



CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY



21 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Administration
Director of Data Processing

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Concerns Regarding SAFE

1. One of the subjects addressed at the recent Science and Technology Advisory Panel (STAP) meeting was the SAFE system and its implementation. Several concerns were expressed at the meeting regarding SAFE, including the fact that there are no plans at present to connect CIA and DIA SAFE systems so that they are mutually accessible. I share several of the concerns expressed by the Science and Technology Advisory Panel, and accordingly would like to meet with you to address several of the issues that were raised by the Panel. I attach for your information and response a list of questions and concerns prepared by the STAP relating to SAFE. While I would appreciate your being prepared to address all of these questions at our meeting, I personally am especially concerned about the following:

-- What actions are under way to ensure that the Intelligence Community has access to CIA SAFE and that CIA SAFE has access to DIA SAFE as well as such systems as COINS and SOLIS?

-- How will SAFE deal with open source material?

-- As described in some detail on page 3 of the STAP paper, what actions are being taken to identify the real needs of the SAFE user community and will they be satisfied by the system?

-- How can CIA make a reasonable evaluation of the current status of SAFE with major portions of the proposed operational capabilities either unspecified or not communicated to the Agency?

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

2. I will schedule a meeting to discuss these issues toward the end of next week. In the meantime, I would appreciate your responding to all of the questions in the attached paper and providing such responses to me by the middle of next week for my use in preparation for the meeting.



STANSFIELD TURNER

STATINTL

Attachment a/s

cc: DDCI
DDS&T

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY



DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Science and Technology Advisory Panel

18 MAR 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

STATINTL FROM:

[REDACTED]
STAP Chairman

SUBJECT: Questions Regarding SAFE

1. In response to your request of March 14, 1980, for comments on the current status of SAFE, I attach a list of eight questions and brief comments that STAP believes should be addressed.

2. STAP is continuing its analysis of the SAFE problem and will prepare an options paper within the next two weeks for your consideration.

[REDACTED] STATINTL

Attachments:
As Stated

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

1.0 What steps are being taken to ensure that the Agency, rather than the contractor is in control of the technical aspects of the design of the system?

The geographic remoteness of the contractor, and the lack of continuing contractor-user interaction can lead to a situation in which the builder of the system also becomes the architect. The absence of reciprocal technical representation, like resident engineers, delays every routine decision and makes larger ones unresponsive to Agency/community needs or technological constraints. Strong Agency technical management is absolutely essential if the system is to satisfy real and evolving agency needs and if it is to be integrated with other Agency and community resources.

2.0 How is SAFE management ensuring that a final working system has been developed from the continuing evolution of an operationally valid pilot system? How has SAFE taken advantage of the experience of similar, very large systems in their:

- 1) system architecture,
- 2) communication and control, and
- 3) changing performance requirements?

How is SAFE management ensuring that the system will:

- 1) make available data on operation and usage of the pilot system to guide development;
- 2) be able to modify both system functions and interaction capabilities so as to meet changing and evolving requirements; and
- 3) be able to add new functions and interactions so as to meet new requirements?

Relevant Experience -- It is well agreed that an information handling system cannot be achieved by a simple Design-Build-Use cycle, no matter how brilliant the design or faithful the building. Consider three (out of many) currently operating very large nets with requirements at least comparable in size and complexity with the Agency/community's:

- 1) the ARPA net,
- 2) the airlines reservation system, and
- 3) the IBM in-house computing net.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

All of these systems evolved - that is, they started as soon as possible with operating pilot systems, so that there was always an operational evaluation of effectiveness. Furthermore, in each case, a primary purpose of the original plans was drastically altered as experience was gained. Even so, developments in concept, hardware, software, and practice are continuing now in greater volume than ever.

2.1 The ARPA Net

The ARPA net was originally conceived by [REDACTED] at the ARPA IPO (Information Processing Office) as a means of netting research computers in order to do distributed computing. The message facility was then a minor function. As message usage rose, packet switching became a powerful tool with wide application elsewhere in the technology. The separate centers in the ARPA net have much independence, subject to some fairly strict requirements for communications protocols and access. This allows competitive development and a common evaluation of new technological developments - e.g., the intelligent terminal is being subjected to widespread experimentation and development.

STATINTL

2.2 Airlines Reservation System

The first automated electronic airfare reservations and ticketing systems were disasters - e.g., SABER, the American Airlines/IBM effort was predesigned and built to an apparently reasonable set of specifications that turned out not at all to match the operational needs. The first successful ones were ad hoc temporary devices (e.g., UNITED) that worked just well enough to be improved.

Note that the requirement for fast and accurate inter-line communications, backed up by automatic commitments for seats and equipment was a much later development; it is, however, by now one of the most valuable and cost-effective facilities.

2.3 The IBM In-House Computing Net

Virtually all the on-line computers at IBM company installations world-wide are netted together by communication

facilities, making them, we believe, the largest net in the world. Admirable new functions exhibited by their systems are:

- 1) a modifiable macro command language,
- 2) a consistent, speedy and flexible data transmission/translation scheme.

3.0 The SAFE user community consists of Intelligence Community analysts covering the full spectrum of research into foreign political, military, economic, scientific, and technological activity. Their effective use of this system and, ultimately, the quality of intelligence they produce rest on whether their real needs can be identified and satisfied by the system. To that end, what actions will be taken to ensure that:

- 1) all elements of the intended user community are actually involved in the system's continuing development,
- 2) the broadest of the present analytical requirements are identified,
- 3) these present requirements can be validated by a consistent method,
- 4) the validated present requirements will be met,
- 5) modifications and new requirements can be accepted as they are identified,
- 6) all analytical users will acquire the necessary skills and familiarization with SAFE on an interim basis so they are ready to begin broad utilization when system IOC is reached,
- 7) this interim SAFE test-phase acquires continuing comprehensive experimental data on user experience with the system, and
- 8) the acquired data on user experience is actually utilized in the architecture and development of the system?

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

4.0 How can the Agency make a reasonable evaluation of the current status of SAFE with major portions of the proposed operational capabilities either unspecified or uncommunicated to the Agency? For example,

- 1) the user command language and its parsing,
- 2) the user programming languages,
- 3) the user editing languages, and
- 4) procedures for backup, including regeneration of derived files lost in crashes.

Note the above have to be prototypes capable of continuing responsive evolution, rather than final imposed prescriptions.

5.0 What actions are under way to insure that the Intelligence Community has access to CIA SAFE and that CIA SAFE has access to DIA SAFE as well as such systems as COINS and SOLIS?

The absence of appropriate linkages with other IC systems makes it highly probable that duplicate facilities and files will be acquired and constructed with higher costs and lessened capability for the total IC system. Provisions for such linkages should be built into SAFE from the start, otherwise it will be difficult if not impossible to backfit these linkages.

STATSPEC

6.0 How will SAFE deal with open source material? Will [redacted] material, either finished publications or field reporting, be made available to the analyst through SAFE? How will SAFE deal with current newspaper and journal entries?

Several of the offices that will use SAFE, in particular OPA and OSWR, make extensive use of open source material. Their analytical efforts will be seriously hampered if their files do not include open source materials.

7.0 What steps are being taken to ensure that SAFE will be designed to allow collaborative usage?

Examination of other similar systems, such as Stanford University's SUMEX system or the internal IBM system, shows

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

that user-to-user interactions comprise a significant fraction of the total use of these systems and greatly enhance the overall analytical capability of its users.

8.0 What steps are under way to ensure that in the procurement of major hardware items, these items will be compatible with existing Agency systems?

The Agency has made very substantial investment in ADP equipment that currently serves a wide variety of users. This investment should be capitalized on in order to enhance the future capabilities and particularly the flexibility of SAFE. If the interoperability of SAFE and existing ODP hardware is going to be dependent on software, then provisions should be made:

1) for the development of the needed software since it will be a major undertaking; and

2) for the establishment of evolving standards and protocols for interconnection.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY