial." I am not -- this is not -- I do not authorize any publisher to excerpt that, because when you read that opening chapter you will realize what I just said is not funny. But it puts the situation in this context. Right away you get a different kind of impression of this double, triple, quadruple agent, than one that might come through in the press, where he is just a victim of the CIA, Green Berets and Army. Apparently he did some things which I think Henry, in legalistic language, might call mitigating circumstances.

ROTHBLATT: Right.

FARBER: Anyhow, Bob Morasco, are you glad that Robin Moore and Henry Rothblatt wrote "Court Martial"? You say that there was so much classified stuff in there that you were alarmed.

MORASCO: I can't say that what is written in that book is incorrect or not the truth. I just can't say that. But I do tend to object to that book being written because the classified information that was in there I couldn't release to the public to help to defend myself at the time of the case, yet 18 months later I can read the story.

FARBER: All right, you were not a Calley-type situation. You were one of, how many, seven, men accused of executing one double or triple agent, and the case never came to trial. How did your life change, except for that automobile accident, when you got back? Were you regarded as a killer, a criminal, a trigger-man, a hero? How, by people who got that low profile of publicity and not all the enormous glare that Calley is living in?

MORASCO: It was mixed. The feeling was mixed. I would say that, generally speaking, I was looked at favorably, but I was looked at favorably by people who didn't know the truth of the case. Now that they know it, if they still look at me favorably, as an American who was doing his duty, now I feel the right to accept that praise. And the reverse is true for those who might have criticized me. Some people seem to feel that I was a controversial character.

FARBER: Did you relish this assignment of eliminating this agent -- I mean knowing what this agent had done, knowing and -- because this is family radio I cannot go into detail as to what that double agent was responsible for, how much suffering, et cetera -- death, murder and torture inflicted on Americans and others. You knew all that. Did you say, "Hot dog, I'm glad that's the CIA's order," or did you say, "Good Lord, me, Bob Morasco, I've got to take this poor man with a wife out in a boat," or where did your attitude follow between those poles?

MORASCO: I most certainly didn't relish the thought of killing a human being. We tried very much, but yet in vain, to try to take care of this situation in another way, besides elimination. The killing of a human being, I just can't imagine anyone relishing. I certainly didn't. It was a war. It was something that I felt had to be done because they were my orders and I felt that people superior to me had considered all possibilities, and that was the best possibility; therefore it was my duty to follow through.

FARBER: You mentioned the direction of the country. In a minute I want you all three to collaborate on your separate estimations as to the direction of the country.

* * *

Bob Morasco comes not to plug a book called "Court Martial," but to separate himself from it and point out that Robin Moore was not in the Green Berets. He has the right to sit down and write any work of fiction he chooses. He so chose, with Henry Rothblatt, to write a work of fiction called "Court Martial," of which Bob Morasco says so much of it is the revelation of classified material that he felt impelled to come to page-one of the New York Times with his story. Incidentally, I think you're to be commended for not calling one of the major magazines, getting yourself $50,000 and playing your role in this that way. I think you have -- no matter how you will be judged by the public, I think you will now be judged on a pedestal shorn of tinsel trappings and distractions. This is right where to do it, page-one of the New York Times.

MORASCO: I would like to pop in here for just a moment, because you just brought something to my mind. About 18 months ago there was a man who went to one of our magazines to sell photographs, photographs of My Lai. He got a great, great deal of money for those photographs. That man's materialism, his thirst for money, has put Lieutenant Calley in a position where he may have to spend the rest of his life in jail. He has also put the United States in a very difficult position.

FARBER: Well, I am sure that man, if he were here, would say, "I have reached the world with pictures, with documented evidence of the atrocity." Instead of embarrassing the Army or subjecting Lieutenant Calley to what he is going through, I am sure his moral emphasis would be where mine is, you know, why have atrocities like this in the first place.

MORASCO: Then why didn't he ... to the front page of the New York Times? Why did he sell ...

MAN: Precisely.

MORASCO: ... them for dollars?

FARBER: Precisely. Precisely. That's how we got into this. I was commending you for taking that latter route.

ROTHBLATT: Barry, let me suggest this. That man took those pictures in the course of his official duties as a photographer, as part of that company operating in My Lai. Those pictures should have been turned over to the intelligence officers and to the information officers of that brigade. His failure to turn over those pictures has embarrassed our country and our government, because, had those pictures been promptly turned over to the information officers and to the intelligence officers, this matter would have been referred in the regular course -- exposed in the regular course of military channels, and there would have been no My Lai case nor My Lai incident. It would have been dealt with in an official way and it wouldn't have had this terrible surreptitious effect of somebody covering up. The Army couldn't be in a position to cover up. There would have been no concealing by anybody because too many people would have known. Instead, if anybody should be indicted for causing this country difficulty, it should be that man who, while doing presumably his job for his country, took money and embarrassed our country at the same time.

FARBER: Bob Morasco, when you said you feared for the direction of this country, what, specifically, did you mean?

MORASCO: When I see that we can go into a war, a defensive war, not an offensive war as we remember in World War II or in Korea -- and in Korea occasionally we were in defensive situations, but to send troops into a war and leave them there for ten years, ten years on a defensive, holding action, a war of attrition, where you just hope that you will kill more of them than they will kill of you and then they will quit, I don't like that direction.

YYou send these men over there to a very difficult situation, and then you bring them home and 18 months later send them to jail.

FARBER: This is not the end, only the clock forces me into temporary submission. This is not even the beginning of the beginning. This is step-one in the painful and vital investigation for all Americans.

My partners for the expedition, former Captain Robert F. Morasco, now Mr. Morasco, one of the Green Berets in the famous Green Beret case, accused of eliminating a double, triple, quadruple agent. Henry Rothblatt went over to Vietnam to mount the defense. Robin Moore, who wrote "The Green Berets," joined Henry in writing a book, called "Court Martial." Now comes Robert F. Morasco and says the story is true, "I am the man who eliminated the agent in question under CIA orders." Bob Morasco doesn't want to be called a trigger-man. I'm going to call him a trigger-man pulling the trigger on a new burst of conscience which will certainly possess the United States for many years to come.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
EXAMINER
E - 204,749
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S - 640,004
MAR 1 1971

B of A Denies Any Ties With the CIA

By Lindsay Arthur

LOUIS B. LUNDBORG
Answers critics

Customers and stockholders today have the assurances of A.W. Clausen, president, and Louis B. Lundborg, chairman, that Bank of America has no ties with the Central Intelligence Agency.

They have assurances, also, that the largest bank would not engage deliberately in black marketing of foreign currencies.

These two points mirror the fact that discussion ranged far beyond the agenda at an annual meeting yesterday of the bank's parent BankAmerica Corp. in Masonic Memorial Auditorium.

The questions came from young men opposed to U.S. involvement in Indochina and critical of some foreign financing.

One of the critics, Ray Henderson of Los Angeles, wanted to know if the bank was aware that the Asian Foundation supports the CIA.

Promote Trade

Lundborg said the bank works with the Asian Foundation in promoting trade and understanding. Clausen added:

"The bank makes development investments all over the world. It has no association with the CIA."

The issue of black marketing was raised in discussion about a European bank in which Bank of America owns an interest that is going business in the Congo.

Clausen said the case is in the courts. He observed:

"Bank of America does not engage in black marketing deliberately."

Others among the young critics questioned whether the bank is profiting from financing shipments to Indochina.

Clausen insisted the decision as to disengagement there is one for the government, not the bank. This issue was raised by Edward Scanlon and James Lowery, also of Los Angeles. They represented the Center for New Corporate Priorities.

Then there was the probem of minority employment and advancement.

Supports Blacks

Carlton B. Goodlett, black physician-publisher, failed in an effort to have Assemblyman Willie L. Brown and Miss Aileen Hernandez, both black, elected BankAmerica directors. Miss Hernandez is president of the National Organization for Women. There were 568 shares voted for Brown and 661 for Miss Hernandez.

Clausen said the bank's minority employment has doubled to 7900 in six years. He added: "Bank of America with its heart believes that it is wrong to discriminate. We are not perfect, but we are striving."

During the two hour and 10 minute session, attended by more than 800 persons, the stockholders elected management's slate of 17 directors and retained Ernst and Ernst as independent auditors.

An effort to provide for cumulative voting failed. Cumulative voting permits a stockholder to vote all of his shares for one, two or more board candidates instead of an entire slate.

Right Vote

Philip Adams, San Francisco attorney, offered the cumulative voting proposal on behalf of Lewis D. and John J. Gilbert, New York management critics.

Adams said the stockholders lost this right two years ago when the bank formed the holding company, BankAmerica Corp.

Replying for management, Samuel B. Stewart Jr., vice chairman, said the right was not used when available.

"The board of directors should be an integral part of the management team," Stewart said, "A director who could not be trusted might leak important information."

Following adjournment, Walter E. Hoadley, the bank's executive vice president and chief economist, engaged the young critics in a "rap" session.

[redacted]

NEWSWEEK

1 MAR 1971

INVESTIGATIONS:

Oswald and the U-2

Among the countless questions left unanswered in 1964 when the Warren commission wound up its ten-month investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy was one that piqued scholars and assassination buffs alike: did Lee Harvey Oswald, when he defected to the Soviet Union, deliver any secrets about America's U-2 spy plane?

In its massive Report and Hearings, comprising nearly 10.7 million words, the commission dismissed, on good evidence, the notion that Oswald was ever a Soviet agent. If the Russians had recruited him as a spy, the reasoning ran, they would have advised him to stay in the Marine Corps, where he had some access to military secrets. If they had hired him as a killer, they wouldn't have sent him to Texas with no money and a Russian wife.

But the question remained—did Oswald, when he got to Moscow on a tourist visa in October 1959, *volunteer* any information that helped the Russians shoot down Gary Powers's U-2 plane over Sverdlovsk six months later? The possibility seemed farfetched, but the commission, in its hearings, brought out two provocative facts. (1) Oswald, in 1957-58, served as a radar operator at two bases from which U-2 planes operated—Atsugi, Japan, and Cubi Point, near Manila, and (2) when he first visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow he intimated he knew "something of special interest" that he planned to tell the Russians.

One paper among the 1,555 numbered documents in the Warren commission files was obviously addressed to that question. Commission Document No. 931, a memorandum from CIA director Richard Helms to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, was indexed "Lee Harvey Oswald's access to classified information about the U-2." But the memo itself was labeled "secret" and locked in the vault-like "Classified Records Area" of the National Archives, along with 389 other reports that the commission never made public.

Scratched: Last week, more than six years after the Warren commission was disbanded, the Helms-to-Hoover memo finally surfaced as the National Archives, after a year-long review with the CIA, FBI and other agencies, quietly scratched the "secret" and "confidential" labels from 85 commission documents. The newly declassified material, examined by NEWSWEEK's Charles Roberts, shed little light on the assassination but did provide an answer of sorts to the U-2 riddle.

In his memo to Hoover, dated May 13, 1964, Helms tartly dismissed a letter from the FBI director suggesting that Oswald may have compromised the CIA's spy plane. His rejection of Hoover's inquiry, however, was based almost entirely on his assertion that U-2s operated at Atsugi and Cubi Point from hangar areas that were inaccessible to Oswald. Conceding that "there were rumors and gossip" about the U-2s and that Oswald "could have heard such gossip," Helms maintained "there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe" that Oswald obtained "factual knowledge" of the U-2 or its mission.

Obviously annoyed at his rival intelligence chief, Helms pointed out that his agency's U-2 "did not gain worldwide notoriety" until the ill-fated Powers mission. "Therefore," he wrote, "it is highly unlikely that the term 'U-2' would have meant anything to Oswald, even if he [illegible] tify the term with any aircraft at Cubi Point, Atsugi or anywhere else."



Oswald and wife in Russia: No secrets

Helms's contention that Oswald was "unlikely" to understand the implications of the U-2 is itself unlikely to satisfy critics of the Warren commission. Neither will new tidbits of information in the other declassified papers. One long-anticipated "secret" CIA report on "Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnaping" is little more than a rehash of known murders and abductions by the Russian security police in the 1950s, with a conclusion by one ex-KGB agent that it was "highly unlikely" Moscow would order the liquidation of a U.S. President.

Grisly Reminders: Along with transcripts of four of the commission's eleven meetings, some 300 documents remain classified—kept in a room behind a combination lock that only three archivists are permitted to open. One, a CIA report, bears the intriguing title "Soviet Brainwashing Techniques." Another is a report on the FBI's interrogation of Yuri Nosenko, a KGB agent who defected to the U.S. ten weeks after the assassination. Also on the green metal shelves are such grisly reminders of Dallas as President Kennedy's bullet-pierced jacket, Oswald's rifle, the autopsy pictures, the bullet that fell from John Connally's stretcher and even the movie camera with which dress manufacturer Abraham Zapruder filmed the assassination.

Barring a court order—three suits are now pending against the government under the Freedom of Information Act—the archives will not conduct another "declassification review" until 1975. Officials who have seen the still-sequestered documents scoff at the idea they would incriminate anyone other than Oswald. "But as long as there is one piece of [illegible]," one archivist observed, "there will be somebody insisting that it holds the key to the assassination."

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

Dead Souls

Khrushchev Remembers
translated and edited by
Strobe Talbott, with an Introduction,
Commentary, and Notes by
Edward Crankshaw.
Little, Brown, 618 pp., $10.00

George F. Kennan

The temptation to resort to deliberate obfuscation as a means of promoting one's political fortunes has been present everywhere and in all times, but nowhere has its appeal been greater than in the murky and dangerous mists of Russian internal political intrigue. The annals of Russian political life are replete with forgeries, falsifications, and mystifications of every variety. The Soviet period is far from being an exception in this respect. If it differs from earlier periods, it does so only in this sense: that in addition to a respectable number of pure forgeries (the "Litvinov Diaries," the various Bessedowski products, etc.) it supports a very considerable number of productions that are mixtures of truth and fiction. The "Sisson Documents," published (and vouched for as authentic) by the United States government in 1918 to prove that the Bolsheviki were German agents, had their origins mostly in the fertile imaginations of Ferdinand Ossendowsky and one journalistic associate; but they did incorporate some genuine material lifted from the files, or tapped from the telegraphic wires, of the Provisional Government.

The "Zinoviev Letter," which caused the fall of Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government in 1924, appears to have been concocted by a Russian forgery center in Berlin; but it made use of certain genuine Comintern documents and in some respects followed *them quite* closely. And as for the so-called "Eremin Document" on which is based a portion (by no means all) of the suspicion of Stalin's services to the Tsarist police in the period from 1900 to 1912, this writer was recently obliged to observe, in a lecture on this subject, that the marks of genuineness in the document were too strong to permit us to view it as entirely fraudulent, and the marks of fraudulence too strong to permit us to view it as wholly genuine. These circumstances are not cited to suggest that one should reason here by analogy; it is simply that this [illegible] might usefully be held in mind as one proceeds to the examination of what is surely one of the oddest and most interesting documents-with-a-pretension-to-authenticity to come out of Russia for many a day.

The volume entitled *Khrushchev Remembers* consists of some fifty fragments of reminiscent and sometimes reflective prose purporting to have emanated in some way from the lips or pen of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. Some of these embrace the recollections of early youth. The main body of them treats of the internal events of the Stalin and immediate post-Stalin periods. The last of them, eleven all told, have to do primarily with problems of Soviet foreign relations and are drawn mostly from the period of Khrushchev's pre-eminence in the Soviet regime. We have no means of knowing how complete this body of material is: whether what is published here is all or only a portion of what is available, or to what sorts of editing the material has been subjected.

Were one to be asked to name the outstanding characteristics of these ostensible reminiscences, one would have to mention, in addition to a certain anecdotal luridness, such things as factual inaccuracy (including occasional internal inconsistencies), a marked vagueness of detail, and an extraordinary degree of political oversimplification and even banality; to which one would have to add that the material does nevertheless contain a number of assertions and suggestions (though far fewer than one might have expected in a document of some 500 pages) which fall into the category of "historically interesting if true."

The inaccuracies occur with monotonous regularity. They need not be extensively recounted. Stalin's banishment to the Vologda province was not, for example, his "first exile"—at least not according to the official biography (which his successors have not seen fit to revise). Lenin did not say that Trotsky had never been a Marxist. Khrushchev was not made a candidate member of the Politburo "at the very next plenum" of the Central Committee after his appointment as First Secretary of the Moscow party organization in 1935. FDR did not refuse, either at Teheran or anywhere else, to drink a toast to the King of England. Svetlana [illegible] party as the one here described; nor did she appear at her father's deathbed only after his death.

The list could go on for pages. The tricks of an old man's memory? Perhaps—though in some instances implausibly so. One is inclined rather to the conclusion that whoever wrote these passages had no access to historical documents or was not interested in using it.

The vagueness of chronology is so pervasive as to appear almost studied. Anecdotes are regularly introduced with such phrases as "one day," "one time," "in the winter," "in 1938," etc. Sometimes there is no indication at all of the time when they took place.

Even more striking, and surely not accidental, is the vagueness on significant points of fact. Poskrebyshev, it may be recalled, was for many years Stalin's *éminence grise:* head of his personal secretariat and presumably at the center of the whole vast network of purges and intrigues. According to this present account, he fell out of favor with his master in the late summer of 1952. Stalin, the author says, then "appointed someone else" to his position.

Are we really to believe that Khrushchev, himself a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and deeply involved in the weird Kremlin politics of those final months of Stalin's life, did not know who this "someone" was, or had no theories about it sixteen years later? Not only his life but his political career might well have depended, perhaps did depend, on the identity of this person.

And why do we have to be told that the Presidium of the Central Committee, as constituted in the immediate aftermath of Stalin's death, numbered "about eleven people"? The author knew very well, as other pages make clear, how many people it contained.

Equally striking, and even more curious, is the political primitiveness of the anecdotes recounted. One has to pinch oneself, as one moves through these pages, to remember that the person talking is supposed to be a man of great political experience, once the leader of the Soviet Communist Party and the architect of Soviet foreign policy, and not an illiterate political child, wandering helplessly through the forests of Kremlin intrigue and high

[redacted]

continued

international politics. Problems of decision which we know to have been ones of great complexity make their appearance here with the greatest casualness and are disposed of in a phrase. There is no examination of issues, no mention of ideological implications, no hint of the actual complexity.

Khrushchev, for example, learns from a casual remark of Stalin that Warsaw has been liberated; and Stalin goes on to enlighten him further by telling him that "the Poles say" that the city has been quite destroyed. Interesting news, was it not?—just as though the Soviet forces had never sat on the opposite side of the river and watched the destruction of the city, just as though Khrushchev was not at that time dictator of the Ukraine and involved in the most intimate way with the process of the "liberation" of Poland. Or was it intended that we should conclude—or, more importantly, that the Poles should conclude—that Khrushchev was wholly uninvolved with the decisions of Soviet policy relating to the Warsaw Uprising?

To see how these various characteristics affect the plausibility and historical validity of the material let us just glance, by way of illustration, at the treatment of a single episode: the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939. In doing so, let us bear in mind that Khrushchev was at that time not only a member of the Politburo but a man who, by virtue of his official responsibilities on the Ukraine, had an intimate interest in the territorial changes effected by the secret Protocol to the Pact (a protocol which, incidentally, is never mentioned in this book). Here is the tale.

Khrushchev (presumably happening to be in Moscow at the time—his normal seat of activity was of course in the Ukraine) was at Stalin's *dacha* "on a Saturday." Stalin "dumfounded" him by informing him that Ribbentrop was flying in the next day; Hitler, it seemed, had asked Stalin to receive him; Stalin had agreed to do so. Khrushchev observed that he and Malenkov had planned to go hunting the next day. Stalin said that was all right: he and Molotov would hear what Ribbentrop had to say; he would tell them of the outcome when they came back. Khrushchev and Malenkov then proceeded to Voroshilov's *dacha*. They found Voroshilov already there; and this showed, observes the author, apropos of nothing at all, that Voroshilov "couldn't have been with Stalin and Molotov for the meeting with Ribbentrop."

The two men stayed at the Voroshilov *dacha*, one gathers, until the next evening; they returned to the Kremlin, in any event, on a Sunday ("that Sunday in August, 1939"), and they could hardly have been gone a full week. They brought their slaughtered ducks with them; and while the ducks were being prepared for dinner, Stalin told them that Ribbentrop had brought with him the draft of a non-aggression treaty "which we had signed." It was, you see, as simple as that.

What is one to make of this nonsense? Almost nothing in it checks with any known fact. Ribbentrop did not bring the draft of a non-aggression treaty. The suggestion for such a treaty had come from the Soviet side in the course of the complex preliminary negotiations, which are here nowhere mentioned, and it was the Russians who produced the draft. Ribbentrop arrived on a Wednesday, not a Sunday, and if Stalin told Khrushchev about it on the day before, this was then a Tuesday, not a Saturday. But then Stalin had no need to tell Khrushchev about it; for the fact of Ribbentrop's impending arrival had all been in the papers that morning. Nor would Khrushchev have likely learned from Stalin's lips of the fact that the pact had been signed. The news was released to the world almost immediately after the signing, in the early hours of the 24th, before the signers and their aides had fairly finished their champagne and gone to bed; and the *Pravda*, with the front-page story of it, was already available at the newsstands when the Ribbentrop party went off to the airport in the morning.

Is there no clue at all as to how and why such a story should have been concocted? Only a very small one. Voroshilov, although the book makes no mention of it, was head of the Soviet delegation which had been, and was at that time, negotiating with the unfortunate French and British delegations sent to Moscow to discuss the possibility of joint military resistance to any further aggressive moves by Hitler. He had seen his French and British opposite numbers on the 22nd. Thereafter, they had been unable to get into touch with him until the evening of the 24th—after Ribbentrop's departure.

[illegible] involved in the question as to whether he had, behind their backs, taken part in the negotiations with the Germans. According to the British official documents, he was at pains to explain to them, when he saw them for the last time, on the 25th, that he had been unavailable the previous day because he had been "duck-shooting." This, in the circumstances (World War II was now only one week off, and the Soviet government was well aware of the fact), was a flimsy and almost insulting diplomatic evasion. But the author of *Khrushchev Remembers* seems concerned to support it.

Would one be reaching too far if one were to see in these passages a very clumsy and ill-informed attempt to persuade others (again, the Poles, perhaps?) that Khrushchev had nothing to do with the negotiation of the Non-Aggression Pact, but to do so in such a way as not to offend against the official Soviet line on the episode in question?

So much for the historical value of these "memoirs." Now a word about their provenance.

The publisher informs us that the materials came into his hands "from various sources at various times and in various circumstances." Since it is unlikely that it was Nikita Khrushchev in person who brought them out, this suggests the intervention of at least one, and possibly several, intermediaries, on whose word the attribution to Khrushchev must be presumed to rest. The publisher, evidently prepared to credit these assurances, professes himself satisfied that the material represents "an authentic record of Khrushchev's words." Since we, however, are not reliably informed as to the identity of the intermediary or intermediaries, and since the history of previous undertakings of this nature does not suggest that such people are invariably to be trusted, we may perhaps be excused if we take an independent look at the available evidence. It could be summarized roughly as follows:

1) Although much of this account could conceivably have been constructed by a third party from material already published (the "Secret Speech," Djilas's writings, Svetlana's *Twenty Letters*, etc.), most of it bears a clear relation to things Khrushchev is known or reputed to have said; some of it has the ring of his own language; and there are repeated references to things which, if true, only someone in the inner circles would have been [illegible] sense much of the account may be said to have in some way originated [redacted]

2) It is, however, most unlikely that the material was edi[illegible] publication by Khrushchev himself. It is entirely possible, even probable, that he never saw it at all in the form in which we see it here, and would not have wished it to appear in this form and in this manner had he seen it. The publisher, in what is surely a rather odd confession for one in his trade to make, admits that it is a matter of speculation whether Khrushchev "intended or expected his words ever to find their way into print, whether in his own country or in the West." The conspicuous gaps in subject matter (there is almost nothing, for example, about internal Soviet political events from the period of Khrushchev's ascendancy, and nothing about the visit to the United States, of which he was once so proud) are not ones likely to have reflected his own wishes.

But beyond this, the very appearance in the bourgeois press of the West of this sort of material—sensational, unideological, highly personal, not even politically serious—could not possibly have been creditable in Soviet eyes to the reputation of a Soviet elder statesman, and particularly one who had once stood at the very summit of Soviet political life. It is clear that this book, rooted as it may be in many of Khrushchev's own utterances and in some instances defending or rationalizing his record as a political leader, was not designed primarily to reflect favorably on him as an individual or to enhance materially his historical image or whatever political fortunes might still conceivably remain open to him.

3) The book does seem designed, on the other hand, to reassert, and to bespeak the favor of the reader for, certain political ideas and concepts with which Khrushchev's name has been prominently connected, and particularly ones in conflict with observable policies and tendencies of the Brezhnev regime, as these appeared at the time when the book was being prepared (primarily late 1967 and early 1968, with one or two items of much later origin—down to the winter of 1970).

The renewed emphasis on anti-Stalinism could be related to the fears of that time (they are still active today) that Brezhnev was developing his own "cult of personality." The arguments in favor of greater freedom of travel, of a more conciliatory line on the cultivation of nuclear armaments, of a more respectful study of Yugoslav models: all these clearly reflect opposition vie[illegible] important echelons of influential Soviet opinion over recent years. The posies thrown to certain satellite leaders (especially Gomulka and Svoboda) and to Tito, while cast in terms of the political views and actions of Khrushchev, are clearly designed to enlist the support of Eastern European leaders for those ideas and tendencies of Russian political life which the book reflects.

It is true, of course, that no direct result could be expected, so far as Soviet politics are concerned, from peddling this material to the readers of *Life* magazine. But the material stood no chance at all of publication in Russia; and the experience of what occurred with Svetlana's books may well have suggested that anything published in this manner would not fail to find its way back to at least certain portions of the Soviet public. On the other hand, it is also not impossible that the appearance of the book in the West will lend itself to exploitation in Russia precisely for the purpose of discrediting, along with the person of Khrushchev, the concepts with which his name has been associated; one cannot even exclude the possibility that the operation was encouraged in certain quarters with just this in mind. The fact that these two hypotheses are in contradiction does not imply, on Russian standards, that both might not have some elements of validity.

One is left, then, only with the strong impression that certain persons interested in ideas often attributed to Khrushchev have taken advantage of his age and infirmity and helpless situation to prepare for publication in the form we know, and to smuggle out to the West in the manner we know, this body of material based on things he is known to have said, or has been heard to say, or (it is not at all impossible) has been taped—with or without his knowledge—as saying. These could have included members of his family, or members of the police detachment charged with guarding and observing him, or superiors of the latter, or all of these together.

It is most unlikely that the operation could have been successfully conducted without some measure of assistance and protection in higher quarters. Since what was done here was not only formally illegal but also politically offensive and wholly unacceptable on traditional standards of the Soviet Communist Party, a heavy degree of personal responsibility has surely been incurred somewhere along the line. And while little of this may become apparent to the Western public, it is [illegible]t just this time, with another party congress in the immediate offing—that the last has been heard of this matter in the inner councils of the regime.

However that may be, the Western reader would be ill-advised to accept this book as the authentic political autobiography of Nikita Khrushchev as he would have wished it to appear. He is a man who has, indeed, a momentous career behind him which he would normally be concerned, at this stage of his life, to explain and to justify. But the constituency before which he would wish to appear with these explanations and justifications would assuredly not be the despised readers of a bourgeois "boulevard" magazine 5,000 miles away; it would be the membership of the world Communist movement, and particularly the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the bosom of which the entirety of his personal and political life has proceeded; and the tone of the book would then reflect the character and expectations of that audience. The work may include a great many things that Khrushchev does indeed remember. It is a far cry from that unsurprising fact to the authentic memoirs on which he would himself wish his record as a statesman to rest and which, we must hope, he will yet find the energies, and the possibility, to compose. ☐

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

CAPITOL STUFF

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Feb. 15—When an American aircraft through error of some sort dumped bombs on friendly forces at the Long Chang base in Laos with resultant casualties and materiel damage, the explosion also blew off a little more cover from the supposedly secret CIA war in the jungle-covered mountains.

News dispatches from Vientiane, the Laotian capital, described Long Cheng variously as "American headquarters" in Northern Laos or as the operating base for assorted undercover activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Blowing Cover Off What Isn't Such a Secret

In view of the stepped-up fighting in the Long Cheng area and the celebrated Plain of Jars, and the domestic flap which has brought repeated White House denials that American ground combat troops are involved in the South Vietnamese invasion along Highway 9, this is as good a time as any for a little further clarification.

CIA Director Richard Helms and his "spooks" in the field have got considerable attention for their operations in Laos in the last four or five years, but they have not been running any little private war of their own. Nor has the Laos war been much of a secret to anybody.

There are about 100 CIA agents in all of Laos. They include men who are experts in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage, in counter-insurgency operations, in surveillance and in military training. They are under the direct control of the American ambassador in Vientiane, and follow orders which are approved by the National Security Council in Washington.

Richard Helms
Not running a private war

Back in the 1961-62 period, the CIA, as well as the Army's Special Forces — the Green Berets — were active in Laos, engaged in surveillance and training operations in support of the royal government. Then, after the Geneva agreement in 1962 creating the troika "neutral" government in Laos, the Americans pulled out.

Some of the spooks may have remained behind. We wouldn't know. But they would have been very difficult to hide in the Laotian population, for the Americans have different colored faces and they are, as a rule, a foot or more taller than the Laotian people.

But a year later, when it was obvious that the North Vietnamese neither had pulled out nor had any intention of pulling out their thousands of regular troops, and fighting was continuing, Vientiane again asked American help. The CIA returned, in small numbers.

While other agencies of the U. S. government are charged with monitoring foreign broadcasts and code-breaking, and while these electronic intelligence duties, of enormous extent and cost, are on a global basis, the CIA does handle local, specific radio interception jobs. Such work would be done in Laos, within easy radio listening range of Hanoi and the North Vietnamese armed forces in the south.

They Made Arrangements With the Hill Men

Over the years, the CIA has established an excellent rapport with the Meo tribesmen, the poor hill farmers who didn't get along very well anyhow with the flatlanders in the cities and around the royal throne.

There were, and are, little pockets of the Meo people scattered all over the mountains; the CIA fed them rice, and supplied them with weapons and training. The spooks used the famed Air America flying company which, contrary to widespread belief, is not a CIA unit but a commercial company, doing business under contract. The American Embassy uses Air America, and so does AID, also by contract.

The Meo proved to be excellent fighters; they didn't like the North Vietnamese nor their Pathet Lao (Laos Communist) associates, and the tribesmen were adept at harassment and interdiction.

Somewhere along the line, the CIA ran into Vang Pao, a tribal chief who was a leader of remarkable ability, who rallied the hill people around his banner and with a relatively moderate flow of American supplies turned his men into a tough little army. Vang Pao, a patriot, got to be so good at his fighting job that the Loatian government finally commissioned him a general and made him the commander of the region around the Plain of Jars.

Long Cheng was selected by Vang Pao as his major base several years ago, and he had CIA communications experts and advisers at hand. But about a year ago, he decided to decentralize. He separated his troops and scattered them around a number of smaller bases; Long Cheng lost its pre-eminence.

He's Got Only a Few Thousand Men

Vang Pao's immediate army consists of about 3,000 to 3,600 men; he doubtless could muster several thousand more in a pinch.

The Meo Tribesmen have raised a lot of hell with the North Vietnamese over the last couple of years in purely guerrilla operations. In the dry season, the North Vietnamese push forward with the Meos snapping at their flanks; when the rains come the Hanoi invaders pull back. Some of the towns and villages have changed hands fairly frequently.

Now, the North Vietnamese have a fresh division in the Plain of Jars area and it would appear that a battle of some consequence is in the making.

All these matters have been fairly open knowledge and the full details are known to four subcommittees of Congress, the Budget Bureau and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as well as the National Security Council. It's a skimpily concealed secret.

The Bolivian Guerrilla

The Diary of Che Guevara
edited by Robert Scheer.
Bantam, 192 pp., $1.45 (paper)

Bolivia a la hora del Che
by Rubén Vázquez Díaz.
Siglo Veintuno: Mexico, 1968.

The Great Rebel: Che Guevara in Bolivia
by Luis J. González and
Gustavo A. Sánchez Salazar,
translated by Helen R. Lane.
Grove, 254 pp., $7.95; $1.45 (paper)

The Complete Bolivian Diaries of
Ché Guevara and Other Captured
Documents
edited by Daniel James.
Stein & Day, 330 pp., $6.95

Ñacahuasu, La Guerrilla del Che
en Bolivia
by José Luis Alcázar.
Era: Mexico, 1969.

Bolivia bajo el Che
by Philippe Labreveux.
Replanteo: Buenos Aires, 1968.

The Death of a Revolutionary;
Che Guevara's Last Mission
by Richard Harris.
Norton, 219 pp., $5.95

John Womack, Jr.

The campaign "El Che" Guevara commanded in Bolivia in 1966-67 was a heroic project. It was only in part Fidelista, to reverse the long series of guerrillero defeats in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Argentina, and thereby reassert the validity of Fidelista strategy in Latin America (and Fidel's independence from the Soviet Union). It was in its ambition characteristically Guevarista, conceived not from a Latin American's concern for his own continent but, after the massive US intervention in Indochina, from a Latin American's concern to share "the fate of the "victim of aggression" on all continents, to accompany the most tormented "to his death or to victory." The aim, as Guevara expressed it to the Tricontinental Conference, was "to create a second or a third Vietnam. . . "

The stakes were immense, as much larger than another Fidelista revolution as the provocation of US intervention in Latin America was beyond regular Fidelista strategy. To fight guerrillas in Latin America as well as in Indochina, the United States would have to institute a dictatorship at home, which would eventually collapse, and to disperse its armed forces abroad, which would eventually disintegrate. With the center of international capitalism in ruins, "new men" of comradely spirit could then build socialism in peace. The risks were also immense, culminating in the chance that the United States, in desperation, would resort to nuclear weapons. But they were the risks that Guevara welcomed as the moments of truth, and that he could move his comrades to accept.

> If we—those of us who on a small part of the world map fulfill our duty and place at the disposal of this struggle whatever little we are able to give, our lives, our sacrifice—must someday breathe our last breath in any land not our own yet already ours, sprinkled with our blood, let it be known that we have measured the scope of our actions. . . .

Bolivia was Guevara's best prospect in Latin America. In comparison with other countries it did not present the disadvantage of Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina, where Fidelistas had already suffered defeats; or that of Ecuador and Paraguay, too vulnerable to repression; or that of Chile, too stable; or that of Uruguay, too urban; or that of Brazil, the prize, but no place for Spanish-speaking guerrilleros to operate.

On its own terms Bolivia was in poor political condition, ripe for subversion. After a popular revolution in 1952 Bolivians had gone through major reforms, which many of them came to cherish as their dearest rights—universal suffrage, nationalization of mines (the country's main industry), dissolution of large estates and distribution of land to peasants, militia of organized workers and peasants, national confederations of industrial and rural unions (under Trotskyist and Communist direction), participation of workers in the management of mines. Altogether this had been Bolivia's "National Revolution." But in the early 1960s the party that had enacted the reforms, the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), had broken into factions, and in 1964 had fallen from office under a military coup. The new junta had preserved some reforms, like universal suffrage and the peasants' titles to their plots of land. But the United States, on which Bolivia depended heavily for grants and loans, had insisted on cuts in "social justice" for the sake of "economic development." And the junta had duly purged the unions, dismissed workers from management, frozen wages, ordered big layoffs, massacred striking miners, opened previously public agencies to private investment, and loudly invited American capitalists into the country. In mid-1966 it had its chief, General René Barrientos, elected to the presidency.

Barrientos could count for domestic support only on the army, a couple of petty parties that could not otherwise enjoy office, and a few pet peasant unions. He had in opposition all other political factions, which were badly divided along ideological, tactical, and personal lines, but which were still organized, well armed, used to the concepts of socialism and anti-imperialism, and sorely intent on regaining power. To win, the guerrilleros did not need to mount a peasant rebellion or sustain a lengthy guerrilla, neither of which has ever been an effective procedure in Bolivian politics, but only to wreck the army's reputation in some ambushes, which would bring down the government and allow friendly leftists to take national office.

Moreover, if the guerrilleros won in Bolivia, they had superb prospects for subversion elsewhere. Landlocked into the continent, Bolivia had around its borders five countries that together comprised over half the Latin American population. To the southwest the guerrilleros would let Chile be—the Christian Democratic government there would be strong and sympathetic to them anyway, because they would weaken Bolivia as a national state. To the northwest, however, the guerrilleros could certainly infiltrate armed

continued

units and supplies into Peru—through the jungles of Pando [illegible] into the Peruvian Andes, there to revive the revolts that had exploded and failed from 1962 to 1965. To the east they could also certainly infiltrate armed units and supplies into Brazil—through the forests along the frontier, thence into the mountains of Matto Grosso, where Brazilian exiles wanted to start a revolt. And to the southeast and south they could certainly infiltrate armed units and supplies into Guevara's native Argentina—indirectly through Paraguay, where they could also try to start revolts, and directly into the mountainous Argentine provinces of Jujuy and Salta, where Fidelistas had tried and failed at revolt in 1963-64.

Once infiltrations began anywhere, a counterrevolutionary intervention would almost certainly follow—not from Peru, which Chile would hold in check on the Pacific, but from Argentina or Brazil (or both), whose armies were eager to act as Pan-American police. Once the crack forces of Argentina or Brazil (or both) were busy in Bolivia, then the governments of Argentina or Brazil (or both) would certainly suffer domestic crises that would endanger their military establishments. And once the armies of Argentina or Brazil were in danger, then the United States would very probably intervene—first with extra advisers from its Southern Command in the Canal Zone, and then with conscripted combat troops. By a progression of likelihoods there could well be "another Vietnam."

The failure of the Bolivian guerrilla is famous, and key private records of the failure are already famously public. The most revealing single record, Guevara's journal, has been out for almost three years in several editions in several languages. Its publicity is doubly secure in the Bantam edition, *The Diary of Che Guevara*, which is "the authorized text" in English and Spanish (nearly half the Spanish strangely printed in cursive), along with Fidel's "Necessary Introduction," some "exclusive" but by now familiar photos, and a glossary.

An even more revealing collection of documents has been out for two years in English, *The Complete Bolivian Diaries*, where Daniel James, in an unusually restrained style, introduces the journals of Guevara and three Cuban aides in Bolivia, "Rolando," "Pombo," and "Braulio." James's translation is inferior to the "authorized" version, but it comes with many [illegible] photos, a handy chronology of the campaign, a useful appendix on individual guerrilleros, and maps. In these diaries, accumulating in entries scribbled in private rests in the Bolivian jungle by men who were living a disaster but could not tell it, is the story of the disaster—the chief's achingly disciplined change of plans for victory into plans for hiding his troop and enduring; the troop's helpless decline from proud confidence into weary confusion; then no more entries—all an open book for the curious, a feast of material for opinions.

The guerrilleros established themselves in isolation in Bolivia. Geographically, they put their base not in a western or central province, in the cold Andean highlands or the lush valleys sinking down from them, where the rural population was densest, but in eastern Bolivia, in the dry hills of Santa Cruz province, where the population thinned out to an average of twenty-five persons over ten square miles, where there was only enough game for a few hunters at a time. "The sun rises blazing each morning on the dusty valley, baking the raw earth and the brown brambles," an American reporter later wrote of the canyon where Guevara was captured. "The teeming insect life—monstrous flies and mosquitoes, spiders and stinging beetles—swarm in the dead stillness. The heat and the dust and the bites turn the skins of humans to a cloak of misery."

Politically, the guerrilleros had no formal connection with any of the parties or organizations in the Bolivian opposition, the MNR, the Trotskyists, the regular Communists, the pro-Chinese Communists, the miners unions, or with the militant local separatists in Santa Cruz. They had only a small apparatus of urban agents in the capital, La Paz, and two or three other cities.

The isolation was deliberate, and reasonable. Out in the wilds Guevara and his Cubans could remain incognito, and train Bolivian comrades without inviting serious suspicions. (On a tip that the base they were constructing was a cocaine factory, the police came out for a bribe and then left.) When the guerrilleros were ready, they could move west into the more thickly populated provinces to stage major attacks. (In training they took lessons in Quechua, which local folk did not speak but which peasants in the highlands and valleys did.) "You couldn't [illegible] a worse place in the hemisphere to deal with guerrillas," an American officer later complained. "It's a natural place for a guerrilla training center."

Politically, by refusing to cooperate with one party in the opposition, the guerrilleros made no enemies among the others. Besides, they could not compromise themselves with parties intent on gaining national power, for the strategy of their struggle was global. And for a start they needed only a small urban apparatus.

Most important to Guevara, the very isolation of the guerrilleros would determine the quality of the Bolivians who joined them, and the political trajectory of the struggle. Recruits would not come on a lark, or out of a hunger for the glory of a stint with "El Che." Nor would they come on orders, because their party or their union sent them (later maybe to recall them). Rather, the dramatic emergence of guerrilleros fighting alone in the hills against the army would draw to their ranks only the best recruits from every party and no party, no doubt only a few men at first, but individuals of extraordinary altruism and courage, who would quickly toughen in their commitment to the cause, and attract others like them to join too. As the guerrilleros hit the army, increasing their appeal and their recruitment, the parties and unions of the opposition would have to give them support—not as allies with claims on them, but only as partners to their lead.

Once the guerrilla took root in Bolivia, Guevara would leave the sharpest and toughest Bolivian guerrillero in command, and, still incognito if possible, turn with his Cubans to the subversion of the neighboring countries.

The guerrilleros began action against the army in March, 1967, three weeks after Guevara had judged them ready for "fighting and decision." They were a respectable force of fifty well-armed men, twenty-nine Bolivians and three Peruvians learning from eighteen Cuban veterans. In the following months two young renegades from the Bolivian Communist Party, "Inti" and "Coco" Peredo, became "steadfast revolutionary and military cadres." Other Bolivians proved plain good soldiers, like "Willy," an ex-official of a pro-Chinese Communist miners union, "a short, strong, dark man," whom Guevara doubted toward the end, "who may take advantage of some skirmish to try to escape alone . . . ," but who a few days later tried to save his wounded chief in the last ambush, and

continued

was captured and executed with him. Other Bolivians proved [illegible] "...two deserters, one 'talkative' prisoner, three quitters, and two slackers.... They are dregs... They want to do no work; they want no weapons; they want to carry no loads; they feign illness, etc."

For four months the guerrilleros hurt the army in Santa Cruz. They themselves lived wretchedly and suffered damage—the arrest of urban agents, the accidental division of their force into two columns that could not reconnect, the capture of Régis Debray, several painful casualties, and the official revelation that Guevara was alive and leading the guerrilla. But ambush by ambush they pushed the government into a crisis.

In April the government appealed to the United States for help, and got radios, small arms, helicopters, and a Special Forces team to train Bolivian troops in counterinsurgency. But it could not decide where to concentrate its force, to control the miners in the west and center of the country or to chase the guerrilleros in the east.

In May the army's continuing losses in Santa Cruz became "a growing concern" to US military advisers. "The Bolivians are spread very thin," one commented. "The threat of the guerrillas throws everything out of balance." But the United States followed the advice of its ambassador in La Paz, and refrained from sending troops, bombers, or napalm. Except for CIA agents and the Special Forces instructors, the Bolivian government was on its own.

In June President Barrientos declared a national state of siege, and arrested scores of prominent politicians in the opposition. But the miners defiantly declared the mines "free territory," and announced a "defense pact" with student associations. Barrientos ordered the best units of the army to occupy the mines, which they did in another massacre. But then Bolivian bishops protested, La Paz University students declared their school a "free territory" too, and the miners went on an indefinite general strike. Even in the wilds Guevara noted "the political convulsion of the country.... Rarely do you see so clearly the possibility of the guerrilla acting as a catalyst."

In July, after the guerrilleros briefly occupied a town on the only highway between the center of the country and Santa Cruz, the government almost collapsed. The political coalition supplying Barrientos's cabinet dissolved, and the army verged on a coup, which would sap its milita[illegible] Yet through these months no new [illegible] started guerrillas in other zones. "The government is disintegrating rapidly," Guevara noted in July, "it is a shame we do not have 100 more men at this moment...."

The guerrilleros remained in isolation, while the government held together in the crisis and mounted a counteroffensive in Santa Cruz. By early August the guerrilleros had units from the Bolivian Fourth Division pressing them from the east and south in Operation Cynthia, and units from the Eighth Division containing them in the west and north in Operation Parabano. They found no refuge among the scattered local farmers, who, paid or scared by the army, often informed on them. The entries in Guevara's journal became dismal.

August 8—"...I am just a human carcass...at some moments I have lost control of myself..."

August 14—"A black day...reports about the taking of the cave...Now I am doomed to suffer asthma indefinitely. They also took all types of documents and photographs. It is the hardest blow they have given us..."

August 24—"At dusk the macheteros [hacking a path through the brush] returned with the traps, a condor and a rotten cat. Everything wound up inside us, together with the last piece of elk."

August 30—"The situation had turned anguishing; the macheteros were suffering fainting spells, Miguel and Dario were drinking their own urine, and Chino was doing likewise, with the ominous results of diarrhea and cramps."

The next day, twenty-five miles away across the brush-filled canyons, the other column waded into a stream and an army ambush, nine of its ten members dying, the other talking for all he was worth. Monthly analysis—"It was without doubt the worst month we have had so far in the war."

September 19—"Sign of the times. I have run out of ink."

September 24—"I with a liver attack, vomiting, and the men exhausted from marches that accomplish nothing...we killed a pig sold to us by the only peasant who stayed home...the rest flee at the sight of us."

September 26—"Defeat... The sound of firing all over the ridge announced that our men had fallen into an ambush... Miguel, Coco, and Julio had fallen..."

September 27—"...the most griev[illegible] Miguel and Julio were magnificent fighters, and the human value of the three is beyond all praise."

September 28—"A day of anguish, which at one moment seemed to be our last."

September 29—"Another tense day."

September 30—"Another day of tension." Monthly analysis—"It should have been a month of recuperation... but...now we have remained in a dangerous position..."

October 7—"...an old woman grazing her goats came into the canyon where we had camped, and we had to take her prisoner...At 5:30 in the afternoon Inti, Aniceto, and Pablito went to the old woman's house where she has two daughters, one crippled and the other half-dwarfed. They gave her 50 pesos, telling her not to say a word, but with little hope that she will keep her promise. The 17 of us set out under a very small moon, and the march was very tiring...At 2 a.m. we rested, for it was now useless to go on advancing."

About 10:30 the next morning the guerrilleros came under fire from the ridges above the canyon, and fired back. They did not know it, but they were at last doing battle with the Bolivian Green Berets, B Company of the Second Ranger Battalion, which had finished its Special Forces training only two weeks before and was now in its first fight. In the next few hours two of the seventeen guerrilleros were killed, and three captured, including Guevara, wounded in the leg. On October 9 in the schoolhouse of a nearby hamlet, after the local CIA agent had his inning with Guevara, the three captives were shot to death on orders from La Paz. Later, seven more guerrilleros were run down in the brush and killed. Five eventually escaped, "Inti" and another Bolivian to remain in hiding in their country, and "Pombo" and two other Cubans to Chile, and finally home to their island.

How to describe the failure? This is a chronicler's problem, not a historian's, for a history of the affair is not yet possible. For the time being it is literally a question of respecting the facts, not just having them right, but taking a tone about them that does due honor to the conviction and courage and fear that charge them. The best books on the Bolivian campaign, the most accurate, the most tightly composed, the most [illegible] Bolivian news-

continued

papermen who have known how to honor the commitment of the army and the guerrilleros.

González and Sánchez Salazar, whose *Great Rebel* is excellent, nicely sketch the Bolivian background to the campaign, scrupulously represent the guerrilleros' preparations, and then carefully report the course of the guerrilla, ending in Guevara's execution, the government's contradictory explanations, and the miraculous escape of the last Cuban survivors across the mud and snow of the Andes into Chile. They include some stunning photos, and append brief biographies and pen portraits of the guerrilleros. The translation is good. Unfortunately the one map is obscure, and there is no index.

Vásquez Díaz's *Bolivia a la hora del Che* is less about the guerrilleros than about the hell they raised in the country—the army's massacre of the miners in June, the government's tribulations in July, the views of the opposition leaders about the guerrilla in August (while it was collapsing), then the last slaughters, the trial of Régis Debray, and the hopes for another guerrilla.

Alcázar's *Nacahuasu* (the name of the canyon where the guerrilleros put their base) is a war correspondent's account of Bolivian troops staggering nervously but loyally through the brush, falling into awful ambushes, and then slowly beating the guerrilleros, who were suffering even more in their duty. Its many photos show well the thicketed and scabrous terrain of the action, the strain on the troops waiting for fire, the horror of death in the wilds, the relief and cruelty of triumph.

In the same tone a French journalist, Labreveux, has written *Bolivia bajo el Che*. It is a collection of short but commendable reports on two separately defined themes—the guerrilla and its impact on the country, and the decay of the "National Revolution" since 1964, in its agrarian reform and nationalized industries.

Two Americans have done the job differently. Richard Harris, a professor of political science, and Daniel James, a journalist "who knows his Latins," have both produced creditable studies of the Bolivian campaign, Harris's *Death of a Revolutionary* sympathetic to the guerrilleros, and James's Introduction to *The Complete Bolivian Diaries* hostile to them. Both studies derive from substantially the same material that the Bolivian and French reporters use, and both amount to substantially the same story as the others. But they differ from the others in purpose and tone. They are attempts to explain the guerrilla, which explain it away.

Harris writes as if the guerrilleros would have fared much better if only they had known what his research assistant told him. James writes as if the guerrilleros must have been fanatics or dunces to start a campaign that he now knows, because they failed, would end in failure. Though both authors have the facts right, mostly, they both betray disrespect for them in not taking the guerrilleros seriously—which is to misunderstand the integrity of the guerrilleros' commitment, and the magnitude of their failure. The same disrespect pervades scores of articles published in the last three years in American, Western European, and Latin American journals to explain how the guerrilleros could not have been serious, because they failed.

In answer to them stands a remarkable letter that a Peruvian refugee from the defeated Peruvian guerrillas of 1965 wrote to a compatriot in Paris.* The letter deserves as much publicity as it can get, to exercise the imagination and conscience of future students of defeated guerrillas.

"Open letter to M. Américo Pumaruna, Paris

"Respected master:

"I venture to write to you, in all humility, after reading your judicious essay . . . in the November issue of that bible of revolutionary thought, *Vanguardia Revolucionaria*. And my humility is no pretence, as I myself have taken part in a crazy guerrilla adventure which today I am able to deplore and reject, thanks to the light shed by your article. This forces me, in addition, to write to you under a pseudonym, as it is my misfortune to be hunted by the [secret police], and I have not had the opportunity of escaping to Europe there to carry out a serious investigation into the revolutionary situation in our country.

"And, in all humility, in the face of the expertise that is yours, I shall proceed with my analysis of the events that have taken place in Peru and that have, to such little purpose, claimed the lives of sub-lieutenant Vallejo, the amiable Mayta, the poet Javier Heraud, Luis de la Puente, Guillermo Lobatón,



Máximo Velando, Raúl Escobar—the latter's death doubly purposeless, as I believe he had left Paris to take part in the guerrilla struggles—Rubén Tupayachi, well . . . one could go on forever. Now you have made me realize that all of them were lacking in theoretical training or ideological understanding, having failed to learn the lessons of Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, etc., and that they threw themselves into a suicidal struggle against the oligarchy and imperialism without consulting you. This is a mistake that I, at any rate, will never in any circumstances repeat.

". . . there are also those young ELN puppies at Puerto Maldonado who will benefit from your advice. . . These ignoramuses were bound to get what was coming to them for failing to consider the consequences of such an absurd action, and to make a thorough-going theoretical preliminary survey. . . . That's the stuff to give these improvisers, who had the temerity to carry on a peasant war without consulting you, you and your well-known gifts. You could at least have told them which elementary handbooks to look up before launching themselves into such lunatic adventures.

"But that is not all. With the authority that your extraordinary revolutionary work . . . in the years 1963-65 [has] given you, you put the entire national left in its place when you say that . . . 'the only position that reflected an extensive and profound study of the rebel organization and the conditions in which it would have to develop was the one adopted by *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* in *VR* No. 4.'

"And here I have one regret. Unfortunately, I was in the mountains with these ignorant revolutionaries and was unable to read it . . . and I did not

---

*The full text of the letter (translated) is in Luis Mercier Vega, *Guerrillas in Latin America, The Technique of the Counter-State* (Praeger: London, 1969), pp. 53-56.

continued

return home! There is another thing: no doubt it was because of the great efforts that went into this historic publication that you and your friends forgot to inform Héctor Béjar and the young people of the ELN that instead of taking to the mountains in order to help the MIR rebellion, they would have done better to have started analyzing, reflecting, diagnosing, prophesying, observing, commenting, etc. . . .

"I should like to continue by drawing attention to the gems in which your magisterial study abounds, but I do not wish to over-extend this piece. You may rest assured, dear master, that I have learned the lesson well: no more guerrilla warfare without a full-scale preliminary grounding in Marxist-Leninist theory, which will take years to acquire, even at the risk of seeing the revolution postponed indefinitely—no matter; never again to ignore the lessons of China, Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.; no further action without consulting you . . .

"I have forgotten one other thing. Stay in Paris, or in Rome, analyzing the mistakes of those who venture to carry on a guerrilla struggle. Imagine our misfortune if, in addition to suffering defeats, to dying in battle like those madmen of the MIR and ELN and of so many other groups that have not yet learned their lesson, we would have to bear the loss of someone like you, with your ability to write critical epitaphs on the guerrillas . . ."

After the failure of Guevara's campaign, it did become practically suicidal to start another guerrilla in Bolivia—and elsewhere in Latin America. Revolutionary operations in the cities, fashionably (and inanely) styled as "urban guerrillas," have recently had successes, above all in Bolivia. But the classic guerrilla, the "little war" out in the country, is now an act of desperation everywhere in Latin America. Even so, some have gone on trying it. They have done what a Latin American does when he wants to burn himself alive, to protest offenses that he cannot stand.

In July, 1968, "Inti" Peredo published a manifesto in Bolivia that he would reorganize the guerrilla. "The struggle of our Vietnamese brothers is the struggle of all the revolutionaries of the world," he declared. "They are fighting for us, and we must fight for them." On September 5, 1969, he published another manifesto that the new guerrilleros were ready for action. Four days later one hundred soldiers and police surrounded him in a house in downtown La Paz, and shot him to death.

Last July some university students tried to start a guerrilla in the bleak mountains north of La Paz, but they were not physically up to it. One starved to death. His comrades, too weak to dig him a grave, carried his corpse with them for days. Others sought refuge in the mine fields, where the miners, who did not approve of their strategy, sheltered them anyway for "humanitarian reasons." In early October the student leaders were captured. One was another Peredo brother, "Chato."

A new military government, trying to keep up a leftist front this time, let the leaders go into exile in Chile and offered amnesty to the students still in the mountains. ☐

NEW YORK TIMES
FEB 1971

The Problem of MIRV: I

By HERBERT SCOVILLE

WASHINGTON—In developing national security policy it is always necessary to estimate the capabilities and intentions of potential hostile nations and then evaluate the risks to national security from alternate decisions on force levels.

This weighing of risks is too often neglected in arms limitation agreements. Frequently the risk from possible violation of the agreement is determined without consideration of the dangers if an unrestrained arms race went on.

A classic example of this situation exists regarding MIRVs or Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles. MIRVs present a very serious risk to national security because of their potential as counterforce weapons, particularly because of the incentive that they might provide for carrying out a first strike.

The major potential strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union is the deployment of MIRVs on its large SS-9 missile. Secretary Laird has said that such a threat would be unacceptable when the Soviets have 420 SS-9s each with three MIRVs (the number of multiple re-entry vehicles tested on the SS-9 so far), or a total of about 1,300 warheads. He has recently reported "some preliminary indications that the Soviet Union may have recently started slowing somewhat the level of activity associated with SS-9 missile construction." Therefore, since they now have less than 300 built, they may never deploy as many as 420. However, even a smaller number of SS-9s would provide an equivalent threat if each missile had more than three accurate MIRVs. There is no technological reason why the Soviet SS-9 MIRV system might not include 10 or more warheads.

Because of this larger payload capacity of the Soviet SS-9 missile, MIRVs present in the long run a greater security risk to the U.S. than they do to the Soviet Union. The U.S. is now ahead in MIRV technology. Only in November did Defense spokesmen announce that the Soviets may have tested for the first time a MIRV system for their SS-9. It will be more than a year or two before the Soviets could have a reliably tested accurate system which could, when deployed, threaten the Minuteman.

We Must Control This Weapon to Avert A New Arms Spiral

The MIRV problem is quite different for the Soviet Union. Instead of a long-term risk, the current U.S. MIRV deployment provides a more immediate threat to Soviet security. The U.S. has attempted to make clear that the present Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles do not have a first-strike counterforce potential and that the U.S. has unilaterally decided not to attempt to acquire such a capability. However, such statements as the Sept. 22 remarks by General Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, that the "Minuteman III with MIRVs will be our best means of destroying time urgent targets like the long range weapons of the enemy" are not likely to reassure the Soviets.

Therefore, the Russians should have a strong interest in an early halt to the deployment of Poseidon and Minuteman even though in the long term MIRVs might provide them with a military advantage.

U.S. verification of a ban on Soviet MIRV deployment by "national" means, i.e., those under U.S. control and not requiring agreed inspection within the Soviet Union, is not possible. External observation of the missile will not tell whether it contains one, three, ten or twenty warheads. Instead, it is reported that the Administration has proposed "onsite" inspections of the deployed missiles. Unfortunately, even this cannot be expected to provide more than illusory confidence that MIRVs are not deployed. The best "onsite" technique would involve a simple "screwdriver" to open the reentry vehicle to see whether more than one warhead were present. X-ray or other similar scientific methods might be substituted, but such inspection would involve the disclosure of what, at the present time, even the U.S. would consider sensitive security information. Admiral Rickover is not likely to look with favor on the Soviet inspection of U.S. nuclear submarines which he considers superior to the Russian ones.

However, even such intrusive inspection would not by itself provide proof that MIRVs were not being deployed. A few hours' advance notice of an inspection would be too long, for it would be a relatively simple matter to substitute, before the inspector's arrival, a single warhead for the MIRV stage of an appropriately designed missile. Even more difficult than for land-based ICBMs would be the verification for non-deployment of MIRVs on submarine missiles. No further analysis is needed to demonstrate that onsite inspection is not a practical or negotiable method of providing confidence that U.S. security is being protected under a MIRV deployment ban.

Does this mean a MIRV limitation is not feasible? No, other means of controlling MIRVs are possible. This analysis of MIRVs will be continued in my second article tomorrow.

This is the first of two articles by Herbert Scoville, former Deputy Director of the C.I.A. and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and author with Robert Osborn of "Missile Madness."

THE MIAMI HERALD
7 FEBRUARY 1971

CIA Plot Rumored in Costa Rica

By DON BOHNING
Herald Latin America Editor

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica — The Costa Rican government has asked the Nixon Administration to recall the reputed CIA chief in Costa Rica amid rumors of an attempt to overthrow President Jose Figueres.

One San Jose newspaper said the recall of U.S. Ambassador Walter C. Ploeser also has been demanded, but the foreign ministry and President Figueres vigorously have denied it.

Apparently to avoid embarrassment to the United States, Costa Rica also officially denies that it has obtained the recall of Earl (Ted) Williamson. But it is known that he is expected to leave the country by Feb. 22 for another assignment. Williamson, first secretary of the U.S. embassy, is widely regarded in San Jose as a CIA representative.

THE situation so deteriorated last month that C. Allen Stewart, a longtime friend of Figueres who is now a State Department trouble-shooter for Latin America, was quietly rushed to San Jose in an effort to straighten out the mess.

The State Department reportedly was astonished at the suggestion that the United States might be involved in any plot against the democratically elected government of Costa Rica, long considered one of the hemisphere's most democratic and pro-American nations.

The entire problem was further aggravated by the departure on January 9 of Larry Harrison, popular young director of the U.S. aid program in Costa Rica. He left on a scheduled trip to Washington and did not return.

HARRISON'S departure officially was described as a "routine" transfer but it is widely accepted in Costa Rica that he was, in effect, tired by the ambassador, perhaps after becoming too indignant over the course of events within the embassy.

Harrison is now special assistant to Herman Kleine, deputy coordinator of the Alliance for Progress program in Washington.

ONLY fragments of the story have surfaced in the Costa Rican press. All of it may never be known. But it is possible, from reliable sources both here and in the United States, to piece together some of the events.

The episode is believed to have had its genesis with the election, and subsequent inauguration in May 1970, of Figueres — a charter member of Latin America's so-called "democratic left," to a four-year term as president.

Almost immediately Figueres began "building bridges" to the Communist bloc, with Costa Rica becoming the first Central American nation to establish diplomatic and commercial ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The move created consternation within some of the military-run governments of Central America.

And it also apparently aroused concern within the American Embassy — said to be deeply divided between liberals and conservatives.

BY LAST fall, reports were reaching Costa Rican officials of Williamson's close ties with members of the political opposition and of indiscreet remarks made by his Cuban wife regarding the country's alleged march toward communism.

Williamson, who had served in Cuba just before the Castro takeover, also was blamed for the seizure and burning of some Marxist literature coming in through the airport. The blame arose through his involvement in a technical assistance program on security.

In late October or early November, the Costa Rican government made an informal suggestion through the State Department's Costa Rican Desk in Washington that Williamson be removed.

No action was taken, although Ploeser is said to have complained to Figueres about going over his head and lodging complaints with an "office boy" or "errand boy" in Washington.

Figueres, in turn, is said to have replied that it wasn't his concern if the State Department ran its Costa Rican Desk through an office boy; that his interest was in having Williamson recalled to avert a major scandal.

THEN, on Dec. 17, a fisherman reported sighting a mysterious ship which had unloaded "long, wooden boxes" on a remote beach near Punta Salsipuedes on the Osa Peninsula, in the southern part of the country on the Pacific side.

The ship was identified as the Waltham, and the Costa Rican government later received information that the vessel was registered to the "commercial section of the State Department." That apparently was inaccurate.

In fact, neither Jane's Fighting Ships nor Lloyd's Registry lists any Waltham. The closest to it is the Waltham Victory, a 455-foot vessel owned by the U.S. Commerce Department and registered at the port of San Francisco. There is nothing to suggest that it was the same ship sighted off Costa Rica.

IT WAS first reported that the "long, wooden boxes" contained weapons, although by the time a Costa Rican Civil Guard patrol got to the rugged region all that was found was a few Coke bottles and some cellophane wrappers.

A story was later put out that it apparently was whisky contraband that had been put ashore, although it is believed the Costa Rica government still does not know for sure. The contraband story presumably was put out to dispel rumors of a coup against the government.

If the boxes did contain weapons, their ultimate purpose can only be guessed.

But in this atmosphere of coup talk, Williamson allegedly remarked that the Figueres government would not last much longer. The remark got back to Costa Rican officials.

EARLY in the week of Jan. 4, the Costa Rican ambassador in Washington requested and was granted an urgent meeting with Charles Meyer, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs.

Meyer reportedly was astonished at the suggestion the United States might be involved in an alleged plot to overthrow Figueres; he assured the ambassador of Washington's continued goodwill toward Costa Rica, and promised immediate action.

On Thursday, Jan. 7, Stewart arrived in Costa Rica and remained through the weekend. His visit included a long conversation with Figueres, during which the alleged Costa Rican move toward the Communist camp presumably was discussed.

On Sunday, Jan. 10, while Stewart was still in town, a brief article appeared on Page 19 of La Nacion, a morning tabloid and San Jose's largest circulation daily.

It speculated that the Costa Rican government was considering declaring Williamson persona non grata.

The next day, Jan. 11, on Page 61 of La Nacion, an article appeared under a two-column headline in which Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio denied the report.

"THE GOVERNMENT of Costa Rica," Facio said, "has not considered declaring (persona) non grata Mr. Williamson, director of special affairs at the American Em[illegible] member

continued

of this distinguished diplomatic mission."

Facio's statement added, however, that he understood that "within a short time Mr. Williamson, who has served in Costa Rica for more than four years, will be transferred to another destination." This was in accord with normal diplomatic practices, Facio said.

It is understood that Williamson will now leave the country by Feb. 22.

The rumors continued, however, occasionally surfacing in the press.

ON JAN. 14, a statement signed by three government party congressmen appeared in Diario de Costa Rica, an afternoon tabloid and sister paper to La Hora.

Among other things, the statement said it was known "positively" that Williamson had "mixed directly" in criticisms of the Figueres Administration and that he had made "intolerable remarks" against the government.

The statement also accused the CIA of being involved in the mysterious ship movements and the alleged arms drop near Punta Salsipuedes.

LA HORA, a San Jose morning tabloid of limited circulation, reported Jan. 30 in a front-page story that Figueres also has asked the United States to recall Ploeser, the conservative midwestern businessman assigned here as ambassador in April 1970. La Hora attributed its information to a member of Figueres cabinet.

Through it all, expressions of public regret, as if meant to deliberately needle the American Embassy, continued to pour from Costa Rican officials about the departure of Harrison, the U.S. aid chief in Costa Rica.

Ploeser himself has taken charge of the aid program as part of a worldwide reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance.

An amiable man who celebrated his 64th birthday Jan. 7, the day Stewart arrived in town, Ploeser insists that both Harrison's departure and Williamson's pending departure are "routine transfers" and that he stands by the Costa Rican foreign minister's statements in both cases.

(Facio, in [illegible] public statement appearing in the local press Jan. 24, noted that Harrison's transfer was a "normal and usual thing within the U.S. State Department" and that Ploeser would take direct charge of the aid program.)

Williamson and Harrison, says Ploeser, "are both good men."

STEWART'S visit to Costa Rica, Ploeser says, was purely coincidental — that he had been in Guatemala, called up and said he was in the area and would "like to come down for a couple of days and see my old friend Pepe (Figueres)."

Ploeser also scoffs at rumors of low morale within the embassy. "You'd have a hard time finding morale any better than it is here right now."

On the face of it, sending Ploeser to represent the United States before a government headed by Figueres would seem like trying to mix oil with water.

Orphaned at seven and a classic example of the self-made man, Ploeser (pronounced Play-zer) classifies himself as a political "middle-roader." His background indicates a more conservative philosophy.

As early as 1940, he was calling for the removal of "punitive taxes on business" and correction of a hostile government attitude toward business. In 1944, during a bid for reelection to Congress, he charged that continuation of Roosevelt's New Deal would mean an American monarchy. Roosevelt's post-war plans, Ploeser claimed, called for setting up of "what amounts to a fascist state, with the government conscripting enterprise, capital and labor as well."

IN 1946, he was a prime election target of organized labor but still managed to win a third term as a congressman from Missouri. He later was defeated, in 1948, while seeking a fourth term.

In 1957, Ploeser was appointed by the Eisenhower Administration as ambassador to Paraguay, where he was awarded the Grand Cross of Paraguay by the government of Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, last of Latin America's [illegible]. Ploeser resigned the post in 1959.

He served as a Republican national committeeman from Missouri from 1964 to 1966. In 1964 there was pressure on him to run for governor of Missouri, but he declined.

AFTER his appointment as ambassador to Costa Rica was announced, he was asked what he thought the Nixon Administration policy toward Latin America should be. He said:

"We should go in available to help a country, not go in like a school-teacher and say, 'Here are all the answers.'"

He also had a comment on career diplomats, saying he thought that Nixon and other presidents were right in appointing ambassadors from sources other than the Foreign Service. He said he felt that Foreign Service officials could lack decisiveness.

"This stems from the system of grading within the Foreign Service. Knowing that promotions depend on a written evaluation of work, professional diplomats hesitate to take courageous stands," he was quoted as saying. "This lack of courage in the pinch grows out of a lifetime of trying not to make a mistake."

WHILE Ploeser's philosophy is oriented more to that of the pragmatic and successful midwestern businessman which he is, Figueres' philosophy leans in the direction of the eastern intellectual establishment.

He led, in 1948, an anti-Communist revolution in Costa Rica, then became provisional president. He was elected to a five-year term as constitutional president in 1953.

Figueres, who considers himself a Social Democrat of the European variety, has always been closely identified with U.S. intellectuals of the Schlesinger - Stevenson-Kennedy philosophy, and at one time was accorded an honorary membership in the Americans for Democratic Action. His wife, the former Karen Olsen, is a New York-born sociologist.

Figueres, 64, was inaugurated May 8, 1970, for his current four-year term.

Ploeser arrived to take up his duties April 18, about three weeks before the inauguration.



Continued

Key Figures in Costa Rica Drama

Walter C. Ploeser

Ploeser

St. Louis insurance executive long active Republican politics. Nixon Administration political appointee as U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica in early 1970. Post had been vacant for several months and was one of last Latin American ambassadorial jobs filled by Nixon Administration after taking office.

Ploeser, 64, served as U.S. ambassador to Paraguay from 1957 to 1959 as Eisenhower Administration political appointee. Awarded Grand Cross of Paraguay by government of Paraguayan strongman Alfredo Stroessner. Resigned as ambassador in 1959.

Entered politics in 1930 with election to Missouri State House of Representatives. Served four terms in U.S. Congress as representative from Missouri 1941-1949. Defeated in bid for fifth term in 1948 elections. Pressure on him to run as GOP candidate for governor of Missouri in 1964 but declined. Republican national committeeman from 1964 to 1966.

Classifies himself as political "middle-roader" but background reflects more conservative orientation. prime target of organized labor in 1946 election to Congress. Staunch opponent of Roosevelt New Deal. Active in immediate post-war years in anti-Communist activities as national chairman of Demolay Committee on American activities.

Took up post as ambassador to Costa Rica in April 1970, shortly before Jose (Pepe) Figueres was inaugurated as Costa Rican president.

Jose 'Pepe' Figueres

Constitutionally elected president of Costa Rica who took office for third time May 8, 1970. Had served an elected term from 1953-58 and also a year as provisional president in 1948-49 after leading successful anti-Communist revolution in his Central American country.

First nine months of current administration marked by opening of commercial and diplomatic relations with Communist bloc nations of Eastern Europe, making Costa Rica first Central American nation to do so. Has caused concern in some military-dominated governments of the region and in conservative circles within Costa Rica.

Figueres, 64, is internationally known liberal democrat with philosophical ties to the Social Democrats of Europe. Also well acquainted in U.S. intellectual circles, particularly among Kennedyites and has lectured at Harvard and other American universities. Charter member, along with Puerto Rico's Luis Munoz Marin and Venezuela's Romulo Betancourt, of Latin America's so-called "democratic left."

Has written several books, articles and pamphlets on political philosophy and also on the aspirations of Costa Rica's National Liberation Party (PLN) which he founded after 1948 revolution. Married to former Karen Olsen, a New York born sociologist.

Figueres

Earl 'Ted' Williamson

Williamson

First Secretary of American Embassy in San Jose, Costa Rica. Recall has been asked by Costa Rican government for allegedly involving himself in country's internal affairs. Listed as embassy political officer but commonly regarded in Costa Rica as CIA chief of station. Due to leave country by Feb. 22, 1971.

Background sketchy but Foreign Service Registry lists place of birth as New York City on March 13, 1915. Served in U.S. Army from 1941 to 1948. Member of the executive staff of the governor of the Panama Canal Zone from 1948 to 1952.

Apparently joined Foreign Service in 1952 and was assigned to Havana as political officer, remaing there for most of immediate pre-Castro period. Married to Cuban. Appointed as political officer to American Embassy in Spain in 1960. Returned to Washington in 1966. Assigned to Costa Rica in 1968.

Registry says Williamson has had "private experience" but gives no indication where or when. Also identifies him as once an assistant manager of an electric company but gives no further details.

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
6 Feb 1971

WHY IT COULDN'T BE THE KGB....

© Victor Zorza, 1971

Perhaps the most plausible of all explanations so far offered of the origins of the Khrushchev memoirs is that which traces it to the KGB. It has everything. There is the factual evidence of the meeting between staff members of "Time-Life" concerned with the production of the memoirs and Victor Louis; the KGB's "fixer" who has repeatedly planted Soviet material on the West. There is the KGB's sinister image, which makes it easy to blame anything underhand or mysterious that emanates from the Soviet Union on that baleful organisation. There is, finally, the motive, indeed a whole series of motives which, if not individually convincing, are impressive by sheer weight of numbers. Also, the people who do accept the view that much of the material is not genuine Khrushchev have to account for it in some way, and it is much easier to blame it on the KGB than on the CIA.

The role played by Victor Louis leaves no doubt that the KGB did have a part in the operation but this does not mean that it was responsible for the whole book. The memoirs contain just too much material which goes against everything that the KGB stands for. The KGB is the inner fastness of the Soviet police state, a huge organisation with tentacles stretching into every area of Soviet life. Like every bureaucracy, it has a vested interest in its own self-preservation, which, in this case, means also the preservation of Stalinist aspects of the Soviet system. It attracts to its ranks some of the most conservative and authoritarian elements of Soviet society, who find within it the scope for indulging in Stalinist vices that is being gradually restricted in other areas of activity. Therefore the greatest threat they face, as individuals and as an institution, is anti-Stalinism.

Yet whatever else may be said of the Khrushchev memoirs, no one could deny that the thrust of the book is wholly and sharply anti-Stalinist. In the words of Edward Crankshaw's introduction, "The chief concern of the person, or persons, responsible for releasing these reminiscences to the West—it certainly appears to be one of Khrushchev's chief concerns—was to counter the current attempts to rehabilitate Stalin."

The anti-Stalinist emphasis of the memoirs is so obvious that it has been stressed by virtually every reviewer. Khrushchev's occasional asides that pay tribute to Stalin do nothing to weaken this impression. They merely serve to show up his own inconsistency, and may be presumed to have been inserted by the forger in an attempt to discredit Khrushchev and, with him, the still surviving members of the Soviet leadership, for the reasons discussed in the previous article.

But if anti-Stalinism was the "chief concern" of the people responsible for the memoirs, it could not have been the KGB. Anti-Stalinism is certainly the chief concern of the "internal opposition" in Russia, but no one has seriously suggested that this inchoate and unorganised group of loosely connected individuals is responsible for the memoirs (and if anybody were to suggest it, this would again point to a forgery rather than to Khrushchev).

Anti-Stalinism is, on the other hand, the chief concern of the Western propaganda organisations—and that means primarily, American organisations — which seek to influence the formation of public opinion in the Soviet Union from outside. Vast amounts of money are spent on their activities, for reasons with which few people in the West would quarrel. Most of us recognise Stalinism as an evil, and we have good reason to fear that its revival in Russia in any form, or the arrival of neo-Stalinism, would not only do much damage to the people of the Soviet Union but might well plunge the world back to the darkest days of the Cold War—or worse.

In that sense, therefore, the Western propaganda organisations which use their resources to reinforce the anti-Stalinist trends that already exist naturally in the Soviet Union—and that are often suppressed by the KGB—are working, ultimately, for the benefit both of the Soviet people and of the West, in the common interest of both.

This is where the CIA comes in. In so far as anti-Stalinism in the Soviet Union is ultimately a factor for the maintenance of peace, the CIA would see it as one of its functions to foster this by every means available to it—and, sometimes, to create the means, when these are not available.

Apart from the book's broadly anti-Stalinist directions, perhaps the most consistent and emphatic political theme raised in the memoirs is that of the need for an open society in Russia. The variations on this theme go so far beyond anything that Khrushchev could conceivably advocate without being accused at the same time of wishing to overthrow the Soviet system as to suggest that much of this material must have been inserted by the forgers.

It is even more certain that the KGB would not have sent out for publication in the West, and for retransmission back to Russia, this powerful demand that the Soviet Union should throw open its borders. One of the KGB's chief functions is to keep the borders closed, and the Soviet people hemmed in, on the grounds that any extensive lifting of travel restrictions might promote the free circulation of political ideas that would rapidly lead to the overthrow of the existing system.

The theme of open borders is developed in the book at every conceivable opportunity, starting from a talk with Tito, who "intrigued" Khrushchev with the story that Yugoslavs were "free" to go abroad as and when they wished, and ending with Khrushchev's own bold proposition, when talking about Eastern Europe, "You cannot herd people into paradise with threats and then post soldiers at the gates."

Khrushchev, the man who authorised the building of the Berlin wall and who boasted about it, concedes a little too readily the claim that this shows a "defect", of the system — in the words a Western propagandist might use—although he also says that it is a necessary and a temporary defect. "Unfortunately," he further admits, "the German Democratic Republic—and not only the GDR—has yet to reach a level of moral and material development where competition with the West is possible."

Not only the GDR? To say, in effect, that the Soviet Union is not only materially but also "morally" behind the West, as he is made to say, and that this is why the borders are kept closed, is something that neither Khrushchev nor the KGB could be imagined as saying. The remark is, indeed, vaguely reminiscent of a point he once made in a public speech, but here, as elsewhere, the forger's licence appears to have greatly extended Khrushchev's original meaning.

He builds up to a crescendo, at the end of the book, with the ringing declaration, "It's incredible to me that after 50 years of Soviet power, paradise should be kept under lock and key."

"Let them live where they want," he announces, when talking about the wish of Vladimir Ashkenazy, the pianist, to live abroad. But he goes further, much further: "I think the time has come to give every Soviet citizen that choice." ...

In what sounds almost like a Western parody of his own public pronouncements, he observes, "Capitalism is a [illegible] which labouring people are condemned to slavery," while "Our way of life is undoubtedly the most progressive in the world."

"So why," he asks, "should we contradict ourselves? Why should we build a good life for the people, and then keep our border bolted with seven locks? Sometimes our Soviet citizens scoff, 'So you're driving us to paradise with a club. Eh? Eh?' . . . I think it is time to show the world that our people are free. . . . I have no doubt that it's practically as well as theoretically feasible for us to open our borders. If it were not feasible, then what kind of freedom would we have?"

What indeed? This is a ready-made script for Radio Liberty, if not an extract from one of its broadcasts to Russia. But it is not Khrushchev, and it is not the KGB.

The memoirs dispute the political philosophy underlying the closed society, and the very reason for the KGB's existence. The apologists for the Police State argue that so long as there are class enemies in the Soviet Union, the KGB must retain an all-powerful and all-pervading presence in all walks of Soviet life. The memoirs contemptuously dismiss this view, and thus drive a final nail into the coffin in which the theory that the KGB is responsible for the memoirs should be laid to rest. "We liquidated the hostile classes fifty years ago," the book says, "and any argument that raises the spectre of class enemies inside the Soviet Union is for fools."

This anti-KGB line which emerges again and again in the book is so persistent and so eloquent that, like the anti-Stalinist line proper, it points to what might be broadly described as an "anti-regime" source of the forgery. The more detailed evidence pointing to the United States will be considered in the next article. Here it should be remarked that the bitter professional hostility between the CIA and the KGB suggests one motive for the anti-KGB line of the book as a whole, and for the seemingly small but quite sharp pinpricks against the KGB strewn across the memoirs.

Thus the world is given, on the authority of no less a person than Khrushchev, the details of a juicy incident in which the KGB tried to compromise a German Admiral. "Our intelligence service obliged him with a young lovely and then tried to photograph him in an indecent pose with her." The story is not a pretty one, but it happens all the time, and the KGB certainly would not wish everybody to be reminded of it. Adding insult to injury, the memoirs explain that the KGB expected to use the photographs to blackmail the A[illegible] its [illegible] service, but his superiors "could not have cared less that he had been with a woman."

Every now and again there is a pat on the back for the KGB, but so backhanded that it would surely have preferred to do without them. Khrushchev's own head of the KGB was, the memoirs repeatedly say, a good man. Khrushchev says that he knew and trusted this man, who is generally known to have been responsible under Stalin for the deportation of millions of people, including whole nationalities in the Caucasus. "Serov is an honest man," says Khrushchev, in what may have been the forger's unconscious parody of Shakespeare. So are they all, honourable men in the KGB. Although, Khrushchev adds, with a final thrust to the heart, there may be some dubious things about Serov, "as there are about all Chekists"—the historical name for the KGB's men in which the organisation takes much pride.

The memoirs also call repeatedly for the rehabilitation of "all" Stalin's victims, alive or dead, thus going far beyond what Khrushchev was prepared to do when he might have had the power to do it. The KGB has opposed such rehabilitations as have occurred, and, after Khrushchev's overthrow, the conservatives in the Kremlin managed to stop the flow of rehabilitations almost completely. The demand for rehabilitation is, in fact, an important part of the case for the liberalisation of the Soviet system which is made so convincingly in the memoirs.

It is good, heady stuff. It is a lot of liberals and opponents the system in Russia think. It is what they say, when they are sure that a KGB informer is not listening. It has been seriously suggested that the KGB has "bugged" the Khrushchev residence, and has sold the tape recordings to "Life" in order to replenish its hard currency reserves. That the Khrushchev's home is bugged is only too likely. That the KGB would undertake a project of this kind to earn foreign currency is beyond belief.

Compared with the vast amounts of foreign currency available to the Kremlin through legitimate foreign trade channels, the million dollars rumoured to have been paid for the memoirs would be of little consequence when compared with the political damage which the publication has done to their interests.

The "open borders" theme, like the whole anti-Stalinist argument of the book, is so sharply opposed to the Kremlin's official policies that it is inconceivable that the Soviet leadership would have authorised the KGB to proceed with a scheme like this. Moreover, the general effect of the book's publication in the West has been so greatly to the detriment of the Soviet image in the world that the Kremlin would never have allowed a project like this to pass beyond the planning stage. Even if it is assumed, for the sake of the argument that [illegible] have been hatched in the twisted imaginations of some KGB psychological warfare experts, a major operation like this would have to be submitted to the Politburo for approval. One look at the contents of the book would be sufficient to convince most members of the Politburo that this was something that would do great damage to the Soviet Union—as, indeed, it has.

It is not just that the message of the memoirs goes against current Kremlin policies. It is, as the "Times" said in introducing its serialisation of the memoirs, "an unwitting indictment of the whole system"—except that it is not unwitting, because if the "Times" could see the point so could the writers of the memoirs, and the readers. The memoirs were intended from the start for syndication in newspapers and magazines throughout the world, as the flow of the material to "Life" over a period of 18 months makes clear. The many millions of people who read the excerpts in such magazines as "Life," in "Stern" in Germany, and in nearly a score of other publications in many countries, will have certainly taken the point that the memoirs are an indictment of the Soviet system. A great many of them are people who would never dream of buying a book on the Soviet Union, and who will therefore form their opinion of the country and its system from these excerpts.

Moreover, although the memoirs deal mainly with events of the Stalinist period, the less sophisticated reader will be left with the impression that, even if things have changed somewhat in Russia, they cannot have changed all that much. He is as unlikely to distinguish between the regime of Khrushchev and Brezhnev as between the regime of Stalin and Lenin. To him, this will be the picture of Russia then and now—of a leadership made up of thugs and gangsters, always at each other's throats, ruling blindly and inefficiently a nation of slaves. Can this be a picture that the Kremlin would have authorised the KGB to sell to the West? Can it be a picture that the KGB would sell to the West, even without the Kremlin's approval? Or can it, as has been argued, have been transmitted to the West by an "anti-Stalinist faction" within the KGB?

Even if one assumes that a faction like this might have been formed within the KGB its members would know enough about their own organisation to realise that they could hardly expect to get away with it for long.

As for the KGB itself, the suggestion that its motive in transmitting the memoirs for publication abroad was somehow to discredit once and for all the books smuggled out of Russia, such as the works of Solzhenitsyn, and to stop in this way future traffic to the West, just does not hold water.

No Western publisher would be deterred from putting out the genuine "Samizdat" work of Russian writers which are barred in Russia. They can be easily authenticated, as they have always been in the past and would be in the future. Neither reviewers nor readers in the West would think of them as being in the same category as the Khrushchev memoirs. Nor is the KGB so foolish as to believe that it could discredit "Samizdat" as a whole by discrediting the Khrushchev memoirs.

It has also been suggested that what the KGB was really after was to discredit the Western information media, because it knew that as soon as the book was published, some Western experts, who shall be nameless, would fall upon it and tear it to pieces as a forgery. But serious studies of this kind will reach only a minute fraction of the many millions of people who have read the serialisation in the popular press, and those other millions who are buying a book that has certainly become a best-seller.

If the Khrushchev memoirs were written neither by Khrushchev himself, nor by the KGB, it should be possible to determine their true origins from the contents of the book: If the writers of the memoirs had a purpose, this purpose must be evident from what they say. Otherwise, the whole operation would be a failure. And if it is possible to identify the purpose, then it should be a comparatively simple task for the inquirer to trace his way back from this to the perpetrators of the forgery.

That it is a forgery, in the sense that many passages cannot have come from Khrushchev himself, is now accepted by some of the leading authorities in the field. Professor Leonard Schapiro, the highly regarded author of the standard history of the Soviet Communist Party, has listed in the "Sunday Times" a number of passages from the book, and commented, "I cannot imagine Khrushchev saying this, even in private, let along for publication abroad."

However, he inclines to the view that the memoirs came to the West from the KGB, and gives his reasons for believing that parts of them may have come from that source. There is perhaps no real difference between us, because I also believe that parts of them may have come from the KGB. But, in trying to account for the sections that could not, as I have tried to show, have come either from the KGB or Khrushchev, I found it necessary to take the argument beyond the generally accepted view of the memoirs.

After establishing that much of the material was not authentic I concluded that an operation of this magnitude could only have been mounted by one of the Western intelligence services. At first I discounted the possibility that the CIA might be involved, partly because the CIA itself had argued so convincingly against this theory. My doubts began when one of the CIA's arguments turned out to be less solid than it had at first appeared.

It [illegible] being widely said within the CIA that its director, Mr Richard Helms, had personally gone to "Life" magazine to plead for some information about the provenance of the memoirs, and had been refused. I have no difficulty at all in accepting the view that "Life" magazine is independent enough to sustain such a refusal, even if the request were to come from the White House. But my inquiries in Washington led me gradually to the view that, if Mr Richard Helms had really cared, he could have put a hundred men on the job, or more, and they would have cracked the story in no time at all. The best information I have is that no such attempt was made, and that the analysis of the book within the CIA was regarded as a low level, secondary task of little real consequence.

The story of Mr Helms's pilgrimage to "Life" may be true, for all I know, but this would not necessarily be inconsistent with the view that the CIA had been responsible for feeding much of the "Khrushchev" material to the magazine, in the manner outlined at the beginning of this series. If the CIA had planted the material on "Life" without any knowledge of this by the magazine's editors, as I suggested could have happened, then Mr Helms's visit—or, if the story is apocryphal, then a visit by one of his assistants—could have been part of the CIA's "cover." It has also been suggested that "Life" might indeed have passed some information to the CIA, if only to keep on the right side of a journalistically useful organisation, but that it was agreed between the two that no word of this should be allowed to leak out. The popular version of the Helms story may be true as far as it goes, but perhaps it does not go far enough.

What I learned in Washington may not be published, but I make no claim that it provides any sort of proof of the CIA's authorship. It merely offered certain clues pointing in the direction of the CIA, and it caused me to search more assiduously than ever in the book itself for an answer to the main question. Cui bono? In whose interest? For whose benefit?

The issue of greatest importance in American foreign policy for some time past has been the war with Vietnam, and evidence of CIA involvement in the forgery would sound much more convincing if it could be shown that an important section of the memoirs is designed to promote the American interest in this matter. In fact the section on Vietnam, brief as it is, sticks out like a sore thumb.

"Why am I bringing this up now?" Khrushchev is made to ask. "Because it relates to the subject of what we can expect now that Ho Chi Minh is dead."

So not only are we told that this was written after Ho's death, but it is also [illegible] the only future-oriented section of the book that it ha[illegible]ertain policy recommendations [illegible] least a case to argue—and it so happens, a case which is in the American interest.

Both American diplomacy and propaganda have been making considerable exertions in recent years to get across to the Russians the view that a victory for Hanoi would work to the long-term advantage of China, and to the detriment of the Soviet Union. Is it a coincidence that the Vietnam chapter in the Khrushchev book is dedicated almost entirely to this proposition?

The Soviet Union has been doing all it could to help Vietnam, the memoirs say, but some of the key positions there are held "by pro-Chinese comrades." They, in turn, have been doing all they could to please China—"in other words," Khrushchev explains, just in case this is not clear enough, they have been working "against us."

This is the first section of the Vietnam chapter, evidently written before Ho's death, as some of the internal evidence suggests. But the material has reached "Life" over a period of more than 18 months, and, as the editors tell us, they drew together diverse fragments from different batches to form them into chapters. After Ho Chi Minh's death, the forgers saw an opportunity to develop the theme in certain directions. With his death, says the Khrushchev of the memoirs, "the infectious growth of pro-Chinese influence will be able to spread more virulently than ever."

For evidence, the authors rely on reading between the lines of official North Vietnamese statements, which have also been studied by Western observers for clues to Hanoi's policies. In Ho's testament, for instance, there is nothing about Russia's "enormous unselfish" help to Vietnam, the memoirs say. Russian resentment at Hanoi's ingratitude, as expressed in the memoirs from the mouth of Khrushchev, will, when broadcast back to Russia, feed the resentment which any nation would feel at such rank lack of appreciation. This is certainly a feeling which the memoirs seek to foster, together with the fear of Chinese influence in Hanoi, thus suggesting the conclusion that it would be preferable, at least from the point of view of Soviet national interest, if such aid ceased. This is certainly something that would work greatly to the advantage of the United States.

In so far as the writers are addressing themselves in this section of the book to the Soviet people, which, on the evidence of their words, they are certainly doing, they are also telling them not to believe their own press. Khrushchev is made to say that "certain information" which has reached him shows that Soviet-Vietnamese relations are not going as smoothly as the Soviet press

continued

and television claimed. From the outside it might seem that everything was fine, but in fact "the pro-Chinese forces" (again) were displaying "a certain unwarranted restraint" towards the Soviet Union. The appearance of friendliness, the writers conclude, is probably "just a facade thrown up by the Vietnamese leadership."

Moreover, the Vietnam leadership—note the subtle transition from "the pro-Chinese comrades" to the leadership as a whole—was probably taking this outwardly pro-Soviet attitude "even with China's blessing" in order to deceive Russia. Whatever the reason the Soviet Union is bound to lose. "I don't think China will release Vietnam from its paws," and pro-Chinese forces will remain powerful in Vietnam. They will do all they can to make Vietnam eat out of China's hand. In other words there is no future in it for Russia, and it may just as well cut its losses.

To support the argument, the memoirs maintain that Soviet relations with Vietnam have deteriorated because of Mao Tse-tung "and his influence on Vietnam." If their authenticity is accepted by the Vietnamese Communists, the stress in the memoirs on the importance of Soviet aid in the past is such as to cause great offence in Hanoi, which has always maintained that it is winning the war by "self-reliance," not thanks to outside assistance. But, says the book, "Vietnam has had no choice but to rely on the Soviet Union. "Its military resistance would be impossible "if it were not for the economic and material aid provided by the Soviet Union." But if this is so, why hint that such aid should be terminated?

And so the Vietnam chapter goes back and forth, always returning to the same argument, stated or implied, that the war can continue only with Soviet support, and that a Vietnamese victory will work to the ultimate advantage of China rather than Russia. At the end of the chapter there is a throw-away sentence calling for the mobilisation of all efforts to bring the struggle to a successful conclusion, but the insistent, repetitive nature of the earlier argument will have done its work. Apologists for the memoirs will argue that the fact that its three-fold message also works in the American interest is pure coincidence.

If the Russians are being made to doubt the expediency of continued aid to Vietnam, if the "pro-Chinese" comrades in Vietnam and the "pro-Soviet" ones are being induced to intensify their quarrel, and if offence is being caused in Hanoi by the claim that the Vietnamese Communists could continue the war, thanks only to Soviet aid, the coincidence is just too pointed for comfort.

The treatment of only one other theme in the book is as policy-oriented as the Vietnam section, and this also happens to be on one of the most important issues between the US and the Soviet Union, that of military policy.

The editors have given it no section [illegible] its own, but most of [illegible] final chapter (together with the "open borders" theme which shows a proper appreciation of its importance on the part of the compilers). As Harrison Salisbury, the "New York Times" correspondent in Moscow in the early fifties, remarks in his review, Khrushchev's final recommendations "seem to have a coherence and a timeliness which many passages of the book do not." It is a fair point, and I would suggest that it also points to an attempt on the part of the authors to foist on "Life" magazine an obvious summing-up of the book's main themes. But there I must part company with Salisbury, who says that the motives "of the party and police accessories who permitted the materials to reach the West almost defy intelligent analysis."

Khrushchev's remarks on military affairs contain the most direct call for a change of policy, more emphatic than anything appearing in the Vietnam section, which makes most of its points indirectly. Because he is now retired, he says: "There is nothing I can do but share my experience with anyone who cares to listen and hope that somebody pays attention."

Who—readers of "Life"? The only people in the Soviet Union who are in a position to do anything with Mr Khrushchev's "experience" are the members of the Politburo and the restricted number of people who comprise the policy-making elite. No one has seriously suggested that Mr Khrushchev would be so foolish as to try to influence them through the pages of "Life," or even by recording his remarks on a tape-recorder, and passing them around Moscow. He is certainly not speaking to posterity as some other sections of the book make him out to be doing. Is it again a case of the forger's right hand not knowing what the left was doing? Certainly this blatant attempt to influence the Kremlin's present policies does not fit easily into the framework of the book as a whole—although it would fit snugly into a CIA attempt to exploit the known Soviet leadership differences on military policy, and to encourage Soviet public opinion to take sides in this dispute.

Khrushchev, who was always in favour of cutting military spending, is now made, quite plausibly, to deplore "this new trend of military over-spending." But, once again, the forgers add point and substance to Khrushchev's known attitudes. They make him advocate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from all satellite countries. He calls repeatedly for unilateral Soviet disarmament, regardless of what the United States might do, in the face of the "greedy and self-seeking" men who run the Soviet armed forces. Mind you, he is "not impugning their moral qualities," but the fact remains that if they have their way, the living standard suffers. Therefore, "they cannot be reminded too often" that these matters must [illegible] not by them.

Again and again the memoirs profess to take part in the current Kremlin debate on the allocation of resources between military and civilian uses, pressing the argument which would appeal to the anti-military faction in the leadership and to the anti-military sections of public opinion in Russia. But because the Russian debate, which is in some ways a mirror-image of the American one, has been restricted to a small policy-making elite, it would serve the American interest if the area of contention in the Soviet Union *could be widened and the number of participants increased.*

When the writers of the memoirs say that they hope that "somebody pays attention," they really hope that everybody will, and that this would help to stir up a debate in Russia which could make it a little more difficult for the Kremlin to spend money on arms, as the American debate has made it more difficult for President Nixon. The difference between the Soviet and the American systems in this area of policy-making is really quite unfair on the incumbent of the White House, and it is not to be wondered at that the CIA would try to do something to bring about an equalisation of burdens between the two Governments.

But while the book's pressure for disarmament is designed for Soviet internal consumption, its insistent advocacy of chemical and bacteriological warfare is presumably meant to show to Western opinion the lengths to which the Russians, including even the redoubtable Khrushchev, are prepared to go. In two widely separated sections of the book he is made to explain that the necessary preparation for war involves the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons—"in short, all the means necessary to repulse an attack and to crush the enemy." Lest this should appear too remote historically—the remark occurs in a discussion of the preparation for the war with Finland—he is made to repeat it, in a more contemporary setting, in a magisterial passage which begins with the announcement that "we must not lower our guard."

Chemical and bacteriological weapons, he explains, are among those which it is now "necessary to have in any eventuality." Although the implication is that they would be used only if an enemy used them first, the impression that the Soviet Union might be the first to use them is difficult to resist—as the forgers would have intended.

He also has it in for "a few of our influential military leaders" who are trying to whitewash Stalin. He hopes that he does not need to point to the absurdity of their attitude—which he then proceeds to do with a vengeance. Elsewhere, he takes [illegible]

continued

up like canaries, what with epaulettes and fancy stripes. Who the hell needs them?

No doubt this, too, would strike a responsive chord among the anti-military sections of public opinion. But while the parts of the book on military affairs and on Vietnam contain the most obvious material in the American interest there are many other indications throughout the book which point in the same direction.

One of the most strongly argued reasons for attributing the Khrushchev memoirs to the KGB rather than to the CIA is that the book contains a number of striking omissions which, it is said, are in the Kremlin's interest. Nothing that is directly unfavourable to the present Soviet leaders appears in the memoirs. There is nothing in the book about the power struggles of Khrushchev's last, crowded years in office, before he was thrown out by the present leadership — although he would clearly want to get his own back on his rivals, at least in his reminiscences, as he does when he savagely attacks his earlier political enemies. There is virtually nothing about the famous cases of the past, such as the Kirov murder of 1934, in which, as Khrushchev had hinted in previous speeches, Stalin had secretly arranged the assassination of one of his own closest associates, in order to provide himself with an excuse for plunging Russia into the bloodbath of the middle thirties.

Khrushchev, it is argued, would have been sure to discuss all this, and much more, in his memoirs. But the KGB, it is suggested, acting on the Kremlin's instructions, would have been equally sure to excise all this from the material it passed on to the West. This argument was pressed with much vigour in the early stages of the controversy about the Khrushchev memoirs, when the official view in the United States — in so far as it was "official" — held firmly to the line that both the KGB and the Kremlin, or some factions within these establishments, were responsible for sending the material to the West for publication.

But if the CIA was responsible for the final shape of the memoirs, then it would obviously have had to think ahead to providing some explanation of their appearance. It presumably arranged for several possible explanations, so that, if the first was "blown," it could retreat to the next best position.

It would thus have made sure that the memoirs contained none of the material discussed above, in order that the omissions should suggest to students of the book that the KGB was indeed responsible. The omissions might appear to point to the KGB, but they are also perfectly consistent with the view that the CIA was engaging in the double bluff which has become almost second nature to intelligence organisations.

By now most official Washington has given up the theory of the Kremlin or KGB origin of the memoirs, but it still stoutly maintains that they are largely authentic, and that they were certainly not "authored," in the apt American phrase, by the CIA. After the appearance of the first article in this series, the "Times" in London reported from Washington that there were "snorts of derision" there at the very idea that the CIA might have been involved. A spokesman for "Life" said that his company had no dealings whatsoever with the CIA — a claim which is quite consistent with my view that the material could have been fed to "Life" by CIA agents masquerading as Russians. It was also reported that there was some "hilarity" at the CIA, which, however, in line with long-standing policy, could make no comment.

But there has been no attempt so far to deal with the evidence presented in this series. The damage to Soviet interests done by the Khrushchev of the memoirs — even to interests which are patently his own — and the benefit which the United States might have expected to derive from it all, keeps showing up throughout the book. The sections on Vietnam and on military affairs are only the most concentrated expression of this. Khrushchev's own special interest in fostering Soviet relations with the developing countries, still an area of considerable competition between the United States and Russia, is skilfully turned in the book against the Soviet Union. Every Asian reading the book will be infuriated by its references to "Asiatic cunning," which the authors take care to explain, every time they bring it into use, so that no doubt should remain in the reader's mind whether it was indeed intended as a racial slur.

"By this term," the memoirs say, "we meant the quality of a man who thinks one thing but says something else." Who are the "We" who thus defined it? From the context, the inquiring reader will find that this was the view of the post-Stalin leadership, no less. Or, more than a hundred pages on, "Asiatic cunning" is redefined as "cajolery, treachery, savage vengeance, and deceit."

This will no doubt help to create the right emotional climate for the discussion of Soviet aid to underdeveloped nations which, the memoirs argue, is wholly disinterested — and then show, repeatedly and persistently, just how self-seeking and designing it all is, how cleverly calculated, how selfishly motivated.

"Take, for example, our policy towards Afghanistan," the memoirs say. It is a fine example, showing how the United States was trying to establish its influence there, perhaps to build a military base, under the guise of aid projects. The Soviet Union countered with aid projects of its own — "drop in the ocean compared to the price we would have had to pay in order to counter the threat of an American military base." Soviet foreign policy, Khrushchev concludes, should be based on the practice of giving "house pres[illegible]" to other countries, [illegible] will always repay us, both economically and politically."

This is in the face of repeated assurances, as in the section on Egypt, that Soviet policy there was "not motivated by self-centred, mercantile interests" — followed in the same paragraph with the counter-point that "we have already begun to reap the fruits of our investments in the future of the Arab nations." No, Soviet help to Egypt was based "on purely humanitarian, not mercenary concerns. Russia had no need of anything Egypt could produce. It had rice and oil of its own. But (a few pages on), before agreeing to finance the Aswan dam, the Soviet Government looked carefully into the question "of what the dam would yield in the way of an economic as well as a political return on our investment." Also, "we had to make sure that the Egyptians could repay us in regular deliveries of their best long-fibre cotton, rice, and other goods."

The developing nations are not the forgers' only target audience. There is something for everybody. The East Europeans, for instance, who have long resented Moscow's attempts to restrict their trade with the West, are told of the Russians' own resentment at Yugoslavia's trade with the United States. But Khrushchev takes the side of the Yugoslavs, "who were simply taking advantage of an opportunity we would have loved to have had ourselves." This is precisely what Russia's critics in Eastern Europe have been saying, and the book obligingly lets Khrushchev provide grist for their mill, in this and in a number of other examples.

Western Communist parties, whose demand for the rehabilitation of the Soviet leaders liquidated in the thirties had flagged somewhat of late, are given good reasons why they should resume their pressure. These men had not been rehabilitated, because "we didn't want to discredit the fraternal (Western) party representatives who had attended the open trials." They then went home and said that the trials were fair, but the memoirs now say that "there was no evidence whatsoever for condemning or even trying those men." So the logical conclusion is that the fraternal parties ought to suggest to Moscow not to bother about their own feelings, but to go ahead with the rehabilitations. The CIA would have no objection at all to a little more friction between the Western parties and the Kremlin.

There is even something for the Chinese, who claimed that the Russians had stolen Vladivostok, the main Soviet city in the Far East, from them. "It's true," Khrushchev says, just like that. He also warns his comrades that the Chinese reform slogans circulating in Russia, which he denounced so often in his public speeches, [illegible]

continued

was a mistake to think that the seeds of those ideas would not find "fertile soil in our country." He also concedes, in effect, the claim of the Chinese that the Russian attitude to them is akin to fascism. "We are being nationalistic when we let ourselves believe that one nation has special rights and superiorities over other nations. That's how nazism started. Therefore, we must realise that the Chinese are our brothers." Strange words, if they came from Khrushchev — but not at all strange if they came from somebody who wanted to provide a little ammunition for the Chinese.

The Chinese as well as all other critics of the Soviet party, in East and West, could not have put it better themselves. The party over which Khrushchev presided for so many years contains "many people without principle, lickspittle functionaries, and petty careerists." All too often, a party card represents nothing more "than its bearer's hope of finding a comfortable niche." Not, of course, that there wasn't some of this in the early years — "but to nowhere near the same extent."

Yes, the early idealism has gone, while many of today's attitudes have a touch of "bourgeois pettiness." In those days, no one would have permitted himself "so much as a single thought about having his own dacha" — and this is Khrushchev speaking, who had several until quite recently. Or is it somebody else, who wants to remind the Soviet people about the comfortable lives of privileged officials?

It is not just individual members, but the party philosophy as a whole that is rotten. To achieve its goals, it was sometimes necessary to "sacrifice moral principles". — an admission that no Communist politician would make, any more than would a Western politician. Khrushchev is made to illustrate this proposition with a large number of examples. My favourite is the incident which describes how Ho Chi Minh told China that the Vietnamese Communists could no longer resist the French pressure in 1954, and had decided to retreat to the Chinese border. He also asked China to move its troops into Vietnam, but the Chinese, the memoirs say, were not keen. Khrushchev did not think that was right. "There is no reason why you should tell Ho Chi Minh that you will refuse to help him if his troops retreat to your border. . . . Why don't you just tell him a white lie? Let the Vietnamese believe that you'll help them if necessary, and this will be a source of inspiration for the Vietnamese partisans." The Chinese agreed to do just that — so the story goes.

This incident has got everything. It shows just how weak the North Vietnamese were when all the world thought that they were winning (at the time of their victory at Dien Bien Phu) — which carries an important message today. It shows that they cannot rely on their closest allies — if that is what the Chinese are — and that Khrushchev thought nothing of a "white" lie [illegible] might have cost thousands of Vietnamese lives.

Now who would want to make all these points? Or who would want to announce to the world that it was the Russians who had started the war with Finland, and the North Koreans who had started the war with the South, and not the other way round, as the Communists have always maintained? Not Khrushchev, surely, but those who want to show the world just how aggressive the Communists have always been.

A great deal of what the book says is true, but this is quite irrelevant to the question of its authenticity. Much of it has been said publicly by Khrushchev himself, and it would be possible to quote chapter and verse for a great many of the statements attributed to him in the book -- although in most cases thy have been subtly altered, or put into a context which produces an altogether different impression from that which he intended. Other Khrushchev statements are taken from Western interviews with him -- as, for instance, the dramatic story of the confrontation between Soviet and American tanks at the Berlin wall, which is recounted in Pierre Salinger's book, "With Kennedy." Still others come from the famous Khrushchev television interview with NBC, which was much longer than what was actually broadcast. "Life" has denied that any of the material came from the NBC recording. But I have obtained a transcript, from one of the people who handled the NBC tapes as received from Moscow, which shows that many passages in it are virtually identical with passages in the book.

The voice-prints which, "Live" says, prove that the taped material is genuinely Khrushchevian have convinced some people of its authenticity — but how much of the book does this account for? In answer to the challenge in my first article that the Russian text of the whole book should be made available for inspection, "Life" said that it was bound by contract not to reveal the source of the memoirs. I have no doubt that this is so, but why should this prevent a study of the text? Certainly an international committee of scholars could devise a whole series of methods for computer and other technical analysis of the text without compromising the safety of the people in Russia who, "Life" claims, would be endangered if the text was released for inspection.

"Life" maintains, according to the "Sunday Times," that not a single reviewer in the United States has cast doubt on the authenticity of the memoirs. Perhaps it has been mis-reported, for I know of several who have done so.

It is true, however, that there is a consensus in the American press and among Government experts largely in favour of the authenticity of the memoirs. This is what disturbed me m[illegible] during my visit [illegible] States, for there is no such consensus in the academic community, and the separation between the two sections of expert opinion suggests that American attitudes in relation to the Soviet Union are not formed on the basis of sufficiently solid study.

This is not to say that I claim to have proved to the hilt my case that the CIA is responsible for the final shape of the Khrushchev memoirs. This is, by its nature, unprovable — unless I could also claim to have been there when the deed was done. But I do claim that the evidence I have produced, shows, at the very least, that there must be grave doubts about Khrushchev's authorship and the KGB's complicity. It is for those who maintain that the book is genuine to prove that it is so, in the face of these questions. They cannot be brushed aside, as "Life" has done.

When I produced in 1965 the analysis which showed that the authorship of the "Penkovsky Papers," the memoirs of the highly successful Western spy in Russia, could also be traced to the CIA, it was said that I had done a disservice to the Western cause. The Soviet press and radio used my articles to show just how shameless and underhand the CIA's operations were. There is enough material in the present series to show that the KGB's operations are no better — although the Soviet press will know how to select for publication only the material which supports its own argument.

In fact, I do not regard myself as a CIA-baiter, and I know enough of the agency's work to have the highest respect for the scholarly standards and impartial quest after truth which informs the work of its analysts. There is a necessary place, in today's world, even for CIA's "Department of Dirty Tricks." So long as its opposite number operates around the world from Russia, the United States must maintain its own equivalent. How to dismantle these organisations is a problem only a little less complex than that of disarmament.

But, just as you don't shoot at your own side in war, so intelligence agencies should confine their "dirty work" to the territory of the adversary. To foist on the Western world a book like the Khrushchev memoirs is to interfere with the free flow of accurate information which the people of the Western countries must have to form their political opinions. Intelligence operations of this kind can damage the democratic process, and it is the function of a free press to produce the evidence which points to such interference — even if, in doing so, it should appear to be helping the Kremlin.

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

[Book* review by V. I. Vladimirov; Moscow, USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, Russian, No 2, February 1971, pp 84-88]

Harry Howe Ransom's book The Intelligence Establishment is a revised edition of the monograph also written by him entitled Central Intelligence and National Security, which was published back in 1958. Studying the problem of the organization and activity of the intelligence apparatus over the course of many years, the author sets out significant material whose authenticity does not evoke doubts in American critics although the facts and, especially, the figures are given with great care and are accompanied by a number of reservations.

The present state of the intelligence establishment is presented in the book against the background of American intelligence's development, beginning with the times preceding World War II, when such miserly means were allocated to maintaining U.S. military attaches abroad that only well-to-do people consented to this work, and only after Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into World War II was an independent intelligence organization -- the Office of Strategic Services -- created in Washington.

At present the U.S. intelligence establishment, which was lifted up on the crest of the "Cold War," has grown and spread into a mighty complex exerting a substantial influence upon the U.S. foreign policy course. Four billion dollars are allocated to intelligence annually. More than 100,000 people are engaged in the organizations of the "intelligence community." Formally entered in this "community" are: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the intelligence services of the Defense Department, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International Development cooperate with them, but without formal representation in the interdepartmental organs. Such "think tanks" as the Institute for Defense Analysis and the Rand Corporation, which is linked with the U.S. Air Force, work in intelligence outside the "community." In addition, the majority of U. S. departments, independently of their regular functions, have created their own intelligence apparatus under this or that designation.

Modern and advanced equipment from electronic deciphering machines to spy satellites equipped with modern apparatus which makes it possible to photograph objects on the ground with an exceptional degree of detail and to return the exposed film to given points, has been provided for the intelligence establishment.

All this activity is coordinated and directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. From the time of its inception in 1947, this organization has acquired a sharp anti-Soviet and anti-Communist trend. (In H. Ransom's expression, the "Truman Doctrine" was the mother of the CIA.) The

---

*. Harry Howe Ransom. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970, xvi plus 309 pages.

continued

CIA is mostly obligated for its contemporary state to A. Dulles who for 10 years occupied leading posts in it. Today, about 15,000 people work at CIA headquarters not far from Washington, in the small town of Langley, Virginia. The political power of this organization supplied a basis for Senator Richard Russell, main chief of American intelligence in Congress, to state that the position of the CIA director is second only to the post of U.S. President in terms of its significance.

There are good grounds for such an assertion. The CIA, seemingly subordinated to the National Security Council, in fact works under the President's leadership. The CIA regularly furnishes the President and other leading officials of the country with summarized materials which are considered when important political decisions are being taken. In some American embassies there are more CIA agents than members of the Foreign Service, and for this reason the residencies of the CIA are usually more expensive than the embassy itself. The CIA does not only operate abroad, but also inside the country, infiltrating its agents into the universities, trade unions, welfare funds, and other organizations. The Director of the CIA is virtually possessed of unlimited financial possibilities. H. Ransom writes: "In the years of its existence, the CIA has spent billions of dollars on ends not ordained by Congress" (p 36).

The main directorate of military intelligence created in 1961 belongs to the most important components of the "intelligence community." Up till then the relatively small intelligence establishments of individual arms of the military could not seriously compete with the CIA. The creation of a Central Intelligence apparatus subordinated to the Chiefs of Staffs committee signified still one more powerful member of the "community." There are 7,000 people in the main directorate of military intelligence and the annual budget is 72 million dollars.

In the same system of the Defense Department yet another semiautonomous and highly secret giant -- the National Security Agency -- is working. Its budget amounts to about one billion dollars and it has a staff of 150,000 people. Besides headquarters and establishments deployed at Fort Meade, halfway between Washington and Baltimore, the agency has branches in Japan and the FRG. The main task of this organization is the interception and decoding of ciphered telegrams of virtually all the countries of the world (the interception and processing of broadcast transmissions are entrusted to the CIA), as well as insuring the security of U.S. ciphered correspondence.

The State Department does not occupy the last place in the intelligence establishment system. The number of its intelligence and research directorate is about 350 people, but, as Ransom shows, "the majority of personnel in the state department are fulfilling intelligence functions to some degree or other" (p 138).

From day to day the U.S. intelligence kitchen reboils tons of materials, turning them into sheets of war communiques and other summarized documents. Secret service data amount to only 20 percent of the intelligence obtained, and the rest are based on an analysis of open materials.

Today's American intelligence does not only rely upon classic espionage but also upon the analytical work of specialists in the field of social and natural sciences, engineers and technicians, and former college professors. Much research is prepared within the walls of the universities under contracts with the intelligence organizations.

Continued

H. Ransom writes that 135 countries of the world, including allies and neutral countries, are under the constant observation of American intelligence. Documents which are used as the foundation of military and foreign policy planning are prepared on the basis of individual services' reports. National intelligence surveys maintain data, which is constantly being renewed, on every country, beginning with the state of the roads, bridges, and reservoirs, and ending with a forecast of its political development. Since 1948, when the publication of intelligence surveys was begun, their overall volume has exceeded the volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica 10 times. Generalized summaries are dispatched to approximately 40 leading U.S. officials daily, and every morning a spetial summary is also prepared "for the President's eyes only."

A very limited circle of people also receive a "Black Book" from the National Security Agency which contains a transcript of overheard conversations and deciphered secret correspondence.

The documents of the series National Intelligence Estimates, which are presented to the President and the National Security Council, exert the most direct influence upon U.S. military and foreign policy. It is considered that the agreed opinion of all elements of the U.S. intelligence establishment is expounded in the National Intelligence Estimates. Documents of a different character come in here: from brief operational information on individual issues to the annual summaries of intelligence data on this or that topical theme. In crisis situations, express issues of the National Intelligence Estimates, are prepared in the course of a few hours.

H. Ransom remarks that in the years of its existence, the CIA has not only efficiently worked out a system for compiling documents, but also methods for maintaining constant nervous tension in the highest government circles -- tension which makes it necessary to witness the indefatigable vigilance of the "intelligence community," which is "standing watch over national security." National Security Council meetings start with the CIA Director's report which contains the latest information that has to do with the day's agenda.

From all that has been said, it is possible to form an opinion about the agreed work and cooperation in the U.S. "intelligence community." In H. Ransom's book, however, many examples are adduced which prove the opposite. Back at the time of Pearl Harbor, when American intelligence was in an embryonic state, there existed interdepartmental rivalry, by virtue of which important information could not be reported as a united whole. In 1949, soon after the formation of centralized intelligence, the "unsatisfactory relations" between the CIA on the one hand and military intelligence, the FBI, and the Atomic Energy Commission on the other, became more complex. Serious disagreements exist between the CIA and the State Department which cannot reconcile itself to the fact that, in the final analysis, the leadership of all the secret operations abroad is not entrusted to it. Duplication in the work remains one of the main problems of American intelligence. In the words of the author, it often happens that the actions of the main directorate for military intelligence and the National Security Agency are not agreed, and likewise, the actions of the CIA and these organizations.

In the Department of Defense system there exists discontent with the centralization of the establishment on the part of the intelligence administrations of the branches of the armed forces which have lost their independence. One of the reasons for creating the main directorate for military intelligence was the aspiration to obtain a more objective appraisal of intelligence data insofar as the great diffusion obtained the extortion

Continued

of appropriations for individual branches of the armed forces by way of presenting overstated appraisals of a potential enemy's possibilities (budgeteering). However, as Ransom shows, "budgeteering" is used as formerly, not only by intelligence leaders. In particular, the Secretary of Defense, Laird, resorted to the "intimidation technique" in 1969, achieving allocations for the safeguard ABM system.

H. Ransom does not come out against the "intelligence community," although at times "the terrible potential" of American intelligence in resolving the fates of the world does frighten him. In his book he comes out for improving the intelligence apparatus, beginning with the CIA.

H. Ransom is primarily fighting for the return of the CIA to its constitutional functions. "Not one organization of the Federal Government," he writes, "has interpreted its legally defined functions with such lightness as the CIA has done" (p 82). Created as a consultative and coordination organ on intelligence issues under the National Security Council, the CIA, according to the definition of The New York Times, has become an important instrument of American policy and a main component of the American administration. It does not stop at any methods. The overthrow of foreign governments and their replacement by new ones, the creation, training, and support of military and militia formations, the creation of fictitious airlines, the construction of radio stations, subsidizing university research centers, and further dirty operations of all kinds are the province of the CIA aktiv-operations which in H. Ransom's opinion only undermine the CIA's prestige.

Furthermore, H. Ransom opposes the virtual absence of control over the CIA by Congress where only a few members of secret subcommittees on the CIA of congressional committees on appropriations and the armed services are somewhat informed. During the years 1947-1967 more than 200 resolutions demanding stricter surveillance of the intelligence apparatus's activity have been put forward for the Senate's examination. (A still greater number of similar draft resolutions were prepared by the House of Representatives.) Adoption of the resolutions fell through as a result of massive opposition from the most influential Senators and Congressmen (M. Mansfield, E. Dirksen, R. Russell, G. Ford, and others).

In 1956 Eisenhower appointed the President's Consultative Council on issues of the intelligence establishment abroad. Its first chairman, Killian, became the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It is of interest that to date the institute has already been receiving a CIA grant for five years to finance its center's work on international research. Subsequent chairmen of this "public" commission were the retired generals Hall and Taylor, also the future Defense Secretary C. Clifford. As H. Ransom notes, the Johnson and Nixon administrations did not attach great importance to the question of control over the CIA.

H. Ransom's book The Intelligence Establishment is furnished with a reference apparatus and a selected bibliography. The several plans, official materials, and texts of speeches by CIA leaders featured in the appendix provide documentary support for the book's individual propositions. We draw the reader's attention to one of the plans.

Continued

Noting that the present organization of the U.S. intelligence apparatus has radically changed the process of adopting unified national decisions and, perhaps "the very character of our constitutional system" (p 7), H. Ransom proposes conducting organizational changes to separate the collection of intelligence material from the making of political decisions.

It is, however, fitting that the author himself does not have much faith in improving the U.S. intelligence machine, and this is obvious in many specific examples adduced in the book. On the other hand, the factual material contained in it concerning the organization and activity of the U.S. intelligence establishment is of interest insofar as it, among other things, makes it possible to become better acquainted with the forces which influence the making of political decisions in the United States and the methods they use for this.

MANCHESTER, ENGLAND
GUARDIAN
30 JANUARY 1971

Deliberate mistakes

The Khrushchev memoirs, says an introductory note at the beginning of the book, can be taken as "a deliberate and revealing exercise in self-rehabilitation." It is more revealing than the translator-editor, who made this remark, ever suspected, for it points directly to the forgers' method of operation.

The greatest contradiction in Khrushchev as a man and a politician was the courage he had shown in de-throning the ghost of Stalin, and the faithful service he had rendered during his life-time: Khrushchev has often tried to explain this contradiction, in public and in private, by saying that he did not really know what was going on under Stalin.

If the memoirs could show this claim to be the nonsense it was, they would serve to discredit Khrushchev and his associates who still rule the Soviet Union from the Kremlin. But to make Khrushchev admit in the book that he had known the truth about Stalin all along would not have been in character. The forgers therefore had to use a method familiar from the practice of subliminal advertising. Every now and again, therefore, they would flash the message briefly on the book's broad canvas which—so far as its surface meaning went — constituted in the words of the introductory note "the most devastating and authoritative case for de-Stalinisation ever made."

In fact, Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956 made out a far more devastating case, and he emerged from it politically unscathed—indeed, far more powerful than he had ever been.

However, as Edward Crankshaw says in his introduction to the memoirs, "Khrushchev does not emerge very well from these pages"—although Mr Crankshaw believes that by Soviet Government standards he does not emerge all that badly either. "The really damaging admissions," he says, "are the unconscious ones."

Or were they, perhaps, put in by the forgers, to make their point, and to ensure that Khrushchev should not emerge well from the book? It is difficult to believe that Khrushchev, who was so concerned to show at every opportunity that he had no part in Stalin's crimes, or knowledge of them, should repeatedly admit the contrary—even "unconsciously"—in the memoirs. He was too much of a political animal to allow himself to make such errors—especially in a book intended as an exercise in "self-rehabilitation."

Stalin, he is made to say in the memoirs, used henchmen to destroy honest men [illegible] knew perfectly well, were innocent. [redacted]self stood above it all rror consumed its own executors." Stalin's police chiefs followed one another into the limbo—"when one band of thugs got too embroiled in the terror he simply replaced it with another." First there was Yagoda who launched the terror in the middle thirties, then, Khrushchev recalls, Yezhov, the Mailed Fist, then Beria.

So far, so good—it is what one would expect Khrushchev to say. Elsewhere in the book, however, the subliminal message is flashed briefly, tellingly. "I had always liked Yagoda. Personally, I saw nothing anti-party in his behaviour." So much for the man responsible for some of the show trials of the thirties, which, as Khrushchev makes clear elsewhere in the book, were a put-up job. As for the Mailed Fist who was responsible for the mass terror for the millions who perished in prisons and in Siberia, Khrushchev says, "I certainly had no objection to Yezhov, he was diligent and reliable. . . . I would frequently make progress reports to Yezhov." Self-rehabilitation? Unconscious admissions?

The authors of the memoirs make sure that this side of Khrushchev is shown at all stages of his career. When he was stage-managing a Moscow party conference at the height of the purge, in 1937, "a good Communist and a good comrade," very popular with the participants, was put up for office. But Khrushchev got a message from the secret police: "Do everything you can to bring that man down." He blandly states that "we obeyed," and the next night the comrade was arrested.

Later, when he became Stalin's viceroy in the Ukraine, one of Khrushchev's own deputies, a Kiev party secretary named Kostenko was arrested. "He was an honest, simple person," but he made the usual confession, incriminating a great many innocent people. Khrushchev urged the secret police "not to have him executed until we have a chance to check out his accusations," but he was shot all the same, after implicating his own successor. Khrushchev's only comment in the book is this: "When I heard that Kostenko had tried to implicate him, I was furious."

Odd admissions, these from a man who repeatedly claims in the book that he knew nothing of what was going on.

His repeated protestations of loyalty to Stalin in his lifetime; and his constant reminders of how much Stalin "liked" him and "trusted" him—there are dozens in the book—do not sit at all well with the anti-Stalinist theme of the memoirs. These are again the subliminal messages which bring out the forger's real purpose. Stalin often invited him to dinner or to share his vacations, "but what an ordeal it was." Khrushchev had to show, "outwardly," a friendly attitude to his master—"but putting up with the ordeal had its rewards and advantages." There were always conversations going on in Stalin's circle "which you could use profitably, and from which you could draw useful conclusions for your own purposes."

This testimony, scattered throughout the book, that Khrushchev was a man of dubious personal morals, in fact an unmitigated blackguard, is as unlikely to have come from his own mouth as the other, politically damaging, evidence cited earlier. The two streams of evidence come together in an incident which, as Edward Crankshaw says in an explanatory note, "leaves a particularly nasty taste."

At the 1952 party congress Khrushchev delivered what was obviously the most important speech of his political career up to that time—a report of the party statutes. After he made the speech, he says in the memoirs, "I fell ill," and he stayed in bed "for a few days" while the debate on his report continued. He was looked after by an elderly doctor who, Khrushchev says he already knew at the time, was on the list of Stalin's victims who were to figure in the "doctors' plot" against the lives of Soviet leaders.

Khrushchev was "tormented" by the thought that the kindly old man, "whose concern for my health I found so touching," would not be spared by Stalin—but, he says, he could do nothing about it.

There is only one thing wrong with this story. "Pravda" records that Khrushchev delivered his speech on a Monday morning, that the debate on it continued for the rest of that day and until Tuesday evening, whereupon he declined "the last word," as Soviet leaders often do on similar occasions. He was there on both days, present throughout the most important public function of his political career so far, and it is inconceivable that he could have confused this with some other occasion. But if the dates are wrong, the whole involved story collapses, for the political point of it is that the "doctors' plot" was hatched by Stalin much earlier than had been previously admitted. The forgers' implied point about Khrushchev's moral turpitude is also lost in the quicksands. It is like a house of cards that falls down when one card is removed.

The "Leningrad case" is another such house of cards—but politically and historically more import- [illegible] for power in Stalin's lifetime between the pretenders to his throne. Stalin had a number of the

continued

party leaders involved in the affair shot, while others were put in prison or sent to Siberia. "I was never in on the case myself," says Khrushchev offhandedly, "but I admit that I may have signed the sentencing order." Stalin would normally put his name on the paper first, and then pass it around the table. "We would put our signatures on it even without looking at it," says Khrushchev.

Perhaps so. But, as Khrushchev also explains, "I never saw the indictments in the Leningrad case," and the whole case remains as much of a mystery to him as it is to Western students. Yet after he became the party's First Secretary, he could have easily called for the papers in the case — and, indeed, would certainly have done so, for the Leningrad affair remained a political issue in the leadership well into his tenure of office.

The political clues presented here are, if anything, more important in establishing Khrushchev's non-authorship of the memoirs than the errors of fact listed in the previous article. What we are discussing here are the bricks and mortar of his political career — things which were so important to him that he could neither mistake nor forget them, and without which the whole structure must collapse. He is made to say for instance, that "I read 'Pravda' as soon as it started coming out regularly in 1915," although he would certainly know, from the obligatory study of party history on which every party member of his generation spent a great deal of time, that "Pravda" was launched in 1912 — as its masthead has prominently proclaimed for many years. Not only did it not start appearing regularly in 1915, but it was banned by the wartime censorship during 1914-17.

The same politically unlikely pattern of "forgetfulness" shows up in the sections of the memoirs dealing with more recent events. He discusses Marshal Konev's role in the suppression of the Hungarian rising of 1956, although the part he ascribes to the marshal was really played by General Batov. This is not just a case of mistaken names, for he refers to Konev's function as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces in suppressing the rising, while in fact the Warsaw Pact organisation played no role in it, because the operation was carried out by Soviet troops.

More recently, the two major international Communist conferences in 1957 and 1960 were bedevilled by the question of Yugoslavia's attendance. The fact that there was no Yugoslav representative there in 1960 was one of the major political issues of the time — yet Khrushchev is made to say that the Yugoslavs were present on both occasions.

Khrushchev ascribes his survival during the Stalin terror to the liking which Nadezhda, Stalin's wife, conceived for him when both were at the industrial academy [illegible] [illegible] lottery ticket . . . It was because of her that Stalin trusted me." This intimacy deepened when Khrushchev became First Party Secretary for Moscow, and started going regularly to Stalin's for family dinners. Stalin and Nadezhda were always host and hostess."

When it was pointed out to "Life" that Nadezhda had died several years before Khrushchev became First Secretary, they explained that his description as such in the book was a translation error. The Russian original really said that he went to the Stalin dinners when he "worked in the Moscow Party committee."

But this does not really dispose of the difficulty, for other circumstantial details about the "family dinners," especially the presence of other members of the family at the table, were described to me by Stalin's daughter Svetlana as "impossible."

Would Khrushchev, so proud of his political skills, really have ascribed his survival to his friendship with Nadezhda — when he knew that many of her other friends and relations were killed by Stalin after her suicide? An old man recollecting his past might make a mistake about the dates of dinner parties, but not about the reasons for his longevity.

Throughout the book Khrushchev displays his distrust for Beria, whom he feared like the plague. He had to be particularly careful lest he allowed himself to be provoked into making anti-Stalinist remarks in Beria's presence (although he repeatedly insists that he was loyal to Stalin). Beria, the book says, probably wanted to provoke him into making such remarks, in order to denounce him then as "an enemy of the people." Yet elsewhere in the book Khrushchev describes how he confided his criticism of Stalin to Beria. It is an inconsistency that could have, and probably would have, cost him his life.

The book is full of such political inconsistencies. These are not errors that he could have afforded to make, and they are not errors that a consummate politician, as Khrushchev certainly was, would describe himself as making. If Khrushchev had been the fool and the knave that he is shown to be in these memoirs, he might have written this book. But he was not — and he didn't write it.

MANCHESTER, ENGLAND
GUARDIAN
WEEKLY - CIRC.N-A
JAN 30 1971

VICTOR ZORZA has deduced that the Khrushchev memoirs now published in the West are not genuine and that the American Central Intelligence Agency has had a hand in them. Here he gives his reasons for thinking they are not by Khrushchev: next week he explains how he thinks the CIA was involved.

Mr K and the CIA

The Khrushchev memoirs, which have been described as the publishing sensation of the decade, are more than that. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that they are the publishing hoax of the century. They do not come from Khrushchev nor, as has often been asserted, from the "disinformation department" of the KGB in Moscow—although both Khrushchev and the KGB had something to do with them. On this occasion, however, the Kremlin's "Department D," as it is familiarly known in the trade, seems to have had the cooperation of its American counterpart, the "department of dirty tricks" in the Central Intelligence Agency, which looks like being responsible for the final product.

The evidence for this view which it has taken me more than a month to collect, will certainly be disputed. The reader will have to make up his own mind on the facts presented in this series. I spoke to Svetlana Stalin (now Mrs Wesley Peters) in Arizona, and to Milovan Djilas, the former Yugoslav leader, in Belgrade. I have questioned the Russian pianist Vladimir Ashkenazy, who has now made his home in Iceland, about the references to his activities which appear in the book. But above all else, I have been checking the facts in every accessible source — from the war archives captured by the Germans, to old copies of "Pravda."

There are literally hundreds of errors of fact, of time, and of place in the book—but the publishers claim that these prove nothing. Mr Ralph Graves, the managing editor of "Life" magazine, which obtained the material and then syndicated it throughout the world, says that Mr Khrushchev is "remembering at a fairly advanced age, and I think it is perfectly natural for him to misplace some dates, places, chronology."

"Khrushchev Remembers" is published in Britain by Andre Deutsch at 70s.

The American publisher of "Khrushchev Remembers" declares in an introductory note that the book "is made up of material emanating from various sources at various times and in various circumstances." But he is "convinced beyond any doubt, and has taken pains to confirm, that this is an authentic record of Nikita Khrushchev's words."

These are not memoirs, the publisher insists, but "reminiscences." However, for the sake of convenience, I will follow the usage which has been generally adopted and will refer to them as memoirs.

Spokesmen for "Life," and the small group of men directly concerned in arranging the publication, refuse to state on record any fact concerning the provenance of the material. However, they have spoken off the record both to officials and to journalists of repute in the United States, which makes it possible to build up a composite picture of the claims they make for the book's origins.

It is claimed that the material came in the first place from members of the Khrushchev family—his daughter Rada, her husband Alexey Adzhubey, the former editor of "Izvestia" who, after the fall of Khrushchev, was given an insignificant journalistic post with a picture magazine, and another son-in-law, Lev Petrov, also a journalist, who died some months ago.

The story is difficult to credit, because these members of the Khrushchev family would have enough experience of international affairs to realise that their role could not remain secret for long—and that sooner or later the KGB would catch up with them, and would ruin what remained of their careers and even their liberty.

Whatever motives they might have for wishing to publish Khrushchev's memoirs, they would not trust their lives to "Life." And, as the disclosure of their names in the American press shows, they would have been right. Even though "Life" might now deny, for the record, that they had played any role in the matter, their names have been published and the KGB would certainly follow up any such clue with the utmost thoroughness and would find out anything there is to find out—as they would have known in advance.

The theory widely held in American official quarters—which deny that the CIA could possibly have had anything to do with it—is that, whatever the origins of the material might be, at some stage the KGB got in on the act. The date quoted most often is late August when Victor Louis, the KGB's international journalistic "fixer," travelled from Moscow to Copenhagen for a week's meeting with staff members of "Time-Life."

At the same time, however, it is claimed that the "Khrushchev" material had been reaching "Life" in dribs and drabs for something like 18 months, during which the work of editing and translation was proceeding apace. Indeed, some American officials profess to believe that the Moscow purveyors of the material intended it to be published in the West in time for the twenty-fourth party Congress in March, since postponed to March this year.

The theory behind this is that the publication of the memoirs, with their outspokenly anti-Stalin-

continued

ist tone, is a move in a power struggle linked to the [illegible] party Congress. The intention, it is argued, was to create a pretext for raising Stalinism as an issue at the party Congress, and to use the resulting debate as a rallying cry for anti-Stalinist elements as Khrushchev did with his "secret speech" on Stalin's crimes in 1956.

However, an alternative explanation is also possible. The CIA has never ceased looking for ways to repeat its most successful operation of all time—the publication of Khrushchev's "secret speech." It obtained the text soon after he had delivered the speech to a secret session of the twentieth Congress. The United States published it to the world.

Khrushchev had intended it as the beginning of a controlled process of de-Stalinisation. The details of it were being read out only to select party audiences in Russia and in Eastern Europe. But the release of the text by the CIA, and its broadcasting back to the Communist countries, began a process of dissension and disintegration within the Communist camp which is still continuing today.

It caused the first rumblings between Moscow and Peking, which were to grow into the fierce Sino-Soviet conflict of later years. It brought about the Polish riots which led to a change-over from the Stalinist to the initially liberal Gomulka regime. It was the main cause of the Hungarian revolt. It made Western Communist parties throw off the Kremlin's tutelage.

The perpetrators of the present Khrushchev hoax appear to hope for great things from it, to judge from comments often heard in Washington. Claiming that it is a genuine article, some officials draw attention to the impact that it has already had in the West, and to reports which they are getting about its impact in the Communist world.

The Voice of America has so far confined itself to broadcasting commentaries on it rather than the text, in order perhaps to give no grounds for undue suspicion, but these need be no less effective as propaganda. Radio Liberty, the American-sponsored radio station in Munich which broadcasts to the Soviet Union, has also been making hay while the sun shines.

In the course of the most extensive discussions with Government officials in Washington about the authenticity of the "memoirs," using all the evidence I had amassed, I was able to shake the self-assurance of only a few men with a more sceptical cast of mind.

With a few notable exceptions the State Department has swallowed the CIA explanation of the memoirs hook, line, and sinker —and in the prevailing state of opinion in Washington these exceptional men would hardly care to be identified. Indeed, a secret meeting held last week at the State Department [illegible] some of the most illustrious and experienced diplomatic and CIA experts on the Soviet Union [illegible] memoirs with hardly a murmur of doubt as to their authenticity.

The men who, as I know from personal conversation, have serious doubts, did not voice them. And those who have no doubts were able to argue afterwards that the memoirs must be genuine, because the CIA would surely not try to deceive so high-powered a meeting.

Nor would it in the ordinary course of things. But if the CIA had been able to persuade Mr Nixon and his closest advisers that the publication of the "memoirs" would yield huge political dividends, the agency would have been authorised to keep all word of the operation confined to the smallest circle at the highest level—as happened, for instance, in the CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba.

It is also argued in Washington that the CIA's own Soviet affairs analysts know no more of the memoirs than do other Soviet experts outside the agency, and that this shows that the CIA's hands are clean. That the analysts indeed know nothing I am absolutely sure. They are people whom I have met repeatedly over the years, and with whom I have argued about interpretations of Soviet events in an atmosphere of give and take, of unforced intellectual inquiry directed at getting at the truth.

During the long discussions I had with them recently in Washington about the Khrushchev memoirs they would have been sure to have given something away, if only by an unguarded change of expression or by an inflection of the voice. Their superiors would have known of this potential "security risk" in discussions among experts, and would have kept all knowledge of any such operation from the analysts.

It is argued, however, that the analysts would need to know the truth, if only because failure to know it would adversely affect their analyses of Soviet policy. Against this it may be said that the contents of the Khrushchev memoirs have no direct bearing on Soviet policymaking, since they are supposed to come from a man who was thrown out of the Kremlin more than five years ago, and has no chance, on any reading of Soviet politics, of returning to the leadership.

Perhaps the most persistent question put to me in Washington was this: supposing, for the sake of argument, that a Western intelligence organisation was behind the Khrushchev memoirs. How would the operation have been carried out?

One possible scenario, as the intelligence jargon has it, would begin with an attempt by the KGB to plant a version of the Khrushchev memoirs on "Life" magazine. The first approach, which is said to have been made more than [illegible] months ago, might well have come from some member of the Khrushchev family circle, acting for the KGB, which would account for the [illegible] which have lately leaked out. [illegible] version of the memoirs would not bear any relation to what was finally published in "Life."

The KGB has engaged in a similar operation once before, when it made available to NBC, the American television network, a filmed interview with Mr Khrushchev, who recollected his years of power and glory in the country "Dacha" to which he had retired.

The interview, shown throughout the world in 1967 made a detailed and impressive case for Russia's foreign policy, especially as it related to Cuba, and argued persuasively against American foreign policies. NBC, however, used only about an hour of a recording lasting several hours.

There was some chagrin at the time in American intelligence quarters that the Kremlin should have found a loophole in Western mass media through which it could reach a vast world public, over the heads of the Western Governments, with a cleverly conceived propaganda message.

That the interview was the first step in a KGB operation designed to gain free access to Western mass media was made clear by the role played in the affair by Victor Louis, who was the principal contact man and "fixer" on the Soviet side. Soon after the broadcast the KGB sought to exploit the breakthrough by trying to plant on NBC a long interview programme with Svetlana Stalin's children, tailored in such way as to denounce and defame their mother for her escape to the West.

The agent, again, was Victor Louis—but NBC declined the offer. The KGB's presumed attempt to plant Khrushchev's memoirs on "Life" might have been a more ambitious replay of the NBC operation. The material it would have offered to "Life" would, presumably, have been as favourable to the Soviet case, and as unfavourable to the West's, as the television interview.

American officials claim to have had no knowledge of the Khrushchev memoirs until their forthcoming publication was announced by "Life" in November. In spite of repeated assurances to this effect, I do not accept this claim. Certainly the officials who spoke to me made it in good faith. But I believe that either "Life" would have informed the CIA at the highest level of what was afoot very early, or that the CIA would have found out what was going on.

Thereafter the CIA counterplay, designed to "punish" the KGB, to deter it from launching similar operations in the future, and also to win for the United States a significant propaganda victory would have gradually begun to unfold.

The CIA would certainly not have told "Life" what it was up to. The agency does not trust journal- [illegible] the Soviet end of the operation, it would then insert its own agents into the chain, and would feed to

"Life" appropriately doctored "Khrushcheviana" that made the propaganda points c[illegible] secure the larger American purpose outlined earlier.

"Life" would thus have been taken in, unknowingly, first by the KGB and then by the CIA. American agents who knew the details of the KGB operation could, for instance, have represented themselves to "Life" as members of an "anti-Stalinist faction" within the KGB.

It has been claimed by the "Times," which serialised the Khrushchev memoirs in Britain, that those interested in restoring his image, and in defeating recurring attempts to rehabilitate Stalin, "can be found within the ranks of the KGB." The security police, the "Times" argued, was attracting increasing numbers of highly intelligent and cultivated Russians who found in its ranks a freedom, "sometimes for good," denied to the great mass of their compatriots. There were a number of cogent reasons why "highly placed members of this elite might consider it a good idea to let Mr Khrushchev have his say."

This, one presumes, could have been the argument which the CIA agents, masquerading as the KGB's anti-Stalinists, could have presented to "Life." They would have said that they knew that the KGB had already begun supplying Khrushchev material to "Life," and they would say that they had much better stuff to offer—sensational anti-Stalinist material, not the dull life story with an admixture of official propaganda which had been provided by the "legitimate" KGB representatives.

It is widely known that the memoirs are a scissors and paste job. The translator-editor, Mr Strobe Talbot, says that the original material was "quite disorganised," and that he had to take "certain liberties with the structure," drawing together "diverse fragments" into chapters.

An originally genuine Khrushchev contribution, if there was one, could have been supplemented by a KGB contribution which would in turn have been improved upon by a CIA offering, and the diverse fragments might then have been made up into chapters.

If the initiative for the whole operation had been the CIA's the Kremlin might have reasonably taken umbrage. But there was indubitably a KGB role, as is evident from Victor Louis's Copenhagen meeting with "Time-Life" representatives.

If, therefore, this was a KGB move that was trumped by the CIA, the Soviet Government can hardly feel wronged—and it may have learned the lesson that games like this are not worth playing, because it stands to lose much more than it can gain.

The elaborate argument presented here depends to a considerable extent on the evidence I bring forward in following articles. These seek to show that the memoirs as a whole could have [illegible] neither from Khrushchev nor from the KGB, and, after eliminating them as the only possible sources, present the evidence pointing to the United States.

The principal publishers of the Khrushchev memoirs, the Time-Life organisation, take refuge behind a cloak of silence from those who challenge the book's authenticity. They are prepared to say nothing for the record, except to reiterate their unshakeable confidence that "the genuineness as well as the significance of these reminiscences speak for themselves." They do not.

Privately, some of the people directly concerned with the publication of the "Life" series have gone so far as to dismiss even the testimony of Svetlana Stalin, one of the few people now in the West who is in a position to prove that the inaccuracies cannot be due to Khrushchev's failing memory.

The "New York Times" telephoned her in Arizona, where she now lives as Mrs Wesley Peters, and read out to her some passages in the book. Questioned about a dramatic incident concerning herself at Stalin's new year party in 1952, she said that in fact she was not even at the party. She was celebrating the new year with her own friends elsewhere.

"Aha," said the man from "Life" when I taxed him with this, "but she didn't deny the incident itself." It might indeed have happened at some other time, and the error in the date would not then be of any great importance. I therefore tried to check this with Svetlana, but, after the first interview with the "New York Times," she had refused to have any further dealings with the press on the matter. When I finally managed to persuade her to discuss the subject again, she allowed me to read out the passages from the book to her—she refuses to read the book herself—and then she commented on them.

The circumstantial account of the party relates how Stalin and his Politburo cronies—Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Bulganin, and Khrushchev himself—were dancing by themselves when Svetlana arrived. She was so tired that she hardly moved while dancing, but Stalin—who had made her join in—insisted that she must carry on. She stopped, leaned her shoulder against the wall, and Stalin and Khrushchev went over to her. Stalin continued pressing her. "I have already danced, papa, I'm tired," she pleaded. Now the real drama began: "With that, Stalin grabbed her by the forelock of her hair with his fist, and pulled. I could see her face turning red and tears welling up in her eyes. I felt so sorry for Svetlana. He pulled harder, and dragged her back to the dance floor."

I put to Svetlana the argument by "Life" that she had only denied her presence at that particular party, not the incident itself. "This never happened," she answered. "Nothing [illegible]." She also gave a detailed explanation of why the circumstantial description of the party was untrue. Stalin and his associates often sang at their parties, after they had had some drink, but they never danced. There were never any women at their parties, and they would not dance by themselves, not even folk dances. Nor, incidentally did she dance by herself, either.

She gave many more such details which show that this and a whole series of other passages in the book could not be true. It has been argued that Khrushchev is an inveterate liar, and that he might simply have invented many of the incidents he describes. But why would Khrushchev invent a story to show that when Stalin travelled from the Kremlin to his "dacha" outside Moscow, Stalin himself worked out a different route every time on a street plan of the city, to thwart possible attempts on his life?

Svetlana said that Stalin always went by "the route," a heavily guarded series of streets. The security system activated all the traffic lights the moment Stalin's bullet-proof car left the Kremlin, and the police constantly made special checks along the route.

The man from "Life" countered that Svetlana, on her own admission, did not see much of Stalin in his last years, and that the system must have changed by then. Svetlana countered that she did see him from time to time, until a few months before his death, and that she knows that the system remained in use.

Svetlana made it absolutely clear that she was not interested in entering into polemics about the book's accuracy with Khrushchev, or with anybody else—such as the KGB—who might be behind it. She had now built herself a new life, she was "completely alienated" from her Soviet past, she was not interested either in the Soviet Union or in its leaders. She wished to have nothing further to do with it all, and she hoped that those reading the account of my conversation with her would understand that she was not in any way personally involved.

The man from "Life" said that "Svetlana herself admits that she hasn't read the book, so she cannot judge." But my conversation with her, lasting nearly three hours, gave her an opportunity to consider the relevant facts and to judge them.

Many of the incidents in the book are closely related to her own published account of her life with Stalin. Indeed, the presumed forger appears to have derived some of his basic material from Svetlana's book—and from many other books published in the West—and to have then embroidered on it.

The memoirs say that the death of Andrey Zhdanov, Stalin's heir apparent, was hastened in 1948 by the fact that "he had lost his [illegible] and was not able to

continued

control himself when it came to drinking." Stalin had to shout at him to make him stop drinking. Now this is something that Svetlana could speak of from her direct experience, for she was at the time married to Zhdanov's son, and thus a member—though a somewhat reluctant one—of the family.

"This alone," she continued, "shows that the man who wrote the book really didn't know much." Zhdanov's heart condition was such that he was allowed no drink. He was not "a drinking type," he had suffered from several heart attacks, he had been ill for a long time, and "everybody" in the Kremlin circle knew all about it.

Svetlana provided a number of other telling examples which show not simply that the writer of the memoirs was a liar, but that he did not know the things which Khrushchev, in his position, would have known—and could not conceivably have forgotten.

The notes which accompany the memoirs say that, apart from small discrepancies, "Svetlana herself confirms Khrushchev's account." They repeatedly invoke the authority of her own book, which was published long before the memoirs, and which can hardly be taken as "confirmation" of the authenticity of the memoirs. But if her authority is held in such high regard by the publishers, should they not also accept her refutation?

The evidence of living witnesses is reinforced by Milovan Djilas, the deposed Yugoslav leader, whose own book, "Conversations with Stalin," also appears to have provided the forger with a good deal of source material. "Khrushchev" recounts an elaborate anecdote, nearly a page long, which Djilas is supposed to have told him during a visit to Kiev. It is a story about a dog, a cow, and an ass, and it is all about elections to Parliament. It concludes with the ass complaining that "they wanted to elect me to Parliament—I barely got away."

The punch-line comes at the end when Tito, who was also in the company, looked "sternly" at Djilas and demanded: "Are you trying to tell us by your fable that we elect asses to Parliament?"

Mr Djilas, however, tells me that he knows no such story. He does know a story about a dog, a cow, and an ass, which he says was very popular in Yugoslavia at the time—but it concerns the manner in which people used to flee abroad from pre-Communist Yugoslavia, and has nothing to do with elections. Moreover, when he met Khrushchev in Kiev (which he describes in his book), in March, 1945, there had as yet been no Communist elections in Yugoslavia. Therefore, he adds, Tito could not have made the remark attributed to him.

Vladimir Ashkenazy, the Russian pianist who has had a tussle with the Soviet Government about his permit to travel abroad, also figures in the book. "It gives me special pleasure when I turn on the radio and hear it announced that Ashkenazy has come to Moscow to give a concert," says the writer of the memoirs. Mr Ashkenazy assures me that he has not been back to the Soviet Union since his quarrel with the Government in 1963, although he has heard that recordings of his performances are sometimes played on Moscow Radio—once or twice a year perhaps.

The Ashkenazy remark in the memoirs might, perhaps, point either way, but the evidence of the other living witnesses shows the mendacity of many of the stories in the memoirs. If Khrushchev intended his book to serve as a monument to his own nobility, and as a lesson to future generations—a point repeatedly made in the book—would he have told so many lies which any historical researcher could show up?

But if the inaccuracies are neither deliberate lies, nor due to a failing memory—and some of the examples quoted here can have been neither—then how does one explain it all?

The study of political forgeries published over the past 100 years or so shows one thing above all others. Every forger is bound to make some serious slips which will lead to questions about his product. The forgers of the Khrushchev memoirs would have been sure to have made at least as careful a study of political forgeries as I have, and to have come to the same conclusions.

They therefore know that they were bound to make at least some mistakes which would cause the authenticity of the memoirs to be challenged. To avert the challenge, they would have inserted a large number of "deliberate errors" into the book, which would make it possible to argue plausibly that Khrushchev's memory had begun to fail. And which would also account for the forgers' own errors, when these were discovered by researchers.

However large the team of forgers may have been, it would have been physically impossible for them to check every single "fact" they had put into the book. They had to invent at least some "original material" to add to what they had garnered from other books. That was the risky part of the exercise.

It is known to students of the period, for instance, that, during the war, Stalin did not usually sign operational orders with his own name, but used the pseudonym Vasilyev. A forger would therefore feel it safe to say, as Khrushchev is made to say, that during the first part of the war when things were going badly, "Stalin's signature never appeared on a single document or order," and that this continued even after the Germans had been driven back from the approaches to Moscow.

But the war archives captured by the Germans show that this is not true. The forgers might have been unable to do all the necessary research in the archives and in the history books, but Khrushchev himself, who was the second in command of important sections of the front during the best part of the war, would certainly have seen Stalin's more important orders.

The archives contain documents signed by Stalin at the time of the first war disasters, and during the period of major failures later on, as well as when the tide of war had turned. One cannot escape the fact that Khrushchev could not have failed to know all this—and he could not have forgotten it, unless his brain had gone soft. But if his memory had failed to that extent, he could hardly have written, dictated, or otherwise participated in the compilation of his memoirs, which contain a great deal of other quite accurate material.

Another category of error which Khrushchev could not conceivably have committed is shown by the example of General Golikov, deputy commander of the Stalingrad front when Khrushchev was the commissar there. A detailed account of the general's fear and cowardice, with a description of how "a look of terror came over Golikov's face," ends with him being relieved of his command in disgrace.

In fact, as Khrushchev would have known, Golikov emerged from Stalingrad with an enhanced reputation, and was given the command of the Voronezh front. Moreover, this man whom Khrushchev is shown to despise and to distrust was appointed in 1958 as the head of the army's main political administration, that is, as Khrushchev's watchdog over the military at a time when there was considerable friction between him and the generals.

Khrushchev, then at the height of his power, would hardly have appointed a man of whom he thought so badly to a post on which his own political control of the army depended.

Khrushchev says in the memoirs that Russia lost a million men in the war with Finland, while the estimate of the Finnish general staff put the number of Russian dead at about 250,000. Even if the Finns had under-estimated the figure—which is unlikely—the number given by Khrushchev is a gross over-estimate, popularly believed in the Soviet Union at the time. A Russian refugee now in the West who might have lent a hand in the writing of the memoirs could put a figure like this into the book. But Khrushchev, a member of the Politburo at the time, would know better than that.

The pattern of error in the memoirs, established in this article, must be based for reasons of space on only a few examples, but there are [illegible] to support the case that Khrushchev could not have, knowingly or not, made many of the mistakes which occur in the book. There is only one way in which the historical evidence could be disputed. The publishers must release the full original Russian text of the book.

"Life" has repeatedly said to inquirers—including myself—that the text cannot and will not be released. Its spokesmen argue that this "might endanger some people" in Russia. But if a study of the text shows that it was written or dictated by Khrushchev, it could endanger only him—and he can hardly be endangered more than he has been by the publication of the English version. If a study of the text does lead to "other people," as "Life" maintains, then it would prove that Khrushchev is not the author.

But the text must be released now. When I challenged, more than five years ago, the authenticity of the "Penkovsky papers"—the memoirs of the Soviet spy whose parentage I also traced to the CIA—much of the evidence was similar to that I have presented in the present case. In reply to my challenge that they should produce the Russian original, the publishers formally declared—in "Life" magazine in 1967, as it happens—that it would be published next spring. Several springs have gone by, and nothing has happened.

Fine words butter no parsnips. This is too serious a business for promises that might not be fulfilled. The Russian text must be released now. All the paper must be subjected to chemical and microscopic examination to show that it comes from Russia. All tape recordings in the possession of the publishers must be subjected to a voice-print test, which "Life" claims has already been done privately. Well-established computer techniques must be used to establish that the word pattern is truly Khrushchev's own. The typescript must be studied to show whether it was produced on a typewriter manufactured in Russia.

There are many other tests, highly technical and reliable, which could put the authenticity of the memoirs beyond doubt. Unless the text is made available—to an independent committee of international scholars—awkward questions must continue to be asked, and the suspicions which point to the CIA must continue to be voiced.

THE LONDON SUNDAY TIMES
24 JANUARY 1971

THE GREAT KHRUSHCHEV CONTROVERSY

Harrison E Salisbury, former New York Times correspondent in Moscow (pictured left in fierc
debate with Khrushchev) calls the book: 'A formidable document, a valuable historical testamen

FIRST THINGS FIRST. This *is* Nikita S. Khrushchev speaking —speaking in a voice that often is his familiar earthy self, flailing at Stalin and paying off old party scores), again justifying his brashest, most dangerous manoeuvres, preening himself over Eisenhower, Dulles, "that son-of-a-bitch Nixon," Mao ("not a madman") and Malenkov, warm but a mite condescending on J.F.K. and R.F.K., tendentiously revising history to burnish his image and, finally, like a great Russian patriarch, calling upon his countrymen to create a new and better society, a freer more pleasant community of men under, of course, what he calls the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

At the same time Khrushchev unconsciously portrays as few before him the tedium, banality, the *posh-lust* of the Kremlin system, the horror of the Stalin years, the abasement of Soviet morals by the gangster ethics of Stalin's police. ("Better I do it than have it done to me.")

Sometimes, he reveals, Stalin passed around to be signed by the Politburo the verdicts on their closest associates. But sometimes not. The procedure was so casual that to this day Khrushchev cannot quite remember whether he signed the death warrant of his brilliant associate, N. A. Voznesensky. "That's what was meant by 'collective sentencing,'" he adds.

But this is not a memoir in the conventional sense. Indeed, Khrushchev probably has never put his thoughts down in writing.

We are dealing here with a corpus which began as an inchoate jumble of rambling family-taped conversations. These raw notes (often confused and inaccurate) have been censored, patched, excised, potted, twisted, distorted and strained through a variety of "editings" which probably began with Khrushchev himself and his immediate entourage, including his son-in-law and ex-Izvestiya editor Alexei Adzhubei. Other fingers in the pie almost certainly belonged to a Politburo member or two, and one or more factions of the Soviet police Establishment which finally seems to have authorised the chameleon-like police literary agent, Victor Louis, to convey the package, complete with a marvellous album of family snapshots, to the West.

There the publishers, with the not always unerring aid of Edward Crankshaw, have transformed this bundle into a fascinating document which, if devoid of spectacular revelation and notably questionable in antecedents, at least gives us a Hogarthian picture of Russian life at the top under Stalin, under Khrushchev, and as it is today.

Khrushchev seems to have commenced his tapings (judging from fragmentary internal evidence) in 1965 or 1966, a year or two after his fall from power and at a time when an energetic and ambitious man might still hope for some kind of a political comeback. The latest segments were dictated toward the end of 1969 or early 1970 (this can be established by his references to events after the death of Ho Chi-minh in the autumn of 1969, and to Fidel Castro's 1970 sugar-cane quota of 10 million tons), that is, at a time when Khrushchev could not hope for a return to power but could still try, perhaps, to illuminate his reputation, encourage any persisting Khrushchevites, pay back enemies and lay some guidelines for the future.

If these were Khrushchev's motives, those of the party and police accessories who permitted the materials to reach the West almost defy intelligent analysis.

A case can be made that someone (Politburo member? Warring police bigwigs?) is using Khrushchev as a weapon against the neo-Stalinist regime of Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny. Or, alternatively, that someone is trying finally to discredit Khrushchev and his liberalising philosophy by deliberately planting this package in the West. Two items are surely bound to [illegible] book contains a panegyric to Ivan S. Serov, Khrushchev's own police chief ("an honest, incorruptible, reliable comrade despite his mistakes") who was dismissed in 1958, and a gratuitous tribute to the recently deceased General Penkovsky ("General Penkovsky is still alive and well. I wish him one hundred years of life and happiness"). Penkovsky was the great-uncle of Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet agent whose exposure as an extremely high-level conduit to Western intelligence caused an enormous scandal in Soviet Government and police circles.

At the same time Khrushchev makes savage condemnations not only of Stalin's police aides like Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria but of a coterie of police-political figures prominent in the Red Army, such as Kulik, Mekhlis, Shchadenko and Marshal P. I. Golikov, long the head of the Red Army's "Political Administration," and whom Khrushchev described as crying in a paroxysm of fear at the height of the Stalingrad battle: "Stalingrad is doomed! Don't leave me behind!"

Without entirely ruling out other possibilities, I think it fair to say that I do not regard Khrushchev Remembers as a fake. But Khrushchev's last tapes have been tampered with almost beyond reconstruction. It would be helpful, of course, if the publishers would release for inspection their original Russian text, with its confusions, bumbling vagaries and all.

Nonetheless, Khrushchev Remembers is on its own special terms a formidable document, a valuable testament in the history of Russian Communism. Nothing demonstrates as does this work the shabby fate of the Russian Revolution.

Compared to the earlier polemical critiques of Trotsky and others in opposition this is just page after page of backstairs kitchen gossip. Not a single discussion of principles; not one indication that the [illegible] Marxism

continued

played any real role in debate, discussion or decision in Stalin's day or even down to the present.

As Khrushchev describes it, he and his comrades in their nightly "sessions at Stalin's" used to gather in the "big roomy bathroom" and over the pissoirs and the lavabos discuss "what the consequences of the session" (sometimes fatal to one or two of those present) might be. When Stalin fell out with his cronies, he forbade them to go to the movies in his private Kremlin screening room which was an equivalent of the King's bedchamber in the days of the Borgias. Here the big decisions were argued and made. When Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov stopped getting invitations to the movies, they knew their days were numbered and desperately begged their colleagues to tell them when there would be screenings; so long as they managed to show up, they still had, in Khrushchev's phrase, "a ticket" on life.

Decisions of great state matters were made in the most trivial manner. When Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to sign the Nazi-Soviet pact in August, 1939, most of the Politburo went shooting for the day at Voroshilov's country estate. Khrushchev's contribution to the event was a fine bag of ducks for the state dinner. He was pleased to have shot one more than Voroshilov who was "being built up by the Press as our 'No 1 marksman'."

The decision to attack Finland in 1939 was the product of a casual weekend conversation in the Kremlin. Khrushchev dropped in just as Stalin was saying "Let's get started today." That decision, he says, cost Russia a million lives—a palpable overestimate.

At the time of the Nazi attack on Russia in June, 1941, Khrushchev paints Stalin as sitting about endlessly in idle conversation, clearly unable to make up his mind what to do. Khrushchev wanted to get back to Kiev because he felt war might come at any moment. But Stalin kept him on and on. ("Look, what's the rush on getting back to the Ukraine?") Finally, Khrushchev broke away, arriving in Kiev on the morning of June 21, 1941, only hours before the attack. "He had kept me around simply because he needed to have company, especially when he was afraid. He couldn't stand being alone," observes Khrushchev.

From these memoirs you begin to get a deeper conception (already sketched out by Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva) of the emptiness and boredom at the top, of Stalin's loss of touch with life, his total isolation from reality, his inability to break the pattern and, of course, his consta[illegible] ever-deepening paranoia.

Dinners with Stalin, highly prized, were in Khrushchev's recollection, "frightful." There had been, he reports, "excessive drinking at Stalin's table ever since before the war. . . . Stalin found it interesting to watch the people around him get themselves into embarrassing and even disgraceful situations. Once Stalin made me dance the *gopak* before some top Party officers. I had to squat down on my haunches and kick out my heels. Later, I told Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan 'when Stalin says dance, a wise man dances.'"

Khrushchev reiterates his Secret Speech indictment that "there was something unquestionably sick about Stalin," and he compares Stalin's acts to those of Hitler and Mussolini.

Indeed, the petty vacuity at the top in Russia vividly reminds us of Hitler's inner circle. But perhaps Khrushchev's most telling comparison is to Nicholas I, the "Iron Czar" whose terror and repressions only Stalin was to exceed. Khrushchev even christens Stalin's era "the reign of Joseph I"—inevitably recalling the famous passage in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "The First Circle" which depicts Stalin musing upon the creation of a Djugasvili dynasty.

It would take a small book to list the omissions, distortions and plain mistakes in "Khrushchev Remembers." It is a pity the book was published so swiftly that it could receive only a kind of cosmetic editing and footnotes which themselves are pocked with error.

Khrushchev says, incidentally, that after Stalin's death the famous note from Lenin threatening to break off personal relations because of Stalin's insults to Madame Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, was found in a "secret compartment." One wonders what else may have been found: Stalin's reply to Lenin (not published to this day)? Nadezhda Alliluyeva's suicide letter to her husband, known to have denounced him violently in policy as well as personality? Private notes from Hitler? Evidence of his long-rumoured connection with the Okhrana, the Czar's secret police? Secret instructions for the murder of Kirov in Leningrad and Trotsky in Mexico City? Who knows? Khrushchev Remembers does not say.

He offers some minor revelations. He says the puzzling fall from favour by Malenkov in 1946 stemmed from a shabby wrangle over aircraft procurement. He mentions in most favourable terms General Vlasov, the Soviet general who after capture by the Nazis set up the anti-Soviet Vlasovite movement. He even asserts that Stalin thought of naming Vlasov commander of the Stalingrad Front. This is more than puzzling. Vlasov was captured in early July, 1942, and the Stalingrad battle did not open until later in the summer. Nor does Khrushchev say, as he might have, that Malenkov was Vlasov's patron. His animus against Malenkov is intense. He recalls Stalin saying, "this Malenkov is a good clerk," reminiscent of Lenin's famous characterisation of Molotov as "the best filing clerk in Russia."

Khrushchev affirms, as had long been suspected, that Stalin came to fear Beria and in his last years was plotting to get rid of him (the "Mingrelian Affair"). He supports Svetlana Alliluyeva, for whom he expresses an almost sticky affection, in her claim that in Stalin's last months he even turned against his notorious *chef de cabinet*, Gen. A. S. Poskrebyshev, but does not attempt to square this with the documented and sinister role Poskrebyshev played in laying the groundwork for the "Doctors' Plot."

What could have been Khrushchev's main purpose in these rambling discourses? He says, at one point, that it is to contribute to the "self-purification of the Party." Perhaps. But if the party were to follow his final recommendations—and these seem to have a coherence and a timeliness which many passages of the book do not—it would be compelled to take the "seven locks" off Soviet borders, to let Soviet citizens freely in and out, to let tourists and travellers, freely in and out, to permit writers and artists to write and create without dogmatic interference, to halt the ever-escalating military expenditures, to bring nuclear weapons under control, to halter the powerful military bosses, and radically to raise the Soviet standard of living.

Few, either outside or inside Russia, would quarrel with Khrushchev's prescription—few, that is, except the grey lumpenbureaucrats and their military patrons who run the Soviet state. To them nothing would be more frightful because to follow Khrushchev's programme would be to put the death warrant on their oligarchical monopoly of power.

I put down Khrushchev Remembers with a feeling of nostalgia. I spent a good deal of time with Khrushchev in his days of glory. I thought, on balance he was good for his country and good for the world. He made hair-raising mistakes. But he didn't mind admitting his blunders. He had the eternal curiosity of a child. And, at heart, it was difficult to believe that he was not sincere in his desire to make a better world. Khrushchev Remembers brings back these impressions with intensity. Khrushchev is, finally, one of the great figures of our times. It is testimony to the temper of Russia today that such a man is kept under house arrest (or, now, in a hospital) isolated from his countrymen, an exile in his own land.

Prof Leonard Schapiro of the London School of Economics says: 'Well played KGB! How Lenin would have laughed'

THIS LARGE, well-produced book, illustrated with unfamiliar and often fascinating photographs, purports to contain reminiscences written down or dictated by Khrushchev during the years which have elapsed since his downfall in 1964. The publishers assert that "they are convinced beyond doubt" that the text is "an authentic record of Nikita Khrushchev's words." Since they do not reveal the basis of their conviction, their statement does not take us very far. It might carry more weight if they were to publish the Russian text, which they appear to have no intention of doing; or if they were to make available the tapes—on which the Russian manuscript is, according to some accounts, partly based—so that those familiar with Khrushchev's voice can judge for themselves.

The translator, Mr Strobe Talbott, tells us that when the material came into his hands it was "quite disorganised." He therefore had to draw together "diverse fragments which are here presented as chapters," with only an occasional "transitional sentence."

Mr Crankshaw has seen the Russian text, and is convinced that what he read was "the real thing." This conviction is based solely on the internal evidence of the text. Mr Crankshaw tells us that he does not know how it was prepared, or why, though the fact that he was told nothing of the origin of the document did not disturb him, since, he says, one often has to use one's judgment in the case of unofficial documents emerging from the USSR. (It may be remarked that it would be difficult to think of a more improbable member of the SAMIZDAT underground publishing fraternity than Khrushchev!)

However, Mr Louis Heren in The Times suggested that the document reached the publishers through the agency of the Soviet Security Police, the KGB. (Even more circumstantial stories, naming the intermediary and stating the date and place where the final transaction took place, have appeared elsewhere.) Other accounts have suggested that the whole, or the bulk, of the document was produced outside the USSR. We may never know the full truth. But if the story that the KGB intervened in some way in order to assist the publication of this document is true (and no one has yet denied it) then one thing is quite certain: the KGB do not enter into transactions with capitalist publishers unless they see some advantage to themselves.

Theories about some faction in the KGB trying to rehabilitate Khrushchev can be dismissed as moonshine—he is old, sick and politically dead. So can the suggestion that the KGB are using the reminiscences to put a stop to any trend towards a new Stalinism—the KGB would be the first to back such a resurgence. Indeed, the whole suggestion that the publication, in English, of this particular hotchpotch could in any way play some role in internal Soviet politics is fantastic. Some more cogent reasons will be suggested later for the KGB involvement. But first let us look at the internal evidence which convinced Mr Crankshaw.

Even in translation, the style and manner certainly seem in many places remarkably like Khrushchev's, with the characteristic jokes, proverbs, crudenesses and all. Does this prove very much? Khrushchev is no literary stylist, and his mannerisms are easy enough to imitate. Secondly, the text is riddled with mistakes, misstatements, plain lies, prevarications, distortions and omissions. Mr Crankshaw, in his introductory passages and footnotes (in spite of occasional factual errors of his own) shows up Khrushchev, or whoever the author is, mercilessly, pointing out many of the omissions and glaring inconsistencies in the narrative.

True, Khrushchev was always notoriously careless with his facts. But the argument that one can deduce the authenticity of the reminiscences from such errors seems to me very threadbare. Anyone faking Khrushchev's reminiscences would be the first to make sure that the text was liberally sprinkled with errors and omissions.

There are three much better tests of authenticity: how much of the text is new? How many errors or statements are there of a kind which Khrushchev is unlikely to have made? How closely do the accounts of incidents in which Khrushchev was personally concerned follow known existing narratives, and how far do they reveal individual touches, or new facts? The plain truth is that on each of these tests this book comes out rather badly.

The text of the reminiscences occupies some 500 pages, of which 350 deal with domestic issues, but only up to 1956; and the remainder with foreign policy issues up to the Cuban missiles crisis in 1962. (It is understandable that the KGB should not wish to release, or try their hand at making up, internal events of more recent date. If, on the other hand, parts of the book were made up outside the USSR, it is equally plain that the author would steer clear of making assertions which new facts emerging in the future could demolish.) The remainder of the book consists of useful appendices, including the so-called Secret Speech of 1956.

So far as my own knowledge goes, there are a few, but only a very few, facts or statements which are new. There is an admission, not to be found in the Secret Speech, that forced collectivisation "brought nothing but misery and brutality"; there is an acknowledgement (never before made in public) that US aid during the war was a vital element in Soviet victory. There is even a little pat on the back for our naval convoys. Other novelties are of lesser importance: an offer to Khrushchev in 1938 of the Deputy Premiership of the USSR; a long story of an intrigue against Malinovsky shortly after the war in connection with a military suicide; and an assertion that the North Vietnamese were virtually on the point of collapse in 1954.

So much for the new information. As regards improbable errors or assertions, these are very numerous. Beria is twice described as Central Asian or Asian — how could even Khrushchev have made such a mistake? Besso Lominadze is stated to have been "tried" —though we know from Margarete Buber-Neumann that he remained at liberty until his suicide in 1934.

I find also the following statements, among others, very implausible: an expression of great respect for Molotov's judgment in foreign affairs and the statement that he was no longer active in 1956; a story of President Roosevelt refusing in public to drink a toast to King George VI (for which a recent correspondent to The Times suggested a possible, if [illegible] Lord Allenby's

continued.

memoirs); Khrushchev's statement that he heard some of Svetlana Allilueva's Letters to a Friend on a foreign radio station; and his cynical admissions that the annexation of the Baltic States and the attack on Finland were merely a part of Soviet power politics without any moral justification. I cannot imagine Khrushchev saying this, even in private, let alone for publication abroad.

Finally, two real absurdities. The totally untrue statement (surprisingly endorsed as accurate by Mr. Crankshaw) that Kosygin was "suddenly released from all his posts" at the time of the Leningrad affair; or the even more startling allegation that Tito supported the invasion of Hungary in 1956. Tito stated the exact contrary in his Pula speech of November 11, 1956: and Pravda never denied it in its reply on November 23, 1956. And is it really to be believed that Khrushchev and Co. went on a tour of all the satellites to get them to endorse what is (quite erroneously) described as a "Warsaw Pact" action?

What I find least convincing about this book is the way in which descriptions of incidents or events with which Khrushchev was most intimately connected are based almost entirely on accounts that are already known outside Russia. One would have expected some new facts or some new personal details in, say, tales of the domestic life of Stalin, or of the arrest of Beria. Yet the former read to me as if they were largely (if not entirely) based on Svetlana's Letters to a Friend. The story of the arrest of Beria, which reads like a gangster film script, follows closely the several lurid versions given by Khrushchev to visiting Socialists or Communists, and all subsequently published.

The colourful charges against Beria, including details of the violation of young girls after drugging, come from a document in the form of an indictment which circulated fairly freely in the satellites at the time, and of which the contents were described in detail to a Committee of the US Senate by a Polish defector. Not one single new fact or circumstance appears in the account of how the Secret Speech came to be delivered.

These are only some examples out of many. Does this mean that the whole document is a forgery? Not necessarily all or even the bulk of it. There may well be large portions of it which are based on tape recordings of what Khrushchev said, such as records of interrogations preserved by the KGB, or secret monitoring of private conversations in his house, or unpublished parts of the NBC filmed interview of 1967 which the KGB sponsored. The difficulty is that we do not know which portions are genuine and which are false, nor are we ever likely to know.

This means that whatever sensational or commercial interest the "reminiscences" may have, for the serious student of contemporary history they are totally worthless; and an historian who relied on any part of them would discredit both his work and his reputation. I fear Mr Crankshaw has not enhanced *his* reputation by sponsoring this book—any more than did the late Mr Isaac Deutscher by endorsing the spurious memoirs of Stalin by the non-existent Budu Svanidze.

But to return to the KGB. There are at least two further possible motives for their operation, in addition to the lure of dollars, and the satisfaction of getting the capitalists to pay those who organise subversion against them. One is the insertion of statements which serve a useful "disinformation" purpose—though I have been unable to spot many such passages. A possible one is an alleged conversation around the time of the Cuban crisis with Robert Kennedy in which the late Senator is supposed to have begged Khrushchev to yield, since otherwise the US Military would take over and force a war. I find this improbable, but in any event it is excellent grist for the New Left Mills.

Even more attractive for the KGB is the general confusion that false or partly false documents cause in the war of "disinformation." They help to discredit the genuine documents, and they cause bewilderment and incredulity among the public, which in turn diverts attention from the more discreditable aspects of Soviet politics. The KGB have specialised for many years in manufacturing the bad in order to drive out the good. No doubt the "Khrushchev" book will be used before long by suitable Left-Wing writers in order to discredit such damaging, and undoubtedly authentic Samizdat documents as the Chronicle of Current Events.

The final irony is that this review of mine (handsomely paid for by the capitalist Press) also helps the KGB in a small way by adding to the debate over these "Khrushchev reminiscences" and thus increasing the general bewilderment. Well played, KGB! And Lord, how Lenin would have laughed at it all!

memoirs); Khrushchev's statement that he heard some of Svetlana Allilueva's Letters to a Friend on a foreign radio station; and his cynical admissions that the annexation of the Baltic States and the attack on Finland were merely a part of Soviet power politics without any moral justification. I cannot imagine Khrushchev saying this, even in private, let alone for publication abroad.

Finally, two real absurdities. The totally untrue statement (surprisingly endorsed as accurate by Mr. Crankshaw) that Kosygin was "suddenly released from all his posts" at the time of the Leningrad affair; or the even more startling allegation that Tito supported the invasion of Hungary in 1956. Tito stated the exact contrary in his Pula speech of November 11, 1956: and Pravda never denied it in its reply on November 23, 1956. And is it really to be believed that Khrushchev and Co. went on a tour of all the satellites to get them to endorse what is (quite erroneously) described as a "Warsaw Pact" action?

What I find least convincing about this book is the way in which descriptions of incidents or events with which Khrushchev was most intimately connected are based almost entirely on accounts that are already known outside Russia. One would have expected some new facts or some new personal details in, say, tales of the domestic life of Stalin, or of the arrest of Beria. Yet the former read to me as if they were largely (if not entirely) based on Svetlana's Letters to a Friend. The story of the arrest of Beria, which reads like a gangster film script, follows closely the several lurid versions given by Khrushchev to visiting Socialists or Communists, and all subsequently published.

The colourful charges against Beria, including details of the violation of young girls after drugging, come from a document in the form of an indictment which circulated fairly freely in the satellites at the time, and of which the contents were described in detail to a Committee of the US Senate by a Polish defector. Not one single new fact or circumstance appears in the account of how the Secret Speech came to be delivered.

These are only some examples out of many. Does this mean that the whole document is a forgery? Not necessarily all or even the bulk of it. There may well be large portions of it which are based on tape recordings of what Khrushchev said, such as records of interrogations preserved by the KGB, or secret monitoring of private conversations in his house, or unpublished parts of the NBC filmed interview of 1967 which the KGB sponsored. The difficulty is that we do not know which portions are genuine and which are false, nor are we ever likely to know.

This means that whatever sensational or commercial interest the "reminiscences" may have, for the serious student of contemporary history they are totally worthless; and an historian who relied on any part of them would discredit both his work and his reputation. I fear Mr Crankshaw has not enhanced *his* reputation by sponsoring this book---any more than did the late Mr Isaac Deutscher by endorsing the spurious memoirs of Stalin by the non-existent Budu Svanidze.

But to return to the KGB. There are at least two further possible motives for their operation, in addition to the lure of dollars, and the satisfaction of getting the capitalists to pay those who organise subversion against them. One is the insertion of statements which serve a useful "disinformation" purpose---though I have been unable to spot many such passages. A possible one is an alleged conversation around the time of the Cuban crisis with Robert Kennedy in which the late Senator is supposed to have begged Khrushchev to yield, since otherwise the US Military would take over and force a war. I find this improbable, but in any event it is excellent grist for the New Left Mills.

Even more attractive for the KGB is the general confusion that false or partly false documents cause in the war of "disinformation." They help to discredit the genuine documents, and they cause bewilderment and incredulity among the public, which in turn diverts attention from the more discreditable aspects of Soviet politics. The KGB have specialised for many years in manufacturing the bad in order to drive out the good. No doubt the "Khrushchev" book will be used before long by suitable Left-Wing writers in order to discredit such damaging, and undoubtedly authentic, Samizdat documents as the Chronicle of Current Events.

The final irony is that this review of mine (handsomely paid for by the capitalist Press) also helps the KGB in a small way by adding to the debate over these "Khrushchev reminiscences" and thus increasing the general bewilderment. Well played, KGB! And Lord, how Lenin would have laughed at it all!

CASE FILE (DESCRIPTION)

HS/HC-950 VOL. II

INSTRUCTIONS

Place card upright in place of charged out folder.
Place [illegible] horizontally in returned file folder.

CHARGE TO	DATE	CHARGE TO	DATE

CASE FILE CHARGE-OUT CARD

FORM NO. 119 REPLACES FORM 36-152
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(7)