



Directorate of Intelligence

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Terrorism
Review [Redacted]

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16 February 1984

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Terrorism Review [Redacted]

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16 February 1984

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Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, [Redacted]

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Terrorism

Review 

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16 February 1984

Perspective

South American Terrorism 

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Terrorism in South America has changed—gone are the days of the Tupamaros and Montoneros who terrorized their countries and threatened their governments through repeated acts of violence. Most of the countries in which terrorism flourished during the 1960s and 1970s—Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil—are quiet now, thanks to the sweeping and brutal government crackdowns on leftist extremism that took place throughout most of South America during the 1970s.



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The South American terrorists of today are different from their predecessors. Although there are remnants of the urban guerrilla groups that operated in the past, some—for example, the Brazilian MR-8 and the Argentine Montoneros—appear to have opted for political means to achieve their revolutionary ends. Apart from the urban guerrillas currently operating in Chile, the most active South American terrorists today are those who form part of larger rural insurgencies.



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Only a few South American countries are currently experiencing a significant terrorism problem:

- Four major insurgent groups have plagued *Colombia* for decades: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the People's Liberation Army (EPL). All four claim to be seeking social and economic reforms. Some of the groups have received training and assistance from Cuba although it is unlikely that Havana has much control over their activities. Security forces estimate that some 4,000 armed guerrillas operate in both rural and urban areas, engaging in a brisk kidnaping business, assassinations, bombings, and armed confrontations with the local police and military. The insurgency in Colombia also has caused strained relations between President Betancur and the military regarding how best to handle the problem.
- *Peru's* Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is an essentially homegrown rural insurgency that has become increasingly active since the establishment of a civilian government in 1980. Its ultimate goals are to mobilize the disenfranchised Indian population and to topple the Belaunde government. Local security services estimate its strength at 1,000 to 1,500 armed combatants, with several thousand additional supporters. Violent attacks such as bombings against public utilities, government ministries, foreign embassies, and various businesses, as well as assassinations of local officials and suspected informants have been an almost daily occurrence in the southern provinces and have become increasingly frequent in Lima.

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- In recent months *Chile* has experienced an escalation in urban terrorist violence characterized by bombings of public utilities and an assassination campaign directed against the national police. Most of the attacks go unclaimed but local services suspect that members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and elements of the Communist Party (PCCH) are to blame. The aim of the terrorist violence appears to be to keep the atmosphere in Chile charged so that the situation is not defused by negotiations between moderate opposition groups and the government. In the past, Cuba has provided training to PCCH and MIR members and currently provides safehaven to exiled leaders. [redacted]

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In those countries in South America where terrorism is not currently a significant threat, local governments nevertheless take the possibility of its reappearance seriously:

- *Venezuelan* security officials worry that the left's poor showing in the December national elections will encourage some leftist groups to return to guerrilla activity. The lack of popular support for violent actions coupled with the effectiveness of the security services against the radical left, however, limit the potential threat from terrorist activity.
- The *Ecuadoran* Government is concerned that, although there appears to be no active indigenous terrorist group, difficult economic and social conditions could give rise to such groups. In addition, Ecuadoran security services have, in recent years, paid close attention to reports that Colombian guerrilla groups are using the border area as a safehaven and for training bases.
- *Argentina's* President Alfonsin has announced that the government will propose tough antisubversion legislation that will hold both the military and former terrorists accountable for crimes committed during the 1970s. As evidence of Alfonsin's resolve to prevent the return of terrorism to Argentina, in December when two exiled Montonero leaders reentered the country to announce the group's renunciation of violence, they were promptly arrested.
- Last month, *Uruguayan* security officials broke up a secret meeting of the small radical leftist Party for the Victory of the People (PVP). Documents found at the meeting site indicate that the PVP is attempting to reorganize and resume operations. Evidence was obtained indicating that the PVP is in contact with members of the Tupamaros. Uruguayan security services, however, appear to have the PVP and other radical leftist groups sufficiently penetrated to prevent them from becoming a threat. [redacted]

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It is unlikely that the scope of terrorism in South America will broaden significantly in the immediate future. Renewed countersubversive campaigns in Colombia, Peru, and Chile together with the enhanced effectiveness of local security services elsewhere on the continent should keep terrorism from posing a threat to government stability in the region. [redacted]

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Highlights

Alert List

Colombia: ELN Planning Anti-US Attack. As a result of debriefings of National Liberation Army (ELN) members arrested in a police raid of an ELN "people's prison," Colombian authorities have learned that the group is reportedly planning to attack the US Marine security guard van in February to commemorate the death of guerrilla priest Camilo Torres. The attack is to take place as the van transports Marine personnel between the Marine House and the US Embassy. The Marines have taken appropriate security precautions. It is not known whether the raid on the people's prison and the subsequent arrests will cause the ELN to postpone or cancel planned operations. [redacted]

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
France: Concern About Libyan-Backed Terrorism. The French Ambassador in Qatar informed the US Ambassador in confidence that Paris is concerned about reported Libyan plans to target up to 15 French ambassadors for assassination. [redacted]

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[redacted] Libyan agents will be sent to various unspecified cities to begin planning the killings. The Libyan decision is said to be prompted by continued French military activity in Chad. We have no information confirming these French fears. [redacted]

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Jordan: Favored Target for Terrorists. Jordanian interests are being targeted internationally by a variety of terrorist groups with support from Syria and Libya, [redacted]

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[redacted] Since the fall of 1983, Jordan has been the victim of several terrorist attacks by the Damascus-based Black June Organization. Syria is determined to squelch negotiations between King Hussein and PLO leader Arafat for a West Bank settlement. Damascus is therefore probably encouraging attacks by its surrogate groups and sympathetic radical Arab states against those advancing a settlement. [redacted]

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Key Indicator

Kuwait: Increased Concern Over Terrorism. The opening of the trial of Dawa Party members on 11 February on charges of bombing the US Embassy and other installations has prompted a worldwide alert against terrorist actions at Kuwaiti embassies and overseas facilities. Dawa has threatened additional attacks if the suspects are not released, and Kuwait has received a number of specific, written threats of bombings, kidnappings, or hijackings. A Kuwaiti foreign ministry official

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warned that US personnel and installations might be attacked to put pressure on Kuwait to free the prisoners. We believe the danger of Dawa terrorism against Kuwaiti interests will remain high during a trial that could last many months. [redacted]

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Significant Developments

France: Iparretarak Increases Activities. The French Basque Nationalist Movement Iparretarak announced to French authorities a "toughening of the armed struggle" against "repressive" French authorities. French officials have reported that terrorists—presumably members of Iparretarak—are attempting to extort taxes from French residents. This is a tactic that the Spanish Basques have used for years with moderate success. In this communique it was reported that on 31 January the group, whose aim is autonomy for French Basques, claimed responsibility for attacks which occurred in 1980 and 1983. We also note that two alleged Iparretarak militants are continuing a hunger strike in a Paris hospital. [redacted]

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Sudan: Western Companies Attacked. Three third-country nationals were killed and six wounded, including one American, during an attack by southern Sudanese dissidents on Chevron's Rub Kona drilling barge, a main base of operations for Chevron, on 2 February. Nothing was stolen, but two letters were left warning Chevron to "stop operations and stop cooperation with the military." Chevron has evacuated 200 of its personnel from the south and halted all oilfield operations except for its activity in southern Kordofan. While the government of Sudan is emphasizing a need to return to operations as soon as possible under increased military protection, some Chevron personnel will not return under any circumstances. [redacted]

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On 6 February unidentified dissidents attacked a truck belonging to the French contractor for the Jonglei Canal project. On 10 February the contractor was attacked again. Six French nationals were taken hostage and the remaining employees are being evacuated. [redacted]

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Israel: Aborted Terrorist Attack on Mosque. Moslem guards surprised intruders in Jerusalem near two Moslem holy places, the Al Aqsa and Dome of the Rock Mosques. Explosives and grenades were left behind by the terrorists who are believed by Israeli police to be associated with the extremist Jewish group, TNT, the Hebrew initials for "Terror Against Terror." The group is believed responsible for 15 attacks in the last 12 months against Moslem and Christian sites in Jerusalem. [redacted] the attacks have had considerable impact in the Arab community and have heightened Moslem-Jewish tensions. Counterterrorism by the Muslim Brotherhood against Jewish holy places reportedly may be planned. [redacted]

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Argentina: The Montoneros and the New Government

The Montoneros, the Peronist leftwing terrorist organization that was decimated by security forces in the late 1970s, are trying to make a political comeback. In the wake of President Alfonsin's stunning defeat of the Peronist party and the overall poor showing of the left in the 30 October general elections, Montonero leaders have apparently decided against the use of violence—at least for now. The Montoneros reportedly intend to focus on more conventional tactics, such as infiltrating labor and political organizations and strengthening their position within the Peronist party. Their goals are to move the Peronist party leftward and to splinter Alfonsin's electoral coalition, but we see little prospect for significant gains on either front any time soon.

The Montoneros, who first emerged in 1970, were used by party chief Juan Peron against the incumbent military regime. They split with Peron over tactics and ideology after he became President in 1973, however, and were banished from party ranks in 1975 by his widow and successor, Isabel. Although they became one of Argentina's most notorious terrorist groups, they were soundly defeated after the military took over in 1976; those not captured or killed were forced into exile. Claiming to represent the true voice of Peronism, they dubbed their group the Peronist Montonero Party and embarked on a propaganda campaign against the military. Argentine officials recently estimated there were 500 abroad and 300 in country, but we believe this count is considerably exaggerated.

The Election Impact

The Montoneros apparently saw the presidential election campaign last year as an opportunity to reassert themselves within the Peronist party. [redacted] exiled terrorist leader Mario Firmenich contacted then Army



Montonero Governor Oscar Bidegain meeting the press upon return to Argentina. [redacted] Clarin

commander Nicolaides in an effort to negotiate a return to legitimate political activity. On several occasions, he and his colleagues reentered Argentina clandestinely for brief visits, [redacted]

Meanwhile, Montoneros inside the country interrupted television broadcasts a number of times with political messages backing leftist Peronist candidates. Sympathizers also distributed pamphlets criticizing the military. [redacted]

The impressive size of Alfonsin's mandate, coupled with the poor showing by the left, seems to have convinced most Montonero leaders that political action now provides the best means for achieving their goals, although some undisciplined factions may still resort to violence on occasion. A secret Montonero

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assessment. [redacted] concluded that the new President's program had effectively co-opted potential leftist supporters. The document further revealed the Montoneros' fear that terrorism might prompt a military backlash, thus threatening the civilians' tenure in office. According to another document, the Montoneros planned to speed up infiltration of leftist political and labor organizations and hoped to make inroads into rural and agricultural unions as well. They intend to mobilize support for job actions should the new government, as expected, turn down demands for large wage hikes. Furthermore, they are seeking ways to split Alfonsin's diverse electoral coalition.

The government, however, has already taken a tough stand against the Montoneros. Obregon Cano and Bidegain were arrested soon after returning, making good Alfonsin's public pledge to hold the former terrorists—like the military—accountable for crimes committed during the 1970s. The President, reiterating his campaign promise to prevent a resurgence of terrorism, plans to press for stringent countersubversive legislation. Moreover, recent statements by government officials suggest that Alfonsin intends to preserve—at least for now—the military's ability to gather intelligence on terrorist capabilities.

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Since Alfonsin's inauguration in early December, the Montoneros' effort to increase their influence reportedly has intensified. Their main target, [redacted] is the radical left wing of the Peronist movement—the Peronist Intransigent Mobilization Party—led by well-known Montonero sympathizer Vicente Saadi. [redacted] his leftwing newspaper, *La Voz*, is funded by the Montoneros and, as of at least mid-1983, his personal income was subsidized by the group. The leftists therefore apparently believe he will use his newly won Senate seat and his post as head of the Peronist bloc in the Senate to further their interests.

Prospects Dim
We believe the Montoneros have little prospect of achieving significant political gains in the near term and that any violence will be swiftly contained. Alfonsin's antisubversive measures deprive them of the opportunity to organize effectively within the country, and several key leaders have already put off their return. Moreover, the Peronist party leadership appears determined to isolate the radical left, especially Saadi, although the odds on success are uncertain. Isabel Peron, who for years did not exercise her powers as nominal president of the movement, has recently reasserted her authority and reaffirmed her rightwing supporters as the party's leaders. [redacted] she intends to contain Saadi, as well as other elected leftists, by helping to shape anti-left legislation.

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Similarly, the Montoneros have stepped up their public criticism of the Peronist party's rightwing leadership, blaming it for the party's defeat. [redacted] the Montoneros intend to try to unseat them and to challenge moderates for control of the party.

The Montoneros probably will also receive less aid and support from foreign benefactors than they did during the military regime, thereby further cutting their potential capabilities:

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To further their objectives, exiled Montonero leaders prepared to return to Argentina soon after the election. The US defense attache in La Paz reported that 20 to 30 members met overtly there to discuss reentry. In December, following an open letter to Alfonsin announcing the organization's intention to pursue peaceful political objectives, two Montonero leaders—former governors Ricardo Obregon Cano and Oscar Bidegain—arrived in Buenos Aires.

- The Palestine Liberation Organization, which in the past provided the Montoneros with training and funds, refused appeals for aid in mid-1983, [redacted]
- Mexican officials, who had supported exiled Montoneros with safehaven and government jobs, are removing many from their posts and forcing them to leave Mexico, [redacted]

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- The Cubans, perhaps the Montoneros' most important allies, are likely to maintain contacts but probably will hesitate to provide much more than low-level support for renewed terrorism, given Havana's interests in strengthening ties with the new civilian government.
- Bolivia's leftist President Siles probably will continue providing safehaven and moral support—the top two Montonero leaders were spotted moving freely in La Paz as recently as late December—but he is unlikely to permit use of his country as a base for guerrilla operations.


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Emergency Zone in Peru



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**Peru:
Status of the
Insurgent Threat** [redacted]

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One year after the military entered the counterinsurgency effort, Peruvian Government operations against the Sendero Luminoso (SL) guerrilla group continue to encounter uneven results. The police have crippled the group's apparatus in Lima and have captured a major insurgent leader. The SL remains firmly entrenched in its Ayacucho highland stronghold, however, where progress by security forces has waxed and waned. [redacted]

forces claimed to have killed 787 "subversives" from September through early December. Our knowledge of insurgent tactics and reports of continuing SL attacks suggest, however, that not only are these body counts probably inflated, but they likely include relatively few armed militants. We continue to estimate total armed SL strength at 1,000 to 1,500. [redacted]

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Since last August, the guerrillas have been especially active throughout the rural Emergency Zone. An insurgent offensive in November forced cancellation of municipal elections in at least four of the Zone's 11 provinces and distorted results in others.¹ The military launched a major counteroffensive but, [redacted]

The higher toll also may be the result of an unofficial "no prisoners" policy that, according to the US defense attache, the military apparently adopted after mid-1983 out of frustration with guerrilla resilience. Based on this [redacted] we believe that the security forces are taking only a few prisoners in Ayacucho and counting on the area's remoteness as well as government restrictions on press reporting to conceal abuses. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Interior Minister expressed concern in December that the guerrillas were gaining strength in the Zone and government efforts were encountering little success. [redacted]

The government's unimpressive showing in the Emergency Zone stems, in our opinion, from the military's lack of a coherent counterinsurgency strategy, its cumbersome and confused command structure, tactical inconsistencies, equipment shortages, and poor intelligence. The continuing shortage of helicopters capable of operating at high altitudes has hampered rapid reaction, restricted the largely motorized Army to the region's few available roads, and probably reinforced the tactical conservatism of officers. Inadequate communication among dispersed patrols in the rugged terrain, poor maps, and conventionally trained troops unused to the Andean climate have also probably discouraged experimentation with small-unit tactics. [redacted]

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[redacted] the armed forces are beginning to make headway in the Zone, but we are not confident that this is an established trend. [redacted]

Outside the Zone, Sendero Luminoso has been less successful. Municipal elections nationwide proceeded normally, and in Lima—site of what we believe is the largest SL concentration outside Ayacucho—the police have severely damaged the guerrillas' organization. [redacted] police sweeps in November netted about 80 SL members. On 16 December, police in northern Peru arrested Antonio Diaz-Martinez, the highest ranking SL leader captured to date. [redacted]

Status of the Sendero Luminoso

[redacted] documents obtained by Peruvian police in late 1983 indicated that SL leaders held a national conference last September at which

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Situation in the Emergency Zone
Army intelligence summaries obtained by the US defense attache's office indicate that government

¹ Subsequently, the Zone was expanded by two provinces. [redacted]

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they agreed to a new offensive, consisting of two six-month "waves" and concluding in October 1984. Captured documents and interrogations of SL prisoners reveal that the primary obstacle to these plans continues to be a severe shortage of arms. Still apparently lacking foreign support, Sendero Luminoso remains dependent on domestic sources for weapons. The documents also stressed the group's need to recruit additional militia reserves. [redacted]

Possible debate over strategy as well as greater heat from the military could be responsible for the first reports of insurgent factionalism. SL leader Abimael Guzman has had little trouble quashing earlier challenges to his leadership, however, and we have no evidence of policy debates at the conference in September. [redacted]

[redacted] guerrilla elements in Huanta Province had decided to stop fighting temporarily and reorganize. At the same time, according to the press, white flags appeared in this area announcing that the Sendero Luminoso had suspended fighting for two years. [redacted]

[redacted] To date, however, the factionalism appears to be localized and shows no sign of significantly weakening the group or reducing its activity. [redacted]

Prospects

Although we judge that the SL will not directly threaten the Belaunde government in 1984, it will still present a major security problem in the Emergency Zone and in Lima. We believe the group will continue to attack rural police to obtain weapons, destroy powerlines and other infrastructure, assault uncooperative villages, and attack "imperialist" embassies and businesses. The government's ability to contain the insurgents would be threatened if they began to receive financial and materiel support from foreign powers, but this would require a dramatic shift in Sendero Luminoso ideology and strategy. We believe this is unlikely as long as Guzman's leadership is not undermined by serious military setbacks or a decline in his reportedly poor health. [redacted]

Despite the administration's severe financial problems, we expect it to allocate additional funds to the security forces both to reduce the insurgent threat and to prevent the military from blaming its ineffectiveness on insufficient government support. In addition, General Huaman, who is noted for his aggressiveness, has recommended civic action programs, withdrawal of most police units, establishment of a coordinated intelligence network, and relocation of some local inhabitants. [redacted]

We believe Huaman will receive substantial support from the highly ambitious new Army commander, General Julian Julia. We anticipate a concerted push in 1984 by Julia to win full control of all military and administrative functions in the Emergency Zone. The Army already has, in our estimation, assumed primary responsibility for most counterinsurgency patrols, but it probably also will demand complete control of the local civil administration, including the power to dismiss and appoint provincial officials and to try guerrilla suspects in military courts. Belaunde may offer limited concessions, such as reducing the police presence, but fear of surrendering his authority and sparking increased human rights violations probably will prevent him from yielding full control of all operations to the military. Nevertheless, military and government efforts across the board are likely to produce some net progress this year. [redacted]

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**Chile:
Terrorism on the Rise**

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The serious rise in terrorist violence in Chile in recent months has prompted President Pinochet to draft stronger security measures.

In response to the recent increase in terrorist activity, President Pinochet reportedly has drafted a new antiterrorism decree that will strengthen the repressive powers of the much-criticized secret police and require tougher sentences for all acts of antigovernment violence. Critics of the proposed law contend that Pinochet's authoritarian regime is threatened less by leftist violence than by growing opposition to the secret police. The proposal requires only the approval of the ruling military junta, comprising the chiefs of the three armed services and the national police.

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The late August 1983 assassination of the Santiago military governor, retired Maj. Gen. Carol Urzua, marked the beginning of the most recent wave of terrorist violence. Terrorist activity appears to be continuing at a high level in 1984. The violence has been characterized by a significant increase in the number of bombing and arson attacks against public property and a campaign of selective assassination, directed mainly against the national police. According to US Embassy reporting, more than 170 bombings took place in 1983—two-thirds of them during the last quarter of the year. Seven national policemen have been assassinated since September. Seventeen bombings were reported in the last week of January alone.

The current high level of terrorist activity appears likely to continue into the near future. A return of the "national days of protest" is being planned for next month by moderate opposition groups, and it is likely that radical groups will take advantage of the public demonstrations that are intended to galvanize public demands for Pinochet's ouster. Although the various terrorist groups operating in the major Chilean cities do not appear to have the capability to mount major operations, they probably will continue highly visible bombings of public property.

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Most of the bombings have been directed against public utilities and have been designed to cause maximum property damage but minimal personal injuries. The most successful coordinated bombing effort occurred in mid-December when unidentified terrorists downed several high-tension electrical towers, causing a simultaneous blackout in Santiago and several other cities in central Chile.

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Local security services believe that members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and elements of the Communist Party (PCCH) are responsible for most of the attacks, perhaps collaborating in some operations. Obscure groups such as the Manuel Rodriguez Front, the Zero Front, and the Salvador Allende Brigade have claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, but we believe that these are merely cover names for MIR and PCCH cells.

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Colombia: Troubled Future for the M-19

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The M-19, Colombia's second-largest guerrilla group, is apparently experiencing a leadership crisis stemming from the accidental death last April of Jaime Bateman, its charismatic former commander in chief. The new leaders' lack of stature has severely impaired their decisionmaking authority, aggravating a reported split over whether to accept the government's peace initiatives or to follow Bateman's edict to continue the armed struggle. Although we believe some spectacular terrorist actions—possibly including moves against US personnel—are likely in the coming months as the new hierarchy attempts to prove itself, a continuation of internal dissension could lead disillusioned moderates to leave the movement, ceding de facto power to more radical elements.

[Redacted]

talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the country's largest insurgent group. Were Bateman still alive, he would have performed such tasks. Fayad also accompanied Ospina to Madrid last October [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Moreover, he recently participated in a joint interview with Ospina that formed part of a major, new M-19 public relations gambit aimed at pressing the government into calling a cease-fire. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Carlos Pizzaro recently was confirmed as military chief of the M-19, despite the fact that he and Ospina reportedly do not get along. [Redacted]

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The struggle is further complicated by demands from some of the 10 members of the national directorate that it should be the final arbiter of policy. Last month, for example, several of their signatures untypically appeared alongside those of Ospina and Fayad on a joint communique with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia calling for a negotiated truce with the government. [Redacted]

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Prior to its leader's death, the M-19 already was reeling from a disastrous public relations error that arose from Bateman's rejection of a government-sponsored amnesty bill that he had originally supported. This decision—which possibly occurred because Bateman preferred being a revolutionary celebrity rather than face an uncertain role in the legal political arena—spawned a dramatic reversal in popular sentiment toward the M-19. Public opinion polls confirmed the disappearance of what remained of the group's "Robin Hood" image from the 1970s. The loss of popular standing led several previously sympathetic major newspapers to cease routinely publishing interviews with M-19 leaders or their communiques. [Redacted]

The M-19 also has been unable to resolve the disputes spawned by the government's amnesty offer in 1982. Many moderates, once fearful of opposing Bateman's rejection of the amnesty, have emerged since his death to renew debate on the issue. Several have broken with the organization, and others have formed a splinter group called the Alternative to Bateman for Peace. [Redacted]

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Organizational Chaos

For the first time in many years, lines of authority in the M-19 are unclear. Rumors persist that Ivan Ospina—the new national commander—is forced to share power with Alvaro Fayad, the current number-two man and chief of political matters. Fayad's high profile was underscored last July when he announced Ospina's appointment and the initiation of merger

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[redacted] this discord extends to middle and lower ranks and is severely affecting the M-19's operational capacity. The US defense attache recently reported statistics showing that M-19 activity has fallen dramatically since Bateman's death. The number of reported incidents is now consistently below the group's three-year average of 15 actions per month. [redacted]

Current Strategy

We believe the M-19 leadership has at least agreed on two immediate goals: to reverse the considerable beating the organization has taken on the propaganda front and to demonstrate that the group is still a potent force. To regain its image as an ally of the lower classes, the M-19 has been hijacking milk trucks to distribute the milk to needy families and attacking buses to protest rising transit fares. [redacted]

[redacted] recent M-19 civic action projects in Caqueta Department—a traditional stronghold—have solidified local support and facilitated guerrilla operations in the area. [redacted]

These efforts have had little success nationwide, however, because of the M-19's threat to embark on a new, more violent campaign to prove its continuing strength and wring concessions from the government. For example, in a televised press conference last December, Ospina and Fayad attempted to portray the M-19 as fighters for social justice, anxious to negotiate in good faith with a conciliatory chief executive but frustrated by a reactionary military establishment. Their bottom line, however, was clear: the country would face a major resurgence of kidnappings unless President Betancur ordered the armed forces to cease offensive operations against the guerrillas. [redacted]

Coming on the heels of an unprecedented national condemnation of terrorism in general—sparked by another insurgent group's kidnaping last November of President Betancur's brother—the M-19's gambit elicited an overwhelmingly negative public response. Numerous editorials decried the group's attempt to practice "politics at gunpoint." Two highly respected ex-presidents—Misael Pastrana and Carlos Lleras Restrepo—both condemned the guerrillas' tactics.

Colombia's highest military leaders came out against a cease-fire, public opinion concurred, and, according to the US Embassy, President Betancur apparently agreed as well. At least for the time being, he not only has rejected the insurgents' call for a truce but authorized an immediate military offensive against them. [redacted]

Outlook

We believe no single, charismatic leader like Jaime Bateman will emerge, so that the M-19 probably will remain disorganized for at least the next year. This does not preclude—and indeed may encourage—the use of terrorist tactics by a hierarchy trying to prove that the M-19 is still a threat. Some such actions may include kidnaping or killing US citizens and their families as well as bombings of US public and private installations. These efforts would complement the M-19's announced strategy of targeting for kidnaping all foreign representatives of multinational firms operating in Colombia. [redacted]

It is not impossible that the M-19 as it is known today may no longer exist by the end of the year. A continuation of the current state of disarray, we judge, could lead many moderates to abandon the armed struggle, thereby ceding de facto power to more hardline elements. This "new" M-19, although smaller than its predecessor, would be likely to employ more indiscriminate violence as its major weapon. This probably would destroy what little is left of the M-19's romantic image and cost it any remaining public sympathy. [redacted]

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Colombia: A Look Inside the FARC

25X1

The US Embassy's debriefing of a recently released kidnap victim has provided a unique, detailed, and sometimes fascinating view of the daily operations of Colombia's most powerful insurgent group—the 2,500-man Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The son of former missionaries turned cattle ranchers, the captive had lived in-country for more than 20 years. He is a well known and respected figure in numerous areas on the Colombian frontier and is very familiar with the area, local conditions, and the guerrillas. We and the US Embassy have found nothing in the source's comments to question the accuracy of his description of his experiences during five months in guerrilla hands. The picture that emerges is one of a well-equipped and trained organization that expertly uses violence—and the threat of it—to achieve its objectives and to ensure the “loyalty” of members as well as civilians living within the FARC's spheres of influence. His characterizations of FARC motivation, tactics, and goals help illustrate why guerrilla activity has been such an enduring characteristic in Colombia and why the armed forces are unlikely to make dramatic headway any time soon.

Organization, Equipment, and Tactics

The basic operational unit of the FARC is an eight-man squad which, according to the source's observations, is highly trained, self-reliant, and well equipped. A commander, a deputy, and a control officer run the unit, which also includes a communications specialist, a medic, a gunsmith, a demolitions expert, and a clerk. Each is armed with a rifle, a sidearm, and an average of six handgrenades. Strong emphasis on weapons familiarity is the norm. The source noted that most ammunition appeared fresh and in good supply with many thousands of rounds expended in target practice during daylight hours. Squad demolitions men enjoy similar training; each constantly practices with various fuses and explosives.

In addition, the guerrillas travel with very light, specialized equipment and are therefore much more mobile than government forces. In case the squad is attacked and scattered, each man carries enough supplies and equipment to reach one of a number of prearranged rendezvous sites and remain there for as long as 30 days. These factors, combined with the rebels' familiarity with the local terrain, give the basic FARC unit several operational and logistic advantages over comparable Colombian army squads, which will make it very difficult for government forces to root the guerrillas out of their base areas.

The next level of command is a three-squad unit. When three of these groups join together, perhaps augmented by a headquarters detachment, they constitute a guerrilla front of roughly 100 men. For some major operations, several of these fronts link up to form a 400- to 500-man force. Nevertheless, FARC tactics remain primarily based upon squad operations. A single squad rarely patrols alone, but each such unit in an operation generally has its own distinct mission.

Frontline guerrilla regulars are backed up by excellent medical support facilities. Wounded soldiers, for example, can expect rapid treatment in the field from mobile medical teams before being transferred to base hospitals—and the kidnap victim saw this type of operation efficiently executed. On a more routine basis, nurses or medics treat viral disorders with intravenous vitamins and antibiotics and use drugs for parasites, amoebas, or other gastrointestinal maladies. Preventive medicine also is practiced with special emphasis on personal hygiene.

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16 February 1984

Most operations are designed to collect supplies, propagandize, and recruit supporters in local towns. Typically, guerrillas herd the residents into some central area and deliver a political harangue. They then extort foodstuffs, medicines, and other "taxes." They also impose taxes on narcotics traffickers operating in their areas. Routinely, young men and women from the surrounding countryside are brought to large FARC camps where they are given basic military training and indoctrination as "reserves." These irregulars are then sent back to their villages as informants, but they can be called to active duty at any time. The "loyalty" of these irregulars is ensured by threats of violence against them or their families.

FARC units usually are willing to fight national police units, whom they regard as no military match. Insurgents are more careful, however, in deciding to attack even small army units, which they avoid unless they enjoy clear military superiority. Moreover, even if they are winning, the guerrillas generally do not attempt to destroy an army unit, preferring instead to withdraw after the advantage of surprise has passed. That the FARC high command closely adheres to this strategy was demonstrated just last month when a 120-member strike force assaulted an isolated 19-man Army outpost, leaving seven dead and four wounded before breaking off the attack. A decision to attack may also depend on how close the insurgents are to their base camps—if they are quite close, they usually will not engage security forces for fear of attracting attention to their strongholds.

Guerrilla Life

The lot of the average guerrilla is harsh. Commanders employ strict discipline and tolerate no insubordination. Minor infractions draw verbal harangues from the squad commander and negative peer pressure, while disobedience of a direct order or unauthorized absence can result in immediate execution. In a combat situation, a squad leader has the authority to summarily execute any troop under his command. During more than five months of captivity the kidnap victim witnessed no breaches of discipline. Even when he wounded a guard during an escape attempt, the squad responded in a controlled manner and took no retribution against him.

Insurgent officers also employ intimidation to ensure the loyalty of the lower ranks. The most common method is close and constant vigilance—a FARC troop is rarely left alone and is never permitted to be away from his unit by himself. In addition, furloughs are infrequent, usually for one night only, and taken in groups. Probably the most effective technique, however, is the standing threat that if a guerrilla departs without authorization, he and his family will be subject to retribution.

Social life for the FARC's soldiers is equally austere. Drugs are not allowed, and alcohol is only distributed in limited quantities on special occasions. Opportunities to have sexual relations with local women are rare and, probably in order to discourage the establishment of relationships that could conflict with a soldier's devotion to the FARC, guerrillas are allowed to have intercourse with any consenting woman only on one occasion. In a similar vein, marriage between FARC combatants is prohibited, although married couples may join the group. As a result of all this, homosexuality not only is fairly common but apparently is tacitly accepted.

Perhaps the source's most penetrating observations, however, are reserved for his captors in general. Citing the fact that most came from broken homes, he terms all of them emotionally disturbed or unbalanced. For example, one guerrilla had a sadistic father who was a major in the army while another was still grieving from a recent divorce. In addition, all of them, without exception, were fascinated by weapons. The source concluded by comparing the FARC to the French Foreign Legion, where each member is running away from someone or something.

Ideology and Influences

The cornerstone of FARC ideology is anti-Americanism, followed by a strong anti-Israeli sentiment. Many of the rebels also are openly anti-Christian. Interestingly, negative attitudes toward the government are directed less at President Betancur—generally considered a well-intentioned leader who is being manipulated by the military, capitalists, and the United

States—and more at the security forces. Cuban influence is extremely strong—Fidel Castro is widely admired throughout the ranks. Several of the rebels told the source that some FARC members had fought in Nicaragua and others were now fighting in El Salvador. The source also estimated that roughly one of four guerrillas he encountered were not Colombians, but were from other Latin American countries.

The depth of ideological commitment among FARC members seemed to vary widely. For example, within the squad that guarded the source, the three squad leaders were unshakably dedicated. The other five members, however, seemed motivated more by desires for revenge against the Army or the national police than by philosophical bent.

Comment

The source describes a well-organized, highly disciplined, and well-armed guerrilla force. Although we have no reason to doubt the source's estimate of the number of non-Colombians he personally encountered, we have no evidence that this group accounts for 25 percent of the FARC's membership nationwide. The insurgents are rarely threatened by government incursions into their rural strongholds. The movement lacks widespread popular support, however. Peasants living within guerrilla-dominated zones cooperate out of fear and lack of government protection. FARC leaders' reliance on intimidation to maintain control within their own ranks also raises questions about both the level of commitment in the lower ranks and the organization's ability to expand the size of its fighting force. Also, the FARC remains no military match for the army, and thus its chances of overthrowing the government are nil. The guerrilla leadership is highly dedicated, nevertheless, and evidently is committed to a prolonged struggle aimed at reversing this outlook.

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Statistical Overview

Terrorist Incidents by Type, 1984 ^a

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	1984 Total	1983
Total	62												62	551
Armed attack	20												20	77
Arson	6												6	48
Assault	0												0	0
Barricade	0												0	35
Bombing	23												23	266
Hijacking ^b	2												2	45
Kidnaping	3												3	41
Other	8												8	39

Terrorist Incidents by Region, 1984 ^a

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	1984 Total	1983
Total	62												62	551
North America	0												0	27
Latin America	8												8	132
Western Europe	19												19	185
USSR/Eastern Europe	1												1	9
Sub-Saharan Africa	10												10	28
Mideast and North Africa	19												19	125
Asia/other	5												5	45

Terrorist Incidents by Category of Victim or Installation Attacked, 1984 ^a

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	1984 Total	1983
Total	62												62	551
Diplomatic	16												16	218
Military	7												7	96
Other government	4												4	50
Business	17												17	84
Other	18												18	103

^a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.




^b Only terrorist-related hijackings will be reported in 1984.



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International Terrorist Incidents and Attacks, 1983-84



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Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received. [redacted]

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**12 December 1983–
20 January 1984**

Turkey: Turkish Counterterrorism Continues

Between 12 December 1983 and 20 January 1984 Turkish security forces captured 21 members of the Revolutionary Way (Dev Yol) and two members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The Dev Yol members are charged with numerous crimes including armed attacks, robberies, and murder in the Tunceli district. The PKK members are accused of armed attacks and having participated in guerrilla training camps in Syria and Iraq. A wide array of arms and publications were also confiscated during the operation. [redacted]

25X1

12 January 1984

Spain: Basque Company Bombed

A high-potency bomb was responsible for heavy damages to Olarra Industries in Bilbao. The company is currently involved in labor disputes concerning its plan to eliminate several hundred jobs, and the company founder is recognized for his outspoken condemnation of ETA. The military wing of ETA (ETA-M) claimed responsibility for the blast which caused no injuries. [redacted]

25X1

14 January 1984

Italy: Bombing at Local Electric Company

A bomb exploded by the entrance of the offices of the local electric company causing minor damages. [redacted]

25X1

15-21 January 1984

Burma: Karen National Liberation Army Bombs Discovered

Burmese security teams discovered seven explosive devices at the Kyaikkasan Stadium, site of the Burma Union Day celebrations which began 12 February. Six were successfully defused while the seventh had to be detonated. Security teams have been searching the grounds since construction of the pavilions began in January. [redacted]

25X1

17 January 1984

Italy: Indictments Handed Down to Rightists

As a result of a lengthy investigation into neo-Fascist terrorist elements, 158 suspects have been formally indicted on charges including subversive association, murder, armed robbery, and illegal possession of arms. The investigation, which began in 1978, concerns the activities of such groups as "New Order" (Ordine Nuovo), "National Vanguard" (Vanguardia Nazionale), and "Proletarian Revolutionary Movement" (Movimento Rivoluzionario Proletario). [redacted]

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Honduras: Second Bombing Near Regional Military Training Center (RMTC)

A small bomb exploded during the early morning hours in a vacant lot in Trujillo, the town where the RMTC is based. There were no witnesses, no casualties, and no group claimed responsibility. The incident is very similar to a bombing on 13 January at the Trujillo airstrip and is noteworthy only because of the proximity of the RMTC. It is unclear whether the bombings are terrorist inspired. [redacted]

25X1

19 January 1984

Spain: ETA Arrests

In the Basque Provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, Spanish police arrested 19 terrorists—members of both branches of ETA: ETA-M (Military) and ETA-PM (Political Military). Most of those arrested were members of ETA-M. Discoveries made during the arrests included large quantities of arms—including a grenade launcher—explosives, two “people’s jails” in which kidnap victims had been held, and a safehouse. In Bilbao, the police arrested Armando Velez Cendoga, head of the ETA-PM group responsible for the kidnaping and death of Army Captain Martin Barrios in October 1983. [redacted]

25X1

23 January 1984

Malaysia: Threat to US Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur

The US Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur received a threatening handwritten note in English, addressing him by name. In addition the envelope contained a pro-Khomeini, anti-US propaganda pamphlet and leaflet in Malaysian. [redacted]

25X1

26 January 1984

El Salvador: US Citizen Murdered

A US citizen riding in a private vehicle with her husband and two children was shot to death in Morazan Province when their vehicle slowed but did not stop at an apparent guerrilla roadblock. [redacted]

25X1

27 January 1984

El Salvador: Ultraconservative Deputy Assassinated


A legislative deputy and member of the ultraconservative Republican Nationalist Alliance (ARENA) was gunned down near his San Salvador home by heavily armed men who opened fire on his car, forced it off the road, and shot their victim 13 times when he attempted to flee on foot. Responsibility was claimed by elements of the Popular Liberation Forces. [redacted]

25X1

Spain: Steel Works Bombed

Members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion at a steel factory in Llodio. The blast caused no injuries. [redacted]

25X1



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27-28 January 1984

Chile: More Terrorist Bombings

Eleven bombings took place in Santiago, damaging electric powerlines and a small transformer. Six bombings in the Vina del Mar area caused minor damage to powerlines, a hotel, and the municipal building. No injuries were reported and no one has claimed responsibility for the incidents. [redacted]

25X1

28 January 1984

[redacted]

25X6

Sudan: Attack on Chevron Camp

Five armed men entered the Chevron camp near Melut and stole the employees' money and personal possessions. [redacted]

25X1

29 January 1984

France: Protest Bombing

A bomb explosion at a Paris manufacturing company was claimed by members of Direct Action who stated that the bombing was a symbolic action against the French military presence in Chad. [redacted]

25X1

30 January 1984

Central African Republic: Libyans Implicated in Attempted Bombing

Under interrogation, one of the two men who attempted to plant a bomb at the Lycee Caron in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR), has admitted he is a Libyan. He was allegedly in charge of a team of Libyan-controlled terrorists mainly of Chadian or Sudanese descent who were to sabotage French facilities in the CAR to point out the unpopularity of the French there. [redacted]

25X1

India: Official Killed

The former Chief Minister of Manipur, Yangmasho Shaiza, was shot at close range at his home. A hitherto obscure terrorist group, the People's Independent Group, claimed responsibility. Their motive is not known. [redacted]

25X1

Turkey: Counterterrorism Continues

On 30 January Turkish security forces captured 11 members of the illegal Turkish Communist Party-Unity (TRP-B) and Freedom Path organizations. Arms and ammunition were also confiscated. [redacted]

25X1

31 January 1984

[redacted]

25X6

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West Germany: Arrests of Croatian Emigres on the Eve of the Winter Olympics
According to the Yugoslav press, West German police arrested 12 suspected anti-Yugoslav Croats and a German associate, and seized pistols, rifles, antitank weapons, and anti-Yugoslav propaganda in a coordinated raid carried out in nine West German cities. Those arrested are reportedly suspected members of a terrorist group believed to be responsible for numerous bombing attacks against Yugoslav establishments in West Germany over the past few years, as well as unspecified activities in Yugoslavia. While the press accounts made no connection between the arrests and West German-Yugoslav cooperation to forestall a terrorist incident at the Winter Olympics currently taking place in Sarajevo, US Embassy officials in Belgrade have no doubt such an angle exists. [redacted]

25X1

West Germany: Threat Against Radio Free Europe

An anonymous letter addressed to Radio Free Europe contained a threat against its personnel covering the Winter Olympics. [redacted]

25X1

France: Armenians Sentenced

On 31 January a Paris court sentenced four Armenian terrorists to seven-year prison terms for the 1981 attack on the Turkish Embassy in Paris which resulted in one death and three injuries. [redacted]

25X1

Late January 1984

Greece: Threats Against Albanian Embassy

According to the Greek press, Albanian Embassy officials in Athens reported to Greek police that they have received threatening telephone calls and requested increased security. [redacted]

25X1

Early February 1984

Yugoslavia: Terrorist Death Sentence Stands

The Croatian supreme court has rejected an appeal by convicted terrorist Jandra Fracin to have his death sentence commuted. Fracin had been sentenced to death for having planted six bombs in public buildings and tourist facilities throughout Yugoslavia during 1982, injuring seven people. Reported to have been a paid member of an anti-Yugoslav terrorist organization located in West Germany, Fracin was accused of engaging in terrorism to provoke an exodus of foreign tourists from Yugoslavia. As death sentences are relatively rare in Yugoslavia, the harshness of Fracin's sentence underscores Yugoslav interest in preventing anti-Yugoslav terrorism. [redacted]

25X1

1 February 1984

Turkey: Communist Party Member Killed

A leading member of the Turkish Revolutionary Communist Unit who was responsible for the death of three policemen in 1983 was killed in a shootout with police on 1 February in Istanbul. Ten other key members of this group were also arrested at this time, possibly destroying the infrastructure of the organization. [redacted]

25X1

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2 February 1984**Czechoslovakia: Bomb in Department Store To Protest Rising Consumer Prices**

Authorities defused a homemade bomb placed in one of Prague's most popular department stores shortly before Christmas. An unnamed group claimed responsibility for the bomb attempt, delivering an ultimatum to the government: if additional price increases were implemented, more bombs would be placed in metros, other stores, and crowded places. [redacted]

Poland: Bomb Threat at US Embassy

The US Embassy in Warsaw received a telephone bomb threat, resulting in evacuation of the facility. A subsequent search proved negative. [redacted]

25X1

Spain: Five Bombings in Bilbao

Five bomb blasts in Bilbao caused extensive damage to the stock exchange, two French banks, and a suburban rail line. A sixth bomb was found at the Bilbao court building and later defused. The unclaimed attacks occurred just prior to the official opening of a campaign for autonomous Basque parliament elections and were probably instigated by members of ETA who have recently begun targeting the French in Spain. [redacted]

25X1

Spain: Retail Business Bombed

On 2 February in the early morning, a furniture company in Vitoria was bombed. Basque separatist guerrillas are suspected. [redacted]

25X1

South Africa: Bombing at Ciskei Consulate General

A TG50 Crocodile-type bomb exploded outside the Ciskei Consulate General in Durban. Although it was the height of the rush hour, only one passerby was injured. The ANC, which uses this type of bomb, has claimed credit. [redacted]

25X1

Sudan: Attack on Chevron Facility

Three third-country nationals were killed and six wounded, including one American, during an attack by southern Sudanese dissidents on Chevron's Rub Kona drilling barge, a main base of operations for Chevron. Nothing was stolen but two letters were left warning Chevron to "stop operations and stop cooperation with the military." No group has claimed responsibility. [redacted]

25X1

England: Indian Diplomat Killed

The second ranking official at the Indian Consulate in Birmingham, Ravindra Mhatre, was kidnaped and later killed by a previously unknown group, the Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA had demanded that the Indian Government release certain political prisoners and a ransom of \$1.4 million. [redacted]

25X1

3-4 February 1984**Guadeloupe: Tourist Hotels Bombed**

Terrorists set five bombs, two of which exploded injuring five persons including two tourists. Bombing targets included the Hotels Meridian and Arawak, as well as a large supermarket, a newspaper office, and the automobile of the manager of

the local Renault agency. No one claimed responsibility for the attacks, but local government officials speculate the bombings to be the work of the Revolutionary Caribbean Alliance. [redacted]

25X1

4 February 1984

Spain: Former ETA Member Shot

Industrialist and former member of ETA Miguel Angel Solaun was shot and killed in Algorta. Solaun was one of the 140 "repentant" ex-members of ETA. ETA-M claimed credit for the killing, called Solaun a traitor and collaborator, and described his execution as a warning. [redacted]

25X1

France: Socialist Party Headquarters Attacked

On the evening of 4 February two molotov cocktails were lobbed into Socialist Party Headquarters in Ciboure. A similar attack occurred on 28 December. This may be the work of either French or Spanish Basques in protest of French Government action or in support of the French Basque hunger strikers. [redacted]

25X1

5 February 1984

Spain: Civil Guard Shot

A retired paramilitary civil guard was shot and seriously wounded in Lasarte by a gunman suspected of belonging to ETA. [redacted]

25X1

Spain: ETA Groups Plan Merger

In a public communique in Madrid the small politicomilitary wing of ETA announced its intention to merge with the larger and more violent military wing, ETA-M. The two groups split in 1974 over the issue of violent attacks. Several ETA-PM members have been granted amnesty by the Spanish Government, and we suspect the remaining members feel a merger will enhance their capabilities for terrorist actions. [redacted]

25X1

6 February 1984

Spain: Spanish Rightists Sentenced

On 6 February in Madrid, Spanish courts sentenced two members of an extreme rightwing gang for crimes committed against leftwing intellectuals. Rafael Gomez Alvarez received a 67-year sentence for a 1979 bomb attack on a Madrid bar in which one person was killed and 10 injured. He was also responsible for another murder and an attempted murder in 1981. Ramiro Rodriguez Borlado was sentenced to 43 years in prison for sending a letter bomb to a club in Madrid in 1980 which blinded one person and maimed another. [redacted]

25X1

Sudan: Attack on Jonglei Canal Contractor

A truck belonging to the French company working on the Jonglei Canal was attacked by unidentified dissidents after it hit a mine. An unknown number of people in the truck were killed. [redacted]

25X1

7 February 1984

Morocco: Bomb Threat to US Legation

The US Legation in Tangier received a bomb threat on a nonlisted phone number. Police found nothing suspicious. [redacted] 25X1

France: Assassination of Iranian Exile

General Oveisi, the Shah's former martial law administrator, and his brother were machinegunned to death in Paris. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Islamic Jihad as well as by a hitherto unused name, the Iranian Revolutionary Organization for Liberation and Reform. The assassination almost certainly was directed by the Khomeini regime and reflects its concern over the increasing anti-Khomeini activities of Iranian exiles in Paris. [redacted] 25X1

8 February 1984

France: UAE Ambassador Shot

The Arab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB) shot the United Arab Emirates' Ambassador to France in the head as he left his apartment building. The ARB has previously claimed responsibility for a Gulf Air airplane crash in the UAE, for murdering an Israeli diplomat in Paris, and for several attacks on Jordanian interests. We continue to believe that the ARB is either a covername for the Black June Organization or a special unit under BJO's leader, Abu Nidal. [redacted] 25X1

Corsica: Villa Bombings

In their continued agitation against French rule, Corsican terrorists bombed a villa, seriously injuring a woman. Another bomb attack against a private residence caused considerable damage. [redacted] 25X1

France: ETA Members Killed

Two members of ETA's military wing were shot and killed by unidentified gunmen on 8 February in the French border town of Flendage. Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL) has claimed responsibility. [redacted] 25X1

Mauritius: Threat Directed at French Embassy

The French Embassy in Port Louis has recently received two threatening letters from the Islamic Jihad, one of which named the French Government-sponsored school there as a target. The Embassy is conducting an investigation into the threats since 18 percent of the local population is Muslim, which includes several thousand Shiites. [redacted] 25X1

Italy: Arrests of Terrorists

As a result of rumored plans for a terrorist "summit" to be held in Milan, the Italian Carabinieri conducted a series of operations against terrorist groups in early February. Authorities made 17 arrests and seized a large quantity of weapons. While Italian press speculated that Barbara Balzarani—the most important BR leader still at large—was among those taken into custody, Carabinieri officials indicated that Balzarani was not arrested. [redacted] 25X1

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Guatemala: Safehouse Seized; Guerrillas Commit Suicide

Guatemalan authorities captured a safehouse used by the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) and seized explosives, weapons, ammunition, Russian handgrenades, an M-79 grenade launcher, and a claymore mine. When authorities entered the residence, they found that two men, believed to be high-level members of ORPA, had taken poison. One died; the other was in critical condition.

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[REDACTED]

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8-9 February 1984

Greece: Bomb Explosions in Athens

Two bombs exploded near the National Museum and National Technical University, causing property damage and slightly injuring two persons. A third bomb exploded earlier in a suburb of Athens. According to various Greek newspapers, there have been several claims of responsibility. The most plausible to date is that of the "Yellow Secret Organization of Air Force Officers and Noncommissioned Officers," who reportedly have demanded the resignation of the Greek Air Force Chief of Staff, threatening sabotage of aircraft if the official does not step down.

25X1

[REDACTED]

10 February 1984

Sudan: Second Attack in a Week on Jonglei Canal Project

Unidentified dissidents attacked the French contractor for the Jonglei Canal project. Six French nationals were taken hostage, and the remaining employees are being evacuated.

25X1

[REDACTED]

11 February 1984

Lebanon: American Kidnaped

Frank Regier, an American professor at American University Beirut, was kidnaped at gunpoint while walking along a Beirut street. The identity of the abductors is unknown. The abduction increased fears of terrorist activity among US citizens in Beirut, and probably has led more of them to decide to leave Beirut.

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[REDACTED]

12 February 1984

Lebanon: Kuwaitis Kidnaped and Freed

Two sons of the Kuwaiti press attache in Lebanon were kidnaped by gunmen. Lebanon's state radio later reported that Amal militiamen seized the kidnapers and released the victims. The kidnaping could have been an Iranian-inspired attack timed to coincide with the opening of the trial in Kuwait of suspects in the December bombing of the US Embassy and other installations.

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[REDACTED]

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