

Directorate of Intelligence



DO NOT GIVE OUT OR MARK ON

Secret-	

25X1

Terrorism Review

25X1

26 May 1983

-Secret

GI TR 83-011 26 May 1983

Copy 440




7 Chile: Change in MIR Tactics (ALA) 9 Red Brigades: Still Active (OGI) 11 Special Analysis: Rightist Terrorism in Italy (EURA) 17 Statistical Overview 19 Chronology	25X1	Terrorism Review 26 May 1983	
9 Red Brigades: Still Active (OGI) 11 Special Analysis: Rightist Terrorism in Italy (EURA) 17 Statistical Overview			
9 Red Brigades: Still Active (OGI) 11 Special Analysis: Rightist Terrorism in Italy (EURA) 17 Statistical Overview	7	Chile: Change in	
11 Special Analysis: Rightist Terrorism in Italy (EURA) 17 Statistical Overview	,	MIR Tactics	
17 Statistical Overview	9	Red Brigades: Still Active	
	11	Special Analysis: Rightist Terrorism in Italy (EURA)	
19 Chronology	17	Statistical Overview	
	19	Chronology	

25X1

Secret

i



Chile: Change in MIR Tactics

25X1

25X1

The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) remains the most violence-prone opposition group in Chile, but heavy personnel losses last month and the apparently growing cohesion of Chile's other, nonviolent leftist political organizations have caused MIR leaders to reevaluate their group's structure and tactics. According to Chilean security forces, the MIR plans to halt military operations at least temporarily and concentrate on recruitment, public relations, and inciting revolutionary peasant activity in southern Chile. We doubt that the MIR will completely suspend military operations but believe that it will scale them back in coming months as the group attempts to recover from its recent setbacks and weighs the option of closer cooperation with the Chilean Communist Party (PCCH).

The MIR, founded at the University of Concepcion in 1965, suffered major losses at the hands of government forces in the mid-1970s, and most of its leadership fled the country. Since 1976 the MIR has been rebuilding, and it tried to recapture public attention and support in March and April of this year by significantly increasing the bombing of water, electrical, subway, and railroad facilities. Twenty-six bombings took place during March and April, and security forces deactivated another 11 devices, including 40 kilos of plastic explosives found in an abandoned car parked next to the presidential palace. We believe that the increase in low-risk bombings could indicate the MIR's declining capability to carry out more sophisticated terrorist activities.

Instead of generating support for the MIR, these attempts have drawn media criticism and strong counterattacks from police and carabinero intelligence units. Security forces killed two MIR members in April, arrested several others—including a political-military chief—and seized arms caches.

The strong police response prompted domestic MIR leaders to move headquarters units out of the capital to provincial cities,

and to focus on promoting a revolutionary 25X1
peasant movement in southern Chile. The MIR was
heavily involved in rural activism during the Allende
regime, and southern Chile's high unemployment and
farm foreclosure rates make it an attractive area for
MIR organizing efforts.

25X1

The MIR's recent setbacks and its concerns over competition from the other leftist groups may have improved chances for a closer alliance between the MIR and the Chilean Communist Party. We believe that MIR leaders have been concerned for some time that the organization's image and position in Chile are declining and that other leftist groups are drawing away actual or potential MIR supporters. Cooperation between the PCCH and the MIR has been blocked in the past by disagreements over the latter's use of violence, but the weakened state of the MIR might make it more willing now to compromise on questions of strategy.

Based on the MIR's history, we believe its shift away from terrorist activity is only temporary. The MIR's previous foreign supporters—including Cuba, Nicaragua, East Germany, and Libya—will probably provide more training and funding in order to restore the group's military capability. The French Government, which has assisted MIR activists to escape from Chile recently indi-

cated its intention to concentrate on relations with 25X1 more moderate Chilean opposition groups. We believe, however, that the chill in Franco-Chilean relations in the wake of recent French criticism of

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret GI TR 83-011 26 May 1983

Chilean police tactics may result in resumption of	
limited French assistance to MIRistas fleeing Chile,	
while still maintaining a policy of official support for moderate groups.	25X1
	25X1

Secret

Red Brigades:	25X1
Still Active	238

Several operations by the Red Brigades (BR) in April and May illustrate that, despite Italian counterterrorism successes, reorganization efforts have enabled columns to remain active:

- An arson attack on a NATO warehouse in Vincenza on 11 April was claimed by the 11 April BR column and a self-styled Communist group.
- Bomb attacks on carabinieri stations in Pistoia Province on 30 April and 4 May were claimed by the 11 April BR column.
- The shooting of a Rome professor on 4 May was claimed by the BR militarist party subgroup, the Partito Communista Combattente.
- A safehouse in Rome belonging to the Red Brigades affiliate group, Armed Proletarian Power (AAP), was discovered on 11 May. The safehouse contained material linking the group to the murder of a prison guard in January 1983.
- Manifestos appeared on factory buildings in Florence in early May, indicating the formation of a new Tuscany BR column, the Umberto Catabiani Brigade "Andrea." The banners said the column opposed the militarization of Italy within NATO.
- In early May, four low-level BR support activists were arrested in Turin while attempting to rebuild the Piedmont BR column.
- Two members of the BR Partito Della Guerrigla—a name the AAP has used in the past—were arrested for an attempted post office robbery in Rome on 17 May.

25X1

It is clear that the Brigades are far from recovering fully from police successes; several of the BR attacks have shown inexperience, inefficiency, and outright ineptness. Some of the arrested members appear to be new recruits. The accidental discovery of the Rome safehouse by police, moreover, has damaged the Rome column. Material seized at the safehouse has resulted in murder charges against several Rome column members for the January slaying of a prison guard. The abortive robbery and ensuing protracted hostage-barricade situation conducted by the fugitive group on 17 May resulted in the arrest of one perpetrator and the eventual surrender of two other terrorists. The shooting of an unarmed Rome professor on 4 May at pointblank range only resulted in minor flesh wounds.

Although no evidence has surfaced indicating new BR plans to attack US or NATO targets, the manifestos in Tuscany suggest a possible threat to NATO facilities, particularly in view of the former Tuscany column's plans to attack NATO installations in the area. Italian police reported that the widow of Umberto Catabiani has recently gone underground and is active within the BR structure, perhaps as a leader. Police also speculate that the 11 April BR column and the Tuscany column are trying to create the appearance of many new columns forming and of a steady regrouping of the BR organization.

Information regarding the extent and resurgence in Italy of the group's operational capabilities is conflicting. We expect the level of threat to US, NATO, and Italian installations, presently not high, to increase during the next several weeks. We suspect the recent rise in BR activity is intended to coincide with Italian national elections scheduled for 26-27 June. The BR wants to press its claim as the "armed party" and as a credible factor in Italy. We believe attacks will be markedly less well executed and less lethal compared to BR operations of the pre-Dozier era.

 DIC	opera	tions	OI the	, pro	002101	cra.	

9

Secret GI TR 83-011 26 May 1983

Special Analysis

25X1

Rightist	Terrorism
in Italy	

Rightist political violence in Italy has a long history dating back to the 19th century and to Mussolini's Black Shirts in the early 1920s. Relatively quiescent after World War II, rightist terrorists reappeared dramatically on the Italian national scene in December 1969 when they bombed Milan's National Agricultural Bank, killing 16 people and injuring nearly 100. As with Mussolini's fascists prior to their arrival in power, the new groups, in our judgment, have sought to create an atmosphere of tension designed to make the government appear impotent and thus provoke popular demands for a restoration of law and order. In the few pronouncements of rightist terrorists, this "strategy of tension" has singled out various segments of Italian society, particularly the PCI and supporters of democratic government, for their "betrayal" of the Italian people.

A recent exhaustive study, Mauro Galleni's Report on Terrorism, claims that rightist terrorists were responsible for 68 percent of the 4,290 terrorist incidents recorded in Italy between 1969 and 1980. Galleni credits rightists with 87 percent of incidents involving multiple deaths and 49 percent of the total loss of life.²

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

The rightists tend to strike in leftist strongholds such as Bologna, which has had a Communist municipal

' Galleni is a PCI official, but it should be noted that the PCI actively opposes leftwing as well as rightwing terrorism. While we are somewhat skeptical about some of his statistics, we find credible his thesis that rightist terrorists are as active as those on the left.

Most incidents causing multiple deaths involve bombings. Of the 178 persons killed by rightist terrorists between 1969 and 1980, 131 were killed by bombs, 85 in the Bologna incident alone.

government for nearly 40 years. Rightist terrorists frequently hit public gathering places where they can create mayhem. Other favorite but more specific targets include leftist politicians, students, and journalists, as well as magistrates who have acted against rightists.

Rightist terrorists have also carried out several bank robberies, primarily to help finance their operations. The same motive—combined with a desire to develop another socially disruptive activity—may explain rightist involvement in the narcotics trade. According to US Embassy officials in Rome, Pierluigi Pagliai, wanted for complicity in the 1980 Bologna railway station bombing, was involved in large-scale narcotics activities in Bolivia when he was captured there in October 1982. 25X1

Terrorist Groups

It is difficult to classify rightist terrorists in Italy as members of a particular group. Police reports seldom identify captured rightists by organization, and some of the leading rightist terrorists in Italy have been named in association with several groups. The most prominent rightist terrorist is Stefano Delle Chiaie, still at large, who is suspected by police of participating in major terrorist events from the 1969 Milan bank bombing to the Bologna train station massacre in 1980. Elio Massagrande and Pierluigi Concutelli are other names prominent in the annals of rightist terrorism. Their multiple associations lead us to suspect that they use different labels to create the impression of greater numbers and power than is actually the case.

25X1

Italy: Rightwing Terrorist Groups/Organizations

NAR	Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari)
	Third Position (Terza Posizione)
MPR	Popular Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Popolare Rivoluzionario)
	Black Order (Ordine Nero)
	New Order (Ordine Nuovo)
AN	National Vanguard (Avanguardia Nazionale)
MAR	Armed Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Armato Rivoluzionario)
	Compass Card (Rosa dei Venti)
	National Front (Fronte Nazionale)
SAM	Mussolini Action Squads (Squadre d'Azione Mussolini)
	The Phoenix (La Fenice)
	Tolfa Brigands (Briganti della Tolfa)
API	Italians' Protection Association (Associazione Protezione Italiani)
AF	Aryan Brotherhood (Fratellanza Ariana)
GdI	Executioners of Italy (Giustizieri d'Italia)
MFR	Fascist Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Fascisti Rivoluzionari)
OPR	Popular Revolutionary Opposition (Opposizione Popolare Rivoluzionaria)
SHB	South Tyrolean Homeland League (Suedtiroler Heimatbund)
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

According to Galleni, at least four of the 11 terrorist attacks between 1969 and 1980 resulting in multiple deaths were perpetrated by New Order and its apparent successor, Black Order. New Order's origins are obscure. Scholars and Italian security services believe that Giuseppe "Pino" Rauti and Clemente Graziani founded it, probably in the early 1950s, as a paramilitary organization consciously modeled after Nazi groups. One journalistic account asserts that the group may have had as many as 2,500 members in the 1960s, but we regard that as exaggerated.

The group's first major attack was the 1969 Milan bombing. Initial police investigations focused on leftists, but subsequent acts led to the arrest of several New Order members, and in 1972 three of its members—Franco Freda, Giovanni Ventura, and Guido Giannettini—were indicted for the Milan attack. The trial and appeals of the case continued until 1982, ending in acquittal of the accused. In April 1973, New Order attempted to bomb a Rome-Turin express train. The resultant police investigation provided sufficient evidence to bring about the legal dissolution of the organization in November of that year.

25X1.

The Italian security services reportedly believe that New Order continued to exist as an underground organization, but an established American scholar claims that some New Order members reorganized under the name Black Order. The scholar alleges that Giancarlo Rognoni is the director of Black Order and that the group has also co-opted members from such other organizations as the National Vanguard, the People's Struggle, and The Phoenix. In any case, Italian authorities in late 1974 charged members of Black Order with two major attacks. The first occurred in May 1974 when a bomb exploded in a public square in Brescia, causing multiple deaths and injuries. The second came in August of that year when an express train was blown up between Florence and Bologna, again with multiple deaths and injuries. Although Black Order has continued to strike public targets, it has never again surpassed the damage attributed to it in 1974.

25X1

Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), in our judgment, is now the most dangerous rightist terrorist group in Italy. Its origins are unknown, but press sources believe it to be an outgrowth of Black Order or of the merger of several smaller organizations. Although NAR's first reported attack did not occur until 1977, Galleni credits them with some 119 attacks by 1980—a larger number of incidents than attributed to any other rightist terrorist group for the whole 1969-80 period. Unlike most rightist groups, NAR claims responsibility for some of its attacks. If Italian police and security service assumptions are correct, however, it did not claim its most spectacular accomplishment, the 1980 bombing of the Bologna

25X1

Secret

12

Secret

25X1	station; with 85 killed and 200 maimed, this attack was the most deadly European terrorist event of the postwar period. NAR has also targeted magistrates on several occa-	War II. The party's electoral success and fascism's traditional militance and violence against Communists make the PCI an obvious focal point for rightist reaction.
	sions, killing some who pronounced sentences against	Propitious terrain is also provided by the neofascist
	rightist terrorists. It murdered Rome magistrate	Italian Social Movement (MSI), which probably has
	Mario Amato in 1980, for instance, apparently be-	important links to rightist terrorists. Founded in 1946,
	cause he had uncovered incriminating evidence on two NAR members. In October 1982, NAR claimed	the MSI has consistently remained Italy's fourth- largest party. It regularly wins at least 5 percent of
	responsibility for an armed bank robbery and an	the votes in national elections and peaked at 9 percent
	attack on a police station in Rome. We do not know	in 1972. The party has always insisted that it is a
	the size of NAR's membership, but the number of	responsible organization working for its goals through
	incidents claimed by the organization and the known members arrested indicate that the group remains	legitimate democratic processes. The MSI has emphasized its democratic bona fides under the leadership of
25 X 1	large enough to be dangerous.	Giorgio Almirante, party secretary since 1969, but we
•	•	believe that Almirante may have tried to create a
	Press reports, as well as Galleni, mention some groups	legalistic facade behind which he and other MSI
	about whom we know nothing beyond their names and the dates of some of their actions. Examples are the	members have tolerated or aided rightist terrorism.
	Mussolini Action Squads, reported by Galleni to have	25X1
	made at least 70 attacks in Milan between 1969 and	There is considerable evidence that some MSI mem-
	1980. Two others, the Tolfa Brigands and Popular Revolutionary Opposition, each have at least a dozen	bers either engage in rightist terrorism or are in close contact with those who do. The founder of New
	actions to their credit since 1979, mainly in Rome.	Order, Rauti, for example, is a leading MSI member.
	Small groups that appear only intermittently are also	In addition, the MSI—unlike Italy's respectable con-
25X1	characteristic of the Italian rightist terrorist scene.	servative parties—claims that any measure is admissi-
	Galleni cites at least 50 such organizations.	ble in the fight against Communism. Italian courts, in fact, have convicted MSI activists of political violence
	Although most Italian rightist terrorist groups are	against individuals as well as the offices of several
	nationally oriented neofascists, a significant exception	political parties. They have also closed at least one
	is the South Tyrolean Homeland League (SHB). During the 1960s these Germanic separatists bombed	section of the party for harboring criminal elements.
	railroad stations, power lines, and bridges and also	25X1
	attacked Italian police officials, principally in the	Potentially more serious than the MSI connection, in
	northern Provinces of Trent and Bolzano. Only minor	our judgment, are scattered indications of links be-
	incidents have occurred since 1980, although local dissatisfaction with Rome's unfulfilled promises for	tween rightist terrorists and members of Italian security services and police forces. Press comments
0EV1	ethnic Germans in the South Tyrol could lead to more	abound, alleging that the government turns a blind
25 X 1	incidents in the future.	eye to rightist crime or, worse, is its accomplice. The
	Political Party and Government Links	3 Rauti reportedly formed New Order because he differed with
	One respected Italian journalist asserts that rightist	MSI policies under then secretary Arturo Michelini. When Almirante became MSI secretary in 1969, Rauti brought New Order
	terrorism requires a "propitious ideological terrain."	back into association with the party. Rauti was elected to the Chamber of Deputies on the MSI ticket in 1972 and has twice been
	In part this is provided by the reaction to the Italian Communist Party, Europe's largest Communist party	reelected. 25X1
	and Italy's second-largest votewinner since World	

13

cloud of speculation and allegation about Italian security service involvement with rightist terrorism began with press reports of a suspected coup plot in June-July 1964. The leading figure implicated in the scheme was Gen. Giovanni De Lorenzo, head of the now disbanded Armed Forces Information Service (SIFAR), who was subsequently elected a senator on the MSI ticket. The parliamentary commission that investigated the case filed a split report. The majority found no evidence of coup plotting, but a dissenting multiparty minority found evidence of illegal activity by SIFAR while it was headed by De Lorenzo.⁴

In a more serious incident, Prince Junio Valerio Borghese and 75 codefendants were indicted and tried for plotting a coup in 1970. Borghese, a former naval officer, received Italy's highest military award in World War II and later founded a rightist organization called National Front. The trial ended in 1978—several years after Borghese's death by natural causes—with the conviction of 46 of the defendants for conspiracy and participation in a subversive organization. Among those charged but acquitted were Gen. Vito Miceli, a former head of the Defense Information Service (SID) and an MSI party official.

Embassy officials in Rome have noted considerable public cynicism at the contrast between the strict judicial treatment of leftist terrorists—such as those involved in the kidnaping of Brigadier General Dozier—and the outcome of rightist cases. The principal defendants in the 1969 Milan bank bombing were not convicted until 1978 and ultimately were acquitted on appeal in 1982. The defendants in the Brescia bombing case were also acquitted, and no one has yet been tried for the Bologna bombing. Pagliai died in November 1982 as a result of wounds suffered in his capture in Bolivia, but Delle Chiaie, who was reportedly with him, eluded capture.

Guido Giannettini, indicted in the Milan ba	ank case,
had been an undercover agent for SID.5 Hi	s arrest
and ultimate acquittal therefore inspired co	onsiderable
press speculation about SID involvement ei	ither in the
planning of the bombing or its subsequent h	andling by
police and judicial authorities.	25X1

Serious questions have arisen in the public mind on links between fascist organizations and Licio Gelli, founder of the illegal P-2 Masonic Lodge whose discovery caused the fall of the Forlani government in 1981. A former head of Italy's domestic security service (SISDE), who was fired for his reputed P-2 membership, has admitted that Gelli was once a paid informer for that agency. Press speculation has argued that Gelli was actually the instigator of the Bologna station bombing, claiming that he chose Delle Chiaie to plan the attack to create a "hot summer" atmosphere to divert attention from the lodge's financial schemes.

It is perhaps impossible to determine the facts of Gelli's or others' involvement in rightist terrorism. Nevertheless, we believe the intense press insinuations of such relationships, and of security service connections to other incidents, have added to public distrust of the government as well as of the motives and interests of the parties, especially the dominant Christian Democrats. Thus, each subsequent scandal or "revelation" feeds the public's suspicions of rightist terrorists and the interests with which they might be connected. The result, in any event, is considerable

³ Giannettini was a journalist for the MSI national newspaper. The publication in the early 1970s of his name and those of other New Order members affiliated with the party led Almirante to denounce New Order publicly. Despite that effort to dissociate the party from known terrorists, Rauti has continued to sit in parliament as an MSI deputy.

⁶ The P-2 lodge was discovered in early 1981. Its membership list implicated many leading Italian politicians and public figures in allegedly subversive activities. P-2 is also believed to have been involved in covering up several major scandals over the past decade. Gelli, who fled Italy in 1981, was captured by Swiss authorities in September 1982 and is now awaiting extradition. He is wanted not only for his illicit lodge activities but also in connection with various financial scandals accompanying the collapse of Italy's largest private bank, Banco Ambrosiano.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

⁴ The Defense Information Service (SID) replaced SIFAR in a reorganization that took place following the De Lorenzo incident.

harm to the reputation of Italian security services, according to the US Embassy.

25X1

International Connections

Only scattered evidence exists on international support for Italian rightist terrorists. Several captured terrorists have claimed in published interviews that some of their cohorts were trained at PLO facilities in Lebanon, but those assertions are not confirmed. In one instance, a repentant rightist told of being trained by Phalangists in Lebanon. Italian security service officials believe that there has been some contact between Italian rightist terrorists and similar or sympathetic groups in Spain, West Germany, and France.

Brigades cadres may also persuade the right temporarily to assume a low profile. As long as the PCI remains an important political force, however, rightist terrorists will retain their old motive for terrorist action. Their threat will be all the more worrisome if they receive assistance from the Italian Social Movement and from sympathetic police and security officials.

25X1

25X1

West German security services have no confirmed reports of collaboration between West German and Italian rightist terrorists but are investigating the alleged involvement of one West German citizen in the Bologna station bombing. Italian police also claim evidence of contacts between the Italian rightist terrorist Marco Affatigato and a French police official, Paul-Louis Durand, who is known to be active in extremist circles and thought to have been in Bologna immediately prior to the explosion. There is no evidence, however, of collaboration between French and Italian rightists in either the planning or execution of the Bologna bombing. After the banning of New Order, five Italian rightist terrorists took refuge in Spain and were subsequently reported to have been in contact with Spanish counterparts. There is substantial evidence of Italian terrorist assistance to Spanish groups—such as the sighting of Italian neofascists in a New Forces training camp in the Pyrenees—but such help appears to be only intermittent.

25X1


Outlook

In Italy, only the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei has recently shown a capacity for sustained action. Reporting for the final months of 1982 shows that Italian authorities have stepped up arrests of rightist terrorists, possibly in response to public pressures. Because much rightist terrorist activity occurs in response to leftist activity—creating a kind of circular terrorism—recent police successes in reducing Red

15

Statistical Overview

International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-83^a



a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

^bBreak-ins, conspiracy, shoot-out, etc.

25X1

589646 5-83

Secret

17

Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received.
Belgium: Onkruit Demonstration In Louvina, 30 members and sympathizers of the antimilitarist organization, Onkruit, staged a demonstration at a Belgian military base, protesting weapons purchases. 25X1
Spain: Narcotics Connection to Basque Terrorists In Guipuzcoa Province, Basque police discovered approximately 7 metric tons of cannabis valued at \$1.3 million. Police speculate that the Basque terrorists are losing public support for their kidnapings, bank robberies are becoming too risky, and the terrorists may now be financing their activities through narcotics trafficking.
Chile: Car Bombing Foiled Chilean police recently discovered that an 25X abandoned car parked next to the presidential palace contained 40 kilograms of plastic explosive. Details of the incident are being closely held within the Chilean Government. 25X1
West Germany: Discovery of Incendiary Bombs Twenty incendiary bombs that ignite on impact were found near the Baden- Wurttemberg railroad line, which is used solely for transport of US military weapons. German authorities have had several reports that anti-NATO and anti- US militants plan to conduct unspecified operations against the US "bomb trains." We suspect this attack may be linked to a West German antimilitarist group, Krieg dem Krieg (War Against War), which was observing and photographing military trains in August and September of 1982 shortly before a US freight train was the target of a bomb attack on 29 September 1982.
Spain: Assassination Claim by GRAPO In La Coruna, the First of October Antifascist Revolutionary Group (GRAPO) has claimed responsibility for the killing of a Civil Guardsman. We believe that this attack—coupled with the 19 April killing of a police officer—indicates that GRAPO has reestablished its capability to conduct terrorist attacks in Spain. GRAPO's anti-US/anti-NATO orientation also indicates the possibility that GRAPO may target US interests.

	•	
Late April 1983	Peru: Aggressive Army Policy	
•	Peruvian Army leaders informed President Belaunde that they intend to take a	
	more active role in the counterterrorist campaign in Ayacucho and are adopting a	
	"no prisoners" policy; however, we have seen no evidence that such a policy is ac-	
, , ,	tually in effect. The President reportedly asked that the Army make every effort to	0574
	respect human lives and rights.	25X1
1 May 1983	Honduras: Terrorist Leader Captured	
-	Honduran authorities arrested Efrain Duarte, leader of the terrorist group Popular	
	Revolutionary Forces—Lorenzo Zelaya that was responsible for the 1980 and	
•	1981 machinegun attacks against the US Embassy, the 1981 ambush of a US	
•		0.5344
	mobile training team, and bombings of several US-owned businesses and their	25X1
Ī	Honduran subsidiaries.	
		25X′
		20/(
Early May 1983	Honduras: Terrorists Declare War	
	Honduran revolutionary groups followed up their public announcement of creating	•
	a Unified Revolutionary Coordinating Board with a declaration of "popular	
	revolutionary war" against the Honduran Government. Official Cuban and	
	Nicaraguan radio stations have broadcast the announcements, thereby providing,	25V1
	in our estimation, indirect endorsement of this activity.	25 X 1
•		
		\neg
•		
		25X1
• `		
L		
		25X6
		20,00

Secret

Secret

20

Secret

Gisel insta work Peter giver check Gern milit 8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa	ng the investigation following the arrest of Red Army Faction la Dutzi, West German police found a map showing 21 US n llations in the Mannheim area. The map—believed stolen by ted at the US military base at Mannheim in 1979-80—was in r Winter, with whom Dutzi resided prior to her arrest. Winter a the map in early 1983 by RAF member Rolf Pohle, with in k out the installations to determine if the map was still accur man authorities presume the RAF has some operational intercary facilities.	Dutzi when she the possession of r claimed he was structions to ate. West
insta work Peter giver check Gern milit 8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa	Illations in the Mannheim area. The map—believed stolen by sed at the US military base at Mannheim in 1979-80—was in a Winter, with whom Dutzi resided prior to her arrest. Winter the map in early 1983 by RAF member Rolf Pohle, with in k out the installations to determine if the map was still accur man authorities presume the RAF has some operational intercary facilities.	Dutzi when she the possession of r claimed he was structions to rate. West est in US
work Peter giver check Gern milit 8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa	ted at the US military base at Mannheim in 1979-80—was in r Winter, with whom Dutzi resided prior to her arrest. Winter in the map in early 1983 by RAF member Rolf Pohle, with in k out the installations to determine if the map was still accur man authorities presume the RAF has some operational intereary facilities.	the possession of r claimed he was structions to ate. West est in US
Peter giver check Gern milit 8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa	r Winter, with whom Dutzi resided prior to her arrest. Winter the map in early 1983 by RAF member Rolf Pohle, with in k out the installations to determine if the map was still accur nan authorities presume the RAF has some operational intereary facilities.	r claimed he was structions to ate. West est in US
giver check Gern milit 8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa	n the map in early 1983 by RAF member Rolf Pohle, with in k out the installations to determine if the map was still accur man authorities presume the RAF has some operational intercary facilities.	structions to ate. West est in US
check Gern milit 8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa	k out the installations to determine if the map was still accur man authorities presume the RAF has some operational inter- ary facilities	ate. West
Gern milit 8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa	man authorities presume the RAF has some operational intercary facilities	est in US
milit 8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa	ary facilities.	
8 May 1983 Afgh A Pa		25 X 1
A Pa		
A Pa		
	anistan: Split in Al Zulfiqar?	
	akistani newspaper reported an armed clash between two fact	
Zulfi	igar in Kabul. This is the first indication we have had of a sp	lit in the group.
		25 X ′
•		
	ed States: Flight 236 Now Boarding for Havana	
	apitol Airlines flight en route from San Juan to Miami with 2	-
	rd was hijacked to Cuba by an unidentified black woman bra	
	l. The hijacker was taken into custody by Cuban officials, and	
	stocking up on cigars and rum, continued on to Miami. The	same Capitol
fligh	t was hijacked on 1 May.	25 X
12 N	The sale of the Dalphin Landilla	
	: Formation of New Red Brigades Column	T D . d
	lorence, manifestos appeared announcing the formation of a ne	-
	ades (BR) column, named for former Tuscany column leader	
	biani who was killed on 24 May 1982 in a shootout with police	
	mention the planned militarization of Italy as the southern "	
	ΓO. We note the previous Tuscany column had planned to atta	
	982, and we suspect the resuscitated Tuscany column may als llation, especially during the time frame of the anniversary o	
1		
	ш.	25X
deati	n	

21

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31	1 : CIA-RDP84-00893R000100170001-2
--	------------------------------------

Secret

20 May 1983	South Africa: Explosion at South African Air Force Headquarters	
	A car bomb exploded adjacent to the headquarters of the South African Air F	Force
	in central Pretoria, killing 18 and injuring 217. The African National Congre	ess
	has claimed credit.	25X1



Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/31 : CIA-RDP84-00893R000100 Secret	0170001-2	
		1
.		
•		
		1
Sa amat		
Secret	,	