




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Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries

25X1

October 1983

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GI IPI 83-003
October 1983

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Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries

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October 1983

This quarterly was produced by and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and suggestions are welcome and may be addressed to

Instability and
Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, on

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October 1983*

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**Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries**

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Preface

This is the third issue of a quarterly publication designed to provide timely warning of significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 July to 30 September 1983, examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy changes. It is not intended to supply short-term warning of revolution or collapse, but rather is designed to address the potential for instability during the next two years in a periodic, systematic, and thematic way through the consistent application of a set of indicators.

We believe that most of the 90 indicators are applicable to most of the countries we examine; other indicators are more country specific. All indicators are examined for every country for each issue. Those countries for which indicators have changed significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are treated in a detailed way in the text.

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The quarterly includes four parts:

- A brief overview of each country.
- A more detailed assessment of countries in which there have been developments of interest.
- A chart summarizing the status of key indicators for each country and tables tracing political and economic changes during the past several years.

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This issue assesses a total of 28 countries that we have identified as particularly salient to US interests. These countries are included because they are strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US friends or allies, or geographically close to the United States.

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Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance**Mexico**

The continuing decline in living standards brought about by President de la Madrid's austerity program—which has improved financial stability and long-term economic prospects—could touch off more substantial antigovernment demonstrations than have already occurred. Discontent contributed to modest setbacks for the ruling PRI party in recent local elections in two northern states. [REDACTED]

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El Salvador ¹

The insurgents are fighting to retake the initiative after a period of several months in which the government made significant political and military gains. The delay of national elections until 1984 will benefit the guerrillas and work against the Christian Democrats. [REDACTED]

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Guatemala ¹

General Mejia, who ousted former President Rios Montt in August with broad military and considerable civilian support, faces serious challenges from an otherwise divided armed forces and from ultrarightist political groups. The insurgents—divided and weakened by the government's counterinsurgency programs—are in no position to mount a successful major offensive this year. [REDACTED]

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Honduras

Army troops in eastern Honduras are mopping up a 100-man guerrilla force suffering from poor logistic support and low morale. The guerrillas entered from Nicaragua in July after training in Nicaragua and Cuba. Additional insurgent groups may be getting ready in Nicaragua for new incursions. [REDACTED]

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Panama

The sudden withdrawal of retired National Guard Commander Paredes from the presidential race probably stems from his anger over recent cabinet changes and his loss of support from key government and military leaders. Subsequent coup rumors implicating Paredes may have been floated by National Guard leaders to justify their removal of his supporters from government and Guard positions. [REDACTED]

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Colombia

A worsening economy and heightened insurgency may soon begin to erode President Betancur's popular standing but are not likely to endanger the country's democratic political system. [REDACTED]

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¹ See part 2 for detailed discussion [REDACTED]

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Secret**Venezuela**

The party that wins the December election will inherit a crippled economy, including widespread bankruptcies, mounting unemployment, and soaring inflation which, if unresolved, could result in social and political turmoil. The weakening economy is eroding support for President Herrera's COPEI party. The opposition candidate for president, Jaime Lusinchi of the Democratic Action party, enjoys a widening lead in the polls that should allow him to defeat his opponent, Rafael Caldera of COPEI, by a large margin.

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Peru

President Belaunde is rapidly losing popularity because of the growing insurgency, factionalism in the ruling Popular Action Party, the resurgence of the major opposition party (the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), economic difficulties, and natural calamities. Belaunde remains likely to survive these crises because the military and the civilian opposition are ill prepared and reluctant to assume power.

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Brazil

Public discontent is mounting over the IMF-mandated austerity program and the leadership of President Figueiredo, who has been weakened by ill health.

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Argentina

The party that wins the general election on 30 October and assumes power by January may enjoy a brief honeymoon in which to address serious political and economic issues. The most pressing include subordinating the military to civilian rule and renegotiating agreements with the IMF and private banks for repaying \$40 billion of foreign debt.

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Chile ¹

Senior military commanders still support Pinochet but would move to replace him if the dialogue with the opposition collapses and the level of violence escalates. Many officers favor an accelerated transition to civilian government and negotiations with the opposition.

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Spain

Incidents of flag burning and demonstrations by radical Basque separatists have enraged the military and rightists, but Prime Minister Gonzalez's firm response to the provocations has satisfied most critics. A rise in unemployment to 17.5 percent is of growing concern.

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Greece

Delinking the drachma and the dollar may provide short-term relief for Greece's severe balance-of-payments problem but also will force up domestic prices and could occasion mild popular discontent.

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¹ See part 2 for detailed discussion.

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Turkey	The military regime is permitting the general election to be held as planned on 6 November but has curbed political activity by opposition groups. A slight increase in inflation portends a slowing down of the economic recovery experienced in the past three years. [REDACTED]	25X1
Morocco	Austerity measures recently introduced to help resolve serious foreign exchange problems will probably soon depress living conditions. King Hassan may have to rely more heavily on the country's relatively efficient security forces to put down unrest. [REDACTED]	25X1
Egypt	The legal opposition, whose relations with President Mubarak continue to deteriorate, is boycotting fall local elections and threatening to boycott next year's parliamentary elections unless Mubarak appoints an interim coalition government to oversee electoral procedures. The government is avoiding unpopular austerity measures despite a worsening foreign exchange situation. [REDACTED]	25X1
Saudi Arabia	Low-key criticism from businessmen who have been hurt by a slowdown in government contract payments does not pose a serious political problem. The government continues to limit expenditures even though oil exports for the quarter rose to an average of 5.1 million barrels per day as compared to 4.1 million in the previous quarter. [REDACTED]	25X1
Iraq ¹	The use of Super Etendard aircraft—if France delivers them—against Iranian oil exports in the Gulf are likely to prompt Iranian attacks that would be devastating to Iraq's battered economy and threatening to the stability of Saddam Husayn's regime. Iranian troops, now spearheaded by Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas, have opened a second front in Iraqi Kurdistan. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	25X1 25X1
Iran ¹	Widespread demonstrations protesting deteriorating living conditions and religious demonstrations in Mashhad and Esfahan attacking the government's economic and social policies do not threaten the regime at this time. [REDACTED]	25X1
Pakistan ¹	President Zia could be unseated by senior generals if unrest in Sind Province is prolonged or if the violence spreads to Punjab Province. [REDACTED]	25X1
	¹ See part 2 for detailed discussion. [REDACTED]	25X1

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Nigeria ¹	Lingering opposition resentment over irregularities in the August elections, in which President Shagari's National Party won a massive victory, threatens the country's still-fragile civilian political institutions. Serious economic problems remain despite Lagos's ability to reschedule about a third of its estimated \$6 billion in short-term arrears. <input type="text"/>	25X1
Somalia	Insurgents sponsored by Ethiopia and Libya have been unable to exploit increasing tribal infighting, which, although an irritant, will not endanger the regime as long as the tribes remain riven. <input type="text"/>	25X1
Kenya	President Moi's unopposed reelection last month reflects his control over national political affairs. His critics remain fragmented, and his ability to lead has been enhanced by a temporary improvement in the country's foreign exchange position. However, the election results also indicate that discontent among the Kikuyu is growing. <input type="text"/>	25X1
Zaire	President Mobutu is monitoring the activities of former parliamentarians, released from prison in May, who are trying to establish a party in opposition to his ruling Popular Revolutionary Movement party. Soaring inflation, which has followed an IMF-mandated 80-percent currency devaluation, may increase the price of staples and provoke unrest. <input type="text"/>	25X1
South Africa	Terrorist activity may increase as the 2 November referendum on Prime Minister Botha's constitutional reform proposals approaches. Botha's powerful National Party machine is likely to win the referendum despite opposition from both leftist and rightist parties and from most nonwhite groups. An unexpected loss could lead to Botha's ouster and would discourage future efforts at reform. <input type="text"/>	25X1
Philippines ¹	A combination of developments—including an escalation of the violent protests that have followed the Aquino assassination, a further withdrawal of support by business leaders, increased unity among moderate opposition groups, and a perception among senior military commanders that President Marcos is losing his grip or becoming physically unable to run the nation—could usher in a period of serious, prolonged instability, including the deposal of Marcos. <input type="text"/>	25X1
	¹ See part 2 for detailed discussion. <input type="text"/>	25X1

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Indonesia

Government dress regulations for public schools have prompted protests from Muslim students and deepened orthodox Muslims' suspicions of government policy. Austerity measures are beginning to strengthen Jakarta's international financial position.

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South Korea

The Soviet shootdown of the KAL airliner has diverted public attention from domestic issues. Security officials do not anticipate serious campus disturbances this fall but are concerned about possible antigovernment protests during President Reagan's visit. Clashes with North Korean infiltrators have heightened government concern over possible terrorist disruptions of forthcoming international conferences in Seoul.

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
Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest

El Salvador

- Sustained government offensives that started in June have forced the guerrillas to mount a series of counterattacks in eastern and central El Salvador to try to recapture the initiative and regain credibility at home and abroad. [REDACTED]
- Government civic action programs are making progress, and the amnesty law has attracted some former guerrilla combatants. [REDACTED]
- Protracted debate by the Constituent Assembly on the draft constitution has eliminated virtually all likelihood of a presidential election in 1983. [REDACTED]
- The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) fears that it will be outmaneuvered by rightist parties in the political jockeying prior to the presidential elections and suspects that the Army's recent successes may reinforce its traditional inclination to play the role of political arbiter. [REDACTED]

Comment

We believe the insurgents have suffered important military and political setbacks during the past three months that have seriously undermined their prospects for at least the near term. The insurgents' failure to disrupt or otherwise halt the Army's summer campaign indicates the continued inability of the guerrillas to defend their base areas from determined government attacks. The insurgents' weakness was further reflected in their avoidance of significant combat and the defensive posture they temporarily adopted throughout most of the country. Concurrently, the confidence of the Salvadoran military increased. Improved small-unit tactics, the strong performance of the three US-trained quick-reaction battalions, [REDACTED] declining guerrilla morale are encouraging the Army to stay in the field. A substantial reduction in military casualties since June has elicited further armed forces support for the aggressive strategy being pursued by Defense Minister Vides [REDACTED]



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Nevertheless, we believe it is premature to reach firm conclusions about the longer-term significance of these recent developments. The newfound resolve of the military, for example, could dissipate rapidly if the guerrillas—who have suffered only moderate losses of men and equipment—were to significantly expand their current tactical operations and score a few more battlefield successes. Recent successful attacks on San Miguel, the country's third-largest city, and on several small towns and government outposts demonstrate, moreover, that the guerrillas remain a power in the north and east. We expect the insurgents will continue to launch periodic offensives in hopes of improving their military credibility and potential negotiating position. [REDACTED]

Effective civic action programs in San Vicente and Usulután departments—including new roadbuilding projects, the reopening of schools, and improved local health care—are adding further pressure on the guerrillas. We believe the guerrillas probably will focus much of their counteroffensive on these departments out of fear that otherwise the civic action programs, which have expanded more rapidly than initially envisioned, will undercut their popularity in these

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former strongholds. We also believe the insurgents are concerned about the results of the recently expired amnesty program. According to the government's figures, which may be exaggerated, some 585 insurgents, including 250 combatants, turned themselves in between May and August 1983. Salvadoran military leaders regard the defections as another indicator of declining guerrilla morale and are likely to push for a renewal of the program. []

Recent signs that Nicaragua and Cuba, preoccupied with the events inside Nicaragua, increasingly see the insurgency in El Salvador as negotiable represent still further grounds for guerrilla concern. Compounding guerrilla difficulties are continuing differences between the five guerrilla factions over political and military strategy, growing doubts about the likelihood of a popular uprising, diminishing support in Western Europe, and increasing cooperation between the Salvadoran Army and its allies in Central America. []

The government's forced postponement of the presidential election from 1983 to 1984, however, means that the guerrillas will not immediately have to face popular repudiation at the polls as they did in the March 1982 election. We believe the postponement reflects the desire of most political parties to buy time as well as the Central Elections Council's need to complete its tardy logistic preparations. The postponement may have the beneficial side effect of increasing voter participation, especially since the previous schedule clashed with the harvest period in many areas. []

We believe the Christian Democrats have the most to lose in the election. They opposed postponement because the party's superior organization had given it a headstart. Christian Democratic leaders also fear that President Magana is seeking to strengthen the Party of National Conciliation, a moderate rightwing party traditionally aligned with the Army. We believe these concerns, plus PDC suspicions that the Army wants to play a decisive political role, are well founded. However, Magana also may fear that neither Christian Democratic leader Jose Napoleon Duarte nor Assembly leader and potential candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson can unite the country. Consequently, Magana may be looking toward the moderate right for a candidate capable of creating a broad-based political coalition. []

Key Indicators To Watch

- Widespread guerrilla attacks on military and economic targets plus terrorism in the capital and other cities.
- An erosion of military confidence and subsequent return to a static defense posture as a result of newly successful guerrilla operations.
- Conversely, continued effective military operations that lead to a further deterioration in the guerrillas' tactical situation.
- Stepped-up Cuban-Nicaraguan logistic support to the insurgents.
- A relaxation of the civic action programs as evidenced by a reduction in the size and number of civic action teams, or the Army's failure to provide adequate security in areas previously cleared.
- Rightist intimidation of labor and other potentially pro-Christian Democratic groups as the election draws near.
- Growing disunity within the government over the issue of negotiations with the guerrillas. []

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Guatemala

- Senior military officers ousted President Rios Montt in August in a near bloodless coup. []
- Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia, the new chief of state who retains his position as Defense Minister, lacks national support and is having difficulty unifying the armed forces which, although broadly supportive of the coup, remain seriously factionalized over major issues. []
- To reinforce armed forces support for his leadership and to avoid antagonizing differing military factions, Mejia is moving cautiously on policy issues, avoiding innovative policies and attempting to improve relations with the United States. []
- Lacking a strong base of support, Mejia also is attempting to gain the approval of key civilian groups, particularly the rightist parties. []
- Mejia has responded to rightwing pressure by abolishing the Council of State—which Rios Montt established without the participation of rightist parties—and by reducing an unpopular tax. []
- Although the insurgents stepped up urban terrorism during September, they have been unable to exploit the unsettled military, political, and economic situation. []

Comment

General Mejia, who previously had opposed a coup, reluctantly agreed with a majority of his senior military commanders to oust Rios Montt largely because the former President's activities—particularly his Protestant evangelism, enactment of tax reforms unpopular with business and rightwing groups, and refusal to set an early date for elections—were undermining military unity and precipitating strong public criticism. Mejia and other senior commanders also wanted to preempt a coup planned by dissident middle and junior grade officers that might have ended in a more substantial change in the regime and weakened the military as an institution. []

We believe that, although opposition to Rios Montt is widespread in the armed forces, their support of General Mejia is only tepid because of his previous



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strong backing for Rios Montt and his thwarting of earlier coup attempts. Indeed, many in the military hate him. To win over middle and junior grade officers, we believe that he will continue to move cautiously on policy issues and avoid major changes. []

Mejia has abolished Rios Montt's widely criticized secret courts and executions, reinstituted a 90-day amnesty for insurgents, and, under pressure from the established political parties, may advance the constituent assembly elections from July 1984, the date set by Rios Montt. In response to rightwing pressure, Mejia has weakened Rios Montt's tax reforms by reducing the unpopular value-added tax. Although he promises to pursue Rios Montt's successful counterinsurgency campaign emphasizing civilian defense forces and civic action and may soon step up counterinsurgency operations—in part to divert the military's attention from politics—we are concerned that he may gradually come to favor conventional military operations over civic action. []

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Realizing that many military officers disliked Rios Montt's strongly nationalistic, anti-US stance, Mejia, in his initial foreign policy announcements, has allied Guatemala more closely with the West and strongly supported US policy initiatives in Central America. We believe Mejia now will press Washington for increased military and economic assistance to support the counterinsurgency effort. We believe he is likely to reject any help conditioned on Guatemala's human rights performance, however, and that the officer corps' disenchantment with his leadership will increase should he fail to obtain this aid. []

The ultrarightist National Liberation Movement is the greatest civilian threat to the new President. Any delay in the return to civilian government or addition to the tax burden would allow the Movement to exploit existing military discontent with Mejia. The Movement wants early elections because its established political constituency, strong financial backing, and ties to conservative military groups currently give it a decided edge over the other parties. The Movement's leaders probably calculate that an early election would also undermine the organizational efforts of some 20 center and leftist parties that were newly formed or reorganized last March as a part of Rios Montt's efforts to diffuse rightwing political power. []

Despite a recent upsurge of urban terrorism and insurgent attacks on economic targets such as farms and power generators, we believe the guerrillas' inability to move decisively to exploit the unsettled postcoup political situation underscores guerrilla problems as well as the success of the government's civic action and amnesty programs. In our opinion, the insurgents are too disorganized and short of supplies to substantially increase their current level of attacks, although we do expect a gradual increase in sabotage and terrorism. []

Key Indicators To Watch

- Sentiments expressed by the military, especially among middle and junior grade officers, that Mejia is not doing what is necessary to ensure that the elections scheduled for July 1984 will be held on time.
- Mejia's failure to garner more foreign military and economic assistance by mid-1984.
- Mejia's introduction of legislation or regulations threatening to the economic interests of rightwing activists and their supporters.
- Government abandonment of civic action programs in favor of a strictly military response to guerrilla activity. []

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Chile


- The two-year economic recession and President Pinochet's reluctance to accelerate the timetable for a return to civilian rule have promoted the growth of a strong opposition movement. [REDACTED]
- A broad spectrum of political and labor activists have sponsored a "day of national protest" each month since May as well as national strikes. The security forces have responded sternly, with 49 civilian deaths as of mid-September. [REDACTED]
- The Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) have carried out several acts of terrorism, including bombings and the assassination of the military governor of Santiago. The extreme left was instrumental in fomenting violence during the August "day of protest." [REDACTED]
- Moderates in the government have persuaded Pinochet to permit several prominent political exiles to return, lift the state of emergency, and consider congressional elections before the scheduled date of 1989. [REDACTED]
- The armed forces, while continuing to back Pinochet, strongly support the political dialogue with the opposition being conducted by Interior Minister Jarpa. [REDACTED]

Comment

Most senior Army officers, spurred on by less influential Air Force and Navy officers, favor restoration of some aspects of civilian rule before 1989. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the military continues to support Pinochet's presidency, but we believe that senior commanders would move to replace him with another officer or a conservative civilian if negotiations with the moderate opposition collapse and violence spirals upward. The officer corps is concerned that the armed forces' unity and professional image will erode if the military is called upon repeatedly to assist the police in controlling violent protests. [REDACTED]

Recognizing the need to address these concerns, Pinochet has reluctantly opened a limited political dialogue with his civilian opponents. His speech on 11 September marking the 10th anniversary of Allende's ouster avoided confrontation. That tack and the fact that the violence occasioned by the protest on



8 September was held to a moderate level should permit the resumption of talks with the democratic opposition that were initiated in mid-August. Although in his speech Pinochet defended the 1980 Constitution's timetable for a return to civilian rule in 1989, he went on to state that the government is considering amending the Constitution to permit the earlier election of a congress. He also expressed support for conservative Interior Minister Jarpa's dialogue with the moderate opposition Democratic Alliance. [REDACTED]

All of Pinochet's critics are dissatisfied with his concessions and continue to demand his resignation. But while moderate opposition leaders want to maintain a dialogue with the government in the hope of extracting significant concessions, the Communist

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Gen. Augusto Pinochet

Gen. Augusto Pinochet is shrewd and politically savvy, and can make propitiating gestures, such as the appointment of the commission to study the return of exiles. But as pressure mounts, his basic inclination is to crack down. A decisive person, Pinochet is tenacious once he makes a decision and rarely changes his mind. The magnitude of unrest recently has led to the uncharacteristic appearance of uncertainty and floundering. We do not believe this signifies a fundamental change in his leadership style, but rather a temporary response to stress. We

believe that as disorder mounts his basic disposition to control and control ruthlessly will again come to the fore. Human rights violations would not especially bother him because he rationalizes these excesses as necessary to maintaining stability. Although he could make conciliatory gestures to the opposition, this tack would be cosmetic, for he is not capable of genuinely opening up and sharing power. He is convinced his own survival is critical to Chile's survival and will do whatever he deems necessary to stay in power. []



Santiago police use water cannons against anti-government demonstrators during the 8 September "day of national protest." []

Wide World ©

Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) are likely to take every advantage of the dismal economic situation and increasing public desire for civilian rule in order to provoke further turbulence, although they may hold off from encouraging violence during future days of protest because of their failure to provoke the security forces into overreacting during the protest on 8 September. In our view, an escalation of violence would polarize the country and delay progress toward the restoration of civilian government. []

The troubled economy—in severe decline since mid-1981 because of the falling price of copper, heightened competition for export markets, high international interest rates, and a sharp decline in the

availability of foreign loans—has caused considerable hardship for a broad cross section of Chileans. Government employment programs and debt rescheduling agreements reached with the IMF and other external lenders are helping to stimulate a modest recovery. Continuing improvement will depend on an upturn in the world economy, a rising demand for copper, and a stable domestic environment. []

Key Indicators To Watch

- Criticism by senior military commanders of Pinochet's policies or personal behavior.
- Persisting opposition protests calling for Pinochet's immediate resignation.
- Further pressure for a more specific timetable for an earlier transition to civilian rule.
- Increased terrorism from the right or left, especially assassinations of key government or opposition leaders, that undermines talks aimed at an earlier return to civilian rule.
- More brutal military enforcement of internal security laws and heavier punishments of violators.
- The resignation or removal of Interior Minister Jarpa. []

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Iraq

- Super Etendard aircraft and antiship missiles—which Saddam Husayn may use against international oil carriers in the Gulf if he becomes desperate enough—are being obtained from France. []
- Iran has opened a second front in Iraqi Kurdistan and captured a base there from which it can supply anti-Baghdad Kurdish guerrillas. []
- The largest Iraqi Kurdish dissident group, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), is now spearheading the Iranian incursion. []
- Ankara fears that the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq may spill over into Turkey and may be preparing another raid into Iraq to weaken the rebels. []
- The economy is deteriorating rapidly as a result of falling oil revenues, import cuts, and food and energy shortages. []

Comment

Baghdad's use of five Super Etendard aircraft—promised but not yet delivered by France—against Iranian oil exports could precipitate further developments resulting in serious instability in Iraq. Baghdad already has threatened to use the aircraft, equipped with Exocet missiles, against international oil carriers using Khark Island. []

[] such a move would prompt swift Iranian retaliation, including the destruction of Iraq's oil pipeline through Turkey. Interdiction of the pipeline—Iraq's sole remaining export outlet—for an extended period would have a devastating impact on the economy, enough to threaten the survival of the regime. []

Baghdad's economy is already in desperate shape. Oil revenues for 1983 are projected to reach only \$7 billion, as compared with \$9 billion in 1982 and \$25 billion in 1981. During the past year Baghdad has been increasingly unable to procure foreign loans, imports have been cut drastically, shortages of fresh food have begun to develop, and long lines to buy gasoline are a regular scene. So far the Iraqi people have been able to accommodate inconveniences. We find it impossible to determine whether such inconveniences and shortages are perceived as serious hardship by Iraqis. We have seen no signs of public



protests, and most Iraqi Arabs still seem to support the regime. We do not believe the population could tolerate the hardships resulting from a total cutoff of the country's oil exports, however. []

Meanwhile, Iraq will find it difficult to put down the Kurdish rebellion and counter Iran's successful penetration in the north. The KDP guerrillas have an intimate knowledge of the topography and are backed up by regular Iranian forces, who are supplying the rebels from Haj Umran, a border post seized in late July. If the Iraqi Army, which is highly mechanized and hence less effective in the rugged northern mountain terrain, fails to rid the area of enemy forces before winter, we anticipate that the Kurds with Iranian support will be able to consolidate their new positions and expand offensive operations next spring. []

Ankara has expressed deep concern to US officials over the changing security situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. It fears that the rebellion will spill over into Turkey's southeastern provinces where 8 million Turkish Kurds reside. Last May Ankara sent two

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*Iraqi prisoners of war captured
on 22 July near Haj Umrān
during the Iranian offensive
into Iraq.*



UPI ©

Army brigades into Iraqi Kurdistan to root out rebellious Turkish Kurds who were using Iraq as a safe-haven. Ankara has threatened to stage another cross-border raid.

Turkey also believes the Iran-Iraq war is escalating dangerously; the Turkish Ambassador to Washington has said that if Iran blows up the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline, Turkey would retaliate against Iran with armed force.

Key Indicators To Watch

- Delivery of the Super Etendard aircraft and their deployment to an airfield in southern Iraq.
- Failure by the Iraqi military to defeat Kurdish and Iranian forces in Iraqi Kurdistan before the onset of winter.
- Major acts of sabotage in Baghdad committed by Iranian-supported opposition groups.

- Acts provocative to Turkey, such as attempts to sabotage the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline, or attacks by Kurdish rebels on Turkish trucks traveling the highway south of the Iraqi-Turkish border.
- The establishment of an Iranian-backed Iraqi puppet government in Iraqi Kurdistan.
- Demonstrations protesting economic shortages.
- Baghdad's inability to borrow further from abroad.
- A new drop in oil revenues.

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Iran

- Despite increased oil revenues and imports, popular and largely spontaneous demonstrations protesting commodity shortages, price increases, unemployment, and poor living conditions broke out in July and August in 14 cities throughout the country.
- Conservative senior clerics who are rivals of Ayatollah Khomeini sponsored antiregime demonstrations in Esfahan in July and in Mashhad in August protesting radical governmental policies.
- Clerics who support radical domestic policies have sought to exploit the unrest and move against their conservative rivals.
- Several exile and other opposition groups are seeking to use the protests to further their antiregime activities.
- The regime has responded to the unrest by attempting to impose price controls, prevent stockpiling, and ensure that goods are distributed more effectively.

Comment

The economic and religious protests that occurred over the summer indicate that popular discontent with the regime is growing but has not reached the level of an immediate threat. Although oil revenues increased during the quarter, economic conditions for the majority of Iranians have not improved because of disruptive government policies and inefficient procedures for the distribution of goods.

Most demonstrations appear to reflect the economic unhappiness of urban workers and others whose expectations were aroused by decrees Khomeini issued in December that implied political repression and severe social behavior codes would be eased. The protesters, however, have avoided direct criticism of Khomeini, who continues to retain the support and loyalty of the lower classes.

A more serious challenge to the regime are the demonstrations sponsored by senior clerics attacking the government's radical economic and social policies



and sheer inefficiency. In July, one cleric publicly shredded a picture of Khomeini and labeled regime policies "un-Islamic."

Exiled opposition groups are attempting to exploit the lower class's discontent and have called for more demonstrations. Concurrently, posters of the Shah's son have appeared in several cities. We believe the exiles will be unable to take advantage of the situation unless they unify, coordinate their actions, and devise a strategy for turning key urban groups against Khomeini.

The government's generally restrained response to the protests appears to have been seen as a sign of weakness and has encouraged criticism. We believe there is not much the regime can do to end peaceful demonstrations led by respected conservative clerics, particularly because Khomeini has appealed to clerics to become more politically involved. The government may also believe that forceful official action to break up lower class protests could result in bloodshed and a cycle of unrest similar to the one that overthrew the

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Shah. Faced with this threat, the government is attempting to distribute goods more effectively and to keep prices down. The cabinet also has been reshuffled in an effort to make it more efficient in dealing with economic problems. We think the challenge from conservative clerics might compel the regime to moderate policies, such as extensive land reform and nationalization of foreign trade, although factional rivalries will make this difficult. []

Behind the scenes, radicals and conservatives within the government continue to battle over power and position. Radical clerics have exploited the unrest to oust rivals and garner new positions for themselves. It was in part radical pressure, for example, that forced the Commerce and Labor Ministers, who supported a freer economy, to resign in early August. We do not believe the radical-conservative power struggle is likely to be won by either side soon. []

In response to worker and peasant grumbling over heavy casualties and lack of battlefield successes in the war with Iraq, the regime has lowered the scale of the fighting by adopting a strategy of attrition. The fighting that has occurred during the Iranian Army's campaign across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan has been less heavy than in previous offensives further south. However, Khomeini still opposes any negotiated settlement []

If Iranian oil exports were to be suspended as a consequence of military attacks by Iraqi Super Etendard aircraft, which are being acquired from France, Tehran's economic situation would not significantly deteriorate in the short term. Tehran undoubtedly would retaliate against Iraq, but we do not expect it to block the Strait of Hormuz, as this would hurt Iran as much as Iraq. Tehran's financial reserves would enable it to continue essential imports at present levels for up to a year. Some austerity measures, however, would need to be taken, and nonessential imports would have to be reduced. Although the population might blame ensuing hardships on the regime because of its insistence on continuing the war, we believe that Tehran would be able to deflect the blame onto Iraq. []

Key Indicators To Watch

- Further demonstrations in major cities, especially any violence or direct attacks on Khomeini.
- A harsh regime crackdown on the protesters.
- The government's failure to modify radical economic policies or otherwise improve economic conditions.
- Further conflict over economic and social policies between conservative and radical clerics that hinders the regime's ability to make decisions.
- Antiregime activities by senior conservative ayatollahs unhappy with the government's radical economic and social policies and a growth of popular support for their positions.
- Increased unity and coordination of activities by exiled opposition groups that makes them better able to exploit antiregime discontent.
- Major destruction of Iranian oil facilities by Iraqi Super Etendard aircraft. []

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Pakistan

- President Zia's announcement on 12 August that civilian rule will be restored by March 1985 prepares the way for him to run for president and thereby retain power.
- The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a coalition of eight left-center parties led by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), has rejected Zia's plans and begun a civil disobedience campaign to oust him from office.
- The MRD campaign has been effective only in Sind Province, where widespread disturbances that began in August reflect serious Sindhi discontent with the Punjabi-dominated military government.
- Conservative and religious party leaders, although also critical of Zia's plans, have disavowed the MRD campaign.
- The economy has been growing steadily.

Comment

Besides providing for his retention of the presidency, Zia's proposals could give the military a constitutional role in politics, including the right to veto legislation. The plan also contains a protracted timetable for the return to civilian government and gives the president extensive powers.

The proposals have evoked strong criticism from the civilian opposition and

we believe that the consequent violent protests have led some top military commanders to try to persuade Zia to begin a dialogue with his civilian opponents, including PPP moderates. Rather than make concessions to the political parties or amend his proposals so as to limit the new president's authority, Zia is now trying to contain the Sind disturbances by co-opting individual politicians and pressuring traditional Sindhi leaders.

Although the military so far has been able to control the Sind unrest, the MRD-sponsored demonstrations and related political violence that have erupted in



Sind Province represent the most serious challenge to the military regime since it assumed power in 1977. The protests have drawn support from a broad coalition of Sindhi society, including landlords, clergy, local elected officials, provincial civil servants, and students. Most ethnic Sindhis have long been alienated from the martial law regime. They believe Zia has abrogated former Prime Minister Bhutto's plan to develop the province, they remain angered by the ouster and execution of Bhutto—himself a Sindhi, they resent domination by the largely Punjabi Army, and they believe their long-term interests are endangered by the growing economic encroachment of outsiders in their province. It is no coincidence that the worst violence occurred in central and northern Sind where newly irrigated land is being given to Punjabi settlers, including many former Army officers.

The USSR and India have publicly criticized the prospect of continued military rule in Pakistan and expressed sympathy for Zia's foes. both Moscow and New Delhi may have played a role in the Sind

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Lawyers march in Karachi in August with placards demanding an end to martial law.



UPI ©

disturbances. Opposition leaders have previously told US diplomats that leftists are receiving substantial Soviet funds. Such external interference could exacerbate Zia's problems in Sind but is likely to work to his advantage elsewhere by permitting him to exploit the strong anti-Indian and anti-Soviet sentiments of many Pakistanis.

Zia retains considerable popular support in the key province of Punjab, notwithstanding strong pockets of opposition. Punjabi bazaar merchants and Muslim clergymen—who we believe could play leading roles in organizing urban unrest—as well as the rightwing and religious parties apparently consider Zia preferable to a PPP-dominated government and refuse to support the opposition campaign. Students and labor groups generally hold civilian politicians in low regard and are unlikely to join the protest movement unless it gathers considerably more steam or Zia pursues plans attacking their interests, such as banning college student unions. Although Punjab's urban and rural poor still support Bhutto's PPP, Bhutto's widow, who is seriously ill in Europe, and his daughter, who has been under house arrest since 1981, are in no position to galvanize them.

We do not believe the military regime will be seriously threatened so long as it retains Punjabi military, merchant, and religious support, the opposition parties remain fragmented, and the economy stays healthy. Zia himself, though, could be unseated by other senior generals if persisting unrest in Sind appears to be the result of his mishandling of the situation, or if the violence spreads to Punjab Province and the Army is called on to suppress fellow Punjabis. Over the long haul, we believe that Sindhi demands for a separate state are likely to grow and seriously threaten Pakistan's territorial integrity unless Zia co-opts the traditional Sindhi elites and provides for genuine Sindhi representation in the proposed civilian government.

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Key Indicators To Watch

- Participation of large numbers of non-Sindhis in antigovernment violence in Sind Province, particularly in the cities of Hyderabad and Karachi.
- The spread of serious anti-Zia protests to Punjab Province.
- Growing support for the protest movement from previously uncommitted conservative, religious, labor, and student groups.
- Evidence of external financial and other support to the opposition for the purpose of increasing the level of protest against the regime.
- Military unwillingness to suppress protests.
- Senior military attempts to bypass Zia and negotiate with opposition political leaders.
- A new serious economic downturn leading to price increases and shortages of essential commodities.



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Nigeria

- President Shagari won reelection, capturing almost 50 percent of the total vote and defeating his nearest rival, Yoruba leader Obafemi Awolowo, by more than 4 million votes.
- In subsequent elections, Shagari's National Party captured 11 of 19 governorships and a majority of federal senate and house seats.
- National Party victories in opposition party ethnic strongholds sparked some violent outbreaks and forced the beleaguered Federal Election Commission to announce an official inquiry, delay elections in two states, and impose curfews and ban demonstrations in several others.
- After protracted negotiations, the government obtained the agreement of more than 20 international banks to reschedule about a third of its total short-term debt of \$6 billion.

Comment

Although the country's cumbersome national elections were completed on schedule, we believe that opposition party allegations of rigging—which in fact was indulged in by both the government and opposition parties—could undercut Shagari's legitimacy in some areas of the country and thus weaken prospects for long-term stability. Election-related violence was modest by historical standards, but nonetheless about 100 people were killed—many by thugs hired by various parties—and hundreds were arrested in riots that followed controversial gubernatorial elections. Thus far, however, most defeated candidates have indicated a willingness to wait for the courts to decide their challenges.

Despite the anger of the opposition parties, we see little likelihood that they will soon overcome long-standing personal and ethnic differences and form a united front. Their allegations of rigging aside, we estimate that neither the Yoruba-dominated Unity Party nor the largely Ibo-dominated Nigerian People's Party attracted much support outside their traditional ethnic bases. Consequently, we believe that



pressure will now build in both parties for veteran leaders Awolowo and Azikiwe to withdraw in favor of younger politicians better able to bridge ethnic and regional divisions.

The National Party's near sweep of the elections carries problems in addition to the accusations of fraud. Shagari's comfortable legislative majority means he no longer can blame economic and political difficulties on opposition obstructionism. We further believe that Shagari will face some significant challenges to his control of the National Party during the first few months of his second term, although we expect him to remain dominant by virtue of his increased mandate. Shagari's public image as a leader able to put national interests ahead of sectional goals and treat all ethnic groups evenhandedly would diminish if he gives in to northern pressure for increased influence in national politics. At the same time, southern National Party politicians will expect to be rewarded for having increased party support in the

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Postelection violence on 15 August by Yoruba supporters of the Unity Party resulted in the death of a progovernment National Party chief and the destruction of his house. [REDACTED]



Nigerian Daily Times ©

south. Jockeying over the choice of a party successor to Shagari—who is constitutionally barred from running for a third term—also is likely to intensify as his second term progresses. [REDACTED]

We foresee continuing economic difficulties even if Lagos continues to produce well over its OPEC-mandated quota of 1.3 million barrels of oil per day. Mounting evidence indicates that future commercial bank loans for consumer imports and industrial goods will depend largely on the government's ability to reach agreement with the IMF for additional loans and retain the Fund's confidence. Historically, Lagos has had little success in systematically implementing tough economic policies, and we believe it will find it similarly difficult to adhere to the IMF conditions we anticipate. [REDACTED]

Although we do not foresee a dramatic slide into political chaos, we believe Nigeria's still fragile civilian political institutions will continue to be tested during the next two years. The government's support will be eroded if economic conditions deteriorate,

especially in urban areas previously controlled by opposition parties. Shagari also will probably find it difficult to follow through on his commitments to bring more efficient ministers into his cabinet, tackle such highly charged issues as the creation of new federal states, and attack endemic problems such as corruption. [REDACTED]

The military provided only logistic support during the recent elections and has remained aloof from politics since 1979. Coming on top of the allegations of election rigging, however, adverse political and economic developments over the next two years could increase ethnic and other tensions in the armed forces. Southern middle and junior grade officers might enter into coup plotting if the perception becomes widespread that Shagari is tolerating excessive corruption and northern influence and not making adequate progress toward resolving the country's social and economic problems. [REDACTED]

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Key Indicators To Watch

- An increase in competition for power and position along ethnic lines within Shagari's National Party.
- Governmental actions especially favoring northern or southern state interests.
- Opposition attempts to link economic difficulties with ethnic issues.
- Heightening ethnic tensions as evidenced, for example, by spontaneous group violence, communal demonstrations, and population flight.
- Increased discontent among southern middle and junior grade military officers over growing northern influence in both the military and the government.



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
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Philippines

- Opposition leader Benigno Aquino was assassinated on his arrival in Manila on 21 August while being escorted by three government security guards.
- Violence following a massive antiregime rally in Manila on 21 September resulted in more than 10 civilian and security personnel deaths and about 200 injured. Anti-Marcos rallies also were held on 21 September in Cebu and Zamboanga
- President Marcos has abandoned his policy of "maximum restraint" and is now cracking down on the mass demonstrations that have followed the 21 September rally.
- President Reagan canceled his November visit to the Philippines.
- The moderate opposition has renewed threats to boycott the 1984 National Assembly election.
- Marcos fears that Aquino's assassination and the violence on 21 September will cause the US Congress to alter the terms of the \$900 million base assistance package scheduled to begin next spring.
- Increasingly serious external financial problems have led Manila to sound out the United States for emergency financial assistance.
- Marcos suffered an acute bacterial infection in early August, causing a flareup of his chronic kidney ailment that required two dialysis procedures.
- Marcos has tightened his control over the military by further strengthening the position of Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Ver, a longtime loyalist.

Comment

Public dissatisfaction with President Marcos's rule appears to be growing, and we believe a combination of not implausible developments could usher in a period of prolonged instability, including the depose of Marcos from the presidency. These factors include



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an escalation or continuation of the sort of violence that erupted on 21 September, a major external debt crisis, the further withdrawal of support by influential business leaders, increased unity among the moderate opposition, open condemnation of Marcos by leading Roman Catholic clerics such as Cardinal Sin, a perception among senior military commanders that Marcos is losing his grip, and further signs of Marcos's ill health. A sustained series of spontaneous mass demonstrations and the absence of conciliatory measures by Marcos would encourage important elites previously loyal to Marcos—such as the military and the President's business cronies—to consider alternatives to his rule and thus further undermine his

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Police clubbing demonstrators during violent anti-Marcos protests on 21 September. [redacted]

Associated Press ©

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position. In the process, we are deeply concerned that the existing good will felt by most Filipinos toward the United States could be seriously eroded because of a popular perception that the United States is propping up the Marcos regime. [redacted]

The foreign media, most of the political opposition, and probably a large majority of Filipinos believe that the government was behind the assassination. Although the government seems to be pressing its own investigation, its statements and explanations have convinced few that it is not responsible for the assassination and it has failed to appoint credible public figures to the investigating commission. [redacted]

We believe the 1984 election could have been a major watershed in the liberalization of post-martial-law politics had the assassination not occurred. In the wake of the Aquino murder, however, Marcos will find it especially difficult to simultaneously appear

fair in setting election rules, induce the moderate opposition to participate, and assure a victory by his ruling party. We anticipate that a boycott of the election by the moderate opposition would deny the legitimacy of the electoral victory that Marcos's ruling KBL party is likely to win. The boycott also would make the moderate opposition—still fragmented and without an outstanding leader in the absence of Aquino—largely irrelevant to the country's political future. The moderates' impotence, we believe, would promote political polarization and play into the hands of both the left and the right. [redacted]

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The Communist Party of the Philippines is exploiting the unsettled political situation, primarily through its political arm, the National Democratic Front. Filipino

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officials claim Communists played a role in the 21 September riots; Communist front groups certainly were prominent at the peaceful demonstrations early that afternoon. The Communists also may be making plans to encourage future violence. They undoubtedly will step up their recruiting activities and could find fertile ground in student and labor groups. The Communists' armed wing, the New People's Army, which operates primarily in rural areas, has not yet attempted to extend its military operations into urban areas in the wake of the assassination. []

We believe a further sharp deterioration in Marcos's precarious health could precipitate far-reaching changes in the nature of the regime. Jockeying for succession already appears to have intensified in the wake of Marcos's August illness. Several of his most influential associates assumed the worst and moved to align themselves with Imelda Marcos, who many ruling party politicians believe will succeed the President if he becomes incapacitated, notwithstanding constitutional provisions providing for an interim government and recent protestations by Imelda that she intends to withdraw from politics. []

Infighting within the defense establishment, presaging an enhanced role for the military in the post-Marcos era, also has surfaced. Following an eruption of longstanding tensions between civilian Defense Minister Enrile and General Ver—both of whom have been touted as potential successors—Marcos came down squarely on the side of Ver, who earlier had consolidated his control over the military by placing loyal officers in key command and staff positions. Marcos summoned Enrile to his office, questioned his loyalty, and told him the defense establishment was being reorganized. []

A disruption of the economy resulting from the financial crisis would further erode Marcos's credibility and make the coming election even more difficult for him. The Central Bank's liquidity is seriously strained, and repayments due on the short-term \$2.2 billion debt may soon cause a foreign exchange crisis. In the meantime, Manila is cutting back sharply on fourth-quarter 1983 spending and plans a 34-percent reduction in capital outlays in its 1984 budget. A 21-percent devaluation imposed in early October promises to ease pressures on Central Bank reserves, but the inflationary effects will add to Marcos's political burdens. []

We believe Marcos is seriously concerned over the potentially adverse effects of President Reagan's cancellation of his November visit. Marcos had hoped to use the event to boost his international image as a statesman and legitimize his post-martial-law political system for domestic consumption. By contrast, Filipinos may interpret the cancellation as implying a US lack of confidence in Marcos's regime and despair or draw encouragement depending on whether they support or oppose Marcos. Conversely, though, Communist and other opposition groups have been deprived of a major event around which they had hoped to organize major demonstrations and perhaps violence. International banks, which were considering curtailing short-term lines of credit to the Philippines, may be reassured by the devaluation in early October. []

Key Indicators To Watch

- A sharp deterioration in Marcos's health.
- The surfacing of strong evidence of governmental complicity in the Aquino assassination.
- Foot-dragging or the deliberate suppression of evidence by the independent commission of inquiry.
- Increased unity among the moderate opposition parties and an announcement that they will boycott next year's election.
- Intensified condemnation of Marcos by leading Roman Catholic clerics or businessmen.
- Adverse reactions to the cancellation of President Reagan's visit, including a loss of confidence in the regime by international banks and a consequent withdrawal of credit lines, capital flight, and signs that Filipinos generally are beginning to believe that Marcos is on his way out.
- Increasing success by the Communist Party of the Philippines in recruiting Filipino youths and workers either into its political wing, the National Democratic Front, or guerrilla arm, the New People's Army.
- Signs of dissatisfaction with Marcos on the part of senior military commanders. []

Part 3. Graphic Indicators

Status of Key Indicators

Legend

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- developments of serious concern

	Social change/ conflict			Economic factors							Opposition activities					External factors				Regime actions and capabilities				
	Ethnic/religious discontent	Demonstrations and riots	Strikes	General deterioration	Decreased foreign aid/ investment	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	Food/energy shortages	Consumer price increase	Key export price index change	Per capita imports decrease	Organizational capabilities	Opposition conspiracy/ planning	Terrorism and sabotage	Insurgent armed attacks	Attraction for public	External support for government	External support for opposition	Government hostility/attacks on US	Opposition hostility/attacks on US	Repression/brutality	Security capabilities	Coup plotting/military discontent	Decreased unity/loss of confidence	Decreased respect for ruler
Mexico	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
El Salvador	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Guatemala	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Honduras	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Panama	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Colombia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Venezuela	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Peru	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Brazil	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Argentina	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Chile	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Spain	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Greece	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Turkey	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Morocco	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Egypt	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Saudi Arabia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Iraq	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Iran	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Pakistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Nigeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Somalia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Kenya	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Zaire	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
South Africa	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Philippines	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Indonesia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
South Korea	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Note: Judgments presented in this chart pertain to individual countries and should not be used for cross-national comparisons with reference to individual indicators.

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Mexico: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**




- developments not of concern, or not applicable
○ developments of moderate concern
○ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	

Population (millions)^b

69.6

71.3

73.6^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

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El Salvador: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**



- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	○	○	○	●	●	○	○	●	◐	○	
Economic factors	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	○	
Opposition activities	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	
External factors	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	○	○	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	○	

Population (millions)^b

4.7

4.6

4.5^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

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


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Guatemala: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Political

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	○	○	○	
External factors	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	○	○	○	○	○	
Population (millions) ^b	7.3				7.5				7.7 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300784 10-83


25X1

Secret

Honduras: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	○	○	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	○	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Population (millions) ^b	3.9				4.1				4.2 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300785 10-83

25X1



Secret

Secret

Panama: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Population (millions) ^b	2.0				2.0				2.1 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300786 10-83

25X1

Secret

Colombia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Political



- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	○	○	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	

Population (millions)^b

25.2

25.6

26.1^cEconomic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

25X1

300787 10-83

Secret

Secret

Venezuela: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	

Population (millions)^b

17.9

18.4

18.9^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$

200

180

160

140

120

100

Consumer Price Increase
Percent

4

3

2

1

0

Exports to OECD Countries
US \$

3,400

3,200

3,000

2,800

2,600

2,400

2,200

2,000

1981

1982

1983

^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300788 10-83



25X1

Secret

Secret**Peru: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a****Political**● developments not of concern,
or not applicable○ developments of moderate
concern

⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	
Population (millions) ^b	18.1				18.6				19.2 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300789 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

Brazil: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**




- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	⊙	⊙	⊙	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	

Population (millions)^b

124.8

127.7

130.6^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.




300790 10-83

25X1

Secret**Argentina: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a****Political**

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	● ^b	○	○	○	○	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Population: (millions) ^c	11.2				11.4				11.5 ^d			

Economic^{e,f}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b The Falklands/Malvinas Islands war.^c Population figures based on mid-year census.^d Estimated.^e Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^f Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300791 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

Chile: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**


- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	


Population (millions)^b 28.1 28.5 29.0^c

Economic^{d,e}


Real per Capita Imports
US \$



Consumer Price Increase
Percent



Exports to OECD Countries
US \$

^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300792 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

Spain: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**



- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	○	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	
Opposition activities	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	

Population (millions)^b

37.6

37.9

38.2^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300793 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

Greece: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**




- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
○ developments of moderate
concern
○ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	●	
Economic factors	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	

Population (millions)^b

9.7

9.7

9.8^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300794 10-83


25X1

Secret

Turkey: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	○	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Opposition activities	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Population (millions) ^b	46.4				48.0				49.2 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

25X1

300795 10-83

Secret

Secret

Morocco: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
 ○ developments of moderate concern
 ○ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	
Economic factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	

Population (millions)^b

21.6

22.2

22.9^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$

40

38

36

34

32

30

Consumer Price Increase
Percent

5

4

3

2

1

0

Exports to OECD Countries
US \$

500

450

400

350

300

1981

1982

1983

^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300796 10-83




25X1

Secret

Egypt: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	○	⊗	⊗	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	⊗	○	○	○	○	○	○	⊗	○	○	
Opposition activities	○	○	⊗	⊗	○	○	●	●	●	●	○	
External factors	●	○	⊗	○	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	○	⊗	⊗	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Population (millions) ^b	43.4				44.7				45.6 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300797 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

Saudi Arabia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	




Population (millions)^b

8.5

8.5

8.5^c

Saudi population includes approximately 3 million foreign laborers.

Economic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300798 10-83

25X1

Secret

Iraq: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**● developments not of concern,
or not applicable○ developments of moderate
concern




○ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	
Economic factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	
External factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○ ^b	○	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	

Population (millions)^c

13.6

14.0

14.5^d**Economic^{e,f}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Concern is with recent Turkish troop incursion into
Iraq and potential effect on Kurdish minority.^c Population figures based on mid-year census.^d Estimated.^e Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^f Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300799 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

Iran: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
○ developments of moderate
concern
○ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Economic factors	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	
Opposition activities	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	
External factors	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○ ^b	○ ^b	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	

Population^c

40.0

41.2

42.5^d**Economic^{e,f}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$

70

60

50

40

30

20

Consumer Price Increase
Percent

12

8

4

0

-4

Exports to OECD Countries
US \$

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

^a Base year is 1975.^b Concern is with effects of war with Iraq.^c Population figures based on mid-year census.^d Estimated.^e Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^f Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300800 10-83


25X1

Secret

Pakistan: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	
Opposition activities	○	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
External factors	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Population (millions) ^b	90.4				93.1				95.6 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300801 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

Nigeria: Selected Political and Economic Indicators***Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
○ developments of moderate
concern
◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	◐	○	●	○	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	◐	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	

Population (millions)^b

79.7

82.4

84.8^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

-15

-20

-25

-30

-35

-40

-45

-50

-55

-60

-65

-70

-75

-80

-85

-90

-95

-100

-105

-110

-115

-120

-125

-130

-135

-140

Consumer Price Increase
Percent

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

-10

-12

-14

-16

-18

-20

-22

-24

-26

-28

-30

-32

-34

-36

-38

-40

-42

-44

-46

-48

-50

Exports to OECD Countries
US \$

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

-1,000

-2,000

-3,000

-4,000

-5,000

-6,000

-7,000

-8,000

-9,000

-10,000

-11,000

-12,000

-13,000

-14,000

^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

25X1

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


Somalia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Political

● developments not of concern,
or not applicable○ developments of moderate
concern

⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	
Population (millions) ^b	5.9				6.1				6.3 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300803 10-83

25X1




Secret

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Kenya: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
○ developments of moderate concern
◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	○	◐	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	●	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	◐	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	◐	●	●	●	●	
Population (millions) ^b	17.1				17.8				18.4 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300804 10-83


25X1

Secret

Zaire: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	○	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	○	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	
Population (millions) ^b	29.4				30.3				31.2 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300805 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

South Africa: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a**Political**

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	○	○	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	

Population (millions)^b

29.4

30.2

30.9^c**Economic^{d,e}**Real per Capita Imports
US \$

70

65

60

55

50

Consumer Price Increase
Percent

6

4

2

0

Exports to OECD Countries
US \$

2,200

2,000

1,800

1,600

I

II

III

IV

I

II

III

IV

I

II

III

IV

^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300806 10-83

25X1




Secret

Philippines: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Political

- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	○	○	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	⊗	
Economic factors	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	⊗	
Population (millions) ^b	50.3				51.6				53.0 ^c			

Economic^{d,e}Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300807 10-83

25X1

Secret

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Indonesia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Political


- developments not of concern,
or not applicable
- developments of moderate
concern
- ◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	


Population (millions)^b 154.3 157.6 161.1^c

Economic^{d,e}


Real per Capita Imports
US \$



Consumer Price Increase
Percent



Exports to OECD Countries
US \$



^a Base year is 1975.

^b Population figures based on mid-year census.

^c Estimated.

^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.

^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300808 10-83

25X1

Secret

South Korea: Selected Political and Economic Indicators^a

Political

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	○	●	○	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	
Economic factors	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Opposition activities	●	○	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	○	●	
External factors	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	○	
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	




Population (millions)^b

40.4

41.1

41.6^c

Economic^{d,e}

Real per Capita Imports
US \$Consumer Price Increase
PercentExports to OECD Countries
US \$^a Base year is 1975.^b Population figures based on mid-year census.^c Estimated.^d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.^e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

300809 10-83

25X1

Secret

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