



Directorate of  
Intelligence

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**Terrorism  
Review**

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26 November 1982

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26 November 1982

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**Terrorism Review**

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26 November 1982

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*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

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**Terrorism**

**Review** [Redacted]

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**Overview**

Recent law enforcement successes and local accommodations are likely, in our view, to result in overall reduced levels of activity by major terrorist groups in Europe for at least the next few months. [Redacted]

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We believe the arrest by West German authorities of Red Army Faction (RAF) leaders Klar, Mohnhaupt, and Schulz is a significant setback for the RAF and will disrupt plans for major operations for an indefinite period. In our opinion, however, remaining RAF operatives may attempt an attack, probably requiring minimal logistic support, to restore RAF credibility. Attacks by fringe and sympathizer groups are likely to continue, but their tactical skill may be limited. Over the long term, the RAF is likely to reconstitute its leadership core and rebuild its operational capabilities as it has following other personnel losses. [Redacted]

Italian authorities have apprehended over 20 Red Brigades members and suspects since early October; the most recent arrests were in the Rome area and in northern Italy. We concur with the view of Italian officials that the Brigades have been thrown into disarray. [Redacted]

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While overtures to the Socialists by Spain's prominent terrorist groups—the Basque ETA/M (Fatherland and Liberty/Military) and the Communist GRAPO (First of October Antifascist Resistance Group)—are unlikely to produce a durable accord with the incoming government, they probably will be accompanied by a reduction of terrorist activity, at least by GRAPO. Moreover, recent arrests by French authorities of Basque terrorist leaders in France, we believe, have raised Basque uncertainties regarding the durability of the French-Basque accommodation, which has provided Basque terrorists sanctuary in southern France. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] one of the most active radical Palestinian terrorist groups, Black June, is attempting to work out accommodations with the French and British Governments that would result in a halt to Black June operations in those countries. If these accommodations reflect pressure on Black June from Iraq to curb terrorist activities, as the evidence indicates, other radical Palestinian groups over which Baghdad exercises influence are also likely to be pressed to reduce their terrorist activities. [Redacted]

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**Hijacking of Soviet Plane  
to Turkey Could Create Problems  
for the United States** [redacted]

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A hijacking incident involving a Soviet airliner—similar to a previous incident involving the United States—could give Moscow the opportunity to depict the West as inconsistent in opposing terrorism. [redacted]

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On 9 November three Soviet citizens hijacked an Aeroflot AN-24 on a domestic flight and forced it to fly to Sinop, Turkey, where the hijackers surrendered to police and requested political asylum. Reports vary, but the pilot and at least one passenger were stabbed, although not seriously, during a scuffle with the hijackers who carried a Beretta pistol, pocketknives, and screwdrivers. The plane with 40 passengers and crew returned the next day to the USSR. [redacted]

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Moscow has demanded the immediate extradition of the hijackers. Turkish officials, however, note that a 1977 provisional extradition accord between Ankara and Moscow remains unratified. The Turks may judge that, in accordance with the Hague Convention, the laws of the country in which a hijacked aircraft lands are applicable. The hijackers have been charged with air piracy, assault, and battery. [redacted]

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The case is reminiscent of a still unresolved hijacking incident involving the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1970, two Lithuanians landed in Turkey after seizing a Soviet plane on a domestic flight. A stewardess was killed during the incident. The two hijackers were convicted of manslaughter and detained in Turkey until 1976, when they went to the United States. [redacted]

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Since that time the Soviet Union has regularly but unsuccessfully demanded their return. It is likely, in our view, that the 9 November incident may renew Soviet interest in this unresolved problem and could result in Soviet attempts to use international cooperation against terrorists as a propaganda issue. [redacted]

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**Abu Nidal Attempting  
To Negotiate With  
European Governments**

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] the radical Palestinian Black June Organization (BJO) is attempting to arrange accommodations with France and the United Kingdom to cease terrorist activities in those countries.

The Iraqis, under US pressure to halt support to terrorist groups, may also have pressed BJO to cease terrorist operations. If so, Abu Nidal probably decided that, since he is under Syrian and Iraqi pressure to quit operations, he should try to obtain some concessions from European governments. Abu Nidal undoubtedly has heard claims by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) that they had a truce with the French for over a year.

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Abu Nidal, leader of the group, which operates out of both Syria and Iraq, claims that he is on the verge of a deal with the French [Redacted]

[Redacted] Abu Nidal said that he would seek Algerian assistance in the negotiations, which would result in a halt to BJO terrorist activity on French soil in return for an unspecified French gesture.

[Redacted]

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A French Government official recently informed the United States that the chief of the French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) held secret talks in mid-September with Rifaat Assad, brother of the President of Syria. During the talks Rifaat agreed to order Abu Nidal to refrain from carrying out terrorist attacks in France, and the French have confirmed that Rifaat did, in fact, issue the order.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] in September BJO attempted to arrange a similar accommodation with the British. [Redacted] BJO offered to cease terrorist operations in the United Kingdom in exchange for release of BJO members imprisoned in June for the assassination of Israeli Ambassador Argov.

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**Cache and Catch Successes  
Against West German Terrorists**

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The recent capture in West Germany of three of the most wanted hardcore terrorists of the Red Army Faction will set back the RAF for the short term but is not likely to destroy the group.

The three arrests, following more than a year and a half of frustrated efforts to capture RAF activists, provide counterterrorist officials a needed boost. All three captured terrorists are suspected of participation in the attacks on General Kroesen in September 1981, General Haig in June 1979, and in the assassinations of three prominent Germans in 1977.

The arrests were the indirect result of the accidental discovery by mushroom pickers of an RAF storage depot buried in the woods near Frankfurt. According to German officials, the cache contained weapons, cash, documentation paraphernalia, targeting information, and a code leading to other storage depots throughout West Germany. Most of these depots were concentrated in the Hannover-Hamburg area and in Land Hesse.

In a well-planned and professionally executed operation, German counterterrorist officials baited the trap and ordered contingents of police to stake out cache sites in wooded areas throughout Germany. On 11 November Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Adelheid Schulz, both fugitives for years, were arrested as they started to dig up the main cache. Five days later, Christian Klar, probably the most important male leader of the RAF, walked into a similar trap in the vicinity of Hamburg.

By 15 November, West German authorities had located 13 separate RAF caches and were searching for another; they believe, moreover, that still unidentified caches exist.



The location of the storage depots and the arrests of Mohnhaupt, Schulz, and Klar represent a significant, but probably not lethal, setback for the RAF, in our view. Other RAF leaders still at large possess organizational and operational skills and are trained lieutenants for the captured leaders. Moreover, the size of the operational cadre is uncertain—new activists, who have moved from a support into an operational role, may not yet have been identified. The history of the RAF indicates that heavy personnel and logistic losses have never permanently deterred terrorist activity.

While the RAF is binding its wounds, the resurgence of terrorist activity against US interests, especially military targets in West Germany, persists, as evidenced by an attempted bombing of a US housing

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facility near Frankfurt within three days of the capture of Mohnhaupt and Schulz. Members of various RAF supporter groups, the Revolutionary Cells, and possibly new and unidentified groups carried out a campaign against US military housing facilities in West Germany during the fall. The RAF arrests probably will result in sympathetic terrorist attacks by such groups.

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**Spain's Socialist Victory  
Prompts Shift in  
Terrorist Strategies**

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Probes by Spain's two major terrorist organizations are unlikely to result in an accord with the new Socialist government.

The two groups appear to view the election of the Socialist Party (PSOE) as a unique opportunity to press for their political objectives. The overwhelming Socialist vote may have been erroneously perceived by the terrorists as reflecting popular support for their positions. Recent indications of incipient French-Spanish cooperation on terrorism may also have prompted overtures to the Spanish Government to inhibit the authorities from further damaging terrorist support organizations.

The First of October Antifascist Group (GRAPO), the terrorist arm of the illegal Reconstituted Communist Party (PCE-R), declared a unilateral moratorium on illegal activities to demonstrate good faith. In a communique on 6 November, GRAPO proposed to dissolve itself if the new government removes Spain from NATO, frees all leftist political prisoners, and meets aspirations of national groups currently "oppressed by the Spanish state."

The Herri Batasuna political party linked to Spain's most powerful terrorist group the Basque separatist organization, Fatherland and Liberty/Military Wing (ETA/M), has formally offered to negotiate with the Socialists on behalf of ETA/M. In a separate move, ETA/M leaders in France have asked the French Socialist Party to act as intermediary between ETA/M and the Gonzalez government.

We believe that continuing ETA/M attacks are intended to demonstrate the group's strength prior to any negotiations. The preelection spate of bombings and the spectacular assassination of a high-ranking Spanish general in Madrid on 4 November also

appear designed to reverse the public's view that actions by the Spanish and French police have crippled the organization. ETA/M also suffered a critical setback with the dissolution of the ETA/Political-Military Wing VII Assembly (ETA/PM), which publicly rejected violence for participation in the political process. ETA/PM's secret negotiations with the Spanish Government resulted in an agreement in September 1982 pardoning VII Assembly members who abandoned violence. These secret negotiations marked a significant milestone in relations between the Spanish Government and the Basque separatists and may have contributed to current ETA/M at-tempts to open a dialogue.  25X1

We suspect the Gonzalez government will reject the ETA/M negotiation offer because of the 4 November assassination and that the record of assassinations will preclude amnesty for Basque terrorists. The vagueness of some GRAPO demands and the group's unilateral truce may permit the government to offer minor concessions in return for a continuation of the truce. A general amnesty for lesser crimes might allow some GRAPO members a face-saving avenue for rejecting terrorism. Dissolution of a violence-prone group such as GRAPO would be a victory for the new Socialist government and would weaken remaining terrorist groups, in our view.  25X1

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**Terrorist Use of  
Armor-Piercing Ammunition** [redacted]

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Since 1977 West German and Italian terrorists have made limited but effective use of various armor-piercing ammunition, which permits the targeting of personnel in hardened vehicles. [redacted]

than conventional ammunition. Contrary to popular opinion, the teflon coating on such bullets does little more than lubricate their path down the barrel. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] [redacted] 15 rounds of teflon-coated ammunition manufactured in the United States by KTW, Inc., have been recovered during investigations of three assassinations conducted by the Red Army Faction (RAF) in 1977 and in 1979. Thirteen additional KTW cartridges were discovered in 1980 at the scene of two separate car accidents in which four RAF members were killed and at the scene of the attempted murder of a French policeman by RAF terrorist Inge Vielt. [redacted]

According to Italian authorities, members of the Red Brigade (BR) Naples Column used military-issue 7.62-mm armor-piercing ammunition to breach the bulletproof glass of an armored car in April 1982. The ammunition and weapons used in this attack—in which a labor official and his driver were killed—had been stolen from a military barracks earlier in 1982. Italian authorities have also stated that, despite police counterterrorist actions, the BR Naples Column retains more than 20 rifles, 13 submachineguns, 44 pistols, and 5,000 rounds of ammunition as a result of raids on two military installations, an Italian Army convoy, and a Calabrian gunshop since February 1982. [redacted] 25X1

The RAF may have access to a greater supply of KTW ammunition than is suggested by the limited quantity discovered to date. West German authorities report that the 28 rounds found include cartridges in three different pistol calibers and that no distinction had been made in the past between confiscated KTW rounds and conventional ammunition. Developed over 12 years ago for the military and police, KTW ammunition has long been available in Europe. According to the manufacturer, most production has been sold to foreign governments for use in their police forces, and there have been large-scale thefts of KTW ammunition shipments abroad. [redacted]

Although we are unaware of what percentage of the stolen ammunition is armor piercing, the ordnance captured by the BR this year provides its local columns with the means to strike at targeted personnel traveling in hardened vehicles. The armor on such vehicles is rated by the number of impacts that can be sustained in a given area. Although most commercially hardened vehicles can withstand three impacts in an 8-inch square, concentrated fire in a small area can defeat this armor. Eyewitness reports of the vehicle attack in April suggest that the BR is aware of this technique. [redacted] 25X1

Such ammunition is well suited for assaults on hardened vehicles. Unlike conventional lead slugs, these bullets do not deform on impact and can penetrate the engine block of a car, one and three-fourths inches of cold-rolled steel, or 72 layers of Kevlar soft body armor. This penetration capability stems from hotter powder loads and machined brass cores, which provide a greater muzzle velocity, mass, and hardness

In addition to the limited use of armor-piercing ammunition by West German and Italian terrorists, the Libyans have sought to obtain large quantities of ultrahigh-penetrating Arcane ammunition. [redacted] the Government of Libya attempted to purchase 1 million rounds each of 7.62 x 39-mm assault rifle and 9 x 18-mm pistol ammunition from Fabrice Bodet, an independent French arms dealer. Developed by Bodet and [redacted] 25X1

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similar to KTW rounds, Arcane ammunition is made of a solid electrolytic copper alloy and in range tests demonstrated exceedingly high penetration by passing through 20 layers of standard Kevlar soft body armor, or through a 3-centimeter-thick block of Lexgard bulletproof glass. [redacted]

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The acquisition of such ammunition by Libya would significantly enhance the capabilities of terrorist groups in the Middle East and Europe. The deal has not yet been completed, however, and, according to a source of the US Defense Attache's office in Paris, Bodet claims he has not yet found a manufacturer to fill the Libyan contract. Once a manufacturer is found, however, Bodet plans to develop a round with a depleted uranium core, which in principal would provide even greater penetration. [redacted]

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Armor-piercing ammunition has no special utility beyond the purpose for which it was designed—that is, to penetrate hardened targets. A person shot with such a round may, in fact, stand a better chance of survival than if shot with conventional ammunition. Because of its higher velocity and resistance to deformation, an armor-piercing round could punch a relatively small, clean hole through its victim—imparting less kinetic energy and leaving a smaller entrance and exit wound than, for example, a jacketed hollow-point lead slug that mushrooms on impact or a modern subcaliber hypervelocity assault rifle bullet that tumbles on impact and causes extensive tissue damage. [redacted]

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Perhaps the worst case scenario would be one in which terrorists load a large-clip capacity weapon with both armor-piercing and conventional ammunition. The attackers could first use the armor-piercing rounds to breach the bulletproof glass of a hardened vehicle, and then kill the occupants with the remaining conventional ammunition. We have no information that a terrorist group has employed this technique to date, but it is within the ability of many to do so. [redacted]

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**PLO: Impact of the  
Lebanese Incursion**

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The Palestine Liberation Organization scored temporary political gains during the Lebanese crisis by winning an improved international image and focusing attention on the broader Palestinian issue. Its long-term political position, however, is weaker than before the Israeli invasion because it lost its independent base of operation and is more dependent on the Arab states.

The PLO will remain organizationally intact for at least the next year, but political divisions between the moderate and radical wings are increasing over the moderate majority's efforts to involve the organization in Middle East negotiations.

The PLO evacuated about 8,500 personnel from Beirut. The bulk of the PLO's fighting forces remained behind in northern and eastern Lebanon. They now number approximately 13,000,<sup>2</sup> including 1,000 or more reinfiltated via Syria. Most evacuated personnel outside Syria are likely to stay put for the next several months, barring dramatic Middle East political developments or a sharp decline in PLO morale.

The host governments are keeping the dispersed PLO units under tight security, and the Palestinians have so far had little effect on the hosts' domestic situation. Serious problems could develop if PLO morale and discipline decline.

The member groups are unlikely to countenance the transformation of the PLO into a strictly political movement. Whether they turn to violence on a large

<sup>2</sup> This number includes regular military structured units plus paramilitary units theoretically under the control of the military commander for the area. It does not include irregular militia forces with some military training.

scale will depend on the progress of diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Arafat's leadership within the PLO and his influence in Arab councils is temporarily stronger than ever. He faces a greater challenge, however, from the radical PLO groups committed in varying degrees to leftist ideologies and more militant hostility toward Israel. Although his advantage over other PLO leaders is likely to diminish during the next year, Arafat will remain the dominant figure in the PLO.

The PLO power balance favors the moderates. Arafat and other moderate leaders believe President Reagan's Middle East initiative contains positive elements, but they are not willing to give it unqualified endorsement. Progress toward a compromise solution of the Palestinian issue would strengthen the moderates' willingness to confront the radicals. Stalemate will continue to work to the advantage of the radicals.

Even among the moderates, however, there is skepticism about US resolve to remain committed to the plan in the face of Israeli opposition. Arafat will probably claim that the PLO cannot make additional concessions without a demonstration of Israeli willingness to compromise or further indications of US intentions, such as sanctions against Israel if settlement activity on the West Bank continues.

Arafat knows that recognition of Israel would irrevocably split the PLO. His need to seek PLO consensus, his conviction that Israel will reject all compromise, and his wariness concerning US intentions will reinforce his inherent reluctance to make any but minor and incremental diplomatic moves. Arafat, in fact, is more likely to err on the side of caution than to risk splitting the PLO.

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Syrian President Assad's increased influence over the PLO radicals improves his ability to prevent the PLO from adopting policies he dislikes. Arafat, however, is less dependent on Syria and more willing to take stands independent of Damascus, but he is unlikely to agree to any Middle East settlement that Syria rejects.

The Arab states seem prepared to continue financing the PLO at roughly the same level as before the Beirut evacuation. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait apparently provide the bulk of the aid received by Fatah and the Fatah-dominated central PLO treasury. Libya is the main source of the radicals' funds.

The PLO in the near term is likely to preserve its enhanced position in Arab councils. The moderate Arab states and the PLO will work to keep their policies from diverging.

If Arafat can maintain his influence over PLO radicals, he is likely during the next year to agree in principle to some form of Palestinian affiliation with Jordan and to give Jordan a qualified mandate to explore Middle East peace initiatives. Most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will continue to accept the PLO as their representative, unless a breakthrough in the peace process convinces them the PLO is missing a real chance for an advantageous agreement with Israel.

The PLO mainstream would welcome a dialogue with the United States but it is unlikely to pay the price of unconditional recognition of Israel.

The USSR's ineffective response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon severely strained relations between the PLO and Moscow. The Palestinians are muting their dissatisfaction, however, because they value the Soviet connection as a vital source of arms and potential leverage on the United States and the Arabs.

Moscow will attempt to disrupt efforts to establish a PLO-US dialogue, knowing that PLO participation in a US-sponsored peace initiative would severely diminish Soviet influence. The Soviets will try to reconcile

differences between Arafat and Syrian President Assad. The widening rift between them complicates Moscow's efforts to stay on good terms with both.

As long as Arafat can credibly hold out prospects for progress in the diplomatic arena and maintain PLO discipline, the PLO groups will probably forgo international terrorism. Radical elements will be harder to control in the present circumstances, however, and even the moderate leaders may be forced to approve limited attacks to maintain their leadership if diplomatic successes are not forthcoming.

Non-PLO Palestinian extremists and sympathetic non-Palestinian terrorist groups have already stepped up terrorist attacks as a result of the Israeli invasion. Their plans increasingly include US and moderate Arab targets along with the traditional Jewish and Israeli interests.



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**Special Analysis**

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**Peru:  
Counterterrorist Capabilities  
of Civilian Security Forces** [redacted]

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Peru's civilian security forces are hampered in their struggle against the Maoist terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (SL) by aged or inadequate equipment, interagency rivalry, and problems of intelligence organization and dissemination. These deficiencies—unlikely to be overcome in the short term—have contributed to the apparent success of SL and have made the terrorist threat appear more serious than it probably is. [redacted]

The memory of his ouster in 1968 by the military, which had been politicized during an earlier counter-insurgency campaign, has led Belaunde to rely almost exclusively on civilian security forces to contain the threat. To date, the results have been mixed. In recent months, a number of midlevel members of the group have been arrested or killed. Nevertheless, repeated attacks on isolated police posts in Ayacucho have forced the overextended civilian security forces to pull back and consolidate in larger garrisons. Incidents such as Sendero Luminoso's attack on Ayacucho prison in March, which freed many terrorists, have highlighted police weaknesses and increased pressure on Belaunde to sanction the direct involvement of the armed forces [redacted] 25X1

We estimate that the SL has approximately 500 active members, although it can probably call on three to four times that number for support activities and occasional acts of violence. The group is concentrated in the rural Andean department of Ayacucho, where it enjoys most of its popular support, but there are also small cells in Lima and other metropolitan areas. The US Embassy reports that members are armed with rifles and submachineguns purchased in Peru or stolen from police posts. [redacted]

**Lack of Interagency Coordination and Cooperation**  
Peru's civilian police services lack the centralized 25X1 command and control of intelligence necessary for successful operations against terrorists. Instead, authority is split among four different agencies—the National Intelligence Service, Civil Guard, Republican Guard, and Peruvian Investigative Police—with overlapping and ill-defined responsibilities and parochial attitudes. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

[redacted] soldiers deserting with their weapons from local units in Ayacucho have joined the terrorists. Explosives are stolen by SL from mines and construction sites. [redacted]

Although the National Intelligence Service was originally intended to act as an overall coordinating agency, it lacks the authority, budget, and staff to do so.

[redacted]

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Following Belaunde's inauguration in 1980, the SL embarked on a campaign of low-risk, high-profile terrorist attacks consisting primarily of dynamiting electrical towers, public buildings, and police posts. Within the past year, however, SL operations have become more aggressive and have included an increasing number of assassinations of local officials and suspected police informants. [redacted]

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Moreover, perhaps because many of its highest officials are military officers, it does not enjoy good relations with the other three civilian services, which are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. [redacted]

The Service's disdain for the Ministry of the Interior—as well as probable encouragement from the military—have reportedly prompted it to ignore the Ministry and initiate its own operations in Ayacucho, including the dispatch of investigation teams. Additionally, an intelligence symposium held in March at the Service's initiative recommended that it be given the power to arrest and interrogate suspects. As long as the Service is dominated by the Army, however, Belaunde will probably be reluctant to grant it such authority. [redacted]

The three police services under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry rarely share information or conduct joint operations, largely because interagency rivalry remains intense. Members of the Peruvian Investigative Police and the Civil Guard are known to have clashed in gun battles. [redacted]

Relations between the Ministry of the Interior and the three police services apparently are as bad as they are among the individual services. The police forces have reportedly ignored useful information about the terrorists provided by Interior Ministry personnel serving in small towns in Ayacucho. Moreover, in early 1982 when the Ministry reportedly established an interagency unit to analyze and act on collected information, the three police services recalled their representatives within weeks of the unit's establishment, and it was subsequently dissolved. Recent Embassy reporting indicates that the Ministry is planning to establish another national-level antiterrorist intelligence unit, but we doubt that it will receive much cooperation from the three police services. [redacted]

In addition, the intelligence services of the armed forces are unwilling to cooperate closely with the civilian agencies—except for the National Intelligence Service, which appears to be controlled by the military. On Belaunde's instructions, the military has provided the civilian security forces with some logistic support and training, but little else. [redacted]

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**Equipment and Training Deficiencies**

Other factors limiting police effectiveness include insufficient funds, aged or ineffective equipment, often widely scattered deployments, and poor training. The Civil Guard in particular suffers from these deficiencies, which severely restrict its ability to operate in remote rural departments such as Ayacucho. [redacted]

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According to a Defense Attache source of undetermined reliability, Civil Guard and other police units in Ayacucho—including members of the Civil Guard's elite "Sinchi" counterterrorist unit—number only 1,000 men. This is probably too small a force to cover effectively a department as large and rugged as Ayacucho, especially when the poor condition of police equipment is considered. [redacted]

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Reliable small arms and sufficient ammunition are often lacking, even among the Sinchis, according to the Defense Attache and Embassy reporting. The terrorists in Ayacucho are thus often better armed than local police units. [redacted]

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Obsolete Civil Guard communications equipment hinders effective command and control of the scattered posts in the province. The US Embassy reports, for example, that several hours elapsed before Guard headquarters in Ayacucho City learned of a recent attack on a remote post because the batteries of the radio at the post were not working. Moreover, police radios are not compatible with those used in Air Force helicopters. [redacted]

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The police forces have no aircraft of their own, and even modern vehicles are in short supply. The Defense Attache and the US Embassy believe that the training of the average Peruvian policeman is as inadequate as his equipment. [redacted]

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Poor training and equipment, together with the belief that the government will not quickly rectify the situation, have adversely affected morale. Rural personnel are sometimes reluctant to engage the terrorists aggressively. The US Embassy reports that the Civil Guard is having difficulty finding officers willing to assume the Ayacucho command, and a Defense Attache source claims that the Guard Intelligence Directorate recently recommended Army intervention in the department. [redacted]

The Civil Guard's Sinchi counterterrorist force remains a potent unit, however, despite the fact it suffers from many of the same equipment deficiencies as regular police units. The Sinchis have a standing unit of approximately 300 men and as many as 2,000 personnel may have had Sinchi training. Sinchi training and morale is far superior to that of the average Peruvian police unit, as demonstrated by the stout resistance offered by 10 Sinchis when they were attacked by an estimated 40 to 80 terrorists in the village of Villaschumen last August. According to the US Embassy, Sinchi-trained officers are currently leading small detachments scattered around the country instead of being concentrated in Ayacucho. The Interior Ministry is considering transferring all Sinchi personnel and similarly trained Republican Guard officers to provide the department with a large, highly trained strike force. [redacted]

Lima may be planning to increase the budget of the police forces. [redacted] in late August the government authorized up to \$35 million for police equipment over the next few years. Training assistance from abroad could also be forthcoming. The Embassy reports that two Civil Guard officers recently left for training in Spain, and that West Germany and Canada might offer antiterrorist assistance as well. [redacted]

#### Outlook

Modernization of police training and equipment, combined with improved coordination and centralization of intelligence activities, would probably give the civilian services all they need to cripple the Sendero Luminoso. We believe the police will probably receive

some new equipment and more effective training, but Belaunde could face opposition from the armed forces if allocations for police modernization impinge on military procurement plans. The current uncertain state of the Peruvian economy could also delay improvements. In addition, at least over the short term, the civilian services probably will fail to overcome their chronic rivalries. Thus, unless tentative plans to establish a new interagency unit eventually produce an effective joint command, the Peruvian antiterrorist effort will probably continue to prove inadequate. 25X1 Also, without a thorough overhaul of intelligence collection, evaluation, and dissemination and a coordinated intelligence effort capable of achieving and exploiting penetrations of the terrorist group, potential gains resulting from improvement in equipment and training would not be realized. [redacted] 25X1

Military intervention remains a possibility if the police cannot control the situation. The armed forces' reluctance to support the police is probably motivated by a belief that the civilian agencies are corrupt and incompetent, but may also stem from a desire to see the police fail, thereby forcing Belaunde to turn to the military. Belaunde, on the other hand, hopes to avoid an escalation of civil-military tensions and will probably try to delay calling in the Army as long as possible. [redacted] Army General Brush, the President's former military aide, is to become Minister of War in January 1983. The President may hope that Brush, a longtime friend and currently commander of the military region containing Ayacucho, will be more amenable to increasing military logistic support for the police and to sharing intelligence with them, thus enabling the civilians to remain in the forefront of the fight against the Sendero Luminoso. [redacted] 25X1

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## Statistical Overview


### Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>645</b>
Government officials	7	1	3	1	4	0	4	5	1	0	26
Diplomats	40	13	47	40	33	40	36	46	28	23	346
Military	6	1	6	6	6	8	8	10	9	8	68
Business	11	12	11	13	9	35	13	13	2	0	119
Private parties, tourists, missionaries, and students	8	5	3	9	2	5	7	2	3	1	45
Other	5	2	6	3	0	7	5	13	0	0	41

### Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>645</b>
North America	3	7	8	8	6	1	6	8	2	4	53
Latin America	10	6	22	20	21	11	17	11	7	9	134
Western Europe	42	9	25	25	17	65	25	36	24	14	282
USSR/Eastern Europe	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	2	11
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	3	1	2	0	2	1	2	0	0	11
Middle East and North Africa	16	4	12	15	9	11	13	24	5	1	110
Asia/other	5	3	8	0	1	5	10	6	3	2	44

### Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks, 1981 and 1982



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**Chronology**

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**Mid-October**

**Libya**

[redacted] Qadhafi offered [redacted] arms and financial assistance in exchange for PFLP-GC assassinations of US Marines in Lebanon. Qadhafi reportedly would like to believe, [redacted] that attacks, unattributable to him, would bring about political pressures to withdraw the Multinational Forces. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

**5 November 1982**

**Italy**

The death of rightwing terrorist Pierluigi Pagliai in Rome deals a blow to counterterrorist officials, who had hoped to determine the extent of his complicity and the identity of other conspirators in the bombing of the Bologna train station in 1980. Pagliai was shot during his capture in Bolivia in October [redacted] and never regained consciousness [redacted] 25X1

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**6 November 1982**

**France**

In Bayonne, two important leaders of the ETA military wing are among four people arrested by French police. The capture of ETA propagandist Carlos Ibargurren and Peio Antxola Larranaga, allegedly in charge of finances, marks the second major arrest of ETA members by French police in a month and may reflect the severity of police crackdown on Basque terrorists hiding in France. [redacted]

25X1

**Spain**

In Madrid, the First of October Antifascist Group (GRAPO) announces a truce in guerrilla activities against authorities following the Socialist victory in the 28 October national elections. GRAPO communique indicates willingness to hold a dialogue with incoming government and cites Spanish withdrawal from NATO as one of the conditions for GRAPO's eventual dissolution. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

**8 November 1982**

**Northern Ireland**

US Consulate in Belfast is threatened by an apparent representative of the Protestant Ulster Defense Force following the acquittal in the United States of five Irish Republican Army gunrunners. The claim by the IRA defendants that their operation was sanctioned by the CIA triggered the telephone threats. [redacted]

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9 November 1982

**France**

In Paris, eight leftists belonging to the Turkish extremist group Dev Sol briefly occupy the Turkish Airlines office, protesting the 7 November referendum that approved Turkey's new constitution. [redacted] 25X1

**USSR**

Three Soviets hijack an Aeroflot aircraft, fly to Turkey, and request political asylum. Moscow demands extradition, and Turkey charges the three with piracy, assault, and battery. [redacted] 25X1

10 November 1982

**Spain**

In Pamplona, a grenade attack on the offices of a newspaper critical of Basque terrorism is believed to be the work of ETA/M, which had previously attempted to assassinate the editor for his strong antiterrorism stance. [redacted] 25X1

11 November 1982

**West Germany**

Red Army Faction leaders Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Adelheid Schulz are arrested at the site of an underground RAF cache near Frankfurt. [redacted] 25X1

12 November 1982

**Italy**

In Milan, the authorities raid a Red Brigades safehouse and arrest three Brigadists. Large quantities of weapons, explosives, and intelligence files are confiscated. [redacted] 25X1

13 November 1982

**Honduras**

A homemade bomb is thrown at the San Pedro Sula offices of Air Florida from a passing car. There is no damage or injuries, and no group is claiming credit. [redacted] 25X1

14 November 1982

**Spain**

In Zumarraga, ETA/PM Eighth Assembly is suspected of kidnaping a prominent local industrialist. Since its split with the Seventh Assembly earlier this year, the Eighth Assembly has developed a campaign to gain publicity and funds through extortion. [redacted] 25X1

15 November 1982

**Honduras**

A bomb is discovered in the Tegucigalpa offices of IBM. The offices are safely evacuated and the device is defused. No group is claiming credit nor is the incident to be reported in the local press [redacted] 25X1

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**16 November 1982**

**West Germany**

Near Hamburg, RAF operative Christian Klar is arrested near a RAF cache. West German authorities have uncovered 13 separate cache sites throughout the country. [redacted]

25X1

**19 November 1982**

**India**

In New Delhi, Sikh extremists are suspected in the grenade attack on the Soviet Embassy. Sikhs are becoming more militant in their political demands to the Indian Government, but the motive behind the attack on the Embassy remains unclear [redacted]

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