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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chair nan, Long Range Planning Group

THROUGH

: Deputy Director for Support/5/266 15 JUL 1965

SUBJECT

: DD/S Long Fange Planning - Assumptions

- 1. The Office of the DD/S is proceeding with its long range planning program on the basis of its judgment as to the requirements necessary to support the Agency during that period. These plans, in the prescribed format, with certain minor modifications, will be submitted on or before the 28 July deadline date. At that time and on a continuing basis as planning progresses, they will be augmented so as to support the level and nature of Agency operations and activities outlined by the plan.
- 2. In order to support this DD/S planning approach, certain assumptions have been made. By way of assistance to the overall planning effort and in accordance with PG-D-4/1 dated 9 July 1965, the attached assumptions are forwarded in advance of the Directorate's detailed plans.

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Acting DD/S Planning Representative

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Attachment:
As Stated

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ASSUMPTIONS - DD/S LONG RANGE PLANNING

- 1. The complexity and sophistication of Agency operations will materially increase making the support tasks of the Agency, in turn, more complex.
- 2. Automation of support services will permit Agency operations to improve in speed and efficiency and will facilitate community coordination as well as operational command and control.
- 3. The recruiting, saffing and compensation programs of CIA will remain independent of other personnel systems and will continue to be administered under special legal authorities available to the DCI.
- 4. Toward the end of the planning period the "staff mix" of the Agency will change. Requirements for clerical personnel will be substantially lower with proportionate increases for technical and professional employees.
- 5. Attrition rates among staff personnel will show very little change during the first five year period. Overall attrition rates for this period will average 10 to 11% per year. During the second five year period the overall attrition rate will remain fairly constant but attrition of professional employees will show a significant increase (averaging well above 7% per year) as a greater proportion of professional employees become 50 years of age and older.
- 6. Highly trained and intrinsically skilled personnel will continue to be the foundation of an efficient and readily responsive intelligence organization. Technological and other advances will affect substantially the kinds of skills and training GIA will require of its employees. To meet these needs and enhance the personnel assets of the Agency, requirements for training will greatly increase.
- 7. The Agency will find it advantageous to place increasing emphasis on the identification and development of its own managerial and executive talent.

- 5. Operating components will place greater emphasis on defining and predicting training requirements.
- 9. In keeping with Agency maturity, increased sophistication, and accumulation of experience, more demands for advanced courses in operations and intelligence will appear.
- 10. With increased emphasis on automation, a marked demand for the training of both managerial and clerical personnel in ADP fields will develop.
- 11. The Career Training Program, the Mid-Career Training Program and the Language Training Program will be continued and strengthened.
- 12. The need for a Senior Officer Program in the Agency will be acknowledged and steps will be taken to establish it.
- 13. The accelerated extension of knowledge in all fields of human and scientific endeavor will require that the Agency make a larger investment in training at external facilities.
- 14. As more and more nations struggle to enhance their worki power positions, there will be increased efforts to penetrate the Central Intelligence Agency by use of intelligence agents, subversion of Agency employees, surreptitious technical penetration and penetration of overseas classified storage facilities.
 - 15. The need for security education of Agency personnel will increase.
- 16. There will be increased opposition-controlled domestic agitation designed to defame the image of CIA in order to neutralise its effectiveness.
- 17. There will be increased difficulty in eliciting security information because of developing resistance in certain quarters to so called invasion of privacy. New investigative techniques will be developed in order to evercome this difficulty.

- 18. There will be continued emphasis through the USIB and its Security Committee to improve security practices and procedures within the Intelligence Community. CIA will furnish leadership in this effort.
- 19. Unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information will continue to cause security concern and will directly affect the activities of the Security Committee of USIB.
- 20. Automatic data processing techniques and improved technical interrogation procedures will increase the source data utilized in security decisions.
- 21. Technical penetrations of Agency installations will be more difficult to detect as technological breakthroughs occur.

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- security support abroad will develop. 22. The need for
- 23. Companies having classified intelligence contracts will increasingly become targets for penetration by opposition intelligence forces.

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31. Requirements for secure teletypewriter, data for ice communications will increase drastically in both voservice.	
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34. The Agency will continue to be involved, period erations requiring substantial communications equipment,	ically, in covert ent and personnel
35. Opposition advancements in technology will necessphasis on security of communications centers, transm	

- 37. Increased sophistication of Agency operations and technological advancements will require: (a) large scale development and procurement of advanced, esoteric intelligence collection and support material, and (b) the closest operational and support coordination.
- 38. The demand for increased flexibility in intelligence operations, and the improvement and increased varieties of cover employed will require equal flexibility and rapid legistical support response to such sophisticated requirements.

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
- 40. Automation of inventory control, supply management, transportation and procurement activities will be effected, thus enhancing timely response to increasingly complex requirements.
- 41. Improved air transportation will reduce the need for overseas logistical depots in favor of direct support from CONUS installations.
- 42. The importance of the "conservation of Agency manpower" which is now becoming patently evident will become an accepted tenant of Agency management policy and will place additional demands on the Agency medical program.

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- 45. The medical components of the intelligence Community will be integrated into an intra-Community medical program.
- 46. Advances in medicine will enable skilled Agency personnel to function at a higher level of performance for longer sustained periods.

- 47. The methods and techniques of rendering financial support to Agency operations will change considerably due to:
 - a. The impact of automatic data processing on accounting and disbursing systems and processes.
 - b. Managements need for greater speed and refinement in financial reporting.
 - c. Continued and increased R&D and procurement of hardware necessitating increased emphasis on cost appraisals, evaluations and site audits of industrial firms.

- f. The increased complexities of administering the financial rights, privileges and benefits of Agency employees and agents (i.e., CIA Retirement System, Insurance programs, premium pay, language incentives, and related fringe benefits).
- g. The Agency's need to maintain a readiness posture to provide contingency Task Groups for utilization in unconventional covert action programs, with the resultant need for effective financial support of such unconventional activities.



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