Intelligence Memorandum

The Allon Plan

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 February 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Allon Plan

Summary

The Allon Plan for dealing with demographic and security problems of occupied Arab territory was presented to the Israeli Government as early as July 1967. Recent discussion of it has centered on two key points—an Israeli controlled Security Zone on the West Bank and an Arab Sector that includes the most populous areas of the West Bank along with a corridor to the East Bank. Israel suggests that the Arab Sector could be administered as an "autonomous" Palestine entity or returned outright to Jordan. Israel appears firm in a resolve to develop and retain the Golan Heights as a protective zone, but details of proposals for occupied Sinai are not clear except for the probable retention of Sharm ash Shaykh and a strip of the Mediterranean coast. Israel intends to retain the Gaza Strip and implies that, given satisfactory negotiations with Jordan on refugee matters, an agreement could be worked out that would give Jordan access to the Mediterranean through the ports of Haifa and Ashqelon. Israel unrealistically feels that the Allon Plan is a workable solution to the

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problems of the occupied territories and has implemented some of its features; other features of the plan are programmed in Israel's new budget. If no settlement with the Arab states is forthcoming, Israel appears ready to complete the Allon Plan without regard for the inflammatory impact that implementation would have on neighboring Arab states.
Background

1. The Government of Israel began to consider alternatives for dealing with demographic and security problems associated with occupied Arab territories shortly after the cessation of hostilities in June 1967. At that time the Minister of Labor, Yigal Allon (now Deputy Prime Minister), presented a plan to improve the national security of Israel and to preserve the Jewish nature of the population. The original Allon Plan has been modified, but it still includes programs designed to hold and develop the West Bank, the Golan Heights, large areas of the Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip and to deal with the population of these occupied territories (See Map 75684). An outline of the Allon Plan appeared in the press in August 1967 and has been discussed from time to time in the press. Early in February 1969 both Deputy Prime Minister Allon and Prime Minister Eshkol made extensive statements on Israeli objectives in occupied territory. The central theme of recent releases has been the development of a Security Zone for the West Bank and the return to Arab administration of the densely populated area of the West Bank. A program in the Golan Heights is well under way, but there appears to be less agreement within the Israeli Government on programs for the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.

Features of the Plan

The West Bank

2. The key element of the plan for the West Bank is the establishment of a Security Zone immediately west of the Jordan River and the northern portion of the Dead Sea (See Map 75676). The proposed zone would be some 65 miles long by 10 to 15 miles wide and would have an area of about 700 square miles or one third of the total area of the West Bank. It would be bounded on the north and south by the Armistice Demarcation Lines that were in force before the June War and are sometimes referred to in Israel as the "green line." Control of this zone would be maintained by up to 20
Israeli nahals, or fortified settlements, in the Jordan Valley. Three nahals have already been established and five more are provided for in the new Israeli budget. There would also be two new Israeli "towns" in the Security Zone: Upper Jericho, looking down over the present Jericho, and Upper Hebron on the slopes above and to the east of Hebron.

3. An Arab Sector would be established between the Security Zone on the east and the Armistice Demarcation Line on the west that was recognized as the border of Israel before the June War. Israel has suggested that this Arab Sector be returned to Jordan outright or be administered as an "autonomous" Palestine entity. The Sector would be some 80 miles long by 15 to 20 miles wide except in the Jerusalem area where it would be 2 to 3 miles wide. The northern portion of the sector includes the area traditionally known as Samaria, and the southern portion occupies much of historical Judaea. Jerusalem would remain Israeli territory, presumably bounded on the east by municipal limits that were extended to include the Jerusalem Airport. Israel has suggested that residents of the Arab Sector might be permitted to visit religious sites in Jerusalem, but details for such an arrangement have not been provided. The Latrun Salient on the northern flank of the corridor to Jerusalem from the Mediterranean would also be retained by Israel.

4. Communication between the Arab Sector of the West Bank and East Bank Jordan is to be provided through a 4.3-mile (7 kilometers)-wide corridor that includes a road extending from the Jordan River at the Allenby Bridge to the city of Ramallah. The city of Jericho with some 10,000 people is situated in the corridor. While specifications for policing the Arab Sector have not been spelled out, mention has been made of establishing an Israeli inspection system to prevent a buildup of firearms and of the intention of Israel to intervene militarily in the event of terrorist attacks directed against Israeli territory from the Arab Sector.
5. The boundary between the Arab Sector and the Security Zone approximates the drainage divide of the West Bank. Elevations are generally 2,700 to 3,000 feet above sea level along the divide. In the northern portion of the Security Zone the land drops steeply eastward to the Jordan River 1,000 feet below sea level, and at the Dead Sea in the south it falls to an elevation 1,285 feet below sea level. To the west in the Arab Sector the slopes are more gentle, especially to the north where the rounded hills and broad valleys of Samaria contrast sharply with the rugged Judaean hills to the south.

6. The population of the proposed Security Zone is sparse. Of a total West Bank population of some 600,000, only about 20,000 Arabs occupy the area that would be included in it. The terrain and climate are more favorable in the Arab Sector than on the arid, badly eroded Judaean slopes within the Security Zone. Israel estimates that 450,000 acres of the West Bank are potentially cultivable, of which only some 50,000 acres fall within the Security Zone. This does not imply that adequate agricultural land is available in the Arab Sector. Much of the potential farmland has yet to be destoned and terraced, and in a region of unreliable rainfall, many of the unirrigated hill slopes could produce crops only when adequate moisture is received at appropriate stages of the crop cycle.

Golan Heights

7. Israel appears to be firmly resolved to develop the Golan Heights as a protective zone. When in Syrian hands, this area was a continuing source of harassment for the Israeli settlements in the upper Jordan Valley. Since occupation, Israel has established 10 new settlements in this occupied territory, and it has plans for 22 more.

Sinai Peninsula

8. Except for the retention of Sharm ash Shaykh and perhaps a stretch of the Mediterranean coastal plain, Israeli statements regarding Sinai
do not agree. One concept would make all of Sinai except Sharm ash Shaykh a demilitarized zone in which there would be no Israeli settlements. This concept, however, conflicts with traditional Israeli sentiment that calls for the retention of all of Sinai. Deputy Prime Minister Allon, according to the 7 February 1969 issue of Time, proposed that Sinai be divided by a north-south line from west of Al Arish to Sharm ash Shaykh—a plan first proposed by the Turks during negotiations with the British in 1906. Mr. Allon would construct a new fishing and resort town at Sharm ash Shaykh and a series of fortified settlements around Al Arish. Two such settlements have already been established on the northern coast, and two more are funded in the new Israeli budget. The Bedouin population would presumably remain as it is. No mention is made of the future of the oilfields on the Gulf of Suez.

Gaza Strip

9. The Gaza Strip is included in virtually all Israeli statements about occupied territory that Israel desires to retain. The problem centers on the relocation of 200,000 or more refugee camp residents now in the Gaza Strip. Israel has suggested that the Palestinian refugee problem could be considered solved if Jordan would accept the transfer of the refugees in the Gaza camps as well as agree to West Bank population adjustments. It is implied that, given satisfactory negotiations on population matters, a settlement could be worked out giving Jordan access to the Mediterranean through the ports of Haifa and Ashqelon.

Unrealities of the Plan

10. The Allon Plan for the West Bank appears to perpetuate the artificiality of the Armistice Demarcation Lines that served as the international boundary between Israel and the West Bank of Jordan from April 1949 to June 1967. The Armistice Demarcation Lines were simply cease-fire lines and are unrealistic as permanent national boundaries. They cut off hill villages from traditional farmland; they deny access to the ports and the fishing
grounds of the Mediterranean Sea; they isolate people in a subsistence economy from sorely needed services, sources of employment, and potential markets.

11. The proposed Security Zone would interfere very little with agricultural production and displace few people, but it would place a new barrier between the Arabs of the West Bank and the East Bank. Furthermore, the virtual encirclement of West Bank Arabs would in effect create another, Gaza Strip--larger in area and population but burdened by the same inadequate resources and lack of employment opportunities. The West Bank has been a food-deficit area since its creation, and at present, only some 360,000 of its 600,000 residents can be fed with locally produced food. The new barriers added by the Allon Plan will deepen the prevailing psychological depression of the Arabs. The loss of Jerusalem as a source of tourist revenue and as a regional market would be a setback to a struggling Arab economy, and denial of free access to Jerusalem, as well as creation of an Israeli barrier along the Jordan River separating Arab from Arab, would further isolate and irritate a beleaguered population.

12. The Security Zone along the Jordan Valley promises a measure of protection that Israel did not enjoy before the June War, but it would not solve Israel's security problem. The valley is not the tank trap it is alleged to be, as evidenced by Israel's own success in climbing the Golan Heights in the June War, nor is the Security Zone a guarantee that Arab troops will never again advance west of the Jordan. Israeli settlements in the Security Zone remain subject to continuing harassment from high ground on the East Bank and possibly from the rough slopes of the zone itself. In addition, while Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and the establishment of the Security Zone along the West Bank would provide protective screens between densely cultivated areas and potentially hostile territory, there is an area of concentrated agricultural development in the Jordan Valley south of Lake Tiberias and north of the
West Bank Security Zone that is not similarly protected. The territorial associations of this 22-mile section of Israel's frontier resemble those that existed north of Lake Tiberias before June 1967. The Jordan Valley between Lake Tiberias and the Security Zone is more than 600 feet below sea level; the Gilead Heights on the East Bank rise abruptly to elevations over 1,000 feet above sea level, and within 10 miles of the river elevations are more than 2,000 feet above sea level. Some 19,000 Israelis live on the Beit Shean Plain at the southern end of this section of the valley where the population density reaches about 220 persons per square mile. These Israeli settlements look up from the Jordan Valley to Jordanian positions some 2,000 feet above the river. Israeli positions on high ground in the Security Zone overlook the Beit Shean Plain, but they are not effective in preventing harassment of the densely populated valley from the high ground on the East Bank.

13. The protection afforded Israel by continued control of large areas of the Sinai Peninsula appears to be the most effective security relief provided by the Allon Plan, whereas the suggestion for solving the population problem of the Gaza Strip seems to be its most impractical element. Even Israel admits that the Gaza question, unlike other features of the Allon Plan, cannot be worked out unilaterally. It is not likely that large numbers of Arabs from Gaza will be resettled within Israel. A realistic approach to the refugee problem requires more cooperation than has been or is likely to be achieved soon in Arab-Israeli negotiations. Israeli statements on the "solution" of the refugee problem and hints that it would permit Arab access to Haifa and Ashqelon appear to be "eyewash" to accompany the unilateral consolidation of occupied territory.

Prospects

14. Israeli concern for the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip reflect an intense concern over harassment
on the frontier and a determination to retain a comfortable Jewish majority within Israeli-controlled territory. From Israel's standpoint, the Allon Plan sets forth relatively simple solutions to nagging problems, but the solutions are designed for unilateral execution. The fabric of the plan is appearing piecemeal, and no effort is likely to be made to implement all aspects of it in the immediate future. The Government of Israel apparently believes that even though the Allon Plan may not be the best possible approach to problems of occupied territory, it contains some of the best alternatives that have been presented. If some direct settlement can be worked out between Israel and the Arab states, the gain to Israel would surpass any benefits now envisioned in the plan. If, however, no settlement is forthcoming, Israel is prepared to complete the development of occupied territory along the lines suggested in the Allon Plan, regardless of its provocative impact on the neighboring Arab states.
ISRAEL
ALLON PLAN FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

- Allon Plan boundary
- Area to be retained by Israel
- Existing Israeli settlement
- Proposed Israeli town
- Jerusalem municipal boundary, 1967

MEDITERRANEAN

ISRAEL

JORDAN

Gaza Strip

Beersheba

AMMAN

TEL AVIV-YAFO

ARAB SECTOR

JUDAEA

Nablus

Ram Allah

Albuni

Gilead Heights

Gaza Strip

ISRAEL

Haifa

Lake Hirtzari

Tyre

Sidon

Sidon

Beersheba

Gaza Strip

JORDAN

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THE ALLON PLAN

I. The Basic Plan

A. The Aim

To secure central Israel against Arab artillery and commando attack.

To relieve Israel of the task of administering and providing subsidies for large Arab population with a high rate of natural increase.

B. The Execution

Security zone 15 miles wide on West Bank of Jordan River containing 20 Israeli frontier settlements.

New Israeli "towns" in security zone near Jericho and Hebron.

Arab territory outside of security zone bounded by UN "green line" recognized by Israel before the 1967 hostilities. Jerusalem remains Israeli.

Corridor to East Bank 4.3 miles wide through Jericho area.

II. Proposals Associated with the Plan

A. Golan Heights Development

Frontier settlements to secure area and protect Northern Galilee from sniping, artillery fire, and commando raids.

B. Gaza Strip

Move the people to Jordan's East Bank.

Take over the agriculture and tie into the national water grid.

Remove the "daggerpointing to Tel Aviv" that has always worried Israel.
C. Sinai

New north-south frontier from southern tip of Sinai to vicinity of El Arish.

Ten frontier settlements to go in east of El Arish.

A new Israeli town to go in at Sharm el Sheikh.

Straits of Tiran remain open and buffer zone remain intact.

III. The Shortcomings of the Plan

A. Population

Perpetuates artificialisms of West Bank UN lines.

Additionally unrealistic by constricting area and adding ring of Israeli army.

Creating another Gaza Strip by fencing West Bank.

Man/land ratio unfavorable.

Population increase great.

B. Security

West Bank security essential in Israeli eyes, Arab population not wanted.

Same attitude toward Gaza - a region of security concern with lack of concern for population.

Plan for Golan Heights and West Bank leaves gate in security "fence" that must be closed to complete the protection of Israeli territory.

IV. Prospects for the Plan