THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1973

Between Coups, Employes of C.I.A. Learn to Knit, Bowl and Play Softball

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

LANGLEY, Va., Sept. 16—When they are not stealing secrets or considering coups d'état, employes of the Central Intelligence Agency indulge in such innocent pastimes as learning to knit, repair cars, bowl, play softball, collect coins and fly small planes.

These are among the popular endeavors sponsored by the Employe Activities Association of the C.I.A., which also maintains a credit union and an insurance agency for its spies and other employes.

Knitting classes, according to the bulletin board announcement, are held Wednesdays and Fridays at noon. For those with more martial inclinations, there are karate classes and training in rifle and pistol shooting. The C.I.A. softball league features teams calling themselves the Lollipops, the Cardinals and the Charlie Browns.

In the basement there is a rubber-covered track for joggers, a favorite of the former director, Richard Helms. In his day, the track rules prescribed: "Never talk to the director while he is doings his laps and never pass the director while he is doings his laps."

With a degree of pride, agency officials display their art, the work of the C.I.A. Fine Arts Commission, which has hung huge abstracts in corridors wide enough to play soccer. The ends of the corridors have been "color-coordinated" by the commission, with tints ranging from cool to warm and warm to cool.

The fine arts people have arranged for enormous photographic blowups of maps of the C.I.A.'s favorite foreign cities — London, Leningrad, Paris and Rome—pasted up on the elevator shafts.

Courtyard Flowers

They also watch over the agency's exquisite courtyard flower bed and its handsome stands of trees. The grounds outside are called "the campus."

Like factory workers, C.I.A. employes eat early and practice temperance, trying to get to the in-house Rendezvous Cafe before the noon rush. The strongest drink is iced tea and the serve-yourself meals cost $1.80.

A visitor asking for an explanation of the 40-foot-wide corridors and the 15 glass doors of the entrance to the 14-year-old building is told that the agency leadership wanted "airiness" instead of a close atmosphere.

Whatever the motivation, the effect has been to cause the agency's employes to walk three and four abreast when they move around the building.

Certain undercover habits persist, as in the C.I.A. car pool. If you want a ride to or from Langley, you fill in a card with all the particulars of office extension number, time and place, but only your first name or nickname and the request: "Call Fred."

C.I.A. people also indulge heavily in jargon, from the boss on down. They talk of "wiring diagrams" when they mean "organizational plans" and "patterned response" instead of "straight answer." But the new boss, and old C.I.A. man named William Colby — his car-pool request would read, "Call William"—has also picked up some current pop phraseology. He was recently heard saying, "I haven't got any hang-ups about . . ."

The C.I.A. also tends to use abbreviations and shorthand. The institution's house symphony orchestra is referred to as "symp orch."

Garrison Planned To Link General To JFK Slaying

By Iris Kelso
Special to The Washington Post

NEW ORLEANS—New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, as late as March 1971, was preparing to accuse another person of conspiring to assassinate President John Kennedy.

Garrison's intended defendant this time was the late Air Force Gen. Charles Cabell, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and brother of Earl Cabell. Earl Cabell, who later became a congressman, was mayor of Dallas at the time of the assassination.

The Cabell story is brought out in tape recordings introduced in Garrison's pinball bribery trial in federal court here.

The account of how Garrison developed his theory that Cabell masterminded the Kennedy assassination is said by some to suggest the way Garrison developed his case against New Orleans businessman Clay Shaw, whom he did charge.

According to the tape Garrison talked with Persh ing Gervais, his former chief investigator and closest friend, about the Cabell theory on March 9, 1971.

Garrison had gotten Gen. Cabell's name from "Who's Who in the South and Southwest." He was prepared to charge Gen. Cabell if he could establish that Cabell had been in New Orleans any time around the date of the assassination, Nov. 22, 1963.

Gervais, at the time of the conversation, had gone to Garrison's home to deliver $1,000 the federal government says was a pinball bribery payment. Gervais, who then was working with the government, wore a voice transmitter under his coat.

Garrison's imagination was triggered when he learned Gen. Cabell was former Mayor Cabell's brother. Garrison's theory was that the CIA was behind the assassination and that the Dallas city government and police department cooperated in it. He thought the assassination was masterminded out of New Orleans. He wanted Gervais to check the records at a motel in New Orleans to learn if Gen. Cabell had been there around November 1963.

In the tape, Garrison's voice could be heard saying, "If I can put him in the Fontainebleau Motel, then I've got enough to grab him by the ------- balls."

"OK," Gervais commented. Garrison: "Now the average guy, Joe Smith, don't want to hear any more when he finds out that the Number Two man in the CIA is the brother of the mayor of Dallas."

Later Garrison said, "Wait till the country finds out that—I been yelling CIA, wait till they find out that the Number Two man in the CIA is the man in charge of the Bay of Pigs and the brother of the mayor of Dallas."

Gen. Cabell was deputy director of the CIA until his resignation effective Jan. 31, 1962. His brother, former Rep. Cabell, says the general was "the engineer" of the Bay of Pigs operation.

Garrison faced the possibility that Gen. Cabell just might not have registered at the Fontainebleau around the assassination date. In that case, he said, he would bring up the General's name at some time when he had a national audience—in a television show or in a speech.

There is no evidence in the tapes that Gervais ever checked the motel records. Cabell's name was never mentioned again.

There was a major drawback to Garrison's plan, anyway. He had no defendant. Gen. Cabell had died in 1970 —several months before Gervais.

Gervais, who probably knew Garrison better than any other person, was notoriously indifferent to Garrison's assassination theories.

In another tape Gervais told a pinball operator, "Clay Shaw had no more to do with that bull--- than you did. Garrison just thought he was going to make himself a big man out of that pile of ----."

Earl Cabell, living in Dallas since his retirement from Congress, had heard that it was him, rather than his brother Charles, whom Garrison hoped to link to the assassination.

At any rate, Cabell was not disturbed. Of Garrison, he said, "That guy is nuttier than a fruitcake."

The story of Garrison's interest in Gen. Cabell could be important in New Orleans. Although Clay Shaw was acquitted of the assassination conspiracy charge, many voters still think Garrison "had something."

In the long run the Cabell story could be more significant than the government's charge that Garrison was guilty of taking payoffs from pinball operators.

Colby Revamps CIA Unit in White House Shakeup

The Office of National Estimates, which CIA Director William E. Colby is abolishing in a White House-ordered shakeup, is to be replaced by a less structured group of intelligence analysts who will individually prepare intelligence estimates under new guidelines.

Despite an effort by the CIA leadership in recent weeks to deny that a radical shakeup of the intelligence evaluation procedure has already been decided upon, the Star-News has learned:

- That Colby decided more than two months ago to abolish the elite 10-man Board of National Estimates which for more than 20 years carried collective responsibility for preparing objective intelligence estimates. The decision was discussed among high-ranking CIA officials late in June and revealed at a subsequent meeting of the high-level U.S. Intelligence Board, but has not been announced to the agency rank and file or to the congressional oversight committees.
- That the board's distinctive and prestigious product, the 50 or more National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)it prepared annually, will now be prepared by individual researchers in a loosely defined group with the new designation: National Intelligence Officials (NIO).
- That NIEs henceforth will be altered to meet long-standing Nixon administration dissatisfaction with the calibrated and scholarly product of the board and its 20-man staff, which together formed the Office of National Estimates. Colby is said to have ordered the NIOs to make their assessments brief, to the point and factual.

To give the new NIE format an added air of precision, Colby has reportedly ordered the abolition of the long-standing verbal scale of certainty which used such hedge words as "apparent," "Possible," "probable" and "almost certain."

INSTEAD, Colby has ordered a numerical scale of certainty from 1 to 10. The FBI has for many years graded informants cited in reports on a T-for-trustworthiness scale on which T-10 indicates total confidence and T-1 indicates almost no reliability.

Authoritatives sources in the intelligence community have misgivings about these changes, warning that the substitution of individual analysts for the collective product of the old system could rob future NIEs of objectivity.

These same sources scoff at the new numerical grading system, calling it a "cosmetic way to achieve a false sense of precision."

Despite the frequently reported complaint of White House policy makers that NIEs were too verbose and took too long to read, intelligence sources familiar with the estimating process point out that estimates deliberately written at greater length in the Nixon administration because Henry A. Kissinger wanted them that way.

EVIDENTLY distrusting BNE output from the start, Kissinger passed the word that he wanted NIEs to include a detailed exposition of the evidence and a clear development of the analytical argument as well as the detailed summary of conclusions the NIEs had previously set forth.

The administration distrust of the existing analytical function seems to be the basic motivation behind the abolition of the BNE and its staff, despite the fear voiced by knowledgeable observers that "the independence and objectivity of the national estimates are threatened by the abolition of this office."

In an internal bulletin circulated in the CIA and to some congressmen a few days after the Star-News first reported last month that the ONE would be abolished, the CIA leadership declared that "the goal is to conserve resources and maintain efficiency by combining the production of NIEs with certain other agency and intelligence community functions."

One undeniable effect of the decision is to remove a

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, September 7, 1973
A-9
★★

body that had a unique and symbolic reputation for objectivity. It is understood some BNE members and ONE staffers will continue to analyze under the new title of National Intelligence Official. Others are to be assigned to a newly created Office of Political Research, reportedly to be headed by Ramsey Forbush, a former member of the BNE.

WHILE THE new structure at CIA clearly reflects White House wishes, the details are understood to be Colby's alone. He is especially credited with the guidelines calling for numerical rather than verbal grading and the decision to remove the estimating function from collective to individual responsibility.

According to one inside source, Colby has shown himself to be as much a stickler for form in his own arrangements as he was in setting his precision guidelines for writing estimates. Until he was finally sworn in as CIA director this week, he continued to operate from small offices in the CIA headquarters and did not move into the director's big suite until the formalities were observed. He also continued to park his car in a remote spot in the vast agency parking lots until Tuesday, when his title became official.

Colby's creation of NIOs in place of the ONE structure is not intended to take the CIA's analyzing function across the line that divides prediction and assessment from policy making, informed sources stressed.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the analyses which are now beginning to come from the NIOs assiduously avoid policy proposals—thereby fulfilling for the moment the CIA leadership's pledge in its recent bulletin that "the objectivity of NIEs will be sustained."

For the longer runs, the relationship of the intelligence community to U.S. foreign policy will not be clear until Kissinger has settled into his new position as secretary of State. At present, he still dominates foreign policy from the White House, in his capacity as head of the 120-man National Security Council staff

But the stature and role of the revamped CIA in the second Nixon administration will not become firm until Kissinger develops a modus operandi for his new dual role as secretary of State as well as National Security Council director. A key unanswered question is whether he will continue to rely on his own NSC crew or, by depending more on career bureaucrats at State, come to depend more on the product of Colby's newly reorganized system of producing intelligence estimates. — OSWALD JOHNSTON and JEREMIAH O'LEARY.

The New York Times Company — NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1973 — Higher newsstand price in air delivery cities



The New York Times/George Tames

NEW C.I.A. DIRECTOR SWORN IN: William E. Colby and his wife with President Nixon during yesterday's ceremony at the White House. Mr. Nixon said, in apparent jest, that he hoped Mr. Colby would tell him what was going on in the world "before I read it in the papers." Mr. Colby replied, "That's a very direct charge."

Airline Linked to CIA May Bow Out

Southern Air Transport Inc., an airline allegedly owned for several years by the Central Intelligence Agency, has evidently decided to give up a large part of its operating authority, according to papers on file at the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Southern in a letter signed by its Washington lawyer, James H. Bastian, said it will not continue to prosecute its applications to renew a large portion of its operating authority.

The letter was sent to Robert Johnson, a CAB administrative law judge presiding over proceedings involving renewal of operating authority for a dozen supplemental airlines.

SOUTHERN currently holds authority to transport inclusive charter tours within the United States and between this country and a group of central and south Pacific islands. It also has authority to fly to Australia, Indonesia, and several Caribbean islands. The airline also has worldwide authority under Defense Department contracts and holds cargo authority to Central and South America.

Southern s decision means the airline will be left solely with its domestic operations and Defense Department contract business.

THE AIRLINE is involved in a fight with several other supplemental carriers. Stanley G. Williams, Southern's president, wants to acquire control of the airline from its present owners — but rival supplemental airlines have complained.

They say former stockholders unlawfully relinquished control of Southern to the CIA and that to allow Williams to simply acquire it now would give him a windfall to their disadvantage, since Southern has been the recipient of large sums of government financial aid.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS A-7
Washington, D. C., Thursday, September 6, 1973

HS/HC-950

Colby Is Sworn In as CIA Director

By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon watched the swearing-in of his new Central Intelligence Agency director yesterday and then made one request: He wanted to learn what was "going to happen" from the CIA rather than reading about it in the newspapers.

"That is a very direct charge," replied William E. Colby, the man who once directed the American pacification program in Vietnam.

Mr. Nixon praised Colby, 53, as "a true professional" and a "Distinguished public servant."

". . . His appointment has met with, I would say, almost universal acclaim . . . and with a very overwhelming vote in the Senate," the President said. "I would point out, too, that his career of service in the CIA is not as well known as most because, as we all know, in that particular organization your successes usually must remain unknown and your failures become known."

The Minnesota-born Colby was known as "the professional's professional" within the CIA. He rose through the ranks after a World War II career with the Office of Strategic Services that included parachute drops into occupied France and Norway.

The oath-taking ceremony in the President's oval office was witnessed by members of Colby's family, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of State-designate Henry A. Kissinger and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The oath was administered by U.S. District Judge George L. Hart Jr.

In a brief response Colby pledged that the CIA would seek to serve "in protecting our national security and welfare."

United Press International

President Nixon congratulates new CIA Director William E. Colby before White House swearing-in ceremony. Looking on are Mrs. Colby and Judge George L. Hart.

Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0

"I take it as a major charge to fulfill both meanings of the word 'intelligence,'" Colby said. "The one is the official meaning of an intelligence organization . . . but the second meaning is the application of the human quality of intelligence to be able to analyze facts and come out with assessments and judgments about them."

Mr. Nixon recalled that he had first met Colby when he was directing the pacification program in Vietnam. The hard work of Colby and others, the President said, had succeeded "in building South Vietnam into a ciable peacetime country."

The President nominated Colby last May to succeed Schlesinger, who replaced Richard Helms, the CIA chief under President Johnson whom Mr. Nixon made ambassador to Iran.

The swearing-in ceremony was the first official business since Mr. Nixon returned early Saturday from a two-week trip to Key Biscayne and San Clemente. Mr. Nixon met Saturday morning with Vice President Spiro Agnew and with counsellor Melvin R. Laird.

White House officials predicted throughout Mr. Nixon's stay in California that a "more visible President" would soon be in the offing. But at the daily White House briefing yesterday, White House spokesman Gerald L. Warren insisted that published and televised reports of scheduled appearances were premature.

Decisions have not yet been reached on Mr. Nixon's next public appearances or when he will hold another news conference, Warren said.

Warren did announce that Mr. Nixon would hold a cabinet meeting this week and also would meet with Republican congressional leaders.

Another meeting that is under consideration is a session with GOP state chairmen, who will be in Washington this Sunday to attend a meeting of the Republican National Committee.

Mr. Nixon returned to the White House at 10:15 p.m. Monday and spent his first evening there since Aug. 16. He escaped the weekend heat at Camp David with his family and close friend Charles (Bebe) Rebozo.

Aides said that Mr. Nixon swam every day in the pool, walked in the woods, watched movies and saw the Sunday broadcast of the football game between the Washington Redskins and the New England Patriots.

The President announced yesterday that he will nominate Vice Chairman George H. Hearn of Brooklyn, N.Y., for a new five-year term on the Federal Maritime Commission.

Hearn, a Democrat, has served since 1964 in the $38,000-a-year post.

CIA-Linked Airline Won't Seek Renewal Of 2 Key Licenses

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL *Staff Reporter*

WASHINGTON — Southern Air Transport Inc., a Miami-based charter airline understood to have been secretly owned by the Central Intelligence Agency since 1960, informed the Civil Aeronautics Board it won't seek to renew two key operating certificates.

In a letter mailed over the weekend to the administrative law judge handling a massive supplemental airline certificate renewal case, Southern Air said it decided it won't prosecute its applications involved in the current proceeding. They include renewal of its authority for cargo and passenger operations from the U.S. across the Pacific to Asia and Australia and between the U.S. and Caribbean points. The transpacific certificate, one of only three granted to charter carriers by the CAB in 1966, has been considered Southern Air's most valuable asset.

Industry sources said Southern's action probably means its applications eventually will be dismissed. Loss of the Pacific and Caribbean authority wouldn't necessarily halt Southern's operations but would inhibit any growth plans. It would continue to hold domestic passenger and cargo and certain world-wide cargo operating rights.

Southern didn't state any reason for its action in the certificate matter. The Wall Street Journal last week disclosed that an application to purchase control of Southern, pending before the CAB in a separate case, apparently represents an effort by the CIA to secretly sell its interest in the airline to Stanley G. Williams, Southern's president. It was reported Mr. Williams filed the application. Other airlines have protested against the sale on the ground it involves illegal government ownership and financing of a certificated carrier.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 1973

58M

C.I.A. Is Reported Trying To Sell Interest in Airline

Southern Air Transport, a Miami-Based Charter Company, Had Done Work for the U.S. Military in Vietnam

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 28 —The Central Intelligence Agency is secretly trying to sell its controlling interest in a charter airline, Southern Air Transport, knowledgeable officials said today.

A member of the Miami-based company, which operates three Lockheed Hercules transports, said in a telephone interviewthat SouthernAir Transport had done contract work for the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. He asked not to be identified.

There is also some evidence that the charter airline performed some clandestine missions for the intelligenceagency in the Caribbean area, specifically to Haiti.

The sale of the 26-year-old airline to Stanley G. Williams is currently before the Civil AeronauticsBoard's administrative law judge, Milton Shapiro.

Mr. Williams, a former Navy man, joined the airline in 1949 and became its secretary-treasurer. Now, as president and direction, he is seeking 100 per cent ownership for $5.1-million.

Nominal Sellers

The nominal sellers are a Washington businessman, Perkins McGuire, and Percival Flack Brundage, also of Washington. Mr. McGuire was an assistant Secretary of Defense and Mr. Bundage a director of the Budget under President Eisenhower.

After six days of secret hearings before Judge Shapiro last June, representatives of four charter airlines competitive with Southern alleged that Mr. McGuire and Mr. Brundage were merely acting for the Central Intelligence Agency. Neither man could be reached for comment this evening.

Officials familiar with the charter airline business said the four companies contesting the sale of Southern to Mr. Williams resented what they regard an unfair competition from Government interests.

They noted that Southern was awarded a choice route across the Pacific Ocean in 1966 even though its presentation was, in the words of a former C.A.B. official, "substantially different" and less well documented than those of many other airlines bidding for the route.

Air America Operation

The award to Southern was evidently made as a requirement of national security. The President of the United States has the ultimate authority to award foreign airline routes on this basis, it was noted.

It appears that the Central Intelligence Agency decided to pick up Southern Air Transport in 1960 in part as an adjunct to its operation known as Air America, which carried out numerous clandestine operations in Indochina, particularly in Laos, during the nineteen-sixties.

Southern's attorney in the case pending before the C.A.B. is James H. Bastian, who is also on the board of directors of Air America.

The 1972-73 District of Columbia telephone book lists both Air America and Southern Air Transport offices as being at 1725 K Street N.W. but a caller was told that Southern had recently closed its Washington quarters and could now be reached at the Miami International Airport.

'National Interest'

Mr. Bastian said on the telephone that he had requested secret sessions in the Southern transaction before the C.A.B. on the ground of "national interest."

But an official of the authority said that all parties at access to all of the information" in the case. He indicated that the representatives of competing companies had broken oaths of secrecy in disclosing the intelligence agency's involvement

Among the companies contesting the sale is Overseas National Airways of New York.

Asked for comment on an article in today's Wall Street Journal dealing with the Southern Transport Case, a representative of the intelligence agency said, "Nobody here feels it is appropriate to discuss it."

Mr. Williams, 52 years old, the president of Southern, was described by company associates as being out of town and unavailable for comment.

However, a man familiar with Southern operations said he was aware the 120-member charter company did fly missions to "certain areas" of Indochina from the Philippines in the past.

Federal Contracts

He added that Southern had also been given contracts by the Agency for International Development to carry relief supplies to Bangledesh last year, and in recent months to the drought-stricken inhabitants of the western Sahara region in Africa.

Southern Air Transport's connection with Air America appears to have involved money as well as personnel, judging from the C.A.B. hearings.

Air America is said to have lent Southern $1.7-million in 1960 to buy two Douglas DC-6 aircraft from it. That was about the time Mr. McGuire and Mr. Brundage appeared in the ownership of Southern. In 1966 Air America lent $5.7-million to Southern.

Southern has also received money from a company called Actus Technology, which is said to be owned and managed by Mr. Williams, Mr. Brundage and Mr. McGuire.

"They are all part of the C.I.A. old boys' club," a charter airlines official said.

The auditing firm for both Air America and Southern is Coopers & Lybrand, the same New York-based international accounting firm that analyzed President Nixon's purchase of his property at San Clemente, Calif.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
5 SEP 1973

SAYS HE WANTS TO BE FIRST TO KNOW

Nixon Quips About News Leaks to CIA Chief

WASHINGTON (AP)—William E. Colby was installed as director of the Central Intelligence Agency Tuesday and President Nixon jokingly told him he wanted to find out what was going on in the world "before I read it in the papers."

"That's a very direct charge," the 53-year-old career intelligence officer responded.

Colby is the third CIA director in less than a year. The oath was administered in Mr. Nixon's Oval Office by U.S. Dist. Judge George L. Hart Jr.

Mr. Nixon praised Colby as "a true professional" and a "distinguished public servant."

Colby has been the CIA's deputy director for operations since March. He was nominated by Mr. Nixon for the top job when James R. Schlesinger quit after a brief tenure to become secretary of defense.

Schlesinger had succeeded Richard M. Helms when Mr. Nixon named Helms ambassador to Iran in a government shakeup that followed last November's election.

Schlesinger witnessed the swearing—in of Colby, as did Secretary of State—designate Henry A. Kissinger and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

OATH TAKING—President Nixon watches as William E. Colby is sworn by U.S. District Judge George Hart Jr. as head of the CIA. Mrs. Colby holds the Bible. Rear, from left, Adm. Thomas Moorer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State-designate Henry A. Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger.
(AP Wirephoto)

Mr. Nixon told the small gathering that Colby was not well-known to the public because in the CIA "your successes usually must remain unknown and your failures become known."

The President praised Colby's direction of the controversial Phoenix pacification program in South Vietnam from 1968 to 1971, saying it had helped make that country "a viable country, which is now paying off."

The program was designed to counter the operations of Vietnamese civilians who provided assistance to the Viet Cong.

Colby told Mr. Nixon his aim would be not only to provide the Administration with hard facts but to apply human qualities to their evaluation and analysis.

September 1973

The CIA's Dirty Tricks under Fire—at Last

ANDREW HAMILTON

For the first time in more than two decades, Congress is beginning to take a hard look at the Central Intelligence Agency. In the wake of revelations of CIA complicity in the Watergate affair, a serious debate about the Agency is now taking shape, and it could develop into an historic battle over the role of clandestine operations in American foreign policy.

"Clandestine operations" (which should not be confused with the gathering of foreign intelligence) include a wide range of political, propaganda, economic, cultural, and paramilitary activities known within the CIA as "covert action" and "special operations," or, more generally, Dirty Tricks. These operations have included, over the years, such practices as:

- Hidden support and assistance to political parties in foreign election campaigns.
- The establishment of dummy foundations to provide funds for a number of private organizations engaged in scholarship, propaganda, labor, youth, and cultural affairs.
- Establishing ostensibly independent, private companies, including a number of airlines.
- Arranging *coups d'etat;* supporting, training, and leading private armies and air forces in foreign nations.
- Helping to establish security police organizations in a number of countries, and other Cold War ploys.

The CIA operations amount, in total, to a clandestine American foreign policy under the exclusive control of the President, insulated from public control and even from public scrutiny—not to mention Congress itself.

President Nixon has given a clear signal that he places a high value on covert operations. His new Director of Central Intelligence, William Egan Colby, fifty-three, spent his adult life in Dirty Tricks, beginning with OSS guerrilla operations in World War II and culminating in a twelve-year stint as one of the CIA officials most deeply involved in the Vietnam war.

Colby was CIA station chief in Saigon (and a staunch supporter of President Ngo Dinh Diem) from 1959 to 1961. From 1962 through 1967 he was chief of the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services, the formal title of the operating arm of the CIA. From 1968 to 1971 he was involved with the "pacification"

Andrew Hamilton is a Washington writer whose articles have appeared in many publications, including Congressional Quarterly, Science, The New York Times, and The Economist in London. Recently he served in the office of program analysis of the National Security Council, where he specialized in the defense program and arms control plans. He wrote "Helpless Giant," a study of the national defense budget.

continued

program in Vietnam, first as deputy and later as ambassador in charge. In 1971-72 he was back in Washington again as Executive Director (number three man) at the Agency. When that post was abolished in a reorganization this year, he became head of the Directorate of Operations, which runs the Clandestine Services.

Colby is a quiet, undemonstrative man—"when he's really mad he's almost whispering," recalls a former employe—whose mild manner conceals the toughness and boldness of a behind-the-lines guerrilla fighter. He has the reputation of being one of the CIA's most resourceful managers of Dirty Tricks. He was responsible, as head of the pacification program, for American participation in the Phoenix program in which thousands of Vietnamese suspects were killed or jailed on suspicion that they worked for the Vietcong.

Senator William Proxmire, Wisconsin Democrat, complained during the recent debate on Colby's nomination that the Senate was being asked to cast a "blind vote." He observed: "We don't really know who Mr. Colby is. We are not allowed to go back into his personal employment history and judge his fitness. We do not know what jobs he has accomplished . . . And we will be confirming him for a blind position [about which] we know very little. . . ."

Although the Senate confirmed Colby August 1 by a vote of eighty-three to thirteen, the decisive battle will begin this fall. Senator John C. Stennis, Mississippi Democrat, has announced that his Senate Armed Services Committee will hold hearings on the CIA's basic legislative charter to determine whether the Agency exceeded its authority in waging war in Laos and in its involvement with the White House "plumbers" in the Watergate affair.

Stennis's Committee is the one whose CIA Oversight Subcommittee has failed to meet for several years, and whose members have rarely expressed any interest in supervising the secret and powerful Agency. But the hearings come amid a growing feeling in Washington—expressed even by Chairman Stennis—that the CIA's Cold War mission as the clandestine action arm of U.S. foreign policy no longer serves the national interest, if it ever did.

The man who founded the CIA in 1947, President Harry S Truman, reached this conclusion a full decade ago. In 1963, he wrote: "For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government . . . I never had any thought that when I set up the CIA it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations."

Other Presidents have had qualms about the CIA. John F. Kennedy, a former aide once said, wanted to "splinter it into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds" after the Bay of Pigs disaster, a CIA-planned operation which Kennedy had approved. Lyndon B. Johnson, hardly a shrinking violet when it came to U.S. exploits abroad, was appalled by the ramifications of some CIA operations. When he took office he learned, according to an account by Leo Janos in the July, 1973, *Atlantic*, that "we had been operating a damned Murder Inc. in the Caribbean." Even Richard M. Nixon, in a 1969 speech to CIA employes, acknowledged that "this organization has a mission that, by necessity, runs counter to some of the very deeply held traditions in the country, and feelings, high idealistic feelings, about what a free society ought to be."

But President Kennedy, like his successors, soon came to recognize the immense potential of an organization whose acts could be neither traced by the victims nor supervised by his political opponents in Congress. The Kennedy years, in the opinion of one former intelligence official, became "the heyday" for the CIA's covert political intervention in other countries. President Johnson followed by unleashing massive CIA operations in Laos and South Vietnam. And President Nixon, in the same 1969 speech, concluded that the CIA "is a necessary adjunct to the conduct of the Presidency."

What both troubled and attracted these Presidents was not the CIA's "quiet intelligence" activities, but its wide range of Dirty Tricks. In the decade since Harry Truman's warning, little has been done to curb the President's own Back Alley Boys. Except for a handful of progressives; Congress continued politely to look the other way and ask no embarrassing questions. Now, in the lurid light of Watergate, Congress can no longer refuse to take a closer look.

By their very nature, covert operations defy effective Congressional oversight. A handful of men in the House and Senate, senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, are the only members of Congress allowed to ask the Agency what it is doing. Their meetings have always been secret, and their deliberations are never disclosed even to other members of Congress. Their recommendations to the Agency, if any, have never been tested in general debate or put to a vote of Congress.

From the time of its inception, the CIA's name has been synonymous with secrecy; no outsider can hope to obtain more than a rough map of its terrain. It is the Agency's practice neither to confirm nor to deny any allegations made about it. CIA employes take the most stringent secrecy oath administered by the Government. This oath has been interpreted by the Agency as prohibiting a present or former employe from revealing anything he has learned while working for the CIA—an interpretation that has won at least partial support in the Federal courts. Victor Marchetti, a former CIA official, is under court order to submit the manuscript of his forthcoming book about the Agency for review before publication, and the Agency has been

 continued

authorized to make deletions, provided they are not arbitrary or capricious.

But the Agency has found it impossible to remain wholly invisible. The picture I present here was assembled from the public record (which grows longer almost daily), and from interviews conducted over a period of several years with a number of present and former CIA employes, intelligence officials from other U.S. agencies, foreign service officers, Congressional sources, and Administration aides. (While I had a limited contact with CIA intelligence analysts when I served as a member of the National Security Council staff in 1970-1971, I had no contact with the clandestine organization or activities of the CIA.)

The CIA has both a public and a secret charter. The public charter, on which Senator Stennis's hearings will focus, is found in the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments (U.S. Code Chapter 50, Title 15, sections 403 ff.). It is the vaguest of charters, stating that the CIA shall "coordinate" intelligence activities undertaken in the interest of national security and shall:

- Advise the National Security Council regarding national security intelligence activities.
- Make recommendations to the NSC for coordination of intelligence activities.
- Correlate, evaluate, and disseminate national security intelligence.
- Perform "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern" as the NSC directs.
- "Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

The last two provisions provide the official rationale for the CIA's clandestine activities, both in collecting intelligence and in performing covert operations. These duties are detailed in the Agency's "secret charter"—a series of top-secret Presidential orders known as National Security Council Intelligence Directives, or "N-Skids."

The Senate Armed Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over the National Security Act, apparently has never seen these documents, though they are essential to an understanding of the CIA's clandestine operations. Colby, the new director, recently promised to make the "N-Skids" available to the Committee, but there is no reason to assume that they will be disclosed to the public.

Section 403(d) also contains two seemingly contradictory provisos regarding CIA activities within the United States. One declares that "the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions." The other states that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

The first proviso, which the CIA apparently violated in extending assistance to the White House "plumbers," was intended to protect the FBI's turf from CIA encroachment and to restrict the CIA to foreign intelligence activities. The second proviso, however, seems to give the Director scope for a broad range of domestic counter-intelligence activities. Whatever the justification, the CIA has not been reluctant to undertake clandestine operations within the United States.

The Act also permits the Agency to keep secret its budget, organization, personnel strength, identity of personnel, and other operational and administrative details, notwithstanding other provisions of law, and to spend money without regard for normal Government procedures.

Three points about the CIA's charter stand out:

First, the Agency is answerable directly to the President, and to the President alone. (The National Security Council is merely an advisory body made up of Presidential appointees—the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.)

Second, the CIA enjoys extraordinary freedom from public and even Congressional scrutiny.

Third, its duties encompass much more than the routine collection and evaluation of information. "The powers of the proposed Agency," warned Secretary of State George C. Marshall in a memorandum to President Truman in 1947, "seem almost unlimited and need clarification."

The CIA grew rapidly from its first days in 1947. ("Bigger than [the Department of] State by '48," was a common boast.) The Agency now has about 16,500 employes (after a seven per cent reduction in force put into effect earlier this year by Director James R. Schlesinger, now Secretary of Defense). In recent years its direct budget has hovered around $750 million, including funds for direct expenses and covert projects, but it may now be slightly lower as a result of the winding down of the wars in Vietnam and Laos.

Similar in size, budget, and overseas staff, the CIA rivals—if it does not surpass—the Department of State as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In *A Thousand Days*, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote that in 1961 the Agency "had almost as many people under official cover overseas (i.e., posing as employes of other Government agencies, such as the Foreign Service or AID) as State; in a number of countries CIA officers outnumbered those from State in the political sections (of the U.S. mission). Often the CIA station chief had been in the country longer than the ambassador, had more money at his disposal, and exerted more influence."

This situation seems to have changed little in the last twelve years. Some recent U.S. foreign policy officials believe that the CIA's overseas employes, both direct and indirect, U.S. nationals and foreign, includ-

continued

ing those operating under "deep cover"—that is, with no visible ties to the U.S. Government—far outnumber those of the State Department.

For a variety of reasons, the CIA's direct budget (including project money) does not begin to tell the full story of the Agency's size or role within the Government:

• In large overseas clandestine operations, such as the war in Laos, covert activities in Vietnam, and the Bay of Pigs invasion, direct Agency costs and project funds represent only a fraction of the total costs to the U.S. Government. The staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee found earlier this year, for instance, that of the $375 million ceiling set by legislation for spending in Laos (until recently a CIA operation) during the last fiscal year, only $5.5 million represented direct CIA expenditures, while another $60 million was distributed by the CIA as project money for support of Laos and Thai irregular troops. The rest of the funds were supplied from the budgets of the Agency for International Development and the Defense Department. (These Laos program figures exclude additional large costs for U.S. air operations in Laos, many of which have been in support of CIA-directed military operations.)

• The CIA has financed, and apparently controls, a number of private corporations which provide cover for covert activities overseas. Of these the largest and best known is Air America. Earnings from these activities are said to be available to the Agency in addition to the annual budget provided from general Federal revenues.

• The CIA has the use without cost, according to former officials, of U.S. military bases and "surplus" equipment, from which it is said to have built up a large worldwide supply and operational base network.

For these reasons alone, the CIA has been called a multi-billion annual operation. But, in addition, the Director of Central Intelligence, in his role as head of the U.S. foreign intelligence community, has responsibilities for coordinating the activities and reviewing the budgets of all U.S. foreign intelligence agencies and operations. In total, these activities—most of them under Defense Department auspices—cost between $3 billion and $4 billion a year, not counting the CIA.

These operations include the costly overhead reconnaissance activities of the Air Force (such as spy satellites, U-2s, SR-71 aircraft); communications and signals intelligence, which come under the direction of the $1-billion-a-year National Security Agency; the analytical staffs and operations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence agencies; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the minuscule State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and such miscellaneous other organizations as the National Photo Interpretation Center and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the latter of which transcribes and translates overseas radio broadcasts. When the tactical military intelligence operations of the various military commands around the world are included, the annual cost may reach $6 billion, according to some sound estimates. In cost, personnel, and influence, the foreign intelligence "community" ranks with or above several Cabinet departments.



SANDERS IN THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL

"No, dear, they weren't on trial . . . they were the prosecuting team"

The CIA is organized into four main divisions, known as "directorates," each headed by a deputy director. Until recently, these men reported more or less formally to the Executive Director, nominally the Agency's number three man. Under Schlesinger's reorganization plan, the post of Executive Director was abolished early in 1973 and the incumbent, at that time William E. Colby, was made the head of the Agency's largest branch, the Directorate of Operations, which has responsibility for all clandestine activities and for the CIA's eighty-five overseas stations. In recent years this Directorate (formerly called "Plans") has had about 6,500 to 7,000 employes and a budget of about $350 million, or nearly half the Agency total.

The other directorates are:

• INTELLIGENCE, which collates, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence collected by all U.S. foreign intelligence agencies and also gathered from unclassified sources. The size of this directorate has been estimated to be roughly 3,000 persons; its budget, about $75 million.

• SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, which oversees re-

continued

search and development of technical systems for collecting intelligence, such as spy satellites; analyzes scientific and technical data collected by all sources, and circulates reports on its findings. The personnel strength is estimated at about 1,500; its budget at about $125 million, not counting large additional amounts (perhaps $500 million to $1 billion) spent annually by the National Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force on technical collection systems.

• ADMINISTRATION, under which are lumped such functions as supply, finance, medical and personnel services, training, security, and communications. (Overseas communications appear to have been transferred to Operations under the Schlesinger reorganization.) In recent years, the personnel strength of this directorate has been estimated at roughly 4,500 and its budget at about $200 million a year.

Former intelligence officials calculate that when support costs are distributed, somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters of the CIA's direct budget is allotted to clandestine operations. Of these funds, more than half are said to go to various types of covert foreign policy operations—Dirty Tricks—rather than to intelligence collection and reporting by overseas stations.

A separate staff known as the Office of National Estimates supervises the preparation of the intelligence community's principal long-range projections—the series of National Intelligence Estimates which cover such diverse subjects as the strength and organization of the Vietcong and the size, trends, and doctrine of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The office is under the direction of the Board of National Estimates, a dozen senior officials from CIA, State, and the military.

In addition, a number of smaller staff offices are attached to the office of the Director. These include the inspector general, general counsel, legislative counsel, cable secretariat, and an office of plans, programs, and budgets. Perhaps the most important of these offices is the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), recently expanded by Schlesinger and given a stronger role in coordinating the programs and budgets of the entire intelligence community.

The Directorate of Operations constitutes the covert side of CIA, known as the Clandestine Services. Officers of the Clandestine Services generally pose as officials of some other U.S. Government agency or private organization, and sometimes use false names. Except for some minor modifications that may have been instituted in the Schlesinger reorganization, the Directorate is organized as follows:

A number of specialized, functional staffs oversee aspects of clandestine activity. Their names provide some notion of the range of CIA work: Foreign Intelligence (espionage and political reporting); Counter-intelligence (reporting the operations of the intelligence services of other nations); Covert Action and Political Action (secret financing of various youth, labor, cultural and academic groups, operating clandestine radio propaganda outlets, large-scale efforts to influence foreign elections); Special Operations (planning, supporting and directing paramilitary operations); and Technical Services (wiretapping, lie-detector operations, illegal entry, false identities, disguises, and the like).

Most work of the Clandestine Services is carried out by the large regional divisions and their field staffs abroad and in the United States. The major divisions, and some of their activities which have come to light, are:

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION, which allegedly recruits agents among foreign students and U.S. residents with relatives in foreign countries. It also interviews Americans planning to travel abroad for pleasure or business and those who have recently returned. (The Domestic Contact Service, which carries out these interviews, was recently transferred from the "overt" side of the Agency, where it was under the Directorate of Intelligence, to the Clandestine Services.) This Division also apparently conducts counter-intelligence activities among East European, Cuban, and other emigré groups in the United States.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION. Among the major known clandestine operations of the past twenty years are:

• Overthrowing the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954.

• Setting up and supporting a special anti-Communist police agency for the Batista regime in Cuba in 1956. The agency, known as BRAC, soon gained a reputation for brutality and oppression.

• Later backing anti-Castro Cuban exiles in a variety of political and paramilitary activities, culminating in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

• Helping to put down an attempted coup in Guatemala in 1961, in part to protect the base of operations for the planned invasion of Cuba.

• Mounting a major covert political campaign to deny leftist Brazilian President Goulart control of the Brazilian Congress in 1962.

• Advising and assisting the successful Bolivian effort to capture Che Guevara in 1966-67.

• Intervening with covert financial and other support for opponents of Salvador Allende in the Chilean Presidential elections of 1964 and 1971.

FAR EAST DIVISION. Largest of the regional divisions, this organization supervised:

• Large-scale clandestine operations by Nationalist Chinese and U.S. agents against mainland China from the Korean War period through the late 1960s. Agents were air-dropped into China—two, Richard G. Fecteau and John T. Downey, were captured in 1952 and freed after the U.S.-China rapprochement of 1971—and

continued

guerrillas and political agents were infiltrated into Tibet in the late 1950s.

- The Philippine campaign against Huk guerrillas in the 1950s.
- U.S. efforts to establish the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem after the Geneva settlement of 1954. CIA agents subsequently encouraged (at President Kennedy's direction) the generals' *coup* against Diem in 1963.
- An unsuccessful *coup* against President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958, in which an American pilot, Allan Pope, was captured.
- The arming, training, and operations of an army of Meo tribesmen in Laos during the 1960s.
- Financing and directing a wide range of clandestine and special operations during the 1960s in Vietnam. These included cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia to gather intelligence and harass North Vietnamese and Vietcong base areas, organizing and paying various mercenary groups, and setting up the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, special Vietnamese teams whose job was to locate and capture (or assassinate) Vietcong political agents. The latter effort, originally organized under the "Combined Studies Division" of the U.S. military command in Vietnam, later became known as the Phoenix program, which Colby headed.

NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA DIVISION, now reportedly becoming one of the more active branches of the CIA. The best known CIA exploit in this part of the world was the *coup* which overthrew Premier Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 and returned political power to the Shah.

AFRICA DIVISION. Deeply involved in Congo affairs during the early and mid-1960s, when the CIA supplied pilots (Cuban veterans of the Bay of Pigs), mechanics, and aircraft to the government of Moise Tshombe.

- The EUROPE and SOVIET DIVISIONS. One of the first major clandestine operations of the postwar period was the massive infusion of funds to prevent a Communist victory in the 1947 Italian elections. According to reliable sources, CIA continued well into the 1960s to provide a large annual subsidy to the Italian Christian Democratic Party. In Greece, the Agency became deeply involved in internal politics in the late 1940s, and its role, according to sound speculation, is undiminished today.

The CIA and its predecessor organizations also helped organize anti-Communist labor unions in France and other West European nations during the period following World War II. The Washington office of the Clandestine Services provided funds to support an entirely independent underground network established under cover of the international division of the AFL-CIO.

For many years during the 1950s and 1960s the Covert Action staff in Washington ran one of the most remarkable CIA activities: the large-scale subsidization of a wide range of youth, academic, cultural, propaganda, and labor organizations in the United States and abroad. Among the long list of beneficiaries of the payments, which ran as high as $100 million a year, were the National Student Association, the Asia Foundation, the American Newspaper Guild, Radio Free Europe, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (which sponsored *Encounter* magazine). The Covert Action staff, under Cord Meyer, Jr., now CIA station chief in London, set up numerous dummy foundations to distribute the money, using a wide number of legitimate charitable institutions as cooperating go-betweens. (One of the dummy foundations was named, by strange and, to me, annoying coincidence, the Andrew Hamilton Fund.)

These subsidies, exposed in 1967, were terminated, but the Covert Action staff remains in business. According to informed sources, its annual budget continued at about the $100 million level in 1971.

This list of operations is hardly comprehensive. It does not, for example, include such large-scale intelligence exploits as the U-2 project and the first spy satellites, both initiated by the covert side of CIA. But the list illustrates the wide range of political, propaganda, and paramilitary operations which the CIA has carried out, in deepest secrecy, at White House behest.

Two points stand out: These operations were often mounted not against hostile countries, *but against neutrals or allies*. And they frequently resulted in creating and sustaining repressive regimes. The CIA has been accused by well-informed U.S. officials of helping to establish "anti-subversive" police units in a number of countries which have then used them to repress all liberal political opposition.

Informed sources estimate that of the roughly $350 million annual budget of the Clandestine Services in recent years, perhaps $225 million—most of it project money—was allocated to covert action and special operations (including $80 million to $100 million for

continued

Vietnam and Laos). The remaining $125 million went to support the CIA's Clandestine Services in its espionage and counter-intelligence activities.

As the budgetary breakdown suggests, the road to glory and advancement in CIA is through operations—Dirty Tricks—rather than the patient and often grubby work of collecting foreign intelligence. A number of former high-ranking intelligence officials have complained over the years about the Agency's tendency to mount "operations for operations' sake."

In theory, CIA covert operations are tightly controlled, and can be engaged in only with the approval of the President, who delegates the task of reviewing suggested operations to a high-level NSC committee consisting of his assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements, Jr.; Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson; and the CIA Director. But this group has no staff facilities for a proper review—the papers are handled at the White House by a single CIA official who acts as secretary to the committee—and, in any event, the committee would hardly be disposed to subject CIA plans to close scrutiny.

CIA station chiefs, moreover, enjoy considerable autonomy. An enterprising, empire-building station chief, as one source pointed out, will be on the constant lookout for an opportunity to mount a covert action, perhaps by bribing a foreign minister or a key legislator. With sufficient initiative, he can increase his budget and staff and enhance the standing of his station with Washington. In the process, the United States gradually becomes drawn more and more into the internal politics of that country.

"The Clandestine Services," says a former CIA official, "never developed a philosophy that 'our job is to spy.' They have always had the desire to manipulate events."

The CIA's predisposition toward operations has been influenced by the fact that for most of its life the Agency has been headed by men who made their reputations in that field. Allen W. Dulles (1953-61) and Richard C. Helms (1965-1973) were both operators; so was the new Director, Colby. Colby and Helms, before their respective appointments as Director, were both in charge of the Clandestine Services, a job which has generally been filled by forceful men who wielded great, if unobtrusive, influence in Washington. By contrast, the Agency's senior intelligence official, the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), has seldom been a man of comparable stature or influence.



As long as the glory, power, promotion, influence, and White House attention fall on the Dirty Tricks operators at CIA rather than on the intelligence specialists, the inherently unmanageable predisposition of many CIA station chiefs toward operations rather than intelligence work is unlikely to come under control. And as long as operations are the principal source of his influence, the Director of Central Intelligence can hardly be faulted for taking a narrow view of his job. In theory, he wears at least three hats: He is the top operator; he is the nation's senior interpreter of foreign intelligence; and he heads the vast but amorphous community of U.S. foreign intelligence agencies. In practice, however, recent directors have not fulfilled all roles equally well.

For several years, White House foreign policy experts have sought improvements in intelligence analysis and management of intelligence budgets and activities. In November, 1971, President Nixon ordered a reorganization of the intelligence committees to address these problems. He gave the Director of Central Intelligence power to oversee the budgets and activities of all intelligence agencies, including those under the Defense Department. The Intelligence Community Staff was expanded and an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) was established with the Director as chairman. At the same time the National Security Council set up an Intelligence Committee to review the quality of intelligence reports.

Director Helms, in the White House view, failed to make the reforms work. This was a factor in the decision to replace Helms (now Ambassador to Iran) with James Schlesinger, author of the 1971 reorganization plan.

Schlesinger's background seemed admirably suited to the broader concept of the Director's job. He was not only a management expert but also an economist and defense intellectual, with a background at Rand Corporation, where he had a reputation as a forceful analyst. But the Watergate scandal forced shuffles. Schlesinger became Defense Secretary. Colby, his successor, is not considered by intelligence experts to be as well-equipped to manage the intelligence community, or to improve the quality of analysis. His appointment appears to have shelved or diminished the ambitious reforms envisioned by Schlesinger. Instead the appointment of Colby put the spotlight back on operations.

When Congress confronts the CIA this fall, it should recognize that it is time for the United States to end all Dirty Tricks operations—by the CIA or any other

continued

organization. Such operations, a standard part of the U.S. foreign policy repertoire since World War II, have become more than occasional embarrassments: They are now a distinct liability to the nation's foreign relations. And they present a serious threat to constitutional government in the United States.

The reasons for ending clandestine operations are not just moral but practical as well. The moral objections to covert action are obvious. Intervening in another nation's internal politics violates the principles to which the United States professes to adhere when it establishes diplomatic relations. And covert intervention offends the general principle that nations, like individuals, should be accountable for their actions.

There are at least two practical objections. The first is that clandestine operations have a corrupting influence on American politics and foreign relations. They undermine the credibility of the Government at home and abroad. Their inherent secrecy violates the principles of accountability in the American political process. Available recourse to clandestine operations breeds contempt for more arduous—but legitimate—methods of achieving objectives. As Watergate has demonstrated, an easy familiarity with clandestine operations and a ready access to persons and techniques used in clandestine operations can become a direct threat to the American political and legal system.

It has been evident for some years that the American political establishment is deeply divided on the directions and the tools of foreign policy. Politics no longer stops at the water's edge. No more vivid demonstration of this division is needed than the recent votes in Congress to end the bombing of Cambodia and to limit the President's war-making powers. In these circumstances a clandestine foreign policy becomes a danger to domestic politics. To prevent leaks, the circle of people in the know is drawn ever smaller. In the process, the definition of the national interest becomes more narrow, and more directly associated with the political fortunes of the party in control of the Executive branch.

As the confusion between the national interest and political advantage spreads, distrust of the opposition grows to paranoid dimensions. Political operatives find it difficult to discriminate between domestic opponents and foreign agents. In this paranoid state, they have no difficulty justifying the resort to espionage and Dirty Tricks—originally developed to fight a clandestine war against alien enemies—against their domestic political opponents. The existence of occasional proof of similar skulduggery on the part of their opponents merely intensifies the psychosis. The result is an indiscriminate intermingling of domestic politics, foreign policy, and covert operations—a common theme in the Watergate affair and associated cases.

If the corrupting effect of clandestine operations is one practical objection, a second is that when they do not fail spectacularly, they are often ineffective. The

successes of the CIA in clandestine operations may be, as several Presidents have hinted, substantial. But these successes would have to be of phenomenal value to outweigh the general damage which results from the CIA's blunders, from the widespread assumption that the Agency meddles everywhere, and from the exposure of those operations which have come to light over the years.

An outright ban on the CIA's clandestine operations would result in a cut of as much as fifty per cent in the Agency's budget, an annual saving of perhaps $300-$400 million, not counting the savings of substantial additional funds diverted from other agencies for covert CIA activities. The more important effect, however, would be a much needed redirection of the efforts of the Agency's overseas staff (which could be greatly reduced in size) toward collection of intelligence.

Since many CIA operatives already work under diplomatic cover at U.S. embassies, it might prove feasible to transfer activities devoted to gathering intelligence—not to operations—to the State Department. (The far smaller British Secret Intelligence Services come under the control of the Foreign Office.)

Such steps would go a long way toward restoring the primacy of the Department of State in foreign relations, and toward putting clandestine activities under an official directly responsive to the Congressional committees responsible for foreign relations. Under the present system, decisions on the use of the Clandestine Services are made by the President, who is not directly answerable to any committee of Congress, and operations are the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, who answers to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, neither of which has principal responsibility for oversight of foreign relations.

Freed from his weighty operational responsibilities,

continued

the Director of Central Intelligence could begin to devote full time and attention to improving the management of the intelligence community and upgrading the quality of analysis.

Finally, it would be feasible to set up a more broadly representative system for Congressional oversight of intelligence activities by the CIA and other agencies, since the risk of compromising sensitive foreign policy operations would no longer exist. This could be accomplished by creating new House and Senate committees, as recommended by Senator Proxmire and others, or by setting up a joint committee on intelligence, along the lines of the existing joint committees on economic policy and atomic energy.

In sum, the Congress should:

- Repeal CIA's vague authority to carry out "other functions and duties related to intelligence," as directed by the National Security Council.
- Substitute, if necessary, language authorizing overseas and domestic activities strictly for collecting foreign intelligence, plus such counter-intelligence activities as are required overseas (leaving domestic counter-intelligence to the FBI).
- Consider placing the Clandestine Services under the operational control of the Secretary of State, either by requiring that he be responsible for reviewing and authorizing clandestine activities, or by transferring the CIA's intelligence collection functions to the State Department.
- Deny CIA all project funds for covert action or special operations, but allow limited secret funds for intelligence purposes only.
- Require the CIA to divest itself of ownership or control of such organizations as Air America.
- Clarify and strengthen the statutory powers of the Director of Central Intelligence by giving him explicit authority in law to review and make recommendations to the President on the budgets and programs of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities.
- Require disclosure of the overall expenditure of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, with reasonable accuracy allowing a little leeway for security purposes.
- Establish a committee or committees of Congress to oversee the programs and authorize the budgets of all U.S. foreign intelligence agencies, including the CIA. An effective oversight committee is essential to insure that a Congressional ban on clandestine operations is honored by the President. Given the fine line between some types of intelligence gathering and the clandestine manipulation of events, it will be impossible to draft a law which closes all loopholes through which small-scale operations will be undertaken. Thus vigorous oversight will provide the only reassurance that the spirit of the law banning Dirty Tricks operations is being observed. The committee should include, but not be restricted to, current members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate, and Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees of the House.

The committee or committees should have automatic access to all finished intelligence reports published by any intelligence agency, and these classified reports should be retained at the Committee for review by all members of Congress. This would provide Congress with an intelligence library, which it now lacks, and could considerably improve the quality of understanding and Congressional action on foreign policy and defense questions.

It is by no means certain that a majority of Congress is ready to bar all clandestine operations. Such a step would signal a major shift from the way the United States has conducted foreign policy since World War II, and opponents will no doubt argue that it would be tantamount to "tying the President's hands" or "unilateral disarmament." And it might also be argued that a clandestine action agency is more necessary in the 1970s than ever, given the decline of the Cold War with its clear-cut antagonisms, the emergence of a multi-polar world of shifting alliances, and the developing contest among the industrial nations of the world for access to oil and other raw materials. Nor is President Nixon likely to abandon without a struggle a tool which seems peculiarly suited to his approach to foreign (and domestic) antagonists.

Finally, the job of defining clandestine operations so they can be stopped without damaging the capability for intelligence-gathering activities or leaving large loopholes could prove difficult for legislative draftsmen.

These are all important practical considerations. Were the nation really in a state of siege, were *real politik* the only basis for conducting American foreign relations, were there a genuine consensus on the aims and methods of American foreign policy, and were clandestine operations compatible with American democratic institutions and processes, then such reasons might suffice to justify continuing such operations. In the real world, they do not.

The Administration's approach, and that of many influential members of Congress, will be to cope with the CIA's current crisis merely by making its covert operations even more truly clandestine, and by restricting them in size to reduce the risk of exposure. But the only way to clear the nation's reputation, restore credibility, and re-establish a basis for a foreign policy based on broad consensus—and the only way to create a real basis for effective Congressional participation in foreign policy—is to put a firm end to clandestine operations. The divorce must be clear and categorical, and ought to carry the force of legislation—an outright ban on Dirty Tricks. □

PHILADELPHI
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867,810

SEP 3 1973

FBI and CIA 'Damaged' by Watergate Investigation, Majority Feels

Part of the serious fallout from the Watergate investigation, in the judgment of the American people, is that the reputations of both the FBI and the CIA have been "damaged."

By 52-36 percent the public feels the FBI was used to its detriment in a coverup of the Watergate affair, while a 46-33 percent plurality feels the same way about the CIA.

In the hearings, testimony was given that L. Patrick Gray 3d, former acting head of the FBI, burned papers that later might have been evidence, allegedly on instruction from Presidential aide John Ehrlichman.

In the case of the CIA, several men who were caught in the Watergate break-in were former CIA employes, and E. Howard Hunt, a Watergate operative, had borrowed disguises and a camera from the CIA, for which he had worked for a number of years.

High-ranking CIA officials have suggested under oath that they felt the White House tried to involve the CIA in the coverup.

On Aug. 18-19, the Harris Survey conducted in-person interviews among a cross-section of 1,536 households nationwide, asking about those alleged White House efforts to use the CIA and FBI. Fifty-six percent felt there had been an attempt to get the agencies to cover up the Watergate affair. Twenty percent felt that that was not the case.

Former CIA director Richard Helms not only related in his testimony that he resisted inferences that the CIA take some responsibility for Watergate and the payments made to the defendants, but he denied vehemently that the CIA had any direct or indirect involvement in the burglarizing of Democratic headquarters or the subsequent coverup.

Nonetheless, in the public's mind, the notion persists quite strongly that somehow the CIA was involved in the Watergate.

Forty-five percent felt that the CIA was involved in the Watergate affair and other illegal domestic spying activities, while 24 percent that it was not.

This public suspicion, that somehow the CIA was involved in Watergate and other illegal domestic spying, is a serious charge, because such lack of public confidence could prove harmful to future CIA activities. Even more serious, however, is the fact that under the law authorizing its existence, the CIA is specifically prohibited from engaging in domestic investigatory operations of any kind.

Helms did admit under questioning that the CIA undertook to draw "a psychiatric profile" of Daniel Ellsberg, the defendant in the Pentagon Papers case, the only time in its history it had done so. However, the CIA denied vigorously that it had any knowledge and any connection with the break-in to Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. No proof has been offered that the CIA had any involvement in that affair.

Public doubts about both the CIA and FBI persist and likely will for some time, even though the Senate committee's inquiry into their possible roles has been concluded.

Based on those doubts, the public believed, 52 percent to 36 percent, that the FBI has been damaged, and 46 to 33 percent that the CIA has been damaged.

Across the board, among every major subsegment of the American public, even including people who voted for President Nixon last November, at least a plurality feels the reputations of both the CIA and the FBI have been damaged. Both have always prided themselves in being above partisan and political considerations.

WICHITA, KAN.
BEACON

E - 66,276

AUG 22 1973

Good and Bad

It's sorta like the mixed emotions expressed in the old joke about seeing your mother-in-law go off a cliff in your new Cadillac.

The Nixon administration is cutting out one office in the Central Intelligence Agency; that's good. But the reports are that the office is being abolished because it has failed to produce the kind of intelligence estimates which would support the administration's politics; and that's bad.

Being disbanded is the elite 30-man Office of National Estimates which has prepared the top secret national intelligence estimates for presidents since Harry S Truman. The major problem is that its studies of the Vietnam war and the anti-ballistic missile controversy did not agree with the Nixon administration's policies.

So, the story goes in Washington, the administration is pressuring the CIA to shape up or ship out, perhaps an office at a time.

It's good news for taxpayers when part of a bureaucracy is being disassembled but it's bad news for lovers of freedom and responsibility when that action is taken out of revenge or vindictiveness on the part of higher-ups.

It's a question of which you regard with the most affection —your mother-in-law or your Cadillac.

CHARLESTON, W. VA.
GAZETTE AUG 27 1973
M - 63,294
GAZETTE-MAIL
S - 106,775

Editorials

Editorials

Which Watergate Story Will Nixon Tapes Tell?

During his Aug. 15 speech in relation to hearings being conducted by the Senate Watergate committee, President Nixon had this to say:

"In all of the millions of words of testimony, there is not the slightest suggestion that I had any knowledge of the planning for the Watergate break-in. As for the coverup my statement has been challenged by only one of the 35 wietnesses who appeared—a witness who offered no evidence beyond his own impressions, and whose testimony has been contradicted by every other witness in a position to know the facts."

Mr. Nixon obviously was referring to his former White House counsel, John W. Dean III, who had told of coming away from a meeting last Sept. 15 "with the impression that the President was well aware of what had been going on..."

But, somehow, the President overlooked or chose to ignore L. Patrick Gray III.

Mr. Nixon, in his Aug. 15 speech on Watergate, also had this to say:

"From the time when the break-in occurred, I pressed repeatedly to know the facts, and particularly whether there was any involvement by anyone at the White House."

Gray testified before the Senate committee about a telephone call he received from the President on July 6, 1972, at a time when Gray was acting director of the FBI. He said he told the President at that time that he and Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the CIA, believed that persons on Nixon's staff were trying to "mortally wound" the President by confusing the question of CIA interest in persons the FBI wanted to investigate in its Watergate probe.

Did the President, so solicitous about pressing repeatedly to know the facts, press Gray for more information as to the persons who were trying to mortally wound him?

No. After a slight pause, said Gray, the man who knew the conversation was being taped simply said: "Pat, you just continue to conduct your aggressive and thorough investig

There followed, during Gray's Watergate testimony on Aug. 6, this exchange between Sen. Herman E. Talmadge and Gray:

Talmadge: "Did you think that your conversation with the President on July 6, 1972, was sufficient to adequately put him on notice that the White House staff was engaged in obstructing justice?"

Gray: "I don't know that I thought in terms of obstruction of justice, but I certainly think there was, it was adequate to put him on the notice that the members of the White House staff were using the FBI and the CIA."

Talmadge: "Do you think it adequate, do you think a reasonable and prudent man, on the basis of the warning that you gave him at the time, would have been alerted to the fact that his staff was engaged in something improper, unlawful and illegal?"

Gray: "I do because frankly I expected the President to ask me some questions for two weeks after that . . ." And Gray went on to explain that the President never told him anything except to pursue his investigation.

President Nixon, in his Aug. 15 speech on Watergate, had this to say:

"Because I trusted the agencies conducting the investigations, and because I believed the reports I was getting, I did not believe the newspaper accounts that suggested a coverup because I was convinced that no one had anything to cover up.

"It was not until March 21 of this year that I received new information from the White House counsel that led me to conclude that the reports I had been getting for over nine months were not true."

Dean, testifying before the Senate Watergate committee, told of a meeting he had with Mr. Nixon in the President's Oval Office on Sept. 15, 1972, and he concluded with this obversation:

"I left the meeting with the impression that the President was well aware of what had been going on regarding the success of keeping the White House out of the Watergate scandal, and I also had expressed to him my concern that I was not confident that the coverup could be maintained indefinitely."

What story would the White House tapes tell?

FORT WORTH, TEX.
PRESS
AUG 20 1973
E - 48,759
S - 54,317

Hoover opposed spy plan because he feared undercutting of FBI

By DAN THOMASSON
Scripps-Howard Newspapers

WASHINGTON — When the late J. Edgar Hoover disapproved of a White House plan to spy on American citizens, it was not because of civil libertarian outrage but because of concern that it would undercut a traditional role of the FBI.

According to several of his former top assistants, that is why the crusty old FBI chief exerted all of his considerable muscle in 1970 to scuttle former White House aide Tom Charles Huston's proposal for domestic intelligence gathering. That scheme included the use of illegal break-ins, wiretapping and mail snooping under the catch-all justification of national security.

Rather than disliking such methods, Hoover's former lieutenants agree, he regarded them as useful tools in the bureau's operations against espionage and organized crime. And until 1966 they were used regularly by his agents with his approval.

"We performed a hell of a lot of surreptitious entries for 25 years," said one top ex-aide to Hoover. "They aren't legal, but they're effective. What the hell — we were trying to catch spies and criminals."

THE SO-CALLED "GA jobs," according to his and other former FBI officials, were performed without benefit of search warrants by a highly skilled team composed of "suicide squads."

They derived their name from the fact that if any member — and all were regular FBI agents — was caught in an illegal act, he was on his own because the bureau would disfavor any connection with his activity.

"I would pace the floor until 4 a.m. waiting for word of success or failure," said one former high-ranking bureau official. "The phone would ring finally and the voice on the other end would say 'it's OK' and I'd know we had been successful."

Targets included homes and apartments of persons suspected of organized crime or espionage, and foreign embassies, he said.

"I always wondered what I would do if I had to disown one of these men," he said. "I don't know whether I could have, realizing that he was acting under my orders."

IN 1936, however, Hoover discontinued these types of FBI undercover operations in a politically sensitive reaction to President Lyndon B. Johnson's intense disapproval of wiretapping (Johnson repeatedly asked Hoover if he was sure the FBI hadn't tapped his telephone when he was in the Senate), and a Senate investigation of unconstitutional snooping by federal agencies.

Four years later, with antiwar demonstrations multiplying on college campuses and guerrilla warfare breaking out in some cities, President Nixon assigned Huston to devise a means of improving intelligence gathering. Hoover's deteriorating relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other "spy shops," Nixon said, was damaging security.

Huston, an ultra conservative who saw nothing wrong with burglary or wiretapping carried out to save the nation from anarchy or Communism, convinced Nixon he should reinstate the discontinued methods. But he said they should be controlled by a super board of FBI, CIA, National Security Council, and Defense Intelligence Agency officials for which he would act as chief co-ordinator.

ON JULY 23, 1970, Nixon gave the go-ahead on the Houston plan.

But it was too much for the aging Hoover who had become increasingly isolated in his fortress office on the fifth floor of the Justice Dept.'s headquarters on Constitution Ave while his beloved FBI was more and more the object of derision.

He regarded the Huston plan as the beginning of a dismantling of the bureau's responsibilities, according to those who were his closest subordinates.

"He saw that thing as disaster," said one of his closest associates. "He saw agents involved with amateurs in something that couldn't be controlled by him. He saw it as an attempt to break down the bureau and he saw it as totally unprofessional."

Had Hoover been permitted to control the Huston plan, employing only the professionals in his shop, he might have gone for it, this man said.

"The Watergate operatione is what you probably would have gotten the first time out under the way Huston and Nixon wanted it," he said. "A bunch of guys bumbling around — the dumbest spies in town."

HS/HC-950

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

41 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017, 697-5100

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM EYEWITNESS NEWS STATION WABC-TV

DATE AUGUST 27, 1973 12:05 A.M. CITY NEW YORK

CIA

BILL BEUTEL: Melvin Laird also says he thinks the Nixon Administration is going to be a good deal more open from now on, perhaps so much so that the President will hold a news conference once a month.

And in that connection, with all the secret places in this country, there are few more secret than the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA left its doors slightly ajar today, and ABC's Bill Downs went out for a look.

BILL DOWNS: Driving through the nation's most secure gate, the $50 million super-secret CIA headquarters looked surprisingly like a well-kept prison, which, in a sense, it is - for the country's most sensitive secrets. Permission to film the seven-story concrete and granite building came as a surprise, and marked a radical departure from previous CIA security practices; meaning the agency is worried about its public image. But any airline passenger flying west from Washington can look out and see the whole one hundred and forty fenced-in acres, including the more than twenty acres of parking lots for the eight to ten thousand faceless employees.

The agency auditorium, sometimes used for cloak and dagger briefings, looks like the top of an ice cream cone. The cafeteria, with its crenelated roof, can feed a thousand anonymous people at a sitting.

We were allowed to photograph only the outside of the agency headquarters, but this is the American taxpayer's first look at his CIA investment. We can report the property is in good condition.

This is Bill Downs, ABC News, at CIA headquarters, Langley, Virginia.

FULLERTON, CAL.
NEWS TRIBUNE AUG 11 1973
E - CIRC. N-A

New Impetus For CIA Review

Senate confirmation of the appointment of William E. Colby to head the Central Intelligence Agency gives new emphasis to familiar questions. Colby has aptly been described as "the epitome of the covert man;" his experience has been largely in this aspect of CIA acitivities, rather than in the agency's routine intelligence-gathering operations. With such a man at the helm, the need for continuing, effective congressional review of the CIA seems in order.

Colby is said to have played an important role in the planning and execution of what virtually amounted to a CIA-operated secret war in Laos in the 1960s. Now there are hints of preparations for a similar United States involvement in Cambodia, with the CIA again active. The fear was expressed by Sen. Harold E. Hughes of Iowa prior to Colby's confirmation that as CIA chief "he might acquiesce in another secret war."

This and other possibilities for secret operations on a broad scale argue for legislative surveillance of the CIA's funding and activities. Such surveillance, a considerable step beyond the present far from stringent oversight, would be desirable in any case. It becomes all the more desirable now that a man of Colby's bent—a competent professional, but one oriented toward clandestine involvement in other nations' affairs is to head the agency.

MOSCOW, IDAHO
IDAHONIAN
AUG 6 1973
E - 5,062

New Impetus for CIA Review

Senate confirmation of the appointment of William E. Colby to head the Central Intelligence Agency gives new emphasis to familiar questions. Colby has aptly been described as "the epitome of the covert man"; his experience has been largely in this aspect of CIA activities, rather than in the agency's routine intelligence-gathering operations. With such a man at the helm, the need for continuing, effective congressional review of the CIA is more urgent that ever.

Colby is said to have played an important role in the planning and execution of what virtually amounted to a CIA-operated secret war in Laos in the 1960s. Now there are hints of preparations for a similar U.S. involvement in Cambodia, with the CIA again active. The fear expressed by Sen. Harold E. Hughes of Iowa prior to Colby's confirmation - that as CIA chief "he might acquiesce in another secret war" - is not unfounded.

This and other possibilities for secret operations on a broad scale argue for legislative surveillance of the CIA's funding and activities. Such surveillance, a considerable step beyond the present far from stringent oversight, would be desirable in any case. It becomes all the more desirable now that a man of Colby's bent - a competent professional, but one oriented toward clandestine involvement in other nations' affairs - is to head the agency.

950

Fly Me, I'm Spooky

CIA Is Apparent Seller Of a Charter Airline, But Nobody's Talking

Southern Air Transport Sale Is Assailed by Competitors; The CAB Acts in Secrecy

'Still Another Muddled' Deal

BY TODD E. FANDELL
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

All the guys in the air-charter business used to wonder why Southern Air Transport (unrelated to Southern Airways) didn't fully exploit the mushrooming charter market. It had the money, it had valuable routes awarded by the Civil Aeronautics Board, and it was modestly thriving. Yet the Miami-based outfit never really seemed to take off.

Competitors suspected, and now they think they know for sure, the reason: For 13 years, Southern has been secretly—and possibly illegally—owned and controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency.

This is coming to light because of an attempt to sell the line and to get the sale approved, secretly, by the CAB. So far, the CAB has appeared to cooperate. Despite legal requirements that public hearings be held on applications to transfer ownership or control of the companies it regulates, the CAB has withheld documents and conducted a closed-door hearing on the sale application. The agency has gone so far as to require oaths of secrecy from witnesses who appeared in the five-day closed hearing in June. "We weren't even supposed to tell anyone how long the hearing lasted," says a lawyer close to the case.

The issue focuses on the attempt by Stanley G. Williams, 52-year-old president and a director of Southern, to buy 100% of the line for $5.1 million. Mr. Williams has told the CAB he already owns one-third, and he wishes to buy the remaining two-thirds from its other two directors, both former high-ranking government officials.

Evidence: Circumstantial but Spooky

Distressed by the prospect of stiffened competition from a line they say couldn't have survived without CIA help, four major charter competitors—joined by eight scheduled airlines—are opposing the sale. The protesting carriers insist that none of the three directors is a true owner of Southern. They are nominees, the carriers say, for the real owner and seller—the CIA.

One source close to the controversy says: "The CIA has maneuvered itself into disclosure of still another one of its muddled operations because it failed to take into account one important factor it should have foreseen. It didn't anticipate the ire of private-enterprise carriers over being forced to compete with an airline that exists only because it was nationalized by the government."

The evidence, it should be noted, is circumstantial. The protesting carriers have been frustrated in proving their contentions, largely because the CAB has ordered numerous documents relating to their charges withheld from public view. Yet an investigation into material that still is available for public inspection—and talks with a number of airline and governmental sources acquainted with Southern's history—shows a series of maneuvers that strongly suggest a CIA interest in Southern. Southern, moreover, has been linked firmly in records to Air America, a Southeast Asia aviation operation known to be a CIA concern.

Southern's attorney is James H. Bastian, who also is an officer of Air America. Last June, in asking the CAB for a secret hearing, he told the agency that information about Southern's "beneficial," or true, ownership "can be better facilitated in an executive session" and that he planned to present only two witnesses: Mr. Williams and Lawrence Houston.

Confusing Ownership Changes

Mr. Houston, at the time, was general counsel for the CIA. He retired at the end of June, though he still maintains a CIA office as a "consultant." Aside from confirming that, a spokeman for the CIA's office of the general counsel declines to comment on the case.

But a former high-ranking CAB official is more talkative. He says the CIA has controlled Southern, and "the CIA got Southern because it was irritated over the way its Air America cover was so thin it had become a laughing matter."

Southern didn't start out as a CIA front. It was founded in 1947, apparently without CIA help, by Frederick C. Moor, who died recently. Mr. Williams, who had held several air-cargo jobs after his World War II Navy tour, joined Southern in 1949. Two years later, he became secretary-treasurer and bought one share of stock for $100. A second share was sold to one Martin S. McHugh. Mr. Moor held the other 98 shares. As late as 1958, that was the ownership structure the line reported in routine filing with the CAB.

By 1960—just how is not explained in the records—Mr. McHugh seems to have been out of the picture. The evidence indicates that in August 1960 a critical change in ownership came about.

Southern, in documents filed with the CAB, now leaves the impression that the would-be sellers of their interest—Percival Flack Brundage and Perkins McGuire—at that time bought their interest from Mr. Moor, for $260,000, and Mr. Williams, for $40,000, for a total of $300,000. Although they normally would explain it, public records at the CAB don't show how Mr. McHugh disposed of his interest, or how Mr. Williams apparently increased his to the point that he received more than one-seventh the purchase price. Nor do they show how he ever came to own the one-third interest Southern now says he owns. (Mr. Williams has been unavailable for comment.)

Mr. Brundage, now 81 years old, was a director of the Bureau of the Budget under President Eisenhower. Mr. McGuire, now 68, is a businessman who was Assistant Secretary of Defense under Mr. Eisenhower. These men, the protesting airlines now say, were the CIA's nominees in purchasing Southern. Mr. Brundage couldn't be reached for comment. Mr. McGuire declines to comment fully. "However, I do want to say," he adds, "that these sorts of things have gone on before, and there is nothing really wrong with what was done here, in my opinion."

He says that he never invested any of his own money in Southern, nor would he receive any money from the proposed sale now pending before the CAB.

Then who did buy Southern? And who will get the money from its sale? Whoever it is, it wasn't long after August 1960, that some airline executives became aware of what they considered a peculiar relationship between Southern and the government. One man who did is Clayton L. Burwell, who at the time was president of the Independent Airlines Association, an industry group.

Deals With Air America

Right after the 1960 change in ownership, Mr. Burwell says, Southern "under mysterious circumstances" was awarded a government contract for inter-island cargo operations among Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan. Southern, he says, "seemed unqualified" when its equipment and operating experience were compared with others who competed for the contract. So on behalf of the industry association, Mr. Burwell tried to protest the award. He abandoned the protest, he says, when told "by sources on Capitol Hill" that Southern was owned or controlled by the CIA, that the contract award had been requested by the CIA and that "we could expect no help in securing review (of the award)."

About the same time, Air America and Southern developed a close financial relationship.

Fly Me, I'm Spooky: Apparent Seller Of a Charter Airline Is the CIA

Continued From Page One

Within a month of the 1960 ownership change, Air America lent to Southern the full $1.7 million purchase price for two Douglas DC-6 aircraft that Southern was buying from Air America. And in late 1966, six years later, Air America gave Southern a direct, unsecured loan of $5.7 million.

Other aid to Southern was indirect. In 1968 and 1969, Southern borrowed $6.7 million from Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. to buy two Lockheed Hercules turboprops. The loans were guaranteed by an outfit called Pacific Corp., which lists itself as an "aviation investment" firm.

More Air America Help

Pacific Corp. would seem to be another CIA firm. Its chief asset is listed as Air America. Manufacturers Hanover is Air America's major bank, and it is widely believed to be the CIA's bank as well. Manufacturers Hanover will discuss none of these relationships—in line, it says, with its policy of not disclosing customers' affairs.

More recently, Air America has funneled money to Southern through Actus Technology, a company also reportedly owned and managed by Messrs. Williams, Brundage and McGuire. Actus holds the lease on the nine-acre site occupied by Southern at Miami International Airport and subleases it to Southern. Its assets consist almost entirely of loans to Southern, and its liabilities are largely loans from Air America. In one recent 15-month period, Actus lent Southern $14 million in funds that Actus apparently borrowed from Air America.

At the moment, Southern owes Actus a balance of $3 million on the latest loan. Part of Mr. Williams' purchase price for Southern (plus the acquisition of Actus) is to be used to pay off that amount. Actus, in turn, proposes to pay off its outstanding $3,125,000 debt to Air America with that $3 million plus $125,000 in funds to be borrowed from a Miami-area bank. In a report that came to light in the CAB proceedings, Coopers & Lybrand, the auditing firm for Southern and Air America, has noted that Southern also owes Actus more than $800,000 in unpaid interest. But the firm has said that these amounts don't show up in the financial statements of either firm, and Coopers & Lybrand assumes—without further explanation—that repayment will never be required.

Patriotism and Favoritism

Right now, Southern has CAB certificates to provide cargo and passenger charter service within the U.S., between the U.S. and the Caribbean, and across the Pacific to Asia and Australia. Its most valuable asset is the trans-Pacific certificate, one of only three awarded by the CAB in a hotly contested 1966 case. People in the business still marvel at this award, because Southern's presentation, they say, was the least impressive of the dozen or so carriers that wanted rights to fly the Pacific. "There is no question that Southern's application was significantly different from the others and definitely not on a par with them," says Jack Rosenthal, former director of the CAB's bureau of operating rights.

Mr. Rosenthal concedes Southern got the certificate because the CAB was aware the CIA wanted it that way. "It would have been the height of folly not to go along," he says, "especially when you consider the President has the ultimate say in any international route matter."

Reluctantly, competing carriers accepted the award. "I guess our attitudes about patriotism and such were a little different then, and we assumed there was a national defense need," says G. F. Steedman Hinckley, chairman of Overseas National Airways, one of the charter lines protesting the proposed sale of Southern.

Even now, the protesting lines are fighting the sale of Southern regretfully. "This matter reached the point where its potential business impact on all of us was so great we reluctantly had to fight it," says an attorney for one. He points out that trans-Pacific certificates are nearing renewal time, and the carriers each want a fair shot at the potentially lucrative business.

And Secret Subsidies?

Precisely how Southern was used—if it was—to further CIA operations isn't clear. Until last year, most of its reported revenue had come from military charter work in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. With the curtailment of U.S. military operations there, it has been suggested, the CIA didn't need Southern so badly. It has been modestly profitable through the years, according to financial statements filed with the CAB. It reportedly had net income of $155,000 last year even though revenue fell sharply to $8.2 million from $11 million in 1971.

The competing airlines suggest that a source of income totaling $6.9 million since 1963, labeled "logistical support group contract revenue" actually represents illegal government subsidy payments to Southern, probably for secret CIA operations.

The competing airlines also contend, among other things, that changes in Southern's ownership in the past weren't accurately or legally reported to the CAB, as the law requires—and that Southern must "purge" itself of its improper reporting before its sale can even be considered. They argue, too, that the law doesn't permit the government to operate an airline certificated by the CAB.

The law governing CAB hearings on changes of ownership or control of certificated airlines provides for executive sessions only when personal matters, or confidential business information, or national defense would be jeopardized. So far as can be determined, none of these issues has been formally raised by Southern; instead, the line has claimed that public hearings would prove "embarrassing."

The CAB law judge who held the closed hearing last June, and before whom the case is pending, did note that he had received a communication from an unnamed government agency asking for secrecy in the case. He gave no reason for the request. Attorneys for the protesting airlines assert that no other such CAB hearing has been held in executive session since World War II.

Colby Plans Changes In CIA Evaluation Unit

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Acting Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby has acknowledged that "some changes will occur" in operations of the agency's top-level evaluative body, the Office of National Estimates.

But he maintained that the office's highly refined and prestigious product, the National Intelligence Estimate, will continue to be produced under the aegis of the CIA as it has for the past two decades.

Colby's assurance was conveyed internally through the CIA's employee bulletin in response to an Aug. 19 news story asserting that he had made a "firm decision" to abolish the office.



JAMES R. SCHLESINGER WILLIAM E. COLBY
... former and current CIA chiefs involved in changes.

The National Intelligence Estimate (known among practitioners as "the NIE") is the U.S. intelligence community's most classified and senior-level assessment on major international issues. It has been relied upon by presidents for guidance on a variety of matters, such as Soviet missile capability and Vietnam war prospects.

There have been growing indications within the past year that influential members of the Nixon administration, notably Secretary of State-designate Henry A. Kissinger and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, were unhappy with the CIA's strategic intelligence estimates.

During Schlesinger's directorship of the CIA early this year he was reported to bave initiated action to overhaul the Office of National Estimates, with the endorsement of the White House. Colby is currently working out the details of the high-level intelligence reorganization.

The notice to CIA employees issued with Colby's authorization alluded to news reports suggesting that senior administration officials were disillusioned with the National Intelligence Estimates and that the CIA was under attack from the administration "for having failed to produce the kind of intelligence estimates that would support its policies."

It asserted that the NIEs would continue to be published and that "the objectivity of the National Intelligence Estimates will be sustained."

However, the "structure" of the Office of National Estimates is under review, the bulletin said, and some changes would occur. "The goal is to conserve resources and maintain efficiency by combining the production of National Intelligence estimates with certain other agency and intelligence community functions," the bulletin said, without further elaboration.

The fate of the office has important symbolic, if not practical, consequences in the intelligence community.

The stratetgic estimates of the CIA were criticized from within the administration for their pessimism on the Vietnam War, (an assessment corroborated by history), for underestimating Soviet military buildups, for failing to predict the intensity of the North Vietnamese 1972 spring offensive.

Although there was no open criticism of the CIA by administration officials, there was a steady dribble of anonymous though official displeasure with the CIA's performance in news stories and partiularly in the syndicated columns of Joseph Alsop last February.

Also last April the former deputy director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, Gen. Daniel O. Graham, called publicly for the reassertion of the military's "traditional" role over civilian analysts in strategic intelligence assessments.

A month after Graham's article was published, with presumed official clearance, he was assigned to the CIA as an aide to Schlesinger with responsibility for the military component of national intelligence estimating.

Because of the sensitivity of the agency and ultra-secrecy of the subject matter with which it deals, officials are reluctant to speak out openly on the quiet but intense bureaucratic drama now taking place in the upper echelons of the CIA.

Within the agency's old-boy network, which felt the impact of Schlesinger's cost-efficiency policies while he commanded the CIA, the rumored abolition of the Office of National Estimates is regarded as a serious blow to the independence and integrity of the intelligence-estimating process.

Schlesinger is known to have viewed the intelligence products of the CIA's career analysts as verbose in style and dubious in content. He did wield the executive firing broom more vigorously than any director in the agency's history, and his policies were viewed with dismay by the hierarchy of old-timers who had operated together since World War II days as alumni of the wartime Office of Strategic Services.

Colby is now the man in the middle. His ties are to the old boys through his life-time association with the CIA. His responsibility is to the administration, which seems deter mined to purge their influence, starting last year with the dismissal of Helms.

That is why, rightly or wrongly, the final decision on the Office of National Estimates is being watched keenly by both sides.

Henry Kissinger *James Schlesinger* *William Colby* *Elliot Richardson*

Joseph Alsop

Mr. Nixon's New Line-Up Of Advisers

It is ironical, but it is true, that President Nixon owes the Watergate horror for the best-staffed administration he has ever had. No one seems to have remarked upon it, yet it is another major point growing out of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's promotion to the State Department.

The development is not unprecedented. In the last couple of years of the Eisenhower administration, the President was ill, aging and a lame duck. He could no longer recruit the real, roaring tenth raters from the business world whom he overwhelmingly preferred. People like "Engine Charlie" Wilson would no longer give a passing thought to leaving General Motors, in order to become Secretary of Defense.

So at the end, President Eisenhower had to be content with a Secretary of State, Christian Herter, whom he actively disliked, and a Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, with whom he basically disagreed. They were men of real ability and strong national-mindedness. And they prevented the close of the Eisenhower administration from becoming a real disaster, although the second Berlin crisis plainly threatened a disaster.

In the present instance, President Nixon has always shown high personal confidence in his new Secretary of State-designate, Dr. Kissinger and his new Secretary of Defense, Dr. James Schlesinger. The difficulty used to be that such men commanded no confidence at all from the President's chief advisors, back in what may be called the Haldeman-Ehrlichman-Mitchell era.

Or maybe it would be more correct to say that in the pre-Watergate era, the President's immediate entourage wanted as few persons as possible in key posts in government who did not appear to be easily controllable by persons like themselves. Sometimes they were deluded, as when they did not oppose Dr. Schlesinger's appointment to the CIA, or Elliot Richardson's earlier choice for the Defense Department.

But Richardson as Attorney General would never have met with the old crowd's approval; and he is more equipped to lead the Justice Department than the Defense Department. With Schlesinger at Defense and William Colby replacing him at the CIA, one can predict the President has acquired two more star performers for two tremendous jobs.

As for Dr. Kissinger's long overdue appointment, it was a change bitterly opposed within the pre-Watergate White House, mainly for rather sordid reasons. As for the Watergate-generated improvement in the White House itself, it hardly needs discussion. But there is one political point about all this that makes the President's quite undesired gain from the Watergate horror worth a lot of thinking about.

Briefly, the Nixon administration used to rely on muscle to get what it wanted. The liberal Democrats, in turn, generously provided most of the muscle by such fashionable follies as the nomination for the presidency of San George McGovern. With this kind publicans in 1972 could have elected an ogre with a long record of cannibalism—provided the ogre just wore a small American flag in his buttonhole.

There is no sign at all, as yet, that the dominant group in the Democratic Party has learned anything at all from the results of their follies. On the contrary, they seem to be Watergate-drunk, in the Senate particularly. Meanwhile, the President, again because of Watergate, has lost most of his former muscle, at any rate in the crucial areas of foreign and defense policy.

In just these areas, the Democratic leaders in the Senate, particularly, are now hoping to have an easy field-day. But they have not noticed some facts of great importance. In these areas, to begin with, the President now has—and for the first time—a united team capable of talking to the country.

One thinks of the first Truman administration in this connection. The Nixon-haters, now, are hardly more violent than the Truman-haters, then. President Nixon's popularity has yet to drop quite so far as President Truman's all-time low. Yet a balky Senate was still forced to accept the great Truman initiatives in the foreign and defense fields, because the country was persuaded by the Marshalls, the Achesons, the Forrestals and the Lovetts.

As yet, the Nixon administration has no potential ally on Capitol Hill of the calibre of that half-comical, half-great man, Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg, to whom this republic owes an immense, forgotten debt. But if the new Nixon team also proves able to persuade the country, you will see the Nixon administration getting its way on Capitol Hill. Indeed, if the country begins to be persuaded, Nixon allies in the Senate will emerge on all sides.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1973

C.I.A. TO UNDERGO MAJOR OVERHAUL

White House Said to Want More Concise Reports

Special to The New York Times

LANGLEY, Va., Aug. 20—The Central Intelligence Agency is about to undergo its first major organizational changes in 10 years, high officials disclosed today.

One agency operation facing reorganization is the top-level Office of National Estimates, which consists of 10 executives and 20 staff members.

National intelligence estimates—drawing if need be on the resources of the entire intelligence community, including the Defense Department and the Labor, Treasury and Agriculture Departments—are regarded as the C.I.A.'s most comprehensive reports.

These estimates are prepared mostly at the request of the National Security council—that is to say, the White House—and deal with specific problems such as political terrorism, or a country or a region.

In the wide marble halls of the intelligence agency's headquarters, decorated with large abstract paintings, a visitor learns that the contemplated changes "will also affect the seventh floor," where the agency's chiefs are.

But senior officials denied suggestions that "heads might roll," or that basic intelligence procedures would be altered.

They pointed out that John W. Hutzenga, the last director of national estimates, retired in June when he reached the age of 60, the normal retirement age. "He did not resign, as was reported in the press," an official said, adding that other senior operatives had also retired in recent months upon reaching 60.

"The estimative process won't be lost in the jiggering and tinkering that is going on," an official contended. "And the talent won't be lost either."

'Repackaging' the Goal

The aim of the shift, according to officials here, is to achieve a "repackaging" of the Central Intelligence Agency's reporting, especially to the White House. One C.I.A. man spoke of "sharpening up our copy."

The changes appear to be in part a response to demands of the agency's principal customer, the White House, for precise, cleanly focused responses to specific policy questions rather than scholarly tomes, for which the Office of National Estimates has been noted.

The Office of National Estimates has been turning out its papers for more than two decades, sometimes at a rate of 50 a year. It has recently been facing a kind of competition from its nominal boss, the National Security Council.

Under the prodding of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, the 100-man National Security Council has produced more than 200 "national security study memorandums," on topics ranging from "chemical-biological agents" to "Iceland" and "Malta."

The C.I.A. changes may also result in a new name for the Office of National Estimates, formed in 1950 to provide a succession of Presidents with analyses to help them make policy decisions.

Elite CIA Unit To Be Abolished

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

In a decision with major implications for the national security, the Nixon administration has ordered a radical overhaul of the Central Intelligence Agency's method of analyzing and evaluating foreign intelligence.

According to authoritative sources in the intelligence community, William E. Colby, the newly installed CIA director, has reached a "firm decision" to abolish the Office of National Estimates, the elite, 30-man office that since 1950 has prepared the top secret and definitive National Intelligence Estimates, the papers on which a succession of presidents has based crucial policy decisions.

John W. Huizenga, the agency's Director of National Estimates and, as chairman of the Board of National Estimates chief of the CIA's intelligence analysts, resigned from the agency at the end of June. He will not be replaced.

THE decision to abolish the Office of National Estimates has not been announced. It is certain to provoke a reaction in Congress, which has already been stirred by revelations of the Watergate case to take a closer look at CIA operations than ever before.

The National Intelligence Estimates, generally referred to as NIEs, probably helped the CIA regain some public trust in recent years. As revealed by the Pentagon Papers, CIA estimates of the Vietnam war set forth unpleasant facts, when the Pentagon was still claiming a military victory was possible.

Early in the Nixon administration, CIA analysts produced estimates that ran counter to White House wishes during the bitter political debate over the antiballistic missile.

Partly because of these controversies, NIEs came to be distrusted and ignored in the latter part of the Johnson administration and through almost the whole Nixon period.

President Nixon is known to have become personally disenchanted with the CIA performance during the ABM controversy, and it is an open secret that his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, has tended to deride and disregard NIEs since he joined the administration.

See CIA, A-12

CIA

Intelligence Overhaul

Continued From Page A-1

The decision to abolish the Office of National Estimates is certain to revive speculation that the CIA is under attack from the administration for having failed to produce the kind of intelligence estimates that would support its policies.

White House dissatisfaction with the CIA is generally believed by sources close to the agency and to the administration to have been a major factor in the resignation of Richard M. Helms as CIA director shortly after Nixon's re-election last year.

Colby's move to eliminate the office that has been responsible for the most refined product of the government's multi-billion dollar intelligence gathering effort shows that he clearly intends to carry out the sweeping changes in the agency undertaken by his immediate predecessor as director, James R. Schlesinger.

BEFORE Schlesinger moved over to the Pentagon as Defense secretary during the administration's Watergate shakeup last May, he had ordered a sweeping cutback in personnel. It was done in the name of efficiency, but older agency professionals denounced it as "brutal," and the purge swept from high-ranking posts in the CIA virtually every officer there who had been close to Helms.

At the same time, Schlesinger brought into the agency, Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a controversial Pentagon intelligence analyst who has openly advocated stripping the CIA of its authority to analyze military strategic intelligence and giving that function to the Defense Department.

At this time, Graham was given a managerial function, but observers thought it likely that he would some day move into the intelligence estimating field.

It is not clear how much of the decision to abolish the Office of National Estimates is Schlesinger's and how much Colby's.

It is also not clear what Colby has in mind to replace the Office of National Estimates. Sources close to the director insist that there is no plan to make the NIEs directly subservient to the policy-makers in the White House.

THE Office of National Estimates was first organized early in the Korean War, when the American intelligence apparatus was still in its formative stage.

Its first director, Harvard historian William Langer, set up the dual structure that still exists: The 10-man Board of National Estimates and the 20-man National Estimates staff, which carried out the research and collated reports from intelligence gathering channels in the CIA and elsewhere in the government.

The estimates, about 50 a year, were prepared almost as though they were scholarly dissertations on a variety of subjects requested by the National Security Council. They were a consensus of the whole U.S. intelligence community, with dissents carefully registered in footnotes, but the 10-man board had responsibility for their preparation.

Under a later chairman, Sherman Kent, the board and its staff developed the system of carefully graded verbal measures of certainty that still characterizes NIEs. "Apparent" is the most tentative and "almost certain" the most definite short of a flat assertion of fact. The grades in between are "possible," "suggested" and "probable."

This verbal precision was apparently infuriating to recent administrations. The White House, even before the Schlesinger reorganization of November 1971, sent word it wanted "facts, not opinions," according to one published account.

WHEN the 1971 plan was announced, it was reported as aiming for an intelligence product better tailored to the wants of its "consumers" in the White House. And when Schlesinger became CIA director, he made it known that NIEs would be more useful if they were "four pages instead of 40."

According to one anecdote current in circles close to the agency, Schlesinger confronted his first meeting with the Board of National Estimates with the observation: "I understand this is like a gentleman's club. Well, I want you to understand that I am no gentleman."

The appointment of Colby, a career professional in the CIA, brought sighs of relief at all levels of the agency. But the abolition of the Office of National Estimates, its elite board and its staff, suggests the sighs may have been premature.

Colby Is Confirmed As Director of CIA

CIA Director Is Confirmed By the Senate

By Mary Russell
Washington Post Staff Writer

Despite increasing congressional concern over the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in domestic affairs, the Senate yesterday confirmed, by a vote of 83 to 13, the nomination of William E. Colby as director.

Colby, a career intelligence officer who spent most of his time in the clandestine Directorate of Operations, headed the controversial U.S. pacification program in South Vietnam from 1968 to 1971.

He underwent intensive grilling by the Senate Armed Services Committee, fearful that attempts to link the CIA with Watergate may have reflected the ways the agency could have skipped the legal ban on domestic intelligence operations by the CIA.

There had been allegations of CIA help to former CIA employee E. Howard Hunt in the 1971 break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in California, plus allegations of attempted CIA help in the cover-up of Watergate.

Colby was in many ways more forthcoming with the senators than previous directors, but not all of his answers

See COLBY, A14, Col. 1

HS/HC-950

COLBY, From A1

to queries were reassuring to liberal senators.

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) submitted a long questionnaire and was disturbed to learn that the agency's Domestic Contact Service, which asks traveling academics, businessmen and other Americans to volunteer information about conditions abroad, has recently been put under operational control of Clandestine Services to improve coordination with CIA's collection activities abroad.

In a floor speech yesterday, Proxmire posed "the possibility that the DCS, which has a good reputation, may now become tainted by the covert side of the agency," the so-called "department of dirty tricks."

In answering the questionnaire, Colby also revealed that the CIA is training Secret Service agents and the new Drug Enforcement Administration officers in counter-intelligence techniques. And he disclosed that diplomats and other foreign visitors are subject to CIA scrutiny while they are in this country.

Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.) said he was assured by Colby that the CIA would not train domestic police forces except in the most extraordinary circumstances. And in that case, Percy said, Colby promised to let the CIA Oversight Subcommittee know.

Colby also said that for the first time the Armed Services Committee will get a look at the secret charter from which the CIA and a variety of other intelligence agencies draw their authority.

But Proxmire was dissatisfied with Colby's answer regarding how far he would go in revealing the CIA budget, which is classified and hidden in the budgets of the Defense Department and other agencies.

Proxmire said Colby and his singer, now Secretary of Defense, had both testified earlier that release of the total budget figure for the CIA would not violate national security.

Proxmire's questionnaire asked Colby this time how far down the line this could go. The senator said, "he used this question as a platform to back off from his earlier position. Now he says that although the 'disclosure of the total figure of the intelligence community budget would not present a security problem at this time, it is likely to stimulate requests for additional details.' He goes on to note that he cannot positively recommend the publication of the total or any subdivision thereof."

Proxmire asked the Armed Services Committee's acting chairman, Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), why he couldn't get that figure. Symington assured Proxmire he was working toward that end and would get together with him off the floor on the matter.

In spite of his reservations Proxmire voted for confirmation. So did both Maryland and both Virginia senators.

Sen. Harold Hughes (D-Iowa), who voted against confirmation, said Colby would not promise that the CIA would not get involved in another secret war as it did in Laos.

Hughes said Colby would only assure the Armed Services Committee that "I will try to keep it out of the kind of exposure that some of these [illegible]."

Hughes also pressed for "where the line should be drawn between CIA and Defense Department activities involving the use of armed force."

Colby answered, "In general, the line should be drawn . . . at the point in which the United States acknowledges involvement in such activities. As a practical matter, however, the scale of the activity will, in many cases, also affect whether the United States is revealed as engaged in the activity."

Hughes added, "Again, the point to be made is that Mr. Colby believes that CIA-run military operations are perfectably acceptable so long as they can be concealed. This is unacceptable to me."

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) questioned Colby about the pacification program called Phoenix, which attempted to neutralize the "infrastructure" of South Vietnam. Kennedy said that, between [illegible] and 1971, 66,972 Vietnamese were killed under Phoenix, but said Colby "clearly feels that Phoenix-type functions, organization and programs . . . are a proper function of the CIA and serve a useful purpose in U.S. foreign policy."

Kennedy said the Phoenix program has been taken over by the South Vietnam special police and national police, but quoted Colby as saying the CIA still maintains liaison with them. Kennedy said a Defense Department witness was unable to assure Kennedy's Refugee Subcommittee that the $12 million in the defense budget for fiscal 1974 being spent for police activities in South Vietnam are not going in part for Phoenix.

Proxmire and Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) used the occasion of the debate on Colby's nomination to announce that they would offer resolutions and bills to strengthen congressional oversight of the CIA and tighten the laws governing its operation.

Proxmire called for the formation of a standing committee (with a full staff) composed of members of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees and others. At present a subcommittee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations members oversees the CIA.

Cranston called for a one-year ad hoc select committee to study the CIA and all foreign intelligence operations. He also said he would offer amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 which would:

- Limit the director of the CIA to an 8-year term.
- Provide that the director and deputy director posts could not both be occupied by CIA insiders at the same time.
- Change the National Security Act so that covert operations—those not directly related to intelligence gathering and analysis—would have to be authorized in writing by the President.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) joined Cranston, Hughes, Kennedy, Joe Biden (D-Del.), Frank Church (D-Idaho), Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), Mike Gravel (D-Alaska), Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), Floyd K. Haskell (D-Colo.), William D. Hathaway (D-Maine), George McGovern (D-S.D.) and Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) in voting against confirmation.

A-6 ★ WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, August 1, 1973

CIA Admits Expansion of Domestic Secrecy Role

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

Despite nagging congressional suspicions over the Central Intelligence Agency's role in the Watergate case, the CIA has moved quietly to expand its clandestine operations in this country.

Replying to a Senate questionnaire, CIA director-designate William E. Colby has admitted that the agency's domestic contact service — its long-established program for interviewing academics, businessmen and other traveling America citizens for voluntary information about conditions abroad — had recently been put under control of the CIA's clandestine services.

Thus, for the first time, the function which has been under control of the agency's analytical and above-board Intelligence directorate has been absorbed by the directorate of Operations (formerly Plans) — the undercover "Department of Dirty Tricks." That department's budget is so secret that it is not only highly classified but also hidden throughout the budget of the Pentagon and other agencies.

COLBY, whose nomination to be director of CIA was scheduled for a Senate vote today, made the disclosure in reply to a lengthy questionnaire submitted by Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., to the Armed Services Committee.

In other replies, many of which were edited by vigilant CIA security specialists, Colby also:

- Acknowledged for the first time that the CIA is training the secret service and the controversial drug enforcement administration in various counter-intelligence techniques.
- Disclosed that foreign diplimats and other foreign visitors to this country are subject to CIA surveillance and other unspecified intelligence-gathering techniques.
- Stated publicly that the CIA and its sister agencies in the intelligence field such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Armed Service Intelligence Branches draw their authority from series of classified and secret National Security Council Intelligence Directories (NSCID) " and a variety of other executive orders and directives."

This was the first public reference by any CIA chief to the agency's so-called secret charter, and Colby at the same time announced another unprecedented fact — that the Senate oversight committees, for the first time, will get to see the actual charter of the agencies they are supposed to watch over.

COLBY'S SENATE confirmation today is virtually assured by a large margin, with even doubters like Proxmire declaring their intention to support him.

But the Senate Armed Services Committee has investigated Colby more closely than any previous nominee and the committee's ailing chairman, John C. Stennis, D-Miss., up to now a unquestioning supporter of the agency, has promised a full-scale review of the CIA charter in the light of the massive clandestine war in Laos and the revelations of the Water-

From the first suspicion that CIA help had been extended to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt before the 1971 burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, even friends of the agency on Capitol Hill had feared the legal ban on all domestic intelligence operations by the CIA may have been eroded.

Colby's replies to some of Proxmire's questions cannot be reassuring.

ASKED whether the program of interviewing American travelers in order to collect foreign intelligence has been reorganized under clandestine services, Colby replied:

In a related questionnaire put to him by the Armed Services Committee, Colby defended in principle the kind of para-military operation abroad that in the past has led to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba or the more recent secret war in Laos — with the proviso that they must not get so big as to be found out.

REPLYING to a query of Sen. Harold E. Hughes, D-Iowa, he said "in general, the line should be drawn between the CIA and the Defense Department with respect to armed force at the point in which the U.S. acknowledges involvement in such activities.

"As a practical matter, however," the reply went on, "the scale of the activity will, in many cases, also affect whether the U.S. is revealed as engaged in the activity."

According to one published report, the Bay of Pigs Fiasco led in 1961 to preparation of a series of so-called National Security Actions memorandums in which the Kennedy administration set proposed guidelines to insure that future para-military dirty tricks would remain small enough to be clandestine and manageable enough for the CIA or other U.S. authorities to deny responsibility. Another NSAM of the period reportedly gave the Joint Chief of Staffs authority over all military operations undertaken by the CIA or other intelligence agencies.

Colby's replies to queries on this score were claffified Secret and deleted in their entirety in the transcript that is to be made public.

"Yes, in order to improve the coordination of its collection activities with those of the agency abroad."

Informed observers interpret this to be muted acknowledgement that the agency will now try to make covert use of traveling Americans to sensitive areas of Europe — such as China, perhaps, now that it is nearly accessible to the West. In the past CIA authorities believed an above-

HS/HC- 950

board approach to students and professors was more likely to yield results.

Asked to account for all domestic operations of the CIA, Colby listed headquarters and routine administrative operations, the Domestic Contact Service, and the agency's use of academic "think-tanks" and other similar institutions on a contract basis for intelligence analysis.

BUT HE also referred to "mechanisms, relationships and facilities . . required within the U.S. to support foreign intelligence operations abroad". This was in obvious reference to dummy "cover" corporations, "safe houses," secure or "sterile" telephone installations and the rest of the apparatus the agency deploys in this country to conceal its tracks.

He added: "Operations are conducted to collect foreign intelligence from foreigners temporarily resident in the U.S." — that is, diplomats and other officials stationed here.

An informed source noted the absence of the language the CIA normally uses to describe its overt intelligence gathering, such as interviews with Americans under the Domestic Contact Service: "on a knowing and voluntary basis for knowledge . . . which they willingly share ." The plain inference is that covert means are routinely applied against some "foreigners temporarily resident in the U.S."

On the question of training domestic law enforcement agencies, Colby's answer seems certain to provoke senators who only six months ago were denouncing the limited aid the agency was providing some local police forces.

REPLYING in the carefully understand language of his profession, Colby disclosed that the agency is giving "limited training to drug enforcement administration personnel in interagency procedures, intelligence coordination practices in overseas missions; to the Secret Service in defensive driving and explosives and demolition devices as related to Secret Service protective responsibilities against terrorists."

"Colby declined to reveal any information about the CIA share of the estimated $6 billion a year intelligence budget except under wraps of Top Secret classifications, and Proxmire took the occasion to call for public release of the budget in a floor speech prepared to preface today's confirmation vote.

A-6 WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, July 31, 1973

CIA Cambodia Effort Thinly Veiled

By Tammy Arbuckle
Star-News Special Correspondent

PHNOM PENH—The official explanation that 10 Central Intelligence Agency operatives based in the Cambodian countryside are solely performing a reporting function plus some overseeing of the end use of military equipment raises more questions than it answers

The official statements don't satisfactorily explain why CIA officials and not military equipment delivery team officials are issuing radios to Cambodian teams in Svay Rieng and raise the question of funding for these radios

Nor do official explanations indicate how the official concerned is involved in organizing the teams and suggesting areas where these teams should work and what they should be looking for Cambodian military sources also say it was an American idea to give code names to team leaders for use on the radios

Interpretation

The U.S official in Svay Rieng lives in a small villa in considerable discomfort, its sandy yard patrolled night and day by armed guards supplied by the local Cambodian commander

THE VILLA doubles as office and radio room as well as living quarters and is staffed by three Cambodians in American employ Who pays the Cambodians' salary? These men were working in the villa on documents relating to the teams' operation If these teams are run by local Cambodians as claimed, one would expect such work to be done in the local commander's office

In nearby Prey Vieng, which was under attack, a Cambodian lieutenant who operates radio equipment also is in American employ The U.S. official from Svay Rieng flew into Prey Vieng while it was under artillery and infantry attack This reporter was not allowed to accompany the official on instructions of the U.S Embassy in Phnom Penh so it was not possible to see what the "reporting" U.S official did

U.S. Embassy officials here are adamant that press will not travel on embassy air transport on a space available basis, a situation which means U.S officials in the field could be doing many things in contravention of congressional intentions without the knowledge of the press or Congress

MANY SMALLER towns and military areas of Cam-

bodia are not reachable by an commercial transport This lack of press scrutiny by withholding the only means of transport was a factor in U.S. involvement in Laos reaching a highly developed stage.

One explanation given this correspondent was that there has been "slippage." It was said an American official all alone amongst local Cambodian officials is asked for many things, transport, air support, etc., and sometimes in order to fister good local relations and through warmth of personal relations the American official can be musled into becoming more involved than he should

Sources said these agents had been specifically briefed on avoiding this at Phnom Penh before going into the field Well-informed sources vake it clear team involvement was not a temporary aberration by the official in Svay Rieng

Teams scattered throughout Cambodia are run from the country's provincial capitals Other well-informed sources said the teams are known as MRRPS (Middle range reconnaissance patrols) or "Merps." The "Black Commandos" in Svay Rieng is merely a local name for the Merps Merps were described by one source as being similar to the LRRPS or "Lerps" in South Vietnam, the long range reconnaissance patrole there, but the Cambodians are called Merps because "Cambodians don't go very far."

THE OFFICIAL explanation linking U.S. involvement to the end use of equipment given by U.S officials sounds as if it was tacked onto a cover story to account for U.S. officials providing radios in Svay Rieng. In another case where an American was photographed giving out radios, it was claimed he was accidentally aboard a helicopter carrying radios which were already Cambodian property under the U.S. military aid program.

Based on sources in Phnom Penh and what this correspondent saw and heard in Svay Rieng it seems we now have a Central Intelligence Agency operation in a twilight zone that borders on intelligence-gathering and paramilitary activity

But the bitter lesson of Laos is plain. In Laos in the mid-1960s the U.S had trail-watching teams monitoring North Vietnamese traffic on the Ho Chi Minh trail and in other areas. These teams were drawn from the Auxiliary Dfense Corps (ADC), a local militia; they were not very good.

For example in August 1965 one of these units left a U.S. official alone on a brushy slope overlooking the Ho Chi Minh Trail He thought the ADC were in the brush around him but they had drifted away Communist troops burst into his hideout, killing two locals The U.S official escaped by running from tree to tree firing his pistol

INCIDENTS like that in Laos led to the decision to train the ADC, and eventually they became guerrilla battalions (BGs) From there they became regiments of four battalions known as Group Mobiles, an effective striking force that was commanded, paid, fed and otherwise managed by the U.S.

In Cambodia the teams are at the earliest ADC stage. Use of CIS personnel with these teams has both the Laos affair as well as World War II OSS operations as precedent.

However, given the poor quality of these Cambodian Merps, a training program is a likely next step and, without press or congressional surveillance, they could become battalions and regiments with the intelligence function giving way to military involvement as it did in Laos, particularly as there is already CIA involvement and some para military overtones.

It is for those reasons that it appears there is a potential for development of a Cambodian private army by the U.S on the Laotian model

Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0

Colby Pressed By Senators on Watergate Role

WILLIAM COLBY

By THOMAS B. ROSS
Chicago Sun-Times Service

President Nixon's nominee for director of the Central Intelligence Agency faces more heavy questioning about his role in the Watergate affair.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) led the nominee, William R. Colby, through four hours of intensive interrogation at a closed meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday.

Later, Kennedy told reporters that Colby was designated as the CIA's chief coordinator of Watergate matters after the break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters 13 months ago.

KENNEDY said he asked Colby about his dealings with White House aides H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III as well as with the Watergate prosecutors.

Kennedy did not reveal Colby's response, but he indicated he was not completely satisfied. He said he remained undecided on how he would vote when Colby's nomination was presented to the full Senate.

The committee is expected to approve the nomination today. Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee, publicly declared himself in favor of Colby

Kennedy is not a member of the committee but, in a virtually unprecedented concession, was permitted to sit in on the secret hearing at his request.

Kennedy was prepared also to question Colby at length on his role as head of the pacification program in Vietnam. Colby has been accused of condoning assassination, torture and imprisonment of political enemies of the Saigon regime in his management of the Phoenix Project, which was part of the pacification program.

COLBY headed the program from 1968 to 1971. He returned to CIA headquarters here to become executive director for control, a position which put him logically in line to be named Watergate coordinator. Early this year, he was promoted to chief of the operations directorate, the "department of dirty tricks."

Nixon proposed him as director in April to succeed James R. Schlesinger Jr., who became Defense secretary in the top-level reshuffle that took place after the Watergate scandal broke.

Kennedy reportedly concentrated his questioning on two key events:

- Colby's role in advising Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., Marine commandant and former deputy director of the CIA, to clear his Watergate testimony with Ehrlichman before giving it to the federal prosecutor.
- Colby's advice to Schlesinger not to go along with a request by Dean that the CIA take back the Ellsberg case documents it had turned over to the Justice Department.

The CIA repeatedly has insisted it had no involvement in the Watergate break-in or coverup. But Robert C. Mardian, former assistant attorney general and a Nixon campaign aide, testified last week that a CIA official told him he would "stake his life" on the fact that the agency had a role in the break-in.

Rep. Lucien N Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence subcommittee, has said he has doubt as to whether the CIA went along at first with White House efforts to deflect the Watergate investigation.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, July 26, 1973

Senate Expected to OK Colby as CIA Director

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

Despite lingering doubts over the CIA's possible role in Watergate and its documented role in Southeast Asia, William E. Colby has moved to within a final floor vote of Senate confirmation to be director of Central Intelligence.

With only Sen. Harold R. Hughes, D-Iowa, dissenting, the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday agreed to approve Colby's nomination.

The vote was taken with the record of Colby's confirmation hearings still incomplete in two key areas. Written questions, seeking written replies, were submitted Monday for more information on agency actions in Watergate and in Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Watergate questions were submitted by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., a non-committee member who was given rare access to Monday's closed hearings. They are understood to concentrate on problems surrounding the CIA's relationship with early stages of the grand jury investigation of Watergate, in which agency officials are said by informed sources to have been only grudgingly cooperative.

UNTIL KENNEDY'S intervention, congressional investigation of CIA relations to Watergate had concentrated on two areas:

Aid to Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy when they were planning the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records in 1971; and relations with White House officials seeking to enlist agency cooperation in interfering with an FBI probe of the Watergate break-in.

A third Watergate problem involving the CIA has only been hinted at in testimony, depositions and other public statements in the [illegible] that the former chief Watergate prosecutor, U.S. Atty. Earl J. Silbert, was not told the details of the 1971 link with Hunt until shortly before the January trial of the Watergate defendants. Silbert did not learn of the Ellsberg burglary until late in April.

Kennedy's investigation of Silbert's problems with the CIA have evidently focused on Colby because the director-designate during all of 1972 held the chief administrative post in the agency, and as such was assigned by the former director, Richard M. Helms, to coordinate Watergate matters with other investigative agencies in the government.

WHILE COLBY'S name has barely been mentioned publicly in connection with Watergate, it is understood that he did most of the actual negotiation with the prosecutor and the Justice Department over these matters.

And while Silbert, who has now resigned from the Watergate investigation, declines comment, it was understood the prosecutors feel their early investigation was hampered by the CIA refusal to come forward with information regarding Hunt and his aliases, for example, which instead had to be developed for the grand jury through a lengthy investigation of all the hotels that Hunt and Liddy stayed at during their travels as White House operatives.

THE CAMBODIA question is likewise problematical. While the State [illegible] 25X1A ment has disputed a recent Star-News report that 10 U.S. officials assigned to provincial posts in Cambodia are military advisers in contravention of a congressional ban on such activities, it is reliably reported that most of the men are either veterans of the secret CIA war in Laos or CIA operatives recently assigned to the area.

Here again, Colby is evidently understood merely to be fulfilling his duty as a CIA professional, in this case following policy directives of the National Security Council — President Nixon and his top foreign policy adviser, Henry A. Kissinger.

Colby's approval by the Senate was regarded as all but certain.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C.
Friday, July 27, 1973
A-5

HS/HC-950

1947 Doubts on CIA Disclosed

New York Times News Service

George C. Marshall, while secretary of state, told President Harry S. Truman in 1947 that he had severe doubts about plans to create the Central Intelligence Agency because "the powers of the proposed agency seem almost unlimited and need clarification."

Marshall's memorandum to Truman on Feb. 7, 1947, five months before the agency went into operation under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, is included in a volume of documents made public by the State Department yesterday as part of its regular historical series on foreign relations.

The Marshall document seems to have contemporary relevance because of the announcement last week by Sen. John C. Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, that he had ordered a full review of the CIA's charter to prevent the agency's involvement in Laotian-style secret wars, or in activity like Watergate.

SENATE CRITICS of the CIA have attacked the language of the original National Security Act as too vague and ambiguous.

They have specifically cited the agency's authorization "to perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally" and another provision calling on the agency "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Marshall, in his memorandum, did not specify what language he was wary of approving. Rather, he seemed concerned about setting up a peacetime intelligence agency with wide-ranging responsibilities that might diminish the influence of the State Department.

THE CREATION of the CIA was regarded by Truman, in his memoirs, as a major achievement of his administration since it brought together what had been a disparate number of military and civilian agencies.

"Here, at last, a coordinated method had been worked out, and a practical way has been found for keeping the President informed as to what was known and what was going on," Truman said.

Gas Use Rises

LONDON — In 1960 about 40 percent of the gas manufactured in Britain was still derived from coal. Today over 90 percent of the country's gas supply comes from the North Sea, and consumption is double that of 1967.

CIA Data Sought on Wheat Deal

By John Fialka
Star-News Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency will be asked to disclose what briefings it gave high Agriculture Department officials before the 1972 Russian wheat deal.

How much Agriculture officials may have known in advance about the deal and the world market conditions that led to it continues to be the focus of a probe by the Senate permanent investigations subcommittee.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., the subcommittee's chairman, said that it will attempt to get the CIA to divulge the content of the briefings in executive session.

HE MADE the statement yesterday after hearings during which Carroll G. Brunthaver, assistant secretary of Agriculture for international affairs, and others said repeatedly that the department had not seen, could not remember, or did not believe reports that the massive sale of wheat was imminent.

The testimony prompted another subcommittee member, Sen. Charles H. Percy to remark that the deal, which caused widespread price increases, commodity shortages and transportation disruptions, may have been a "bitter price to pay" in order to learn how to deal with a shrewd team of buyers from a large, centralized government such as the Soviet Union.

Yesterday, subcommittee investigators noted that the State Department notified Agriculture in late June that a three-man Soviet wheat-buying mission had been granted a visa to enter the United States.

Brunthaver, who told subcommittee members that during that period Agriculture felt Russia was preparing to buy corn and soybeans, said the message from State "was never brought to my attention."

BRUNTHAVER'S predecessor, Clarence Palmby, told the Senate panel earlier that he did not read agriculture attache reports from Moscow that predicted damage to the Russian wheat crop during the spring of 1972 because the reports were so "voluminous."

Brunthaver's superior, Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz, said yesterday that the department "did not believe" a special report from the U. S. attache in Moscow which arrived on July 5 that stated Russians would be short by about 20 million tons of wheat. The report was later classified.

Brunthaver said his memory was hazy about a visit to his office on July 3 by Bernard Steinweg, vice president of the Continental Grain Co., who testified earlier that he told Brunthaver that the Russian team had offered to buy over 4 million metric tons of wheat from Continental.

And Brunthaver said he did not remember a phone call Steinweg says he made on July 6, telling Brunthaver that Continental had signed the sales contract with the Russians — the first and largest transaction in the unprecedented 12 million ton sale.

"SURELY THERE must be some way you can check these things out," said Jackson, who added that he will arrange a new hearing so Steinweg and Brunthaver can appear jointly for a confrontation over the reported meeting and phone call.

Jackson and other subcommittee members have repeatedly referred to the fact that the impact of the Russian trade cost the United States over $300 million in subsidy payments to wheat exporters during the late summer of 1972.

By selling the Russians over 350 million bushels then in U. S. surplus wheat stocks, they have pointed out, all or most of the subsidy payments could have been avoided.

Brunthaver admitted yesterday that he decided to maintain the subsidy system although traders from Continental and other companies, he said, had warned him that the Russians were seeking offers on unspecified "large" amounts of wheat. His decision, he said, was not communicated to Butz.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, July 24, 1973

24 MAY 1973

Meany, Brown the CIA and Africa

By George Morris

After many years of unsuccessful effort to build a "labor front" for the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. investors in Africa, the top bureaucracy of the AFL-CIO and its international affairs director, Jay Lovestone, are now making a new effort to penetrate French-speaking former colonies in partnership with the rightwing Force Ouvriere (FO), the smallest labor group in France. The scheme is financed from the U.S. coffers that are also funding the African-American Labor Center of which the veteran "labor" man in the CIA, Irving Brown, is director.

The AFL-CIO bureaucracy became especially interested in Africa after then Vice-President Richard Nixon returned from a tour of Africa in 1957 with a report picturing a wonderful opportunity for U.S. penetration in areas that were colonized by European powers. Those powers are "irrevocably tarred with their colonial past," Nixon observed, but "America is heir to no such past in Africa. It is that fact that makes her heir to Africa's future." (Quoted in a British Cabinet paper, exposed and published in a pamphlet by the Nigerian Trade Union Congress in 1960, titled "The Great Conspiracy Against Africa.")

In the years that passed, hundreds of millions of dollars have been invested in Africa by U.S. multinationals, yielding super-profits. But notwithstanding AFL-CIO efforts and the millions of U.S. appropriations for the effort through the Agency for International Development (AID), no appreciable success was registered for a "labor base." One major reason is that there were already substantial unions in Africa in pre-independence days that experienced struggle against the colonial industrial employers. They easily smell imperialism in its latest, neo-colonialist cloak.

Last June 8-9, at a conference in Paris between George Meany and Andre Bergeron, president of Force Ouvriere, an agreement was reached for joint operations in French-speaking former colonies. Soon after, the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union News, monthly sheet edited by Lovestone for mostly AFL-CIO staff people and operatives abroad, disclosed details of the plan and began plugging it in every issue. Essentially, the scheme is modeled after the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the joint AFL-CIO-industrialist outfit for "training" Latin Americans for what is called "free" unionism.

AIFLD, which gets about $8 million annually from AID, was set up shortly after the Bay of Pigs disaster for the CIA and U.S. imperialism, at a meeting in 1962 between Meany, President Kennedy and then Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg. They discussed ways to give the CIA a more effective and "popular" cover. AIFLD was exposed as a CIA cover during the scandal of 1966-67.

Working towards the formal agreement, FO had established in March 1972 a so-called "Trade Union Institute for Co-operation," with an FO secretary, Pierre Galoni, as director. The plan is for Galoni's TUIC and Brown's AALC to work jointly. FO, it need hardly be noted, has neither much membership nor treasury. The money will come through Brown. Galoni's men will provide the French language contacts (possibly among African students in France) and similar services.

How can one explain FO's willingness to enter such a partnership with the AFL-CIO bureaucracy — and at a time when there is hostility between most unions of Europe and Meany's crowd? Meany's recent denunciation of the leaders of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and especially of the British union leaders, is an indication of the strained relations.

To understand the meaning of this deal with FO, it is necessary to go into some background. Hardly had the AFL and CIO leaders split away from the World Federation of Trade Unions in the coldwar forties (with the aid of the CIA), and set up the ICFTU with U.S. money, than tensions flared up in the new federation over control and over the Meany demand for an African division to be headed by Irving Brown. Certain rightwing leaders of British, French, Dutch and Belgian unions resisted Meany's pressure because they were just as zealous on behalf of their former colonial rulers. Meany charged that they were "soft" on communism, and were leaving a "vacuum" in underdeveloped lands to the Communists.

By 1969, Meany's group concluded there was no hope for the ICFTU becoming the vehicle for AFL-CIO penetration into Africa. Meany announced withdrawal from the federation his group was most instrumental in founding, deciding to depend entirely on AIFLD, AALC and a similar outfit in Asia for his "international" nationalism." Through the years of inner struggle in the ICFTU, Force Ouvriere was in Meany's pocket, always "pro-American," because it was, in fact, a creation of the AFL-CIO and CIA — with U.S. money.

During the heat of the scandal in 1967, with headlines exposing the way the CIA used phony "foundations" to channel money to student, labor, cultural and other organizations to front for it, Thomas Braden, who was for a number of years a top official in the CIA, confessed in an article in the Saturday Evening Post (May 20, 1967) that it was he who conceived of the CIA tactic. He recalled how one day in 1950 he gave Irving Brown $15,000 (and still has the receipt) for payment to gangsters in French ports to attack the "Communist-led" dock workers. He described how Meany and David Dubinsky, of the garment workers, put Lovestone in charge of the CIA's drive against "Communist-led" unions in Europe, notably in France and Italy, with millions of CIA dollars. One of the results of that drive was the splitaway of a group from the French General Federation of Labor (CGT) and formation of Force Ouvriere.

Meany has often boasted that AFL-CIO operations in France "saved" that country from communism. Joseph C. Goulden, author of the recent biography of Meany written with his cooperation, cited a 1951 speech by Meany before Chicago's Catholic Labor Alliance, in which he bragged that the FO existed "primarily due to our effort." The same book cites Meany's speech before the New York Bond Club in 1964. He said, "We financed a split in the Communist-controlled union in France. We financed this split — we paid for it."

"One group Irving Brown used as a front," wrote Goulden, "was the Jewish Labor Committee in New York which acted as a conduit to get AFL money to the FO, ostensibly for Jewish relief. . . . By 1947 the AFL was committed to sending $5,000 every three weeks." The Jewish Labor Committee is a rabid anti-communist anti-Soviet organization set up

continued

and financed by Dubinsky's group.

Little wonder then that FO is still in Meany's pocket and Irving Brown is still head of the AALC with millions of AID money in his hands for operations in Africa under Lovestone's general direction. Already in December 1971, in a greeting to the AFL-CIO convention in Miami Beach, as reported in Lovestone's sheet, Pierre Galoni looked forward to the joint operation. He said, "This is what we are already doing in French-speaking Africa with the African-American Labor Council and with our good friend Irving Brown."

The objective is still the same disruptive, splitting activity that was projected in 1947—the year the CIA was established. The so-called seminars and several technical projects, such as a garment-making school in Kenya and an auto repair shop in Nigeria, are just a come-on for swindling unsuspecting African workers. The plan is to use French-speaking agents just as AIFLD uses Spanish-speaking agents.

The workers of Africa, rising to a new militancy, as so well demonstrated in the current strike wave of black workers in South Africa, are hardly likely to give more encouragement to agents of imperialism today than they gave a generation ago. But they do need international solidarity precisely because they are at a higher stage of their struggle, confronting most often the multinational companies of U.S., Britain, France and other European firms.

They need more than an occasional resolution of sympathy from the AFL-CIO. They need funds to enable them to strike as long as necessary to win. They need real friendship, picket demonstrations in front of the head office of the multinationals, even sympathy strikes at plants in the U.S. But the striking black workers in South Africa have not received a penny from the AFL-CIO.

Africa confronts U.S. unions in another sense. Take, for example, the recent announcement by the Anglo-American Corp., a big gold mining company in South Africa. The company said it will give an average raise of 26% to the 120,000 black gold miners. Very generous? The raise will bring the average underground worker's earnings to $45.44 a month. The starting rate will be brought up to $20.53 a month. But white underground gold miners get $575.10 a month. The "generosity" for the blacks came in face of a strike wave or the threat of a strike. With such an advantage in black labor exploitation, U.S. companies appreciate the protection they get from the racist government of South Africa. As in some Latin American lands, through AIFLD, they want the help of the AFL-CIO's "internationalism" to keep things as they are.

The dirty role of AFL-CIO-FO-CIA in Africa should be made known to the trade unionists of Africa through every available channel. The trade unions of Africa are well able to set their own policy without the offered "help," and most certainly not from men who have their own racist stables to clean.

20 MAY 1973

'Supersecret' Work of C.I.A. Is Scored

By PAUL MONTGOMERY

Two leading scholars in the field of national security said yesterday that the "supersecret" operations mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency had become a self-serving and uncontrolled danger to United States foreign policy and should be abolished by Congress.

A paper was presented at a conference on government secrecy here by the scholars, Morton H. Halperin of the Brookings Institution and Jeremy J. Stone of the Federation of American Scientists. It described the working of the mechanism for covert political action in foreign countries and indicated the ways in which they said it distorted public policy.

Mr. Halperin, a former Defense Department and White House staff member, told his audience at the New York University Law School that the paper was based on public records rather than inside knowledge. He said that when he was in the Government, he did not have the security clearance necessary to participate in official discussions of covert operations.

Members of Committee

The paper said that approval of covert operations, which could include rigging elections in Chile or supporting an invasion of Cuba or conducting a secret war in Laos, came from a committee whose existence had never been publicly announced by the Government—the Forty Committee.

The membership of the committee, according to the paper, is the assistant to the President for national security affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of State for political affairs and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Halperin and Mr. Stone said that each member was served by a staff that operated independently of the department to which he was assigned. The operatives for the covert plots, the paper said, come from the C.I.A.'s Plans Directorate, whose administration is at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., and which maintains staff members overseas, usually with embassy cover.

All participants, the paper said, have a security clearance far above "top secret" whose existence is itself a classified matter that cannot be discussed by insiders.

The paper says that originally the Forty Committee was created to carry out assignments from the National Security Council. However, it said, since there is now such an extensive "plans" establishment, the establishment itself generates proposals. Since secrecy is so intense, the budgets of operations do not come under the usual scrunity.

Separate Meetings

The paper says that many situations arise in which policymakers with high security clearance hold meetings to discuss options open to the United States in a given country. The "dirty tricks" operatives, however, with even higher clearance, meet separately to discuss a whole range of options unknown to the others.

The consequence, the paper says, is that assessments by the State Department, Congress, th executive, the public and even the overt intelligence-gathering arm of the C.I.A. are distorted because they are not privy to the covert operations.

After an election in a given country, for example, the State Department might decide that a certain trend was developing and base its policy on that trend, when in fact a covert operation might have rigged the election.

The "supersecret" clearance required also tends to limit participation in covert decisions to those who support them and earn their living by them, the paper says. "The lack of vigorous dissent, so common in other proposals of a controversial nature, tends to lead to routine approval," the authors say.

New Policy Trends

The paper contends that the covert operations mechanism was not authorized in the intent of the legislation creating the C.I.A.

It also argues that covert interference in the internal affairs of other countries has been made unnecessary by recent foreign policy trends toward "disengagement" with the Communist nations. The only likely targets, it says, are Third World countries—"an area with which we are not at war, and from which we are not in danger."

The authors urge the abolition of the entire covert-operations apparatus. The intelligence-gathering activities of the C.I.A. and the National Security Agency could then be made almost entirely public, and their plans and budgets scrutinized by Congress like those of other Government agencies, the paper states.

The two-day conference on Government secrecy, which ended yesterday, was sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice and the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program at New York University.

1 June 1973

On vacation from Yale, Al McCoy came across the first clues that enabled him to untangle the web of intrigue involving America's national security agency in the Vietnam heroin epidemic

HOW THE C.I.A. GOT HOOKED ON HEROIN

by Thomas Buckley

The whipping elephant grass tore at his black pajamas. The monsoon rain turned the red earth to gluey mud that pulled at his boots. A creeper vine hooked his spectacles and pulled them off. Pressing flat against the ground, he twisted his body and groped blindly until he found them. For a moment he lost sight of his Laotian interpreter and his Australian photographer. And the flat crack-crack-crack of the automatic rifles continued. He heard the bite of the bullets through the air over his head, heard them thudding into the sodden hillside behind them, and Alfred W. McCoy, doctoral candidate at Yale University, thought to himself, "What the hell am I doing here? I feel like the patsy in one of those Eric Ambler thrillers. Suddenly everyone wants to kill me."

Sitting in his modest apartment in New Haven one day recently, Al McCoy was inclined to laugh it all off, but there are experienced intelligence officials who still wonder how he got back to the United States alive. Many men who take on the Mafia, the Unione Corse, the South Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai governments, not to mention the Central Intelligence Agency and its private armies, don't.

But perhaps because he's tough enough behind his spectacles and his diffident manner to have played prep-school football and rowed on the Columbia crew, hasn't learned the bad habits of professional journalists and is still young enough at 27 to be sure he's going to live forever, McCoy got away with it. He came back to write a book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, that ripped the veil of secrecy from one of the grimmest sides of the American involvement in that part of the world, besides being one of the best pieces of investigative reporting published in the last 20 years.

What McCoy put together was a devastating and amply documented indictment of the C.I.A. and the motley collection of warlords it has been supporting for as long as two decades for their responsibility for the heroin epidemic that engulfed American troops in Vietnam in 1 Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0 swelled the estimated number of addicts in the United States to 500,000 or more. The cost in ruined lives, packed jails, and losses in the robberies and assaults that these addicts will commit for years to come to support their addictions will add substantially to the $150 billion or more that this country squandered in its ill-starred Vietnam adventure.

While President Nixon was bargaining with the Turkish government to reduce its opium crop, supposedly the source of most of the heroin coming into the United States, and other so-called experts were arguing that Communist China and North Vietnam were secretly running the traffic into South Vietnam, McCoy found persuasive evidence, now becoming generally accepted, that 70% of the world supply of illicit opium was being grown in the inaccessible mountain valleys of the "Golden Triangle" of northern Burma and Laos.

More important, he found out that between the simple tribesmen who grew the stuff—and seldom used it themselves except in case of illness—and the ultimate consumer in American cities, it was our "anti-communist" allies who were making fortunes out of this crop of misery. Not surprisingly, the C.I.A., which has grown accustomed to operating outside the law all over the world, tried to suppress the book by threatening McCoy's publisher with libel actions. When the agency failed to produce a convincing case against the book, the master spies of Langley, Va., in effect were admitting what anyone, including this writer, who has spent any time in Southeast Asia already knew—that he was absolutely right.

"I first got interested in Vietnam when I was studying for my master's degree at Stanford," McCoy told me. "I wrote an article on Pan American-World Airways' profits out of the Vietnam war for *Ramparts* and then I edited a collection of articles on Laos. After it appeared in January, 1971, my editor at Harper & Row suggested that there might be a book in the Golden Triangle. The opium had been mentioned in newspaper and magazine articles from time to time but no one had ever tried to pull it all together and get to the bottom of it."

During his spring vacation at Yale that year, McCoy went to Paris. There he talked not only to Vietnamese and Laotian political exiles but also to former officials of the French colonial government of Indo-China, which comprised present-day North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. He found to his amazement that doors that should have remained firmly shut swung open to the young unknown graduate student.

Maurice Belleux, now an executive in a helicopter concern, received him in his apartment. He was once head of the Service de Documentation Exterieure et du Contre-Espionage, the French equivalent of the C.I.A., in Indo-China. "It was amazing," McCoy recalled. "The first thing he said was, 'I bet you want to know how we ran the opium traffic during the first Indo-China War. Here, let me draw you a chart.' The chart in the book is the chart he drew for me."

Unlike the C.I.A., Belleux' organization was kept on a tight budget, inadequate to pay for its informers, its hired assassins and all the other expenses of an intelligence organization that government accountants prefer to know nothing about. Beginning in 1946, when the French colonialists were trying to make themselves more popular with their Vietnamese subjects by suppressing the opium traffic that they had promoted, the S.D.E.C.E. gradually took it over.

In alliance with French military intelligence, which had similar financial problems, S.D.E.C.E. took on local experts—the organized racketeers of the Union Corse and the Binh Xuyen gang of Chinese and Vietnamese, who in the last days of French rule in Saigon had virtual control of the city, even to running its police force.

"It was very strange in Paris," said McCoy, who speaks fluent French. "I would go to see someone I knew had been a leader of the Binh Xuyen (pronounced Bin-Zwin), which was an absolutely merciless, ferocious outfit—one of them was Van Sang, who at one time had been the head of the national police—and he would be sitting in his luxury apartment, talking absolutely calmly about the worst sort of murders and tortures."

Before he left Paris, McCoy had a pretty good idea of the extent of the traffic, not only in the 1950s but also—and here his sources were the tens of thousands of Vietnamese who make the French capital their home—down to the present day. He told his publisher what he had found out, and Harper & Row

 continued

agreed to give him a large enough advance to enable him to visit Southeast Asia and take the time to write his book. As soon as the spring term ended, McCoy was on his way.

By then Vietnamization was well under way. American forces in Vietnam, which had reached a peak of 550,000, not counting the sailors of the Seventh Fleet and the vast Air Force bases and support units in Thailand and the Pacific islands, were being withdrawn. Those who remained had been shifted to defensive operations. Bored and frustrated, they had become frequent users of marijuana—the concern that this aroused on the homefront was soon to seem almost laughable. Gradually many of them came to prefer the superior sense of well-being that came with the white powder available so cheaply and easily in every village and city and from the Vietnamese laborers at their own base camps.

McCoy stopped first in Hong Kong. With its almost entirely Chinese population, many of them refugees from the first days of the communist takeover of mainland China, who arrived with their opium addictions intact, the city had a booming narcotics problem of its own. Beyond that, its crowded and bustling harbor made it an ideal transshipment point for narcotics headed for the United States from elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

"I got many of my interviews through Old China hands," McCoy told me. "One of them—I don't want to mention his name—took me out to an isolated part of the New Territories [the mainland section of the crown colony as distinct from Hong Kong island] and set me down with a Chinese. He told me how the heroin industry moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong in 1949, about the warfare between the Chinese factions—the secret societies, the gangs from Swatow and Amoy and Canton, and about the patterns of the trade."

It was also in Hongkong that McCoy discovered that Santo Trafficante Jr., the son of the acknowledged Mafia boss of Florida, had been there shortly before him, and had gone on to Saigon, which is not a place where anyone has gone except on business for quite a long time. It's McCoy's theory, and I think a good one, that Trafficante was working out the routes and methods of payment for what was to turn out to be the wholesale invasion of the United States by Asian heroin.

McCoy followed Trafficante to Saigon, the once langorous and beautiful capital of Cochin-China, where faceless coolies and silent white-clad servants had waited on their French masters, before being transformed into better-paid lackeys for the Americans. McCoy plunged into a round of interviews, following up leads given to him by Vietnamese exiles in Paris.

Though Saigon was a base for scores of American reporters, he told me, he was astounded to find that few of them were pursuing the heroin investigation. "The working press was just going out to the bases to see G.I.s using heroin," McCoy said. "Everyone already knew that. Or the press would go out to see the opening of a new treatment center. In terms of the really big story—the corruption and complicity of the Vietnamese government—there was nobody working on it except for Phil Brady of NBC Television.

McCoy swung his long legs and fell silent for a moment. "The information was really there," he went on. "American officers told me about the corruption of the general who had been the Vietnamese commander in the Delta and who became President Thieu's right-hand man in the Presidential Palace. American customs advisers told me pointblank that even if all traffic on the civilian side of Tansonhut Airport was shut off, heroin would keep coming in on the military side."

Ironically, during the five weeks that he spent in Vietnam a crackdown on drugs was supposed to be in effect. "Old opium addicts and young heroin addicts were being arrested, but it was just for show," McCoy said. "The distribution system wasn't being touched. Tom Fox, an American friend of mine, speaks good Vietnamese, and I would hop into a cyclo—a two-seater motocycle taxi—and tell the driver that we were G.I.s and we wanted heroin. We were always able to get it, in about five minutes. Then we'd ask the person we scored, 'Where are you getting your heroin from? Are you having any trouble with the police?' Questions like that. They'd tell us, 'No problems at all, but we've kicked the price up a couple of hundred piasters because people *think* there's a crackdown.'"

Gradually, McCoy completed his reconstruction of how the heroin traffic had developed in Vietnam. It led him into the winding alleys of Cholon, where the influence of Binh Xuyen still lurked, along with the power of Chinese millionaires who transferred their funds through family and clan banks in Singapore, Taiwan, Beirut and all the way to New York.

"Before I left the states I went to see Major-General Edwin Lansdale," McCoy said. "He was President Ngo Dinh Diem's top adviser on intelligence and counter-insurgency warfare when he was with the C.I.A. He told me to forget about my project. 'You won't come back alive,' he said. He told me that back in the 1950s he had tried to get to the bottom of the workings of the opium racket. He recruited a Chinese businessman to analyse it for him. The trouble was that he got too close to the men who ran it, Lansdale told me, and he got killed."

After the battle of Dienbienphu brought an end to the French era in Indo-China and the United States rushed in to replace them with its nominee, Diem, the opium traffic was suppressed for a couple of years. Ultimately, though, Diem's brother and chief adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu—the family name comes first in Vietnam—persuaded him to allow it to be revived to provide the funds for the brothers' secret Can Lao party. Nhu was widely believed to be an opium addict himself.

In November, 1963, with American acceptance, a military coup overthrew and murdered the brothers. While a succession of governments during the next two years brought South Vietnam close to total collapse, the opium trade flourished under the leadership of Nguyen Cao Ky, the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force. He had been involved in smuggling opium into the country since 1961. Indeed, his opium profits helped to provide the clout that put Ky into position to claim the premiership himself in 1965. After coming to power, Ky, the swashbuckling flyer, gave the job of supervising the opium racket—in those days the users were almost entirely Chinese and poor Vietnamese, although a good many Americans, including this writer, were known to smoke a few pipes every once in a while—to his most trusted adviser, Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, who was also director of the national police.

In 1967, the Americans who had brought Ky to power, as they had brought Diem to power, eased him out by pressuring him into taking the vice-presidency on the ticket headed by General Nguyen Van Thieu. Soon General Loan was seriously wounded while leading an attack against Vietcong shock troops who had occupied a factory building in the Saigon outskirts during the "second tet" offensive. A week later, in circumstances that remain mysterious, almost all the rest of Ky's most powerful supporters were killed or wounded when the Saigon police station at which they were meeting was "accidentally" rocketed by an American helicopter.

Thieu gathered the strings of the opium and gold rackets in his own hands. By 1969, as the American presence reached its peak and then began to decline, a decision was taken somewhere or it may be simply that it was the pull of events, to broaden the market for opium by refining it into heroin and supplying it to American troops. From Bangkok and laboratories that were set up in Laos, near the Long Tieng base of the C.I.A., the almost pure white powder first began to trickle, then to flood, into Vietnam. It was the narcotic equivalent of a convenience food: opium is difficult to prepare for the pipe, difficult to smoke properly, often makes the user nauseous, and provides a slow glow of pleasure. Moreover, its pungent odor is easily detectible. Heroin, the refined and concentrated product of the sap of the opium poppy, is colorless, odorless and provides a "rush" of euphoria, whether smoked, inhaled or injected in solution with water.

But as the American public became aware of the threat, the outcry grew. Finally, Washington exerted enough pressure to at least produce several highly publicized arrests. Several Vietnamese politicians, operating either on their own or as Thieu's agents, were seized at Tansonhut Airport or in Bangkok with hundreds of pounds of heroin concealed in their luggage.

From Saigon, McCoy followed the heroin trail to Bangkok and Thailand's northern border region around Chiengmai, where he found the army and police deeply involved in the traffic, and from there into the Golden Triangle, the growing regions of Burma and Laos, itself. The opium poppy, *papaver somniferum*, is a delicate plant that flourishes only in certain soils and climates. These are found in a narrow band of mountains that stretches some 4,500 miles from the Anatolian plateau in Turkey across northern India to the Shan states of Burma and northern Laos. The last two, perhaps the most

continued

inaccessible places [illegible] Curtain, have been [illegible] of the C.I.A. at various times over a period of 20 years or more, McCoy found.

The Shan states, separated from the weak central government in Rangoon by hundreds of miles of trackless jungle, were ruled for years by the remnants of Chinese Nationalist army units that fled across the border from Yunnan when their commander, Chiang Kai-shek, thousands of miles away, was driven off the mainland to Taiwan in 1949. Almost unknown to the western world, these troops were armed and paid by the C.I.A. for cross-border intelligence operations, sabotage, and even for a projected invasion of China. It appears now that the Nationalists were happy to take our money without ever having any serious interest in so harebrained a scheme, and they augmented their subsidies by organizing and enlarging the opium-growing of the hill tribes.

Clashes between these troops and the Burmese army began in the early 1950s and continued for more than a decade. Finally, in 1961, after Burma and Communist China signed a secret agreement that provided, among other things, for joint operations against the main Nationalist base, the Shan states were conquered. The Nationalists took heavy casualties, and the remaining troops, some 6,000, retreated across the Mekong River into Laos.

Driven out of Burma, the Nationalists continued to collect and market the opium crop of the hill tribes. In Laos, they encouraged the ethnically related hill people to increase their planting. At first, the crude opium was carried to the Thai border by mule caravan, taken to Bangkok in military and police trucks, and from there shipped by sea to Vietnam and around the world. But as a demand for heroin was being created among American troops in Vietnam, McCoy discovered, the pattern changed rapidly. Laboratories to refine opium into morphine base and then into heroin were established both in Bangkok and, more importantly, in Laos. They were staffed by expert underworld chemists flown in from Hongkong.

To learn about these developments at first hand, McCoy crossed the Thai border into Laos at Vientiane. There he picked up an interpreter, Phin Manivong, and an Australian guide and photographer, John Everingham. They bought sets of the cheap and durable black cotton pajamas that are the ordinary clothing of peasants and mountain tribesmen in the region, loaded their packs with sleeping bags, a change of socks, a few cans of C-rations for emergency use, and first-aid supplies, and started north. They hiked, hitched, or paid their fare on the rattling local buses that occasionally passed their way.

"The black pajamas make you a curiosity," McCoy said, "and since we were traveling on foot or any way we could, it was obvious that we weren't American intelligence agents or clandestine warfare specialists." Unarmed, the three went north on the old French highway 13 that runs to Luang Prabang. Eighty miles from Vientiane, entering the opium-growing uplands, they left the highway and hiked along a track through the mountains another 10 miles to the village of Long Pot, which nestles in a sheltered valley below 5,000-foot peaks. This was part of the dominion of General Vang Pao, commander of the C.I.A.-sponsored "secret army" of Meo tribesmen that for 10 years had been almost the only force holding back the North Vietnamese-supported Pathet Lao insurgents.

In peacetime the Meos' chief occupation had been growing opium to supply the Saigon and Bangkok markets. Part of the price that Vang [illegible]port was the cooperation of the intelligence agency in getting the valuable crop to market. Since Pathet Lao troops prowled the valleys, the only safe and practicable way of doing this was aboard the helicopters and light planes of Air America, the C.I.A.-sponsored airline that operated all over Southeast Asia. But as McCoy was to find out, the opium was now being refined into heroin before leaving Laos, in seven factories set up by Vang Pao almost under the protective guns of the Long Tieng combat base.

From there it was flown into Vietnam and Bangkok aboard Vietnamese and Laotian military aircraft. In his scores of interviews, McCoy also learned, it seems correctly, that just one of these factories had an annual production of 3.6 tons of heroin, more than a third of the estimated annual consumption for the entire United States.

Long Pot proved to be a microcosm of the suffering of Laos that has gone on for years with almost no notice in the United States. It was a primitive community of about 300 persons, divided into 47 households. Its head man told McCoy, through his interpreter, that it produced about 15 kilos—a kilo is 2.2 pounds—in a good year, and that it was sold to Vang Pao's purchasing agents for $40 to $60 a kilo. They arrived, McCoy was told, in helicopters piloted by Americans. Since the cultivation of the opium took all the villagers' time, they were also supplied with rice, their staple food, by the Americans.

"All through the 1960s", McCoy told me, "Long Pot was a loyal Meo village. But when the fighting intensified between Vang Pao and the Pathet Lao, more and more young men were conscripted. In 1970, the head man told us, 60 were taken. They suffered heavy casualties. The next year, when the head man knew that he would have to provide more manpower, he decided not to do it. He told the villagers to hide in the hills when the troops arrived. But Vang Pao and the C.I.A. struck back hard: they stopped the rice drops. The word came down that they would be resumed only when the villagers agreed to move to refugee villages more tightly under Vang Pao's control."

At about the same time, McCoy went on, Pathet Lao patrols began to penetrate the countryside near Long Pot, putting the villagers in double jeopardy. The most serious danger was that the presence of the insurgents would lead to air strikes against them that would destroy the village.

"It was incredible, the tension in Long Pot," McCoy recalled. "The first night we were there, as soon as we sat down for dinner, it was obvious that the village was hungry. There wasn't any meat and only chopped vine leaves instead of proper vegetables to go with the rice, and there wasn't much of that. Meo officers with M-16s were all over the place. They began questioning us, looking suspicious and hostile, wanting to know what we were doing there. It was only between 1 and 2 a.m. that the head man would have a serious discussion with us. Before he would talk he got up and walked around the outside of his hut to make sure no one was listening. Even then he spoke only in a whisper. That's when he explained how the opium traffic worked, about the helicopters flying in, and about the losses the young men from the village were taking. He told us the village was being starved out, and he wanted publicity, even though he realized it was dangerous for him personally."

Next morning McCoy, Everingham and their interpreter set out in a monsoon rainstorm at [illegible] country to another village [illegible] miles away that had been bombed recently, they had been told, by the Laotian air force. The Long Pot headman sent a bodyguard of five men with them. The party had gone about halfway when they suddenly came under fire from an ambush position in the hills overlooking their path. "There were a couple of mortar rounds, then automatic rifle fire," said McCoy. "It's a funny feeling, being under fire for the first time. I didn't know whether we were going to get out of there alive. After a couple of hours we decided we didn't have any choice but to go back to Long Pot."

After talking to the head man again, McCoy came to the conclusion that it hadn't been the communists shooting at his party, but a detachment of Vang Pao's troops who didn't want them to get to the other village. "I don't think they were trying to kill us," McCoy told me with a modest laugh. "They could have done that easily enough, I think, if they had wanted to, but, of course, I didn't know it at the time." By then, he had the facts he had come to Southeast Asia to get.

He and his companions returned to Vientiane, where he told the press of the plight of Long Pot. The press accounts were printed all over the world, and within a few weeks, the pressure of public opinion forced the C.I.A. to resume its rice deliveries. (It was not to last. In January, 1972, the Pathet Lao infiltrated the area around the village. The inhabitants were forced to flee, and then it was burned to the ground in a napalm air attack.)

For the rest of 1971 and into the spring of 1972 McCoy worked 18 hours a day turning his notes into the book he wanted to write, demonstrating that the C.I.A., as a byproduct of American policy in Southeast Asia, had played a major role in the explosion of narcotics addiction both among American troops in Vietnam and in the cities of the United States.

By June, 1972, while McCoy's manuscript was not yet set in type, the book trade was buzzing about it. Not surprisingly, the C.I.A. heard about it, and on June 1, a senior intelligence official, Cord Meyer Jr., arrived at Harper & Row's New York offices. The book, he warned, might well be inaccurate, libelous and "damaging to the interests of the country".

On July 5, Lawrence R. Houston, the C.I.A.'s general counsel, finally came to the point. The agency wanted to see the manuscript before publication to point out any inaccuracies it might contain. Over McCoy's bitter protests, the publisher agreed. The C.I.A. soon delivered a 1,500-word critique, but by general agreement at the firm this failed to cast any serious doubt on McCoy's overall thesis. No changes were made and indeed the publication date was moved up from September to August.

However, civil libertarians were disturbed by the agency's intervention, and McCoy was disappointed and angry at what he saw as his publisher's failure to vigorously defend their, and his, constitutional rights under the First Amendment. A few weeks after his book's publication he reviewed the affair in a long article in the influential *New York Review of Books*. At one point, he recalled, Harper & Row had told him that unless he agreed to the C.I.A. review it would not publish the book.

"I would have withdrawn the book myself," McCoy told me, "but it would have meant having to find another publisher and very likely being faced with the same problem all over again."

CONTINUED

So with reluctanc
the C.I.A. review, but in a letter to [redacted] publisher,
one of several published with the a[redacted], he said
he would permit no deletions from his manuscript. "Having sacrificed principle," he wrote, "I do not feel that Harper & Row can expect me to sacrifice substantive portions of my book as well."

Is there any improvement in the narcotics situation in Southeast Asia since the book appeared? "Assuming that the Thieu government stays in power," he said, "the ceasefire in Vietnam will probably lead to an increase in narcotics smuggling, to make up for the loss of big American appropriations. The only thing I can say is that the Bureau of Narcotics in Washington seems a little more conscious of the problem. It finally admitted last fall that at least 30% of the heroin being used in this country was coming from Southeast Asia, which was rapidly growing as a source. Before then the official estimate had been 5%. I don't think they can ignore it anymore, and I guess that's progress of a sort."

THE LONDON TIMES
2 May 1973

CIA staff cuts

From Mr Miles Copeland

Sir, Incident to your piece "Too many elderly spies in CIA cling on to jobs", may I point out the following facts which your readers would do well to keep in mind during the coming weeks when stories will be breaking about a major shake-up in the entire American intelligence-security community?

The CIA's "spies"—or, as they are called by intelligence officers, "agents"—are almost all on life-time contract, and are rarely terminated except at their own request or for malfeasance. Even those who are languishing in jails in Siberia continue to receive deposits to their Swiss bank accounts.

The CIA rarely, if ever, employs American citizens as agents. The CIA's agents are citizens of the USSR, East Germany, the other block countries, Communist China, and Cuba—all, incidentally, Communist Party members in good standing.

It is true that Mr Schlesinger is wielding a mighty axe at the CIA, so much so that the old timers there are beginning to yearn for the return of some nice, easygoing chap such as the late General "Beetle" Smith. But those he is pushing into early retirement are administrators, desk officers, and other headquarters types who have long ago come in from the cold, and who now do about as much spying as their counterparts in the Fish & Wildlife Division of the Department of Interior.

In any case, there is not much cutting that Mr Schlesinger can do in the CIA's "department of dirty tricks", because Richard Helms had already cut it down to skeleton proportions. An inter-agency committee which recently took an across-the-board look at the production side of intelligence concluded that in quality less than 5 per cent of the "raw information" which eventually winds up as "intelligence" comes from espionage sources, and that in quantity the CIA's espionage branch produces less information in a year than a satellite orbiting the earth produces in a day.

Yours,
MILES COPELAND,
21 Marlborough Place, NW8.

11 April 1973

Chile cancels talks:

Expose ITT, CIA role in Chile

By BARRY RUBIN

U.S. Senate hearings on efforts by the Nixon administration and U.S. corporations to sabotage the Chilean government of Salvador Allende began having their repercussions last week.

Allende last week announced the suspension of economic talks between Chile and the U.S. in light of revelations during the Senate hearings of the Nixon administration's collusion with the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. (ITT) to overthrow Allende's Popular Unity (U.P.) government.

The most important new development has been the report that the top-level National Security Council allocated $400,000 to the Central Intelligence Agency for propaganda to be used against Allende during the 1970 Chilean presidential election campaign.

Other testimony has revealed that ITT offered a $1 million fund to help defeat Allende. Edward Gerrity, ITT vice-president for corporate relations, offered the excuse that the fund was to promote housing and agricultural grants to improve Chile's economy, but former CIA director John McCone testified that he had transmitted an ITT offer of the money to block Allende's victory to the CIA and the White House. Former U.S. ambassador to Chile Edward Korry refused to comment on this or other questions at the hearings, including ITT memos which claimed Korry was instructed by the White House to do all short of military action to prevent Allende from taking office.

Another memo from Anaconda Copper Co. recounts that Secretary of State William Rogers had raised the possibility of stopping U.S. sales to Chile from any business company. The comment was made at a September 1971 meeting of U.S. companies with investments in Chile.

Finally, Korry told the hearings that the CIA had commissioned a poll on the election which predicted an Allende victory. The $400,000 propaganda appropriation would have tried to counter that trend.

ITT SEEKS COMPENSATION

ITT is now trying to collect a $92.6 million claim with the Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC), a U.S. government-sponsored institution designed to reimburse companies which have overseas assets nationalized. But if the subcommittee hearings show that ITT helped provoke the nationalization, OPIC will not have to pay on the claim.

The details of ITT's 18-point plan, designed to insure that the Allende government "does not get through the crucial next six months," were exposed in ITT memos uncovered and released in March 1972 by columnist Jack Anderson.

At that time, according to both ITT and the Chilean government, both sides were near agreement on compensation, but the Anderson revelations of ITT's attempts to overthrow the U.P. led the Chilean government to break off the talks. The U.P. government is now preparing to nationalize the Chilean telephone company, in which ITT owns a major share, worth about $150 million. A constitutional amendment allowing for the nationalization is now going through the legislative process although the government has been operating the company since 1971.

In addition to its share in the phone company, ITT owns two hotels, an Avis car rental company, a small telex service and a phone equipment plant in Chile.

Talks on re-negotiations of the Chilean debt to the U.S. and on the resumption of purchase credits to Chile began last December and resumed March The next day the talks were suspended by the Chilean government in response to the latest revelations. Chile owes the U.S. about $60 million for repayments of debt from November 1971 to the end of 1972 out of a total debt of $800 million. Another controversial question, which Chilean Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda says is holding up an agreement, is the question of compensation for U.S. copper companies whose holdings have been nationalized. Crimmins has told the House of Representatives that the U.S. refuses to waive compensation.

Under a 1914 treaty between Chile and the U.S., the disagreement on copper compensation could be submitted to an international panel for non-binding arbitration. Chile has offered to use this means for arriving at an agreement, but the U.S. refuses.

Following the breakdown in talks, the Chilean ambassador to the the U.S., Orlando Latelier, who also headed the Chilean negotiating team, returned home to confer with Allende on the latest developments. He is scheduled to return this week with Almeyda, who will be addressing the Organization of American States. The combination of Almeyda's presentation of Chile's case on nationalization, the expected resolution of Peru to remove the boycott and blockade against Cuba and the continuing struggle over the Panama Canal Zone, should make the OAS meeting heated and significant.

Other U.S. activities against the Allende government are documented in the January 1973 issue of Latin America and Empire Report, the magazine of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). The NACLA report shows how the U.S Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, private U.S. banks and suppliers have suspended or severely curtailed credits to Chile. While U.S. goods formerly accounted for 35 to 40 percent of Chilean imports, in 1972 they dropped to around 15 percent.

In the 1960s, Chile was the most favored recipient of Alliance for Progress funds and foreign loans. Thus, NACLA writes, "both the U.S. business community and the U.S. government understood by early 1971 that Chile was dependent on U.S. dollars in order to import needed goods" and that the elimination of this funding "pulled the prop out from under the dependent Chilean economy."

Now, in cooperation with the U.S. government, these banks have instituted an "invisible credit blockade" to produce shortages of spare parts, machinery and other goods needed by Chile.

In addition, NACLA reports, the U.S. government has sought to "isolate Chile from the capitalist world" by pressuring other nations to refuse financial aid to Chile. European capitalist have, however, refused to follow the U.S. lead and agreed to most of Chile's debts owed to them in 1972.

There have even been some breaks among U.S. banks. Irving Trust, Bankers Trust and the Bank of America are carrying on a very limited business with Chile and various companies continue to trade on a cash and carry basis.

In a number of respects, U.S. policy has back-fired. If the U.S. will not trade with Chile, its West European competitors will fill the markets formerly controlled by U.S. companies. The U.S. pressure has also helped to intensify the anti-imperialist reactions of a number of South American countries against the U.S. and its multi-national corporations. The Panama meeting of the UN Security Council is just one example of this.

Every week brings new defeats for the U.S. strategy in South America. At the recent session of the UN Economic Commission for Latin American (ECLA) in Quito, Ecuador, South American countries unanimously condemned U.S. economic policy toward the continent. The resolution was based on a detailed report showing how South America suffers great economic losses because of unequal trade agreements with the U.S.

10 APR 1973

Victor Zorza

Putting the Military in Charge of 'Intelligence'

An article by the Pentagon general newly appointed to curb the Central Intelligence Agency throws a strong light at the murky fog which envelops the CIA.

The article by Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham, which appears in the current issues of the Army magazine, strongly urges the transfer of some of the CIA's most important functions to the DIA, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. The fact that Graham has been appointed chairman of the interagency committee which will ride herd on both the CIA and DIA suggests that the case he presented in his article has been accepted by the White House.

What is at issue is not simply a bureaucratic conflict between intelligence agencies or men ambitious for promotion, nor even a squabble about who is to control the $6 billion spent annually by the "intelligence community," although all these elements are present in the dispute. The real issue behind the struggle over the reorganization of the CIA concerns the whole direction of U.S. defense policy and, therefore, foreign policy.

On the face of it, Graham provides what looks like the first insider's account of the perversion of the intelligence process by the military in pursuit of bigger defense appropriations. He admits that military intelligence has often supplied the exaggerated estimates of the Soviet threat demanded by the defense chiefs—"the bigger the better." And when military intelligence failed to "maximize enemy threats" as instructed, it was denounced by the brasshats for "wishful thinking."

"More often than not," he says, "military intelligence people came to heel under such criticism and stumped hard for the worst-case view." Although he believes that this attitude is waning now, "there are still some old hands" in military intelligence who are so used to yielding to their Pentagon superiors "that they automatically produce threat estimates designed to please, or at least certain not to offend." Military planners who profess to "coordinate" an estimate produced by military intelligence are quite capable, he says, of reducing it "to the lowest common denominator mush," and to "inoffensive pap."

> **"It is this distrust of the DIA, which has caused successive Presidents to turn to the CIA, that Graham has set out to cure."**

The purpose of this remarkable confession which Graham makes on behalf of his colleagues, if not on his own—for he implies that his own estimates were always right—is not far to seek. He says that by "abusing the intelligence process" the military professionals have "produced the best arguments for taking the responsility for threat description out of military hands," and have caused the decision-makers to turn elsewhere for "objective" assessments.

It is this distrust of the DIA, which has caused successive Presidents to turn to the CIA, that Graham has set out to cure. The burden of his argument is that the military can and will now make the right decisions—although he does not make it clear why it should be trusted to mend its ways.

The decisions about the defense budget, and about the nature of U.S. forces and weapons development, were always supposed to be made in response to intelligence estimates of the Soviet "threat." But more often than not they resulted from a mix of budgetary restraints, intelligence estimates, pressures by the military-industrial complex pork-barrel interests and many others.

Now a basic change, which is as yet barely perceptible, is taking place under the surface. The U.S.-Soviet agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, and Mr. Nixon's grand design for a "generation of peace," have brought entirely new factors into military policy. The major weapons programs such as the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine missile systems which are now pending are far more costly than any in the past: U.S. decisions on them will depend to a considerable extent on Mr. Nixon's estimate of the effect they have on the strategic balance, and on arms reduction bargaining.

Therefore, if the Pentagon is to have a real influence on the making of defense policy, it must wrest control of the intelligence estimates back from the CIA. Even if Graham's appointment means that his argument about the control of intelligence has been accepted by the White House, the struggle is by no means over.

The issues involved in this conflict, which will have a major bearing on strategic arms limitation and disarmament, are so momentous that the next battle will be joined almost before the last is over.

MILWAUKEE, WISC.
STAR-TIMES
MAY 3 1973.
WEEKLY - CIRC.N-A

Central Intelligence Agency involved in world drug traffic

BY RICHARD MORRIS

Where does dope come from and how does this mummifying poison continue to reach America's shores without any real degree of effective curtailment?

According to issued statements from the International Narcotics Control Board of the United Nations, "There is little evidence of a leakage of opium gum to the illicit market from India and Iran."

With the reduction of Turkey's 21 opium producing provinces to seven for the 1971 harvest, and with an announced further reduction to four provinces in 1972, Turkey has ceased to be the focal point for illicit opium production. Southeast Asia emerges as the world's opium producing giant with a yearly production of an "estimated" (again) 1,400 tons. Burma, long a British protectorate, delivers 400 tons of opium to the world, and the pro-Western governments of Laos and Thailand harvest in the remainder.

Representatives of the United States claim heavy commitments in Southeast Asia and assert that their demoralizing presence on that part of the planet is to "enable it to remain non-Communist." To progogate and peddle drugs is never mentioned. On the other side of the question, Long Cheng, base for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is reported to be the central collecting point for the majority of opium exported outside of Southeast Asia.

Puppets react as their puppeteer's finers instruct. CIA operations in Southeast Asia obviously require the cooperation of high local government officials as well as mecernary adventurers.

Former CIA director Richard Helms denies that agency's involvement in the flourishing drug traffic in Indochina, and relates that the CIA does not "officially condone" the same drug traffic. But, Helms does not denie "the CIA provides virtually all the transportation, the arms and much of the money needed to sustain the drug traffic in Indochina."

Eighty percent of the world's supply of opium is exported from Southeast Asia, as reported by the United Nation Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

Like any other traffic, drug traffic has to be directed also. Narcotics are not exported from Turkey, India, Southeast Asia or any other source of growth without "exact" routes that leads to "exact" destinations. If such was not the case, chaos and confusion; verily, drug wars would explode among drug trafficing nations.

However, the mere fact that only 20 percent of illicit narcotics entering American shores and confiscated at their port of entry, offers substantial proof that drug trafficing succeeds consistently due to a highly efficient organizational operation.

The MITRE Corp., a "think tank" located in McLean, Va., is one such American based organization concerned with the application of technological methods of approach which include "operations analysis" and "systems engineering." A Federally financed institution, MITRE Corp. conducts serial surveillance flights over poppy growing territories --- similar to the U-2 reconnaissance flights used to detect missle bases in Cuba.

Using [illegible] advanced methods of technology, [illegible] only can detect poppy crops in early growth, but can radioactively treat that crop with "tracer" mater[illegible] and follow the entire route - port for port - the drug travels enroute to its specified destination --- from the source to the user. Under these conditions, a narcotic route can either be INTERRUPTED or FACILITATED.

David Jaffe became a member of the department staff at MITRE Corp. in September, 1970. Before coming to MITRE, Jaffe was deputy head of the Public Safety Department for Research Analysis Corp. Part of the qualifying criteria for Jaffe promotion was the success of studies he directed on the relationship between the physical environment and the crime rate, logistic support to police and fire departments in combating civil disorders, and the role of police in a ghetto community --- while at Research Analysis Corp.

Testifying before the Select Committee On Crime on April 27, 1971, Jaffe spoke in reference to MITRE's use of radioactive tracers: "Four primary handicaps exist in the use of trace material:

(1) 'Inserting the tracers into the drugs and the tagged drugs into the illicit traffic;

(2) The tracer must be safe for use INTERNALLY or INTRAVENOUSLY;

(3) The tracer must be highly reliable;

(4) A tracer, to remain a unique indentifier, cannot be reused until the tagged material has been cleared from the marketplace --- A CONDITION WHICH CAN REQUIRE SEVERAL YEARS."

The trace materials used are chemically structured to survive the processing that transforms opium to heroin and can be inserted into the distribution network at points other than the source. MITRE constantly refreshes its Data Bank on the complexities of information needed to describe the production, distribution, and consumption of narcotics at the national --- and international level as well. According to Jaffe "the effectiveness of drug control is dependent on access to that information." End Quote.

Could it be that the MITRE Corp. actually functions as the nucleus for planning, analyzing, and programming America's drug traffic? Why is it necessary to conduct surveillance flights over poppy crops of supposedly "friendly" nations receiving so-called Corp. a vital part of America's vicious and conspiratorial circle of death for Black people?

Charles B. Rangel, Congressman from New York's 18th Congressional District (Harlem), in an address from the floor of the House of Representatives stated, "Law enforcement and custom officials scurry about making isolated arrests and seizures here and there, but outside the United States, tons and tons of illicit heroin continue to flow unchecked toward our shores."

After briefly explaining the extent which drug addicts in his neighborhood are engulfed in an existence saturated with disease and crime, Congressman Rangel continued, "They lose interest in all the normal concerns of life---work, school, family life, and friends. Their lives become living death, until they finally crumple to the floor of a hallway or bathroom dead and frothy white endema fluid begins cozing from their nostrils or mouth." Another Black Death Statistic...(To be continued)

HS/HC-950

18 MAY 1973

Aide Quits C.I.A., Impugning Its Honesty

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 17—An expert on Indochina resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency today, charging the intelligence community with "grossly" underestimating the size of the insurgency in Cambodia and with refusing to admit that the conflict there was a civil war.

Samuel A. Adams, in a resignation statement to the C.I.A. that he also gave to The New York Times, also said that the intelligence community was "neither honest enough nor thorough enough" in its work on Indochina.

Mr. Adams's views were disputed by experts in both the State Department and the C.I.A., who stuck with the official analysis, shared by the Pentagon, that the insurgent force of 40,000 to 50,000 is almost totally dependent on North Vietnam, and responsive to Hanoi's will.

Rebels Almost 'Independeant'

In an interview, Mr. Adams took direct issue with the official view of both the size and control of the rebel force.

He said that the Cambodian insurgents were "virtually independent" of Hanoi and that they numbered 200,000, of whom as many as 100,000 were organized into regular units. He also asked there were "no more" than 2,000 North Vietnamese with the insurgents, specialists in such work as mine-laying and engineering.

The size and control of the rebel force is an issue that underlies congressional efforts to cut off funds for the continued American bombing of Cambodia in support of the Lon Nol Government. The Administration had defended the raids as necessary to offset the North Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia.



The New York Times

Samuel A. Adams

Moreover, the Administration has also tended to describe the Cambodian insurgents as a poorly organized force that could be handled by the Lon Nol forces of 200,000 if not for North Vietnam's aid.

Nixon Statement Recalled

For example, President Nixon in his recent State of the World Message repeatedly referred to Hanoi's "aggression" in Cambodia. And Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in a recent appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the Lon Nol Government was opposed by a force of 70,000—35,000 Cambodians and 35,000 North Vietnamese.

Mr. Adams, in recent days, has been briefing such antiwar Senators as George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and Charles McC. Mathias Jr., Republican of Maryland, on his views and he has been invited to testify before a Foreign Relations sub-committee.

Critics of the bombing say that the fighting there is essentially a civil war between Cambodians and that the United States had no business intervening.

The C.I.A. refused to comment on Mr. Adams's resignation.

Mr. Adams, a 10-year veteran of the agency, also was involved in a dispute in 1967 over the size of the Vietcong force in South Vietnam.

He insisted that it was 600,000, while the official estimate was 275,000. He said that his figure was accepted as the accurate one in 1968 after the Tet offensive.

In March, Mr. Adams testified for the defense in the Pentagon Papers trial of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr.

He said that some of the highly classified documents were based on inaccurate and perhaps deliberately misleading information, thus making them of no importance to enemy intelligence.

'Repeated Misjudgments'

In his resignation statement, Mr. Adams said his "main reason" for leaving was "the belief that U.S. intelligence has been neither honest enough nor thorough enough in conducting research on the war in Indochina."

"The failures in research have led to repeated misjudgments of the nature and strength of our adversaries there," he said.

He also cited his "inability" to correct the situation.

"Since 1967, I have submitted complaints about the integrity and completeness of research to the inspector generals of the C.I.A. and the U.S. Army to the National Security Council, and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," he said. "My criticisms were met with evasion, delay, and sometimes threat. As far as I can determine, they were largely fruitless."

Mr. Adams, who has written a history of the Cambodian Communist movement for the agency, said there was "no disagreement" that Hanoi supplied most of the insurgent war material. But said that Hanoi's control over the insurgents was much less thanthat stated by the Administration. He likened it to the relationship between Peking and Hanoi.

HS/HC-950

11 MAY 1973

Schlesinger to fill defense chief post

By ADAM CLYMER
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—President Nixon shuffled his shaken administration again yesterday, moving four familiar, trusted and untainted figures into new jobs at the White House, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency.

He named John B. Connally, Jr., former treasury secretary and head of Democrats for Nixon, to be a regular but part-time "special adviser," serving without pay but continuing all his existing business and legal ties.

Mr. Nixon announced he would nominate James R. Schlesinger, who took over as the head of the CIA earlier this year, as secretary of defense. He would succeed Elliot L. Richardson, now seeking confirmation as Attorney General.

A career CIA official, William B. Colby, now the agency's deputy director for operations, was named to succeed Mr. Schlesinger as director of central intelligence.

And H. Fred Buzhardt, Jr., general counsel for the Pentagon, was designated a special counsel at the White House to take charge of the Watergate case and its effects there, including such matters as dealing with attorneys for White House aides now under investigation.

Finally, Mr. Nixon scrapped the "super-cabinet" plan announced with great fanfare in January by the now-departed assistant to the President, John D. Ehrlichman. He told all members of the Cabinet that he now wanted to deal directly and more frequently with all of them, and he abolished the posts of counselor to the President which he had bestowed on three of them.

These shifts were announced by Mr. Nixon at a Cabinet meeting, according to Ronald L. Ziegler, his press secretary, who in turn announced them to reporters.

"Will be available"

Mr. Ziegler's announcement about Mr. Connally's duties emphasized that the former Texas governor, who joined the Republican party last week, and whom Mr. Nixon has sometimes touted as a successor in 1976, would not have "operational authority," but "will be available to the President when the President wants to call on him, and we assume that will be frequently."

Mr. Ziegler said he also assumed Mr. Connally would be consulted on both foreign and domestic matters, and guessed that he would be spending something like three days a week at the White House.

Pressed on whether a conflict of interest would be created because Mr. Connally will continue to serve the President and his law clients and business interests, Mr. Ziegler said that would not arise "simply because he is an individual who is devoting his time to be available to the President to consult with him not on operational matters, or policy, direct policy decisions, but to be an overall special adviser to the President, someone the President can call upon to discuss general subjects which he may be interested in."

Later he said, "But then going beyond that, I'm sure that both men — certainly the President and Governor Connally — would in any of their discussions eliminate anything that would suggest the possibility of a conflict of interest." He offered the assurance repeatedly.

Asked if he would provide "a list of his business and legal connections at the moment," Mr. Ziegler replied, "Well, I think his law firm will do that."

However, Mr. Connally's secretary at the Houston firm of Vinson, Elkins, Searls, Connally and Smith, one of the nation's largest, declined to name either his clients or his directorships. She referred a caller to the firm's managing partner, A. Frank Smith. Questions were put to him through a secretary, but he did not respond.



JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
. . . from CIA to Defense

WILLIAM B. COLBY
. . . to head CIA

However, from other sources it was learned that Mr. Connally serves on the boards of directors of Pan American World Airways; the First City National Bank of Houston (the country's 47th largest); the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, a major natural gas pipeline firm; the American General Insurance Company, of Houston; the Halliburton Company, parent of the Brown and Root construction company; Texas Instruments, Inc., and others.

He joined those boards since resigning as secretary of the treasury June 12. He is also a partner in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., a Hawthorne (Calif.), contracting firm.

JOHN B. CONNALLY, JR.
. . . named Nixon adviser

His law firm represents Occidental Petroleum, and Mr. Connally accompanied Armand Hammer, head of the firm, to the Mideast early this year in connection with Saudi Arabian oil leases. Soon after that, President Nixon said Mr. Connally "has been traveling in his private capacity as an attorney, but he has, at my request, undertaken some informal discussions with leaders in various parts of the world."

Many of these firms have vast dealings with the federal government or come under its regulatory agencies. Pan American, for example, is seeking an extension of airline routes which will eventually come to Mr. Nixon for approval.

Mr. Ziegler, while never suggesting just what Mr. Connally would be advising Mr. Nixon on, did eventually rule out his discussing "operational mat-

continued

ters such as oil policy and so forth."

In announcing the selection of Mr. Schlesinger, Mr. Ziegler said the President feels his "proven management expertise and wide knowledge of national security and defense affairs make him exceptionally well equipped to provide the strong leadership needed at the Department of Defense."

However, David Packard, former deputy secretary of defense, disclosed yesterday that he had been offered the post and rejected it, feeling that he should not again leave a family firm, Hewlett-Packard.

Mr. Colby, who was chief of the CIA's Far east section from 19[illegible] to 1968 before going to Saigon to take charge of the Vietnam Pacification program, was praised by Mr. Nixon, through Mr. Ziegler, as "a highly qualified and thoroughly respected professional."

He added that the President was confident that Mr. Colby would carry through the controversial reorganization and trimming of the agency.

The three super-cabinet officials were James T. Lynn, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and counsellor for community development; Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture and counsellor for natural resources and Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and counsellor for human resources. Other Cabinet officers on the domestic side reported to Mr. Nixon through them. Mr. Ehrlichman said each would be "the pivot man to whom the President would look."

And Mr. Nixon said the plan, which paralleled Cabinet reorganization legislation he submitted first in 1970 but which the Congress has rejected or ignored, would help end "wasteful musclebound government in Washington" and replace it with "change that works."

The secretaries who were not counsellors were occasionally unhappy at the even-further reduced access to Mr. Nixon, and those who were had less time to run their own departments. Giving up the plan is seen here as another reduction of the "Berlin Wall" which Mr. Ehrlichman and another departed assistant to the President, H. R. Haldeman, were said to have built around Mr. Nixon.

And another obvious effect is to increase the relative importance of Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., who was Mr. Ehrlichman's deputy as executive director of the Domestic Council and whose position as a funnel for domestic policy is enhanced by the elimination of the super-cabinet posts.

11 MAY 1973

CONNALLY IS NIXON AIDE IN MAJOR SHAKE-UP; SCHLESINGER TO HEAD DEFENSE, COLBY C.I.A.; MITCHELL AND STANS INDICTED FOR PERJURY

COUNSEL IS NAMED

Buzhardt Will Advise on Watergate—the Super-Cabinet Dies

By JOHN HERBERS
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10 — President Nixon announced today another major reorganization of government and reshuffling of political power as a result of the Watergate scandals.

He disclosed the following at a cabinet meeting:

¶John B. Connally, the former Secretary of the Treasury who switched from the Democratic party to the Repubican party a few days ago, will join the White House as an unpaid special adviser to the President on a part-time basis while continuing his law practice in Houston. He will advise the President on various domestic and foreign matters and on rebuilding the White House staff.

¶James R. Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence, will be nominated as Secretary of Defense to replace Elliot L. Richardson, who was nominated at Attorney Genera last week to take over the troubled Justice Department and oversee prosecution of the Watergate case.

¶William E. Colby, deputy director for operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, wil become its director to succeed Mr. Schlesinger.

¶The super-Cabinet that the President set up in January as part of a plan for highly centralized control of the bureaucracy will be mostly demolished with the President going back to the traditional system of direct contacts with the regular Cabinet members. The super-Cabinet system collapsed ac-,cording to Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, because its two chief architects and operators, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, resigned last week as Pres dential aides because of the scandals.

¶J. Fred Buzhardtjr., general counsel of the Defense Department, is moving to the White House on a temporary basis to be special counsel on Watergate matters. Leonard Garment will continue to have over-all counsel duties for the White House, but Mr. Buzhardt will answer directly to the President. As the Top Defense Department lawyer, Mr. Buzhardt has been heavily involved in the Pentagon papers case.

The moves came after Mr. Nixon had addressed a Republican fund-raising dinner here last night at which he said:

"We are not going to allow this deplorable incident to deter us or deflect us from going forward toward achieving the great goals that an overwhelming majority of the American people elected us to achieve in November of 1972."

Mr. Nixon said much the same thing at his Cabinet meeting this morning, which Mr. Connally and Mr. Schlesinger attended. Afterward, Mr. Ziegler reported the changes to a crowded press room.

The appointments followed the pattern that Mr. Nixon had established earlier in seeking to repair the Watergate damage: instead of turning to outsiders, as some Presidents have done in scandals of the past, Mr. Nixon drew on his established circle of aides and advisers.

Refusal From Packard

The post of Defense Secretary was first offered to David Packard, who served as Deputy Secretary in the first Nixon term and who had returned to private business and apparently did not want to resume government service.

Reshuffling of officials has been so rapid that it had an air of musical chairs. Mr. Richardson, Defense Secretary for three months, has not yet been confirmed as Attorney General and the Senate is showing no inclination to hurry with the confirmation, as a result of pending matters in the Watergate case.

Mr. Ziegler was asked if there would be any problem of Mr. Schlesinger taking Mr. Richardson's seat at Defense in case of further Senate delay. He said the White House was confident the Senate would act soon.

Following the announcements, Mr. Ziegler was flooded with question, many of them centering on the unusual situation of Mr. Connaly's acting as Presidential adviser without giving up his law firm position.

He is a senior apartner in the Houston firm in Vinson, Elkins, Searls & Connally, whic represents various corporate interests. Asked if this would not represent a conflict of interest, Mr. Ziegler said Mr. Connally had been advising the President in the past on a variety of matters and that he would have no operational functions in the White House. The press secretary said that Mr. Connally would be given an office in the Executive Office Building, would probably be here three days a week and would be available to the President on any matters about which Mr. Nixon wished to consult him.

tZiegler Is Pressed

This was an arrangement Mr. Connally apparently preferred rather than returning to a full-ime Cabinet-level post. The former Texas Governor is widely regarded as a leading contender for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1976.

Pressed as to the question of conflict of interest, Mr. Ziegler said, "I am convinced" that the President and Mr. Connally will be careful to lay aside any interests represented by Mr. Connally's law firm in their consultations.

Mr. Ziegler was then asked if the White House would provide a list of corporate clients of the Conally lasw firm. He said that would have to come from the firm. In Houston, a spokesman for the firm did not respond to a request for the list of clients.

The super cabinet that Mr. Nixon set up in January was short-lived. Seekking to put into effect by executive order much of the Nixon reorganization plan that Congress had refused to enact, the President elevated three Cabinet officers

continued

by giving them titles of Counselor to the President in addition to Cabinet titles and offices in the Executive Building, where they spent much of their time.

They were Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, with administration-wide jurisdiction over human resources: James T. Lynn, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, with authority over community development matters; and Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, with jurisdiction over natural resources and environment.

Three Are Demoted

Mr. Ziegler said that the President had told all his Cabinet members today that the three would no longer have the title of Counselor to the President and he would maintain closer contacts with each member of the full Cabinet.

Not affected by the dismantling, however, were the positions of George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury and assistant to the President for economic affairs; and Henry A. Kissinger, the President's chief adviser for foreign affairs.

Administration policy and operations, Mr. Nixon was reported to have told the Cabinet, will be coordinted through Administration-wide committees in which the three demoted Cabinet members will have considerable authority.

The move is expected to repair to some extent the President's relations with Congress. Many Representatives and Senators had complained that the centralized setup curtailed Congressional oversight of the executive branch and access to the White House.

However, Mr. Ziegler seemed to be saying that the return to the traditional Cabinet system was based on the departure of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. The super Cabinet grew out of a reorganization commission study headed by Roy Ash, now director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman had a strong hand in shaping the commission's plan, and when the super Cabinet idea went into effct, Mr. Butz, Mr. Lynn and Mr. Weinberger reported to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Only Mr. Shultz and Mr. Kissenger reported directly to the President, as they are still free to do.

However, further staff shakeups were expected as Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., temporarily assigned to the White House to oversee the reorganization, works with the President for what some White House aides believe will be a more open Administration.

Today's moves also raised questions about the future of the C.I.A., which had been undergoing reforms and cutbacks under Mr. Schlesinger, a former economic professor. Mr. Colby, who will succeed him, has been in international intelligence work for many years, including Southeast Asia.

As to Mr. Buzhardt, the new White House special counsel, Mr. Ziegler, said he had been brought in because Mr. Garment, whom Mr. Nixon turned to after he dismissed John W. Dean 3d, as counsel, had too heavy a work load.

Mr. Garment, Mr. iegler said, will draft legislation for reforms in campaigning financing while Mr. Buzhardt advises the President on ongoing developments in the Watergate case.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
11 MAY 1973

Colby---Named CIA Head---Known for His Heroism Without Bravado

BY RUDY ABRAMSON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — William E. Colby, President Nixon's choice to take over the Central Intelligence Agency, got his first experience in intelligence work with the French resistance behind the lines in World War II.

He volunteered for Col. William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan's Office of Strategic Services in 1943 after it put out a call for men fluent in French to parachute into occupied France to work with the resistance.

A year later, Colby volunteered to lead a parachute team into enemy-held northern Norway to blow up rail lines being used by the Germans.

Esteemed by Boss

A quiet, bespectacled man little known in Washington outside the intelligence community, he is described ay an associate as "capable of very spectacular things but absolutely without external bravado."

He is said to have been highly regarded by former CIA Director Richard Helms, who also began his intelligence career in World War II as a member of the OSS.

After serving a little more than a year as the CIA's executive director and comptroller, Colby was named its deputy director for operations just last month as Helms' successor James R. Schlesinger began massive personnel changes in the agency.

Colby takes over the CIA at a time when it is vulnerable to criticism that it went beyond the bounds of the National Security Act by cooperating with an undercover investigation of Daniel Ellsberg and a burglary of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist in Beverly Hills.

Schlesinger, who was nominated as the new secretary of defense by President Nixon Thursday, criticized the agency for being insufficiently cautious in lending assistance to two central figures in the Watergate scandal—E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.

A White House spokesman said Thursday that Colby is in full accord with Schlesinger's criticism of the agency's role in the matter.

"Colby is in full agreement with Schlesinger's determination that the activities of the agency in the future will remain within its charter and he intends to proceed directly and specifically in that way," White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said.

A closed-door Senate investigation of the matter was to continue today but there was no plan to call Colby to testify.

When the CIA provided phony identification and disguises for Hunt and Liddy before the break-in at Dr. Lewis Fielding's office, Colby was working in the State Department.

Cushman's Role

Sen. John McClellan's Senate subcommittee investigating the CIA's assistance to the burglars and its preparation of a behavior profile on Ellsberg will hear testimony today from Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., Marine Corps commandant.

Cushman ordered CIA officers to cooperate with Hunt after a telephone request from John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's domestic affairs adviser who has resigned in the midst of the Watergate and Ellsberg disclosures.

The general was deputy director of the CIA at the time.

After World War II, Colby obtained a law degree from Columbia University and joined a law firm headed by Col. Donovan. He took his first government position in 1949 as an attorney for the National Labor Relations Board.

Since then he has served in staff jobs at U.S. embassies in Stockholm, Rome and Saigon.

In 1962, he became chief of the CIA's Far East division. Six years later, he moved to the State Department's Agency for International Development and was for 2½ years the top official of the U.S. pacification program in South Vietnam.

11 MAY 1973

GROOMED BY HELMS

Old CIA Hands Laud Colby Move

BY OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

Earlier this week the Central Intelligence Agency, still somewhat demoralized by the bureaucratic house cleaning ordered by its new director, James R. Schlesinger, was shaken by disclosures that the agency had helped Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt in an illegal domestic espionage mission.

Called to account in Congress, Schlesinger admitted the 1971 association with Hunt was "ill-advised" and promised such things would never happen again. And he strongly implied that his predecessor, Richard M. Helms, the career agent ousted from the CIA directorship early in President Nixon's second term, was partly to blame.

Today, with congressional hearings still pending, Helms' administration stands partly vindicated. With the sudden transfer of Schlesinger to the Pentagon, the new CIA director-designate turns out to be the very man Helms himself was quietly grooming as his successor: William E. Colby.

The announcement that Colby, a veteran agent who is the CIA's ranking expert on Vietnam, would step up to the directorship from his post as director of clandestine operations, drew uniform praise from old agency hands.

'S professional" was the way one old hand summed it up. The consensus was that no more fitting a successor to Helms himself could have been found — despite the bureaucratic house-cleaning Schlesinger had carried out in recent months.

Less reverently, Colby's coming could be described as the re-establishment of the "old-boy network" that has dominated the agency since its beginning in 1947 and which Schlesinger, for reasons of ideology as well as economy, had been instructed to dismantel.

A Yale graduate, a World War II alumnus of Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan's Office of Strategic Services who twice parachuted behind enemy lines, Colby, 53, is probably best known as an architect of the pacification program in Vietnam in the late 1960s.

DETACHED from the CIA to serve under the controversial Robert Komer in Vietnam right after TET 1968, Colby quickly made a name for himself as the rare official in that frustrating, endless war "who always listened to what you had to say and always followed through when he promised something," as a province adviser who served under him recalled yesterday.

—Associated Press

WILLIAM E. COLBY

The pacification program, or Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), despite the controversy that surrounded its counter-insurgency offshoot program, Phoenix, was one of the few American operations in Vietnam whose participants occasionally believed they were accomplishing something.

HS/HC-950

continued

Phoenix, with its highly publicized and exaggerated body counts of Vietcong killed by its South Vietnamese operatives, gained a widespread reputation as an organization of political assassination. This could inject controversy into Colby's confirmation hearings in the Senate.

BUT FOR CORDS operatives in the field, little of that oort of reputation has rubbed off on the slight, bespectacled and self-effacing Colby who created little lore, and even close associates had trouble thinking of an anecdote to illustrate his style.

The most characteristic one perhaps was related by Colby's former boss Komer:

Colby, on loan to the State Department from the CIA, was extremely reluctant to inherit Komer's colonial scale house in Saigon and chauffeur-driven car when he took over as chief deputy in the CORDS program in November 1968.

He even felt uneasy with the title ambassador, Komer recalls, and agreed to accept the title, house and car only when it was pointed out to him that the Vietnamese nominally running the program would think he was down-graded if the trappings of Komer's lifestyle were not maintained. "He still made one mistake," Komer recalled. "He didn't keep my Chinese cook."

HELMS, like Colby, stepped up to the CIA directorate from the directorship of clandestine operations.

Despite in-house elation at seeing an insider resume control at the CIA, informed observers feel that the main lines of the modernization Schlesinger began will remain — if only because Colby was virtually the only charter member of the old-line intelligence club to be promoted under Schlesinger's tenure.

"If he has the mandate to keep on cutting down staff, he'll dh it," one associate from Vietnam days predicted. "He has that ruthlessness."

UNDER Schlesinger, a staff cutback of five to ten percent of the agency's 15,000 employes was well underway, and during Schlesinger's first few weeks in office, a whole group of old-line professionals who had been close to Helms were fired.

The actual direction the Colby regime will take probably will not become known for many months. But a few surface indications could appear immediately if Colby decides in the name of professional tradition to undo some of the minute changes of style Schlesinger has ordered in his first few months as director.

Changing "plans" to "operations" was one. Another was even more symbolic: When you telephone the agency's central switchboard now, the operator no longer answers with a recital of the number you have just dialed. She says, "Central Intelligence." Such candor has been unheard of for the past ten years at least.

30 MAY 1973

CIA Budget Is Below $1 Billion Committee Says

LAMOURE, N.D. (AP) — A member of the Senate watchdog committee for the nation's spy agencies has disclosed that the budget for the CIA is less than $1 billion a year.

Sen. Milton R. Young, R-N.D., said in an interview that the overall annual budget for the three top American intelligence agencies — the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency — is about $3 billion and the CIA receives the "smallest portion of that figure."

The $3-billion figure is about half the estimate used by some critics of the Defense Department and its related agencies. They estimated as recently as a month ago that the three big spy agencies consume $6 billion a year. Specific budgets for the intelligence agencies are classified information.

WASHINGTON POST
30 MAY 1973

Hunt Writes That He Urged '61 Assassination of Castro

By Donald Lambro
United Press International

Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA agent who helped plan the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, says he recommended to his superiors that Fidel Castro be assassinated as part of the takeover plot.

The disclosure was made in a forthcoming book by Hunt in which he tells about his part and that of the Kennedy administration in the invasion by several hundred Cuban exiles who were trained, equipped and directed by the United States to overthrow Castro's Communist regime.

Hunt describes the extent to which the Kennedy administration was committed to the invasion pan—which was born in the final days of the Eisenhower administration—and how air support considered vital to the mission was cancelled at the last minute by President John F. Kennedy.

A copy of the book's galley proofs was obtained by UPI. It is to be published in November by Arlington House of New Rochelle, N.Y.

Hunt charges that President Kennedy tried to "whitewash the New Frontier" after the fiasco by "heaping guilt on the CIA." Kennedy accepted the responsibility for the invasion at the time but much of the blame for its initiative and execution was placed on the CIA by others.

Hunt believes that the assassination, which he says was "a task for Cuban patriots, would leave Castro's army leaderless and confused." His written proposal was to "assassinate Castro before or coincident with the invasion."

Richard Bissell, chief of the CIA's clandestine services, said that the plan was being considered by "a special group" within the government, Hunt writes.

"So far as I have been able to determine no coherent plan was ever developed within CIA to assassinate Castro, though it was the heart's desire of many exile groups," he says.

Hunt maintains that top military men and White House officials in the Kennedy administration were far more responsible for the invasion plan than they admitted at the time. "Assault planning was almost directly in the hands of the Pentagon," he says in the book, titled "Give Us This Day." He also says he was told in mid-1960 that then-Vice President Richard Nixon was the invasion's "action officer" within the White House during the last days of the Eisenhower administration.

Hunt also says that Adlai E. Stevenson, then ambassador to the United Nations, and who maintained he had been kept in the dark about the invasion, had been briefed "well prior to invasion date."

Hunt says an examination of U-2 spy plane photos showed the Cuban pilots "had claimed more destruction than actually occurred" during a raid by B-26 bombers and a "cleanup strike" was ordered just as CIA deputy director Charles Cabell entered the room. Cabell, who was acting director while the agency's chief, Allen Dulles, was on a speaking engagement, said only one had been authorized and that he would check to see whether another would be permitted.

Hunt says he was told by Bissell that at a hurriedly called meeting later that day attended by President Kennedy, his Policy Planning Council chairman Walt Rostow, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Stevenson, and special assistant Arthur Schlesinger among others, Kennedy decided there was to be no second strike.

11 MAY 1973

CIA Chiefs: A Study in Contrasts

Washington, May 10 (NEWS Bureau)—James Rodney Schlesinger, a handsome, precise, pipe-smoking academic, will move into his fourth high-level national security post with the Nixon administration if he is confirmed as Secretary of Defense.

Schlesinger, 44, hardly had time to find his way around the labyrinthine corridors of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he took over as director last Feb. 2, before the President had plucked him away.

He was sharply critical yesterday of his own agency for what he called its "ill-advised" cooperation with a White House request for materials to be used against Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg. The CIA involvement in the burglary at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist came long before Schlesinger succeeded Richard M. Helms as CIA chief.

A Harvard Ph.D. and former senior staff member at the Rand Corp. think tank in California, Schlesinger joined the administration in its first month as Assistant Budget Director in charge of national security programs. He became chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in August 1971.

Married since 1954 to the former Rachel Mellinger, Schlesinger is the father of four sons and four daughters. They live in Arlington, Va.

★ ★ ★

William Egan Colby ,53, who succeeds Schlesinger as director of central intelligence, is a long-time spy who for several years headed the controversial "Project Phoenix," a program of political assassination directed at suspected Communist leaders in South Vietnam.

Currently the deputy CIA director for operations—known as the "department of dirty tricks" —Colby vounteered for the Office of Strategic Services, World War II forerunner of the CIA, in 1943. After wartime service with the French resistance behind enemy lines, he obtained a law degree from Columbia Law School and joined a New York firm headed by former OSS director Gen. William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan.

He held a series of government jobs with the National Labor Relations Board and the State Department before he became chief of the CIA's Far Eastern division in 1962. In 1968, he returned to Saigon, where he had served as first secretary of the U.S. Embassy from 1959 to 1962, to head the U.S. pacification program in South Vietnam in the wake of the Tet offensive. His responsibilities included directing Project Phoenix.

A tough administrator with piercing blue eyes, he worked a man-killing pace and spent many days in the field in Vietnam.

Colby became controller of the CIA in January 1972, and deputy chief for operations last March 3. He is married and according to the CIA, has "a number of children" and lives in Bethesda, Md.

25 MAY 1973

Ex-CIA Agent Says Nixon Shocked By Report of Red Network in S. Viet

This is the second "exclusive report" based on extensive interviews with Samuel A Adams, a central intelligence agency expert on Southeast Asia insurgents who has resigned.

By Patrick J. SLOYAN
News American Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Despite threats he would be fired, a Central Intelligence Agency expert on Indochina warned President Nixon in 1970 that U.S. policy in South Vietnam was being undercut by Communist agents who had "penetrated" all levels of the Thieu government, the CIA expert says.

Samuel A. Adams, whose resignation at the spy agency is effective June 1, said in an interview that he ignored "intimidation" from his CIA superiors to slip to the White House his report on infiltration of Thieu Government posts.

"The President was very upset and so was Henry Kissinger," Adams said. "It showed that Vietnamization — turning the war over to the South Vietnamese — could not work because there were as many as 30,000 agents in all levels of the Saigon government."

According to Adams, these agents of North Vietnam are still holding key positions and "eating away the guts of the Thieu government."

He said some of the Communist agent activities included:

● A senior army general in the South Vietnamese highlands whose orders to South Vietnamese regiments resulted in serious Saigon government battle field losses.

● One agents, eventually arrested, was acting as chief adviser on American affairs to President Thieu.

● Another Communist agent directed the assassination of supporters of the South Vietnamese government while ostensibly purging the Thieu government of communist agents.

"Most allied intelligence operations were penetrated by North Vietnamese agents," Adams said. "I think these agents ran many of our operation aimed at recruiting Vietcong leaders in South Vietnam.

For example, Adams explained, the CIA was forced to go though middlemen in efforts to contact or bribe Viet-Cong officials.

"Usually, it turned out that the middlemen were Communist agents," he said.

According to Adams, early in the Vietnam conflict there were some suspicions that Communist Chinese forces were involved in Vietnam military operations.

"Often in such cases, we would turn to the South Vietnamese government for such intelligence," Adams said. "But they couldn't get anything. Instead, they would make up — just make it up — reports on whatever we were interested in.

"We came up with the money and they came up with Communist Chinese army units, tank units all over the place. These operations finally became known as 'paper-mills' — they'd turn out anything we wanted.

"We created a cottage industry of phony intelligence reports from the South Vietnamese intelligence community."

Adams' report on agent infiltration of the Saigon government was ordered sent ot the White House after members of Kissinger's National Security committee were tipped by Adams as to its contents.

"That blew the roof off the CIA." he said. An aide who helped Adams prepare the report was transferred, intimidated and eventually resigned from the CIA.

"They tried to get me a letter of reprimand but they could hardly do that because it was an issue of informing the President," Adams said.

Adams' efforts to tell the White House about agent infiltration and doctored reports that underestimated communist forces in Indochina resulted in a series of what he considered threats from his superiors.

'My reports made them look bad because I would not go along with pressure from politicians and the Pentagon," Adams said.

"They (his CIA superiors) told me I'd be out in the street, I'd never have any future at the agency and made other threats," he said.

At one point, Adams demanded a formal agency Investigation into charges that the CIA approved estimates of the Vietcong that had been fabricated by Gen. William Westmoreland, U.S. Commander in Vietnam.

Adams said CIA Director Richard Helms finally called him for a meeting.

"What do you want me to do — take on the entire military?" Helms said, according to Adams.

According to Adams, Helms agreed — but later tried to block — Adams' efforts to inform President Nixon's intelligence staff about the phony Pentagon estimates.

Bad Intelligence estimates resulted in Nixon demanding an investigation of the CIA at one point, Adams said.

At issue was CIA estimates of supplies reaching Communist forces in South Vietnam. Involved were supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and through Cambodia's port at Sihanoukville.

"The CIA said nothing important was coming through Sihanoukville bu the Pentagen said it was an important source of supplies," Adams explained.

Adams became involved when he attacked CIA estimates of what Communist forces needed to operate in South Vietnam. "According to our estimates, Communist troops were not using as much supplies as did the tiny rebel army in Biafra," he said.

"We had good information on the Biafran operations and when I made the comparison, it knocked the bottom out of official CIA estimates. It became known as the 'Biafran Memo' and I was threatened with dismissal if it got circulated to other intelligence agencies.

"It may not sound important but you've got to realize that some of these top guys at the CIA based their whole careers on estimating enemy logistics."

In the 1970 invasion of Cambodia by U. S. forces, large amounts of Communist supplies were found stockpiled after having been landed through Sihanoukville. "The military was right and the agency was wrong in this case," Adams recalled.

Nixon ordered an investigation. But Adams said Helms appointed as director of the probe the very man who had come up with the bad logistics estimate in the first place.

"It was like appointing Lizzie Borden the head of a commission on ax murders," Adams said.

The investigation never produced results and it is an example of the kind of thing that Adams said finally persuaded

Continued

him to quit the CIA in protest.

"I made a decision at one point in all these battles that I didn't really need a promotion. I was making $19,000 and that was enough income. I decided I would be the one guy who would not go along, would report these wrong things through official channels until something would be done.

"But the CIA can't be reformed from within. When a guy makes a big mistake at the agency, usully he gets kicked upstairs. His boss has something on him and can be sure that he'll never make any trouble and just go along.

"It is the old bureaucratic problem — everybody scrambles to cover up mistakes and protect themselves. But when you start doing this with intelligence for the President, it's really bad."

Eventually, Adams' efforts resulted in orders prohibiting him from continuing research on Indochina problems.

"They ordered me to stop lecturing CIA agents on the Vietcong which I thought was just stupid. It only hurt the guys who were going to Vietnam who didn't known beans.

"They didn't have anyone to replace me so I took leave and conducted the lectures on my own time."

In prosecuting Daniel Ellsberg for releasing the Pentagon Papers, the governoent called army experts to testify that Ellsberg had made public "c l a s s i f i e d" information about Comounist strength in Vietnam.

Reading the testimony, Adams concluded that the information was not only unclassified but that it was the same data that the Pentagon had "faked" in 1967. Despite CIA and Justice Departments efforts to block him, Adams finally testified for the Ellsberg defense.

It was one of the rare instances when a CIA employe has been permitted to testify about agency operations in public session.

A few weeks later he decided to quit when, he said, the CIA began doctoring figures on the Communist movement in Cambodia.

Administration officials say U.S. air operations in Cambodia are designed to halt a North Vietnamense-led effort to seize the U. S. backed governmentin violation of the Indochina ceasefire.

According to Adams, the Cambodia insurgents are a home-grown, revolutionary force conducting a vicil war. While they get supplies from North Vietnam, Adams said, the Communist insurgents do not qualify as "outside aggressors."

And, Adams said, the Cambodian Communists are closer to 100,000 strong as opposed to the 40,000 to 50,000 estimated by the CIA.

"It's the same old thing again — they are tailoring the intelligence to fit U.S. policy," Adams said.

. In recent days, Adams has been briefing senators and congressmen about the situation in Cambodia and what's wrong with the internal operations of the CIA.

He is getting a lot of Capitol Hill attention because of the Watergate scandal's connection with the CIA.

"I loved my work at the CIA, I found it fascinating. I hope to return to work at the CIA some day. But first I'm going to write a book — maybe two books.

"The CIA needs someone to clean it up. Someone from outside — maybe Congress."

'Strangest' Airline to Keep Busy

By Robert Kaylor
United Press International

BANGKOK—The United States is formally withdrawing from Indochina but Air America Inc., a company that can claim the title of the world's strangest airline, is staying on.

The company is a charter airline that has operated in various forms in various parts of Asia for the United States. In recent years, its highly paid civilian pilots have done the biggest part of their flying in Laos for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Earlier this year, when most of the U.S. war apparatus in Vietnam was being phased out, Air America was hiring more pilots. It had landed a contract to fly helicopters for the International Commission of Control and Supervision under the title of "ICCS Air Services."

The helicopters were former U.S. Army aircraft and the bills for the ICCS operation were believed paid by the U.S. government, with which Air America has special links.

Flying in Vietnam for the ICCS has started out to be as hazardous as flying in Laos, where 17 of the airline's American crewmen and a similar number of local employees have been killed in Communist attacks.

In recent weeks, three Air America crewmen and six passengers have been killed by Communist ground fire in South Vietnam.

Most civilian companies would quickly pack up and leave in the face of such war casualties, but Air America flies on. For the pilots, a big motivation is pay, which starts at about $25,000 a year. In a typical 12-month period, 25 per cent of the company's pilots flying in Laos earned above $40,000 each.

Air America once served as the model for a rather shady outfit called "Air Expendable" in the Terry and the Pirates comic strip. But in real life, it has seen some adventures that rival anything that Terry ever found himself involved in.

Air America helicopters, based at Udorn in northeast Thailand along with the U.S. Air Force, fly CIA-sponsored guerrilla troops and war cargoes in Laos. Although it is technically in a noncombat role, Air America has carried the guerrillas on helicopter assaults on occasions when the Air Force refused to provide its jolly green giant helicopters for the job, citing danger from antiaircraft fire.

Before the Laotian cease-fire went into effect in February, Air America pilots regularly flew in to evacuate wounded guerrillas while U.S. Air Force jets made strafing passes nearby.

According to well-informed sources, Air America helicopter pilots regularly flew into North Vietnam in the mid-1960s to support guerrilla operations there before the final ouster of pro-American troops from northeast Laos. The missions brought cash bonuses.

Hugh Grindy, a Washington-based executive who is Air America's president, traveled to the Laotion capital of Vientiane within the past several months to discuss the airline's postwar role there. Following his departure, a proposal was heard that Air America planes and pilots operate as before but under the name of the Laotian national airline.

All of this has led many people to believe that the company is nothing more than a front for the CIA. Officials of the company and U.S. intelligence sources deny it.

But there is ample evidence that Air America enjoys a relationship with the U.S. government that other contract airlines which operate in Southeast Asia do not have. The H-34 and Chinook helicopters and C-123, Caribou and C-130 transports flown by Air America are actually U.S. Army Air Force and Navy planes leased to the airline under a special arrangement.

Whatever its real status, Air America is also big business. Financial authorities list its sales as about $50 million a year. It operates some 130 aircraft in Asia. It has a total payroll of about 8,500 persons, ranking it in size between National and Braniff Airlines in the United States.

Air America traces its ancestry back to Civil Air Transport, an airline started after World War II by Gen. Claire Chennault of Flying Tiger fame.

American pilots of Civil Air Transport dropped supplies into the besieged French fortress of Dienbienphu during the first Indochina War.

HS/HC-950

Central Intelligence Agency: It keeps . . . its own directors in the dark on some secrets

For 25 years, the Central Intelligence Agency has operated so effectively as the world's largest spy shop that few in Washington really know its size or the scope of its activities. For several weeks, Tribune Washington bureau reporters John Maclean and Jim Squires pried up edges of the CIA's veil of supersecrecy to put together this surprising portrait of the agency. This is the first of three reports. The second and third reports will appear on Monday's and Tuesday's Perspective pages.

By John Maclean
and Jim Squires

WASHINGTON—While Richard Helms was still director of the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], he once initiated a study to find out how many airplanes the CIA operated. The results were startling.

An executive was assigned full-time to tally the CIA's air fleet, which was scattered all over the world. Most of the planes were part of civilian corporations which were covers for CIA activities, such as Air America Inc., a charter airline based in Asia.

After six months of digging, the executive reported to Helms that the CIA operated more planes than any single United States airline.

FURTHERMORE, the work force employed maintaining and flying the aircraft was larger than the CIA career work force, estimated at about 15,000.

But most startling of all was this: The CIA, the top-rated intelligence agency in the U. S. government, had been unable to track down exactly how many planes were at its beck and call.

A full accounting had been blocked by secrecy within the CIA itself. Some clandestine operators were simply unwilling to divulge, even to the CIA investigator, exactly what they were doing. In other cases, planes were switched from place to place under such security that the investigator could not keep up with them.

The frustrated executive had to report to Helms that probably he had missed 5 to 10 per cent of the air fleet after his months of searching.

His problem is not unique. The CIA has been shrouded in secrecy since its inception in 1947.

This has been its greatest strength, allowing it to operate in the often dirty world of intelligence gathering with a minimum of outside interference.

BUT EXCESSIVE security also has contributed to some of the CIA's biggest blunders.

Many observers think, for example, that the Bay of Pigs fiasco might have ended differently if President Kennedy and then CIA Director Allen Dulles had stayed at their command posts in Washington during the invasion.

Had these two men stayed in closer touch with the situation as it developed, they might have anticipated the disaster Fidel Castro's air force caused. But both men purposely left the capital to give the appearance that the U. S. government had no role in the invasion.

More important than a swollen bureaucracy or a botched operation, however, is the overall role of the CIA.

Is the CIA independent of elected officials, carrying out political assassination and interfering with foreign governments at whim?

Does the CIA frame U. S. foreign policy?

Is the CIA employing the same "dirty tricks" at home that it has used to fight the Cold War abroad?

Where will the CIA be directing its attention now that relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China are more relaxed and Indochina is not such an open sore?

A series of interviews with CIA men and others in and near the intelligence community have provided at least partial answers to these questions. But even close observers of the CIA differ from each other.

AN EXAMPLE is the current revamping of the CIA and the intelligence community being carried out by the Nixon administration.

Already more than 1,000 on the CIA's headquarters staff have been fired in a "slenderizing" operation. Helms, the master spy of Cold War fame, first was replaced by James A. Schlesinger, a management expert. Helms was nominated ambassador to Iran.

Then when Schlesinger was picked to head the Defense Department after four months at the CIA, he was replaced by William E. Colby, the agency's deputy director for operations.

The changes have been carried out at the behest of President Nixon, who is-

continued

sued a directive N[illegible], 1971, outlining [illegible] objectives and improvements for the intelligence community.

The chief reforms the President called for were elimination of redundancies and more coordination between the members of the intelligence community. The CIA director should take a greater hand, Nixon stressed, in relations between the CIA and the eight other departments of the government concerned with intelligence gathering.

BUT ONE CIA insider reported that when Helms made attempts to streamline the flabbiest of the agencies, the massive National Security Agency, he "came away with his nose bloodied."

The other agencies also have a sense of self-preservation. They are the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Intelligence and Research Bureau of the State Department, and the intelligence arms of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The President's directive opened the way for widely differing interpretations, and some wishful thinking.

One top intelligence official told The Tribune that clandestine operations have been cut to the bone. With Helms gone, there is no one left to press for covert actions of dubious worth, such as the killing of more than 100 agents in South Viet Nam attributed to the CIA during the Viet Nam War.

But other sources with close CIA ties said there will always be a capability within the CIA to carry out "black," or clandestine, activities.

President Nixon's naming of Colby as successor to Schlesinger places a professional spy once again in charge of the CIA.

COLBY EARNED a reputation as "the professional's professional" in a career spanning World War II and the Viet Nam conflict.

Colby first arrived in South Viet Nam in 1959 where his cover job was first secretary for the American embassy and his actual assignment was station chief for the CIA.

Colby was overseer of several CIA projects, including organization of mercenaries to fight Communists in Laos and counterterror activities thruout Viet Nam.

Colby served several stints in Viet Nam before returning to Washington where he has been deputy director of [illegible] so-called "department of dirty [illegible]cks" since March.

Presidents always have been intrigued by having a loyal, efficient agency prepared to carry out those aspects of foreign policy for which the U. S. government might not want to take responsibility, this group says.

Even the analytic role of the CIA is up for reappraisal in some quarters.

A top Army intelligence expert, writing in the April issue of Army magazine, argued for reassertion of the military's top role over civilians in making national security estimates.

The article, by Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, deputy director for estimates of the Defense Intelligence Agency, made headlines. The Pentagon spent considerable time and effort stressing that the military was not making a play for such a role.

THE CONGRESS is charged with overseeing the CIA, but most congressmen know little more than they read in the newspapers about the agency.

Since the CIA was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, more than 200 bills have been introduced in Congress seeking to increase the CIA's accountability. All failed.

The seniority system assures that the power of oversight is lodged with a few Senate committee chairmen not given to excessive inquisitiveness.

"Once you've got the President and the key members of the oversight subcommittee in Congress, you don't need the rest of the Congress, the press, or the public," a CIA source told The Tribune.

Sen. Stuart Symington [D., Mo.], one of the five members of the oversight subcommittee, began a campaign several years ago to find out about the secret war the CIA was conducting in Laos.

One elderly don of the subcommittee was given a CIA briefing on the year's activities and budget needs and returned to the subcommittee to report.

"What did they say about Laos?" Symington asked.

After assuring Symington that everything in the budget was "fine," Symington's colleague replied that as far as Laos went, he wasn't sure what was going on there because he had forgotten to ask.

The names of the subcommittee members are secret, but educated guesses on Capitol Hill include three men: Sen. John C. Stennis [D., Miss.], 71; Sen. James O. Eastland [D., Miss.], 63; Sen. John L. McClellan [D., Ark.], 77; Sen. Symington, 71; and an ex-officio member, Sen. J. William Fulbright [D., Ark.], 68.

[illegible] infrequently as [illegible] a year. Their function is to give a congressional stamp of approval to CIA projects, many of which are little explained to the senators.

On another occasion when Symington was investigating a CIA operation, Stennis admonished him, "Sometimes you just have to shut your eyes some and take what's coming."

The Senate group has acquired a paternal feeling for the CIA over the years.

When Sen. Frank Church [D., Idaho] broke all precedent by having William V. Broe, chief of the clandestine services, Western Hemisphere, testify before a congressional hearing about the CIA's role in Chile, Church had to go before the special watchdog group.

Church later said he had undergone a grilling about why Broe was being asked to testify, what questions might be asked, and whether it all was really necessary.

Church said he believed his colleagues were more interested in protecting the CIA than in uncovering what really happened in Chile.

The CIA's budget, which is estimated roughly at $750 a year, legally does not require any review. A select group of the five-man subcommittee review the budget, but they primarily are looking at programs, not expenditures.

The specific items of the CIA budget are hidden in the funding of other government departments, mostly the Air Force.

"The role of the U. S. intelligence community is one of the most important, and due to its nature, least known aspects of our government," Sen. William Proxmire [D., Wis.] said in a speech in the Senate floor this spring.

"HERE IS AN arm of our government that consumes by rough estimate some $6 billion a year and employs 150,000 people. And yet it is essentially free from public inspection or congressional restraint.

"U. S. intelligence must remain a strong element in our defense posture. But the very importance of it also demands that we begin to talk about and analyze the proper role for U. S. intelligence. For too long Congress has looked the other way."

Even when Congress looks at the CIA, it is likely to see a blurred image. For what the CIA is supposed to be and what it really is are two dramatically different things.

Tomorrow: A CIA cold warrior discusses the agency's tactics--including the careful cultivation of Presidential favor.

21 MAY 1973

Ex-agent describes tactics

Clandestine work of the CIA

In this second report of three on the supersecret CIA, a former operative tells how the agency becomes an extension of Presidential power. Yesterday, the agency's ability to keep Congress in the dark about its size and functions was analyzed. The authors are members of The Tribune Washington bureau.

By John Maclean
and Jim Squires

WASHINGTON—Twenty years in the spy business have taken their toll on Martin Walsh.

Walsh fought the Cold War hard. Altho he once must have cut a fine figure with his high intellectual forehead, penetrating eyes, and military bearing, the rigors of clandestine operations have left his frame worn, his eyes sunken, and his beard shot thru with gray.

Walsh's career with the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] spanned nearly the entire lifetime of the agency. Walsh had been with the Office of Strategic Services [OSS] during World War II and found it natural, as did many others, to continue that kind of work with the CIA.

WALSH AGREED to talk about the CIA at a meeting arranged thru a mutual friend and after it was agreed his identity would be hidden. Martin Walsh is a pseudonym.

Walsh's physical deterioration has a parallel in the history of CIA operations.

The clandestine work of the CIA has overshadowed, at least in the public mind, the agency's role as a collector and coordinator of intelligence data.

The CIA today is known for such operations as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the secret war in Laos, its role in the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Viet Nam, its funding of the National Student Association.

The original purpose of the CIA was to see that Pearl Harbor could never happen again. The late President Truman decided that the United States needed a centralized intelligence organization during peacetime, and so the CIA was brought into being by the National Security Act of 1947.

The bulk of the early staff, the "old boys" of the CIA, were professional spies from the ranks of the OSS.

THE CIA's authority to become something more than an objective observer comes from a series of secret directives from the National Security Council [NSC], to whom the CIA is responsible.

Known as NSCIDs, for National Security Council Intelligence Directives, these documents allow the CIA to carry out covert operations at the direction of the NSC.

One in particular, NSCID 10-2, which has been referred to in public, apparently was the first to establish the principle of covert action.

One section states that the CIA has the duty to "perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally" and to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security."

As the Cold War has begun to thaw, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with the extent of CIA clandestine operations.

The criticism has come from sources on the Right as well as the Left. President Nixon called for "elimination of less efficient or outmoded activities" of the CIA in a Presidential directive on Nov. 5, 1971.

A SERIES OF interviews by The Tribune with figures in and close to the CIA has indicated, however, that the CIA's "department of dirty tricks" will continue to operate, tho probably less actively than in the past.

This is in direct conflict with numerous reports that the firing of more than 1,000 of the CIA's career force of about 15,000 has been aimed at substantially reducing the CIA's clandestine role.

"The clandestine capability will always be there," said Walsh at a luncheon with a Tribune reporter.

"There will always be a need to carry out those parts of foreign policy for which the United States might not want to be held accountable."

Do station chiefs abroad or their subordinates think up and carry out operations on their own? No, says Walsh. The CIA is an action arm of the White House. Overseas operations are never outside the scope of policy laid down by the President.

Take assassination, said Walsh. ["I've never carried one out myself, altho I lost several of my own men."]

An agent might decide assassination was called for, but in a case as serious as this approval would be necessary probably from the director of Central Intelligence himself. If the operation went beyond the scope of given policy, it would be a matter for the NSC and the President to decide.

"The indoctrination of a President begins early," another CIA source said in explaining his version of the relation between the White House and CIA.

THE CIA SENDS out its "classiest briefer" while the Presidential candidates are still on the campaign trail. He gives the candidates a once-over-lightly view of CIA activities.

"Once a President is elected, you send in a sophisticated head-knocker. Helms [Richard Helms, former director of Central Intelligence] was perfect, a real man's man.

"Helms used to hit it hard—the CIA has been a loyal, effective, and discreet tool. Pretty soon the President gets the idea. The CIA is his private action arm."

Tomorrow: Altho 1,000 employes have been dropped, the CIA's arm for clandestine operations is at full strength.

22 MAY 1973

The CIA agent has many roles

In this final report of three on the organization and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the world's largest spy shop's operations abroad are outlined. In the first two reports, the authors, members of The Tribune's Washington bureau, discussed the CIA's ability to evade congressional scrutiny and its intimate contact with the White House.

By John Maclean and Jim Squires

WASHINGTON—A typical CIA setup in a foreign country is to have a station chief and perhaps several agents under him assigned to the U. S. embassy. They may be listed under cover jobs such as first secretary, cultural attache, and so on.

The field agents, in turn, hire whomever they can recruit for piecework or on a full-time basis.

Informed estimates are that about 1,400 CIA agents are assigned to U. S. embassies thruout the world, but this is only guesswork. The CIA has no exact accounting of how many people work for it, partly because so much of its work is done by contract with individuals or civilian cover corporations.

DURING THE late 1960s when student protest demonstrations and campus disorders in the U. S. were at a peak, the students of a small Midwestern college broke into a desk of a professor and discovered their teacher had some ties with the CIA.

The CIA had just finished compiling a list of all members of academia on its payroll, a project that took several months. The new index, however, did not carry the name of the Midwestern professor.

The CIA executive who had compiled the index reported this omission and later was stopped in a hallway by one of his colleagues.

It turned out the professor, indeed, was a CIA agent, but this had been hidden from the executive when he was preparing the index for murky reasons having to do with security.

It could have been the professor was engaged in sensitive research, or he might have been a CIA "spotter," alerting the CIA to potential career officers among the student body.

Clandestine operations is but one of four divisions of the CIA. The Plans and Operations Division, known as the "department of dirty tricks," carries out covert operations. The other three are involved in support of analysis. They are the division of intelligence, science and technology, and support.

THE DIRECTOR of plans has two subdivisions under him which carry out many secret operations. They are known as special operations and domestic operations. Each has about 200 persons assigned to it.

If the CIA has licensed assassins, a la James Bond, it is there that they are found.

All indications are that the estimated recent 1,000 firings by the former director of Central Intelligence, James A. Schlesinger, have left special operations and domestic operations with undiminished roles.

The CIA maintains offices in at least 20 cities thruout the U. S., including Chicago.

The CIA uses these offices as recruiting stations and to question travelers to Communist countries. The policy of the CIA is not to use any pressure on travelers, but simply to ask a selected few to report what they have seen and heard.

SOME BEND over backwards to help, others do not. The CIA always tries to be polite in these matters, but sometimes agents are used whose experience has been in dealing in foreign countries.

When agents on the West Coast some months ago used threats of force and intimidation to try to scare a woman into spying for them on a country she was about to visit, the woman complained publicly. The CIA had to spend some effort smoothing over the resulting waves of indignation.

The domestic offices also help CIA agents establish cover before they go overseas. If a CIA man is to go to Asia posing as a representative of an American firm, the quickest way to blow his cover is to use a phony company.

Sometimes a cover company is operated for years by the CIA to establish its authenticity.

What CIA agents do while their cover is being established and what they do once their CIA careers are over is a subject of concern to some members of Congress and the public.

THE CONVICTED Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt and James W. McCord Jr., both ex-CIA men, are lurid examples of rogue spies.

With the Viet Nam war no longer the open sore it once was, some observers expect the CIA to shift central focus to problems such as narcotics traffic, terrorism, economic developments in poor countries, the Middle East, the developing nations of Africa, and political movements in Latin America.

It may be true, as CIA officials say, that the role of clandestine operations is shrinking due to changing U. S. foreign policy goals. But if so, it is shrinking at no fast rate.

POLITICAL FEARS OVER WATERGATE

Indicate Officials Doubt Inquiry Concerned National Security

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3—The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and high White House officials viewed the investigation in the weeks after the Watergate bugging in June, 1972, as a potential political bombshell and not as a legitimate matter of national security, according to a series of high-level C.I.A. memorandums.

The memorandums were submitted last month to a Senate subcommittee by Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the C.I.A., and James B. Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence.

According to the documents, President Nixon's top White House aides repeatedly warned that the on-going F.B.I. investigation into the Watergate episode could lead to high political figures.

Copies of the documents, whose contents had not previously been disclosed, were examined and transcribed by The New York Times.

Nixon Order to F.B.I.

President Nixon, in his 4,000-word statement on May 22 about the Watergate affair, said that he had forbidden the F.B.I. to interfere either with on-going covert C.I.A. operations or with matters of national security that had been handled by a special investigations unit set up in 1971 to investigate the publication of the Pentagon papers on the war in Vietnam and other matters.

The President, without fully explaining the circumstances, said in his statement that "elements of the early post-Watergate reports led me to suspect, incorrectly, that the C.I.A. had been involved." He added that he had requested his two chief D. Ehrlichman, "to insure that the F.B.I. would not carry its investigation into areas that might compromise these covert national security areas or those of the C.I.A.".

End to Inquiry Sought

Subsequent testimony last month before a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence, headed by Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat of Arkansas, brought allegations that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman had urged General Walters to seek a halt to the F.B.I. investigation of a Mexican money-laundering operation that had provided more than $100,000 in operating funds for the Watergate break-in team.

The nine Walters memorandums and one submitted by Mr. Schlesinger also provided these disclosures:

¶John W. Dean 3d, the former White House counsel, expressed the belief on June 26 that Bernard L. Barker, a member of the Watergate team, "had been involved in a clandestine entry into the Chilean Embassy." There has been no official confirmation that the White House, the Committee for the Re-election of the President or the Watergate conspirators had any connection with a May, 1972, break-in at the Chilean Embassy.

¶L. Patrick Gray 3d, then acting F.B.I. director, had been urged by some high level officials to force Harold H. Titus Jr., the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, to stop his attempts to subpoena the financial records of the Republican re-election committee as part of the on-going investigation into the financing of the Watergate team. General Wal-

Times
Monday
4 June 1973

HS/HC-950

Memos of C.I.A. Disclose Political Fears

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

ters quoted Mr. Gray as saying: "He could not [stop the subpoena]. Whoever wanted this done should talk to the Attorney General and see if there was any legal way to do this. He [Mr. Gray] could not."

¶Mr. Dean telephoned Mr. Schlesinger at the C.I.A. on Feb. 9, 1973, to seek advice about a pending Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation into the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation in connection with "th Chilean problem." Mr. Schlesinger quoted Mr. Dean as saying that "this investigation could be rather explosive." Similar concern was expressed by Mr. Dean about the Foerign Relations Committee's interest in the Chilean Embassy burglary.

¶Richard Helms, then the Director of Central Intelligence, told a meeting of top White House aides on June 23 that he had told Mr. Gray by telephone the day before that the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the manipulation or handling of cash inside Mexico. General Walters quoted Mr. Helms as flatly declaring: "None of the suspects [in the Watergate break-in] were working for it nor had worked for the agency in the last two years."

The general further quoted Mr. Helms as saying that "he had told Gray that none of his investigations was touching any covert projects of the agency, current or ongoing." Mr. Haldeman then replied, according to the Walters memorandum, that the general "could tell Gray that I had talked to the White House and suggested that the investigation not be pushed further." General Walters did as requested, according to his own memorandums.

The White House refused to amplify President Nixon's May 22 statement.

In statements issued after appearances before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee, both Mr. Halderman and Mr. Ehrlichman have denied accusations that they acted improperly. The former White House aides suggested that anay wrongdoing had been initiated by Mr. Dean.

Without mentioning the disclaimer of any C.I.A. involvement that was provided by Mr. Helms last June, Mr. Halderman declares in a statement issued Thursday that the White House request for a review of the F.B.I. investigation "was done with no intent or desire to impede or to cover up any aspect of the Watergate investigation itself." Any such activities, he said, were taken without his knowledge.

Mr. Ehrlichman, in his statement, quoted General Walters as being unable to provide assurances to the White House about the possible infringement on C.I.A. activities that would result from an extensive F.B.I. inquiry into the Mexican money trafficking Mr. Ehrlichman also quoted Mr. Nixon as declaring, in July, 1972, after receiving further assurances that no C.I.A. activities would be compromised, that he still "feared" the harmful effects of the F.B.I. investigation.

The Walters memorandums provided a strikingly different image of those first meetings in late June about the on-going F.B.I. investigation. The general quoted Mr. Haldeman as saying on June 23 that the "whole affair was getting embarrassing and it was the President's wish that Walters call on the acting director [of the F.B.I.] and suggest to him that, since the five [Watergate] suspects had been arrested, this should be sufficient and that it was not advantageous to have the inquiry pushed."

General Walters quoted Mr. Gray as declaring in a subsequent meeting on the same day that "this was a most awkward matter to come up during an election year and he would see what he could do."

Three days later, according to the general's memorandums, he met privately with Mr. Dean — after first getting approval from Mr. Ehrlichman — and was told by Mr. Dean that "some of the accused were getting scared and 'wobbling'."

At another meeting on June 28, Mr. Dean was quoted by General Walters as declaring that "the problem was how to stop the F.B.I. investigation beyond the five suspects... Dean then asked hopefully whether I could do anything or had any suggestions."

The general's reply, as he candidly wrote in his memorandum, was "that the affair already had a strong Cuban flavor" and that the Cubans had "a plausible motive for attempting this amateurish job which any skilled technician would deplore. This might be costly but it would be plausible."

Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0

Joseph Alsop

The Price Of Paralysis In the Senate

Now that the Watergate investigating committee has graciously recessed, it may interest a few people that the U.S. government is remarkably close to grinding to a halt. The ultimate cause is Watergate—intoxication in the Senate, so you can blame the President if you choose. But the Senate is still the body that has chosen to halt the government in many vital ways.

To get an idea of what is happening, you need only glance at a single area where even the dilatory Senate used to be capable of reasonably swift decisions. In the bad old days—which some are beginning to regard as the good old days—the Senate cherished two principles in dealing with vacancies in really major government posts.

First, the President, as head of the executive branch, was considered to have a right to fill major posts with men of his choice—unless they could be shown to have really grave deficiencies. Second, it was also considered improper to leave posts like the secretaryship of defense, or the directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, in a kind of empty limbo for undue periods of time.

Today, however, we have had no Secretary of Defense since the President transferred Elliot Richardson to the Justice Department. The CIA has also been leader-less since the President decided to give the Defense Department to his new CIA director, Dr. James Schlesinger, and to promote the able CIA professional, William Colby, to the directorship Schlesinger has abandoned.

No senator on the Armed Services Committee can need to know much more about Dr. Schlesinger, since exhaustive hearings were held before he was confirmed for the CIA directorship. As to Colby, no one anywhere has so much as whispered that this was not a good choice by President Nixon. Officially, to be sure, the hearings on Schlesinger were delayed because of his need to attend a NATO meeting in Europe. In reality, in view of the hearings just held, there was no apparent need to question Schlesinger further.

Presumably, the Defense Department and the CIA will now cease to be headless in a few days' time. But this is only because of the forceful intervention from his hospital bed of that relic of the more national-minded past, the chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Sen. John C. Stennis. Until Stennis intervened, the acting chairman, Sen. Stuart Symington, meant to deal with Dr. Schlesinger's nomination concurrently with the vast, complex and controversial military procurement bill which will demand weeks of hearings!

This kind of senatorial ego-trip is merely frivolous. As to what Sen. J. William Fulbright is currently doing in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, uglier adjectives might well be used. Here the problem has been the President's choice of four distinguished Foreign Service veterans for high posts here and abroad.

Because of their past service in Southeast Asia, the four veterans were



James Schlesinger

William Colby

all subject to Senator Fulbright's angry veto. They were adjudged to be guilty men, and confirmation was initially refused to all four. Under heavy pressure from the senior Republican on his committee, Sen. George Aiken, Fulbright then gave way on the nomination of the former ambassador to Thailand and Italy, Graham A. Martin, to be the new U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam.

The argument used was the need to have an ambassador to deal with President Nguyen Van Thieu at this tricky juncture. All kinds of ego-massage, not just for Fulbright, but also for other committee members like Sen. Jacob Javits, was further demanded and provided, before the confirmation of Graham Martin was reluctantly conceded.

Meanwhile, there are William H. Sullivan, named for the Philippines; J. McMurtrie Godley, nominated assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs; and Charles Whitehouse, for ambassador to Laos. All are men of impeccable character. Whitehouse is perhaps the Foreign Service's most admired member of his rank and age. The charge against all of them is, solely and simply, that they faithfully carried out their instructions while on duty in Southeast Asia.

This makes you almost homesick for the awful McCarthy-time. After all, Sen. Joseph McCarthy so implacably and successfully pursued John Davies, John Stewart Service and their colleagues, on the unique ground of their individual "bad judgment." What Senator Fulbright is doing is in fact much worse.

He is making it a proof of fatally "bad judgment" for Foreign Service officers to execute their own government's policy decisions. So what are Foreign Service officers to do in the future, if the Fulbright elaboration on the late McCarthy is generally accepted?

Curb Urged On Private CIA Funds

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Star-News Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on multinational corporations, reporting on its ITT-Chile hearings, today called for a congressional review of the process by which CIA clandestine operations are authorized and conducted.

The subcommittee, headed by Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, said the hearings in March raised questions about the so-called "Forty Committee," an interdepartmental group under presidential national security adviser Henry Kissinger which reviews CIA clandestine operations.

The report said unanswered questions include how much detail the Forty Committee communicates to the CIA; whether CIA tells the Forty Committee the means it intends to use in carrying out assignments; and whether the committee knew CIA would discuss with a U.S. corporation efforts to influence the Chilean political situation.

"I'm distressed by what happened but I can find nothing illegal about it," Church told a press conference. "That's why we need a law to bar this incestuous relationship between government and private corporations."

CHURCH ANNOUNCED the subcommittee has unanimously approved recommending legislation that would make it a criminal offense for American citizens to offer or provide funds to U.S. government agencies for the purpose of interfering in foreign elections. The bill, which will be introduced by the Foreign Relations Committee, also prohibits U.S. employes from accepting such funds.

The penalties described in the bill would be a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

Church said the record on the ITT-Chile case would be sent to both the Justice Department and to special Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox but he said the subcommittee does not now see any indication of perjury because of amended testimony.

The subcommittee's scrutiny and the proposed congressional inquiry of CIA Church said, because existing oversight committees of Congress have "done very little overseeing."

THE SUBCOMMITTEE hearings brought out great detail about discussions among ITT, the CIA and State Department officials about the Chilean situation, including an ITT offer of money up to seven figures to set up a campaign fund for a rival of Marxist Salvador Allende.

The CIA in turn suggested a plan to create economic chaos in Chile. None of these discussions resulted in any action because the CIA rejected the ITT money offer and ITT did not think the CIA proposal was workable.

In 1971, nearly a year after his election and months before the ITT-CIA discussions were made public, Allende expropriated ITT holdings in Chile.

"It is clear from this case," the subcommittee reported, "that there were significant adverse consequences for U.S. corporations which arose out of the decision to use ITT in the way it was used — willing as ITT may have been — and that it was not in the best interests of the U.S. business community for the CIA to attempt to use a U.S. corporation to influence a political situation in Chile."

THE SUBCOMMITTEE asked whether the Forty Committee considered the possibility of bloodshed and civil war in discussing interference and whether it thought about the consequences if the plan to accelerate economic chaos in Chile had been successful.

The record of the hearings calls into question the administration's stated policy of dealing with governments as they are in Latin America, the subcommittee said.

The subcommittee said it is understandable that ITT wanted the assessment of the U.S. government on the Chilean presidential election. "But what is not to be condoned," it said, "is that the highest officials of ITT sought to engage the CIA in a plan to covertly manipulate the outcome of the election. In so doing, the company overstepped the line of acceptable corporate be-

Hill Calls Hunt on CIA

By Fred Barnes
Star-News Staff Writer

A House Armed Services subcommittee has subpoenaed Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. to testify about how he gained access to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1971.

When Hunt appears on Thursday, it will be his first testimony before any of the congressional committees that are looking into aspects of the Watergate scandal. He is slated to testify later before the special Senate Watergate committee.

A former CIA agent, Hunt is now serving a 35-year prison term for his part in the break-in a year ago at the Democratic party's headquarters at the Watergate.

The House subcommittee wants to question Hunt in regard to his activity in 1971 as a member of a special White House team, known as "the plumbers," that was assigned to track down leaks of national security information.

HUNT MADE contact with CIA officials in July 1971 and was given burglary equipment that was used in the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in Los Angeles.

In addition, Hunt was able to query a top CIA operative, Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, about Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers, the 47-volume secret study of the war in Vietnam which Ellsberg released to the press.

According to testimony of Gen. Robert Cushman, the CIA's deputy director in 1971, White House aide John Ehrlichman phoned him to clear the way for Hunt to get in touch with CIA officials. Ehrlichman has denied this.

The House subcommittee, which is headed by Rep. Lucian Nedzi, D-Mich., is seeking Hunt's version of how he got into CIA headquarters on repeated occasions, which officials he dealt with and what assistance he received.

AMONG OTHER things, the subcommittee is interested in finding out if Hunt got CIA aid in forging cables that implicated the Kennedy administration in the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam.

At a closed-door subcommittee hearing yesterday, convicted Watergate burglar James J. McCord Jr. confirmed that he wrote five letters to the CIA between July 1972 and January 1973, warning officials that an effort was underway to have the agency take the rap for the Watergate affair.

One of the letters was to then-director Richard Helms and the others were to Paul Gaynor, a CIA official with whom McCord was acquainted.

According to Nedzi, the letters said that Gerald Alch, McCord's attorney at the time, had urged him to implicate the CIA in the Watergate break-in. Alch has denied this.

McCORD SAID the letters were designed to "alert" the CIA "that a major effort was being undertaken to lay the Watergate affair off on the CIA."

He said that he still felt "loyalty" and "respect" for the CIA because of the years he worked for the agency. If the CIA were blamed for the Watergate mess, McCord told reporters, "I felt it would take years to recover."

McCord also said his account of the Watergate scandal, entitled "Watergate Sanctions," will be published in August. He said he hasn't "deliberately withheld" any information so that it could be revealed first in the book.

Nedzi said that the subcommittee, which is exploring CIA involvement in domestic affairs, will hear testimony next week from Alch and former White House aide Charles Colson, in addition to Hunt.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Saturday, June 23, 1973

HS/HC-910

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, June 6, 1973

Secrecy Of CIA Backed

By Fred Barnes
Star-News Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has asserted that the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency should remain secret because it involves "delicate questions of foreign policy or military security."

Congress acted within constitutional bounds when it put the lid of secrecy over the agency's expenditures in the CIA Act of 1949, Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold said.

The administration's argument came in a recent brief submitted to the Supreme Court. In it, the justices were urged to rule that taxpayers aren't entitled to sue in federal court in a bid to force public disclosure of CIA expenditures.

The 3rd U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in July that a Pennsylvania man had a right to file a taxpayer's suit challenging the CIA Act. The administration appealed that ruling and the Supreme Court has agreed to review it next term.

THE TAXPAYER, William B. Richardson, contends that a section of the Constitution requires disclosure of CIA spending. The section reads: " . . A regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

In the brief, Griswold said that the section "has never been interpreted as preventing Congress from deciding (as it has in the CIA Act) that certain narrow classes of federal expenditures should not be disclosed where delicate questions of foreign policy or military security are involved."

Congress, he said, "has found secrecy to be in the national interest in several settings. For example, over $2 billion was secretly expended on the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb during World War II."

Other statutes "making confidential appropriations," Griswold added, include those dealing with expenditures by the FBI and Atomic Energy Commission and "presidential expenditures for foreign intercourse."

IN DECIDING that CIA funding "should remain confidential," Congress "has exercised what has been consistently regarded, since the foundation of the Republic, as a legitimate congressional prerogative," he said.

Griswold declared that a 1968 Supreme Court ruling governing the right of taxpayers to sue in federal court against federal expenditures wasn't broad enough to permit the suit against CIA secrecy.

He called the lower court ruling which allowed the suit "both unauthorized and unwise."

If allowed to stand, the lower court decision "would inject the federal courts into consideration of virtually every imaginable question bearing on the constitutionality of actions of the legislative and executive branches at the behest of a disgruntled 'taxpayer' who wants to ventilate his opposition to some governmental program or procedure," Griswold warned.

He said that the "purpose and scope" of the section of the Constitution cited in the CIA secrecy suit "do not support an individual taxpayer's right to satisfy his curiosity about the details of funding a sensitive federal agency. . ."

Nixon's Worry on CIA Puzzling

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Star-News Staff Writer

The U.S. intelligence community is openly skeptical of President Nixon's reported concern over whether an FBI investigation of the Watergate could have exposed any covert operations of the CIA.

It is well-known that some legal functions of the CIA and FBI overlap, both in the United States and overseas. It is equally certain that CIA and FBI agents have found themselves using the same individuals as sources and informants. It is a matter of long practice that CIA and FBI officials have exchanged information of mutual interest.

These factors taken into consideration, veterans of both services think it is highly unlikely that there could have been any valid concern in the White House that the FBI probe

Interpretation

of Watergate would have "blown the cover" of anything the CIA was doing in the interest of legitimate national security.

THE CASE IN point, if John D. Ehrlichman's account of President Nixon's reported concern is correct, presumably involves Mexico — one of the few countries in the world where there are CIA and FBI agents in any numbers. The size of the CIA and any of its informants is unknown but the FBI has about 25 agents assigned in Mexico. In overseas posts, the FBI agent-in-charge is known as the legal attache but the duties vary according to the country.

In Mexico, the FBI legal attache Robert Nischwitz and the CIA station chief, or CAS in intelligence jargon, are stationed in the American Embassy. Both men are members of the so-called "country team" and attend all team meetings conducted by the ambassador. They know each other quite well and they function with elaborate concern for the prerogatives and functions of the other.

In theory, the FBI has no role in anything but criminal matters involving violation of U.S. laws while the CIA has exclusivity in political reporting, assessment or action. In practice, the FBI, whether in Mexico City, London, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Caracas or Tokyo, inevitably finds itself in a position to garner and report political information through its contacts with foreign police forces, Americans living abroad and others.

SIMILARLY, THE CIA, although limited by charter to operations overseas, has legal and logical security functions within the U.S. boundaries. CIA agents in the United States customarily interview or debrief servicemen, businessmen, students or tourists returning from abroad.

The late J. Edgar Hoover always viewed the CIA with a baleful eye, was jealous of the prerogatives of the FBI and, toward the end of his life, eliminated the job of his liaison man in Washington with the agency. This did not end exchanges of information between the agencies but as agents of both organizations have said repeatedly:

"We don't tell each other everything."

Often enough, where the CIA and FBI co-exist overseas the amount of cooperation depends entirely on the personalities and views of the top man. In some countries, the coop-

eration is considerable; in others, almost non-existent. It is a situation both agencies can live with much better than the ambassadors they theoretically are subject to.

It was in Mexico in 1963 that the two agencies found out, in a known incident, that they both were using the same paid informant. He was a Mexican national with more capacity for scenting an informant's fee than for veracity, and the information he was peddling could have brought the United States to the brink of war with Cuba.

THIS TRAUMATIC experience came within 48 hours of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. CIA reported to Washington it had information that Lee Harvey Oswald, the Kennedy assassin, had been seen at both the Cuban and Soviet embassies the previous month. Furthermore, CIA reported Oswald had been seen with a Cuban black and two other men at an open-air nightclub in Mexico City and had accepted $6,000 from the Cuban.

The FBI office in Mexico, then run by veteran agent Nate Ferris, tracked down the same informant. They verified that Oswald had tried to gain audience at the Cuban and Russian Embassies but further learned that he had been turned away from both. But FBI agents also learned that the informant, labeled a "T-10" (trustworthiness ratio on a scale of 1 to 10), had made up the story about the passing of the money from the Cuban to Oswald.

The temper of the United States was so agitated in November 1963, that the false story involving the Cuban could have precipitated violent public reaction and even war against Fidel Castro. The FBI report cooled off hotheads in official Washington and the story did not get out until later.

CIA Lifting Veil on 'Charter'

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

Under pressure from the Watergate case, the Central Intelligence Agency is gradually opening the doors on one of its most cherished secrets, the so-called "charter" under which it has operated for more than 25 years.

In an unprecedented action, the National Security Council has quietly authorized limited congressional access to the dozen or so classified intelligence directives from which the CIA has built up its authority to function.

The chairman and ranking minority members of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on intelligence operations, John L. McClellan, D-Ark., an dMilton R. Young, R-N.C., were granted permission last week "to review these directives in the very near future," according to a report from McClellan's office.

The permission was granted after McClellen's request for access to the secret NSC intelligence directives (known as NSCIDs) was relayed to CIA Director-designate William E. Colby during a closed-door hearing earlier this month.

McCLELLAN'S successful request marked the first time that any congressional committee charged with oversight of the CIA has ever asked to see the executive branch charter upon which the spy agency has based its authority to conduct clandestine operations abroad and maintain cover organizations at home.

The NSCIDs, which extend from 1947 to the present, are secret interpretations of the sometimes vague language of the 1947 National Security Act (NSA) which created the CIA. The agency was banned from most domestic operations, but a way was left open for it to "perform such other functinns and duties relating to intelligence" as the National Security Council "may from time to time direct."

The NSCIDs are believed to set forth specific authorities for the CIA to act under the otherwise vague charter of the 1947 law. For instance, according to one published report, an NSCID in 1948 authorized the agency to set up mechanism foo carrying out clandestine operations abroad.

OTHER SUCH directives are believed to have led to the extensive operations the agency maintains in the United States today, ostensibly to interrogate returning travelers, in the veiled words of recent testimony by Colby, "to give our people abroad perhaps a reason for operating abroad in some respects so that they can appear not as CIA employes, but as representatives of some other entity."

The very existence of the NSCIDs was largely unknown to Congress until very recently, even to the oversight committees — even though several thousand upper and mid-level CIA operatives at Langley, Va., headquarters and around the world are thoroughly briefed on the secret charter as soon as they get their intelligence security clearances.

The secret directives were most recently brought to congressional attention by Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., who has been seeking legislation to curb CIA clandestine operations and bring the agency under tighter control. In a June 12 letter to Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and McClellan, Proxmire specifically urged that the oversight committees "obtain copies of the directives and review them for public release."

IN A REPLY last week, McClellan revealed that the process has quietly begun. He informed Proxmire that Colby was asked to produce the NSCIDs. "Mr. Colby advised that he has received permission for Sen. Young . . . and myself to review these directives in the very near future," McClellen added.

In a parallel development, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John D. Stennis, D-Miss., revealed yesterday that he had opened a committee review of the 1947 act, its 1949 subsidiary, the CIA Act, and all the porblems raised by the CIA secret war in Laos and the recent allegations that White House aides tried to involve the agency in Watergate.

SYMINGTON, the acting committee chairman, who has been running the committee while Stennis recuperates from injuries he received in a holdup shooting last winter, has already requested Colby to arrange access to the NSCIDs for the Armed Services subcommittee on central intelligence.

Yesterday's disclosure by Stennis, who has watched committee business closely from Walter Reed Hospital, makes it plain that Armed Services, too, is confident of access to the secret charter.

At issue, as Symington put it in a recent interview, is whether the secret directives upon which the CIA bases operations are themselves "a violation of the law."

In his letter yesterday to Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, D-Maine, urging passage from an unamended war powers bill and promising committee review of the CIA, Stennis put it this way:

"The experience of the CIA in Laos, as well as in more recent disclosures of matters here at home, have caused me to definitely conclude that the entire CIA Act should be fully reviewed."

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Saturday, July 21, 1973
A-5

HS/HC-950

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1973

Senate Calls Critics to Inquiry on Colby

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 19—The Senate Armed Services Committee said today that it would reopen public hearings tomorrow to hear testimony against President Nixon's nomination of William E. Colby as the new Director of Central Intelligence.

This will be the first time that the committee has ever invited witnesses to speak publicly against a high-level official of the Central Intelligence Agency, committee aides said.

The decision by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, acting chairman of the committee, resulted in part from recent complaints made privately against Mr. Colby's work in South Vietnam by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and some former C.I.A. and military officials.

Mr. Colby, the former head of all covert operations for the agency, testified in an open session on July 2, with Senator Symington the only member of the committee present. After that hearing, the Senator said that he would enthusiastically support Mr. Colby's nomination —a statement tantamount to assuring confirmation by the full Senate.

Committee sources said that until the latest decision, there had been no plans to hold any additional open hearings on the nomination of Mr. Colby to succeed James R. Schlesinger, who became Secretary of Defense in the Watergate shake-up of the Nixon Administration.

The main criticism to be aired tomorrow deals with Mr. Colby's activity in South Vietnam. From 1959 to 1962, he was the agency's station chief in Saigon, and from 1968 to 1971 he was head of the American pacification agency in South Vietnam, which included the C.I.A.-directed Operation Phoenix, which between 1968 and 1971 led to the death of 20,587 Vietnamese.

The Phoenix program was designed to uproot the Vietcong network but its critics charge that it was a cloak for systematic assassination, murder and torture—a charge that Mr. Colby has denied before Congressional committees.

The committee said that two former officials of the agency were expected to criticize Mr. Colby's intelligence work. They are Paul Sakwa, who was head of Vietnam covert activity at C.I.A. headquarters when Mr. Colby was the Saigon station chief, and Samuel C. Adams, a specialist in Vietcong and Cambodian Communist activity, who recently resigned from the agency. Mr. Sakwa left it in 1962.

Mr. Sakwa has given the committee material that shows, he says, that Mr. Colby was 'an uncontrollable agent" who deliberately slanted intelligence and provided Washington with misinformation in the early nineteen-sixties, giving a false, rosy picture of developments in South Vietnam.

Testifying against Mr. Colby's activities as head of the pacification program will be Representative Robert F. Drinan, Democrat of Massachusetts, a frequent critic of the war, and David Harrington and K. Barton Osborn, former military advisers in the pacification program, who have charged Mr. Colby with condoning assassination and torture.

Mr. Colby's name has also been mentioned in connection with C.I.A. help to E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former operative of the agency and one of the convicted Watergate conspirators, who broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's phychiatrist with the help of a disguise and equipment supplied by the agency.

The Senate committee staff said that Archibald Cox, the special Watergate prosecutor, spent an hour with Senator Symington today. Staff members said that they expected that Mr. Colby would be invited to testify again next week to answer any criticisms made tomorrow.

Colby Given 4-Hour Quiz By Kennedy

United Press International

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) yesterday questioned William E. Colby in a closed Senate Armed Services Committee session for nearly four hours without deciding whether he will oppose or support Colby's nomination as CIA director.

Colby was "responsive" and raised no new doubts about his role in the Vietnam pacification project or about his cooperativeness during the investigation of CIA involvement in the Watergate affair, Kennedy said.

Kennedy said after the hearing he will submit additional questions in writing and accept written replies.

"Whether I will support or oppose him depends on additional information I have requested," Kennedy said.

Acting chairman Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said he and another committee member, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) also intended to submit written questions. Symington said Kennedy, not a committee member, held the floor most of the time during the hearing.

Colby, a career CIA official since 1962 except for other brief assignments, in 1968 headed U.S. support of South Vietnam's wiping out the Viet Cong operations within its borders — the so-called "Phoenix Program," reported to have involved executions of VC terrorists.

Kennedy said he wanted assurances that "this type of program will never be repeated by an agency of the United States—particularly the CIA."

But Kennedy said his chief interest in getting the committee's permission to question Colby was connected with the investigation of possible CIA involvements in the Watergate burglary.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, July 26, 1973 A 11

HS/HC-950

Senate Committee Finally Approves Colby as CIA Head

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday approved the nomination of William E. Colby to be director of the Central Intelligence Agency, after an inquiry spread over three weeks.

Sen. Harold E. Hughes (D-Iowa) cast the only dissenting vote on Colby, explicitly reserving the right to vote for confirmation on the Senate floor if he chooses, after studying Colby's responses to questions.

Acting Committee Chairman Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said after the vote yesterday that he does not know if there will be a Senate floor fight over Colby, but said, "I believe he will be confirmed."

Colby is a career professional with 22 years of service in the CIA, most of it in clandestine intelligence work.

In three hearings, including an unusual open inquiry July 2 on his qualifications for the top CIA post, Colby was questioned most closely about his direction of the controversial anti-Vietcong "Phoenix" program in South Vietnam. He was also questioned about CIA involvement in the Watergate scandal, clandestine U.S. activities in Laos and Cambodia, and other subjects.

Colby denied that the Phoenix program, which he helped supervise as head of the U.S. pacification effort in South Vietnam from late 1968 to 1971, sanctioned the murder of South Vietnamese civilians suspected of being Vietcong agents. Thousands of Vietnamese were killed in the process of "neutralizing" the Vietcong, and Colby acknowledged there was initially a "counter-terror" program which was later abandoned. The deaths, he said, came in Vietcong firefights with allied troops.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) said Wednesday, after prolonged questioning of Colby in a closed hearing, that he wanted assurance that "this type of program will never be repeated by an agency of the United States—particularly the CIA."

Kennedy also questioned Colby Wednesday about the extent of CIA activities in the Watergate scandals, which were also explored yesterday in the televised hearings. Kennedy is not a member of the Armed Services Committee but was invited to participate in questioning Colby. The Senator said his vote on the Colby omination will depend on his study of Colby's responses to additional questions submitted by Kennedy.

Colby also was questioned Wednesday during the closed hearing about the recent assignment of CIA personnel to field posts in Cambodia, which, Sen. Symington contended, raised questions about whether U.S. involvement in clandestine warfare "on the Laos pattern" might be repeated in Cambodia.

In the questioning Colby reportedly told the Senators that CIA personnel assigned to province capitals in Cambodia have no "paramilitary" function, but only gather intelligence. The State Department similarly has said, without identifying the men as CIA agents, that there are "10 American civilian officials" engaged in gathering information" in the provinces. Other sources said there are more than double that number of CIA agents doing similar work in Cambodia.

Symington said yesterday that "I consider it unfortunate and necessary" to conduct such activity in Cambodia at this time, but he said Colby was operating under administration instructions.

Colby was nominated by President Nixon on May 10 to succeed James R. Schlesinger as CIA director, when the latter was named Secretary of Defense. Colby's extensive service in what has been dubbed the "dirty tricks" branch of CIA, aroused many of the recent questions about his administrative capacity to direct the agency, although he has been described by associates as a "professional's professional" in CIA work.

HS/HC-950

Senator Henry Jackson Gets THE SMELL O

GRIT
AMERICA'S GREATEST FAMILY NEWSPAPER

Pub. Weekly at 208 W. 3rd St., Williamsport, Pa. 17701 ©GRIT Publishing Co., 1973—91st Yr., No. 32 | JULY 22, 1973 | Second-Class Postage Paid at Williamsport, Pa. | 20 CENTS

Tough Guys of CIA Aim to Clean Image

New Leader of Secret Agency Plans Changes

For 26 years, the Central Intelligence Agency has been a ghost patrol in the international cold war—sometimes fighting dirty, always fighting hard. Occasionally, the CIA has also invaded the homeland, practicing its own controversial brand of espionage against American citizens. Now on the threshold of new leadership, the CIA may be getting rid of its bad reputation as a snooping "Big Brother" in the U. S. and an unwanted outsider interfering in the internal affairs of foreign nations.

Headquartered at Langley, Va., the supersecret superspies are polishing their image.

Seeks New Image

Known somewhat irreverently as the advance guard of American espionage at home and abroad, the CIA has been implicated in several national and international black eyes—events such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the U-2 incident, and the Watergate scandal. CIA agents have been accused of spying on political opponents of the Nixon administration and of infiltrating student groups, peace causes, and political movements.

The CIA now says it wants to clean up its bad name—to get back to its job assigned by President Harry S. Truman. When he founded the agency in 1947, Mr. Truman wanted it only to gather foreign intelligence and evaluate it.

The new director of the CIA, William E. Colby, has promised to hew closely to that line.

The 52-year-old favorite of President Nixon told senators during his confirmation hearings in Washington earlier this month that he believes some mistakes were made in the past. He vowed that his leadership of what has been called "the president's private army"

Turn to Page 3, Column 1

Tough Guys of CIA Plan To Clean Up Their Image

Continued From Page 1

will pull it back to its original mission of keeping up on foreign information.

"I intend to participate in no domestic intelligence activities," he said.

Instead, Colby proposes to set the CIA on the trail of big-time narcotics, international crime, and world-wide terrorism.

Admits Abuses

With these hopes for change, CIA supporters are beginning to admit that some bad things have crept into the agency. Because it is permitted to operate behind closed doors, almost completely removed from public scrutiny, these abuses came that much easier.

Perhaps understating the practices of the past, Colby has admitted the CIA fell to "occasional abuses" in the form of political assassination.

He realizes it is this element of the CIA—its illegal and often violent meddling in the private affairs of foreign nations—which especially needs to be cleaned up.

On this front, Colby's biggest task will be to reduce the activity of the so-called "dirty tricks department."

It is this group, once headed by Colby himself, that has engineered the most spectacular and most controversial of past CIA foreign activities—interfering in elections, trying to overthrow unfriendly governments, disregarding laws and customs, and other secret agent escapades reading like the script for a Mission: Impossible television show.

Perhaps because they have tried so hard to avoid publicity, the dirty tricksters of the supersecret organization occasionally caught the glaring attention of the nation.

The rules and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency are vague as far as the general public is concerned.

It works under a "secret charter" of presidential directives that appears to be secret even to congressional committees which are supposed to watch over it. Its equally secret budget—estimated at $750,000,000 or more—is couched in the general defense budget.

No one outside the agency even knows how large its staff is. The law permits the CIA to keep secret the titles, salaries, and number of personnel it employs. Estimates of manpower, though, range from 15,000 to 18,000.

STAR, 18 MAY 1973

BY MARY McGRORY

Gotterdammerung Hall

Why, people ask in astonishment, were nice clean-cut men on the President's staff playing cops and robbers — mostly robbers, it turns out — when they were supposed to be helping him solve the nation's problems?

The weather of their daily lives has to be a factor. They were both bored and scared stiff. The atmosphere, we learn from the extorted glimpses now vouchsafed, must have been that of a Prussian military academy in the 19th Century. Thomas Jefferson's White House, in Richard Nixon's time, became Gotterdammerung Hall.

Up in the Lincoln Room, the President was locked away brooding over the revival of the death sentence. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were slashing funds for widows and orphans and hanging up on Congress.

Henry Kissinger, the one faculty member allowed to masquerade as a life-lover, was plotting the destruction of Asian villages and tapping a colleague. Father John McLaughlin, the Jesuit who was the official representative of Christian love and mercy, was rationalizing the greatest bombing in the history of the world and great clouds of smoke poured out of the typewriter of Patrick Buchanan, whose assignment was to roast the press.

For diversion the young men could look forward only to the occasional, and we can imagine how dreaded, invitations from their mentors, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, to spend an evening watching home movies of scenes in the life of Richard Nixon.

The weekends brought no respite from the sturm and drang. Sundays meant enforced attendance at the White House prayer meetings where they were assaulted by the marshmallow lava of the homilies of the Rev. Dr. Billy Graham.

Then in 1971, two exotic characters burst upon the dismal scene. E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy brought into their circumscribed lives a whiff of "Bonnie and Clyde" and "Mission Impossible." Under the guise of stopping "security leaks," the young men in the White House were drawn into thievery, forgery and mad excitement.

Hunt and Liddy roamed through the file cabinets of the State Department, ransacked the CIA for illicit treasure. They brought back masks and wigs and other disguises.

Their redoubtable headmaster, John Ehrlichman, smiled upon the venture. When Hunt and Liddy returned — empty-handed, they insist — from their larcenous mission in Los Angeles, Ehrlichman said "naughty, naughty, don't do it again."

And what if some flicker of conscience learned at mother's knee or in high-school ethics class had troubled the young strivers? To which of their superiors would they have confided their misgivings?

As James McCord Jr. was to say about the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters — how could he imagine there was anything wrong with a scheme that was discussed in the hearing of the attorney general of the United States?

Everybody was assumed to be guilty until proved innocent. And the innocent were quickly corrupted. The game was to get something on everybody so that nobody could talk.

The other day, the acting director of the FBI stood up at a press conference and said that the records of wiretaps had been taken from J. Edgar Hoover, because the assistant director of the FBI, William H. Sullivan, suspected that Hoover might use them "against the attorney general or the President."

The flavor of the noxious airs which these young men breathed was best bottled in a quotation from Sullivan about Hoover, the idol of three generations of American boys:

"That fellow was a master blackmailer, and he did it with considerable finesse, despite the deterioration of his mind."

Nobody under Mr. Nixon's roof trusted anybody — and with good cause. The supreme paradox of the present chaos is that the President's defense is that he trusted them all.

STILL CHANCY — Partly cloudy tonight with possibility of showers. Low tonight near 60. Yesterday's high, 85 at 2 p.m. Today's low, 62 at 3:10 a.m. Details: Page B-6.

The Evening Star and The Washington Daily News

121st Year. No. 150

x WASHINGTON, D.C., WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1973—88 PAGES

SAYS NIXON REQUESTED MEETIN

Ehrlichman Tells of C

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

The high-level White House meeting six days after the Watergate break-in last summer at which CIA officials were told to curb an FBI investigation "was held at the President's request" former White House aide John D. Ehrlichman said today.

Ehrlichman, speaking to reporters after giving Senate testimony, insisted that the meeting was held to make sure that national security would not be compromised by a "vigorous" FBI investigation.

Ehrlichman did not link President Nixon directly with an order given at that meeting that the FBI be requested to hold up a probe of campaign funds "laundered" in Mexico City.

Recapitulating nearly three hours of closed-door testimony before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on intelligence operations, Nixon's former domestic policy chief made these additional points:

He denied that he or White House aide H. R. Haldeman had made any "improper suggestions" to CIA officials that would lead former Acting FBI Director L. warn Nixon that were seeking "to President by co incident.

Ehrlichman that former Whit W. Dean III wa referring to, but r details.

Ehrlichman denie

Evening Star
and
The WASHINGTON DAILY News

NIGHT FINAL

x WASHINGTON, D.C., WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1973—88 PAGES

Phone 484-5000 CIRCULATION 484-3000 CLASSIFIED 484-6000 10 Cents

A/S NIXON REQUESTED MEETING

n Tells of CIA Parley

est ony, insisted
as eld to make
ec ty would not
a ' gorous" FBI

ot k President
an order given at
e FBI be request-
obe of campaign
n Mexico City.

Recapitulating nearly three hours of closed-door testimony before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on intelligence operations, Nixon's former domestic policy chief made these additional points:

He denied that he or White House aide H. R. Haldeman had made any "improper suggestions" to CIA officials that would lead former Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III to warn Nixon that members of his staff were seeking "to mortally wound" the President by covering up Watergate incident.

Ehrlichman strongly suggested that former White House counsel John W. Dean III was the man Gray was referring to, but refused to give any details.

Ehrlichman denied any recollection of having urged former CIA deputy director Gen. Robert E. Cushman to help out Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. during the summer of 1971. Cushman has filed a sworn affidavit naming Ehrlichman as the man who smoothed the way for CIA assistance to Hunt, who was preparing for a break-in of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The Watergate: 'How Will It All Turn Out?'

The way Dean Acheson told the story, Lyndon Johnson had the habit, during the lowest moments in his struggle with Vietnam, of complaining that none of his principal advisers could ever tell him how it would all turn out. Finally, in some impatience, Mr. Acheson one day replied: "Mr. President, if General Washington had asked that question at Valley Forge, you would have had to tell him: 'George, there are only two ways it can turn out—and one of them is too terrible to contemplate.' "

Of President Nixon's Watergate crisis, something the same can be said, except that it seems to us there are perhaps three alternative ways for it to turn out. The first, and far and away the best, outcome, we believe, would be for the whole story to be dredged up in a way which would clear President Nixon convincingly of any complicity, identify and bring to justice those guilty of crimes, remove from office those proven to be unfit, and set in motion the kind of reforms in the President's manner of doing business that are so urgently needed to restore the public's confidence in the political process and the conduct of government. The next best way it could all end would be with *any* outcome of the various investigations and judicial actions which gave the public reason to be confident that justice had been done and that we had gotten somewhere very close to the bottom of the whole affair—wherever this might leave the President. And the worst way for it all to end—the outcome almost too terrible to contemplate—would be the "nightmare" scenario described elsewhere on this page today by Stewart Alsop, by which the public would be left confused, alienated and unconvinced, with no clear answers as to what really happened and what part the President actually played in it, and the President would be left crippled and incapable of effective leadership, to be harried and hounded and perhaps forced in one way or another to leave office without having been proven guilty of anything apart, perhaps, from gross negligence and bad management.

What it comes down to, then, is the question of whether justice, in its precise and also in its larger meaning, is going to be done—and be seen to have been done—convincingly. And while we do not pretend to be able to say at this point whether this will turn out to be the case, it is perhaps possible to identify those elements now in play which will prove decisive. In some part, the outcome will be shaped by the way the Senate Select Committee under Senator Ervin conducts its inquiry, and all that can be said about that after only two days of hearings is that it would seem to be off to an admirable beginning. Questioning has been meticulously fair; hearsay evidence has been quickly and carefully identified as such; the committee and its staff have the air of having done the essential groundwork and of knowing where they are going and of how to proceed without trampling on the rights of those accused of wrong-doing.

An even larger part in determining the outcome lies with the President. Assuming that he has been remote as he claims to have been from the political and governmental atrocities that have been committed in his name, the re-making of his presidency is going to be difficult at best. He has dismantled his super-Cabinet and let it be known that he intends 1) to restore the power and prestige of his Cabinet and the big departments and agencies; 2) to open up his administration and relax the excessively tight White House grasp on everything; 3) to reach out to

to the press. But an unpaid, part-time John Connally, policy-making without statutory authority or operational responsibility and a four-star general clinging to his Army commission while directing traffic in the very center of civilian authority are not even permanent, let alone persuasive remedies for the closed, unresponsive, and autocratic style of governing which, to give Mr. Nixon the best of it, was responsible for getting him into this mess. So on this score we can only wait for further evidence.

The third, and in many ways the most important factor in determining the outcome of Mr. Nixon's Watergate crisis will be the character and the quality of the investigation and the prosecution to be conducted by the administration in connection with the lengthening list of crimes which can no longer even begin to be encompassed by the word "Watergate"—the Ellsberg burglary, the Vesco transaction, the subversion of the statutory role of the Central Intelligence Agency, the political sabotage and espionage of the 1972 campaign, the obstruction of justice, the perjury and all the rest. And this brings us to consideration of the most urgent matter bearing on the outcome of this whole affair—the choice by Elliot Richardson of former Solicitor General Archibald Cox to be the government's special "Watergate" prosecutor.

To come to the point quickly, we believe Mr. Cox to be an excellent choice. His apparent acceptance of the terms under which he will serve, and of the degree of independence of action and judgment he will be allowed, would seem to us, when taken together with his intellectual capacity, legal experience and reputation for integrity, to remove any serious question about the way his tremendously difficult and disagreeable assignment will be carried out. Perhaps it was possible last week for doubters in the Senate to argue that Mr. Richardson had not been ready enough to surrender enough control over his prosecutor. But it has always seemed to us, as we argued at the time, that almost everything depended on the quality of the man he picked: a poor choice would not be reassuring, even with a total grant of independence from administration control; a good choice, by the very nature of his position, would have enormous power to run the show, if only because any sign on his part of unwanted interference would be so damaging to the interests of the President as well as Mr. Richardson. Mr. Cox is tough-minded, knowledgeable about the workings of the Justice Department. He is also self-evidently independent of any ties or partisan leanings that might compromise him since he was, after all, a Kennedy man.

So we can see no reason for prolonged or partisan wrangling over either the choice of Mr. Cox, or the guidelines under which he will work, or the confirmation of Mr. Richardson. Such is the magnitude of the mess we now confront that even the most thorough and publicly persuasive investigation and prosecution cannot absolutely guarantee the best of all possible outcomes to the Watergate affair. Nothing can, for we are still a long way from the answers to the crucial questions having to do with the degree of involvement of the President. But the selection of Mr. Cox is an essential first step toward an end to it all that will be convincing and conclusive enough to be reassuring to the American public. And a convincing and believable outcome, whatever it may turn out to be, is essential if we are to avoid the one ending to the Watergate affair which, in Mr. [illegible] contemplate."

(AND DREARY — Cloudy
cool today, chance of
ers this afternoon and
ht. High today in 60s,
tonight near 50.
rday's high, 65 at 1:30
Today's low 45 at 12:30
Details: Page A-2.

The Evening Star
and
The WASHINGTON DAILY News

HOME
FINAL

ea No. 139 ★ WASHINGTON, D.C., SATURDAY, MAY 19, 1973—44 PAGES Phone 484-5000 CIRCULATION 484-3000 CLASSIFIED 484-6000 10 Cents

ADMITS MAKING CLEMENCY OFFER

aulfield Denies Naming Nixon

By BARRY KALB and MARTHA ANGLE
Star-News Staff Writers

The Senate Watergate investigation appears headed for a major conflict in testimony betwen two of its star witnesses, James W. McCord Jr. and John J. Caulfield, the man who admits he transmitted offers of executive clemency from the White House to McCord.

McCord told the committee yesterday that during meetings in January, Caulfield promised him clemency, money for his family and other inducements to plead guilty at the Watergate trial then under way. McCord said Caulfield told him President Nixon was personally aware of the offers.

Caulfield, The Star-News has learned, has already admitted to the Watergate grand jury that he made the offers to McCord as McCord said. But Caulfield also told the grand jury, according to informed sources, that he never mentioned the name of Nixon or anybody else in connection with the offers.

FOLLOWING McCord's nationally televised statements yesterday, presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said at the White House that the President "at no time authorized anyone" to make such offers.

Ziegler repeated previous statements that the President never participated in or knew of the


JOHN J. CAULFIELD


JAMES McCORD JR.

Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0

President never participated in or knew of the [illegible] denied that Nixon has any intention, because of the Watergate scandal, [illegible] signing before his second term is up.

The discrepancy between McCord's and Caulfield's versions of their meetings, plus matters such as a secret letter which sources say McCord mailed to Caulfield in December but has never mentioned in testimony anywhere, raises doubts about some of McCord's testimony.

Caulfield has told the grand jury that he made the offers to McCord on orders of his former boss, then White House counsel John W. Dean III.

THIS CONFESSION, and Caulfield's corroboration of the fact that the offers were made, provide some of the firmest evidence to date that White House officials were deeply involved in the Watergate cover-up.

Caulfield could not be reached personally for comment, but did read this statement for television cameras:

"I have briefly reviewed Mr. McCord's statement before the Senate Select Committee, and while it does not fully reflect my best recollection of the events which took place between he and I during January of this year, it is true that I met with Mr. McCord on three occasions in January and conveyed to him certain messages from a high White House official."

Caulfield then said that he had "fully disclosed" the pertinent information to the grand jury, and has been questioned on two occasions by the Senate committee staff. He is due to testify publicly before the committee on Tuesday, after McCord finishes, and reportedly plans to invoke neither executive privileges nor his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Caulfield, according to The Star-News' sources, realizes he could face criminal prosecution for aiding in an obstruction of justice, but has chosen to testify freely anyway.

THE PROSECUTORS, however, reportedly are more interested in his testimony than in prosecuting him, and therefore do not plan at the moment to indict him. The same strategy was used during the Watergate trial with Alfred C. Baldwin III, who told of operating the wiretap placed clandestinely inside Democratic National Committee headquarters last spring.

See McCORD, Page A-11

The Evening Star
and
The Washington Daily News

Published by THE EVENING STAR NEWSPAPER CO., Washington, D.C.
JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, *President* NEWBOLD NOYES, *Editor*

A-6 * TUESDAY, MAY 29, 1973

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.

Sleeping Secrets of the Republic Might

President Nixon has come out, belatedly, with a distinction, on which an empire may hang. It is this, that he did not seek to discourage an investigation of Watergate, rather did he seek to discourage an investigation of only that part of Watergate which might have touched on matters pertaining to the national security which no one should pry into. No one, we are expected to believe, includes the Justice Department, the FBI and the CIA.

In other words, says the President, there are state secrets that investigators might have stumbled across in sifting through the rubble of Watergate which no investigators should be permitted to know about.

The explanation will be greeted very widely with disbelief. It is of course true that one's memory tends to flatter one's motives. And it is true that Nixon's grudging concessions apropos Watergate suggest a trajectory from confidence in presidential innocence, past skepticism, towards disbelief.

But this is the moment for worldly men to reflect on certain facts of life. Richard Nixon is the President of a republic — remember; a republic, not a totalitarian state — which is principally, perhaps even uniquely, responsible for maintaining the peace of the world. All the mechanics of doing that kind of thing are very often best not dwelled upon.

In judging the mechanics of the Watergate operation itself it pays to remember that they thought of themselves as doing, within the borders of the United States, that which James McCord and Howard Hunt did more or less routinely outside the borders of the United States. There is the tortured nexus. Watergate in fact had nothing to do with the imperatives of the national security. But in ferreting out the secrets of Watergate, the sleeping secrets of the republic might, Nixon tells us, have been disturbed. And the malefactors of the Watergate enterprise were, unquestionably, seduced by men surrounding Nixon who spoke in accents to which CIA operatives tend to respond, and who brazenly distorted the distinction Nixon now asks us to hold sacred.

The President can be assumed to know not only many things that we do not know about routine operations of the government, but many things that we should not want to know, or certainly not to dwell upon; things that other countries' leaders know very well about but do not wish to crowd upon the public consciousness. The situation in 1969 in Cambodia that caused Nixon to tap the White House telephones is a case in point. We were bombing Cambodian targets with the tacit acquiescence of Sihanouk. But publicity given to those bombings would cause Sihanouk to denounce them, the Air Force to desist, GIs to die. That publicity was given to the bombings after a White House leak.

It is very tempting to want to look at the details of the national security data that Richard Nixon wants to continue to conceal, which impinge now in an eccentric way on Watergate; but really, the curiosity is like that of Lot's wife, to look back upon Sodom. It is a pity Nixon has not acted more credibly in the past. But it is unfair, unworldly and altogether reckless automatically to assume that at this moment he is telling other than the truth and that we can satisfy ourselves that certain secrets should be secret only by making them non-secret.

DREARY — Showers or thundershowers today, high in upper 60s. Mostly cloudy with chance of showers tonight, low in 50s. Partly cloudy tomorrow, high in 70s. Yesterday's high, 76 at 3:10 p.m. Yesterday's low, 45 at 1:30 a.m. Details: Page E-6.

The Sunday Star
and
The Washington Daily News

INSIDE METRO — Some missing love letters are causing more of a stir in Surry County, Va., than safety violations at the new atomic power plant there. Page B-1.

1st Year. No. 140 **** WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 20, 1973 Phone 484-5000 CIRCULATION 484-3000 CLASSIFIED 484-6000 40 CENTS

CIA HEAD PRODDED BY HALDEMAN

Helms Cites 'Higher-Up' Pressure

ERBERT KALMBACH

$200,000 Kalmbach Fund Bared

By ROBERT WALTERS
Star-News Staff Writer

Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal attorney, has acknowledged that he collected more than $200,000 last summer "for distribution through intermediaries to the Watergate defendants or their attorneys," the General Accounting Office said yesterday.

Kalmbach, a Newport Beach, Calif., lawyer who has been a personal friend and political ally of Nixon for more than a decade, also "had custody of approximately $1.9 million in funds" subsequent to Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign, a new GAO report said.

In addition to disclosing the existence of those two previously unreported funds, the GAO report issued yesterday also:

- Identified seven men, two of them White House officials, who were given more than $900,000 by the Nixon campaign committee in 1971 and 1972. That money came from a $1.7 million fund composed of unreported cash donations to the political organization.
- Charged that the largest of those cash payments, $350,000 given to an aide of H.R. Haldeman, then White House chief of staff, was "an obvious attempt to evade the disclosure requirements" of a new federal statute governing political finance which went into effect April 7, 1972.

See GAO, Page A-6

Grand Jury Told of Request

By BARRY KALB
Star-News Staff Writer

Former CIA director Richard M. Helms has reportedly told the Watergate grand jury that when H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III tried to enlist CIA aid in the Watergate cover-up on June 23, Haldeman told Helms the request was coming from "higher up."

At that time, there was only one person at the White House higher than Haldeman, and that was President Nixon.

Helms, now ambassador to Iran, made the statement to the grand jury Friday, according to informal sources.

There was no indication that Haldeman, then White House chief of staff, actually used Nixon's name in his unsuccessful effort to involve the CIA in the bugging and cover-up.

NOR COULD The Star-News' sources say that Helms had been able to ascertain that the requests for CIA help were in fact coming from the President.

But members of Congress who have been reporting on congressional testimony by Helms and Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, CIA deputy director, have stressed that when requests were made by aides with the authority of Haldeman, the authority of the President himself was taken for granted.

See HELMS, Page A-2

RICHARD M. HELMS

Helms: 'Higher-Up' Cited

Continued From Page A-1

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., who as acting cha rman of the Senate Armed Services Committee has been quest oning current and formerCIA officials about CIA links with Watergate, announced yesterday that he had turned over to the grand jury and Senate Watergate Committee 11 in-house CIA memoranda. They deal with conversations between top CIA officials and the three White House aides — Haldeman, former domestic counsel head Ehrlichman and former White House counsel Dean — between June 23, 1972, and February of this year.

Withouth providing details, informed committee sources have told The Star-News they belive the memoranda contribute "added fact" to the suspicion that Nixon knew of the cover-up attempts.

SYMINGTON said on Thursday, after hearing closed-door testimony from Helms, that "it is hard for me to visualize how Nixon could have been unaware of what was going on."

In a statement released Friday, in which he revealed the existence of the memoranda, Symington went even further:

"I believe these memoranda are highly significant, and my first impression of them is that they appear to verify one of my statements yesterday at a press conference, namely that it is very clear there was a high-level attempt by the White House to unload major responsibility for the Watergate bugging on the CIA.

"Also," Symington continued, "it is even more difficult for me to visualize that the President knew nothing about it."

One source close to the CIA-Watergate probe described the memos as presenting an important "added fact" about one of the conversations. This is believed to be the June 23 meeting—six days after the Watergate arrests—at which Walters was ordered by Haldeman, with Helms present, to interfere with the FBI's Watergate investigation.

Helms' grand jury testimony Friday, like that of convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord's before the Senate Watergate Committee, was second-hand "hearsay" at best, and both bits of testimony fail to provide conclusive proof that the President knew of the cover-up.

McCord testified on Friday that in January John J. Caulfield, a former White House aide then working at the Treasury Department, had tried to buy McCord's silence at the Watergate trial and that Caulfield had said Nixon was aware of the attempt.

This prompted White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler to once again issue a statement denying that the President in any way knew about or condoned the cover-up.

While the grand jury continues to gather evidence against these three men and a number of others, a determined effort is being made by the prosecutors, the Senate committee and the press to determine whether there is any evidence to implicate Nixon.

According to Justice Department sources, the three prosecutors share the feeling that the President must have been aware of the cover-up. However, these sources say, the prosecutors so far have uncovered nothing more concrete than the type of testimony Helms gave.

AT THE moment, those seeking the answer to the Watergate puzzle find themselves in roughly the same position regarding possible Nixon involvement as they did before April regarding such high Nixon aides as former Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell.

During the earlier period, evidence, testimony, unconfirmed reports by "sources" and the like consistently led right to the door of Mitchell's office. But there was never enough to carry the suspicion across the threshhold.

Now Mitchell himself has admitted sitting in on three meetings in early 1972 at which the bugging was discussed, and knowledgable federal sources say he will almost certainly be indicted in the case. Haldeman and Ehrlichman, once considered unreachable by the investigation, have admitted through their attorneys that they too might be indicted.

IN HIS Senate testimony on Friday, McCord stated that Caulfield had told him the President was personally aware of the attempts to pressure McCord into remaining silent.

Caulfield, according to reliable sources, has told the grand jury that he did transmit offers of money and executive clemency in an attempt to buy McCord's silence, but has said he never mentioned Nixon's name or that of anybody else to McCord.

The apparent conflict between the two men's versions of the story will be dealt with on Tuesday, when Caulfield begins his Senate testimony as soon as McCord finishes his.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The Watergate: 'How Will It All Turn Out?'

The way Dean Acheson told the story, Lyndon Johnson had the habit, during the lowest moments in his struggle with Vietnam, of complaining that none of his principal advisers could ever tell him how it would all turn out. Finally, in some impatience, Mr. Acheson one day replied: "Mr. President, if General Washington had asked that question at Valley Forge, you would have had to tell him: 'George, there are only two ways it can turn out—and one of them is too terrible to contemplate.' "

Of President Nixon's Watergate crisis, something the same can be said, except that it seems to us there are perhaps three alternative ways for it to turn out. The first, and far and away the best, outcome, we believe, would be for the whole story to be dredged up in a way which would clear President Nixon convincingly of any complicity, identify and bring to justice those guilty of crimes, remove from office those proven to be unfit, and set in motion the kind of reforms in the President's manner of doing business that are so urgently needed to restore the public's confidence in the political process and the conduct of government. The next best way it could all end would be with *any* outcome of the various investigations and judicial actions which gave the public reason to be confident that justice had been done and that we had gotten somewhere very close to the bottom of the whole affair—wherever this might leave the President. And the worst way for it all to end—the outcome almost too terrible to contemplate—would be the "nightmare" scenario described elsewhere on this page today by Stewart Alsop, by which the public would be left confused, alienated and unconvinced, with no clear answers as to what really happened and what part the President actually played in it, and the President would be left crippled and incapable of effective leadership, to be harried and hounded and perhaps forced in one way or another to leave office without having been proven guilty of anything apart, perhaps, from gross negligence and bad management.

What it comes down to, then, is the question of whether justice, in its precise and also in its larger meaning, is going to be done—and be seen to have been done—convincingly. And while we do not pretend to be able to say at this point whether this will turn out to be the case, it is perhaps possible to identify those elements now in play which will prove decisive. In some part, the outcome will be shaped by the way the Senate Select Committee under Senator Ervin conducts its inquiry, and all that can be said about that after only two days of hearings is that it would seem to be off to an admirable beginning. Questioning has been meticulously fair; hearsay evidence has been quickly and carefully identified as such; the committee and its staff have the air of having done the essential groundwork and of knowing where they are going and of how to proceed without trampling on the rights of those accused of wrong-doing.

An even larger part in determining the outcome lies with the President. Assuming that he has been remote as he claims to have been from the political and governmental atrocities that have been committed in his name, the re-making of his presidency is going to be difficult at best. He has dismantled his super-Cabinet and let it be known that he intends 1) to restore the power and prestige of his Cabinet and the big departments and agencies; 2) to open up his administration and relax the excessively tight White House grasp on everything; 3) to reach out to the press. But an unpaid, part-time John Connally, policy-making without statutory authority or operational responsibility and a four-star general clinging to his Army commission while directing traffic in the very center of civilian authority are not even permanent, let alone persuasive remedies for the closed, unresponsive, and autocratic style of governing which, to give Mr. Nixon the best of it, was responsible for getting him into this mess. So on this score we can only wait for further evidence.

The third, and in many ways the most important factor in determining the outcome of Mr. Nixon's Watergate crisis will be the character and the quality of the investigation and the prosecution to be conducted by the administration in connection with the lengthening list of crimes which can no longer even begin to be encompassed by the word "Watergate"—the Ellsberg burglary, the Vesco transaction, the subversion of the statutory role of the Central Intelligence Agency, the political sabotage and espionage of the 1972 campaign, the obstruction of justice, the perjury and all the rest. And this brings us to consideration of the most urgent matter bearing on the outcome of this whole affair—the choice by Elliot Richardson of former Solicitor General Archibald Cox to be the government's special "Watergate" prosecutor.

To come to the point quickly, we believe Mr. Cox to be an excellent choice. His apparent acceptance of the terms under which he will serve, and of the degree of independence of action and judgment he will be allowed, would seem to us, when taken together with his intellectual capacity, legal experience and reputation for integrity, to remove any serious question about the way his tremendously difficult and disagreeable assignment will be carried out. Perhaps it was possible last week for doubters in the Senate to argue that Mr. Richardson had not been ready enough to surrender enough control over his prosecutor. But it has always seemed to us, as we argued at the time, that almost everything depended on the quality of the man he picked: a poor choice would not be reassuring, even with a total grant of independence from administration control; a good choice, by the very nature of his position, would have enormous power to run the show, if only because any sign on his part of unwanted interference would be so damaging to the interests of the President as well as Mr. Richardson. Mr. Cox is tough-minded, knowledgeable about the workings of the Justice Department. He is also self-evidently independent of any ties or partisan leanings that might compromise him since he was, after all, a Kennedy man.

So we can see no reason for prolonged or partisan wrangling over either the choice of Mr. Cox, or the guidelines under which he will work, or the confirmation of Mr. Richardson. Such is the magnitude of the mess we now confront that even the most thorough and publicly persuasive investigation and prosecution cannot absolutely guarantee the best of all possible outcomes to the Watergate affair. Nothing can, for we are still a long way from the answers to the crucial questions having to do with the degree of involvement of the President. But the selection of Mr. Cox is an essential first step toward an end to it all that will be convincing and conclusive enough to be reassuring to the American public. And a convincing and believable outcome, whatever it may turn out to be, is essential if we are to avoid the one ending to the Watergate affair which, in Mr. contemplate."

The WASHINGTON STAR
JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, President NEWBOLD NOYES, Editor
A-18 ★ THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1973

WILLIAM SAFIRE

Admission of Error, Not Guilt

In one of the most remarkable statements ever issued by the White House, the President made these confessions:

1. A bureaucratic civil war took place in the intelligence community in 1970, pitting J. Edgar Hoover's FBI against our foreign intelligence agencies on the issue of whether to resume authority, ended in 1966, permitting U.S. agents to burglarize for national security reasons. Hoover, who did not want his men involved in this kind of operation, won. Cooperation between agencies bogged down and our intelligence "deteriorated."

2. The President stated "I approved" the creation of the unit called "the plumbers" to investigate national security leaks after the publication of the Pentagon papers, and "I told Mr. Krogh that as a matter of first priority, this unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg's associates and his motives." The picture this calls to mind of a U.S. president acting as angry spymaster is disheartening.

3. The President asserted he told Asst. Atty. Gen. Petersen to "confine his investigation to Watergate and stay out of national security matters." That means the President obstructed the investigation to the extent he felt necessary to protect national security. If his accusers want to say that makes him part of a cover-up, so be it, which also applies to the next point:

4. The President said "I instructed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to ensure that the investigation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House investigations

5. "It is clear that unethical, as well as illegal, activities took place in the course of that 1972 campaign. None of these took place with my specific approval or knowledge." The President is a lawyer, and is advised by men who are careful about every word in a written statement; the addition of the word "specific" before "approval or knowledge" is probably the greatest single confession of error in the document.

The President's confessions — and these are only a handful of those made in the statement — are confessions of error, not of guilt. He says he misjudged; he did not intend; he "should have been more vigilant." But in terms of the commission of a crime, he admits nothing.

Since the statement seems to raise more questions than it answers, why did the President issue it?

It enables the men he mentions — Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Krogh, deputy CIA chief Walters—to testify truthfully without seeming disloyal to the President.

It puts information out in a big bucket — not drop by drop, as in the cartoon of water torture inflicted on the Republican party in the post-Harding era.

It reminds the fair-minded of the context of the times; now that Vietnam is over, we tend to forget the fury of the opposition to the war and the real domestic threats some of the protesters posed.

It tries to separate dirty politics, which is unconscionable, from the dirty, but somewhat more conscionable business of stretching or breaking laws on behalf of national security.

news conference in which the President can speak like a lawyer in court, making references to a detailed brief, and not like a defendant telling the story for the first time.

Most important, the statement focuses attention on the dilemma that drew the Nixon administration into the supersnoop business in the first place: At what point does the defense of our system corrupt our system?

It is satisfying to say, "An obsession with security leads to political paranoia, and the overreaction to dissent turns leaders into would-be dictators." Or, in regard to association with people you have degraded by requiring them to do the dirty work, to apply the adage, "When you lie down with dogs, you get up with fleas."

There is much truth in that, but how far are we willing to take the argument? How do we protect our secrets? Is it such a good idea to try to uncover another country's secrets? Do we need a covert operation in CIA at all anymore?

The President, after two months, has decided upon a strategy to deal with Watergate: To admit error rather than guilt, and to change the battleground from "was the President involved in these sleazy political shenanigans?" to a loftier "what liberties are we prepared to give up for national security?"

For a man with his back to the wall, it is a daring strategy, but it is risky, too — for one of the fruits of the detente Nixon brought about is a long-awaited lessening of the lust for secrecy, and another is a growing reluctance to subvert the law in the name of

The Evening Star
and
The Washington Daily News

JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, *President* NEWBOLD NOYES, *Editor*

A-18 THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1973

DAVID BRAATEN

New Attraction for Tourists

Back in 1950, tourist guides in old Vienna made a startling discovery: American visitors weren't interested in St. Stephen's Cathedral, the Hofburg, or the little tavern where Ach-Du-Lieber Augustine, paralyzed with drink, was thrown out for dead during the great plague.

Traditional sightseeing attractions were out; what the tourists wanted to see was the ferris wheel where Harry Lime and Holly Martens met, the cobblestoned square where Harry Lime's death was faked, the kiosk where he disappeared miraculously into the sewers, the grating his dying hands couldn't move.

A thousand years of art and history took a back seat to a single work of fiction.

☆

Watergate is doing the same thing to Washington, and while we can't match Vienna in art and history, we can top their sightseeing syndrome in one respect: Watergate, for all its artistic debt to "The Third Man," is not a Graham Greene fantasy. Our famous mystery thriller is nonfiction.

So far there may not be quite enough Watergate-connected loci for a full-fledged Gray Line tour, but with the grand juries and congressional committees working as hard as they are, it shouldn't take long. Meanwhile, the guides will have to meet the public demand . . .

☆

"As we leave the Kennedy Center, laze and jemmin, you will see on your right the famous Watergate complex . . . Yes, sonny, there, on the sixth floor, that's right. That's the balcony the cops walked out on, and there, on your right, is the balcony of the Howard Johnson Motel, where the lookout with the walkie-talkie was standing . . .

"On your right the historic Old Post Office Building. On your left, the new FBI Building and — yes, sonny? . . . That's right, there's the Triangle Building across the street, where James McCord was briefed on the radical threat to the American electoral process, which in turn led to the, uh, nonradical threat to the American electoral process . . .

"On your right, famous old Union Station. What? All right, on your left, the Monocle Restaurant, where McCord was told he should go along with the gag and pin it all on the CIA . . . On your right, the old Manger-Hamilton Hotel, where McCord first met Bernard Barker . . . On your left, the Hay-Adams Hotel, where McCord and Jack Caulfield had lunch . . .

"On your left, the British Embassy, and as we approach the Washington Cathedral, on your right the CIA 'safe house' where E. Howard Hunt picked up his wigs and his camera. . . .

"I'm sorry, folks, we can't make it to the Blue Fountain Inn. You'll have to catch McCord's telephone booth on the Antietam Battlefield tour . . .

☆

"Leaving historic Alexandria, with its famous landmarks, Gadsby's Tavern, the Masonic Memorial, John Dean's townhouse, coming up on your right is National Airport, one of the nation's busiest . . . Yes, that's where the 'Man with the New York Accent' left hush money for the Waterbugs in a coin locker. No, sonny, we don't have time to look for a key in the phone booth by the Eastern Airlines counter . . .

"We're running a little late, folks, so we'll skip the rest stop at the Second Overlook and swing past D.C. Jail . . . That's the cell up there, sonny, the one with the southern exposure and the American flag in the window . . .

"What's that? . . . No. No more Watergate stops today. Besides, the White House is a special tour by itself."

The Washington Star
and
The Washington Daily News

CROSBY N. BOYD, *Chairman of the Board*
JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, *President* NEWBOLD NOYES, *Editor*

A-14 ★★ TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1973

RUSSELL BAKER

Suggestions for Improvement

It is not too early in the Watergate business to start drawing lessons and thinking about reform. Following are a few of the more obvious things that might be done to improve the quality of government.

1. Abolish the FBI and CIA. Both have become intensely bureaucratized agencies with too many activities — electronic eavesdropping, keeping secret dossiers on citizens and members of government, collecting intelligence for domestic political manipulation — characteristic of secret-police functions in a totalitarian state.

★

Entrenched police bureaucracies are not only unattractive in an open society but also dangerous. With their blackmail powers over political leaders and their ability to harass their enemies, they become small states within the state.

The best way to dispose of their threat is to dissolve such bureaucracies periodically — every 10 years perhaps — and empower Congress to create such new national police bureaus as may from time to time seem necessary.

This might even improve police and intelligence performance, since new government agencies tend to be dynamic and effective while aged ones become absorbed in internal politics and wasteful, possibly dangerous plots for expanding their own power.

Needless to say, Congress should be cautious about permitting personnel carryover when abolishig one set of police agencies and establishing its successor. Amateurism at the police station is always preferable to the efficiency of a Gestapo or KGB.

2. Get the President off Mt. Olympus. The important thing is to restore his contact with American life. At present he is treated like a live mummy, wrapped tightly in his own highly peculiar work problems and sealed off from the living world in the famous Oval Tomb.

Periodically, Presidents ought to be compelled to drive their cars in a rush hour, catch a taxi in the rain, and wait their turn for a drugstore-counter lunch. Since this is probably impossible — because of our hundreds of thousands of armed maniacs — we may have to be satisfied with more modest inroads upon his grandeur. His emperor's fleet of transport vehicles, for example, can mostly be disposed of. His assistants can surely make do with taxi or bus.

★

He should be placed under some inexplicit compulsion to maintain modest contact with the public. Once a month, perhaps, he might be required to sit in front of TV cameras and talk to us about what is going on. Regular news conferences might be held without television cameras — they impede discourse between man and group, encourage posturing and place corrupting importance on show-business skills or lack of them in politicians.

3. Get the President out of show business. The present grotesque importance accorded "Charisma" among presidential politicians reflects the disagreeable tendency in American life to look upon the President as a superstar, complete with fan clubs to deluge him in postcards and letters whenever he appears on camera to call the faithful to composition.

★

4. Cut presidential campaigns to eight weeks. Outlaw political advertising. Provide limited amounts of free TV, radio, newspaper and billboard space for major candidates.

Make the Internal Revenue Service start enforcing the gift-tax law on big contributions to politicians. And why not, as long as we are discussing the impossible, change the President's term from four years to three? Four years is too long to wait for a referendum on presidential performance.

Considering the volatility of the times, three years is probably too generous. The faster turnover in Presidents which would result from the three-year term would probably tend to make them more commonplace and, therefore, less regal. It would compel them to keep in mind that a President is, after all, only a President.

and

The Washington Daily News

CROSBY N. BOYD, *Chairman of the Board*

JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, *President* NEWBOLD NOYES, *Editor*

A-14 ** TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1973

CROSBY S. NOYES

What Ervin and Co. Can Do for America

One of the sadder aspects of the Watergate affair is the reaction of those very sincere people who insist on minimizing its significance.

As every newspaper in the country is well aware by this time, one of the major themes of these protesters is that the newspapers themselves are the real culprits in blowing up the story out of all proportion to its real importance. Another is that what happened is par for the course in American politics. As one reader wrote The Star-News:

"The Watergate case, as an instance of political espionage and misuse of campaign funds, is surely not the heinous crime the media make of it. American politics has been corrupt, venal and self-centered as far back as memory permits."

Maybe so. Yet this widely held attitude reflects a cynicism that is, in fact, something new in American political life. And it is also, perhaps, a measure of how far the Watergate affair itself has undermined public confidence — not only in the performance of this administration — but in government as a whole.

It is a reaction to be expected in foreign countries. In China and the Soviet Union, where such goings on are indeed routine stuff, virtually no mention of Watergate has appeared in the press. Western Europeans, who know something about political scandals, are more impressed by the intensity of American reaction than by the affair itself. The South Vietnamese are reported to be secretly delighted to find another government apparently as corrupt as their own.

Still, it is not excessively naive to say that Watergate is very far from being par for the course in American politics. Charges of criminal conspiracy reaching into the heart of the White House and the top levels of the federal administration are anything but routine. The idea that politics — and by extension politicians and the government itself — are inherently corrupt and venal, if not downright crooked, amounts to a considerable injustice to a great many perfectly honest and dedicated men and women.

This, it seems to me, is a growing misconception that can cause real injury if left unchecked. And it is perhaps in this area that the hearings presided over by Sen. Sam Ervin, D-N.C., can make their greatest contribution in neutralizing the poisons generated by the Watergate case.

There are problems, of course, in holding hearings in public while grand juries still are hearing evidence and handing down indictments on specific criminal charges connected with the case. It is quite true that the problem of granting immunity from prosecution to some witnesses before the committee is a delicate one which could complicate the work of the grand juries. It is possible that the evidence presented to the Senate committee may to some degree prejudice the judicial machinery.

It also is possible that the Senate hearings may result — at least for the short run — in a further decline of public confidence in the administration. The announced purpose of the committee is to educate the public and to determine what new laws may be needed to correct the abuses of the past, and that may be a painful process.

Yet no less important, quite certainly, than the process of determining criminal responsibility and punishing guilty individuals. By itself, the judicial process is unlikely to provide the public with a clear perception of where we have been in this affair and where we must go from here. As the committee vice chairman, Sen. Howard Baker, R-Tenn., put it:

"Although juries will eventually determine the guilt or innocence of persons who have been and may be indicted for specific violations of the law, it is the American people who must be the final judge of Watergate."

And, if the committee does its job, that judgment certainly will not be that the government as a whole is corrupted and unworthy of the confidence of the American people. Quite on the contrary, the real lesson that will be learned is that the Watergate affair was a grotesque aberration engineered by people with precious little knowledge of the American political system and the permissible limits of political conduct.

The essential job of the committee, in short, is to restore the confidence of the people in the system of government in this country and the integrity of the vast majority of those who serve the system. And that is a far more important objective than sending a few scoundrels off to jail.

The Evening Star
and
The Washington Daily News

CROSBY N. BOYD, *Chairman of the Board*
JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, *President*
NEWBOLD NOYES, *Editor*

A-14 **
TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1973

The CIA in a Better Light

Enough new information has come out of the Watergate-Pentagon Papers investigation so that accounts can be better squared on the involvement of one key department, the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA looked bad in the wake of disclosures that at White House request it had provided assistance to the burglars of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and that it cooperated in compiling a psychological profile of Ellsberg. We said at the time that this involvement compromised and discredited the CIA.

Since then, there has come some rather remarkable testimony from General Robert E. Cushman, former deputy director of the agency, General Vernon Walters, currently deputy director, and Richard M. Helms, who was director of CIA in the period covering both the Ellsberg and the Watergate episodes. Although CIA does not emerge blame-free, the new disclosures do afford a better perspective, and do place the agency's role in a more favorable light.

To recapitulate: General Cushman used bad judgment in helping burglars E. Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy, though it is fairly clear he did not know their mission, and though CIA assistance to them was halted even before the burglary took place. Helms used similar bad judgment in acquiescing on the Ellsberg profile. So much for the Ellsberg-Pentagon Papers period in 1971.

In the 1972 period following the arrest of the Watergate burglars, high White House officials evidently attempted on several occasions to unload major responsibility on CIA for what happened, and to get the agency to help scuttle the FBI's investigation. Helms and General Walters deserve great credit for refusing to go along with the White House suggestions, which Senator McClellan described as "beyond impropriety."

Should Helms and Walters have gone to the President, or Congress, with that information? Perhaps so. In retrospect, it is understandable that they did not. Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former CIA official, wrote recently in the New York Times:

"In fairness to CIA and other departments involved, the role of the White House staff should not be underestimated. It is not the custom of the bureaucracy to question a call from the executive offices. It is assumed that the President's people know what they are doing. While they may not inform the President of all details, it is usually believed they are operating under approved policy guidelines."

The point is worth remembering. It is one thing to have been marginally compromised. It is another to have used the power and authority of the White House to plot the compromising.

The Evening Star
and
The Washington Daily News

JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, President NEWBOLD NOYES, Editor

A-16 * WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 1973

MARY McGRORY

McCord Creates a Desert

By MARY McGRORY
Star-News Staff Writer

Point of View

In an anonymous letter sent to his only pal in the White House in December, James McCord wrote prophetically, "Every tree in the forest will fall."

When McCord, the amiable old spook, left the stand of the Ervin committee, he left a ravaged landscape behind him. So gripping, outlandish and unshakeable had been his tales of life in the Nixon campaign committee that the President at the end of the day popped out with a statement warning all investigators to have a care for "national security."

In his accusations about the President's sinister grand design to turn the CIA into a cloak for the Watergate operation, McCord had been corroborated by no less a personage than the agency's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters.

And when McCord finally wound down, his buddy — a New York cop named John J. Caulfield, brought into the White House to "provide private investigative support" for God knows what other schemes — advanced to the witness table to corroborate McCord's charges of political pressure from the White House to accept executive clemency in all details save for the mention of the President's name.

McCORD dropped his big bombs last week, but he had a few hand grenades in his final hour. He mentioned casually, when discussing the deep-laid plot for the lay-off of Watergate on the CIA that James Schlesinger, the short-lived director, now Defense secretary-designate, "would go along." Nobody took him up on it.

By now everyone is wary. Pull off a splinter on Watergate and a wall falls in.

Fred Thompson, the husky, phlegmatic minority counsel asked about the only question that anyone dared put to McCord after the spate of specifics had flooded a million living rooms across the nation. Why hadn't he sung sooner?

Obviously, burglary had not bothered him. He had made a formal act of contrition, but 19 years in the agency had coarsened his conscience sufficiently to had the blessing of the then attorney general.

AND SURELY although a pleasant man in other respects, he was at one with his leaders about the perilous state of the republic, menaced as it was by enemies from within. He gave the usual litany of bombings and threats, glided over the the chilling information that the McGovern people had a "a pipeline" in CREEP, and as the clincher, cited the report that the Vietnam Veterans Against the War had an office in the Democratic National Committee.

The VVAW, a touching band numbering a thousand at full strength, staged a pathetic demonstration on the Mall in 1970 and gave the Republican National Convention in Miami its only honest moment when they marched in total silence to the Fountainbeau.

It was actually after the break-in that McCord learned of their firebase at the Watergate, which makes the break-in history's first pre-emptive or perhaps retroactive protective reaction raid.

What then, had impelled him finally to raise his voice and blast the forests of Richard Nixon? Well, two things, it seems. One was that it was not done in the style of the CIA, the agency he loves.

HE TOLD his friend, Jack Caulfield, that in the CIA the rule, if caught, was for everyone to go together. While he was meeting Caulfield on the second overlook of George Washington Parkway Jeb Stuart Magruder who he says knew all about it, was feasting with his family and acting as master of the inaugural revels.

He left the impression that he might have swallowed his sentence as he would have swallowed a death pill on a foreign mission, had the conspiracy taken the group rate to the slammer.

He waited until Judge John H. Sirica, after "a sham trial," had urged them all to come forward and tell all they knew. The Senate committee had provided the only forum where McCord could tell all his secrets.

On the only occasion his light voice rose and his tired face turned dark with emotion, McCord said, "I am fully convinced this was the right decision."

CAULFIELD, a distraught, pop-eyed, bumpy-nosed upwardly mobile Bronx native, came on afterwards and said that 99 and 44/100 percent of what McCord had spilled was true. Caulfield was another interesting case. A man eaten alive by ambition, he was ever on the watch for advancement in administration espionage circles and his ego was wounded by John Mitchell who treated him as "only a bodyguards."

Caulfield slightly laundered McCord's version of what he had told him during one of their renezvous: McCord said Caulfield arned him, "You know if the administration gets its back to the wall it will have to take steps to defend itself."

Caulfield scrubbed it up a bit to read: "Jim, I have worked with these people and I know them to be as tough-minded as you and itself."

Caulfield scrubbed it up a bit to read: mim, I have worked with these people and I know them to be as tough-minded as you and I."

They weren't saints, either of them, but they are believable. And Richard Nixon is in the hands of people like McCord and it is

HS/HC-950

The Evening Star
and
The Washington Daily News

JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, *President* NEWBOLD NOYES, *Editor*

A-16 * WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 1973

Mr. Nixon's Explanation

In his long statement on Watergate released yesterday, President Nixon assures us that he had no prior knowledge of the bugging operation, that he took no part in—and indeed was unaware of—any cover-up, that he neither authorized nor knew of any offer of executive clemency to the conspirators, that he did not know until his own investigation revealed it of any effort to fund the Watergate defendants or to break into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, that at no time did he attempt—nor did he authorize others to attempt — to implicate the Central Intelligence Agency, and that he neither authorized nor encouraged his subordinates to engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.

Mr. Nixon would have us believe that, in actions he may have taken as regards Watergate, he was motivated by nothing but concern for the national security.

It may be so. But there are a few matters which still confuse us and upon which we would welcome further presidential elucidation. For example, Mr. Nixon admits that the White House Special Investigations Unit ("The Plumbers") was set up in June, 1971, with his approval. He describes it as "a small group" under John Ehrlichman, consisting of Egil Krogh, David Young, E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, a unit known only to "a very few persons at the White House."

Mr. Nixon says the task of The Plumbers was two-fold: to stop security leaks and to "investigate other sensitive security matters." We can understand the group's first function. But we find it a trifle hard to understand that, with a huge federal intelligence establishment at his beck and call, Mr. Nixon felt compelled to turn to this small group of buccaneers to undertake tasks of grave national security. Was the FBI really that useless? Could no one in the Secret Service be trusted? What about the National Security Agency, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Treasury, the Defense Department? What qualities had Hunt and Liddy that were lacking in these great departments and agencies?

What were these "sensitive security matters" to which The Plumbers devoted themselves? Well, before their work "tapered off around the end of 1971," they investigated Ellsberg's "associates and motives." They tee headquarters, "a complete surprise" to Mr. Nixon. His initial reaction is that the guilty should be brought to justice, but within a few days he is "advised" that there is "a possibility of CIA involvement." He also is stricken with concern "that the Watergate investigation might well lead to an inquiry into the activities of the Special Investigations Unit itself."

When he is worried that the CIA may be involved, does Mr. Nixon ask Richard Helms, then director of the agency, if this is the case? He does not. He instructs Haldeman and Ehrlichman to see that Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray and the Deputy CIA director, General Vernon Walters, "coordinate" their activities so that nobody's covert operations are exposed. Why was Helms by-passed and then shipped off to Iran? We'd like to know. And when Walters told Gray that CIA had no operation which could be compromised by the FBI's investigation (in Mexico in this instance) and Gray told Mr. Nixon that on July 6, did not the President smell at least a small laundered mouse?

And why was Mr. Nixon so concerned about the inquiry leading to The Plumbers? National security matters, so he says. And that, presumably, is why he told Assistant Attorney General Petersen to treat his investigation of Watergate virtually as if it were only a common case of breaking and entering, and "to stay out of national security matters." But could the President not have realized that, no matter how pure his motives, instructions of that nature to Petersen could only result in so severely limiting the investigation as to make it virtually worthless? For by his own definition, anything and everything a White House-based group like The Plumbers did could have a national security construction placed on it.

Mr. Nixon declares in his statement that "it is not my intention to place a national security 'cover' on Watergate." We are relieved to hear that, because a close reading of his statement could lead someone who had not totally suspended his critical faculties to believe that that is precisely what Mr. Nixon is trying to do. We are equally relieved to hear that "executive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct" when men like Haldeman, Ehrlichman and former attorney general John

Washington Whispers®

[Items appearing on this page are being talked about in Washington or other news centers]

When Brezhnev Comes Calling . . . A Good Word For Sam Ervin . . . Appeasing Senator Jackson

It's to be a crowded agenda for President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev when they meet in this country starting June 18. During Henry A. Kissinger's recent trip to Russia, he and Mr. Brezhnev discussed 25 separate matters of mutual interest to be taken up at the summit talks in Washington and San Clemente.

★ ★ ★

When President Nixon sounded out leaders of Congress on his proposals for a commission to chart campaign reforms, he got scant support from Democrats. Reason? Democratic insiders admit privately they are reluctant to support any commission that would take some heat off the President. They also fear that such a commission might spotlight some questionable campaign practices on the part of their own Democratic colleagues.

★ ★ ★

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., pressed into duty as White House operations chief, reportedly was among those who recommended the shift of James R. Schlesinger from CIA Director to Defense Secretary in the Nixon Administration's latest shake-up. Comment of one official: "It's an example of how topsy-turvy things are these days —a general being instrumental in selecting his own boss at the Pentagon." General Haig is the Army's Vice Chief of Staff.

★ ★ ★

A Republican Congressman from the farm belt is telling friends that the "energy crisis"—not foreign-policy considerations—motivated his vote against funds for further bombing in Cambodia. His comment: "We were being asked for money to keep the bombers flying while farmers back home were fearful they couldn't get enough gasoline to keep their tractors

For two weeks after Watergate pressures brought his resignation as one of the President's top aides, John D. Ehrlichman remained at work in the White House, on "transition" chores. But he found that things had changed. Secret Service guards who for years had waved him through the gates insisted on scrutinizing his White House credentials and examining the contents of his briefcase.

★ ★ ★

One high official of the Nixon Administration telephoned Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz and urged him to apologize for publicly assailing Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., key man in the Senate's inquiry into the Watergate scandal. Mr. Butz, in a speech at Charlotte, N. C., called the 76-year-old North Carolina Democrat a "publicity-seeking Senator" and denounced the probe as a "political inquisition." The official who disagreed with him asserted: "Sam Ervin is a man of integrity. I'd rather have him handling the investigation than 90 other guys up there."

★ ★ ★

New indication that Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York has his eye on the 1976 presidential race: On a recent visit to the White House, he announced that he is creating a National Commission on the Future of America in Its Third Century—and smilingly said that as chairman of the commission he will be traveling all over the country. It was not lost on others that this will provide the Governor with many opportunities to seek widespread support.

★ ★ ★

Administration sources say that a "purge" of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency team which negotiated with Russia in the first round to appease Senator Henry M. Jackson (Dem.), of Washington. Senator Jackson has criticized the SALT I agreements as a giveaway to the Soviets.

★ ★ ★

Texas Republicans say ex-Democrat John B. Connally is willing to campaign hard next year for Republican Senators including such Eastern "liberals" as Jacob Javits of New York and Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland. Said one Texan: "Connally will go out of his way to dispel any idea he is a provincial 'conservative.' "

★ ★ ★

Diplomats from the Soviet Union were conspicuously absent when David K.E. Bruce—first U. S. emissary to be stationed in mainland China in more than 20 years—was given a ceremonial greeting at the Peking airport. The reason: In a snub typifying the strained relations between the Communist rivals, the Chinese didn't inform the Soviet Embassy about Mr. Bruce's arrival time.

★ ★ ★

The latest revelations about wiretaps on persons suspected of leaking Government secrets are causing some Democrats on Capitol Hill to wonder out loud whether they had been targets for electronic eavesdropping. Particular concern was evident among members of committees with access to much sensitive information.

★ ★ ★

Some Asian diplomats in Washington predict the U. S. may yet have to accept the return of ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Cambodia's leader. They describe Sihanouk—who is supported by China and acceptable to North Vietnam—as the only Cambodian with a chance of keeping the country from fragmenting in the con-

d civil war.

WHY ERVIN HEADS THE SENATE INQUIRY

The star of the Senate Watergate hearings is a Democrat from North Carolina noted chiefly for his folksy manner—and his profound knowledge of the U. S. Constitution.

Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 76, has spent nearly 19 years in the Senate without being tagged as one of the "greats" of that legislative body.

Yet, with no murmur of dissent, he was chosen to take the spotlight in the special investigation of Watergate and related incidents.

—USN&WR Photo

Senator Ervin at opening of Watergate hearings. He brings a reputation for fairness, knowledge of law to investigation involving widespread scandal.

In weeks ahead, at times before vast TV audiences, Senator Ervin will lead the questioning of alleged participants in, and victims of, the affair that has shaken the Nixon Administration.

How did he come to be chosen? What qualities brought him the leading role in the biggest investigation staged on Capitol Hill in years?

Reputation for fairness. Mr. Ervin is known in the Senate as an effective storyteller who presses home points by quoting the Bible, the Constitution, "Omar Khayyám" and various sages of the Carolina mountain country.

He has also earned the respect of members of both parties as a "fair-minded man." And he has long confused those who pin politicians with labels of "conservative" or "liberal."

While he has been a nonpartisan Senator during the [illegible] Ervin has not avoided controversy. Shortly after he came to the Senate he was named to the select committee to consider censure charges against the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Rep.), of Wisconsin. He eventually favored censure, but typically introduced a new term into the debate by charging Senator McCarthy with being "guilty of disorderly conduct by flyblowing."

Aides had to explain to puzzled colleagues that "flyblowing," in the South, was often used to mean "smearing."

Stands on issues. During the 1950s and early '60s, Senator Ervin became identified with opposition to civil-rights legislation. He always insisted he favored equal treatment for blacks, but said it should be accomplished through State action, not federal laws.

Senator Ervin put many Administration witnesses of both parties through their paces with hours of tough questions based on the constitutionality of civil-rights proposals. Those sessions came to be called "Ervin's School of Law."

In recent years, he has taken stands more to the liking of "liberal" members—for example, leading opposition to Government "snooping" and a "big brother" watch over U. S. citizens.

In frequent Senate speeches, he warned that individuals were in danger of being victimized by Government [illegible] was alarmed by the growing tendency to identify citizens by numbers, by the possible invasion of privacy through Government questionnaires, and by the failure to safeguard rights of federal workers from acts of a prying employer.

Recently, Senator Ervin's devotion to the principle of separation of powers between executive and legislative branches drew him into the fight over the Nixon Administration's impoundment of funds voted by Congress.

Earlier, underscoring his independent line, Senator Ervin upset some "conservatives" by his strong opposition to the Subversive Activities Control Board, established in 1954 to identify Communist or Communist-front organizations.

Typically, he saw the board as an unconstitutional affront which "has no rightful place in our land."

Legal background. Mr. Ervin was born on Sept. 27, 1896, in Morganton, N. C., in the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains. After getting a law degree, he practiced in the Morganton office of his father, became involved in Democratic politics.

As a judge, he served on the county criminal court, then on the superior court, was later appointed to the State Supreme Court. In 1954 he was named to fill out the term of Senator Clyde R. Hoey. His name has been magic on the North Carolina ballot ever since.

As a student of the Constitution, Senator Ervin is credited by fellow members with always doing his homework. It is said that "the law is his hobby." He frequently is spotted alone in the Senate law library, several books indexed and spread out before him.

Often he takes law books home at night to the simple quarters he and Mrs. Ervin occupy in the Methodist Building a block from his Capitol Hill office.

A close friend of many years says this of Senator Ervin:

"He doesn't look at issues from a philosophical standpoint. He looks at them from the Constitution, and he is confident that he is consistent—no matter which way the chips fall."

What to expect—. Associates can't recall when Senator Ervin last lost his temper. But they think this calm demeanor will be tested in the Watergate hearings, which could produce many confrontations in months ahead.

What is certain to be produced, however, is further evidence of Senator Ervin's deep-felt convictions about America and freedom. In a past debate, he summed up his view:

"If America is to be free, her Government must permit her people to think their own thoughts and determine [illegible] elected officials in

CIA MEMO ON HALDEMAN

'Nixon's Wish' Cited for Cover

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

Six days after the Watergate break-in last June, federal prosecutor Earl J. Silbert revealed at a routine bond hearing involving the burglars that a bank draft of $89,000 linked to Bernard L. Barker, one of the suspects, had been traced to a bank in Mexico City.

That same day, June 23, 1972, according to recent testimony before three congressional committees, White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman tried to enlist CIA cooperation in blocking an FBI investigation of an ill-defined Mexico City finance operation.

According to a memo by CIA deputy director Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters which was prepared a few days later but revealed only yesterday, heading off the FBI probe was deemed so urgent that Haldemann told CIA officials that day "it is the President's wish" that Walters go to FBI acting director L. Patrick Gray III to call the FBI investigation off.

In the annals of the complex Watergate affair, the details of the tortuous financial trial that led from a Houston mining company, through Mexico City, to Barker and then to GOP fundraiser Maurice Stans' safe did not surface for many weeks.

TO WALTERS and to former CIA director Richard M. Helms, who testified yesterday in an open session of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, the connection was totally obscure last June.

As Helms recalls it, he was summoned by telephone to be at the White House at 1 p.m. June 23 to discuss an unidentified subject and to come with Walters, a former aide to President Nixon who barely six weeks before had been sworn in as CIA deputy.

Once in Ehrlichman's office, Helms recalled, Haldeman told the men there was a danger the Watergate incident might be capitalized upon by the "opposition." Apparently some danger to the national security likewise was invoked, as Helms recalls it, because "Haldeman also mentioned the Bay of Pigs, in an incoherent statement I didn't understand."

THEN HALDEMAN gave his order: "It was decided at the White House," Helms testified yesterday, that Walters should go to Gray and tell him that continued investigation of the Mexican finance might jeopardize CIA operations there

Star-News Photographer Joseph Silverman

Richard Helms testifies.

Walters, in a confidential memorandum of the same conversation, which Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) in part revealed at yesterday's hearing, put it more bluntly. "It is the President's wish that you go to Mr. Gray ..." is the way he heard Haldeman's order.

Helms yesterday insisted that he had no recollection of the phrase "it is the President's wish." But he left no doubt that he regarded an order from Haldeman as issuing from the top. "When the President's chief of staff speaks to you," he noted, "you assume he speaks with authority."

Haldeman told the New York Times yesterday that the President was not in any way involved in the Watergate cover-up.

Helms revealed yesterday that the CIA immediately checked the only conceivable link between the Mexican money transfer and its own operations in Mexico. This was Manuel Ogarrio Daguerre, an attorney to whom had received a $100,000 transfer from Gulf Resources and Chemical Corp. of Houston as a bill payment April 3, 1972.

OGARRIO, Helms told the committee, "had no relation to the agency," and by June 26 the CIA director and his deputy were trying to tell White House aides they could not invoke CIA operations to block the FBI probe.

Ogarrio, as the investigation eventually was to reveal, bought $89,000 in bank drafts from Banco Internacional in Mexico City April 4, 1972.

The next day the drafts, plus $11,000 in cash, were delivered by courier to Nixon fund-raisers in Houston. The money was Washington. The drafts were cashed through Barker's Miami bank account before the money went back into a campaign safe used, in part, to finance Watergate spying.

Some of these connections between Watergate and the GOP campaign might never have been made had Haldeman's order of June 23, been carried out, and the Mexico City bank transaction, which Watergate prosecutor Silbert revealed that day, might never have been developed. The full details of the Mexican transaction are still under investigation by a federal grand jury in Houston.

Helms, looking back yesterday on that early stage of the Watergate scandal, stressed the seeming innocence of what Haldeman seemed to be asking him to do, even after it had been revealed that the reason offered for blocking the FBI probe — CIA operations in Mexico — was spurious.

Whether or not Haldeman spoke at "the President's wish." Helms made it plain, "assistance to the President hasn't been considered a crime until recently."

HE EXPLAINED: It was only six days after Watergate when Haldeman spoke, the full import of Watergate was unknown, he could not understand what a Mexican bank transaction had to do with the incident.

Later, as the scope of the case began to widen, Helms said, "My total preoccupation was to keep the CIA uninvolved in the whole matter — and I succeeded in so doing."

In late November, a few weeks after Nixon's landslide victory, Helms was summoned to Camp David and told he was resigning as CIA director, some six months before reaching retirement age, and being reassigned as ambassador to Iran. Haldeman was present at that meeting with the President, Helms recalled yesterday.

Asked by several senators whether his removal was related to his refusal to let the CIA be used by the White House in the Watergate case, Helms had one reply· "I honestly don't know."

STILL ANOTHER of Walters's "memorandums of conversation" — written last year but disclosed yesterday to the New York Times by other congressional sources—quotes Gray as saying that the President, during a telephone conversation, had inquired about "the case," an apparent reference to the Watergate inquiry.

This memorandum quotes Gray as telling the President that the Watergate case could not be covered up and that he thought that Nixon should get rid of those involved

The memorandum, prepared by July 13, is said to be Walter's recollection of a conversation held just a day earlier with Gray

The document quotes Gray as saying that President Nixon had called him a week earlier to congratulate him on FBI action frustrating an airplane hijacking in San Francisco.

"Toward the end of the conversation," according to the Walters memorandum, "the President asked him (Gray) if he had talked to me (Walters) about the case. Gray replied that he had. The President then asked him what his recommendation was in this case

The memorandum then continued:

Gray had replied that the case could not be covered up and it would lead quite high and he felt that the President should get rid of the people that were involved. Any attempt to involve the FBI or the CIA in this case could only prove a mortal wound and would achieve nothing.

"The President then said, 'Then I should get rid of whoever is involved, no matter how high up?' Gray replied that was his recommendation.

"The President then asked what I thought and Gray said my views were the same as his. The President took it well and thanked him."

HS/HC-950

...Os. Yesterday's high, 9... at ...:30 p.m. Today's low, 50 at ...:25 p.m. Details: Page B-6.

The WASHINGTON DAILY News

...st Year. No. 142 · Copyright © 1973 The Evening Star Newspaper Co. · WASHINGTON, D.C., TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1973—56 PAGES · Phone 484-5000 CIRCULATION 484-3000 CLASSIFIED 484-6000 · 10 Cents

REFUSED TO TURN ON CIA

McCord Cites White House 'Ploy'



—Star-News Photographer Joseph Silverman

Sen. Howard Baker, Sen. Sam Ervin (from left) and counsel Sam Dash confer at today's hearings.

By MARTHA ANGLE
and JAMES DOYLE
Star-News Staff Writers

Convicted conspirator James W. McCord Jr. today told a Senate Committee that defendants in the Watergate case were subjected to White House pressure to blame the operation on the Central Intelligence Agency and he alone resisted the pressure.

McCord said that his co-defendants and his own attorneys tried last December to get him to go along with the story that the CIA had been behind the Watergate break-in and bugging.

"I refused to do so," he said, reading from a detailed memorandum he submitted to the Senate Watergate Committee on May 7.

AT ONE POINT, McCord said, he told Gerald Alch, one of his attorneys, that "even if it meant my freedom, I would not turn on the organization that had employed me for 19 years and wrongly deal such a damaging blow that it would take years for it to recover . . ."

By late December, McCord testified, "I was completely convinced that the White House was behind the . . . ploy . . . and would do whatever was politically expedient at any one particular point in time to accomplish its ends."

During Christmas week, he said, he sent an unsigned letter to John J. Caulfield, a former White House aide who had first recruited McCord to handle security for the Republican National Committee and who then was employed at the Treasury Department.

HS/HC-950

—Star-News Photographer Joseph Silverman

James W. McCord reads his opening statement at today's Watergate hearing.

By late December, McCord testified, "I was completely convinced that the White House was behind the . . . [illegible] . . . and . . . ever was politically expedient at any one particular point in time to accomplish its ends."

During Christmas week, he said, he sent an unsigned letter to John J. Caulfield, a former White House aide who had first recruited McCord to handle security for the Republican National Committee and who then was employed at the Treasury Department.

THE LETTER, HE said, was designed to head off the alleged White House attempt to blame Watergate on the CIA. In substance, it said:

"Dear Jack: I am sorry to have to write you this letter. If (CIA Director Richard) Helms goes and the Watergate operation is laid at CIA's feet where it does not belong, every tree in the forest will fall. It will be a scorched desert.

"The whole matter is at the precipice right now. Pass the message that if they want it to blow, they are on exactly the right course. I'm sorry that you will get hurt in the fallout."

THE LETTER, McCord said, contained no request that the White House contact him. If he had wanted to talk with Caulfield, McCord said, he could have telephoned him easily.

McCord last Friday testified that Caulfield met with him three times in January of this year to transmit White House offers of executive clemency, monetary payments and a future job if he would remain silent about the Watergate case.

McCord also said he was "convinced" that Helms was fired as CIA chief last year so that the White House could replace him with its own man and blame Watergate on the CIA.

McCord said he considered it part of a continuing plot in the White House to effect "political control" over the agency.

Reading from a previously prepared memo, McCord said he had been told that James R. Schlesinger, who replaced Helms as CIA chief, "would go along" with the White House plot to blame Watergate on the CIA. Schlesinger has since been nominated to be Secretary of Defense.

See HEARINGS, Page A-4

—Star-News Photographer Joseph Silverman

James W. McCord reads his opening statement at today's Watergate hearing.

Watergate At a Glance

Political spying operations for the White House were carried out by a former New York City policeman under John D. Ehrlichman's direction starting in 1969, sources said. Page A-1.

Senate action on Elliot L. Richardson's nomination as attorney general may come by tonight, following what is expected to be favorable action by the Judiciary Committee today. Page A-7.

Richardson owes his confirmation to the committee's confidence in the independence of his old Harvard Law School professor, Archibald Cox, as special Watergate prosecutor, Mary McGrory writes. Page A-9.

James W. McCord today told a Senate committee that he alone of the Watergate defendants resisted White House pressure to blame the burglary on the Central Intelligence Agency. Page A-1.

An effort to persuade CIA officials to intervene and call off FBI probing of aspects of Watergate case came less than a week after the break-in and was represented as "the President's wish," a CIA memo made public yesterday disclosed. Page A-6.

A White House plan for widespread domestic espionage following the 1970 Cambodian invasion is under investigation by congressional committees. Page A-2.

MAN WHO CALLED McCORD

A Multi-Purpose Agent

A former New York policeman was hired by presidential adviser John D. Ehrlichman in 1969 to conduct political syping operations under Ehrlichman's direction and was paid secretly by President Nixon's personal attorney, according to informed sources.

The sources said Anthony T. Ulasewicz carried out a series of assignments from Ehrlichman that ranged from a probe of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's Chappaquiddick accident to an investigation of a teacher reportedly harassing Julie Nixon Eisenhower in Florida.

Ulasewicz has acknowledged he was the man with a New York accent who made a telephone call to James W. McCord Jr., offering him executive clemency if he would plead guilty and remain silent at his Watergate burglary trial. McCord, who described the clemency offer on Friday, was to resume his Senate testimony today.

Acting under orders from Ehrlichman, it was learned, Ulasewicz at various times investigated alleged ties between Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, D-Maine, and corporate polluters, checked on reported harassment of the President's daughter, probed the finances of Sen. Hubert Humphrey's campaign, and investigated a Georgetown incident of unspecified nature involving House Speaker Carl Albert.

See SPY, Page A-4

—United Press International

ANTHONY ULASEWICZ

HEARINGS

McCord Reports Cover-up 'Ploy'

Continued From Page A-1

McCord's former attorney, Alch, flew to Washington from Boston today to demand an opportunity to testify before the Senate committee tomorrow on McCord's accusations against him. Representatives of his law firm said Alch has a 5 p.m. appointment with committee counsel to demand rebuttal time for the charges made by McCord last Friday against his former lawyer.

Alch associates said the Boston attorney came here because he has documents to back up his story and because he "thinks the committee might not put him on the stand."

Under close questioning by the committee members, McCord was unable to say the offers for executive clemency, money and a job after prison came directly from any official at the Committee to Re-Elect the President or the White House. And, he said, the suggestion that he use as a defense that the Watergate break-in was a CIA operation came from his lawyer, Gerald Alch, and not from any government or campaign official.

McCord mentioned conversations with fellow conspirator E. Howard Hunt and his late wife, with another convicted conspirator, Bernard Barker, and with Caulfield.

Sen. Herman Talmadge, D-Ga., said at one point to McCord, "You have not connected it with the White House or the Committee to Re-Elect the President" directly. McCord did not counter this statement, although in testimony Friday he said Caulfield told him President Nixon was aware of their meetings.

ON ANOTHER subject, McCord told the Senate committee that in January or February 1972 one of his co-conspirators, G. Gordon Liddy, told him he was going to Las Vegas to "case" the office of Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.

Liddy told him Attorney General John N. Mitchell had indicated that Greenspun had "blackmail" information linking a Democratic presidential candidate with racketeering elements.

McCord said he personally tends to "disbelieve" any such information ever existed.

Liddy, he said, made two trips to Las Vegas — in February and again in April 1972 — to plan "for an entry operation into Greenspun's safe."

McCord, in response to questions from committee members said that to the best of his knowledge there never was an actual break-in at Greenspun's office.

After the April trip, he said, Liddy told him of plans for the "entry team" to go from Greenspun's office to the Las Vegas airport "where a Howard Hughes plane would be standing by to fly the team to a Central American country."

At one point in his testimony, McCord said that among the reasons he had to believe that the Republican campaign was endangered was thhat he had received information that Vietnam Veterans Against the War had an office within the DNC at the Watergate.

But in answer to a question from Sen. Lowell Weicker, Jr., R-Conn., McCord said he did not get that information before June 17, the day of the break-in. He could not recall the source.

It was at about this time, McCord said, that another co-defendant, E. Howard Hunt "gold me he was in touch with a Hughes company that might need my services after the election."

Both Hunt and Liddy told him they had handled a Howard Hughes contribution to the Nixon re-election campaign, McCord testified.

McCORD today also elaborated on the factors which persuaded him to participate in the Watergate bugging venture in the first place.

First and foremost, he repeated, was the "sanction" given the operation by Mitchell and John W. Dean III, counsel to the President—sanction relayed by Liddy.

In addition, McCord said, as security director for Nixon's re-election is anxious to obtain information regarding possible violence against the committee and the Republican party.

In February 1972, pipe bombs exploded at a police station in Manchester, N.H. One of those arrested was carrying letters saying, "We have just bombed the offices of the Committee to Re-elect the President in New Hampshire." McCord said a bomb attack on committee offices in Manchester was obviously planned after the police station effort.

A few days later, he said another bomb exploded at Republican county headquarters in Oakland, Calif.

There were numerous threats, McCord said, against Mitchell and his wife, Martha.

McCord said he was anxious to learn what groups were fomenting violence, who was funding them or encouraging them and what they were planning next.

He said he had "no indication whatever" that Democratic party chairman Lawrence O'Brien or Sen. George McGovern had any knowledge of such groups and their plans, but thought it possible that staff members "might be working behind their backs to quietly encourage" certain radical groups.

"I felt the Watergate operation might produce some leads answering some of these questions," McCord told the committee.

"In hindsight, I do not believe that the operation should have been sanctioned or executed. However, you asked me about my motivations at the time."

McCord testified today he pressed his old friend Caulfield to ascertain whether — as McCord believed — his telephone calls were being intercepted by the government.

HE CONCEDED that he had deliberately made two telephone calls to foreign embassies in Washington in an attempt to be overheard on government wiretaps. But he denied that this was a ploy to undermine the government's case against him.

McCord said he made the calls to test the government's honesty. He was convinced his own telephone had been illegally wiretapped, he said, but believed the government would probably deny it if asked about it in court.

He said he tried to be overheard on other taps on embassy telephones to see if the government would admit overhearing him there. He said it didn't. News reports today identified the embassies as those of Israel and Chile.



—Associated Press

Egil Krogh Jr. (right) talks with his lawyer, Steven Shulman, as they leave U.S. District Court here after Krogh met with Watergate prosecutors.

Spy: Multi-Purpose Agent

Continued From Page A-1

Sources said he also conducted a background check on Rep. Mario Biaggi, D-N.Y., candidate for mayor in New York, and looked into the possibility that the brother of one possible Democratic presidential contender had been involved in a homosexual incident in New York.

SO WIDE was the net cast by Ulasewicz, sources said, that at one juncture, he was assigned to investigate the activities of a "Donald Simmons" in the 1972 Wisconsin primary, only to discover that "Simmons" was actually Donald Segretti, alleged GOP saboteur indicted in Orlando, Fla., May 4 on charges of distributing a phony letter on Muskie stationery accusing Humphrey and Sen. Henry M. Jackson of sexual misconduct.

From 1969 to 1971, the sources said, Ulasewicz was carried on the law office payroll of Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal attorney. Beginning in September 1971, he received lump-sum cash payments from Kalmbach that in one instance totaled $30,000, it was reported.

Ulasewicz has been identified in earlier news reports as the agent whom Kalmbach used in contacting one or more of the seven convicted Watergate conspirators in regard to payments of "hush" money in exchange for their silence about the involvement of high White House officials in the Watergate operation.

ARRANGEMENTS for his expenses, including the maintenance of an apart-

worked out with Kalmbach, sources said.

McCord, who is expected to conclude his Senate testimony today, told the panel Friday that former White House aide John J. Caulfield in January transmitted offers of money, executive clemency and a future job in exchange for silence about the Watergate incident.

During that same time, McCord testified, he had received telephone messages from an unidentified caller arranging the meetings with Caulfield. Press reports have identified Ulasewicz as the anonymous caller.

It was Caulfield, sources said, who recommended Ulasewicz to Ehrlichman shortly after he himself was hired in March 1969, to supervise legitimate "discreet investigations" and maintain liaison with federal law enforcement agencies. Caulfield and Ulasewicz were former colleagues on the New York police force.

Caulfield is expected to appear before the Senate committee later today or tomorrow.

SOURCES said Caulfield and Ehrlichman first interviewed Ulasewicz at the American Airlines terminal at LaGuardia Airport in New York in the spring of 1969, and Ulasewicz began his "investigative" work in July of that year. Chappaquiddick was his first assignment, it was learned.

Ulasewicz was told to use code names, avoid any mention of his White House connection and report verbally to Caulfield, sources said.

In a related development, the Scripps-Howard News Service reported that Ulasewicz has led Senate investigators on a tour of locations in the Washington area where he hid money for eventual distribution to the original Watergate defendants.

That "hush money," allegedly given to the defendants in return for willingness not to implicate higher officials in the conspiracy, was transmitted from Kalmbach to Ulasewicz and then to the late Mrs. Dorothy Hunt, wife of one of the defendants.

WASHINGTON'S National Airport was a major "drop point" for delivery of cash to Mrs. Hunt, and one of Ulasewicz's favorite locations, according to the story written by Scripps-Howard staff writer Dan Thomasson.

His account said large sums of money were stashed in a locker at the airport for pickup by Mrs. Hunt, who would gain access to the locker by retrieving a key Ulasewicz had taped in a hidden place in a telephone booth near the Eastern or American Airlines ticket counters.

Mrs. Hunt was killed in a Chicago plane carsh in December, and at the time of her death she has $10,000 in cash in her purse. The amount which she and others distributed to the defendants was more than $300,000, according to the Scripps-Howard story.

The story also said some of the "hush money" was left in "some of the most public places imaginable," and usually was composed of $100 bills left in plain manila envelopes.

CITING the case of one middle-man who allegedly took $1,000 of the payoff money for "expenses," Thomasson's story said investigators believed some of the funds were "skimmed" by those who handled them.

The Senate committee is expected to summon Ulasewicz sometime after it has heard the testimony of McCord and Caulfield.

GOOD START—Clear tonight, low in 50s. Sunny tomorrow, high in mid-70s. Yesterday's high, 66 at 4:30 p.m. Today's low, 57 at 2:30 a.m. Details: Page D-4.

The Evening Star
and
The Washington Daily News

NIGHT FINAL

1st Year. No. 141

x WASHINGTON, D.C., MONDAY, MAY 21, 1973—54 PAGES

Phone 484-5000 CIRCULATION 484-3000 CLASSIFIED 484-6000 10 Ce

'It Is the President's Wish,' CIA Memo Quotes Haldeman

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

CIA Deputy Director Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, in a memorandum prepared last June, said he was ordered by White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman to interfere with an FBI investigation of the Watergate case and was told "it is the President's wish" that he carry out the order.

The memo was written a few days after a June 23 White House meeting in which the order was relayed to Walters in the presence of then—CIA director Richard M. Helms and presidential domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman.

The substance of the memo was revealed today in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Helms, testifying to the committee, said he had no recollection that the President's name was invoked on the June 23



Pressed by committee members, Helms de- "[illegible]" that Nixon's name did not come up at the meeting. He stressed he had no independent recollection that would back up what Walters wrote.

DURING MORE than two hours of an open hearing, at the conclusion of which Helms was roundly praised by committee members for refusing to yield to White House pressure, Helms stressed that he gave orders after Watergate that the agency was under no circumstances to be linked with the widening scandal.

Much of the testimony merely confirmed earlier disclosures of the campaign by White House aides Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III to use the CIA to hinder investigation of Watergate and too provide a cover for the five Watergate burglars.

Helms made it plain, however, that his perplexity was extreme in the face of evidence that top-ranking White House aides, invoking presidential authority, were seeking to involve the agency in illegal activities.

See CIA, Page A-2



—Star-News Photographer Joseph Silverman

Former CIA Director Richard Helms prepares to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Watergate At a Glance

H. R. Haldeman told CIA officials "it is the President's wish" that the agency tell the FBI to limit its Watergate investigation, according to testimony on Capitol Hill today. Page A-1.

Investigators are tracing the movements of the Nixon re-election campaign's undercover operator, Donald H. Segretti, to Pittsburgh, San Diego, San Francisco, Milwaukee and Portland. Page A-1.

Former Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell and former Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans plead not guilty to perjury and conspiracy charges at their arraignment in New York. Page A-8.

Nixon campaign advisers were reported to have given hush money to Watergate defendants as recently as five weeks ago. Page A-8.

CIA

'President's Wish,' Haldeman Quoted

Continued From Page A-1

Asked why he did not go personally to Nixon with his misgivings, Helms replied: "My interest was to keep the agency out of this case under all circumstances, and I wanted to stay as head of the agency to keep it out.

"I though I would be more successful doing this than someone who came along later," Helms said.

At another point in the hearing Helms was asked about the CIA role in the burglary of the Beverly Hills offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Helms indicated disgust over White House requests of the agency he formerly headed.

He said the CIA went along with requests for the assistance because "assistance of the President has not been a crime until fairly recently."

TWO WEEKS AFTER the November election, Helms was informed by Nixon that he would be removed as CIA director and reassigned as ambassador to Iran. Helms has refused to discuss his conversation with Nixon, on the reasons for his removal.

But in the face of widespread speculation in the wake of the most recent Watergate revelations that Helms' departure was related to his refusal to involve the CIA in the cover-up, Helms today only pleaded ignorance when asked directly if that was the reason for his forced resignation.

The senators also pressed hard on the fact that Walters, Helms' deputy who was specifically chosen to do the White House bidding, was a former interpreter for Nixon and had been the White House choice to be CIA deputy.

Helms admitted today, "I would have preferred to have an agency man put in the job."

WHEN ASKED further by Sen. Charles H. Percy, R-Ill., why Haldeman and the other White House aides concentrated their attention on a White House appointee, Helms conceded, "I thought it very odd at the time."

Committee members, Percy included, hastened to stress they meant no criticism of Walters, who in the face of the White House pressure, obeyed Helms' directive and refused to cooperate.

WASHINGTON STAR COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
225 Virginia Ave. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
484-5000

SUBSIDIARY and AFFILIATED COMPANIES
THE EVENING STAR NEWSPAPER CO.
THE EVENING STAR BROADCASTING CO. (WMAL-AM-FM-TV)
FIRST CHARLESTON CORP., Charleston, S.C. (WCIV-TV)
WLVA INCORPORATED

distinguished jurists, only to have three of his first four choices turn him down.

New York U.S. District Court Judge Harold R. Tyler was the first to opt out, telling friends that he would be too much under the Administration's thumb. Los Angeles attorney Warren Christopher, who had been Deputy Attorney General under Lyndon Johnson, excused himself on the grounds that "the guidelines do not provide the requisite independence which I felt was necessary to do the job." Colorado Supreme Court Justice William Erickson also declined, and the suspicion began to grow that the Administration still could not quite bring itself to allow the prosecutor a genuinely free rein. Finally, Richardson managed to tap Archibald Cox, 61, an old Kennedy hand and former U.S. Solicitor General (box). Together they sat down and worked out a set of ground rules that give Cox virtually unlimited authority over the investigation.

A Test of Muscle

Cox's appointment was widely acclaimed, and it will probably clear the way for Richardson's swift confirmation. But a host of other problems await the Administration on Capitol Hill. Mr. Nixon last week vetoed a bill that would have made his director and deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget subject to Senate confirmation, and in what promises to become an early test of his post-Watergate muscle, Senate opponents started an energetic campaign to override the veto.

Military appropriations for Indochina are another urgent problem. Two weeks ago, the House voted down new funds for U.S. bombing in Cambodia, and last week the once-hawkish Senate Appropriations Committee voted unanimously to cut off all funds for military action in Cambodia and Laos. The final vote will come after Memorial Day, and it is widely assumed that Congress will for the first time use the power of the purse to try to force a change in the President's conduct of the war. Congress's newfound independence was already affecting Henry Kissinger's bargaining power in his renewed talks with the North Vietnamese representatives in Paris, and foreign chanceries were wondering whether President Nixon could continue to play so forceful a role in world affairs (page 47).

His fundamental problem with Congress was that support for the President had become a political liability rather than an asset. "Senators up for re-election are going to bend over backward to vote against the Administration," one high-ranking Republican leader conceded. Congress, having long bridled at Presidential supremacy, showed every sign of taking advantage of Mr. Nixon's sudden vulnerability. The President might, as Ziegler said, have a lot to accomplish in his second term, but it was difficult for the time being to see how he would go about it.

The High Price of 'Security'

The Watergate scandal had long since transcended the mere burglary and bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters. But as the story continued to unfold last week, that episode emerged as part of the end game in a slow, sad process of the corruption of power—a progression that began in concern for the national security, went on to the bending of ethics and laws and ended in outright police-state tactics as the Nixon Administration lost all sense of the difference between the nation's welfare and its own.

The week's blockbusters, falling with almost cadenced regularity, included the eye-catching allegations that Henry Kissinger, hitherto untouched by the widening scandals, had approved FBI wiretaps on his own National Security Council aides; that White House aides feared a senile J. Edgar Hoover might parlay this involvement into genteel blackmail of higher-ups, and that highly respected former CIA director Richard Helms, now U.S. ambassador to Iran, may well have known more about the Watergate than he had previously let on. But the week's worst news was the emerging picture of an almost routine resort to illegality by top government officials.

That impression was reinforced when Richard Nixon's own distance from the Watergate scandal shortened appreciably. In response to published accusations by fired White House counsel John W. Dean III (NEWSWEEK, May 14), Presidential press secretary Ron Ziegler admitted that the President had never ordered or received an in-house investigation directly from Dean, despite Mr. Nixon's references to such a counsel's report in two television addresses. The President, White House sources said, had actually communicated his wishes to domestic assistant John D. Ehrlichman (who finally drew his last Federal paycheck last week, along with Dean and Presidential Assistant H.R. Haldeman), and Ehrlichman later indicated to Mr. Nixon that Dean had cleared the White House staff of complicity.

Over at FBI headquarters, meanwhile, interim director William D. Ruckelshaus was facing a battery of newsmen under klieg lights ("You mean he's going to answer questions?" marveled an old FBI hand) to confirm a suspicion that had emerged in the closing hours of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's Pentagon-papers trial two weeks ago—that the whole secret-police apparatus that was to become Watergate had actually been set in motion in the spring of 1969, two years earlier than previously supposed. Thirteen government officials, some of them members of the top-level National Security Council, and four newsmen were tapped by the FBI under direct orders from the President.

Wally McNamee—Newsweek

Helms: A presumption of complicity

UPI

Kissinger: Tap day at the NSC

Wrestling the Secret Service

The logs from these taps, one of which had recorded Ellsberg, had been reported missing from the FBI since July of 1971 (the straw that finally forced dismissal of the Ellsberg case), but Ruckelshaus disclosed that the FBI recovered them from Ehrlichman's safe a fortnight ago, provoking what he facetiously called an "arm-wrestling" session with Secret Service men assigned to the White House.

It was these early wiretaps that connected Kissinger with the undercover tactics. In the early months of the Administration, NEWSWEEK learned last week, Mr. Nixon became "enraged" over a leak to The New York Times that reported all too accurately that the U.S.

was bombing Cambodia with the acquiescence of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. At the President's direction, the FBI was called in to investigate the leaks and Kissinger proffered a list of "four or five" names of possibly talkative insiders on the National Security Council staff. The list eventually grew to seventeen—including, FBI sources confirm, Dr. Morton B. Halperin (a liberal Ivy League professor and friend of Ellsberg), along with Kissinger aides Winston Lord, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Daniel I. Davidson and Anthony Lake and four newsmen from the Times, CBS and The Sunday Times of London.

There was no suggestion of treason in the leaks. "The trouble with Henry," one Administration official said, "is that he was too damned careful at times in protecting a bunch of clowns who wanted to show off to their journalist friends, who in turn wanted to impress their Russian friends." The accumulated tidbits, cleverly assembled by the Russians, could be seriously embarrassing. Once, according to an FBI source, the U.S. had prepared two positions going into an early round of the SALT talks. "When our negotiators got to the table," this agent told NEWSWEEK's Nicholas Horrock, "they found the Russians knew the U.S. fallback position and simply would not deal on the basis of the first line. It was very, very damaging."

Protecting the Innocent

And before a Supreme Court ruling in 1972, the wiretaps themselves were not clearly illegal. "What has to be understood here," Kissinger told NEWSWEEK's Henry Trewhitt last week, "is that we are talking about [wiretaps] that were legal, that were carried on through previous Administrations; that no use was made of this for any other purpose than safeguarding of classified information, and that it was as much a protection for the innocent as anything else."

Nonetheless, in the Byzantine byways of Mr. Nixon's Washington, the wiretap logs might have other uses—and nobody appreciated that better than Hoover, even though he was in his mid-70s and, according to one Administration official, showing the ravages of "arteriosclerotic senility." On direct orders from Mr. Nixon, Hoover sent copies of the wiretap logs to Haldeman in May 1970. He also pulled the originals from the FBI files and put them in a safe in assistant director William Sullivan's office—a move that let him keep his control of potentially embarrassing documents in case they should prove useful.

The last of the seventeen wiretaps was finally ended in February of 1971—a date that dovetailed with another important event in the Justice Department. This was the arrival of Robert Mardian, then 48, as an Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security Division, an old witch-hunting relic that had lain dormant since the middle '50s. Aggressive, suspicious and very well connected in the Barry Goldwater-Richard Kleindienst wing of the GOP, Mardian doubled the ISD staff, began exploring FBI files and making connections with other government intelligence agencies. He arranged for such security measures as arresting 13,000 antiwar demonstrators on May Day, and in remarkably short order put together the DOJ's string of unsustainable conspiracy cases against the Harrisburg Seven, Leslie Bacon, the Camden 28, Ellsberg and several others.

Mardian also made a friend at the FBI: assistant director Sullivan, a 30-year veteran who was finding it increasingly difficult to deal with Hoover and increasingly easy to ally himself with Administration attempts to ease the old man out. There was fear that Hoover was using his knowledge of the embarrassing NSC wiretaps to make sure that neither Attorney General John Mitchell nor anyone else made an overt move on him.

Photos by Wally McNamee—Newsweek

In the summer of 1971, Sullivan told Mardian that he, not Hoover, had possession of the logs, and two or three days later the Assistant Attorney General returned with what he said was authorization from Mitchell to take control of the reports himself. It was only after Sullivan resigned, in a final confrontation with Hoover, that the old G-man confirmed that his "insurance" reports were missing. By that time, FBI sources said last week, the logs had managed to wind their way through Mardian to Ehrlichman's safe and thence to the nascent White House "plumbers" operation—all in all, a textbook example of the way in which originally legal Administration activities were transmuted, step by step, into the stuff of scandal.

Nor was the White House brass content merely to traduce the FBI. As first became evident two weeks ago, upper level White House aides also prevailed on the CIA in that same summer of 1971 to outfit Hunt and Liddy with disguises, electronic equipment and cameras used in the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office in a search for his medical records. In late summer of 1971, the CIA also acceded to a White House request for a psychiatric "profile" of Ellsberg before deciding that such activities were outside the CIA's legal charter and calling a halt.

Stuck to the Tar Baby

As testimony before acting chairman Stuart Symington's Armed Services Sen. Committee made clear last week, however, the CIA was firmly stuck to the tar baby. On June 23, 1972, six days after the five GOP burglars were discovered in Democratic National Committee headquarters, Helms and deputy director Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters were summoned to Ehrlichman's office at the White House, Walters told the committee. Bob Haldeman was also there, Walters testified, and said "that the Watergate incident was causing trouble and was being exploited by the opposition." Walters was prevailed on—with Helms sitting by—to go that afternoon to acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray III and ask him to call off the FBI's recently begun investigation of "Mexican aspects of the matter," using the professional excuse that the FBI was trampling on CIA cover activities in the area.

Ruckelshaus (left), Halperin: The logs wound up in Ehrlichman's safe

The "Mexican aspects" of the case were four unreported GOP campaign checks—later traced to Gulf Resources executive Robert Allen—that had been laundered in Mexico and dispatched to Waterbuggers G. Gordon Liddy and Bernard L. Barker, who cashed them for the

telltale $100 bills that the burglars were carrying at the break-in. Walters said he delivered the White House message to Gray—who promised to honor the CIA's territorial priorities—and returned to CIA headquarters, where he discovered that the CIA had no covert activities going in Mexico that might be upset by the FBI investigation.

Walters protested as much when he was called to John Dean's White House office three days later, according to the general's Senate testimony, and Dean responded with two not terribly delicate prods. "Dean asked whether the CIA might have taken part in the Watergate episode without my knowing it," Walters told the senators. The general said he replied that this "was not possible," but Dean, persisting, "asked whether there was not some way in which the agency might have been involved." If these were attempts to remind Walters of the CIA's earlier involvement in the Ellsberg raids, however, they fell on stony ground, because Walters had not joined the agency at the time and apparently had been told nothing about them. Dean finally asked "whether I had any idea what might be done," Walters said, "and I replied that those responsible ought to be fired. He seemed disappointed."

Dean tried again the next day, Walters testified, this time making a more direct proposal. "He asked if the CIA could not furnish bail and pay the suspects' salaries while they were in jail, using covert-action funds for this purpose," Walters said. The general refused "to be a party to any such action," he said, and threatened instead to resign and to take his reasons to the President or, failing that, to the CIA "oversight committees" in Congress—which would be interested in knowing that the White

A SECRET AGENT NAMED 'TONY'

His code name was "Tony." A retired New York City cop with twenty years' experience in security and intelligence operations, he found a second career as a political undercover agent for the White House—strictly off the record. Beginning in 1969, government investigators told NEWSWEEK last week, Tony was part of a super-secret police operation: tracking a string of prominent politicians and their relatives, following up tips about their drinking problems, finances and sexual improprieties.

According to NEWSWEEK's sources, Tony—whose real name is Anthony T. Ulasewicz—was hired by Presidential Assistant John Ehrlichman and paid by President Nixon's personal attorney, Herbert Kalmbach, on orders from White House chief of staff H.R. (Bob) Haldeman. What's more, the sources suggested that Tony's operations—of a piece with the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office and the Watergate break-in—were only parts of a larger pattern of secret police activity under President Nixon. "Some of it was conducted under the guise of national security by established agencies," one investigator told NEWSWEEK's Nicholas Horrock. "Other phases were handled strictly free-lance. There is an absolute pattern of this activity throughout the Administration."

Mystery Voice: Tony's link to the White House was none other than John J. Caulfield, another former New York cop, who was named by convicted Watergate burglar James McCord last week as the man who tried to buy McCord's silence with an offer of "executive clemency." Indeed, Senate sources identified Ulasewicz as the "mystery" voice who called McCord several times to repeat the offer. In March of 1969, Ehrlichman brought Caulfield into his office to serve as liaison with various law-enforcement agencies and handle "certain discreet investigations" for him, investigators said.

Soon after, Ehrlichman reportedly ordered Caulfield to find a veteran investigator to help with the field work and Caulfield chose Ulasewicz—a buddy from the NYPD's elite Bureau of Special Services (once known as BOSSy), which protects foreign embassies and VIP's and carries out intelligence and undercover operations throughout the city. Ulasewicz, 54, a trolley-car operator before becoming a cop in 1943, had also worked a beat in Harlem and collected nine commendations.

Ehrlichman, Caulfield and Ulasewicz first met in May or June of 1969 at the



UPI

Ehrlichman: 'Discreet investigations'

American Airlines terminal of New York's La Guardia Airport, the sources said, and Ehrlichman hired Tony on the spot—on a code-name-only basis. His first assignment was reportedly a thorough investigation of Sen. Edward Kennedy's involvement in Mary Jo Kopechne's death on Chappaquiddick in 1969, with the report to be forwarded to the White House. Over the next two years, he reportedly conducted more than half a dozen field probes into all sorts of allegations, among them:

- An incident in Washington's Georgetown section that might have proved embarrassing to House Speaker Carl Albert.
- Possible financial links between Maine Sen. Edmund Muskie and corporations with significant pollution problems.
- Hubert Humphrey's campaign funds.
- Rumors that a brother of one Democratic hopeful might have been involved in a homosexual incident.
- The alleged harassment of Julie Nixon Eisenhower by a Florida schoolteacher.

In every case, said the sources, Tony's assignments came down from Ehrlichman. And in the summer of 1971, the veteran agent was ordered to begin coordinating his activities with the White House "plumbers" team then trying to plug security leaks. More political assignments followed. Ironically, one involved the suspicious activities of a man who turned out to be Donald Segretti, assigned to carry out political espionage and sabotage in Mr. Nixon's behalf, and also paid by Kalmbach.

NEWSWEEK has also learned that at least two other Nixon dirty-tricksters were imitating Segretti's tactics around that time. Government sources report that former White House aide Herbert L. (Bart) Porter has told investigators that he and Jeb S. Magruder, deputy director of the Nixon campaign, recruited operators who were code-named "Sedan Chair I" and "Sedan Chair II" and paid them thousands of dollars to disrupt Democratic primary campaigns.

But Tony's assignments were more sinister—and he was paid for them, NEWSWEEK's Stephan Lesher learned, through two bank accounts started by Kalmbach with approximately $1 million ostensibly left over from Mr. Nixon's 1968 Presidential campaign. The agent's salary and expenses continued until the fall of 1971, the sources said, and "another $30,000" was given him in March 1972 by Caulfield (who had just received some $50,000 in cash from Kalmbach). Ulasewicz and Ehrlichman were not immediately available for comment. Haldeman denied the story ("I had absolutely nothing to do with this guy"), but Kalmbach has testified that Haldeman told him to funnel money to Ulasewicz. Kalmbach insisted, however, that he did not know Tony's real mission. "Mr. Kalmbach," said his lawyer, "had no idea of the purpose at this early stage."

House was ordering the CIA to violate the law by spending agency funds within the U.S. Dean seemed "taken aback," Walters reported, but called him in again the next day to ask once more if Walters had "learned anything more about CIA involvement" and to solicit helpful ideas.

Brave Men, Brave Talk

Walters heard nothing more about Watergate for another week, but then Gray told him that the FBI could not hold up its Mexican investigation without a formal letter from Helms or Walters. Walters replied, he said, that the CIA had no reason to make such a request. Walters said he told Gray that "attempts to cover this up or to implicate the CIA or FBI would be detrimental to their integrity" and added that he "was quite prepared to resign." Gray replied, Walters said, that "he too was prepared to resign on this issue." (Gray eventually did resign, enmeshed in scandal, but not until nine months later.)

Walters' explosive account of top-level White House advances was backed up in every respect except one by Helms—but that one exception was perhaps the jackpot question. By his threat to go to the President with Dean's alleged improprieties, Walters clearly implied his belief that Mr. Nixon did not know that his aides were trying to unload the whole scandal on the CIA. Helms, summoned home from Iran to appear before three separate Congressional committees last week, apparently managed to imply just the opposite. Though no direct question was put to Helms about Presidential authorization or knowledge by any Congressional committee, chairman Lucien N. Nedzi of the House Armed Services intelligence subcommittee told newsmen that Helms "felt he was getting orders from the highest authority."

Senators Symington and Henry Jackson picked up the same feeling from Helms's testimony at their committee hearings. Again without asking the Presidential question directly, Jackson said he was satisfied that Helms and other CIA officials "had reason to believe the requests had the sanction of the President." Symington said after Helms's testimony that "it is hard for me to visualize" how Mr. Nixon could have failed to know about the cover-up. But Jackson admitted that Helms had never actually asked Ehrlichman or Haldeman if they spoke for the President ("You don't ask those questions when you're a professional and in this kind of climate") and that the senators had unearthed no evidence linking Mr. Nixon to his aides' overtures.

Though the two Democratic senators expressed a belief that Helms "behaved very well" in his handling of White House overtures, the former CIA director was clearly in trouble with angry legislators in both houses. In addition to taking Presidential authorization for granted, Helms apparently made no attempt to tell anyone of the transparently illegal advances allegedly made by Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean—in spite of the fact that Congress had established oversight committees in each branch precisely in order to safeguard the intelligence agencies from the danger of being turned by executive whim into domestic *tonton macoutes*. Helms had also assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearings last winter that the CIA had not been involved in the Watergate case.



Walters: Heavy duty

Former counsel Dean: Two prods for the CIA

Senatorial outrage was not mitigated by the senators' own laxness as watchdogs. Under intensive pressure from newsmen, Symington admitted that "our oversight committee hasn't been functioning for the last year or so" and conceded that "it would have been up to them [the CIA directors] if they didn't report it to us." Helms has testified before the Watergate grand jury and will appear before both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Ervin committee—and Washington insiders were wondering if he would survive with his ambassadorship intact.

The Senate's growing testiness over the whole Watergate scandal surfaced elsewhere in an extraordinary exchange between Maine Sen. Edmund Muskie and South Carolina Republican Strom Thurmond, one of those most irked by the CIA disclosures. The arena this time was a joint committee hearing in which Daniel Ellsberg was testifying on executive branch secrecy. As Ellsberg persistently injected comments on Watergate, Cambodia and other matters that Thurmond regarded as off the subject—twice saying that he believed President Nixon was guilty of wrongdoing in Watergate—Thurmond got progressively angrier. And when Ellsberg concluded that J. Fred Buzhardt—a Thurmond protégé and Mr. Nixon's super-clean new White House Watergate counsel—had lied under oath at Ellsberg's trial, Thurmond retorted furiously that Ellsberg had got off the hook in Los Angeles only because government misconduct had made the case unprosecutable.

Unfit to Be President?

"His innocence is established," Muskie replied tartly, "until a court decides otherwise." The colloquy went back and forth—Thurmond arguing that Ellsberg had not been found innocent, Muskie that he was innocent in the absence of a conviction—until Thurmond exploded at Muskie: "You brought him here today to criticize the President of the United States. I'm surprised at you, a Presidential candidate. You're not fit to be a Presidential candidate."

The gasps that followed that exchange promise to be echoed again and again as the congressmen, in their several inquiries, circle closer to what Representative Nedzi called "the $64 question"—the President's own possible involvement. Not much else is left. Last week's disclosures not only solidified the case against three of the President's most powerful advisers and further tarnished the image of the National Security Council, FBI and CIA, but it also called into paradoxical question the White House's well-trumpeted concern for national security. It was in the name of national security, after all, that the antecedents of Watergate were born—yet when the crunch came, the White House seemed instantly ready to compromise the agencies most responsible for safeguarding that security.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MAY 20, 1973

'Supersecret' Work of C.I.A. Is Scored

By PAUL MONTGOMERY

Two leading scholars in the field of national security said yesterday that the "supersecret" operations mechanism of the Central Intelligence Agency had become a self-serving and uncontrolled danger to United States foreign policy and should be abolished by Congress.

A paper was presented at a conference on government secrecy here by the scholars, Morton H. Halperin of the Brookings Institution and Jeremy J. Stone of the Federation of American Scientists. It described the working of the mechanism for covert political action in foreign countries and indicated the ways in which they said it distorted public policy.

Mr. Halperin, a former Defense Department and White House staff member, told his audience at the New York University Law School that the paper was based on public records rather than inside knowledge. He said that when he was in the Government, he did not have the security clearance necessary to participate in official discussions of covert operations.

Members of Committee

The paper said that approval of covert operations, which could include rigging elections in Chile or supporting an invasion of Cuba or conducting a secret war in Laos, came from a committee whose existence had never been publicly announced by the Government—the Forty Committee.

The membership of the committee, according to the paper, is the assistant to the President for national security affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of State for political affairs and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Halperin and Mr. Stone said that each member was served by a staff that operated independently of the department to which he was assigned. The operatives for the covert plots, the paper said, come from the C.I.A.'s Plans Directorate, whose administration is at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., and which maintains staff members overseas, usually with embassy cover.

All participants, the paper said, have a security clearance far above "top secret" whose existence is itself a classified matter that cannot be discussed by insiders.

The paper says that originally the Forty Committee was created to carry out assignments from the National Security Council. However, it said, since there is now such an extensive "plans" establishment, the establishment itself generates proposals. Since secrecy is so intense, the budgets of operations do not come under the usual scrunity.

Separate Meetings

The paper says that many situations arise in which policymakers with high security clearance hold meetings to discuss options open to the United States in a given country. The "dirty tricks" operatives, however, with even higher clearance, meet separately to discuss a whole range of options unknown to the others.

The consequence, the paper says, is that assessments by the State Department, Congress, th executive, the public and even the overt intelligence-gathering arm of the C.I.A. are distorted because they are not privy to the covert operations.

After an election in a given country, for example, the State Department might decide that a certain trend was developing and base its policy on that trend, when in fact a covert operation might have rigged the election.

The "supersecret" clearance required also tends to limit participation in covert decisions to those who support them and earn their living by them, the paper says. "The lack of vigorous dissent, so common in other proposals of a controversial nature, tends to lead to routine approval," the authors say.

New Policy Trends

The paper contends that the covert operations mechanism was not authorized in the intent of the legislation creating the C.I.A.

It also argues that covert interference in the internal affairs of other countries has been made unnecessary by recent foreign policy trends toward "disengagement" with the Communist nations. The only likely targets, it says, are Third World countries—"an area with which we are not at war, and from which we are not in danger."

The authors urge the abolition of the entire covert-operations apparatus. The intelligence-gathering activities of the C.I.A. and the National Security Agency could then be made almost entirely public, and their plans and budgets scrutinized by Congress like those of other Government agencies, the paper states.

The two-day conference on Government secrecy, which ended yesterday, was sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice and the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program at New York University.

CROSBY S. NOYES

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, May 17, 1973

Why Nixon Can Be Expected to Resign

We are talking about legalities — about a sense of fair play — about the awesome trauma that might be involved in the deposition of a president. We are talking, in short, about what may happen and studiously evading the implications of what already has happened.

The central issue of the Watergate affair — which now, of course, includes the Ellsberg and Vesco affairs — it seems to me, is the issue of the abuse of presidential authority. And on the basis of what is now undisputed public knowledge, there can be no doubt that the abuses were many and flagrant.

From the outset of this administration, the issue of presidential authority has been one of strenuous contention between the White House and the Congress, mostly relating to the war-making powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the use of armed forces in the Indochina conflict. Watergate has abruptly transferred the issue to the domestic scene.

The inherent advantages of an incumbent president at election time have always been recognized and conceded. Regardless of campaign finances, no one else has the same power to mobilize public opinion or to manipulate events at home and abroad to his political advantage.

What has not been recognized or conceded — until now — is that an incumbent president faced with an election can assert his powers as commander-in-chief to mobilize the apparatus of the federal government in his own behalf. That this was done in the last election — with or without the President's personal knowledge and consent — is beyond doubt.

To a degree that is yet to be fully established, the Justice Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department — to say nothing of the White House itself — have all become implicated in the skulduggery engineered by the men already tried and convicted for the Watergate break-in. And in each case it is abundantly clear that the officials involved believed that they were acting in accordance with the wishes — if not on the direct orders — of the President himself.

Take, just for one example, the case of Gen. Robert H. Cushman Jr., the former deputy director of CIA and now commandant of the Marine Corps. Cushman, by his own admission, never doubted for a minute that White House aide John D. Ehrlichman was speaking for the President when Ehrlichman asked him to place the facilities of the CIA at the disposal of E. Howard Hunt Jr., later convicted in the Watergate conspiracy.

As the result of this request, the CIA provided Hunt with a variety of exotic spy equipment, including voice-modifiers, cameras, wigs and hidden tape recorders used in burglarizing the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in September 1971. It was not until considerably later, Cushman says, that he became suspicious of Hunt and called off the deal.

The implications of this incident are frightening. Regardless of who may have been at fault, the fact that the CIA was put to use by the likes of E. Howard Hunt — on the orders of the man who now runs the Marine Corps — reflects a corruption at the top levels of command in this country that is quite simply intolerable. It is small comfort to be assured by Sen. John L. McClellan, D-Ark., that he doesn't think Cushman "would do it again."

It has been pointed out that I have supported the policies of Richard Nixon — which have been, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, a modification of the policies of Lyndon Johnson, John Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower — with some enthusiasm and consistency.

I still do. If this administration could be judged entirely — or even primarily — on its diplomatic performance — on the skill with which it has extricated us from our involvement in Vietnam — on the way it has exploited our influence with adversaries and friends in the interest of world peace — Nixon, in my book, deserves a large measure of gratitude and applause.

But the President of the United States cannot be judged or exonerated by one aspect of his leadership, no matter how important. The dimensions of his power forbid categorically any gross abuse of that power, at the risk of enormous danger to the nation. It is impossible to deny that this has happened.

Innocent as the President himself may be, his administration has been discredited as no administration within my recollection by the Watergate disclosures. Talk of protecting the "rights of the defendant" as against the "rights of the government" is absurd in a situation where the executive is itself the defendant.

The measure of acceptability of all presidential appointments at this point — including notably the "special prosecutor" — is how independent they will be of executive direction — in short, how relentless they will be in "getting to the bottom" of this tragic affair — which, of course, really means getting to the top.

Quite properly, the President has assumed full responsibility for the appalling abuses of the public trust that were committed by his people in his name. It is no longer a question of proving foreknowledge, complicity or criminality of any kind. No matter how fair-minded the American people may be, they will not suffer a leadership that has betrayed and humiliated them. I for one am convinced that when Nixon realizes the extent to which his authority has been shattered by these events, he will resign.

e Exit

ars that he spent build-
ureau of Investigation,
skillfully made it a na-
t, seemingly as solid as
mid. In the year since
the FBI has been so ri-
weaknesses and strife as
-gate that it more close-
disintegrating piece of
ands. Several of its top
o retire in the next four
eau's vaunted *esprit de*
s, and the morale of its
been shattered.

fear that their proudly
ency has become, at
lic eye, a mere tool of
e. They privately assert
after the disclosure
ped the phones of some
ficials and newsmen for
use—many Americans
BI as a potential threat

faults, Hoover kept the
the quadrennial quakes
itics. He played politics
Republicans and Dem-
ain the independence of
agents knew this and re-
ch they benefited from
could not stomach some
tocratic actions got out
they did not talk. Only
s was there a split in the
pro-Hoover and anti-
ns, and this was scarcely
outside.

ast week W. Mark Felt,
g associate director, an-
tention to retire June 22.
lo. 2 man in the FBI since
th the temporary, pinch-
William D. Ruckelshaus
st all his time to prob-
Watergate, Felt has been
ow. Only 59, Felt could
for eleven more years.
ion follows closely on re-
uncements by two of the twelve assistant FBI directors: Leonard M. Walters, 54, chief of the inspection division, and William B. Soyars, 50, head of the computer-systems division. Together with the retirement of Assistant Director Dwight Dalby a few months ago, this rush for the exit will leave vacant four of the 13 top posts in the bureau. By a quirk of the FBI retirement law, the three leaving next month will collect an extra cost-of-living retirement bonus, but that is not the main reason for their quitting.

"Those guys are plainly fed up," said a colleague in the command echelon, adding: "I'm fed up, too, but I'm going to stick around for a while. We feel that the President almost wrecked the bureau with the appointment of L. Patrick Gray as director. Then after Gray was forced out, we were insulted by the President's refusal to look for a new director within the bureau."

On April 30, all of the FBI's top brass in Washington and all but one of its 59 field-office chiefs sent a telegram drafted by Walters asking Nixon to pick one of the FBI veterans—"among whom there is an inherent nonpartisanship" —as the new chief. Instead, he made the interim choice of Ruckelshaus, who had been the able head of the Environmental Protection Agency, without even bothering to inform Felt, who learned of the appointment from a reporter. The telegram elicited no response.

Bum Rap. "Ruckelshaus may be a fine, independent fellow," said a high FBI man, "but he's only holding the job until the President picks a permanent director. After our bitter experience with Gray, any appointee from outside the bureau will have trouble winning the acceptance of the agents."

The FBI's Washington headquarters is demoralized. Said a senior field agent: "There's very little leadership. Decision making? Forget it. There's a vacuum. The decisions are being made now in the field offices. If you phone Washington with a problem, more often than not headquarters will say: 'Don't bother us with your problems—we've got our own.' "

The agents feel that the entire FBI took a "bum rap" because of blunders by Gray and the Department of Justice in the Watergate investigation. Almost to a man, agents argue that Nixon is trying to gain control of the agency for his own purposes and to "politicize" it. Echoing a common sentiment, one high-ranking agent says: "Nobody wants to work for a political hack." And, he adds, the retirements will grow to a mass exodus if the President picks another political appointee to head the bureau.

ELSHAUS, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE FBI



THE CIA

Operating at Home

By law, the Central Intelligence Agency is prohibited from doing any spying or other internal security work. But the Watergate scandal has raised doubts about whether the agency is following the rules.

From the beginning, the CIA has had links to the case. Two of the convicted conspirators, James McCord and E. Howard Hunt, are former employees of the agency. The CIA admitted supplying Hunt with equipment—including false identification papers, a camera and a disguise kit—used in burglarizing the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Last week the CIA deputy director, Lieut. General Vernon Walters, said that White House aides had persistently, though unsuccessfully, tried to enlist the agency's help in covering up the Watergate break-in.

On other occasions, the CIA has been exposed as operating within the U.S. In the late 1950s, according to David Wise's book, *The Politics of Lying,* the CIA trained Tibetans in Colorado's Rocky Mountains to fight against Chinese Communist rule. At the same time agency men were preparing Cubans for the Bay of Pigs invasion.

For 15 years, until exposed in 1967, the CIA subsidized the National Student Association so that it could send delegations to international gatherings that were well attended by official Communist groups. During some of those years, the agency also had been secretly giving funds to other private organizations —among them, the Asia Foundation, Radio Free Europe and Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. The intent was to finance work abroad that would enhance democracy's image, such as cultural projects, helping to organize agricultural cooperatives, and anti-Communist propaganda.

In February the agency admitted that it had trained policemen from nine U.S. cities and counties, including New York, in clandestine photography, identification of explosive devices and analysis of intelligence data. The purpose was to improve police ability to fight crime.

Then there was the curious case in 1960 of the gangster's girl friend. Un-

der a deal that was never fully explained, the CIA got information about Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba from Sam ("Momo") Giancana, then boss of the Chicago Mafia. Momo's girl friend was Phyllis McGuire of the singing sisters, and he wanted to chase off a rival, a well-known comedian. Sam's strategy was to convince Phyllis that the rival was a philanderer. The comedian returned to his Las Vegas hotel suite one night to discover two private detectives digging through his belongings. At his call, sheriff's deputies arrested the pair, and they languished in jail for days before disclosing that they were working for a Miami detective agency. Three years later, some embarrassed CIA officials admitted that they had staged the raid as a favor to their gangland spook Giancana.

Supporters argue persuasively that the agency sometimes has to act on home ground to counter Communists and other subversives, who have much latitude for operating within the U.S.'s free society. Still, one of the consequences of Watergate will be rising demands by Congress that it get greater powers to police the CIA.

The Ways and Means of Bugging

In Chicago, ex-Cop Eddie Bray, who heads a private detective agency called American Security Agents, Inc., reports that there has been a 100% increase in one lucrative phase of his operations —"debugging," the detection of hidden devices used to eavesdrop. In New York, John Meyner, president of Sonic Devices, Inc., which also peddles "bug"-finding skills, says he cannot drive through downtown Manhattan without picking up a flood of illegal eavesdropping signals on his sensitive detectors. Just four blocks from the White House, an electronics store named the Spy Shop is doing a thriving business selling both eavesdropping and debugging equipment.

Has the ear of Big Brother become omnipresent in the U.S.? The disclosures of extensive eavesdropping in the Watergate and Pentagon papers cases suggest that it has.

The Nixon Administration, helped into power by its pledge to restore law-and-order, has never made any secret about its intention to use the bug as an anticrime weapon. Former Attorney General John Mitchell justified this policy by saying: "Any citizen of this United States who is not involved in some illegal activity has nothing to fear whatsoever." That would have been scant reassurance for the Congressmen, journalists, FCC employees, campus radicals, black nationalists—and even White House aides—who have been subject to Government wiretaps. Most had engaged in no illegal activity.

The legal authority for Government eavesdropping is murky. As long ago as 1928, in the first wiretapping case to reach the Supreme Court, Justice Louis Brandeis declared that the right to be let alone is "the right most valued by civilized men." His was a minority view, however, and despite the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure, the majority held that tapping telephone wires leading into a house was not in itself a breach of the premises or a violation of the owner's privacy.

■

It was not until the '60s that it abandoned the technical, legalistic view of privacy and held that the Fourth Amendment does indeed protect the citizen from wiretapping. In response, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the first federal statute legalizing electronic eavesdropping in investigations of such crimes as treason, robbery, murder as well as bribery and narcotics trafficking—provided that the Government first obtains a court warrant. Since then, local versions of the federal law have been passed in 21 states.

Still, the Federal Government has continued to do some of its bugging without a judge's permission, claiming authority for the taps under the President's oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" against foreign and domestic enemies. This was the interpretation of the law that allowed the phones of Henry Kissinger's aides to be tapped. Last June, however, in an 8-to-0 decision, the Supreme Court held that such taps could not be used against purely domestic political "suspects" without a warrant.

Under provisions of the 1968 act, ordinary citizens, including private detectives, cannot use bugging devices The penalty: a fine of $10,000 and/or five years in prison. Nonetheless, the accessibility of new and hard-to-detect eavesdropping gadgetry has encouraged an increasing number of citizens to violate the law. As a result of the miniaturization of modern solid-state electronic equipment, tiny pea-pod-size microphones, transmitters no bigger than a package of cigarettes and other sophisticated gear are available over the counter in ordinary radio stores at prices ranging from a few dollars to thousands. They can readily be adapted for spying and implanted in walls, flowerpots and draperies.

What is surprising about Watergate is that, despite fine equipment, the Republican operatives used such sloppy techniques; they broke into the office of the Democratic National Committee and planted two electronic bugs, consisting of tiny microphones and transmitters that could broadcast a distance of several hundred yards. They hid one in the ceiling, but it failed. The other, intended for Democratic Chairman Lawrence O'Brien's phone, was inadvertently planted in an aide's phone. It was when they returned three weeks later to repair the foul-up and also to take some photographs that they were caught.

According to Columbia University Professor Alan Westin, author of *Privacy and Freedom*, they could have done a better job without risking entry. One possibility: directional parabolic microphones (like those used by television at sports events) that could have picked up whispers in the Democratic committee rooms from the Howard Johnson's listening post across the street. If the sliding glass door to the terrace was closed, the operatives could conceivably have bounced a laser beam off the glass. Since the pane vibrates from the talk in the room, the reflected laser light would have been "imprinted" with this conversation.



DEMOCRATIC OFFICIAL INSPECTS BUG PLANTED IN HIS WATERGATE PHONE (LEFT); TRANSMITTER IN FAKE FLOWERPOT (ABOVE); RECEIVER USED BY WATERGATE BUGGERS (ABOVE RIGHT)

'Dirty Tricks' Have Had a Long History

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

The techniques of Watergate—burglary, electronic surveillance, laundered money, "plausible denial"—have had a long history in the intelligence craft.

They are the so-called "dirty tricks" that for years have been the province of the Central Intelligence Agency and its foreign counterparts, tricks refined through nearly 30 years of a "cold war." In the United States, a mysterious group known as the Forty Committee has the last word, or sometimes the next-to-last word, about giving the green light to any specific operations.

Its role is clearly defined: to consider and approve covert activities in foreign countries in a manner that would be "disavowable" or "deniable" by the United States—or at least by the President of the United States.

Currently its designated members are Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security adviser who serves as chairman; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr.; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Porter; acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William E. Colby, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer. The head of the joint chiefs is an addition made during the Nixon administration. The Attorney General was also added while John N. Mitchell held the job.

In the years of its existence under five Presidents, the committee, which has been known by a variety of names, dealt with such activities as the 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, the 1953 coup in Iran that overthrew Premier Mossadegh, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, the "laundered" funding of friendly political parties in Europe

See TRICKS, A9, Col. 1

HS/HC-950

The Forty Committee: Holding

TRICKS, From A1

and Latin America, the U-2 reconnaissance flights over China and the Soviet Union, and the mounting armies of Meo tribesmen and Thai "volunteers" in Laos.

"The committee was the President's surrogate," said one official familiar with national security operations. "The whole idea was to allow the President 'plausible denial' . . . It protected the President." The President never signed any papers so there was never any evidence on the record that he either had knowledge of or approved any of the covert operations undertaken, informed sources said.

Witnesses from the various government agencies were often brought before the handful of top officials to explain particular operations. Said one experienced official: "They were like a bunch of schoolboys. They would listen and their eyes would bug out. I always used to say that I could get $5 million out of the Forty Committee for a covert operation faster than I could get money for a typewriter out of the ordinary bureaucracy."

Another said that the committee was the most efficient in town. There were no "horse holders," no "colonels turning charts." Decisions came quickly, he said.

The core group had from the beginning been four officials who dealt exclusively with foreign affairs and who were just under the top—the national security adviser, the deputy secretary of defense, the under secretary for political affairs in the State Department and the director of Central Intelligence. The head of the joint chiefs was specifically excluded, according to one informed source, because political rather than military considerations were the subject of the committee's deliberations.

The Attorney General was specifically excluded because his concerns were supposed to be exclusively domestic. During the Kennedy administration Robert F. Kennedy is said by a number of sources to have sought membership but was refused.

For this reason the Mitchell appointment to this and other highly secret committees, such as the verification panel for arms control, raised serious concerns in the intelligence community about the "mixing up" of domestic and foreign matters.

Invited Confusion

Mitchell, in the view of those familiar with the operation, was there because of his close relationship with the President. As the only Cabinet officer on the committee, he became its ranking member although the national security adviser continued as chairman.

To those who saw the committee in operation, "Mitchell served as the President's eyes and ears." When Richard Kleindienst succeeded Mitchell at the Justice Department, he did not move into the slot created for the Attorney General on the Forty Committee.

In the words of Thomas L. Hughes, former director of intelligence and research at the State Department, "the Mitchell appointment was an early and symbolic act, either of carelessness or purposefulness, which inevitably invited confusion and temptation for a partisan past and future campaign manager currently holding the office of Attorney General."

Hughes said the committee "was originally set up carefully and exclusively as a small and responsible group limited to those people at the highest levels below the President whose official responsibilities were clearly in the foreign affairs area, to consider and propose foreign operations."

In the view of one source familiar with national security operations, clandestine matters—which were supposed to be examined from the long-range foreign policy point of view and from the national security point of view—imperceptibly became a question of whether they would get this administration into trouble. The question became to be whether immediate domestic implications would be too great.

Variety of Names

Throughout its history, by whatever designation it had, the Forty Committee was to fulfill one overriding function: to assert political control of covert operations. The committee was to consider the wisdom of any proposed activity, its chances of success, whether it would accomplish the purposes desired and whether it was "moral," "proper" and in the interests of the United States. In the words of one person familiar with its operations: "This was an arm for the furtherance of American foreign relations."

But the existence of the committee itself was a subject of 'plausible denial.' In its first incarnation it was known as the 10/2 or 10/5 Committee, named after the documents creating it. Under President Eisenhower the name changed to the 54/12 Group, again named after the secret order establishing its role — "54" referring to the year of the order. It was also known at that time as the "Special Group." When someone inadvertently acknowledged the existence of the group, it was renamed the 303 Committee.

Thus if someone asked whether there was such a thing as the 54/12 Committee the answer could be, in truth, no. For by that time it was the 303 Committee, now named for the room in which it met.

The most recent christening — the Forty Committee — is derived from a national security decision memorandum redefining its duties, according to Morton H. Halperin, former member of the National Security Council Staff, and Jeremy J. Stone of the Federation of American Scientists.

During the Kennedy administration, covert operations were also under the control of a parallel secret committee with far more limited responsibilities. This was the counterinsurgency committee.

Sources familiar with national security operations at the time recall that the President's brother, Robert, then Attorney General, was fascinated by the covert operation being run by the

...the U.S. Bag of 'Dirty Tricks'

CIA. He fervently wished to get on the 303 Committee, forerunner of the Forty Committee.

This was vetoed, apparently by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who was brought into the White House after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. As a substitute, Taylor agreed to place Robert Kennedy on the counterinsurgency committee. Once this group started operating, a certain number of cases that might have gone to the Forty Committee (then the 303 Committee) went to the counterinsurgency section.

Weekly Meetings

At least since the Kennedy administration, there has grown an active debate over the propriety of any such covert operations perpetrated by an open society. The agruments in opposition have grown stronger during the current proclaimed era of negotiation and the warming of relations among former Cold War rivals.

In the Truman and early Eisenhower years, when the Forty Committee was known as the 10/2 or 10/5 Committee, meetings were irregular. Then, according to authoritative sources familiar with the operations, President Eisenhower decided that covert operations needed a closer look.

He ordered once-a-week meetings. There was no official chairman but Allen Dulles, then head of the CIA, pretty much controlled the sessions which met in the office of the under secretary of State.

The meetings were said to be rather formal, with an agenda and well prepared staff papers. Few outsiders knew what it was doing, but occasionally witnesses were brought into present specific projects. By most accounts, the committee itself was empowered to consider and approve operations. Only in cases of disagreement was a specific project brought to the President.

But at all times the committee operated under the President's overall policy determination. Authoritative sources say that it was chiefly when Dean Acheson was Secretary of State that specifics were brought to the Oval Office, because of Acheson's frequent reservations.

"In its pristine days," according to one knowledgeable source, "the theory was that things were thrashed out here so that all departments understood each other." Often the committee's report went to the National Security Council with the President attending, said this source. "It was here that one of the Cabinet members might register the dissent of his agency if such dissent existed."

Fewer Meetings

Because of the secrecy surrounding the very existence of the committee, it is difficult to give an accounting of its more recent functions. From recent Senate testimony it is known that the subject of "participation" in the 1970 Chile elections was one concern of the Forty Committee. That election brought Salvador Allende, a Marxist, to power in Santiago.

Informed sources say, however, that during the Nixon administration there were fewer and fewer formal meetings of the Forty Committee and more and more "telephonic concurrences" — involving quick checks rather than intensive discussions.

One possible reason for the slackening number of meetings could be that the number of covert operations has diminished, but some sources attribute it to a more ad hoc style and a greater than ever dedication to secrecy.

One source said there has not been a formal meeting of the group for more than a year—although it is always possible that some who formerly knew about the committee have been cut out as the White House became more secretive. "There grew up a narrow, incestuous secretive quality among the advisers to the President," said one source. "The old formality used to make this impossible."

Domestic implications became an increasingly important consideration, according to one official who noted that the Forty Committee was only one of a number of similar groups with virtually the same membership. For example, this source noted, the issue of arms to Israel might come to the Defense Programs Review Committee where domestic political implications in the United States might weigh in the considerations.

One official who occasionally had appeared before any White House committees which Mitchell attended spoke of the changed atmosphere during the Nixon administration.

"I never felt comfortable being there when Mitchell was there. I felt his presence caused the members to speak in a very guarded way, not saying what they really thought of foreign political risks for fear they would show themselves not mindful enough of the impact on this administration. He was the administration's presence, not the U.S. government . . .

"There was no real intellectual discussion . . . This was a travesty of serious governmental operations . . . There was inadequate staff work, secretiveness, narrow-based decisions. There was always an intense effort to make the President look good as the main consideration."

By their very nature, covert operations, if successful, become known only after the fact if at all. Sometimes it takes years, sometimes only months—as the domestic covert operations known under the heading of Watergate show.

Thus what, if anything, the Forty Committee or its successor by another name may be considering now is known to only a few men. Of greater interest for the moment is whether there was a domestic equivalent of the Forty Committee dealing with covert operations in this country, and if there was who was on it.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, May 16, 1973

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Keeping the Burglars Out

By FRANK GETLEIN

Perhaps prematurely, everybody has been drawing moral lessons from the conspiracy, burglary and corruption of the American political process summed up in the name Watergate.

The Rev. Billy Graham, for example, thinks the Watergate crimes show the need for a great spiritual revival in America. This is understandable from a professional point of view, Dr. Graham being the nation's leading spiritual revivalist, but a more realistic analysis would find just the opposite to be the Watergate lesson. The burglars and other criminals were acting on behalf of and apparently also on the instructions of the most self-consciously holy, spiritually revived, prayer-breakfasting, God-invoking White House gang since "Lemonade Lucy" Harrison had the temperance ladies in.

★

If Watergate is where godliness has led the holy clowns from the White House, this country may not be able to afford a spiritual revival.

President Nixon seems to have drawn several other moral lessons: Pay more attention to what people are doing in your name; fire people you are deeply convinced are innocent of wrongdoing, and, above all, no doubt, don't hire a counsel who isn't willing to be a scapegoat.

For their part, the Democrats must have learned a lesson they ought to have learned a long time ago: When you are running against Richard M. Nixon, keep your back to the wall and your hand on your wallet. No one would suggest the President of the United States is a bandit, but he does seem to inspire an excess of zeal in those devoted to his cause.

Jerry Voorhis and Helen Gahagan Douglas were but the first in a long line of political corpses found floating with the knives in their backs inscribed "RMN." The latest victims of that zeal seem to be Sens. Muskie, Humphrey and Jackson, done in by forgeries in Florida, false and embarrassing phone calls and letters, bogus orders for large quantities of food, drink and flowers, and, of course, the familiar zealous acts of breaking and entering and burglarizing files.

For the rest of us, the lessons cannot really be drawn until all the returns are in, but one fundamental necessity seems clear even this early: We have got, somehow, to get the CIA the hell out of our domestic politics.

★

The agency has, of course, denied that it had anything to do with the cameras, the red wigs, the bugging apparatus and so on that burglar and ex-CIA agent E. Howard Hunt Jr. has testified he got from the agency in an agency outpost, a "safe house" maintained for just such purposes.

But even on the record as already established, the CIA gave us Hunt, McCord and most of their mob from Miami, alumni, with one exception, not only of the agency but of its finest hour, the Bay of Pigs blow for freedom by surreptitious invasion of a sovereign country.

★

The theory of late 20th century government seems to be that we have to have people like Hunt and McCord on the government payroll to save us from the dread Commies.

Fair enough. At the moment, however, a more urgent problem is how to save the Republic from Hunt and McCord and perhaps from the CIA at large.

The very least we can expect is a law preventing graduates of the CIA, like Hunt and McCord, from engaging in political activity for a period of years, particularly from accepting employment or contracts from outfits like the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

If retired spooks want to run for public office themselves, that's fine: There are many constituencies that from time to time feel the need for a trained burglar as their man in Congress or the city hall. Also, their opponents are fairly warned and can hire their own free-enterprise burglars to protect them.

But to have government-trained burglars in the White House as political consultants is now untenable and must be stopped by statute.

United Press International

Former CIA Director Richard Helms arrives to testify before a Senate subcommittee.

Nixon Name Used To Pressure CIA

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Staff Writer

Several high White House aides invoked the name of President Nixon when they asked the Central Intelligence Agency to help cover up the Watergate scandal and assist key conspirators, Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) disclosed yesterday.

Helms, who is now ambassador to Iran, emerged from the hearing room with his jaw tightly clenched and bored through a crowd of newsmen to a waiting car without making a comment about the first of at least three scheduled appearances before [illegible]

United Press International

Former CIA Director Richard Helms arrives to testify before a Senate subcommittee.

Nixon Name Used To Pressure CIA

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Staff Writer

Several high White House aides invoked the name of President Nixon when they asked the Central Intelligence Agency to help cover up the Watergate scandal and assist key conspirators, Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) disclosed yesterday.

For that reason, McClellan said, Richard M. Helms, who was then CIA director, and other intelligence officials did not inform either Congress or the President about the requests.

McClellan said they "wanted to go as far as they could to accommodate the President" because the requests had come from such high offices of the Executive Branch.

"Some things went too far and they put a stop to it," McClellan said after listening to three hours of testimony by Helms in a closed Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing.

Helms, who is now ambassador to Iran, emerged from the hearing room with his jaw tightly clenched and bored through a crowd of newsmen to a waiting car without making a comment about the first of at least three scheduled appearances before Watergate-related investigating panels.

But McClellan later reviewed Helms' testimony, and then angrily accused the White House of violating the National Security Act by trying to pressure the CIA into covering up financial manipulations connected with Watergate.

Referring to the 1947 act that prohibits the CIA from domestic intelligence work, McClellan said, "I'm satisfied the CIA made a mistake. I'm satisfied that the CIA was imposed upon."

McClellan also implicitly criticized Helms for his silence over a two-year pe-

See HELMS, A20, Col. 1

Aides Invoked Nixon's Name

HELMS, From A1

riod, saying that when it became obvious "a cloud was being passed over the agency" the former CIA director had an opportunity to complain about the pressures brought to bear by the White House.

But he reserved his most stinging criticism for former presidential aides H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III, calling their actions "beyond impropriety."

Two major White House requests of the CIA to assist in apparent conspiracies were met, McClellan said, and a third was refused. Only one of the three requests, he said, was personally approved by Helms, and that was done "reluctantly."

"Mr. Helms and his assistants were seriously imposed upon and they undertook to mitigate those impositions by doing as little as they could, and finally they did refuse," McClellan said.

The first CIA involvement with Watergate figures, McClellan quoted Helms as testifying, occurred when the agency provided E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy with disguises, burglary tools and electronic surveillance equipment that were used to break into the offices of Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

McClellan said Helms did not know the equipment had been provided—at Ehrlichman's request—until "sometime later, when Hunt began making more requests for CIA assistance.

Helms, according to McClellan, ordered former Deputy CIA Director Gen. Robert E. Cushman to stop providing equipment to Hunt.

McClellan said the next request came when David L. Young, a National Security Council staff member, asked the CIA for a psychological profile on Ellsberg.

Helms "reluctantly went along" with that request, McClellan said, even though he "didn't think it was quite proper by reason of the source."

Former presidential aide Egil Krogh Jr. has said in a sworn statement that the profile provided no useful information to a special White House security squad called "the plumbers," and for that reason the burglary of the psychiatrist's office was planned by Hunt and Liddy.

The third White House attempt to involve the CIA in the Watergate scandal was made last June 23 by Haldeman to Helms and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, McClellan said.

McClellan said Helms testified that Haldeman "suggested to him that Gen. Walters go to see the director of the FBI and ask them to call off the investigation into the Mexican money journey."

He was referring to the $100,000 check that was "laundered" through a Mexico City bank, proceeds of which ended up in the safe of Nixon fund-raiser Maurice H. Stans. The money figured in bankrolling the Watergate break-in and other political espionage operations of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Walters testified before another Senate subcommittee on Monday that he told

in Pressuring CIA

Dean three days later that he would resign if ordered by the White House to compromise the CIA in the Watergate case.

McClellan said yesterday that it was Helms who ordered Walters not to get involved in asking Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to cover up the probe. McClellan said Helms was convinced that the FBI investigation of the Mexican connection would not interfere with the CIA's operatives in Mexico, which he said had been suggested by Haldeman.

McClellan and Sen. Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb.) repeatedly emphasized Helm's reluctance to become involved in a Watergate cover-up. Another subcommittee member, Sen. John Pastore (D-R.I.), described Helms as "quite hurt that his reputation has been tainted after 40 years (of government service)."

However, when asked why Helms did not take his concerns to President Nixon while his agency was allegedly being pressured by Haldeman and Ehrlichman, McClellan said:

"He remained silent ... He didn't feel that he was called on to go to the President. He didn't want the CIA involved."

When reminded that in at least three confirmation appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last January and February Helms flatly denied any CIA involvement in Watergate, McClellan said, "He did not relate this to the Watergate."

Hruska chided reporters for attaching the "Watergate" label to every allegation of White House misfeasance. He claimed that at the time of the confirmation hearings Helms did not connect the requests made to the CIA to the break-in at Democratic National Headquarters.

McClellan conceded that he "didn't intend to put (Helms) through the grill" during the hearing. He said that he and other subcommittee members had little time to prepare questions and that Helms was testifying mostly from memory.

However, McClellan said he probably will seek more testimony from Helms at a future date. He said he also planned to seek testimony from Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Young.

Helms, meanwhile, is scheduled to testify at 10 a.m. today before the Senate Armed Services Committee and sometime later before a federal grand jury here and the Senate Select Subcommittee investigating the Watergate scandal.

121st Year. No. 136

x WASHINGTON, D.C., WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1973 —88 PAGES

Nixon OKd Wiretaps

Helms Faces Probers

CIA Watergate Role Probed

BY OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms became the focus of scrutiny in the Watergate case today in the wake of disclosures of persistent White House efforts to use the Central Intelligence Agency to cover up administration responsibility.

Testimony disclosed by the Senate Armed Services Committee has put it on record that Helms knew as early as June 23, 1972 — six days after the Watergate break-in — that White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman tried to order CIA interference with an FBI investigation related to the case.

The testimony by Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the CIA deputy director under Helms who still is in that post, gave no indication that Helms ever tried to communicate any misgivings to President Nixon, despite his knowledge of what White House aides were doing. However, the testimony did indicate that CIA officials did not give in to the pressure.

It was disclosed in testimony before the special Senate Watergate committee last week that acting FBI director L. Patrick

See CIA, Page A-6

Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0

CIA Watergate Role Probed

BY OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms became the focus of scrutiny in the Watergate case today in the wake of disclosures of persistent White House efforts to use the Central Intelligence Agency to cover up administration responsibility.

Testimony disclosed by the Senate Armed Services Committee has put it on record that Helms knew as early as June 23, 1972 — six days after the Watergate break-in — that White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman tried to order CIA interference with an FBI investigation related to the case.

The testimony by Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the CIA deputy director under Helms who still is in that post, gave no indication that Helms ever tried to communicate any misgivings to President Nixon, despite his knowledge of what White House aides were doing. However, the testimony did indicate that CIA officials did not give in to the pressure.

It was disclosed in testimony before the special Senate Watergate committee last week that acting FBI director L. Patrick

See CIA, Page A-6

—Associated Press

Former CIA Director Richard Helms be-

CIA: Role in Watergate Probed

Continued From Page A-1

Gray III, the man the CIA was expressly ordered by Haldeman and Ehrlichman to warn off the scent, tried to inform Nixon last July 6 that something was wrong.

ACCORDING TO the Walters account, it was only that day that Gray learned that the CIA had been dragged by the White House team into an effort to block an FBI investigation of Republican campaign funds that were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank en route to the bank account of one of the Watergate conspirators.

Helms, who according to the Walters account had been aware of such White House maneuvers for more than a week before Gray found them out, testified today before two congressional committees probing CIA complicity in White House-directed operations, intelligence subcommittees of the Senate Appropriations and the House Armed Services committees. Helms is scheduled to face the full Senate Armed Services Committee tomorrow.

AS CIA CHIEF, Helms, unlike Gray, was directly responsible to the President. Nevertheless, acting Armed Services Committee Chairman Stuart Symington, D-Mo. sought during a news conference yesterday to exonerate Helms and all other CIA officials of wrongdoing or even official laxity.

Citing the "facts of life in Washington," Symington offered this explanation: "When the President's staff tells you to do something, you naturally feel that you know what you should do — and you do it."

Helms, now ambassador to Iran, was called back to Washington last weekend as reports began to spread of CIA involvement in Watergate, its coverup and the related burglary of Pentagon papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

He has been in Washington since Monday and spent more than five hours yesterday at the U.S. Courthouse, where he was interviewed by Watergate prosecutors. Authorities declined to say if he would testify before the Watergate grand jury.

HELMS' HEARING before both subcommittees today was originally planned as testimony limited to the Ellsberg burglary, which involved a CIA supply of false documents, disguises and other materials to Watergate conspirator and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt during the summer of 1971.

Walters' testimony, however, has brought the agency into the thick of the Watergate scandal itself. Both Sen. John L. McClellan, D-Ark., head of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee, and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., head of the House Armed Services subcommittee, have been furnished copies of a sworn affadavit in which Walters yesterday set forth substantially the same account he gave the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Walters account, besides setting forth in the greatest detail so far available the efforts of high White House aides to cover up the Watergate burglary, also gives the fullest account so far of an effort to pin some of the blame on the CIA.

TAKEN TOGETHER with last week's account of Gray's hesitant efforts to thread his way through the Watergate labyrinth, the Walters account shows a White House inner circle marshaling all its resources to protect itself and other administration officials within a week after the Watergate break-in.

According to these accounts, the coverup began last June 23 — six days after the discovery June 17 that a former CIA agent named James W. McCord and four Cuban-Americans recruited in the name of national security had in-

Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0

vaded Democratic party headquarters in the Watergate, where they had placed an electronic eavesdropping device.

On June 23, Helms and Walters were summoned to Ehrlichman's White House office and were there informed by Haldeman "that the Watergate incident might be exploited by the opposition" — presumably the Democrats — and told that something must be done.

With Helms apparently acquiescing, Haldeman ordered Walters to bypass his boss and go directly to Gray in an effort to block an FBI investigation of the Mexican funds on the grounds that the probe would compromise CIA operations in Mexico.

THE ORDER, according to an Armed Services Committee paraphrase of Walters' still-classified testimony, was "decided" within the White House. Symington, presenting the Walters narrative to reporters yesterday, said there was no testimony or evidence to link such orders to Nixon himself.

Walters, who joined the CIA only that spring, carried that message to Gray the same day. Afterwards he checked agency records and discovered there were no operations in Mexico that could have been compromised by an FBI probe of the bank accounts. Helms, an agency veteran who had been director since 1966, apparently still did not intervene.

It had been impressed on both Helms and Walters that John W. Dean III, the President's counsel, was in charge of Watergate affairs in the White House. Accordingly, Walters on June 26 went to the White House counsel with the information that there was no CIA involvement in Mexico and let the matter rest there. He related this the same day to Helms, who apparently was satisfied and "assured Gen. Walters that he was acting correctly," according to the testimony.

Walters' reluctance to cooperate evidently bothered the White House group, however. The next day, Dean summoned Walters to another meeting and, according to the committee account, "asked if there was some way the CIA could go bail or pay the salaries of the individuals accuses in the Watergate case while they were in jail." Walters again refused and this time threatened to resign rather than identify McCord and the "Miami four" of the Watergate burglary as regular CIA operatives.

DEAN CALLED Walters again June 28 — the third try in as many days. This time he asked "if there could have been some CIA involvement that Gen. Walters did not know about."

Walters again refused to go along, and this time threatened to go directly to the President to protest if he were ordered to compromise the CIA in Watergate, according to testimony.

There is no publicly known evidence that either Walters or Helms actually did this. But by this time, June 28, FBI director Gray was becoming restless and doubtful on his side of the investigatory fence.

ACCORDING TO Gray's reported testimony to Senate investigators, he had grown extremely worried about the CIA involvement he had been told about by Walters on June 23 and by the White House team intermittently since then. He independently tried to set up a meeting with Helms and Walters on June 28, but was dissuaded that morning by Ehrlichman, who according to reported Senate testimony canceled the meeting.

Finally, on July 5, Gray took his doubts directly to Walters.

In a telephone call reported in Walters' testimony, Gray told the CIA deputy "that he could not stop the investigation of the Mexican financing unless he received a letter from the (CIA) director or Gen. Walters stating that such an investigation would damage the agency's access in Mexico.

This must have distressed Walters, who had been told more than a week before, on June 26, that Dean would deal with his misgivings on this point. On July 6, according to the Walters account, the CIA deputy went to see Gray, personally insisted that the FBI probe of the Mexican financing would endanger no CIA operations, and assured him that the CIA had no interest in interfering with any investigation.

WALTERS "then testified that he told Mr. Gray the story of his meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, and that he had been told to convey his previous message to Mr. Gray," the committee narrative continues. "Gen. Walters testified that he repeated to Mr. Gray his determination to resign if there was an attempt to compromise the CIA in this issue."

It was on that same day that Gray tried to warn Nixon directly that there was something wrong with the White House handling of the case, according to his own reported testimony before the Senate Watergate investigating committee.

On July 6, Gray telephoned campaign director Clark McGregor to complain about the "runaround" he was getting from the White House staff. According to on report of the testimony, Gray made this call with the acquiescence of a high CIA official — presumably Walters.

Within 30 minutes of the call to McGregor, Gray received a call from Nixon himself, and he repeated the complaint. According to his reported testimony, Gray was told to continue his investigation as he had been doing, and not to concern himself with White House involvement.

N. Y. Times, Wed., 2 May 1973

'AGING' OF STAFF A C.I.A. PROBLEM

Spies Are Too Old and Too Numerous, Director Says

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 1—James R. Schlesinger, the Director of Central Intelligence, has told Congress that a major problem confronting the Central Intelligence Agency is that its spies are becoming too old and too numerous.

The difficulty, he explained in recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, is that agents in clandestine overseas operations have "stayed around as long as they have wanted." As a result, he said, "we have an aging staff" in the agency's operations division that handles overseas activities and there is little room for promotion of aspiring young spies.

Suggestions that some of the spies have come to look upon their jobs as "a sinecure," Mr. Schlesinger said:

"The intelligence community of the United States is not designed to provide cushy positions for time-servers."

Mr. Schlesinger testified before the committee early last month in support of legislation that would raise from 830 to 1,200 the number of former overseas agents whom the agency can retire at the age of 50 after 20 years of service. His slightly censored testimony was made public today in one of the rare occasions when the testimony of a Central Intelligence Director has been published.

Many Recruited After War

Since taking over as director in February, Mr. Schlesinger has begun a major reorganization of intelligence activities, including the largest personnel cutback in the history of the agency. From his testimony, which provided the first official explanation of his plans for personnel reorganization, it is apparent that one of Mr. Schlesinger's major objective is to weed out over-age spies through retirement.

Mr. Schlesinger disclosed that in recent years the intelligence agency had reduced its "overseas population," with some of the agents absorbed into the headquarters staff and others retired. But, he said, it still has "too many people in the operational areas," particularly as it turns increasingly to technological means, such as satellites, for obtaining intelligence information.

This surplus of operatives, he said, is compounded by the problem of the agency's clandestine service. "We are facing a very severe hump in age composition" between 1970 and 1980, he said.

Immediately after World War II, in its formative years, the intelligence agency engaged in an extensive recruitment program, particularly on Ivy League campuses. Most of those postwar recruits are now reaching the age of 50 or more but show little desire to leave the agency.

The agency's problem, Mr. Schlesinger said, is that, unlike the military or foreign service, it has no system for "selecting out" agents as they move up in seniority.

"It has been assumed that people come in and de facto they have stayed around as long as they wanted," he said. "As a result, we have an aging staff."

Promotions Delayed

As compared with the rest of the Government, the director said, the intelligence agency has a disproportionately old staff. For example, he said, about 70 per cent of the agency's employes in executive grade positions are over 45, compared with about 50 per cent in other Government agencies.

Mr. Schlesinger attributed some of the agency's morale problems to the overlay of older agents, with the resulting "reduced opportunity for younger people." In the early days of the agency, he said, a person could expect to acquire executive responsibilities by age 48 but now he must wait until age 55.

Consequently, he said, "we had a movement out of some of our younger people whom we would like to retain in order to build for 20 years ahead."

Mr. Schlesinger acknowledged that his personnel reorganization and reductions had caused morale problems and criticism within the agency. But he suggested that this reaction should be balanced against the morale problems of persons who left the agency "because they saw insufficient opportunity, partly because they did not believe that the agency was vigorous enough, that it had become a tired bureaucracy."

HS/HC-950

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS F-5
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, May 2, 1973

CIA Chief Wants More Spry Spies

United Press International

Old age has hit the spy business.

The bright young men from Harvard and Yale who entered the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency after World War II have become bright old men, and CIA Director James Schlesinger says they must give way to another generation.

In an edited version of closed-session testimony released yesterday by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Schlesinger estimated that 70 percent of the agency's executives are now over 45, and 85 percent of them have been in the government more than 20 years.

As a result of this "disproportionately high" percentage, top positions in the CIA are clogged up, and young, promising personnel have been quitting because of the lack of advancement opportunity.

"Our problem is that unlike the State Department, unlike the Department of Defense, there has been no selection-out system," Schlesinger said. "It has been assumed that people have come in and de facto they have stayed around as long as they have wanted. As a result, we have an aging staff."

Schlesinger, who took over the top CIA job this year, has been engaged in an extensive overhauling of the agency and hundreds of CIA officials have lost their jobs. Many have come flocking to Capitol Hill and the government bureaucracy looking for work.

Schlesinger denied that the shakeup would diminish the CIA's role and lead to domination by the Defense Department's intelligence-gathering agencies.

The April 5 hearing was on a bill, since passed by Congress and now before President Nixon, to increase the ceiling on annual CIA retirements from 800 to 2,100. Schlesinger said the intelligence community was "not designed to provide cushy positions for time servers."

Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, May 10, 1973
A-13
★★

CIA Is Ordered To Mind Ps & Qs

Reacting to disclosures linking the Central Intelligence Agency to a White House-directed undercover operation that included burglary and a covert psychiatric profile of Daniel Ellsberg, CIA director James R. Schlesinger has ordered an organizational housecleaning to prevent such activities in the future.

Schlesinger assured senators yesterday that he is reviewing "all agency activities" in order to put a stop to future domestic operations "outside its legitimate charter" and in violation of laws barring the CIA from security operations within the country.

Supplying cameras, disguises and false documents to Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy on request of the White House was careless and in violation of "procedural steps and approvals normally required by agency regulations," Schlesinger said. The observation amounted to all but direct criticism of the administration of former CIA Director Richard M. Helms.

FURTHER, referring to the use of the agency's office of medical services to work up two assessments of Ellsberg on White House demands, Schlesinger declared: "The preparation of a profile on an American citizen under these circumstances lies beyond the normal activity of the agency. It shall not be repeated."

More generally, Schlesinger said that he has "directed each employe and invited each ex-employe" to report directly to him any questionable cases in which the CIA may be indulging in forbidden domestic activites.

Schlesinger's statement, delivered to a Senate committee behind closed doors, and then — in an unprecedented move — made public with his blessing, came closer than any director in the 25-year history of the CIA to admitting that the legal ban on domestic operations has sometimes been bent — if not broken outright.

TESTIFYING on the material and operational support the CIA lent a covert White House probe of Ellsberg that included a burglarly of his psychiatrist's office in September 1971, Schlesinger also made these disclosures:

- Helms, Schlesinger's predecessor as CIA chief, directed the preparation of a psychiatric profile of Ellsberg by agency specialist Dr. Bernard Malloy. Two profiles were worked out over a series of months, Schlesinger reported, and there were several consultations between Malloy and the White House agents, Hunt and Liddy.

The profile had originally been requested by David Young, the White House aide whose representations gained Hunt access to classified State Department files during the same period.

- The paths for Hunt, a former CIA agent, and Liddy to agency cooperations were smoothed by White House domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman in a phone call to Marine Corps Gen. Robert E. Cushman, then the agency's deputy director.

The call, on July 8, 1971, came only a few days after publication of the Pentagon Papers began in the *New York Times*, and agency records show that Ehrlichman advised Cushman of Hunt's appointment as a special White House security consultant. Agency cooperation with him was requested.

- Hunt, paying a personal call on Cushman at the CIA headquarters, sought technical help from the CIA's clandestine operations directorate to help him carry out a White House mission. Schlesinger described the mission in these terms: "To visit and elicit information from an individual whose ideology he was not entirely sure of."

Hill to Probe CIA Link To Break-In

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

A major flurry of investigative activity is being launched on Capitol Hill into the Central Intelligence Agency's alleged role in the burglary of the office of the psychiatrist who treated Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg.

Chairmen of three separate Senate and House panels which oversee CIA operations announced yesterday that they would immediately begin inquiries into the episode.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of an Armed Services subcommittee on the CIA, disclosed that the agency's director, James R. Schlesinger, confirmed to him yesterday that Marine Corps Commandent Robert E. Cushman Jr. authorized use of CIA equipment in the Ellsberg burglary case.

The equipment was used by the Watergate break-in team headed by former CIA agents E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy to burglarize the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist, in connection with the White House investigation of the Pentagon Papers case during 1971.

See CIA, A12, Col. 2

A 24 Tuesday, May 8, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Congress to Probe CIA Link to Break-In

CIA, From A1

Nedzi said Schlesinger confirmed to him, in a telephone conversation yesterday, that the CIA equipment was issued to Liddy and Hunt "and that the order emanated from Gen. Cushman." The role of Cushman, who was at the time of the incident deputy director of the Central Intelligance Agency, was disclosed yesterday by The New York Times.

The Michigan Democrat said Schlesinger had also ordered a wholesale review within the agency of the extent of its involvement in the Watergate case and the Ellsberg investigation.

One high-ranking CIA official said the disclosure of the agency's role in the operations of the Hunt-Liddy team under White House direction came as a severe jolt to institutional morale at CIA's Langley, Va., headquarters.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), chairman of the Senate's joint CIA oversight committee, announced tersely of the new development: "We plan to look into it. If true, I don't like it."

Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), who heads a separate Appropriations subcommittee on operations, said he is calling in top CIA witnesses on Wednesday to testify about the agency's involvment in the Pentagon Papers case.

Lead-off witnesses, he said, will be Schlesinger and Dr. Bernard Melloy, chief of the CIA's psychiatry division. Melloy was reportedly ordered by his superiors over his own objections to provide the White House with a psychiatric profile of Ellsberg.

McClellan announced that former CIA Director Richard Helms, who headed the agency at the time of the Pentagon Papers investigation, will be called to testify later along with Cushman.

The 1947 statute which created the CIA decreed that the agency should "have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions," McClellan noted. The statute did, however, assign responsibility to the agency "for protecting internal security functions."

The basic responsibility for domestic surveillance against espionage and sabotage, including breaches of national intelligence, is that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Nedzi said that his Armed Services subcommittee on the CIA will begin hearing witnesses on Thursday "to find out what they know about the situation."

He said he, too, will ask for Helms' return from Iran if the former director is personally implicated in the Pentagon Papers break-in. "If I had to make a guess," he said, "this was not too widely known in the agency."

Cushman's involvement in the White House investigation is significant in view of his long and close relationship with President Nixon. In the late 1950s he served as Mr. Nixon's special assistant for national security affairs during his last four years in the vice presidency.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, May 8, 1973

Director Confirms CIA

BY OSWALK JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

James R. Schlesinger, the newly installed CIA director, has confirmed privately that the CIA supplied a camera, disguises and false documents to Watergate consipirator E. Howard Hunt before the 1971 bread-in at the office of the psychiatrist who had once treated Daniel Ellsberg.

Schlesinger, who offered the confirmation in a telephone conversation yesterday with Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of the House Arms Services subcommittee on intelligence, acknowledged that Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., then deputy director of the CIA, ordered the supplies, Nedzi said.

Confirmation that Cushman, now Marine Corps commandant, authorized clandestine supplies for Hunt and fellow conspirator G. Gordon Liddy in their administration-directed probe of the Pentagon Papers leak, emerged from an internal probe now under way at the CIA, Nedzi was told.

Still unconfirmed is Hunt's testimony to the Watergate grand jury that the CIA also gave Hunt, Liddy and the team of Cuban emigrees recruited for the Ellsberg burglary operational assistance, two "safe-house" rendezvous points in Washington and an untraceable "Ssterile" telephone number to call if help was needed.

(Cushman has been ordered by the Defense Department not to discuss his alleged involvement in the burglary. He failed to show up for a scheduled news conference at Rotterdam yesterday, where he is touring Dutch defenses. An aide announced the general would have nothing to say.

(The aide said Cushman had been ordered to submit an affidavit to the Justice Department on the matter when he returns here.)

Nedzi, concerned that CIA activities in the case may have violated laws banning the agnecy from domestic operations, is planning a subcommittee investigation this week. Sens. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and John L. McClellan D-Ark. also announced yesterday seperate probes of the incident.

The State Department, meanwhile, has offered seperate confirmation of another aspect of the rapidly developing case. Officials acknowledged late yesterday that Hunt in 1971 had free access to State Department cables relating to the 1963 coup in which South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated.

According to a sketchy State Department version of the incident, officials acceded to White House request that Hunt be given unlimited access to the department's fileof cable traffic to and from Saigon during 1963.

Hunt worked in the file room during late September and early October of 1971, officials recalled, and he was allowed to make photo copies of as many cables as he choose.

Some of these copies may have provided the raw material for cables Hunt later fabricated, allegedly on orders from former White House Special Counsel Charles W. Colson, to implicate President John F. Kennedy in the Diem assassination.

According to grand jury testimony released in Los Angeles by Federal District Judge W. Matthew Byrne Jr., Hunt plowed through several thousand state Department cables in order to vhunt plowed through several thousand State Department cables

Supplies Went to Hunt

in order to "verify the authenticity of materials that had already appeared in the press" in the Pentagon Pase.

The actual regulations under which the CIA has operated are set forth in a series of highly classified directives from successive presidents and national security councils over the years — from the Truman administration to the present.

These are sometimes collectively referred to as the "secret charter." Glimpses of this charter have surfaced occasionally, especially when domestic operations of the CIA have been hcallenged. In a case involving an Estonian emigre employed as a CIA counter intelligence agent that reached the Supreme Court two years ago, it was revealed in an affidavit signed by Helms himself that the deputy director for plans (ie. chief of clandestine operations) has "specific responsibility — for the conduct of the agency's counter intelligence operations."

As an organizational matter, the support Hunt claims he got from the CIA in the Ellsberg burglary would have been carried out under the deputy director of plans, presumably under the heading "counter-intelligence operations."

Under the 18-month-old reorganization of the CIA, Cushman, as deputy director of the agency, would have had unquestioned authority to order the camera and other materials and probably to offer operational support as well.

The burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist took place in September 1971, however, some two months before the reorganization plan was announced by President Nixon, so the line of authority may not have been that clearly defined.

Helms himself has privately assured Nedzi and other congressional overseers of the CIA that he had no advance knowledge of the Watergate break-in, and the agency through an official announcement has disclaimed any advance knowledge of the Ellsberg break-in.

In his only publicly recorded reference to the Watergate case, Helms, now ambassador to Iran, last February admitted to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that both Hunt and James W. McCord, another convicted Watergate conspirator, were former CIA agents. He added, in a voice verging on anger:

"They had all retired. They had left. I have no control over anybody who has left . . . they had both been retired at least two years."

Despite Schlesinger's limited confirmation that Hunt, himself a former CIA operative in the clandestine services or "dirty tricks" division of the agency, enjoyed CIA support in the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, serious questions remain.

The distinction between merely supplying equipment, reportedly on White House orders, and actually lending operational support could be crucial, according to informed sources in the intelligence community.

The supplying of equipment is viewed as a routine administrative matter that would have carried out without question upon orders of Cushman, who was number two in the agency as deputy director, under Richard M. Helms, the then CIA director.

A request for agency cooperation in a government-wic probe of a national security leak such as the Pentagon Papers would be regarded as "normal administrative stuff" once sources observed. "The fact the White House was trying to find out about those leaks was hardly something the agency would re unreceptive to."

CIA participation in actual support of the burglary team, through the supply of safe houses and a secure telephone contact such as Hunt described could be more serious, however, since a violation of federal law might have been involved.

Nedzi and other congressmen charged with overseeing CIA activities are keenly sensitive to a proviso in the 1947 National Security Act which expressly forbids the CIA to engage in domestic "internal security functions."

Federal courts have sometimes favored the agency with a liberal reading of the law, however. The same act empowers the agency to "protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure," and this clause has been interpreted to authorize some domestic counter-intelligence activity, even though counter intelligence is technically the exclusive province of the FBI.

Times Links Marine General To CIA Role in Ellsberg Case

By Martin Weil
Washington Post Staff Writer

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., while deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1971, authorized CIA involvement in the plot to burglarize the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist, the New York Times reported in today's editions.

Attributing its report to sources close to the Watergate case, The Times said Cushman, who left the CIA Jan. 1, 1972, and is now a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, authorized the use of CIA material and research in the burglary.

The Times said that the general was questioned last week by the FBI and is reported to have accepted full responsibility for the decision to let the CIA help E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy prepare for the break-in.

Cushman acted at the request of John D. Ehrlichman, who resigned last week as President Nixon's chief domestic affairs assistant, according to the Times report.

Hunt, a convicted Watergate conspirator, has testified before a grand jury here that he and Liddy, also a convicted conspirator, sought to get information from the break-in that would bear on the mental makeup, and "prosecutability" of Ellsberg, who is on trial on charges of espionage and theft in the Pentagon Papers case.

Efforts by The Washington Post to reach Cushman last night were unsuccessful.

A CIA spokesman said that a detailed explanation of any CIA involvement in the burglary plot has been given to the Department of Justice, and declined to comment further on the matter.

In his testimony, Hunt, a CIA veteran, said the CIA provided cameras, disguises, false papers and other "technical assistance" for the burglary operation.

He described meetings with CIA agents in so-called "safe houses" — secret hideaways — in Washington, and said he was given a "sterile," or unlisted, phone number, whose billings are not reflected.

In addition, he said that when the break-in turned up nothing the plotters went to the CIA for a psychiatric profile of Ellsberg, compiled at second hand.

A 10 Monday, May 7, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

HS/HC-950

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Monday, May 7, 1973 A-7

Cushman Okayed CIA Aid to Hunt

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
New York Times News Service.

Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., the Marine Corps commandant who in 1971 was deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, authorized the use of CIA material and research in the burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist, sources close to the Watergate case say.

The sources said yesterday that the general, who is now a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acted at the request of John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's chief adviser for domestic affairs until he resigned last week.

Cushman, who left the CIA in 1971, was questioned by FBI agents late last week, the sources said, and reportedly accepted full responsibility for the decision to permit the CIA to help E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy prepare for the break-in.

Cushman could not be reached for comment.

The federal prosecuting team in the Watergate case first learned of the burglary at the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding in an interview last month with John W. Dean III, who resigned as counsel to the President last week. Then, in grand jury testimony Wednesday, Hunt told of utilizing CIA disguises, fake identification papers, and even a "safehouse" in the Washington area that were provided by the agency's clandestine services, the so-called "dirty tricks" department.

GEN. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN JR.

Hunt, a 20-year CIA veteran who, along with Liddy and five others, were arrested last year in connection with the Watergate bugging, also told the grand jury that he believed that cooperation with the CIA had been arranged by one of his superiors, Egil Krogh Jr.

At the time, according to grand jury testimony, Krogh, deputy to Ehrlichman was directly in charge of a special White House team that had been set up in the aftermath of the June 1971 publication of the Pentagon Papers to determine who was involved in the disclosure of the documents.

Krogh, who reportedly has resigned his new job as under secretary of Transportation, has sent a classified affidavit to the Ellsberg trial court Friday in which he reportedly accepted full responsibility for the burglary.

Two sources confirmed yesterday, however, that Krogh did not have the authority to deal directly with the CIA on such matters as arranging help for a clandestine operation inside the United States.

One source knowledgeable about the Hunt-Liddy burglary plan gave the following version of how the agency's cooperation was enlisted:

The CIA connection was initiated by Hunt, who had instant telephhone communication with that agency and other intelligence offices through a highly secure scrambler telephone that he and Liddy ordered installed in their quarters in the Executive Office Building, next to the White House.

AFTER BEING told by a CIA official that further authority was needed before the agency could provide any assistance, the source said, Hunt went to Krogh, who took thhe problem to his superior, Ehrlichman.

Then the source went on:

"Ehrlichmaan makes a telephone call to Cushman, and says, 'Hey, these guys need some chores done. Won't you take care of it?' Cushman says, 'OK I'll do it.'"

"There was absolutely nothing in writing," the source said. "There was only one call — just a little lean-on call by Ehrlichman. And then Hunt and Liddy began asking for safehouses and all the rest."

At the time of Ehrlichman's alleged call, all the key intelligence agencies of the government were said to be cooperating with the Hunt-Lidddy group.

President Nixon was known to have been angered by the disclosure of the Pentagon

See CUSHMAN, Page A-7

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Monday, May 7, 1973

CUSHMAN

General Cleared Aid to Burglars

Continued From Page A-1

Papers, which were published in part by The New York Times in June 1971, and by publication by The Times a few months later of details of the strategic arms agreement then being worked out by the White House and the Soviet Union.

Ehrlichman, in a statement provided to the FBI and read at the Ellsberg trial, acknowledged learning of the burglary — which failed to produce any of Ellsberg's psychiatric records — after it took place, and warning Krogh and the others not to do it again.

The complete connection between Hunt's White House operations and the CIA has not been fully determined. One former high-ranking White House adviser said yesterday that Hunt had been recommended for his job with the "plumbers" by Richard Helms, former CIA director, who was named ambassador to Iran early this year.

Attempts to reach Helms by telephone this weekend were unsuccessful.

Agency officials refused to comment on the reported link between Ehrlichman and Cushman, but one official did confirm a report in the Washington Post that an agency psychological profile of Ellssberg haad been prepaared and provided oover protessts off some agency officials.

One source with close connections t the agency described maany senior aagency officials as being "aangry and depressed" over the disclosures. "They feel that irreparable damaagge has been done by this to the CIA," the source said of the senior officials. "They think the whole pr9ject was an absolute violation oof the CIA's chaarter."

The legality of the agency's cooperation with Hunt and Liddy is questionable. The Naational Security Act of 1947, which set up the agency, expressly bars it from having any "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions." But the laaw alss authorizes the agency to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosurre" — aan authority thaat seems relevant to what the government viewed in June, 1971, as the illegal theft and publication of the Pentaagon Paapers, a secret Defense Deepartment study on the History of the Vietnam war.

The Evening Star
and
The Washington Daily News

Published by THE EVENING STAR NEWSPAPER CO., Washington, D.C.
JOHN H. KAUFFMANN, *President* NEWBOLD NOYES, *Editor*

A-12 TUESDAY, MAY 8, 1973

The CIA and Ellsberg

On and on come the ugly revelations, the almost daily disclosures of how this nation's political and judicial processes have been manipulated and corrupted. Now we learn that the Central Intelligence Agency shares heavily in the responsibility for the Ellsberg case, which if not directly related to Watergate nevertheless helped set the stage for it and is indisputably part of the same poisonous syndrome.

Start with the premise that, for its own purposes, the CIA had no interest in digging up damaging information on Daniel Ellsberg and his role in leaking the Pentagon papers in June, 1971. But the White House surely did. And someone at the White House, possibly John Ehrlichman, induced someone high at CIA, probably General Robert E. Cushman, to authorize the use of the agency's clandestine services in the burglary of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. That happened in September, 1971, while Richard Helms was still head of CIA and two months before General Cushman left his post as deputy director of the agency to become commandant of the Marine Corps. Meanwhile, and just as disturbing, the head of CIA's psychological assessment unit was directed (by whom?) to cooperate with the White House in working up a psychological profile of Ellsberg.

At this point, the CIA-Ellsberg episode is subject to any number of interpretations. Loose threads and unanswered questions are everywhere. Yet even an interpretation most favorable to the agency leads to conclusions that are devastating.

The CIA, in brief, has been used and compromised and discredited in somewhat the same way that the FBI, under Patrick Gray, was used and compromised and discredited in the Watergate investigation. Perhaps it was the guiltier of the two. For the CIA lent its offices to the perpetration of a shoddy crime, to the trampling of civil liberties and to a domestic surveillance operation that by law it had no business conducting even indirectly.

It is difficult to believe that Helms, a canny and professional man, would have known all this beforehand and consented to such an improbable venture as the Hunt-Liddy burglary of the psychiatrist's office. Of course, anything is possible, as the nation has learned with relentless regularity the last few weeks.

General Cushman, even if his implication in the affair can be partially explained as unthinking, has a great deal to answer for. He is, to be sure, a distinguished military officer. He is also a longtime friend and supporter of the President's. Those two things need not have been incompatible. But in this case, apparently, they were. In the anything-goes pattern of Watergate, an otherwise decent man appears to have blocked off conscience and good judgment, and gone along with whatever the White House requested.

At first the Watergate scandal was said to be the work of a few ideological zealots. Lately, it has been fashionable to lay the blame on men close to the President with a superloyal, ad-agency turn of mind. But the web of Watergate-Ellsberg spreads much farther than that. In the FBI, in Justice, now in the CIA, it involves men and vital institutions the American public should have had every reason to trust, but now do not. Aside from the diminished stature of the presidency itself, that is what is hardest to take.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, May 8, 1973

MARY McGRORY

Time to Sound the Bugle Call?

What Gen. Alexander Haig, President Nixon's new chief of staff, might do is to sound the bugle for some "whiskey-drinking, poker-playing, evil old men" to fill the decimated ranks of the White House staff.

The President has hinted that all pols are cads in the crunch — and his own record is compelling evidence on the point — but what most politicians have that was never exhibited by the clean-living Pharisees who served Nixon was a sense of limits.

They will do almost anything to get elected, but even a ward-heeler would have balked at forging cables in the name of a dead president.

An honest rogue might have suggested caution in approaching the judge with a job offer in the middle of the Pentagon papers trial.

"It wouldn't look right if it got out," he might have murmured.

SOME THINGS ARE scared to the housebroken politician. J. Edgar Hoover, for instance. But the later director was apparently inveigled into giving his approval for a White House "investigation" of Daniel Ellsberg — an investigation that should have been done by the FBI.

The old man, it has been said hereabouts recently, would never have been lured into the trap that closed on his successor, L. Patrick Gray, who blindly accepted an order to conduct a patsy probe of the Watergate.

Gray was compromised, gangster-style, we have since learned. They have something on him. He burned "hot" documents passed to him in the White House by John Dean and John Ehrlichman.

In 1971, Hoover may have been compromised himself. The White House had indulged his cry for the blood of the Berrigan brothers and their friends.

SO PRESUMABLY the old man gave way in his turn. And the White House was literally turned into a den of thieves, something that might have shamed an old precinct worker, especially while prayer meetings were being held so ostentatiously under the same roof.

Gov. Ronald Reagon offered the thought that the men around the President were not "criminals at heart." That may be true. They were something more dangerous to a Republic. They were barbarians.

They seized the government the way the Vandals fell on Rome. They sacked and pillaged it. They tore down the temples and smashed the statues. Nothing they had not tone themselves had any value. No institution, not tradition, no idea beyond power, had any meaning.

They treated the FBI like a private detective agency. They made a mockery of the Justice Department. They used the CIA as a wardrobe and camera-supply house. It is against the law for the CIA to conduct comestic operations. But for the men who wore the flag in their lapels while excoriating those who burned it, there were no laws.

Now the Marine Corps, another symbol of incorruptibility, has been dragged in. Its commandant, Gen. Robert Cushman, when he was deputy director of the CIA, gave the White House all it asked in the way of masks and wigs and false papers, "safe" houses and "sterile" phone numbers when the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist was being plotted in the Executive Mansion.

"Semper Fidelis" is the motto of the corps. Cushman had served the President as a military aide, and he knew the terrain. Fidelity to the president is all that counts.

Seemliness is still eluding the men around the President, and, for the matter, the President himself. H. R. Haldeman and Ehrlichman rode to the grand jury in White House cars. It was a touch of bravado perhaps. They once owned the government, they still command its trappings. It does not cross their minds that people might offended by the cavalier use of public property at a moment when their abuse of public trust was being attested to in courthouse a continent apart.

The emperor who presided over the most massive heist in the history of the Republic — the national honor — is sitting in the ruins, issuing new decrees about executive privilege and new denials of his knowledge of what went on at his door and in his name.

And self-respecting politician would have long since resigned.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, May 8, 1973

SMITH HEMPSTONE

A New Bay of Pigs for CIA?

It is now clear that the Central Intelligence Agency has been far more deeply implicated in the Watergate-Pentagon Papers scandal than had previously been suspected.

Earlier this week, the New York Times, quoting "sources close to the Watergate case," said that Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., the agency's former deputy director and now commandant of the Marine Corps, authorized CIA assistance in the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The Times said Cushman, who is out of the country and has not commented publicly on the allegation, acted at the request of former presidential counselor John D. Erhlichman.

An indirect CIA connection with the Watergate Seven had been evident from the beginning of the affair last June. G. Gordon Liddy, the former White House consultant and operational chief of the bugging of Democratic national committee headquarters, had been an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. E. Howard Hunt Jr., his deputy, had been the CIA agent who planned the aboritve Bay of Pigs invasion.

James W. McCord had served 19 years in the CIA until his "retirement" in 1970; he became security chief of the Nixon campaign committee in 1972. Cuban-born Bernard L. Barker worked with Hunt on the Bay of Pigs invasion, acting as a link between the CIA and the army of exiled Cubans.

Frank Sturgis (alias Frank Fiorini) also was involved in the Bay of Pigs and has CIA connections. The two Cuban members of the raiding party, Eugenio R. Martinez and Virgilio R. Gonzalez, also had records of anti-Castro activity.

But the emphasis always was on a past CIA association. It was easy to believe this: Washington and Miami are full of former intelligence agents willing to undertake contract work which their colleagues within the CIA would be forbidden by law to engage in (under the National Security Act of 1947, which created the agency, CIA's activities are restricted to work abroad).

It now appears possible, even probably, that Liddy, Hunt and possibly others of the Watergate Seven had not in fact severed their relations with the intelligence community and were, indeed, operating with the knowledge and consent of the CIA.

These seemingly isolated but possibly interrelated events point to a pattern of CIA involvement:

- Hunt was hired by the Robert R. Mullen & Co. public relations firm in 1970 on the personal recommendation of the then CIA Director, Richard Helms. It is still unclear as to whose payroll Hunt was on after he joined the White House staff in the summer of 1971.
- In December of last year, when Watergate was just beginning to heat up, Helms was fired as CIA chief and shipped off to Teheran as ambassador to Iran.
- Helms' successor, James R. Schlesinger, who came to CIA from the Office of Management and Budget via the Atomic Energy Commission, has been conducting a widespread purge of the agency.
- Hunt testified last week to the Watergate grand jury (according to a transcript released by attorneys for Pentagon Papers defendants Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo) that the CIA provided him and Liddy with cameras, disguises, false identity papers and other "technical assistance" for the burglary of the Beverly Hills office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Hunt told of meetings with CIA agents in two of the agency's "safe houses" — secret hideaways — in this city. He also told of being given a CIA "sterile" telephone number — an unlisted number in which billings are not reflected — to call when in need of "material" assistance.

Hunt's grand jury testimony can be given a great deal of credence because in it he correctly identified Dr. Bernard Melloy as the head of the CIA's psychiatric unit. Dr. Melloy's identity previously had been a closely held secret. He is not listed in the Washington, Maryland or Virginia telephone directories, but he maintains a private office at 2520 Pennsylvania Ave., in addition to his CIA office in McLean, Va. Hunt also revealed, correctly, that Melloy's unit works up psychiatric profiles on persons "of interest" to the U.S. government. Ellsberg was the subject of one of these profiles; similar studies have been made of Fidel Castro and Leonid Brezhnev.

Although Helms was appointed head of the CIA by Lyndon Johnson in 1966, President Nixon has close personal links with the present deputy director of the CIA, Maj. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, as he had with Walters' predecessor, Gen. Cushman, the Marine Corps commandant.

Gen. Cushman was Nixon's naval aide during the former's vice presidential years. Gen. Walters was President Eisenhower's personal interpreter and accompanied Nixon on his disastrous 1958 tour of Latin America.

In short, it looks as if CIA may have been into the Watergate-Ellsberg mess up to its clandestine ears.

James R. Schlesinger: To the Pentagon

POST, Friday, 11 May 1973

Impatient Fact-Finder . . .

By Stuart Auerbach
Washington Post Staff Writer

Pentagon briefers have a shock coming when James R. Schlesinger takes over as Secretary of Defense: he hates the chart and slide shows that military men love to use to make their points.

"Let's cut out that Pentagon baloney," he once told a retired Air Force colonel. "Just give me the facts."

That's Schlesinger in a nutshell: abrupt, impatient with superficial trappings and searching for facts; a man who knows the value of using shock tactics while trying to gain control of a sprawling federal agency.

In his four years and three months in government —almost the length of the Nixon administration— Schlesinger has been shaking up the establishment.

In 16 months as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission he reorganized and transformed it from a promoter of nuclear power to a regulator of the atomic industry. And then, before he left for the Central Intelligence Agency, he persuaded President Nixon to pick another maverick, Dixy Lee Ray, as the new AEC chairman.

During the past four months he has put his imprint on the CIA. He took the job as CIA director with a mandate from President Nixon to clean out dead wood and to end the bickering between the nation's intelligence agenices.

Schlesinger worked so hard at the assignment that when he came to work one day with a cast on his right hand a story went around the agency that he had broken it pounding on his desk.

The new director complained to Congress that the CIA is overloaded with overage spies recruited during the Cold War who have trouble adjusting to today's more peaceful world. He began pushing early retirement for some and has started reducing the CIA's 15,000 employees by at least 10 per cent.

Moreover, he was appalled by some of the Mickey Mouse supersecrecy at "the agency."

He ordered switchboard operators to answer calls with "Central Intelligence Agency." Employees now answer the phone with their names or office identifications (such as Vietnam Desk) instead of merely repeating the extension number.

Schlesinger also has ordered the removal of signs identifying the CIA headquarters at Langley as a highway research station. He ordered new ones saying, "Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Va.," installed.

Earlier this week he brought a display of candor rare to CIA directors when he admitted to a congressional committee that CIA assistance in a burglary attempt on the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist was "ill advised." He pointed out three times however, that it occurred while Richard Helms was director.

This didn't endear Schlesinger to the "old boy" network in the CIA.

One CIA veteran commented yesterday that "there wasn't a wet eye in the place" when word got out that Schlesinger was moving to the Pentagon.

He will not be among friends when he moves to the Pentagon either. During his two years with the Bureau of the Budget and its successor agency, the Office of Management and Budget, Schlesinger was an overseer of the Defense Department's money requests. He had a reputation for insisting that better management could save defens, dollars.

In the Nixon administration's first year, his friends report, he was personally responsible for trimming $6 billion from the Pentagon budget.

"He had the hammer on the defense guys for more than a year," recalls a high-ranking Nixon aide. "He's made very few friends in the Pentagon."

Nevertheless, Schlesinger indicated recently that the era of cutting defense spending should end. In a little-noticed speech delivered last September when he was still AEC chairman, Schlesinger said:

"I am firmly persuaded that the time has come, if it has not already passed, to call a halt to the self-defeating game of cutting defense outlays . . . It is an illusion to believe that we can maintain defense forces adequate for our treaty obligations to, say, NATO and Japan, with sharp curtailment in defense expenditures supposedly directed only to waste and duplication."

Schlesinger first came to President Nixon's attention through his work as assistant director of OMB, when he headed a survey team that in 1971 evaluated the nation's intelligence network. The report recommended the sweeping reforms that Schlesinger was eventually to undertake.

'National Security' Used as Muzzle, Dean Says

Former White House counsel John W. Dean III says he believes that the Nixon administration is inveighing national security to force him to give "very limited testimony" in Watergate investigations.

Associates of Dean, who was fired by President Nixon after becoming deeply implicated in the Watergate scandal, have offered further details behind his statement yesterday charging an "ongoing effort" to see that he does not tell all he knows to a grand jury or to the Senate.

His complaint inthat statement that someone was trying to put "restrictions" on his testimony was meant as a reference to restraints in the name of national security as well as claims of privileged communications with the President, his associates said.

These sources said that the stationing of FBI and Secret Service guards to watch over Dean's files at his White House office was behind his complaint that he was being kept from "obtaining relevant information and records."

DEAN'S STATEMENT

yesterday also said there were attempts to influence how federal prosecutors handled his testimony — a reference, associates said, to what Dean considers to be pressure to deny him immunity from prosecution.

In discussing Dean's suggestion that efforts were being made to "discredit me" or to "get me," associates cited a statement broadcast by CBS News that Dean did not want to go to prison principally because he was fearful of being molested sexually.

That is "a lie spread by his enemies," one associate said.

The argument that "national security" considerations dictated that data relating to the Watergate affair should not be given to investigators was used by Dean himself, another former White House aide, Charles W. Colson, has declared.

In an interview with FBI agents, made public yesterday during the Pentagon Papers trial in Los Angeles, Colson said that the issue had come up at a meeting with Dean when they were discussing what he would say about FBI questioning of him on the Watergate affiar.

COLSON SAID that he asked what he would do if the agents quizzed him about a bunglary that was related to government attempts to probe the leak of the Pentagon Papers to the newspapers. That burglary, of a psychiatrist's office in Los Angeles in 1971, has been related to the Watergate scandal because it was carried out by some of the same men convicted of the Watergate break-in.

Dean advised him "that if asked, he was not to discuss the matter inasmuch as it was a national security matter of the highest classification," Colson said.

According to Colson's testimony, he received the same instructions from Ehrlichman in March or April of this year.

Meanwhile, there were these other developments in the Watergate affair:

- Former Nixon campaign treasurer Hugh W. Sloan Jr., in sworn testimony released yesterday, said that a number of high Nixon campaign and administration officials were aware — or had reason to be aware — last summer that the scandal might reach higher in the government than was being publicly acknowledged.
- Gen. Robert E. Cushman, former top CIA aide, who has been cited as the source of authority for the CIA to help equip the men taking part in the psychiatrist's office burglary, was preparing an affidavit on his role. Cshman was scheduled to appear soon before two Senate committees probing CIA involvement, perhaps later today. Aides to the general have been indicating the general did not know what the men in the burglary were planning.
- A CIA psychiatrist told senators yesterday that the personality profile he was ordered to prepare on

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, May 11, 1973

Daniel Ellsberg, accused of stealing the Pentagon Papers, was the first of its kind ever made on an American citizen. The profile was prepared as part of the same Pentagon Papers leak-plugging effort which involved the burglary of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Former CIA Director Richard Helms is scheduled to appear early next week to tell what, if anything, he knows about the CIA role in the buglary episode.

Nixon campgian aide Sloan, in his sworn testimony made pblic yesterday, indicated that Maurice H. Stans, chief fund-raiser of the Nixon campgian in 1972, had some inkling of the bugging scandal last summer.

Sloan recounted how he became suspicious of the large amount of money being given Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, and asked Stans if deputy campaign director Jeb Stuart Magruder had the authority to approve such disuursements.

Stans checked with campaign director John N. Mitchell — also indicted in the New York case yesterday — who said Magruder did have the authority, Sloan said.

HE SAID, "I believe I expressed concern generally (to Stans) about the fact that the totals were mounting up without any knowledge on our part of what, in fact, had happened to our money."

Stans replied, Sloan said, "I don't want to know, and you don't want to know."

Sloan also said that following the June 17 arrests, Magruder asked Sloan to perjure himself at any forthcoming trial regarding how much money Sloan had given Liddy.

Sloan said he refused to perjure himself — and did not do so — and said he began attempting to alert higher-ups in the Nixon Administration about what apparently was going on.

But Dwight Chapin, then the President's appointments secretary, brushed him off by saying:

" . . . (1) you are overwrought, and (2) the important thing is to protect the President, and (3) you ought to take a vacation."

He then went to John D. Ehrlichma, then head of the President's domestic counsel and one of the top presidential advisors, he said.

"I think I got as far as saying there were funds that I did not know where they went, and there might be a connection with the situation. He told me to go no further, that he didn't want any of the details, if I had any personal problems I had a special relationship with the White House and they would be glad to arrange anaattorney.

"I said, 'That isn't my concern. I just want you to know there is a problem over there,' and he said his position was that he would have to take executive privilege until after the election in any case."

The Weather

Today—Cloudy, high in 70s, low in low 50s. The chance of rain is 50 per cent today an 20 per cent tonight. Saturday—Cloudy, high in upper 60s. Temp. range: Yesterday, 82-54; Today, 73-53. Details, Page C6.

The Wash Tim

96th Year .... No. 157

FRIDAY,

Mitchell, Stans Ind

Schlesinger to Pent

FBI Tap Disclosed

Part-time Presidential Adviser

Connally on Nixon Staff

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
. . . Defense Secretary

WILLIAM E. COLBY
. . . CIA director



JOHN B. CONNALLY
. . . presidential adviser

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

In a major administration reshuffle forced by Watergate disclosures, President Nixon yesterday named CIA director James R. Schlesinger Secretary of Defense and former Treasury Secretary John B. Connally a part-time presidential adviser.

Mr. Nixon said he will nominate William E. Colby, the Central Intelligence Agency's deputy director for operations, to succeed Schlesinger.

ington Post

ies Herald

FINAL

108 Pages—4 Sections

MAY 11, 1973 Phone 223-6000 Classified 223-6200 Circulation 223-6100 15c Beyond Washington, Maryland and Virginia 10c

icted in Vesco Case; agon, Colby to CIA; at Ellsberg Trial

From the Defense Department, the President tapped J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., the Pentagon's general counsel, to be special counsel to the President to handle all Watergate matters affecting the White House.

Yesterday's shift of positions was the second major one in less than two weeks. On April 30, the President announced the resignations of H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III from the White House staff and of Richard G. Kleindienst as Attorney General.

That day, the President moved Elliot L. Richardson from Secretary of Defense to the post of Attorney General. Richardson, former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, had been at the Pentagon only since Feb. 1. Like Richardson, Schlesinger had just taken over the CIA directorship in February, after serving as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The President also told his Cabinet yesterday, at a meeting attended by both Connally and Schlesinger, that there would be more direct personal communications with each member. Mr. Nixon said he was ending the "super-Cabinet" arrangement in which three Cabinet officers had broadened responsibility and acted as counselors to the President, press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler reported.

The three who revert to regular Cabinet status are James T. Lynn of the Transportation Department, Caspar W. Weinberger of Health, Education and Welfare, and Earl L. Butz, of Agriculture. Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz will retain his added

See PRESIDENT, A12, Col. 5

The Watergate

Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell and former Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans were indicted in New York yesterday on charges of lying to a federal grand jury and obstructing justice by interfering with a government investigation. New Jersey politician Harry Sears and financier Robert Vesco were indicted in the same case.

In Washington, the White House announced another major shakeup in the management of the government—CIA Director James Schlesinger was nominated for Secretary of Defense; William Colby, a career CIA man, was nominated as his successor; Texan John B. Connally accepted a part-time job as a presidential adviser; Defense Department Counsel Fred Buzhardt was shifted to the White House as a special counsel. At the same time, three "super-Cabinet" posts were abolished.

There were new disclosures in Los Angeles at the Pentagon papers trial of Daniel Ellsberg. Some of his conversations, the government disclosed, were intercepted from a phone tap—in place more than a year—at the home of a former high government official, Morton Halperin. Arguments to dismiss the case against Ellsberg will be heard today.

Hugh W. Sloan Jr., treasurer of President Nixon's reelection campaign, disclosed in a deposition that he had warned the White House and his superiors last year that campaign officials may have been involved in the Watergate case.

CIA Chief Named Defense Secretary

PRESIDENT, From A1

assignment as assistant to the President.

In yesterday's actions, the President followed a pattern he set earlier in reorganizing his administration in the wake of the Watergate disclosures and the resulting resignations. He turned to old and trusted advisers instead of going outside.

However, informed sources said that the President emphasized in the Cabinet meeting and in a meeting with Republican congressional leaders that he would move outside that close circle in future appointments.

In the past, a criticism in Congress, among Cabinet officers and from the press was that presidential aides Haldeman and Ehrlichman erected a "Berlin wall" around the President, shielding him from critics and friends alike.

Mr. Nixon reportedly promised to enlarge and strengthen the White House legislative staff under William E. Timmons and to make himself more frequently available to members of Congress. The Cabinet departments were instructed to strengthen their legislative liaison as well and to seek Capitol Hill contacts on a bipartisan basis.

Mr. Nixon also promised a decentralization of authority away from the White House and to the Cabinet departments.

With Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. now the White House staff chief instead of Haldeman, there will be a different approach, with more reliance on the established bureaucracy, more freedom for departments to be true executors of policy and with new pledges to spread rather than to contract authority.

Whether the new promises will be carried out remains to be seen, but the change in intentions reflects the extent to which the President has been shaken out of old habits.

Reports on Capitol Hill that he is considering bringing Secretary of State William P. Rogers into the White House and making national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger Secretary of State were denied by an official spokesman.

Connally, who recently switched to the Republican Party, will serve without pay and will have no operational responsibilities, Ziegler said. Connally will make himself available on a part-time basis whenever the President wishes to consult him, the press secretary explained.

The rest of his time Connally will devote to his law practice in Houston. Ziegler insisted that there would be no conflict of interest between Connally's public and private life.

In answer to questions, Ziegler said the President could consult anyone he wishes, but that he was sure he would not consult Connally on oil problems, for example, since Connally's law firm represents oil interests.

They will consult "on a broad range of matters," foreign as well as domestic, but the President does not expect to give Connally specific operational assignments, Ziegler said.

"I am sure the President and Governor Connally would in any discussion eliminate anything that would involve conflict of interest," Ziegler maintained.

While the Connally and Buzhardt appointments are for an interim period, Ziegler indicated they may last months rather than weeks.

The exact lines of authority between special counsel Buzhardt and acting presidential counsel Leonard Garment were not spelled out in the Ziegler announcement, but both appear to have some responsibility in Watergate matters while Buzhardt has the major responsibility.

Garment will be in charge of preparing legislation the President has promised to guard against future corruption in political campaigns, Ziegler said, and will have all the other duties of a White House counsel.

Garment was named acting counsel after Dean's departure from the post last week.

The new Secretary of Defense-designate, taught economics at the University of Virginia and was a senior member of the Rand Corp. before joining the government in 1969. While an assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, a report he prepared caught the President's attention. From OMB, Schlesinger moved to the chairmanship of the AEC and more recently to the CIA.

His successor at the CIA, Colby, has spent three decades in intelligence, starting with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. He served as first secretary of the U.S. embassy in Saigon from 1959 to 1962 and then he returned to Washington as chief of the CIA's Far East division. In 1968, he went back to Vietnam and took over the pacification program until June of 1971.

Buzhardt practiced law in South Carolina before coming to Washington in 1961, where he worked for eight years on the staff of Sen. Strom Thurmond. He joined the Defense Department in 1969.

CROSBY S. NOYES

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, May 17, 1973

Why Nixon Can Be Expected to Resign

We are talking about legalities — about a sense of fair play — about the awesome trauma that might be involved in the deposition of a president. We are talking, in short, about what may happen and studiously evading the implications of what already has happened.

The central issue of the Watergate affair — which now, of course, includes the Ellsberg and Vesco affairs — it seems to me, is the issue of the abuse of presidential authority. And on the basis of what is now undisputed public knowledge, there can be no doubt that the abuses were many and flagrant.

From the outset of this administration, the issue of presidential authority has been one of strenuous contention between the White House and the Congress, mostly relating to the war-making powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the use of armed forces in the Indochina conflict. Watergate has abruptly transferred the issue to the domestic scene.

The inherent advantages of an incumbent president at election time have always been recognized and conceded. Regardless of campaign finances, no one else has the same power to mobilize public opinion or to manipulate events at home and abroad to his political advantage.

What has not been recognized or conceded — until now — is that an incumbent president faced with an election can assert his powers as commander-in-chief to mobilize the apparatus of the federal government in his own behalf. That this was done in the last election — with or without the President's personal knowledge and consent — is beyond doubt.

To a degree that is yet to be fully established, the Justice Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department — to say nothing of the White House itself — have all become implicated in the skulduggery engineered by the men already tried and convicted for the Watergate break-in. And in each case it is abundantly clear that the officials involved believed that they were acting in accordance with the wishes — if not on the direct orders — of the President himself.

Take, just for one example, the case of Gen. Robert H. Cushman Jr., the former deputy director of CIA and now commandant of the Marine Corps. Cushman, by his own admission, never doubted for a minute that White House aide John D. Ehrlichman was speaking for the President when Ehrlichman asked him to place the facilities of the CIA at the disposal of E. Howard Hunt Jr., later convicted in the Watergate conspiracy.

As the result of this request, the CIA provided Hunt with a variety of exotic spy equipment, including voice-modifiers, cameras, wigs and hidden tape recorders used in burglarizing the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in September 1971. It was not until considerably later, Cushman says, that he became suspicious of Hunt and called off the deal.

The implications of this incident are frightening. Regardless of who may have been at fault, the fact that the CIA was put to use by the likes of E. Howard Hunt — on the orders of the man who now runs the Marine Corps — reflects a corruption at the top levels of command in this country that is quite simply intolerable. It is small comfort to be assured by Sen. John L. McClellan, D-Ark., that he doesn't think Cushman "would do it again."

It has been pointed out that I have supported the policies of Richard Nixon — which have been, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, a modification of the policies of Lyndon Johnson, John Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower — with some enthusiasm and consistency.

I still do. If this administration could be judged entirely — or even primarily — on its diplomatic performance — on the skill with which it has extricated us from our involvement in Vietnam — on the way it has exploited our influence with adversaries and friends in the interest of world peace — Nixon, in my book, deserves a large measure of gratitude and applause.

But the President of the United States cannot be judged or exonerated by one aspect of his leadership, no matter how important. The dimensions of his power forbid categorically any gross abuse of that power, at the risk of enormous danger to the nation. It is impossible to deny that this has happened.

Innocent as the President himself may be, his administration has been discredited as no administration within my recollection by the Watergate disclosures. Talk of protecting the "rights of the defendant" as against the "rights of the government" is absurd in a situation where the executive is itself the defendant.

The measure of acceptability of all presidential appointments at this point — including notably the "special prosecutor" — is how independent they will be of executive direction — in short, how relentless they will be in "getting to the bottom" of this tragic affair — which, of course, really means getting to the top.

Quite properly, the President has assumed full responsibility for the appalling abuses of the public trust that were committed by his people in his name. It is no longer a question of proving foreknowledge, complicity or criminality of any kind. No matter how fair-minded the American people may be, they will not suffer a leadership that has betrayed and humiliated them. I for one am convinced that when Nixon realizes the extent to which his authority has been shattered by these events, he will resign.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Watergate and the CIA

The rush of events has cast the impression that the Central Intelligence Agency, too, was caught up in the crisis of governance known as Watergate and was somehow despoiled or suborned. But such a comprehensive indictment should not be handed down casually. A closer look at the three main episodes of Watergate-CIA involvement suggests another and more complex view.

In the first episode, in July-September 1971, the CIA was asked by John Ehrlichman to give retired CIA employee Howard Hunt, then identified as a White House security consultant, technical help for an undisclosed mission. The Pentagon Papers had just been published. The CIA's legislative charter gives it "responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures," and in that context the then-deputy director, Gen. Robert Cushman, who had long known Mr. Ehrlichman and who had also served as a personal aide to Vice President Nixon, granted technical aid to Howard Hunt. But he was put off by Hunt's manner; the agency, learning that "domestic clandestine operations" were involved, cut the Hunt link in five weeks; General Cushman quickly informed Mr. Ehrlichman. The burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist took place a month later. At the same time, CIA Director Richard Helms, in the same context of an ostensible White House investigation of security leaks, ordered up a CIA psychiatric profile of Mr. Ellsberg at White House request. His successor, James Schlesinger, later termed these missions "ill advised."

In the second episode, beginning only six days after the Watergate break-in of June 17, 1972, top White House aides reportedly tried on repeated occasions to induce the CIA to halt an FBI probe into the "laundered" Mexican money that financed the break-in (by having the CIA invent a false rationale that the probe would compromise CIA sources); those aides then asked CIA to use secret funds to "go bail or pay the salaries" of Watergate conspirators. By available testimony, the CIA resolutely rejected these entreaties. Gen. Vernon Walters, the then-deputy director and also a former aide to Vice President Nixon, even said he would resign and go to the President before so compromising the agency.

In the third episode, in early 1973—by then, "Watergate" was rapidly unfolding—the White House sought to have the CIA receive back (knowingly) the Ellsberg burglary materials it had blindly given Hunt in 1971. The CIA absolutely refused.

So what do we have? In all three episodes, the White House trampled over the provision of the CIA's charter specifying that the agency function "under the National Security Council" and it sought to turn the CIA to purposes having at best a tenuous connection to the agency's intelligence mandate—even the way the White House presented it—and at worst no connection whatsoever. In the episodes involving the Mexican money and the receiving back of Ellsberg burglary materials, successive CIA directors and their deputies stood off fierce White House pressure aimed at forcing them to violate the spirit and letter of their charter. In the episode involving aid for a mission whose purpose was at first unknown to the CIA, the agency recovered promptly when it got a better sense of what was going on.

The further question arises of whether Mr. Helms should have reported, either to the President or Congress, whatever may have been his suspicion or knowledge at various times that something sour was going on. We submit that no final answer can be offered until there becomes available a fuller record not only of precisely what Mr. Helms told Congress last February and March and again in the last few days, but also of the steps he may have taken to protect the CIA from taint before he was relieved of the agency's directorship.

To establish a kind of base line, we think it appropriate meanwhile to recall a rare public speech Mr. Helms gave in April 1971, before any of the known incidents had occurred, in which he spoke with feeling and sensitivity of the difficult role of a secret intelligence agency in a free society. The CIA operates "under constant supervision and direction of the National Security Council," he said. It assumes only "normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information . . . In short, we do not target on American citizens."

To the extent that the integrity of the professional intelligence community may have been compromised, we think it necessary to look first to the White House. It was the men there who in their cavalier abuse of power and their contempt for the institutions of American government—even an institution as sensitive as the CIA—tried but, it seems, largely failed to compromise and subvert the CIA.

Dean Sought CIA Funds

Agency Rejected Plea

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

White House aides seeking to enlist CIA aid in covering up the Watergate case last summer tried to get agency officials to pay "scared" and "wobbling" witnesses from top secret funds, apparently to hide their connection with the Nixon reelection campaign, a top CIA official has charged.

According to an affidavit by the CIA deputy director, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, prepared Saturday and made available late yesterday, former White House counsel John W. Dean III specifically asked that "covert action funds" be used to pay bail costs and salaries for the Watergate burglars.

Use of funds earmarked for foreign "covert actions" normally requires a directive from the President himself. Dean was "much taken aback," Walters reported, when he was told CIA funds could not be used for domestic purposes without specific approval by Congress.

ACCORDING TO Walters' affidavit, which in most respects paralleled his closed-door testimony in recent days before a Senate committee, Dean made this request June 27, 1972 — 10 days after a team of five headed by a former CIA agent was discovered inside Democratic party headquarters at the Watergate here.

During the meeting, Walters said, Dean "reviewed the Watergate case, saying that some witnesses were getting scared and were 'wobbling.' I said that no matter how scared they got, they could not involve the CIA because it was not involved in the bugging of the Watergate."

See CIA, Page A-6

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, May 17, 1973
A-21
**

CIA: Dean Sought Secret Funds

Continued From Page A-1

Dean then made his request: "He then asked if the CIA could not furnish bail and pay the suspects' salaries while they were in jail, using covert action funds for the purpose."

IN MAKING the request Dean was asking the CIA deputy to draw on a top secret fund which is specifically committed in the CIA's budget, itself highly classified, to clandestine operations overseas.

The covert action fund is under the jurisdiction of the deputy director of plans, the agency's department of "dirty tricks," and is used for such secret operations as bribing candidates or voters in elections and meddling more violently in the domestic affairs of other nations. The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the 1953 coup that restored the Shah to control of Iran, or the more recent clandestine war in Laos were all eligible for funding from the covert action fund.

Under CIA operating regulations, set forth in a series of highly classified memorandums handed down by the National Security Councils of successive presidents, covert action operations and their funding must be cleared by the top-secret "Forty Committee" in the White House.

THIS COMMITTEE, named after a numbered National Security Council memorandum, is the successor to the similarly named "303 Committee." It is composed of representatives from CIA, the State Department the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs, and is chaired by Henry A. Kissinger. It is responsible for approving all clandestine operations by CIA operatives, and it carries the express authority of President Nixon.

Walters rejected Dean's request out of hand. His affidavit continues:

"I replied that this was out of the question. It would implicate the agency in something in which it was not implicated." He added, in an evident reference to the Forty Committee. "Any such action by the agency would imply an order from the highest level, and I would not be a party to any such action."

He also pointed out that using the covert action fund for a domestic operation would violate another CIA regulation designed to keep the agency, which is governed by the National Security Act of 1947, out of internal security operations. When the CIA spent money for operations inside the United States, Walters explained, "We had to report this to the Oversight Committees of the agency in Congress."

THIS WAS a clear warning to Dean that the White House group he represented, which included H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, could not rely on a CIA cover to hide payments to the Watergate burglars. It evidently dismayed Dean.

"He was much taken aback by this." Walters reports, adding that Dean at length agreed that "the risks of implicating the CIA and FBI in this matter would be enormous."

Walters added: "I said that what was now a painful wound could become a mortal one. What was now a 'conventional explosion could be turned into a multi-megaton explosion."

Dean's request for covert funds to pay the Watergate suspects was evidently the second part of a White House effort to enlist the CIA in covering up the source of funds for the Watergate team's finances.

Earlier, according to the Walter's affidavit and to Senate testimony made public in recent days. Haldeman and Ehrlichman had tried to order CIA interference in an FBI probe of campaign funds which had been "laundered" through a Mexico City bank.

Meanwhile, in a continuing probe of CIA responsibility in the case former CIA Director Richard M. Helms faces two committees today: Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri's Armed Services Committee, where Walters made his disclosures earlier this week, and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan's intelligence subcommittee of House Armed Services.

Helms yesterday reportedly told a special subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee chaired by John L. McClellan, D-Ark., that he had been concerned by what White House aides were ordering the CIA to do in covering up Watergate, but that Helms made no effort to warn President Nixon what was going on.

Helms, currently ambassador to Iran, has been recalled from his post to explain CIA involvement with White House staff operations. He will be on call for further testimony. McClellan said.

The Senator said that three White House aides implicated in administration efforts to involve the CIA in domestic operations would be called on to testify: Haldeman, Ehrlichman and David R. Young.

According to McClellan's account, Helms, in most details, corroborated the earlier testimony of Walters that Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean sought CIA interference in an FBI investigation related to the Watergate case.

"Mr. Helms and the CIA . . were seriously imposed upon," McClellan said. "They tried to do as little as they could, and finally refused to do what was required of them."

McClellan said Helms was "concerned" when Haldeman and Ehrichman sought CIA interference in an FBI probe of the Republican campaign funds which were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank before winding up in the bank account of one of the Watergate conspirators.

Helms was likewise aware of a White House request that the CIA pay bail charges for five men arrested in the Watergate last June and pay their salaries.

THE CIA director did not, however, try to tell Nixon about it, McClellan said. "He didn't feel he was called on to go to the President. As I understand the facts, he remained silent."

Helms, as director of Central Intelligence and enjoying enhanced authority after a 1971 reorganization of the intelligence community, could report directly to the President and the National Security Council.

Asked if he would have done the same thing in Helms' position, McClellan told reporters, "I think I would have warned the President. I would have come forward if I thought a cloud was being cast over my agency."

McClellan, however, refused to criticize Helms directly for his reticence. "These requests were coming from the President's top men," McClellan pointed out.

Watergate

AS NIXON PICKS UP THE PIECES

Big changes are taking place—with the President moving to restore confidence in the White House, seeking to rebuild an Administration damaged by the Watergate scandal.

—Wide World Photo

A sweeping overhaul of the Executive Branch of the Government is now under way as President Nixon picks up the pieces of the Watergate wreckage.

Some of the President's closest friends and most-trusted advisers have resigned or been swept out of office. As May began, only a few of their places had yet been filled on a permanent basis. More shifts were foreseen.

The Watergate scandal itself kept on spreading. Almost every day a new development pointed an accusing finger at some new victim. Forecasts were that a federal grand jury, when it completes its investigation, will hand down a number of criminal indictments—including the names of several men who served at the side of the President.

Some processes of government were slowed as the housecleaning removed key administrators or shifted them to new jobs. Most heavily affected were the White House itself, which lost top members of its staff; the Defense Department, left temporarily without a full-time chief; the Justice Department, put under new management; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with its second Acting Director in a year; and the Environmental Protection Agency, whose administrator was shifted to the FBI.

There were omens of trouble for the President in his efforts to win enactment of his legislative program. And the Nixon hope of building a "new majority" to extend his party's control of the Government was conceded to have been set back.

In the President's time of political trouble one bright ray shone through for him: On May 2, John Connally, a former Texas Governor who had served 18 months in the Nixon Cabinet, switched from the Democratic to the Republican Party. That story begins on page 26.

—Crockett in "Washington Star-News"

The Republican Party which Mr. Connally joined was riven by dissension. Many Republicans, looking to future elections, were trying to disassociate themselves from the Watergate affair—and all who had any connection with it.

Democrats are seizing on the scandal as an opportunity to strengthen their hands in their battles with President Nixon in Congress and with the Republicans in the coming elections of 1974 and 1976.

All this was in the mind of the President as he made a big move on April 30.

Responsibility accepted. In a dramatic appearance on nationwide television, Mr. Nixon denied personal guilt in the burglarization and bugging of the Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate complex last June. But he accepted "full responsibility"—as the boss—for what the appointees did.

Saying "there can be no whitewash at the White House," he pledged action to purge his Administration of the possibility for such abuses in the future. The full text of the Nixon address begins on page 70.

A purge of the President's official family began even before he spoke.

Among those resigning were H. R. Haldeman, the White House chief of staff, and John Ehrlichman, the President's top adviser on domestic affairs.

Both had been named in leaked reports to the press as implicated in an attempt to cover up the involvement of

(continued on next page)

[continued from preceding page]

White House aides in the bugging plot. The acceptance of their resignations was described by Mr. Nixon as "one of the most difficult decisions of my Presidency," and he praised them as "two of the finest public servants" he knew.

There was no such expression of presidential unhappiness at the simultaneous departure of John W. Dean III, the White House legal counsel. It was Mr. Dean who had been ordered to make the original investigation and report which the President used as the basis for denying for months any involvement by anyone on his staff.

Out, at the same time, went Attorney General Richard Kleindienst. Although not personally linked with the bugging, he said he resigned because of his close relations with some persons involved.

To replace Mr. Kleindienst as Attorney General—and to take over the Watergate prosecution—Mr. Nixon appointed Elliot Richardson. An old friend, Mr. Richardson had already served Mr. Nixon as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, then as Secretary of Defense.

President Nixon described Mr. Richardson as "a man of unimpeachable integrity" and said:

"I have given him absolute authority to make all decisions bearing upon the prosecution of the Watergate case and related matters. I have instructed him that if he should consider it appropriate, he has the authority to name a special supervising prosecutor for matters arising out of the case."

This idea of a special prosecutor, independent of the Administration, drew strong support in Congress, and Mr. Richardson indicated to several Senators that he would bring in such a man.

With the Watergate's criminal prosecution placed in new and trusted hands, the President turned to rebuilding the shattered command structure of his Administration for the tasks of governing the nation that lie ahead.

The rebuilding begins. Among President Nixon's early moves were these:

- David Packard was tagged as his choice to succeed Mr. Richardson as Secretary of Defense. Mr. Packard, a California industrialist, was Deputy Defense Secretary 1969 through 1971.
- Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., was brought back to the White House as coordinator of the President's staff, succeeding Mr. Haldeman.

General Haig's term of service was described as indefinite—perhaps long term. Since January, he has been Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Before that, he served in the White House as chief deputy to Mr. Nixon's national-security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger.

More than faces are changing at the White House. Big changes are predicted in the way the White House is run.

The immense power that was concentrated in the hands of Mr. Haldeman is expected to be decentralized. Until the reorganization of the White House is completed, Mr. Nixon's Cabinet officers were instructed to work more closely with these four assistants: Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., Executive Director of the Domestic Council; Stephen B. Bull and David N. Parker, special assistants to the President.

Vice President Spiro T. Agnew is to play an increased role in overseeing operations of the Domestic Council. The responsibility of top-level contact with Governors and mayors is also being restored to the Vice President.

The "super-cabinet" that Mr. Nixon set up a few months ago becomes more important now. President Nixon will rely heavily on these men who serve both as department heads and as counselors to the President: Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Caspar Weinberger, Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development James T. Lynn.

The President told his Cabinet that the National Security Council, under Henry Kissinger, and the legislative-liaison staff, under William Timmons, will carry on as before.

There are to be more meetings of the Cabinet in the future than in the past. Mr. Nixon will count on Cabinet members for information and advice he used to get mainly from White House aides.

Changes in system? The rigid staff system that Mr. Nixon brought to the White House may be a thing of the past. As one aide said:

"The staff system is Richard Nixon. If it changes, he has to change—and I believe he will. I feel that from now on there will be less reliance on the staff, more reliance on the presidential counselors and the Cabinet."

A major aim in all these changes, in the view of informed insiders, is to end what critics have called the "isolation" of the President—to ensure that he



—UPI Photo

General Haig, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, was brought back to the White House to take the place of H.R. Haldeman as chief of the President's staff. He served earlier as deputy to national-security adviser Henry Kissinger.

MAJOR CHANGES IN NIXON COMMAND

OUT—Some top-level aides

Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General.

H. R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff.

John D. Ehrlichman, top domestic adviser to the President.

John W. Dean III, legal counsel to the President.

L. Patrick Gray III, Acting Director of the FBI.

Jeb Stuart Magruder, Assistant Secretary of Commerce.

Gordon Strachan, general counsel to the U. S. Information Agency, former aide to Mr. Haldeman.

IN—Old hands in new jobs

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., chosen interim chief of the White House staff, moving from the post of Army Vice Chief of Staff.

Elliot L. Richardson, nominated as Attorney General, moving over from job as Secretary of Defense.

William D. Ruckelshaus, named as Acting Director of FBI, former Director of Environmental Protection Agency.

Leonard Garment, named acting legal counsel to the President, moving from post as special consultant.

gets more information from more different sources than in the past.

It is charged that a major reason why Mr. Nixon was so long in moving on the Watergate affair was that his close aides screened him away from information making the public rounds that he should have received.

No matter who eventually fills the White House vacancies, they are expected to be men with a "more realistic" attitude toward Congress than the men they succeed.

Said one close Nixon associate:

"I think the President realizes that he needs people in those jobs who will have a little more sophistication—a better understanding of Washington and Congress. The capital is a city of compromise. You just can't have it your way all the time. Both Ehrlichman and Haldeman, although devoted to Nixon, did not have an understanding of Washington or Congress."

Some White House compromises with Congress are predicted in the weeks ahead—but not necessarily because of Watergate. "It's just part of the job of doing business in Washington," as one insider put it. From another insider came this comment:

"Nixon cannot afford to let Watergate soften his stern stand against high spending. If we permit weakness to develop because of Watergate in our dealings with Congress or with the bureaucracy or with foreign countries, then we have had it. We might just as well pack up and go home. All the goals we are striving for must be sought just as earnestly as before Watergate."

A sampling of opinion of congressional leaders—in both parties—indicates that the President's "clout" with lawmakers has been diminished by Watergate. Some predict he may lose a few close tests he would have won.

Yet, it is suggested, the departure of White House aides who were never popular with lawmakers might open the way to an era of better relations.

On the President's action to clear up the Watergate affair, many members of Congress—including some Republicans—feel he did not go far enough.

On President Nixon's ability to pick up the pieces and rebuild his Administration, a widely held view in Congress is expressed by one leader in these words:

"Yes, he can—but he'll have to pay more attention to Congress and he'll have to be tough on prosecuting the guilty in the Watergate case."

How the lid blew, page 20; key men in new jobs, 24; the Connally story, 26; text of President's address, 70; world reaction to Watergate, 75.

INVESTIGATORS TURN ATTENTION TO MILLIONS IN SECRET CAMPAIGN FUNDS

EXPLOSIVE NEW disclosures on Nixon re-election campaign funds are widening the scandal erupting from the Watergate case.

A rush of sensational developments came early in May.

On May 4, sworn testimony of Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., former treasurer of the Committee to Re-Elect the President revealed this:

Mr. Sloan said he destroyed the original records of between 1 million and 2 million dollars in cash contributions on orders of Maurice Stans, former U. S. Secretary of Commerce and finance chief of the re-election committee.

Maurice Stans. His handling of political contributions comes under fire.

The testimony was given in a deposition taken in connection with a suit against the re-election committee by Common Cause, a public-interest lobby. The suit demands an airing of campaign contributions made before the new federal election law took effect last April 7.

Also on May 4: "The New York Times" said that Herbert W. Kalmbach, California lawyer who was President Nixon's personal attorney, has told Government investigators he destroyed all records of campaign contributions he handled before the new federal law became operative.

Investigators are focusing on three sets of secret funds, according to "The Washington Post."

One—linked directly to the Watergate bugging operation—was a cash hoard said to have been kept in a safe in Mr. Stans's office. It is said to have fluctuated from $350,000 to $700,000 or more.

A second account, reported to have contained up to $500,000, was kept in a Newport Beach, Calif., bank, under Mr. Kalmbach's name.

The third fund, "The Post" said, amounted to $350,000 kept in a safe at the White House, allegedly under the jurisdiction of H. R. Haldeman, who resigned on April 30 as Mr. Nixon's chief of staff. This money, the newspaper said, was shifted from the re-election committee to the White House before April 7.

The grand jury investigating the Watergate case is attempting to determine whether "hush money" for the seven convicted conspirators came from the secret funds. That issue is certain to figure importantly in coming Senate hearings.

Campaign agent indicted. One way in which campaign money was spent was suggested on May 4 when a federal grand jury in Orlando, Fla., indicted Donald H. Segretti, a paid agent of Nixon campaign officials. He was charged with being the author of fake and scurrilous smear letters circulated in an attempt to sabotage Senator Edmund S. Muskie (Dem.), of Maine, in the 1972 Florida presidential primary.

A federal grand jury in New York is investigating a $200,000 donation to the Nixon campaign by Robert Vesco, a target of fraud charges made by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mr. Stans and former U. S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell, who resigned as campaign chief two weeks after the Watergate break-in, are figures in that inquiry.

On May 2, the Justice Department accused the re-election committee of "failing to make required reports on a $200,000 contribution."

As the campaign scandal grew, ousted White House legal counsel John W. Dean III announced publicly May 4 he had placed Watergate-case documents in a safe-deposit box because he feared his White House safe might be burglarized.

HOW THE LID BLEW OFF

Almost obscured by the White House crisis are the latest details of the Watergate story itself. Added together, they forced the President to act.

IT WAS A SERIES of rapid, dramatic developments that moved President Nixon to action in the long-festering Watergate scandal.

For nine months after the break-in at Democratic Party headquarters in Washington's Watergate complex last June 17, it appeared that the bizarre episode might come to a dead end with the conviction of the seven men arrested in the bugging plot.

Indictment and trial had failed to break the silence of the defendants.

What was described as a massive probe by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the then Acting Director L. Patrick Gray III shed no public light on whether "higher-ups" were involved.

All this time, President Nixon—relying, he said, on reports from trusted aides—continued to absolve publicly members of his White House staff.

The McCord letter. Suddenly, on March 23, the lid blew off.

On that day, U. S. District Court Judge John J. Sirica made public a letter to him from convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord, Jr.

The letter charged perjury at the trial of the "Watergate Seven," pressure on the defendants to keep silent and plead guilty, and involvement of other persons.

From that day forward there were sensational developments almost daily.

But these developments lacked official verification. Instead, as reported in "The Washington Post," "The Washington Star-News," "The New York Times" and other newspapers, they were based on leaks, hearsay, the allegations of unidentified "reliable sources," and other material ferreted out by newsmen.

The news stories told of furious infighting behind the scenes.

"To save the Presidency." It was reported that on March 20—a day after Mr. McCord wrote his letter to Judge Sirica and three days before it was made public—White House counsel John W. Dean III told the President this: "To save the Presidency," Mr. Dean and the Chief Executive's two top assistants, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, would have to tell all they knew about the bugging plot and a cover-up, and face the consequences.

John N. Mitchell says he refused to approve plan to bug Democrats.

H. R. Haldeman resigned as chief of President's White House staff.

John W. Dean III was ousted by Mr. Nixon as White House legal counsel.

Meanwhile, Mr. McCord was being questioned in secret session by Senate investigators. Word leaked that he named Mr. Dean and Jeb Stuart Magruder, former deputy manager of the Nixon Campaign Committee, as having known of the espionage conspiracy.



The Watergate complex. Circled area was scene of the break-in on June 17, 1972.

—UPI, Wide World Photos

John D. Ehrlichman quit post as the President's top assistant for domestic affairs.

Next, news reports said that Mr. McCord had implicated John N. Mitchell, former U. S. Attorney General and campaign chief.

Mr. Mitchell, who had resigned as campaign director two weeks after the break-in, denounced the implication as "slanderous."

First casualty. More was to be heard from Mr. Mitchell later. But first, Mr. Gray became a Watergate casualty. On April 5, when it became clear that because of Senators' dissatisfaction with his role in the bugging investigation he could not be confirmed as FBI Director, the President, at Mr. Gray's request,

(continued on next news page)

WATERGATE HISTORY

[continued from page 20]

withdrew the nomination. But Mr. Gray stayed on as Acting Director.

On April 14, Mr. Mitchell was summoned to the White House for a secret conference.

That week-end, there were other developments. At a meeting in his "hideaway" office in the Executive Office Building, Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen told Mr. Nixon that witnesses were changing stories and pointing accusing fingers.

It was this information that led the President to announce on April 17 that he had learned of "serious charges" and that he was personally taking over the investigation of possible White House involvement—a probe that had been handled from the beginning by Mr. Dean.

Mr. Nixon did not disclose the nature of the information. But news stories on April 19 said that Mr. Magruder was ready to tell a federal grand jury that he helped plan the Watergate invasion along with Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell—and that Mr. Mitchell had arranged payments to buy the silence of the convicted conspirators.

Mr. Dean issued a statement declaring that he refused to be made a "scapegoat" in the scandal. Mr. Kleindienst—because of "close personal and professional relationships" with persons against whom allegations were being made—removed himself from the Justice Department's investigation, which was left in Mr. Peterson's hands. On April 30, he resigned as Attorney General.

On April 20, Mr. Mitchell testified before the grand jury. He told reporters later that early in 1972 he had attended three meetings at which bugging the Democrats was discussed—one while he was still Attorney General—but that he had refused to approve the plans.

Also on that day, news stories reported that Mr. Dean was ready to implicate Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman in a cover-up of the scandal. Next day, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman—who have steadfastly maintained their innocence of any wrongdoing—retained a noted Washington trial attorney, John J. Wilson.

Side issues. Throughout the hectic course of the Watergate investigations, related but unsubstantiated charges of improper involvement by campaign officials in other activities were headlined.

For example, "The Washington Post" reported on April 24 that a grand jury in New York was investigating a $200,000 cash contribution to the Nixon campaign by Robert Vesco, target of a fraud

—Wide World Photo

Charges by James W. McCord, Jr., led to explosive developments.

investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The newspaper said the grand jury was concentrating on the roles of Mr. Mitchell and Maurice Stans, former U. S. Secretary of Commerce, who was finance chief of the re-election campaign.

On April 27, Mr. Gray resigned from his FBI post in the wake of published reports that, after a White House meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean, he had destroyed documents from the files of convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt, Jr. Mr. Gray said that, when the documents were disposed of, he was unaware of their nature.

The material allegedly included phony State Department cables, fabricated so as to link the late President John F. Kennedy with the 1963 assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, as well as documents bearing on the Chappaquiddick tragedy involving Senator Edward M. Kennedy, in which a young woman was drowned.

Another burglary? Still another bizarre development came at the Pentagon Papers trial of Daniel Ellsberg in Los Angeles.

On April 27, Federal Judge W. Matthew Byrne, Jr., received a copy of a memorandum from Earl J. Silbert, prosecutor in the Watergate case. The memo said Mr. Silbert had information that convicted Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt, Jr., and G. Gordon Liddy had burglarized the Los Angeles office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

On May 1, Judge Byrne handed to defense attorneys the report of an FBI interview with Mr. Ehrlichman, conducted on April 27.

The report quoted Mr. Ehrlichman as saying he had hired Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to investigate the Pentagon Papers matter "directly out of the White House," and that part of that inquiry was preparation of a "psychological profile" of Mr. Ellsberg.

The FBI said that Mr. Ehrlichman learned of the break-in at the psychiatrist's office—which occurred in 1971—after it had taken place and that he instructed Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy "not to do it again."

The exodus. Such sidelights distracted public attention only momentarily from the Watergate scandal and its still-to-be-answered questions.

In letters of resignation on April 30, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman affirmed their innocence of wrongdoing and expressed confidence that they would be vindicated.

As the greatly broadened affair headed for further grand-jury proceedings and televised hearings before a Senate investigating committee, the spotlight was on Mr. Dean. News stories gave this account of events that put him in the role of star witness:

The 34-year-old lawyer—fired from his job as counsel to the President on April 30—was described as having become convinced weeks ago that he had been misled by his superiors, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.

Mr. Dean was said to have gone to federal prosecutors to tell his story. Within hours, according to the published accounts, the prosecutors confronted Mr. Magruder with allegations that he had committed perjury in denying knowledge of the bugging plot, and then received from him confirmation of a series of meetings hatching the conspiracy early in 1972.

From that point, the news stories said, the grand-jury probe had a different focus—and new information was accumulated by the President in his own investigation.

All of this led to the dramatic actions announced by Mr. Nixon on April 30.

But neither the resignations of top aides nor the President's televised address on the night of April 30 cleared away the Watergate mystery.

In its editions of May 2, "The New York Times" quoted Government investigators as saying they have evidence that high-ranking officials of the White House and the campaign committee conspired to arrange a cover-up designed to obstruct the investigation.

Involved, according to "The Times" account, were Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, and Frederick C. LaRue, a former White House aide.

The sequence of sensational events has set the stage for further revelations through the grand jury, the courts, and Senate hearings.

So far, the scandal has been brought before the public mainly through "leaks," information from anonymous "sources" and hearsay. The full story—told under oath and spread upon the official record—is still to come.

[illegible] DAILY NEWS
Monday, May 14, 1973

MILTON VIORST

Bureaucrats and Watergate

As the ripples of Watergate widen, it becomes painfully obvious that not merely the White House staff became corrupted. The rot has penetrated deeply into the vast network of the federal bureaucracy.

We have known for some time that the FBI compromised itself by funneling reports of the Watergate investigations to the political operators in the White House.

The indictment of one former attorney general, the resignation of another and the persistent suggestions of negligence on the part of the federal team of prosecutors make it apparent that the Justice Department was no model of integrity, either.

Now we are told that Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson and Deputy Undersecretary William Macomber, both old-school-tie types, gave access to highly secret documents to the bandits of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

And the CIA assisted in plans for the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist — perhaps with the authorization of Richard Helms, the ex-director, but surely with the concurrence of Gen. Robert Cushman, then the CIA's deputy director and now the commandant of the Marine Corps. This information reflects well on neither the CIA nor the Marines.

Conceivably, one can understand and even rationalize the conduct of H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, who have long known and served Richard Nixon, whose loyalty to Nixon superseded all others, whose station in life depended on Nixon's re-election.

But how does one explain the willingness of such distinguished professionals as Johnson and Macomber, Helms and Cushman, to acquiesce in these dirty little games?

I don't know the answer to that question — but I suspect it is one of the most serious raised by the Watergate affair. For if the whole bureaucracy can be infected by a few rogues in the White House, then we can have no confidence in our government and our national penchant for cynicism is justified.

I suspect part of the problem is that our country lacks the tradition of a strong, self-confident and esteemed civil service. We tend to denigrate our professionals as mere "bureaucrats." The President himself periodically threatens and fumes at the bureaucrats. The secretary of state regularly casts aspersions on the members of his own department.

In England and France and Japan, countries where the civil service tradition is solid, professional functionaries have a sense of themselves and of their responsibilities. Governments may come and go — but they stay on to serve the state. Their duty is to continuity, not to fleeting opportunism.

Ideally, this ought to mean that our bureaucracy is more flexible than others, able to adapt to political shifts and social changes. But I don't think that's the case. I suspect our bureaucracy simply has less commitment to ongoing responsibilities — and more vulnerability to the whims and weaknesses of whoever comes along to exercise power.

That's why it's so important that the President set a tone of unwavering integrity. The President establishes the moral atmosphere in which the White House staff functions. He also sends out the signals by which the bureaucracy operates.

But the signals the bureaucracy has received from Richard Nixon are the firing of Ernest Fitzgerald and the attempted firing of Gordon Rule for exposing waste at the Pentagon, a massive shakeup in the Bureau of Labor Statistics because Nixon didn't like publication of unfavorable statistics, a replacement of competent secretaries of commerce and interior with new men more suitable to campaign contributors.

Nixon, unmistakably, has been saying that what the administration requires is not nonpartisan dedication to the nation but unswerving loyalty to its own political well-being.

So when John Ehrlichman calls the CIA and says the President wants the agency to bend the law and help in the Ellsberg investigation, Helms may dislike the order, but doesn't challenge it.

Actually, maybe the President never told Ehrlichman to phone. But that's not the key issue. The President established the ground rules by which this administration has operated. And the CIA officials, no less than Ehrlichman, simply carried them out.

What Watergate is telling us, then, is that the Nixon legacy is the suborning of the federal establishment. And I doubt that Nixon, in the remaining years, has the means — or the will — to undo that legacy.

Haldeman, Dean Pressed CIA

NEW CONTACTS DISCLOSED

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

White House aides H.R. Haldeman and John W. Dean III both participated in efforts to involve the Central Intelligence Agency in domestic activities on behalf of the Nixon administration during 1971 and 1972, Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., said today.

Symington, contiuning a Senate investigation of the CIA's role in helping the September 1971 burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, told reporters today he had learned of new evidence of White House efforts to bring the agency in on its operations.

Symington refused to give any details, but it was clear from what he told reporters during a break in committee hearings that the additional attempts to involve the CIA took place after the burglary.

Symington did stress that the operations did not involve the bugging of Democratic National headquarters at the Watergate in 1972, suggesting more undercover activities are yet to be disclosed.

"I was surprised to learn that not only (John D.) Ehrlichman and Dean were involved, but that Haldeman was also," Symington said. "They were involved up to their ears."

Although Symington indicated he knew of earlier Dean involvement, his reference today to Dean was the first disclosure that the former White House counsel was somehow involved in White House contacts with the CIA as well as the first news of Haldeman's role.

IT WAS revealed last week that Ehlichman, President Nixon's chief domestic aide, personally intervened to gain CIA cooperation with Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt in an operation that later turned out to be the burglary of Ellsberg's analyst. Symington declined to give any details of Dean's or Haldeman's actions.

The key informant in today's revelations was the present deputy director of the CIA, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who held that post from early 1972. Walters testified today before Symington's armed services sub-committee on intelligence.

What Walters revealed, Symington said concerned attempts by the White House team of Haldeman, Ehlichman and Dean to involve the CIA in unspecified operations during the time he was deputy director—that is, during 1972.

Also present to testify today was Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., a Marine Corps commandant who was CIA deputy director in 1971, when the Ellsberg burglary occurred. Cushman has already admitted that the CIA, at Ehrlichman's request, gave Hunt false documents, disguises and other equipment when he was planning the burglary.

WITH CUSHMAN and Walters in the committee room were also James R. Schlesinger the out-going CIA director who has been designated secretary of Defense, and William E. Colby, who has been named to succeed him.

In his testimony last week and in a formal affi-

Continued on Page A-2

CIA

Continued From Page A-1

davit made public Friday, Cushman said the former CIA director, Richard M. Helms, gave his assent to the support the agency gave Hunt in what was clearly to be a domestic operation.

The national Security Act of 1947, under whose authority the CIA operates, expressly forbids the agency to engage in any internal security or domestic police operations.

Helms, now ambassador to Iran, has been called to testify before Symington's subcommittee and also two other Congressrional units probing CIA activities during 1971 and 72 — the Pentagon Papers-Watergate period.

Symington said Helms would testify to his group later this week, but a precise date has not been set. Helms' travel plans are not being formally announced, but he left Tehran over the weekend and is believed to be in Washington now.

HS/HC-950

"STAR", 16 MAY 1973

Musical Chairs

White House

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

The White House last summer pressured the Central Intelligence Agency to help high administration officials conceal their part in the Watergate conspiracy, a Senate committee has reportedly been told.

According to several fragmentary accounts of closed-door testimony by CIA officials appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday, the agency was urged by White House aides to extend the "cover" of CIA employment to some of the Watergate break-in team and to help conceal the financing of the operation.

The CIA refused both requests, it was reported.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., acting chairman of the committee for the special investigation, disclosed yesterday that former White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John W. Dean III were involved in efforts to implicate the CIA in domestic activities on behalf of the Nixon administration.

SYMINGTON declined, however, to give any details of what Dean and Haldeman tried to do. Last week it emerged from depositions by CIA officials that John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's chief domestic aide, personally intervened to win agency cooperation in the 1971 mission which led to the burglary of the psychiatrist of Pentagon Papers case defendant Daniel Ellsburg. Symington promised to disclose more at a news conference scheduled for later today.

It emerged from other sources that the White House triumvirate, apparently with Haldeman taking the lead, sought active CIA help in covering up the role of administration higher-ups in Watergate.

Specific details were scanty, but the scheme reportedly had two main facets:

FIRST, the CIA was to revise its employment records to restore to its payroll two former employes involved in the break-in—E. Howard Hunt, a retired 20-year CIA veteran who was also involved in the Ellsberg burglarly, and James W. McCord Jr., another CIA veteran who was among those arrested in the Watergate complex June 17.

At the same time, the CIA was asked to add to its payroll the so-called "Miami Four" — the Cuban-American operatives whom Hunt and coconspirator G. Gordon Liddy had hired as foot soldiers in the scheme. Two of these men also apparently took part in the Ellsberg burglary.

SECOND, the CIA was asked to help cover the tracks of administration officials in using Republican campaign contributions which apparently had been earmarked for political espionage during the 1972 political season.

In this connection, the CIA was reportedly asked to help cloud traces of about $89,000 in campaign contributions which were "laundered" through a Mexico City bank account before winding up in the bank account of Bernard Barker, one of the Watergate operatives.

While precise details of the proposals were lacking, the testimony appeared in some respects to support the claim advanced by McCord in a May 7 memo to the special Senate committee investigating Watergate that higher-ups behind the plot tried to put some of the responsibility on the CIA.

THE KEY witness before the committee yesterday was Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, who has been deputy director of the CIA since May 1972 — a month before Watergate.

Speaking to reporters after the morning committee session, Symington revealed for the first time that Haldeman and Dean had been implicated in importuning the CIA on behalf of the White House. These overtures, he said, had been made during Walters' tenure as deputy director.

Ehrlichman had been named last week as the administration official who approached Walters' predecessor, Ge. Robert E. Cushman, to request help for Hunt's operations investigaging the Pentagon Papers leak during 1971.

According to affidavits and statements from Cushman, now Marine Corps commandant, and CIA director James R. Schlesinger, the association with Hunt was broken off in late August 1971 — just a week before Hunt, Liddy and the Cuban group carried out the burglary of Ellsberg's pyschiatrist's office in Los Angeles.

LT. GEN. WALTERS

DESPITE this rebuff, however, it apparently emerged from Walters' testimony yesterday that Haldeman and Dean returned to the agency with new approaches after the Watergate burglary, nearly a year later.

From Symington's account of the committee session, Walters had most of his dealings with Haldeman, whose name had not before yesterday been linked with covert administration contacts with the CIA

Dean's role is still unclear, but a hint may have

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, May 15, 1973

Pressure on CIA Indicated

emerged in U.S. District Court yesterday during a hearing into the disposition of classified documents relating to Watergate which Dean had sequestered in a safe deposit box until turning them over to the court yesterday.

Under questioning from Chief Judge John J. Sirica, Dean disclosed that the papers bore the obscure security classification "Top secret — handle via commint channels." This is an extremely sensitive classification denoting a highly restricted status that is used primarily in the intelligence community.

"COMMINT" refers to "communications intelligence," the highly classified procedure of intercepting foreign diplomatic and intelligence messages that is quietly carried on by both the CIA and the Pentagon's intelligence establishment.

Presumably, Richard M. Helms, who was CIA director during the period of the reported Dean-Ehrlichman-Haldeman overtures, was instrumental in turning down the post-Watergate request for help.

According to Cushman's affidavit in the case last week,.' Helms at first approved the decision to supply false documents, disguises and other undercover equipment to the Hunt group.

That earlier association was broken off because it was feared Hunt's machinations were involving the CIA in domestic operations of a sort which are expressly forbidden by the federal law.

Helms, now ambassador to Iran, has been called back to Washington to testify before several congressional committees investigating CIA links with the Ellsberg burglary. He is scheduled to testify tomorrow before Sen. John L. McClellan, D-Ark., sitting as the intelligence subcommittee of the appropriations committee.

IN CONNECTION with the Mexican campaign contribution issue, the Associated Press reported today that Walters postponed FBI interviews with Mexican lawyer Manuel Ogarrio Daguerre and Minneapolis attorney Kenneth H. Dahlberg. The two men's names appeared on the checks that ended up in Barker's account. These checks eventually furnished a link between the wiretappers and the Nixon re-election committee.

Walters told acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III that the CIA was interested in the two lawyers. But Gray earlier had been told by Walters' boss, Helms, that the CIA was not involved in the case.

Gray, according to an authoritative account of statements he made to Senate investigators last week, then arranged a meeting to straighten out the difficulty.

BUT CHRLICHMAN called Gray and canceled the meeting, the Associated Press said, leading to an argument between the two men over who was running the FBI's investigation. According to the account, Ehrlichman conceded that Gray was in charge, but the meeting was canceled anyway. This was June 28, 11 days after the break-in at Democratic offices at the Watergate building.

On July 6, according to Gray's reported statement to Senate investigators, Gray finally forced from Walters a written admission that in fact the CIA had no interest in Dahlberg or Ogarrio. Gray said he and Walters agreed President Nixon should be informed because "this confusion was just not normal in most investigations."

Gray talked to Nixon by telephone, told him of "confusion" between the CIA and FBI, blamed it on "either carelessness or indifference of White House personnel," and warned Nixon that the situation "could wound the President."

Walters' testimony yesterday apparently confirmed much of Gray's account, and gave a number of details about the coverup attempt, the Associated Press said.

ARMY

April 19



Strategic Intelligence

Estimating The Threat: A Soldier's Job



In his landmark book, *The Soldier and the State,* Professor Samuel P. Huntington draws our attention to an extremely important and sometimes neglected fact:

> The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security, and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. . . .

So, the reason for the existence of our armed forces is to counter threats to our security, and the function, composition and size of those forces depend on the perception of threats by the national leadership. If the military profession loses its role in describing these threats to national security, it surrenders much of its influence in decisions about military strategy, military force structure and the nature of its own armaments.

We have in the past ten years come perilously close to losing this vital role. The impact of the intelligence views of the Department of Defense was progressively weakened between 1960 and 1970, and the voice of civilian agencies in all facets of military intelligence became progressively more dominant. The military budgets carried the onus of heavy outlays for intelligence collection, but the key intelligence judgments derived from this costly effort were for the most part made in other agencies.

This situation can be too easily dismissed as the result of bureaucratic maneuvering, of "whiz kids" ignoring military advice, or of the general growth of anti-military sentiment in and out of government. The fact is that the muting of the military voice in military intelligence was largely of our own doing. Military professionals—both users and producers of intelligence—through failure to understand the strategic intelligence function, downgrading of the role of intelligence in general and sometimes abusing the intelligence process, have in the past produced the best arguments for taking the responsibility for threat description out of military hands. Now is the time to face these facts, and to take the attitude and the necessary steps to correct the situation.

One has little difficulty in arguing the need for good tactical intelligence among military professionals these days. One prime lesson learned in Vietnam was the fact that superior military force cannot be brought to bear in the absence of good intelligence. The Army has acted and is still acting vigorously to insure that good tactical intelligence will be available to commanders in all levels of warfare. However, we are concerned here with an area about which there is less agreement—strategic intelligence.

Strategic intelligence is that which is used to make strategic decisions. This fact is often lost sight of among planners and decision-makers. There is a tendency to think of intelligence gathered by Washington-controlled resources as "strategic" and that gathered by the commands as "tactical" or "operational" intelligence. This is nonsense. If intelligence is used to make tactical decisions, it is tactical intelligence; if it is used to make strategic decisions, it is strategic intelligence. The means by which it is collected is quite beside the point. For example, in 1950, when front-line troops reported the fact that the Chinese were crossing the Yalu, it was tactical intelligence to all levels of command in Korea, but strategic intelligence to Tokyo and Washington. On the other hand, knowledge of a new surface-to-air missile in country X is strategic intelligence to national planners but it is tactical intelligence to any air unit which may operate in the area.

It is extremely important to get this matter straight. If we don't, we will continue to have expensive bureaucratic squabbles about intelligence resources, based on spurious arguments about control echelons. Commands will jealously guard intelligence resources on the grounds of "tactical" intelligence requirements and Washing-



After the well-publicized 'missile gap' failures of the late '50s, the position of the uniformed services in national intelligence matters went into a long decline. The pendulum is now swinging back, particularly in the critical area of estimating the strength of potential enemies.

By Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham

ton intelligence agencies will fail to see that their refined "strategic" collection systems are producing a great deal of tactical intelligence, neglecting the need for quick dissemination to the commands.

The definitional dilemma is compounded somewhat by tactical decisions that are often made in Washington. This fact of military life today means that military intelligence organizations in Washington find themselves hip-deep in the tactical intelligence business, traditionally the purview of commanders in the field. Further, there is the unfortunate tendency among intelligence producers and users to associate the term "strategic" exclusively with intercontinental nuclear-strike matters. For instance, you would find few intelligence officers in the targeting business who would not consider their product "strategic" intelligence. In fact, it is not; it is essentially tactical intelligence stored up against the contingency of executing the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan).

The general conceptual confusion between tactical and strategic intelligence is jeopardizing the commanders' control of their intelligence assets. But a more serious intelligence problem, in my view, is the danger of the military profession as a whole losing the function of defining the military threat for the national leadership. The basic problem is one of confidence in the military intelligence product within the services, the Department of Defense and the other departments of government.

The intelligence products of greatest impact in the national decision-making arena are the estimates. These contain the intelligence which most heavily influences strategic decisions. They are usually predictive in nature, pulling together basic order-of-battle, technical, doctrinal, economic and political intelligence to describe overall military postures of foreign powers. The estimates project military threats from the present out two, five and ten years. Military planners are heavily dependent on these estimates in force structuring, force development and weapons development.

It is in this area that we military professionals have been in danger of losing our shirts to civilian agencies. To put it bluntly, there is a considerable body of opinion among decision-makers, in and out of the DOD, which regards threat estimates prepared by the military as being self-serving, budget-oriented and generally inflated. This gives rise to a tendency to turn to some other source for "objective" threat assessments. The suspicion exists not only with regard to broad strategic estimates—for example, trends in the manned bomber threat—but to such detailed military estimates as the ability of the Soviet field army to sustain itself in the field under various assumed levels of combat. The trend toward independent analysis has been gathering over the past ten years and there are now analytical staffs in the civilian intelligence community paralleling those of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on almost every military intelligence subject.

The responsibility for this situation to a large degree rests with the military side of the house, not with the civilian agencies. The lack of confidence in the threat estimates emanating from military intelligence agencies which caused users to request outside opinion in the early 1960s, is fully understandable. It stemmed from a series of bad overestimates, later dubbed "bomber gap," "missile gap," and "megaton gap." These and other seriously inflated estimates of less notoriety have hung like albatrosses around the necks of military intelligence officers ever since.

In its first several years of existence, DIA was plagued by the prevalent notion, even in the DOD staff, that the agency could not be counted upon for an objective threat assessment. This suspicion was reinforced by the fact that DIA did not perform well in the estimating area. The agency was harried by a combination of birth pains and the burgeoning demands for essentially tactical



U.S. Air Force

A singular lesson of Vietnam was that superior military force avails little without good intelligence: 11th Armored Cavalry troops make ready to launch an assault on entrenched enemy forces northwest of Saigon after receiving intelligence and subsequent air support.

intelligence in support of Washington-level decisions on the Vietnam war. The estimates function simply muddled along until the Agency was reorganized in 1970 by Gen. Donald V. Bennett, USA. Meanwhile, planners and decision-makers had become accustomed to going elsewhere for their threat estimates.

At first blush, it would appear that the blame for this situation can be laid at the feet of intelligence officers—first in armed services intelligence agencies and then in DIA. But this is too simple; the military intelligence *user* must take his lumps as well. Too often the user has not been content with an objective judgment from his intelligence officer—he has wanted the answer that "supports the program." While planner pressure on intelligence estimates is not nearly as blatant or widespread as some quarters would contend, there has been enough of it to make it tough to regain full confidence in the military intelligence effort.

In the service staffs the fact that the position of the intelligence chief is a notch under the other key staff chiefs almost invites planner pressures on intelligence. It takes a pretty tough-minded assistant chief of staff for intelligence to defend an estimate that runs counter to the well-laid plans of the rest of the general staff. In some ways, planner pressure is worse when it arises in the joint staff arena. Planners of all services "coordinating" an intelligence estimate are quite capable of reducing it to lowest common denominator mush. There are still some "old hands" in intelligence who are so inured to yielding before user pressures that they automatically produce threat estimates designed to please, or at least certain not to offend. These types are getting fewer, but they still exist.

When intelligence yields to consumer pressure, it cannot remain credible. When intelligence estimates are reduced to bland judgments acceptable to all planners, it is difficult to justify the expensive outlay of resources to collect intelligence. Such inoffensive pap can be produced without evidence.

Fortunately, the somewhat dismal picture outlined above has brightened measurably over the past few years. The stature of intelligence estimates produced by the military has increased considerably and the accusations of bias have abated. Several factors account for this: DIA pulled up its socks and put proper emphasis on the estimates job; a new crop of more professional, less conformist intelligence officers is available for estimating work and, most important, there is a new appreciation of the intelligence function among our military customers.

The Defense Intelligence Agency was reorganized in November, 1970. One of the key changes was the establishment of a separate directorate charged with the production of defense intelligence estimates. One of the prime reasons for this move was the fact that there was, practically speaking, no way to discover the views of the DIA director on important estimative matters. DIA views were submerged in the text of national estimates (NIE's) prepared at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and coordinated with all Washington intelligence agencies, or in the text of joint estimates which were coordinated with the service planners. The only exception to this rule was the rare dissent to a national estimate when a specific view of the DIA director was noted at the bottom of the page. DIA's institutional anonymity was, in large part, a product of the original service objections to the creation of the agency. "Running with the pack" was the one way to avoid collision with the individual services. It was bureaucratically much safer to have any substantive argument be between a service and the "intelligence community" than between a service and DIA. The trouble was that this attitude put civilian agencies in the position of final arbiters of any disagreements inside DOD on threat definition.

The new DIA directorate for estimates permitted proper attention to the estimating function.

MAJ. GEN. DANIEL O. GRAHAM, a 1946 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, now deputy director for estimates in the Defense Intelligence Agency, has served in several posts in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, and commanded the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion in U.S. Army Pacific. In Vietnam he was chief of the Current Intelligence, Indications and Estimates Division, Directorate of Intelligence Production, in the office of J2, U.S. Military Assistance Command.

Under the old setup, the estimates job was under the directorate for production, which was also charged with answering the daily intelligence mail. The heavy demand for current intelligence on Vietnam, the Middle East and other crisis areas was too urgent and too time consuming to permit much effort on the more scholarly problem of estimates. The new directorate created an adversary process on substantive issues *within* DIA. The estimators, who must defend DIA views in the DOD and national intelligence arena, frequently challenge the results of analysis from the other DIA directorates. This necessary friction causes key intelligence judgments to be thoroughly scrubbed internally, ensuring that DIA won't find itself out on a limb defending a weak argument of some single analyst, a situation which prevailed all too often under the old setup.

The new crop of analysts and estimators available to both the service intelligence offices and to DIA are indispensable to a new effort to regain respectability for military threat estimates. Intelligence specialist programs within the services—and here the Army must be singled out as having the most effective program—are paying off in the form of real professionals capable of making objective assessments of the evidence on hand and defending the intelligence product among their fellow officers. On the civilian side, the new generation of analysts who have entered DIA are not afflicted with an overriding defensive attitude about service intelligence opinions. Many of the old hands used to react with arguments about the DIA "charter," rather than counter differing intelligence views with good substantive analysis.

In the long run, however, the most telling factor in the improvement of military intelligence estimates is the increasing awareness among consumers that the only useful intelligence is objective intelligence. There was a time when the rule-of-thumb for acceptability of threat estimates among planners was "the bigger, the better." Intelligence estimates which failed to maximize enemy threats in both sum and detail were likely to draw fire as "wishful thinking." More often than not, military intelligence people came to heel under such criticism and stumped hard for the "worst-case" view. These old attitudes are waning now and simplistic demands for the scariest possible threat estimates are much less prevalent among users. Some hard lessons have been learned

Military planners have seen some unfortunate results of inflated estimates over the past several years. With regard to Vietnam, it became painfully obvious that "worst-case" assessments of enemy capabilities by Washington estimators gave the erroneous impression that the more casualties we inflicted on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, the stronger they got. When theater intelligence tried to offset this by stressing the evidence of the telling effects of Allied operations



U.S. Army

In 1950, when front-line troops reported that Chinese forces were crossing the Yalu River, it was tactical intelligence to all levels of command in Korea; it was strategic intelligence to Tokyo and Washington. Here, U.S. 2nd Division troops climb aboard a tank as they withdraw following an attack by Chinese Communist forces in December, 1950.



U.S. Air Force

Officers in the targeting business generally regard their product, such as this analyzed aerial photo of Hanoi railway yards and POL targets, as strategic intelligence. Others contend it is more usually tactical intelligence.

In 1970 Gen. Donald V. Bennett reorganized DIA in order to produce better intelligence, particularly in respect to threat estimates.

on the enemy, the effort was branded as a lot of unwarranted, policy-oriented optimism. In February, 1968, the communists corroborated the estimate that they were in desperate straits by launching the militarily disastrous Tet offensive. That fact was overlooked by almost everyone, however, most preferring to believe the new gloomy estimates (later proved grossly overstated) that the VC, although defeated near the cities, had "taken over the countryside."

Many Pentagon planners have also learned that "worst-case" estimates can be used to squelch military programs just as easily as to support them. A proposed program can be made to look like a total waste if its opponents are given free rein to postulate the size and sophistication of future threats to the system. Overestimates of future Soviet strategic missile capabilities killed the U.S. counterforce strategy at least four years before the strategy became invalidated by real Soviet capabilities.

The advent of arms limitation agreements sharply underscored some additional problems of inflated intelligence estimates. The "horse-trading" aspect of these negotiations raises the very real possibility of trading off actual friendly capabilities for enemy "capabilities" existing only on paper in our own intelligence estimates.

These examples lead to another important point that is beginning to be understood in military planner circles: Estimates of future enemy forces and hardware are by nature estimates of *intent*—not just of *capability*. The old arguments about "capability versus intent" are heard less now in DOD. It remains true that intelligence should emphasize capability in descriptions of current and near-future enemy forces. But the minute you tackle the usual problem of estimating enemy forces (or hardware) a year or so into the future, you have entered the realm of intent. For example, since World War II the Soviets have never, to our knowledge, deployed forces or fielded hardware as fast as their total capability permitted. To estimate that they would do so with regard to some weapon system or type of force in the future would make little sense. Indeed, all estimates of future Soviet forces derive from an attempt to discern what part of their total capability the Soviets *intend* to use in military programs and which programs they *intend* to emphasize. This is not a very difficult-to-fathom verity of intelligence estimating. It is remarkable how long it has taken some of our military users to wise up to it.

While not all users of intelligence in DOD have learned the pitfalls of trying to make intelligence "fit the program," most have. Today there is a much improved market for objective intelligence judgments and this is a most hopeful sign in the field of military intelligence. When we get to the point where the strategic intelligence officer knows that his prime customers are going to raise the same amout of hell about overstatement as about understatement of threats, the objectivity of intelligence estimates will be almost automatic.

Objective intelligence is a goal to be devoutly pursued by the entire military profession. However, an important word of caution is in order: An objective intelligence judgment is not necessarily a valid judgment. Validity depends on the evidence available to the intelligence people and the quality of the analysis applied to that evidence. Any planner or decision-maker not convinced that there is good evidence and good analysis behind an intelligence judgment should feel perfectly free to reject it. And the intelligence officer should not get his nose out of joint if his product is not always accepted as gospel. However, the user cannot insist that the intelligence officer recant and change his best judgment. If he does this, he corrupts the whole system.

To sum up, I think that the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security. Both the military user and the military producer of strategic intelligence have come a long way since the "missile-gap" days. DIA has hit its stride in the production of respectable military estimates. While there will always be a legitimate reason for independent judgments from outside DOD on issues of critical importance to national decision-makers, there is no longer a need, in my judgment, to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies. The best assist the Army can give to such an effort is to insist on objective strategic intelligence, cooperate with DIA in producing it, and put good officers in the strategic intelligence field.

▲

Pecking Order

An old soldier who saw service during the days of the horse cavalry tells about the time at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., when a sergeant and a private he knew were on a wagon detail from a bivouac area to a nearby farm.

Several guard points had been set up on the road leading out of the field training exercise area in which the bivouac was located and at each the sergeant driving was challenged. To each "Who goes there?" he would reply:

"Sgt. Jones and wagon with horse manure and a private."

The passenger said nothing the first two times, but as they approached the third and last barrier, the soldier asked respectfully:

"Sergeant, when you talk about the wagon this time, how about putting me first?"

LT. COL. TOM HAMRICK
U.S. Army, retired

A FRIEND IN NEED

Although he begged off replacing White House chief of staff H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird is quietly working for the President. He is advising him on personnel changes and, as one colleague put it, "on a few other things," a phrase Washington takes to mean the post-Watergate cleanup. Laird has an out-of-the-way government office, halfway between the White House and Capitol Hill.

THE MAKING OF A DILEMMA

One innocent victim of the Watergate scandals: author Theodore H. White, whose fourth "Making of the President" book is due to go to press right now—just as indictments are being issued and investigations proliferate. He is locked in by contracts with his publisher, Atheneum, as well as Time-Life Films and the Literary Guild, which has selected his book for September distribution. Should White put aside two years of work to try to stay *au courant* with the breaking Watergate story? After wrestling with the problem, White concludes: "The countdown is over, blast-off has taken place and I'm in orbit. I have enough fresh background to explain how Watergate happened—but I'll be waiting for the trials like everybody else."

THE WATERGATE BOOK CLUB

The tide of Watergate books will soon be at the flood. The Washington Post's prize-winning team of Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein has a $55,000 advance for a book due in November. Frank Mankiewicz, George McGovern's campaign director, will publish another the same month. Watergate operatives James McCord and E. Howard Hunt are reported hard at work on first-person accounts. Clark Mollenhoff, Washington bureau chief of The Des Moines Register (and a onetime Nixon aide), has a manuscript in the works, and a writing team from The Sunday Times of London is mulling one. "Our Gang," novelist Philip Roth's savage satire on the Nixon Administration, will be reissued in a "Watergate Edition." And a paperback on the scandal is being prepared with the dramatic title "The Impeachment of Richard Nixon."

OLD STORIES NEVER DIE

The dizzy succession of new faces in the front offices of the Nixon Administration has revived one of Washington's hoariest gags. With all the comings and goings at the Pentagon, Justice Department, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI and other bureaus, the recurring line heard in the corridors is, "If the boss calls, be sure to get his name."

AN OLD PRO'S VIEW

The full dimensions of the Watergate scandal did not emerge until after his death in January, but the late President Lyndon Johnson had seen enough to form an opinion. In his view, he told friends in Texas, "Nixon has made a terrible mistake surrounding himself with amateurs."

PERON'S HOMECOMING

The No. 1 guessing game in Buenos Aires is what exiled dictator Juan Perón will do after his protégé, Héctor Cámpora, is installed as President next week. First bet was that Perón would visit Argentina briefly, then return to his base in Madrid. The word now is that he will settle in Buenos Aires and take a large hand in Cámpora's administration. A search is on for a house to handle Perón and a full staff.

ENERGY AND THE ECOLOGISTS

A new voice has been raised in the energy vs. environment debate—and it is sounding a note that clashes with the theme adopted by the Administration. The White House has echoed industry arguments that much of the energy plight should be blamed on overeager environmentalists. Now Russell Train, head of the President's own Council on Environmental Quality, is contradicting this line. Of the 75 major nuclear-power plants now behind schedule, Train says, only nine have been held up by environmental debate. He also challenges the oil-industry view that desperately needed refineries have been blocked by clean-air-and-water advocates. Until the latter half of 1972, Train says, existing refineries never got above 75% of capacity.

THE SHRINKING STOCK MARKET

Watchdogs at the Securities and Exchange Commission are concerned over the latest Wall Street phenomenon—companies using new profits and cash to buy back their own publicly held stock. In recent months, such "buy-ins" have accounted for 5% to 10% of all public trading on the New York Stock Exchange. With mutual funds and other institutions doing 60% to 70% of exchange business, the SEC fears that the supply of stock available to small investors is getting too tight for a genuinely open market.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, May 9, 1973

McCORD MEMORANDUM

Blame-the-CIA

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
New York Times News Service

James W. McCord Jr. has charged that he was pressured on two occasions before his trial to say that he and his colleagues were working on a CIA operation at the time of their arrest in the Watergate break-in.

In a memorandum to federal and Senate investigators made available to the New York Times, McCord said that at one point Gerald Alch, his attorney, told him that his personnel records at CIA could be altered, if needed, to show that he had been restored to active duty

McCord retired in 1970 after 19 years of CIA service.

McCord quoted Alch as saying that James R. Schlesinger, the newly designated CIA director, "could be subpoenaed (to testify at the trial) and would go along with it."

AT NO POINT in the document did McCord say who he thought was the source of the pressure. But he said that, by the time the actual trial began in January, "I was completely convinced that the White House was behind the idea and ploy which had been presented, and that the White House was turning ruthless, and would do whatever was politcally expedient at any one particular point in time to accomplish its own ends."

McCord said his refusal to go along with the plan infuriated E. Howard Hunt Jr., a fellow member of the Watergate break-in team who had served in the CIA for 20 years.

A CIA spokesman expressed surprise at McCord's memo but said there would be no immediate comment.

Alch declared through an associate that "it would be inappropriate to comment at this time because of his attorney-client relationship" with McCord. Alch is still representing McCord in the criminal case stemming from the Watergate arrests.

HOWEVER, another lawyer who was involved in the case confirmed that there had been serious discussions among the defendants and their lawyers about the possibility of contending that the men had been participating in a CIA mission. The lawyer, who requested anonymity, said.

"The general thought was that the CIA would keep a discreet silence. We figured that they wouldn't dare come forth."

He added that he "got the impression" that the Committee for the Reelection of the President certainly had no objection to that kind of a defense."

In his memorandum, which was dated May 4 and delivered to the investigators Monday, McCord noted:

"There had been indications as early as July" that the CRP was claiming

HS/HC-950

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, May 9, 1973

Plot Alleged

that the Watergate operation "was a CIA operation."

McCord quoted Hunt's wife, Dorothy, who reportedly handled money for the Watergate defendants after their arrests, as having said that Paul L. O'Brien, a CRP attorney, had first told her that the break-in at the Democratic National Committee was a CIA operation.

O'Brien, who is known to be under investigation by the grand jury in connection with any coverup of Watergate, was unavailable for comment.

MCCORD further quoted Hunt as saying on more than one occasion before the trial that he (Hunt) had information in his possession that "would be sufficient to impeach the President."

McCord went on to quote Mrs. Hunt (who died last winter in a plane crash) as having said that her husband had delivered a bitter letter to Kenneth W. Parkinson, another Republican lawyer, in which Hunt had threatened "to blow the White House out of the water." The threat was apparently made because Hunt was not receiving enough payoff money from the CRP in the months after his arrest, other sources have said.

Parkinson, who is also a target of the current grand jury investigation to determine whether there was any obstruction of justice after the break-in, denied any knowledge of a plan to describe the bugging as a CIA operation.

In his memorandum, McCord said that he had become convinced that high-level White House officials were trying to get control over CIA intelligence assessments and estimates, "in order to make them conform to 'White House policy.'"

McCord said that he had become convinced that the White House dismissed Richard Helms as CIA director last fall "in order to put its own man in control." Another purpose, the memo said, was "to lay the foundation for claiming that the Watergate operation had been a CIA operation," and that "Helms had been fired for it."

CIA Is Told To Mind Ps & Qs

Reacting to disclosures linking the Central Intelligence Agency to a White House-directed undercover operation that included burglary and a covert psychiatric profile of Daniel Ellsberg, CIA director James R. Schlesinger has ordered an organizational housecleaning to prevent such activities in the future.

Schlesinger assured senators yesterday that he is reviewing "all agency activities" in order to put a stop to future domestic operations "outside its legitimate charter" and in violation of laws barring the CIA from security operations within the country.

Supplying cameras, disguises and false documents to Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy on request of the White House was careless and in violation of "procedural steps and approvals normally required by agency regulations," Schlesinger said. The observation amounted to all but direct criticism of the administration of former CIA Director Richard M. Helms.

— Associated Press

James L. Schlesinger talks with the press.

FURTHER, referring to the use of the agency's office of medical services to work up two assessments of Ellsberg on White House demands, Schlesinger declared: "The preparation of a profile on an American citizen under these circumstances lies beyond the normal activity of the agency. It shall not be repeated."

More generally, Schlesinger said that he has "directed each employe and invited each ex-employe" to report directly to him any questionable cases in which the CIA may be indulging in forbidden domestic activites.

Schlesinger's statement, delivered to a Senate committee behind closed doors, and then — in an unprecedented move — made public with his blessing, came closer than any director in the 25-year history of the CIA to admitting that the legal ban on domestic operations has sometimes been bent — if not broken outright.

TESTIFYING on the material and operational support the CIA lent a covert White House probe of Ellsberg that included a burglarly of his psychiatrist's office in September 1971, Schlesinger also made these disclosures:

- Helms, Schlesinger's predecessor as CIA chief, directed the preparation of a psychiatric profile of Ellsberg by agency specialist Dr. Bernard Malloy. Two profiles were worked out over a series of months, Schlesinger reported, and there were several consultations between Malloy and the White House agents, Hunt and Liddy.

The profile had originally been requested by David Young, the White House aide whose representations gained Hunt access to classified State Department files during the same period.

- The paths for Hunt, a former CIA agent, and Liddy to agency cooperations were smoothed by White House domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman in a phone call to Marine Corps Gen. Robert E. Cushman, then the agency's deputy director.

The call, on July 8, 1971, came only a few days after publication of the Pentagon Papers began in the *New York Times*, and agency records show that Ehrlichman advised Cushman of Hunt's appointment as a special White House security consultant. Agency cooperation with him was requested.

- Hunt, paying a personal call on Cushman at the CIA headquarters, sought technical help from the CIA's clandestine operations directorate to help him carry out a White House mission. Schlesinger described the mission in these terms: "To visit and elicit information from an individual whose ideology he was not entirely sure of."

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, May 11, 1973

CARL T. ROWAN

CIA's Involvement Appalling

Several days after the Watergate burglary of last June 17 my wife and I went to a screening party at the Motion Picture Association headquarters here. We chanced to sit beside Richard Helms, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and his wife Cynthia.

The pre-film conversation turned to Watergate.

"This Watergate thing is so ridiculous that if you wrote it as fiction the publisher would laugh you out of his office," Cynthia said.

Helms laughed and, in the course of a brief discussion, dropped one comment that, as my close friends know, has bothered me ever since.

"Cynthia and I had been up late and had just fallen asleep when they telephoned me to tell me that these fellows had been arrested in the Watergate," he said.

"Why," I asked myself and my friends for months, "would anyone call the CIA director in the wee hours of the morning about some arrests in a burglary unless the CIA was involved?"

But I just couldn't write about that remark. I couldn't prove CIA involvement in Watergate, and I didn't want to believe the CIA was involved in this kind of political crime. So the most I could bring myself to write was this, on August 6, 1972:

"The previous employment of several of those involved in "the Watergate caper" and recent strange revelations of big money floating into bank accounts out of nowhere have aroused some serious misgivings that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved. But for what reason? Not partisan political purposes surely."

I guess I wasn't cynical enough or mean enough to put my larger suspicions into print. I truly regret that bit of cautiousness.

Well, the chilling truth is now out. The CIA *has* become involved in political crime as ordered by the White House and that is a sinister development that overshadows everything else that has gushed forth from this cesspool we call Watergate.

E. Howard Hunt, the convicted Watergate burglar and ex-CIA agent (and who knows when if ever he became an "ex" agent?), has testified that the CIA provided cameras, disguises, false papers and other assistance when he and G. Gordon Liddy burglarized the office of the psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg, now on trial in connection with the Pentagon papers.

The New York Times has reported that the CIA role was approved by Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., Helms' deputy and now the Marine Corps commandant.

How can I interpret Helms' comment at that movie party in the light of these recent disclosures?

I can only conclude that the CIA was up to its armpits in the dirty work masterminded by Hunt and Liddy, in the Ellsberg case but also in the Watergate crime. I can only conclude that this vast organization with all its secret money, all its capacity for eavesdropping and other dirty tricks, was turned into an apparatus for perpetuating the power of Richard Nixon and his cronies.

You can bet that this kind of corruption of the purpose of the CIA was not taken lightly by Helms (and do not believe for a moment that Cushman approved this frightening gambit without Helms' knowledge). I can damn well guarantee you that the CIA became involved only on direct orders from the President, or orders from Haldeman or Ehrlichman, claiming to speak directly for the President.

In either case, no presidential assistants or appointees such as Helms would undertake so serious a violation of the intended role of the CIA without assurances of presidential knowledge and approval.

So that old campaign button finally speaks the truth: "NIXON'S THE ONE."

There is a question that hounds us all, and the answer is almost unspeakable except in private surroundings. When a president is riding the top of the world, hogging the glory and the headlines with reelection virtually assured, why resort to such malevolent police state tactics? It defies rational explanation.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, May 11, 1973

MARY McGRORY

Nixon Is Hit Where He Lives

The House of Representatives, playing Brutus to Richard Nixon's Caesar, dealt him "the unkindest cut of all" on a day of murderous slashes.

They told him to stop bombing Cambodia. It was the first Southeast Asia policy setback any president has sustained in the House in 10 years. No VFW post has supported Nixon more unquestioningly in whatever violence was afoot — bombings, minings, invasions.

His present domestic difficulties were not mentioned. He was, for the most part, reverently referred to as the Commander-in-Chief, whose hands should not be "tied," from under whom the rug should again not be yanked "precipitately."

In the cloakrooms, the Republicans murmured that it was "not the time" to let the President down. But blind trust has gone out of style.

The day had brought the indictments of two of his former Cabinet officers, John Mitchell and Maurice Stans, a pair he pointedly praised on election night. The Ellsberg trial had yielded up another of its routine sensations: An FBI bug on a former White House security aide. The President's former counsel, John W. Dean III, issued another scream about liars lately at large around the Oval Room.

The Democrats had suggested, and no flip-charts were needed, that the moment had arrived to let Richard Nixon know that the House of Representatives is not his obedient servant, but actually a branch of the government.

The debate was a regurgitation of 10-year-old arguments. One more time, the hawks pleaded, we should bomb for peace. They shouted that the Communists — some of whom are now Richard Nixon's best friends — are "testing us." Delicate negotiations will be imperiled. The world is watching.

But they had lost their prized pawns, the troops and the prisoners. And the doves had picked up a valuable ally in Speaker Carl Albert, newly awakened to the witlessness of using B52s as ambassadors to prop up a regime the administration privately admits is going to collapse anyway.

"Join not the multitude to do evil," cried George Mahon of Texas, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and, until that hour, as feared in the House as Richard Nixon.

"Why not give him a little more time?" he begged.

But time is running out for Richard Nixon. When the tallies flashed on the new scoreboard on the walls, the doves cheered like basketball fans tasting their first victory. Thirty-six Republicans were among the 219 who told Richard Nixon that he couldn't "transfer" Defense Department funds to finance the current round of slaughter from the air.

The President is also running out of men. His acute personnel shortage was being illustrated at the time the vote was taken. Elliot Richardson the square-jawed Yankee with the flexible principles, has been frantically switching from his barrister's gown as attorney general-designate to his brass hat as Defense secretary.

While he was dancing on the head of a pin with the Senate Judiciary Committee about his new duties as the supervisor of the special Watergate prosecutor, he was being quoted on the House floor as the Pentagon chief who needed a show of strength. If he is as tough on the Watergate as he has been on the war, Nixon officials will be blown up as relentlessly as Asian peasants.

At the White House, the President was shuffling the cards again, and putting old faces in new places. John Connally will be a White House counselor, and seems cast in the role of the Angel of Dien Bien Phu to tend the wounded and hearten the general in the surrounded fortress. Running for the White House from inside the water-logged Executive Mansion is a dubious venture, but Connally had no choice.

The President has rearranged around him the same kind of hard-nosed, cold-eyed men who got him in trouble in the first place. If he is a chastened man his choices do not say it.

J. Fred Buzhardt, the Pentagon counsel, was ferried over the river to become a special adviser on the Watergate. Buzhardt flatly refused to give a Senate committee the rules of engagement in the air war.

William E. Colby, now in state; the prospective CIA director, was the operator and defender of the infamous Phoenix program in Vietnam, a system of political assassination. James Schlesinger, who leaves CIA to become Defense secretary, will be questioned about Watergate defendant James McCord's allegations that Watergate was supposed to be palmed off as a CIA operation.

Richardson, speaking as secretary of Defense several days ago, had informed the House, with the contempt of Congress that is the mark of the true Nixonian, that it did not matter how they voted, that the Cambodian bombing would go on.

But it matters to Richard Nixon. It is a signal that the long spell has been broken. He was hit where he lives, in foreign policy. In fact, the only encouragement he gets these days is from abroad, from countries who tell us it would be a mistake to cancel Richard Nixon's grand design for running the world just because he couldn't handle the corruption that has all but inundated the Oval Room and made his presidency almost as vulnerable as Lon Nol's.

Watergate At a Glance

Telephones used by reporters for at least three newspapers were bugged by the Nixon administration over a two-year period beginning in 1969, sources have reported. Page A-4.

Former White House aide John W. Dean III has complained that "national security" arguments were being used to try to stop him from giving full testimony on the Watergate case. However, former White House aide Charles W. Colson has said Dean himself used that argument to prevent disclosures to the FBI about a Watergate-related incident. Page E-19.

Atty. Gen.-designate Elliot L. Richardson, testifying at his nomination hearings, left in doubt the powers he will grant to a special prosecutor. Page A-16.

Chairman Sam Ervin of the Senate's Watergate committee has defended his panel's plans to go ahead with its public hearings. Page A-4.

The FBI has admitted wiretapping the suburban Maryland home telephone of a man who had just left a sensitive post with the National Security Council. Page A-2.

President Nixon chose William E. Colby as the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The move restored leadership of the CIA to one of the group of professionals who have dominated the agency since its beginning in 1947. Page E-19.

Former Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell became the second man in U.S. history to be charged with a crime after being the nation's top law-keeper. But troubles came to him in politics during the first Nixon administration with the ITT case, and grew from there. See Page E-19.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS E-19
Washington, D. C., Friday, May 11, 1973

GROOMED BY HELMS

Old CIA Hands Laud

BY OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

Earlier this week the Central Intelligence Agency, still somewhat demoralized by the bureaucratic house cleaning ordered by its new director, James R. Schlesinger, was shaken by disclosures that the agency had helped Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt in an illegal domestic espionage mission.

Called to account in Congress, Schlesinger admitted the 1971 association with Hunt was "ill-advised" and promised such things would never happen again. And he strongly implied that his predecessor, Richard M. Helms, the career agent ousted from the CIA directorship early in President Nixon's second term, was partly to blame.

Today, with congressional hearings still pending, Helms' administration stands partly vindicated. With the sudden transfer of Schlesinger to the Pentagon, the new CIA director-designate turns out to be the very man Helms himself was quietly grooming as his successor: William E. Colby.

The announcement that Colby, a veteran agent who is the CIA's ranking expert on Vietnam, would step up to the directorship from his post as director of clandestine operations, drew uniform praise from old agency hands.

'S professional" was the way one old hand summed it up. The consensus was that no more fitting a successor to Helms himself could have been found — despite the bureaucratic house-cleaning Phoenix, with its highly publicized and exaggerated body counts of Vietcong killed by its South Vietnamese operatives, gained a widespread reputation as an organization of political assassination. This could inject controversy into Colby's confirmation hearings in the Senate.

BUT FOR CORDS operatives in the field, little of that oort of reputation has rubbed off on the slight, bespectacled and self-effacing Colby who created little lore, and even close associates had trouble thinking of an anecdote to illustrate his style.

The most characteristic one perhaps was related by Colby's former boss Komer:

Colby, on loan to the State Department from the CIA, was extremely reluctant to inherit Komer's colonial scale house in Saigon and chauffeur-driven car when he took over as chief deputy in the CORDS program in November 1968.

He even felt uneasy with the title ambassador, Komer recalls, and agreed to accept the title, house and car only when it was pointed out to him that the Vietnamese nominally running the program would think he was down-graded if the trappings of Komer's lifestyle were not maintained. "He still made one mistake," Komer recalled. "He didn't keep my Chinese cook."

HELMS, like Colby, stepped up to the CIA directorate from the directorship of clandestine operations.

Despite in-house elation at seeing an insider resume control at the CIA, informed observers feel that the main lines of the modernization Schlesinger began will remain — if only because Colby was virtually the only charter member of the old-line intelligence club to be promoted under Schlesinger's tenure.

"If he has the mandate to keep on cutting down staff, he'll dh it," one associate from Vietnam days predicted. "He has that ruthlessness."

UNDER Schlesinger, a staff cutback of five to ten percent of the agency's 15,000 employes was well underway, and during Schlesinger's first few weeks in office, a whole group of old-line professionals who had been close to Helms were fired.

The actual direction the Colby regime will take probably will not become known for many months. But a few surface indications could appear immediately if Colby decides in the name of professional tradition to undo some of the minute changes of style Schlesinger has ordered in his first few months as director.

Changing "plans" to "operations" was one. Another was even more symbolic: When you telephone the agency's central switchboard now, the operator no longer answers with a recital of the number you have just dialed. She says, "Central Intelligence." Such

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS E-19
Washington, D. C., Friday, May 11, 1973

Colby Move

candor has been unheard of for the past ten years at least.

Schlesinger had carried out in recent months.

Less reverently, Colby's coming could be described as the re-establishment of the "old-boy network" that has dominated the agency since its beginning in 1947 and which Schlesinger, for reasons of ideology as well as economy, had been instructed to dismantel.

A Yale graduate, a World War II alumnus of Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan's Office of Strategic Services who twice parachuted behind enemy lines, Colby, 53, is probably best known as an architect of the pacification program in Vietnam in the late 1960s.

DETACHED from the CIA to serve under the controversial Robert Komer in Vietnam right after TET 1968, Colby quickly made a name for himself as the rare official in that frustrating, endless war "who always listened to what you had to say and always followed through when he promised something," as a province adviser who served under him recalled yesterday.

The pacification program, or Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), despite the controversy that surrounded its counter-insurgency offshoot program, Phoenix, was one of the few American operations in Vietnam whose participants occasionally believed they were accomplishing something.

—Associated Press

WILLIAM E. COLBY

—Associated Press

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

SHUFFLE AT PENTAGON

Two Tough Executives

BY ORR KELLY
Star-News Staff Writer

The latest shifts in the Nixon administration's game of musical Cabinet chairs will put two men with reputations as tough, no-nonsense administrators in charge of the Pentagon.

James C. Schlesinger, who will come to the Pentagon as defense secretary, has, in three months as director of central intelligence, bounced a thousand of the Central Intelligence Agency's 15,000 employes and begun a major overhall of the entire intelligence community.

His deputy will be William C Clements Jr., a Texas oil well drilling executive who became No. 2 man to Elliot L. Richardson at the Pentagon in early February.

In his relatively brief time at the Defense Department, Clements has shared broadly in the administration of the department with Richardson, but he has also tended to concentrate in the procurement areas. He has handled such tough problems as contractual disputes with the Grumman Aerospace Corp. over the F-14 fighter and with Litton Industries over a series of large ship building contracts.

BACKING UP Schlesinger and Clements, at least for the time being, will be David Packard, the California industrialist who served as deputy defense secretary for the first three years of the Nixon administration. He was the President's first choice to succeed Richardson when he was asked to become attorney general.

In a brief meeting with reporters yesterday Packard said he had found he was unable to take on the top Pentagon job but had volunteered to serve as a consultant to Schlesinger and Clements. He will have the unique role, for consultant, of testifying before congressional committees in support of the defense budget.

To prepar for that job, he said, he intends to do some traveling and to take a fresh look at such programs as the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine.

The shift announced yesterday will also deprive the Pentagon, at least for the time being, of one of its key officials, General Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., who was named a special counsel to the President for Watergate affairs.

BUZHARDT HAS come into public attention in the last few days as one of the few governmental officials who said no to White House sleuths who later became involved in the Watergate bugging.

Buzhardt was reportedly approached in September of 1971 by David Young, a White House aid

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, May 11, 1973
E-19

William E. Colby: To the CIA

'The Professional's Professional...'

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

"Call Helms and tell him to give Colby to Komer," Lyndon Johnson barked at his national security adviser, Walt W. Rostow, one day in the fall of 1967.

The Colby to whom the late President referred was William E. ("the professional's professional") Colby, who was nominated by President Nixon yesterday as new director of the Central Intelligence Agency to replace short-termer James R. Schlesinger.

The peremptory call from President Johnson to Rostow was made in the midst of a conversation between the President and his chief pacification advisor in South Vietnam, Robert W. Komer. "What do you need?" the President insistently asked Komer.

"I want a guy I can train as a successor," Komer responded. "I've got my eye on Bill Colby at the CIA."

Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms exploded when he learned of the unorthodox manner by which Komer had instigated the presidential demand for Colby's services, Komer recalled in an interview yesterday.

"I felt there was a war on and something had to be done," he said. 'Dick calmed down once he got it off his chest. In fact he told me: 'You know I would have given you Colby if I had to.'"

"The professional's professional" was one admiring characterization of Colby.

"The complete *apparatchik*," was the more qualified description of an ex-foreign service officer who knew Colby during his long years of service in the Vietnam war. "He has lived his whole life in the clandestine service, and he came up through the ranks."

Stewart Alsop once wrote of the dichotomy within the Central Intelligence Agency as between the Bold Easterners and the Prudent Professionals. The first group was comprised of tweedy Grotonians with some money, social position and a touch of Anglophilia. They reigned in the pre-Bay of Pigs era.

In the second category were the professional intelligence men—specialists and technicians—who made their way on merit alone upward through the anonymous bureaucracy at Langley.

William E. Colby represents the triumph of the Prudent Professionals. He is a man of medium height and unobtrusive dress, Haspel rather than Brooks. "If he were a little taller he would look like a third Bundy brother," commented a Senate student of intelligence affairs.

Most of his professional life has been spent on the dark side of the intelligence world, the Directorate of Plans, known in the denigrative vernacular as "The Department of Dirty Tricks."

He was born in St. Paul, Minn., in 1920, the son of an Army officer. He was graduated from Princeton in 1940, and during World War II worked in the OSS under General "Wild Bill" Donovan, the most estimable of credentials for a young man who would make his career in the intelligence service.

Colby parachuted behind Nazi lines in France to work with the maquis and into northern Norway to blow up railway lines supplying German reinforcements.

But the centerpiece of his career was Vietnam, where he arrived in 1959 as "first secretary"—so described yesterday by a CIA spokesman—of the American embassy. Actually, as was well known in Saigon those days, Colby was the CIA's station chief in South Vietnam, and it was during this period that his long association with the war was first forged.

In 1962 he became chief of the Far East Division of the CIA's Directorate of Plans in Washington. The agency's role in the Indochinese conflict was paramount at the time, several years before the big U.S. military build-up.

The CIA organized an army of Meo mercenaries to battle the Vietnamese Communists in Laos. And in Vietnam the precursors of what was to be called the "pacification" program were being set into motion—the CT (counter-terror) units, the Revolutionary Development cadre, the Provincial Reconnaisance Units and then the controversial Phoenix program—all under CIA management.

[The Soviet Union said yesterday that Colby had been in charge of a program aimed at "physically exterminating" the Vietcong in South Vietnam.]

Colby was the working overseer, the Prudent Professional, in charge of developing these programs and making sure that they worked. Whatever the failure or success of Colby's intelligence handiwork may have been, they produced controversy.

The critics charged that Phoenix and the other programs accomplished little else than visiting torture and assassination on innocents while antagonizing large segments of the Vietnamese population. The proponents claimed success, and buttressed their contentions with awesome statistical data which Komer reduced to computer printouts and passed on to Washington.

Colby returned to Vi
nam in March, 1968, as Kc
er's understudy, and the
lowing November too o
the pacification job, wh
was by then under the ju
diction of the State Dep
ment.

He lived during th
three years alone in K
er's spacious villa in Sai
and traveled out to
countryside almost ev
weekend, occasionally t
ing newspapermen or
gressional VIPs with h
On occasions he would co
back to Washington to
tify on the successes of
programs for which he
been an architect and ch
enforcement officer.

Colby's final stint in V
nam ended in June, 19
when he returned to Wa
ington and disappeared i
the CIA's sprawling hc
office at Langley, where
plunged into administra
work, a curiously sedent
role for the old intellige
warrior.

Last March he was na
by Schlesinger to head
Directorate of Plans, wl
he had spent his life ur
various covers and often
in the cold.

Yesterday when he
named to the No. 1 spo
there was cause for joy a
Langley. One of their ow
had made it.

POST, Friday, 11 MAY 1973

Approved For Release 2008/04/14 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120003-0

CASE FILE (DESCRIPTION)

Vol I - 1973

INSTRUCTIONS

Place card upright in place of charged out folder.
Place card horizontally in returned file folder.

CHARGE TO	DATE	CHARGE TO	DATE

CASE FILE CHARGE-OUT CARD