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I. Introduction

This chapter, to be written last, will explain the arrangement of the CRS History, noting that it begins (Chapter II) with a summary of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] piece which is an account of the functional history of OCD from 1946 through 1952; then returns to 1946 to trace OCD's organizational development from Chapter III' onward.

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II. Early Functional History and Development to 1953

A. The Liaison Function

Throughout their histories, the Office of Collection and Dissemination and its forebearers had actually performed two basic functions: liaison and reference. The functions had come into being together as part of the earliest planning for the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), and were considered vital to the proposed development of the new central intelligence concept.

Operating in tandem from the time of their inception, the liaison activities (requirements, collection and dissemination) in effect sustained the reference function which was embodied in the original Reference Center.

The latter was envisioned as a focal point where the intelligence officer would find "all" of the pertinent information bearing on a given problem.

The liaison function, on the other hand, represented the beginning of the requirements-collection-dissemination-reference cycle.

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Thus, in January 1946 when CIG was directed to "correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security" and to assure appropriate dissemination, two of the principal actions required to execute this directive were embodied in the liaison function - i.e., collection and dissemination. In other words, someone had to determine what information was needed by the intelligence producers, that it would be collected for them and, finally, that it would reach them.

Against this background, two independent units, the Office of Collection and the Office of Dissemination, were established in July 1946, both directly under the Director of Central Intelligence but operating "within the cognizance" of the Interdepartmental Coordination and Planning Staff (ICAPS). The former acted for the Director in "collecting" foreign intelligence and establishing coordination with the other collection agencies to "determine the means and methods most appropriate" for obtaining such information to support the production of national intelligence by the Office of Research and

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Evaluation (ORE).\* Similarly empowered as the DCI's agent, the Office of Dissemination was responsible for disseminating the "evaluated strategic and national policy intelligence" produced by ORE.

(Responsibility for disseminating the flow of incoming intelligence documents from the other intelligence agencies was assigned later.)

*from the beginning*  
At first neither Office was involved in "collection" and "dissemination" in the sense in which the terms are traditionally understood in the profession - i.e., actual collection of information in the field and deciding to whom the intelligence should or should not be disseminated. Rather, the "collection" activity had to do with broad planning and coordination within the US intelligence collection apparatus; while "dissemination" was similarly concerned with broad decisions reached on an inter-agency basis regarding permissible distribution of evaluated national intelligence. In short, liaison activities were treated as unique types of interagency

\* Renamed the Office of Reports and Estimates in October 1946.

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coordination, an activity supervised in general by ICAPS.

For whatever reason, the two Offices failed to survive two months. Presumably management almost immediately recognized as artificial the administrative barrier separating the two closely aligned functions. At any rate, on 10 September 1946 they were combined into a single Office of Collection and Dissemination, working directly under the DCI for Reports and Estimates on the one hand and for ICAPS <sup>and</sup> ~~for~~ the non-CIG agencies on the other.

The mission was generally the same although, in retrospect, it appears to have been slightly more realistic. The Requirements Branch was responsible for determining what each agency wanted to know; the Collection Branch assigned field collection responsibility; and the Dissemination Branch assured proper distribution of ORE-produced intelligence.

Under the circumstances prevailing at that time, however, OCD could, at best, only limp along. Like the other CIG components, it was still seriously

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undermanned and just as seriously lacking in the experience required to effectively perform the proposed centralized service. For instance, the question of central control - even guidance - of requirements and collection was far from intra-agency, let alone inter-agency accord, ~~solution~~. Even in dissemination the staff-hungry Office had to have help disseminating ORE's production. To further complicate matters, the Office had been assigned the additional responsibility of "reading" and distributing all incoming intelligence documents received from the other agencies. APP-6

By mid-1947, however, OCD was fairly well into its developmental period and was putting together a callow but reasonably effective liaison operation.

Intense recruitment and training programs were beginning to alleviate its staffing problem and all three branches (Requirements, Collection and Dissemination) were hard-pressed to keep up with the rapidly mounting volume of business.

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In January of the same year (1947), its sister organization, the Reference Center, had been formed and was experiencing the same administrative and operational problems common to all new (and first-of-its-kind) organizations (discussed below).

Of the two parallel operations, OCD's six months of seniority had given it a slight jump on the Reference Center and although it seemed well on the road toward carrying out its assigned mission, the consolidated office was fast approaching another reorganization - one which, however, would be the last <sup>major</sup> organizational upheaval for almost two decades.\*

\* In 1967 the functionally arranged Office of Central Reference (OCD's new name from 1955) was drastically reorganized into the area-oriented Central Reference Service (CRS).

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B. The Reference Function

Development of OCD's liaison function, however, was only part of the story. For while the requirements, collection and dissemination machine was being assembled and put into operation, management was simultaneously ~~for~~ forging a companion piece that was equally important to the new central intelligence concept--a central reference system.

As noted previously, the 1946 Presidential Directive to CIG to "correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security" and to assure appropriate dissemination, had resulted ultimately in the formation of OCD, the new Agency's liaison arm for requirements, collection and dissemination.

But the Office of Collection and Dissemination, as organized in September of 1946, did not represent even in theory, a complete answer to the problem it was designed to solve. In addition to the information collected through the mechanism of OCD, there already existed large stores of information in the files of other Government agencies. All this somehow had to

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be brought together and made accessible to the estimates officer. Thus, the original CIG planners in early 1946 envisioned the creation of a reference center ~~sp2-6/~~, a "total library" where, for the first time, an officer could find in a single place all information bearing on any given problem, and not have to consult any other source. The CIG planners rightfully considered the creation of such a reference center an essentially vital part of the mission ~~sp2-3/~~. They also recognized the problem that faced them in determining the nature of the beast to be developed-- i.e., either a system that guaranteed access to the files of participating agencies; or a common library where, in fact, all national security intelligence would be deposited; or a <sup>om</sup>comprise arrangement according to which required intelligence would be released at the holder's discretion. In other words, would it be an interagency effort operated for the benefit of all concerned or a CIG-oriented system developed within the context of "correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence by ORE"?

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At the policy level, early signs indicated a preference for the latter.

Such policy matters notwithstanding, the practical planners\* who were designing the reference center were faced with a task for which there was no precedent or experience upon which they could draw. The problems were formidable and the solutions had to be created, not borrowed. For a library of such hitherto unknown complexity, for example, the problem of systemizing the mass of information for specialized control was, in itself, almost overwhelming.

The problems of designing the central reference facility remained with the organization's architects until the close of 1946 when they adopted what they hoped would be a workable solution. They had decided that the required degree of specialization was too unusual for library terms and would necessitate semi-autonomous satellite libraries: for graphics, foreign

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\* [redacted] (an ORE senior officer and later Executive, OCD) and [redacted] (o/del) Adviser for Organizational Management) were primarily responsible for planning the reference center.

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industrial installations and biographics. In addition, there would be a traditional library for all other material. Probably the most important part of the over-all solution, however, was the decision in favor of unlimited use of business machines wherever applicable in the operations of the new reference center.

On 1 January 1947, the CIA Library, then known as the Intelligence Document Division, was organized. The Central Index (later the Machine Techniques Branch and then the Machine Division) came into being on 17 March; the Foreign Industrial Register in June, and the Graphics Register in July. Actual formation of the Biographic Register was delayed until unique interagency problems could be solved.\* ~~pp 8, 9, 10~~ 6

In March the planners submitted their blueprint for a reference center to ICAPS. They were approved with modifications in June.

The modifications, however, were important because, among other things, they changed a fundamental principle upon which the original proposals

\* The Contact Control Register was also originally placed in the reference center but was transferred to the Office of Operations in August 1948. pp 12/ 227/

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had been based and reflected continued policy-level preference for a CIG-oriented service organization.

According to the March proposals, the basic duty of the new organization's chief would be to establish "central reference activities for CIG and the member agencies."\* The ICAPS version as approved in June, however, directed him to "Establish the central reference activities for CIG\* and maintain appropriate liaison, administrative and policy-making activities."

It was obvious that the approving authorities wanted an independent reference center whose prime (but not exclusive) function was to serve CIG, a concept which would subsequently prevail. ~~pp. 11, 12~~

\* Italics ours.

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Actually, the central reference "mission" that was approved by ICAPS in June 1947 was to remain basically unchanged for both the Office of Collection and Dissemination and the Office of Central Reference\* throughout their histories.

Specifically, the statement of mission authorized the Reference Center (RC)

To be the repository for all intelligence and intelligence information to be permanently filed by CIG, to maintain records of all available intelligence sources, intelligence information and intelligence; to provide a reference

\* OCD's new name, adopted August 1955 as being more descriptive of the Office mission.

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library for CIG; and to establish, in coordination with OCD, procedures for utilization of its materials and catalogs by other agencies.

Operations of the Center were closely coordinated with and, in fact, "fed" by those of OCD. As indicated above, the latter functioned independently under the director "and the cognizance of ICAPS" while the Reference Center was attached to the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) "for administrative support." <sup>The</sup> RC-ORE organizational arrangement lasted barely three months. In September the Center was transferred to the CIA\* Executive for Administration and Management (A&M) for various reasons. First, subordination of a reference unit to a particular production office tended to inordinately channel the reference efforts into that particular form of production. More important, however, was the fact of life that ORE had its own problems and considered administrative support to the Reference Center incidental to its own function. There were frequent conflicts between satisfying RC and ORE support requirements and when

\* The Central Intelligence Agency was established in September 1947, replacing CIG.

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such conflicts occurred, the Center almost invariably received second priority. The Center's plans were ambitious, including expensive machines and people to operate them, and management was pressuring the 1947 staff of 172 people for speedy development of the basically sound plan of operation. Second priorities, then, particularly in budgetary matters, showed that development and justified the Center's transfer to A&M in September.

For eight months after the Center's transfer, it continued to operate in close parallel with OCD, receiving the intelligence collected by the latter office and performing the final function of the collection - dissemination - reference cycle.

By early 1948, however, flaws in the over-all system had become evident.

In 1946, CIS planners had decided that the liaison functions of requirements, collection and dissemination were sufficiently important to require a separate office where the functions could be concentrated upon exclusively. Although plausible in theory, the scheme did not work out in practice

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because the arrangement isolated OCD's liaison function from both the people who generated requirements (production), and the reference people who knew what was already available. Thus, liaison tended to operate in a vacuum and its staff became increasingly divorced from the realities of both production and reference. Further, their contacts with other offices had become formalized and ritualistic, creating too much paperwork, delay and inefficiency. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

The two-year-old fledgling needed corrective medicine and the Director obliged. In May 1948 General Orders merged the functions of the Reference Center and OCD into a new Office of Collection and Dissemination\* and confirmed [REDACTED] as the Assistant Director. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

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- \* Along with the Reference Center, A&M's Central Records Division, Services Branch, was also merged into the new OCD. Of the services involved, however, the messenger and courier service and management of the Agency's administrative records and archives were transferred back to A&M's successor (Deputy Director for Administration) in December 1950, while OCD retained Top Secret Control and "custody of registered documents." ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

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 an enthusiastic advocate of the use of business machines (Electrical Accounting Machines or EAM) for the indexing and retrieval of information, had been brought in from Harvard University in January 1948 to head up the Reference Center. ~~lp48/~~

In the new Office of Collection and Dissemination, the liaison function of OCD (old) was now reconstituted as the Liaison Division. The remainder of the Office - with the exception of administrative support staffs - was entirely comprised of the Reference Center elements which remained unchanged: The CIA Library and the Machine Division; the Liaison Division and the Biographic, Industrial and Graphics Registers.\* ~~lp227/~~

The arrangement was new but the mission remained unchanged: providing liaison and reference service first and foremost to Agency customers and, secondly, to other departments.

\* Immediately following the consolidation, the Machine Techniques Branch was renamed the Machine Division and the Liaison Branch became the Liaison Division.

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C. Liaison and Reference Merged

The consolidation of liaison and reference was especially important in the development of the collection-dissemination-reference function in CIA. In effect, it recognized the distinction between the theoretical and practical realities of the three activities. That is, major decisions regarding allowable dissemination, allocation of field collection responsibilities and the extent of reference service responsibility, rightly belonged to the higher levels of policy-making and was not to be confused with the practical, day-to-day routines. Rather, the latter should be solely concerned with making paper move from one point to another; assuring that analysts' collection requirements were properly coordinated and that they received the information they needed. Two years' experience had also shown that collection and dissemination (i.e., distribution) were routine activities which should not operate as a separate organizational entity but were inseparably bound up with reference. To wit, the "collection" man was

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supposed to know what the analyst needed and where it could be obtained. The "reference" people, on the other hand, knew what was already available and need not therefore be collected. Thus, OCD's July 1948 "Statement of Functions" was far more realistic than preceding charters and the organizational set-up more workable. Further, the mission statement clearly indicated that OCD would become more a facility for CIA alone than a truly centralized file where the intelligence officer could find all the necessary information without having to check other sources.

First, as the system had developed up to 1948, there had been no call for Central Intelligence to establish a collection or reference system for the entire intelligence community.\* Further, any attempt to "coordinate"--that is, to determine the contents of other agencies' files in order to obtain pertinent

\* Later there would be a few exceptions, such as the delegation of responsibility to CIA for biographic intelligence under NSCID-8 of 28 May 1948.

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information--would involve the Director's "right of inspection" (apparently never invoked by any DCI) as well as the issuance and enforcement of interagency compliance directives. To these and other policy reasons was added a clinching, practical argument: surveys conducted in 1946 and 1947 had clearly indicated that such an interagency "library" would be too extensive and complex to permit effective central management. ~~pp 17, 19, 20~~

Thus, the dilemma that had plagued early CIG planners had now been resolved. Finally cast aside was any idea of an OCD "super" file. Instead, the decision had been made to continue the system's development within the context of "correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence"-- that is, as produced by ORE.

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Although arranged somewhat differently, the functions of the OCD units remained basically unchanged. The Library would continue to serve as a general repository for the machine-indexed collection of intelligence documents; the Biographic, Graphics and Industrial Registers would maintain files and provide service within their respective fields of responsibility; and the Machine Division would provide machine support and develop new EAM techniques as required. The Liaison Division would continue its liaison functions of requirements, collection and dissemination.

In short, the mission statement removed any confusion about prerogatives and functional responsibilities. The keyword was "service."

Any doubts ~~about~~ <sup>were</sup> about the Office's mission ~~was~~ quickly dispelled in November 1948 in a "Memorandum for All Hands, OCD" from the new Assistant Director. In what was a total statement of policy, dynamic "Jamie" Andrews flatly identified service to Agency requesters as the Office's "major function" and

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specified that such requests would never be denied unless "compliance would work harm to the Agency by interfering with other [vital] services..." Burying the old ritualistic approach for all time was his typically brusque warning that "No hint of this approach will be tolerated today." Channels and procedures, as far as Dr. Andrews was concerned, were worthless if they failed to yield "practical results." In short, Andrews held that OCD primarily existed to provide service to CIA customers and would not concern itself with questions of policy, prestige or prerogatives.

The OCD that emerged from the May 1948 reorganization was a viable, service-dedicated organization. By the end of the year, it had fully absorbed the May changes and was already proving itself to be an ~~effectively~~ workable organization. The organizational structure, in fact, was to remain basically unchanged throughout the Hillenkoetter and Smith administrations\* despite the impact of major

\* Admiral Hillenkoetter served as DCI from May 1947 to October 1950 and General Smith from October 1950 to February 1953.

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investigations by the Eberstadt Committee and the Dulles Committee. Ironically, both committees surveyed OCD during and immediately after the reorganization and both came to similar conclusions.

The Eberstadt Committee\* in its December 1948 report acknowledged that OCD appeared to be an efficient operation under its "new head" although it had sometimes acted as a "bottleneck" in the past. The Committee suggested, however, that the title "OCD" was a misnomer, that it should become purely a reference service, and that its liaison functions <sup>might</sup> should be "split off." 7-4-27

The Dulles group's survey report of January 1949\*\* similarly recommended that OCD's collection and dissemination functions be transferred to a new "Coordination Division" (an expanded ICAPS) and that the "library, index and register functions" be placed in a "centralized Research and Reports Division" (ORE).<sup>†</sup> The survey team

\* The Hoover Commission's Task Force on National Security Organization headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt.

\*\* The committee of consultants chaired by Allan Dulles had been established in February 1948 to survey CIA and the US intelligence community. The committee began its survey of OCD about mid-1948.

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was thus urging return to an organizational set-up which had already proved unworkable. However, the Dulles Committee had begun its investigation immediately after the OCD reorganization and therefore had neither the opportunity to observe how the functions (collection, dissemination and reference) had operated separately, nor what the consolidated Office was capable of achieving after its "shake down" period. Under such circumstances, the Committee's conclusions were understandable--i.e., viewing collection and dissemination as functions of coordination (ICAPS) to be managed apart from reference which they considered adjunctive to research (ORE). 1-p. 29, 30

The report, ~~thoroughly reviewed in an early history of OCD, 1/~~ in essence, constituted a plan to dismember OCD and parcel out its functions to other Agency components.

The reply to the Dulles Committee report by the AD/CD (Andrews) to the Director was immediate and characteristically devastating. In his memorandum of rebuttal, Dr. Andrews zeroed in on the obvious

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fact that the proposed functional separation had already been tried and found wanting. He cited the reasons why the arrangement had failed and emphasized, contrary to the Committee's view, the close inter-relationships<sup>h</sup> of liaison and reference. It was only after lengthy and often painful experience, Andrews held, that the Agency had indisputably learned that the two functions were indeed so closely related that they were performed best by a single, independent administrative unit. In his words, it was

too early to say that the present is the best of all possible organizational patterns for these functions, but it is not too early to say that it represents an improvement over the older and more obvious pattern which is now proposed anew. ~~P30/~~

The Director agreed and in his February 1949 comments to the National Security Council (NSC), rejected the Dulles Committee's recommendations. The NSC, in turn, endorsed the Committee's plan. It was, however, a limited endorsement since it contained the reservation that "there may be other

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methods of organization which will accomplish the same objectives. 1 p33/

In July of 1950 (three months prior to his departure), Hillenkoetter received still another reorganization plan for OCD, this one having been prepared by his Management Staff after a year's study. The plan affected only two of OCD's six divisions (the Liaison and Machine Divisions), would transfer some of their functions to other Agency components and reconstitute the remaining functions, along with the Library and the three Registers, as the Office of Reference and Dissemination. The so-called ORD Plan proposed that LD's collection requirements function be re-established under the "joint control" of the requirements staffs of ORE and OSI; and that LD's work of obtaining information from the files of other Government agencies as well as maintenance of its Control Register of CIA contacts with other Government agencies be transferred, respectively, to the Office of Operations (OO) and the Inspection and Security Staff.

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With regard to the Machine Division's responsibility for providing EAM support to all Agency units, the Staff proposed that since machine work for OO's Contact Division had recently been decentralized to OO, that now the indexing of Agency employees (especially for the finance and personnel offices) be transferred to the Special Support Staff. The remaining OCD functions that would be assigned, along with the Library and the three Registers, to the proposed ORD consisted of MD's primary work with indexed intelligence documents, and such administrative services as the courier and messenger activity, the records management program and custodianship of archives. Although Admiral Hillenkoetter asked the Assistant Directors who would be involved for their comments, he expressed concern that the proposed "dismemberment of OCD" would be more costly than the existing arrangement. 1 pps 37-40/ Still other OCD organizational problems which had been under study from mid-1950 onward, included centralized procurement of foreign language publications, the creation of consumer-oriented branch libraries and the handling

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of "special intelligence" documentation. pp 40 & 41/

Resolution of these and other problems regarding OCD depended, to a considerable degree, on the impending reorganization of the production offices which, of course, was being held for consideration by the new Director.

General Walter B. Smith succeeded Admiral Hillenkoetter on 7 October 1950. He very quickly announced formation of a new Office of Research and Reports (ORR) on 13 November\* and, a few days later, an Office of Intelligence coordination (O<sup>I</sup>/C).\*\*

\* In this production office reorganization, ORE was replaced by ORR (first under Theodore Babbitt and shortly afterward, Max F. Millikan) and the Office of National Estimates (ONE) under William L. Langer. Less than two months later, on 15 January 1951, the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) was established under Kingman Douglass. The Office of Scientific Intelligence (organized in December 1948) remained under Marshall H. Chadwell. "Chron" Vol. I p. 39/

\*\* ICAPS, established in July 1946, had been renamed COAPS (Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff) in July of 1950. The new OIC thus replaced COAPS. "Chron" Vol. I p. 37/

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Since General Smith, immediately after taking office, had announced his intention of implementing the Dulles Plan, it now appeared certain that ORR and OIC would absorb the functions of the Office of Collection and Dissemination. (OCD's reference and machine support functions even appeared in a proposed ORR organizational chart.) 1 pps 43 & 44/

After a month of deliberation, however, just as Admiral Hillenkoetter had decided to leave OCD essentially intact (despite or partly because of NSC's limited endorsement of the Dulles Plan), so too did General Smith.

On 1 December 1950, it was announced that OCD would remain essentially intact organizationally and functionally. On the same date, the new CIA organizational chart again showed OCD, but this time grouped with the production offices under the new Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, William H. Jackson. The only functional changes were minor and involved the transfer of administrative support activities to the DD/A (see footnote on page ~~15~~ above).

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Beginning with General Smith's administration, OCD embarked on a long period of organizational and functional stability that was also characterized by growth, especially during the first two years (1951 and 1952). In that relatively short time span, the office's staff, ~~as noted previously,~~ almost doubled in size from about 400 people in 1950 to nearly 700 by February 1953 and the files more than doubled to a total of over a million regularly classified documents -- a total which included neither the large holdings of Top Secret and specially classified material nor the Library's already extensive unclassified collections. 1 pv 47/

With the operation stabilized and the "central reference" concept generating a rapidly increasing workload, management turned its attention to OCD organizational problems which had been under study since the summer of 1950. The problems, none of which had been mentioned in either the Dulles recommendations or in the "ORD Plan," revolved about OCD's jurisdiction over certain types of

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materials, expansion of its documentary holdings and further demands for specialized services.

As a result of management's studies, the problems were largely resolved but the resultant changes did not effect either OCD's basic charter or organizational structure. Relatively inconspicuous as the changes were, they nonetheless significantly bolstered OCD's jurisdiction as the Agency's central reference facility. ~~1-V52/~~

For example, the responsibility for distributing *(previously handled by ONE and, before that, by ORE)* all IAC cables within CIA was transferred ~~from ORE~~ <sup>^</sup> (not yet reorganized into ORR) to OCD and re-established as a Cable Branch in the Liaison Division in February of 1951. ~~1-V52 & 2-VII-1/~~

Similarly, OCD's Agency-wide responsibility for the procurement of foreign language publications was affirmed in December 1950 and early the following year the function was centralized within the Library. (Procurement had previously been split among the Library, OO's Foreign Document Division and the DD/A's Procurement Office. In addition, most operating offices had ordered such publications independently.) ~~1-V41, 52/~~

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Another issue concerned further development of facilities for exploiting "special intelligence" (SI) -- in this instance, choosing between local (decentralized) control of SI indexing and reference services by the originating office, or merging the services into OCD's centralized system and thus continue movement toward the ideal of "all-source" coverage. To assure that storage techniques used for special intelligence would be compatible with those used for collateral intelligence, responsibility for the SI indexing and reference functions (but not for requirements and dissemination) was transferred to OCD in June 1951. The activities, which previously had been handled by the CIA Advisory Council (for communications intelligence), were now re-established in OCD's new Special Register on a compartmented basis -- that is, physically located within OCI's\* "closed" area. 1-V41, 52, 74/

\* OCI, as noted previously, had just been organized in January of the same year.

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Also in the same year, OCD responded to increasing demands from Agency components outside the production area by establishing three branch libraries: one located in K Building to serve DDP components; another in Central Building for the Medical Office; and the third in Alcott Hall to serve the Office of Training. The satellite branches were designed to make the main library's specialized holdings more immediately accessible to offices located away from the main collection.

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In addition, there were yet two unresolved "problems" involving the Industrial Register and the Biographic Register which did effect OCD's basic charter.

Under consideration, for instance, were plans to obtain an NSC charter that would formally recognize the Industrial Register (IR) as a service of common concern and strengthen its jurisdiction in order to eliminate duplication of files and effort in other US agencies.

Similarly, other efforts had been under way to extend the NSC-approved charter of the Biographic Register (BR) to include responsibility for coverage

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of foreign, nonscientific personalities. The Register was the only OCD component that was armed with an NSC directive. The directive, NSCID-8, promulgated 25 May 1948, was a "common concern" charter that made CIA responsible for biographic coverage of foreign scientific and technical types. In practice, however, the pressure of requester demands from both CIA and non-CIA offices had virtually forced BR to extend its coverage to include all types of foreign personalities. It was for this broader biographic responsibility that the planners sought authority in a revised NSCID-8.

After General Smith became DCI (in October 1950), plans for NSC formalization of the Industrial Register's function were apparently shelved as a matter of official inter-agency discussion. The biographic problem, however, was referred to the Office of Intelligence Coordination early in 1951 for study.

After more than six months of investigation, OIC in September reported an agreement among the IAC agencies to enlarge the scope of *(ICA)*'s biographic responsibilities but only to include foreign personalities of "economic concern." The principle of a completely

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centralized biographic reference facility was rejected as "not at present practicable" and the committee limited itself to expressing the hope, somewhat piously, that there would be

completely free access, subject only to legitimate security considerations... among the departmental biographic facilities, so that all the resources of the intelligence community will be exploited to meet the requirements of any department.  
1-V42&80-82/

By the close of 1952, then, OCD had absorbed the effects of several reorganizations and had been progressively developed into <sup>a</sup> worthwhile central reference facility for CIA and (secondarily) for the rest of the intelligence community. ~~TOP SECRET~~

Much had been accomplished by the Office's architects and leadership. Singularly fortunate was the fact that the leadership had not only been highly capable but continuous from the beginning, particularly with regard to Dr. Andrews. As noted above, <sup>former</sup> he had been brought in to head up the Reference Center in January 1948 and four months later (in May) was selected to lead the merged

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operation as Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. In both jobs, Andrews put into highly successful and pioneering practice his enthusiasm for the use of business machines (EAM) for the indexing and retrieval of information. He was to continue his forceful leadership as AD/CD until his resignation in August 1957. Dr. Andrews' principal assistants had also held key positions from the earliest years of OCD's development. His Deputy was [REDACTED] who, prior to his appointment as DAD in April 1951, had been assistant chief of the Liaison Division from October 1949.

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His first Executive was [REDACTED] originally a senior officer in ORE. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the chief designers of the original Reference Center.) When [REDACTED] was reassigned in August 1952, he was succeeded by [REDACTED] the CIA Librarian since June 1947. ~~2-6-57~~

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Andrews' principle of centralized service was the driving force behind OCD's operations and would continue as the dominant theme of its successor

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organizations. There would always be administrative conflict with the proponents of decentralization but the trend toward the goal of complete centralization would continue during the years to come.

Thus, as OCD moved into a period of consolidation, its role as a central reference facility at the end of 1952 was broadly recognized and the authors of the 1950-1953 OCD history noted that

The development of OCD's reference facilities as an inter-Agency support organization, available alike to the departmental intelligence agencies and to the CIA offices, was also advanced, between 1950 and 1953, but progress was made less by organizational change and formal directive than by continuing CIA/OCD policy to proffer its services to the IAC member agencies, and to extend its assistance to them in all possible cases, limited only by priority demands for service from within the Agency. Under this policy, reaffirmed in January 1951 and March 1953, there was no reference division in OCD that did not have an extensive clientele among the other agencies, and only in rare cases was it necessary to deny their requests because of priority demands within the Agency.

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III. OCD Stabilizes--1953

By 1953 the Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) had stabilized and after more than half a decade of early growth turmoil, its unique "central reference" concept had been engineered into an effective, first-of-its-kind centralized reference facility, primarily for CIA but also for the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). Although at last standing on steady feet and entering a period of consolidation--improving operational procedures, restructuring organizationally and attacking problem areas--OCD would continue to be plagued by staffing and training problems and by rapidly increasing service demands. It would also continue to be perennially beset by the forces of decentralization. The ideal of complete, Community-wide centralization, although it would never be fully realized, would remain a goal for years to come, particularly with the advent of the computer age.

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Nonetheless, unharassed during the preceding two-year period of relative organizational stability, by 1953 OCD's leadership had successfully put together an organization which, however unsophisticated, was basically capable of fulfilling the mission for which it had been established: providing central requirements, collection, dissemination and reference facilities.

Dr. James M. Andrews was still the Assistant Director and would continue in that assignment until his resignation in August 1957. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] continued to serve, respectively, as Deputy Assistant Director and Executive Officer. 2/

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In retrospect, it appears that much of the credit for the design and development of OCD and, in fact, for its very existence, belonged to Jamie Andrews. First his pioneering and enthusiastic belief in harnessing the potential of business machines for an entirely new field--that is, converting existing EAM equipment to apply to the problems of libraries and intelligence files--had resulted in the development of a prototype automated system for information storage and retrieval

that was unmatched in the intelligence area. In

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In addition, it appears indisputable that it was James Andrews alone who, at the time of the major Agency reorganization in late 1950, convinced the DCI (General Smith) that OCD should not be dismembered and subordinated to ORR. Another Agency historian of the period contends that General Smith was so impressed with Andrews' "persuasive powers...spirit and his grasp of his business," that he decided "to leave Andrews and OCD exactly as he had found them," even though it meant reversing his own (Smith's) Deputy, William H. Jackson. 3/

At the division command level, however, several key personnel changes had been made during the

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previous year. [redacted] the Assistant

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Librarian, had succeeded [redacted] as the CIA Librarian in August 1952 when the latter was named Andrews' Executive. Previously (in February),

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[redacted], Chief of the Industrial Register, had been reassigned and in July, [redacted] had

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replaced [redacted] as Chief of the Biographic Register.

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\* [redacted] formerly a senior officer with the Library of Congress for eleven years, had served as the Foreign Service's first Publications Procurement Officer and Acting Director of the Agency before joining CIA in March of 1948.

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25X1A In March of 1953, [REDACTED] was chosen to succeed [REDACTED] as Chief, Industrial Register. The other 1953 division chiefs were [REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A the Graphics Register; [REDACTED] the

25X1A Special Register; [REDACTED], the Liaison Division;

25X1A and [REDACTED] the Machine Division. [REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED] headed the OCD Administrative Staff and [REDACTED]

25X1A [REDACTED] the Operations Staff. [REDACTED]

25X1A In addition to organizational stability, the 25X1A period 1950 to 1953 was also characterized by growth.

As service demands shot upward, the OCD staff almost doubled in size from about 25X1A [REDACTED] employees in 1950 to about 25X1A [REDACTED] by early 1953.\* Indicative of the rate of growth was the fact that while OCD almost doubled

in size during this period, the intelligence group which it served---that is, the production, operations

and support offices---increased by 25X1A [REDACTED] from about [REDACTED] in

February 1953. Similarly indicative of the increasing magnitude of OCD's reference problem was the surging

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growth of the Office's files during the same period, more than doubling in size to reach a total of over a million regularly classified intelligence items--- not including the large unclassified Library collection and other specially classified ~~reports~~ <sup>files.</sup> 4/

As OCD and its customer offices had increased in size, so too had their need for space. Cramped into "M" Building (the old "temporary" government office building close to Constitution Avenue on 26th Street) was practically all of OCD, ORR, OSI and other elements. The already creaking "M" Building was dangerously overtaxed and the need for additional space in the area was urgent. Unfortunately, the only available, nearby space was in Riverside Stadium, an unused skating rink across from "M" Building at 350 - 26th Street. The interior of the Stadium was one vast ~~unbroken expanse~~ <sup>with a sunken skating area,</sup> poorly lighted, badly ventilated and in sad disrepair. Nonetheless, a major program of repair and renovation was undertaken to make the unlikely site suitable for office use and on the weekend of 4 April 1952, the major portion of OCD

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CONSOL - 6 -

moved into "The Stadium" and was open for business on Monday. 5/ 25X1A

Resettling [redacted] people in the Stadium 6/ in the course of one weekend (along with their office equipment and furniture, the Registers' already bulky files and the Machine Division's heavy equipment) without noticeably disturbing service was an herculean task. Virtually all OCD personnel were involved in the operation. Many worked until midnight for three successive days and by Monday noon, 7 April, OCD was again in full operation, having achieved a not inconsiderable logistical feat. 7/

A few OCD elements remained in place and were not shifted to the Stadium. The Library's main files and the Office of the Assistant Director stayed in "M" Building. The Special Register continued to operate within OCI space in "Q" Building (behind "M"), and the Graphics Register remained in Building 14 at 23rd Street and Constitution Avenue. (There were also six OCD people working in the branch libraries at "K" Building (For DDP) and Alcott Hall. 8/ for the Office of Training). 8/

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So, with the exception of the Biographic Register, which soon would move "up the hill" to North Building on E Street, Riverside Stadium would remain "home" to most of OCD for nine years until its relocation in the new Headquarters Building.

And it would prove to be an unsettling home. The old building was fraught with safety and health hazards. Despite the extensive and very costly rebuilding operation preceding the move, the building was to remain in a constant state of repair for most of the years of OCD's occupancy. One month after the move, a four-page memorandum to the Chief of General Services listed 19 deficiencies in the building. Most of the defects were serious in nature, such as faulty plumbing, buckled floors, defective electrical wiring, <sup>placement</sup> installation of fire extinguishers and grossly inadequate ventilation. Not the least of the complaints concerned bad odors emanating from "a stagnant pool of water under the north end of the building" and, at the other end, from the adjoining

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stables! And then there were the ladies' rest rooms, where the defective plumbing and absence of mirrors, soap dispensers and "bolts on doors" inspired the following message "To The Powers That Be, From The Gals In OCD":

Oh, the restroom isn't restful anymore,  
There's water six feet deep upon the floor,  
The walls are blue and slimy,  
The faucets dry and grimy,  
And the restroom ain't the best room anymore.

If you like privacy behind the little door,  
Then this room, girls, you surely will deplore:  
We cannot comb our hair,  
For the mirror, it ain't there--  
Oh, the restroom ain't the best room anymore. 9/

Most critical, however, was the oppressive heat that developed in the badly ventilated building with the advent of summer. During the worst of the heat spells, a nurse from the Medical Staff took up her duty station within the Stadium from about 1100 hours onward, as would a technician swinging a sling cyclometer to obtain temperature and humidity readings. Their daily tours weren't lengthy, however. All personnel were frequently released by noon, leaving behind a volunteer skeleton force.

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General Services ~~arranged an emergency~~ <sup>finally installed</sup> installation of air conditioning equipment and work crews gradually overcame the ~~host~~ of other defects. It was months, however, before the situation could be described as even close to normal. In fact, as late as August 1955, water leaks repeatedly flooded the EAM punched card file room and the microfilm laboratory 10/ and, in one instance, the building had to be sand-bagged when the flooded Potomac River threatened to overflow its banks.

In time conditions became more bearable. With constant attention, the old building served its purpose until the move to Headquarters and many still in CRS remember the unused electrical sign that hung on one wall of their "office." Although never lighted, its message was clearly visible: "All Skate"!

Although almost totally relocated physically, OCD's 1953 ~~structural~~ <sup>organizational</sup> scheme was still functional and would remain fundamentally unchanged for some 15 years. It consisted of the CIA Library and the

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Liaison Division, the four Registers, the Machine Division and the Administrative and Operations Staffs. The requirements, collection and dissemination functions were primarily carried out by the Liaison Division. The collection and reference functions, however, were also implicit in the Library's maintenance and servicing responsibilities for its general book and monograph collection and the rapidly growing classified intelligence document files. Finally, each of the four specialized Registers amassed files and provided reference service on specific subjects of foreign intelligence interest: personalities of scientific and technical significance (the Biographic Register); industrial installations (the Industrial Register); graphics, both still photography and motion picture films (the Graphics Register); and personality, subject and commodity data from special intelligence (the Special Register).

OCD's organizational structure in 1953 has been likened to a wheel with the Library and the four Registers closely grouped around the "hub" which

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provided their EAM support--the Machine Division (see chart). Off to one side was the Liaison Division serving as a clearing house for inter-agency contacts (*Washington-based* locating information sources for Agency customers and channeling CIA data to external users). In effect, OCD was the "middleman" between the Agency's research and production offices on the one hand, and the sources of information on the other.

The Liaison Division stood at the beginning of the cycle: coordinating and issuing collection requirements; and receiving and disseminating the vast flow of incoming intelligence data which, by law, flowed into CIA from the other intelligence agencies. The Machine Division electrically processed copies of all incoming documents after they had been indexed by the Library according to the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC), and the material was then stored in the Library's master file where it, along with the conventional book and monograph collection, remained available to Agency analysts. At the same time, copies of the documents were also routed to the four reference Registers where, after selective processing, they remained similarly available from the specialized

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IV. Early Organizational History and Development to 1953

Such was the Office of Collection and Dissemination in 1953, its operational cycle still comprised of the two original functions: liaison (requirements, collection and dissemination) and reference; together with the machine data processing which had rapidly become the third major function.

The genesis and general development of the three functions had been the work of policy makers and senior planners. It was OCD's line divisions, however, which had borne the brunt of making the plans work by successfully crafting the practical machine. Theirs had been a hectic, *and stimulating experience, although* often painful and frustrating ~~experience~~ creating a new world of information handling while they grew almost bewilderingly in size, responsibility and sophistication. As with any new activity, they had begun with a directive and a handful of people and had traveled the pathfinder's route of invention, challenge and change before finally achieving operational maturity.

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This odyssey--the organizational evolution of OCD's divisions and registers--has never been formally chronicled. The only extant official history of the Office of Collection and Dissemination\* is more an office-level, functional survey of OCD which only treats of the working level units referentially. Historically essential, then, is the need to complement that Office survey with individual histories of OCD's component elements--their origins and subsequent development. The individual chronicles, however, must remain relatively brief. First, the scope of this paper precludes essaying the exhaustive individual studies which the units' importance and operational complexity justify. In addition, there is a sometime scarcity of historical documentation on some of the divisions during various time periods. For the most part, the high-level direction and enabling issuances are generally available but it is the routine administrative paperwork, the in-house working level issuances

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\*The 1954 [REDACTED] paper summarized in Chapter II.

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through which an organization's development can be plotted, that are frequently unobtainable. The scarcity of this type of documentation is especially apparent for the earliest developmental years of the several offices for collection and dissemination; that is, from their inception in early 1946 to mid-1948 when they were merged with the Reference Center. Hopefully, the historical evidence must exist somewhere but further, deeper research is necessary to determine whether the documentation still survives, buried in some highly unlikely crypt, or whether it was indeed disposed of during one of the records reduction programs which regularly sweep the Agency. At any rate, the histories of OCD's organizational elements will be brief--primarily because of the time factor rather than lack of documentation--and, for reasons of clarity and continuity, will follow the same pattern of functional development which prevails in the preceding chapter--that is, liaison and reference.

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A. The Liaison Elements

Liaison (requirements, collection and dissemination) was the primal element in the development of OCD. As previously noted, almost immediately after the close of World War II, the Presidential Memorandum of 22 January 1946 established, inter alia, the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) under a Director of Central Intelligence. It directed the DCI to correlate and evaluate intelligence "relating to national security" and to assure appropriate dissemination. 11/ The principal actions thus required to execute the basic directive were collection (both in the field and from other agencies' files), evaluation and dissemination. Accordingly, in order to carry out these activities, General Vandenberg on 19 July 1946 signed into existence the first four offices of the new Central Intelligence Group to provide centralized "services of common concern." 12/ The four offices, shown on what is apparently the first CIG organizational

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(dated 12 July 1946)

chart were the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Collection, the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the Office of Dissemination (Figure <sup>1</sup>/<sub>V</sub>). \*

The fundamental importance of collection and dissemination to the new central intelligence operation, or to any intelligence operation for that matter, is self-evident. Before intelligence can be evaluated, it has to be collected; and the finished product produced therefrom has to be distributed if it is to serve its purpose. It is therefore not surprising that collection and dissemination accounted for two of the first four offices established by CIG and that each

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\* One previous chart, issued as Appendix "B" to the NIA Directive of 8 February 1946, reflects CIG's planning status at that time--the initial five-month period under the first DCI, Admiral Sidney W. Souers. With the exception of the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), the chart shows only an Administrative Section and two operating staffs: the Central Planning Staff (to design CIG); and the Central Reports Staff, the ad interim producer of the President's daily intelligence summary. The planned operating divisions are simply forecast by the line "Central Intelligence Services (To be determined)" (Figure <sup>2</sup>/<sub>A</sub>) Attachment "A" lists the Group's initial personnel authorization, totaling 165 slots, 43 each from State and Navy and 79 from the War Department. 13/

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was an independent office under an Assistant Director who answered directly to the DCI.

The Office of Collection (OC) was responsible for collecting intelligence "required for the production of strategic and national policy intelligence" and for coordinating the collection of necessary foreign intelligence with other government agencies. The Office of Dissemination (OD), on the other hand, was to assure proper distribution of the "strategic and national policy intelligence" produced by ORE. Thus, at the very outset of Agency history, the ancestral elements (OC and OD) of what one day would become the Office of Central Reference, had been established--at least on papers.

As with all new organizations, CIG's initial period of existence was primarily devoted to planning and organizational development. The only significant line activity was carried out by the Central Reports Staff <sup>(CRS)</sup> which had been hurriedly assembled to produce daily intelligence reports for the President and other top officials. By June 1946, when the first

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DCI, [Admiral Sidney W.] (Souers) submitted his Progress Report to the NIA, 14/ he reported that CIG activities since its activation on 8 February had been

...characterized principally by the administrative details of organization, the consideration of urgent problems, and the basic planning for a sound future intelligence program.

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Noting that [redacted] of the then authorized strength of [redacted] people had been brought in from State and the Service Departments, the Admiral reviewed the progress which had been made toward achieving the major goals established for CIG. Collection and dissemination were among the problems for which, he said, "immediate solutions are well advanced.\* He concluded that since the planning phase had been completed, "the operation of centralized intelligence services should be undertaken by CIG at the earliest practicable date."

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\* Included in the category was the "Central Register of Intelligence Information," later to be known as the Reference Center, whose parallel development would merge with that of collection and dissemination in 1948.

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Thus the initial five-month planning phase under Admiral Souers had come to an end and on 10 June 1946 Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg became the second DCI, generally coincidental with the outset of the actual organization building period. Having started with the most rudimentary set-up (Figure 2), the organizational structure was now in a constant state of flux, changing almost weekly as the new central intelligence machine geared up to carry out its assignment. It was a period of feverish activity and organized chaos for the new agency's first members. New services were being established to meet new <sup>9</sup>post-War needs of the Intelligence Community. At the same time, many of the functions of the Strategic Services Unit, then undergoing liquidation, were being absorbed. Personnel recruitment accelerated quickly after the initial drafts had been supplied by State, War and Navy. Personnel rosters, lists of assignments and reassignments appeared almost daily.

*had been* By July, at least the basic structure had begun to take shape and set forth in the <sup>19</sup>20 July organizational chart mentioned above. *Three* *Directive* ~~Two~~ days later, a second set of charts

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was issued "showing the tentative organization and functions of the components of the Central Intelligence Group down to and including the branch level." 15/ The more detailed nature of the 22 July charts (Figure 3) dramatically illustrates the bewildering proliferation of the new agency.\* There were still only four operating offices (OC, OD, ORE and OSO),<sup>Plate 1</sup> each of which was now broken down to the branch level with the exception of OSO, for which there was simply a sterile statement of mission.<sup>Plates 6 & 8</sup> The scope of responsibilities assigned to the early Offices for Collection and Dissemination is rather surprising and, as it developed, were quite short-lived, particularly with regard to the former.

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\* This is particularly true of the Director's Executive Staff which, at this early point, has become a veritable hodgepodge of nascent functional elements. Plate No. 4 shows no less than 15 units and sub-units, temporarily grouped under the Executive Director for developmental purposes, but nearly all of which will subsequently become operating offices or major divisions--for example, security, communications, special intelligence (the Advisory Council), finance and personnel.

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The Office of Collection, as charted on Plate No. 6 (Figure 3), had six branches. Two of them, the Information Control Branch (OC's Message Center for receiving and distributing raw intelligence) and the Personnel and Administration Branch, were supervised by the Executive. In addition there were four operating branches, one each for Security, Requirements, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence and something called "Special Intelligence." Thus, in addition to the basic requirements and collection activities, the original Office of Collection was assigned broad security powers\* including, but not restricted to Top Secret Control and custodianship of registered documents; responsibility for monitoring foreign broadcasts; and some rather vague activity in the field of "special intelligence."

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\* For example, the Branch's primary responsibility was to prescribe "such information controls, counterintelligence measures, and over-all security measures as may be required to secure the operations of the CIG."

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The Office of Dissemination (Plate No. 8, Figure 3) was composed of three branches: Distribution (mail and reproduction services), Intelligence Control and Surveys and Reports. The Intelligence Control Branch applied to dissemination the "over-all security measures prescribed by the Security Branch of the Collection Office"--for example, authentication of document classification and security control of dissemination procedures. The main job of the Surveys and Reports Branch was to assist ORE, primarily in the dissemination of evaluated strategic and national policy intelligence produced by the latter office. The Branch was also assigned, inter alia, responsibility for the maintenance of an "intelligence operations room" and a briefing and presentations capability.

Personnel records for both Offices are incomplete for the period. The Acting Assistant Director for Collection was [REDACTED] and Col. [REDACTED] was assigned to the Security Branch, presumably as Chief. Navy Captain [REDACTED] was the Acting Assistant Director for Dissemination.

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Other key personnel assignments to OD included Army Colonels [REDACTED] and Lt. Col. [REDACTED] initial CIG assignment in February 1946 had been that of Acting Assistant Chief of the Central Planning Staff.) Both operations were housed in what was then known as the "New" War Department Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, N.W., the site of today's State Department headquarters building.

Such were the functions and organizational structures of the original Offices of Collection and Dissemination as officially described in July of 1946. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the Offices actually got under way in executing all the functions initially assigned to them. Possibly, some were never more than "paper assignments." The charts themselves, as well as the Administrative Order to which they were attached, were labeled "tentative." The Administrative Order further declared that

Because of limited personnel presently available, the Office of Collection and the Office of Dissemination...activities will necessarily be restricted largely to planning for future operations.

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One month later, another Administrative Order setting forth the "Interim Policy and Procedure for Dissemination" still specified that ORE would continue to disseminate its own intelligence products until the Office of Dissemination had obtained sufficient personnel to function adequately. 17/

Whether or not the Offices actually did achieve an operational mode by early September (at least, personnel orders attest to the assignment of people and rooms and daily security check duties), they remained in a constant state of change. Within a relatively short period, they not only lost numerous of their originally-assigned functions but their separate identities as well. The first change concerned OC's relationship to the Office of Special Operations. Included in the mission of the Office of Collection was the following:

In conjunction with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff [ICAPS] and the Office of Special Operations, conducts constant research into the field of collection of information, and recommends new means, methods and techniques for improving the over-all intelligence coverage by United States governmental collecting agencies. (Plate No. 6, Figure 3)

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But the original clandestine services people would have none of this. They considered their collection operation sacrosanct. As a result, a change order appeared on 6 August 1946 which deleted the words "and the Office of Special Operations" from the OC statement of mission. 18/

Then, on 10 September, presumably for obvious administrative reasons, the separate Offices of Collection and Dissemination and all their functions were merged into a single Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD). 19/ Excepted from the merger were the functions of the former Office of Dissemination "pertaining to maintaining an operations room, and briefings and presentations in connection therewith," which were transferred to ORE. **STATSPEC**

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Next, the new Office lost the [REDACTED] Office of Operations when the latter was activated on 17 October 1946 20/ and, on 1 July of the following year, the OCD Security Branch, originally in OC, was abolished and its functions transferred to the Executive for Inspections

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and Security (I&E). 21/\* . Left unexplained by available historical documentation is the nature and fate of the original OC's Special Intelligence Branch, whose mission was to determine

...the utilization of such special means and methods of collecting information as may be placed at the disposal of the Director of Central Intelligence. (Plate No. 6, Figure 3)

Both the Branch's title and mission statement thus suggest communications intelligence but that special field was handled at that time by the Advisory Council under the Executive Director. (Plate No. 4, Figure 3) However, General Vandenberg, in discussing CIG's progress at the Fourth NIA Meeting on 17 July 1946, observed that CIG was receiving "daily requests" to take over functions performed by other departments, including one suggestion that "CIG centralize the handling of codes and ciphers to improve their

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\* Presumably, Top Secret Control and custodianship of registered documents were among the functions transferred but both would be assigned back to OCD in May 1948.

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security." Another source recalls a February 1947 briefing which mentioned a planned "censorship function" for OCD. It is also possible that the Branch's function was intended to support the activities of the Office of Special Operations in some manner. None of these suggested proposals ever materialized, of course--at least, not within OCD--and whatever its <sup>intended</sup> purpose, the Special Intelligence Branch appeared only on that first CIG organizational chart of 22 July 1946. No subsequent charts contained such a unit.

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By late summer of 1946 the mission--now charged to a consolidated Office of Collection and Dissemination--had been pared back to its primary liaison functions of requirements, collection and dissemination. (Actually, its security functions would remain until their transfer to the I&E Staff some six months later.) The new Office was structured into three branches--one each for Requirements, Collection and Dissemination (Figure 4)\*--and its assigned basic mission was

To determine the collection and dissemination requirements for strategic and national policy intelligence information and intelligence; and to formulate and supervise the implementation of operating plans, policies and procedures in connection therewith...

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\* On this undated organizational chart, the time of which has been established as October 1946, the projection of an Office of Security was premature. The particular security conception envisioned here was never realized. Instead, an Inspections and Security Staff under the Executive Director was organized on 1 July 1946. (See also Figure 5.) The Office of Security, as such, actually did not appear until February 1955.

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Navy Captain [REDACTED] OD Chief, was named the first Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. Chosen for the Deputy job was Col. [REDACTED] also from OD. Col. [REDACTED], the only hold-over from OC, was named to head up the new Office's Collection Branch and Col. [REDACTED] the Requirements Branch. The third branch (Dissemination) was set up under [REDACTED] who had originally been assigned from State to CIG and slotted as the Acting Administrative Officer. (Col. [REDACTED], Chief of the Office of Collection, was reassigned to the Office of the Director and shortly thereafter returned to the War Department.) 23/

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The Office had emerged from its incubation stage and was struggling to solve the problems inherent in all newly achieved operational capabilities. Not surprisingly, the most immediate collection and dissemination problems involved OSO and OO. Especially irritating to OSO, for example, was the fledgling OCD's habit of simultaneously levying collection requirements upon overt and covert sources. OSO rightfully held that overt possibilities (nonclandestine

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overseas sources as well as headquarters' files) should be exhausted before their limited covert resources were approached. Among other matters worrying both OSO and OO was the ever-present danger of having one of their sources compromised by OCD Collection Directives levied on other agencies concerning reports which had originated with OO/C or OSO.

Far more basic, however, were the two major problems of coordinating field collection and, secondly, defining OCD's collection and dissemination role. With regard to the first problem, the field representatives of the several U.S. Departments had always reacted solely to home office collection requirements irrespective of category. To conform to the new centralized intelligence concept, the NIA sought to coordinate field activities--namely, to maximize the collection capability by avoiding unproductive duplication and improper channeling--by allocating Agency collection responsibilities within certain broad categories. Thus, the Department of State was assigned responsibility for political, cultural and sociological

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subjects, and the War and Navy Departments for, respectively, military and naval matters. Each agency was free to collect economic and scientific information according to their respective needs. 24/ Confusion resulted among the field collectors. Generally, the provisions of the NIA directive were in conflict with, or at best not in consonance with outstanding departmental collection directives. Washington itself first had to be coordinated through the issuance of revised departmental collection directives reflecting the NIA pattern. Further, field collectors were reluctant to conform because of basic loyalties. They had to be assured that copies of anything they collected outside of their delegated sphere of interest and then turned over to the primary agent, would indeed also be made available to their home office. Or, more broadly, that the collateral or secondary intelligence needs of no Washington department would suffer from the elimination of duplicate reporting. Continued pressure from Washington eventually achieved working effectiveness in coordinated collection but it was

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to take a long time. In fact, it would never be completely achieved.

The other major problem was defining OCD's role in collection and dissemination--particularly with regard to the latter. From the outset, OCD's collection function was generally understood to be one of broad planning and coordination with respect to the government's intelligence collection system--i.e., a liaison activity--rather than direct involvement in field collection. OCD's function, in other words, was that of a middle-man allocating responsibility for field collection of required intelligence. There were, however, officially recognized exceptions to even this rather mundane role. The Office of Special Operations dealt directly with the FBI and other counterparts and would, in fact, accept from OCD only requirements of demonstrated importance which could not be collected through overt channels. Similarly, OO frequently by-passed the OCD mechanism and worked directly with its own sources, as would the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) with the AEC a

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short time later. Moreover, even within the "middle-man" sphere, OCD's authority was further dichotomized in that it handled only "specific" collection requirements. Responsibility for "general" or "standing" types of requirements belonged to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS).\*

Contrary to the relatively clear cut status of OCD in the sphere of collection, however, its dissemination role was surrounded by confusion from the beginning. To avoid another Pearl Harbor, the NSC had placed a positive obligation upon the DCI to keep the policy and operational echelons of the Government informed with timely and accurate warnings through the fullest exchange of information. This was basically a positive charge devoid of exceptions. Thus, the CIG Administrative Order which, in August 1946, set forth an interim policy for the dissemination of CIG-produced intelligence,

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\* ICAPS had replaced the Central Planning Staff (CPS) in July 1946.

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in effect directed that all such intelligence would be disseminated by OCD "in close collaboration with ORE and interested offices and staffs." 25/ The intelligence dissemination principle, however, also implied a negative system of controls to safeguard the information. The Administrative Order had also stated that desirable changes would be made to meet organizational requirements. The "interested offices and staffs" began pressuring for the "desirable changes"--i.e., negative controls to safeguard the intelligence to be disseminated. In the process that would take place over the next half-dozen years, OCD's role as a disseminator of "all" intelligence would change to that of disseminator of only that intelligence which could safely be disseminated on a "need to know" basis. The function moved toward decentralization, in contrast to the basic, fundamental principle of centralization. Offices such as OSO and OO naturally wanted to protect their sources and methods and their material was "sanitized" prior to dissemination, or, as in the case of the former's counterespionage reports, withheld altogether.

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Within a short period of time many other types of reports would be exempt from the OCD channels. Nonetheless, most types of Agency-produced reports as well as the largest bulk of incoming material came within the purview of OCD's dissemination system. Dissemination, even with all the exceptions, rapidly became the largest and most meaningful of OCD's functions. As previously noted, it was soon afterward described as "the single most important tool for carrying out the Director's continuing obligation to insure exchange of intelligence..." Dissemination, in fact, was to remain an OCD function long after the other two original activities (requirements and collection) had been transferred to other offices.\* Given the broad and ill-defined terms of its original mandate, and the fact that only some of the functional conflicts were essentially

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\* Domestic collection (from US Government sources) went to OO/C in July 1961; the requirements function to the Collection Guidance Staff (CGS), O/DDI in June 1963; and the remaining pure liaison activities to CGS and the Domestic Contact Service (formerly OO) in January 1967.

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resolved during its first year of operation, OCD came to be recognized simply as an intermediary between the collector and the producer;\* and as a distribution center within CIG and a central clearing house for the routing of intelligence within the government.

By early 1947, then, the operation in the new Office of Collection and Dissemination had settled down as much as any operation could in that early, tumultuous period. If the Office's mission was more pleb<sup>ic</sup>ian than was originally envisaged, its services were nonetheless vital to the Government's new centralized intelligence operation. In January 1947 when General Vandenberg presented his Year-End Report (for 1946) to the NIA, he highlighted, among other things, the increasing workloads of OCD's Collection and Dissemination Branches. He noted that the former was already handling collection requests from seven Government agencies in addition to the internal CIG requests, and that the other agencies had "come more and more to call on [OCD] to assist

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*and 1955,*

\* There would be minor exceptions in the future when, as in 1950, OCD was to engage in direct field collection by sending survey and microfilming teams to Western Europe to collect overt industrial and

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in locating and supplying their required intelligence material." 26/ By March the Office's on-board strength stood at [REDACTED] against an authorized ceiling of [REDACTED] 27/ and in June Admiral Hillenkoetter's\* first report to the NIA emphasized CIG's (OCD's) expenditure of "much time" for the coordination of U.S. collection efforts "through clearing house arrangements and central reading panels." 28/ At about this time--mid-1947 or shortly thereafter--OCD's by now noticeably lumbering operation was moved from the War Department location on 21st Street to South Building in the 2430 E Street, N.W. complex and to "M" Building on 26th Street, N.W. near Constitution Avenue. 29/

Throughout the second half of the year, personnel and work statistics continued to climb. By October the on-board strength had risen to [REDACTED] and the authorized ceiling to [REDACTED] 30/ In the same month, 25X1A

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\* Hillenkoetter replaced Vandenberg in May 1947 as the third DCI.

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the Office received about 325 Requirements compared to 175 in August; and issued almost 400 Collection Directives against the August total of 250. 31/ As the end of the year approached, it was becoming alarmingly evident that something was wrong with the OCD operation; that the system as originally conceived, was sound in theory only. In practice it was unworkable.

As previously noted, one of the basic objectives of the central intelligence concept was the establishment of an equally centralized reference system where "all" pertinent information would be readily available to the intelligence estimators and producers. By the close of 1947 the resultant Reference Center had generally completed its first year of operation and it had become obvious that its function was vitally interwoven with that of OCD. Yet the two functions were organizationally separated. The liaison officers in OCD who collected the required information were isolated from the production people who needed the information as well as from the reference people who knew what information was already available and therefore need not be collected. In consequence,

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OCD's collection and dissemination activities were operating in a vacuum, artificially isolated from the Agency's practical operations which they were designed to support. In addition, OCD's procedures had become pompously ritualistic and all business was conducted through formal channels and memoranda. The inevitable results were "inefficiency, time-consuming delays, and much invective." 32/ In short, after some two years of actual experience, CIA\* management had concluded that dissemination and collection coordination were routine activities which hardly justified a separate office; that most of OCD was sinking in its own morass of paper; and that the system which had evolved was self-defeating and ineffective. (Apparently, the Dissemination Branch, unconcerned by questions of prestige or prerogatives, was the only part of OCD that was doing an effective, down-to-earth job and it was seriously overworked--or understaffed, depending on one's point of view.)

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\* The name change from CIG became effective in September 1947.

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If the O/DCI had become increasingly disenchanted with the OCD situation, they must have been happier with the Reference Center's management. It appears that [REDACTED] who had been primarily respon-

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sible for the design and development of the Reference Center and was then its Acting Chief, 33/ was called

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in by Executive Director [REDACTED] in late 1947 and quietly informed that he [REDACTED] had found the man

he wanted to head up the Reference Center and that he further intended to merge the Center and OCD. "The

man" of course, was Jamie Andrews who arrived less than two months later in January 1948 and immediately took up his assignment as Chief, Reference Center.

By this time, although the Center had been in operation less than a year and was OCD's junior by about six months, it was already larger than OCD and, apparently, boasted a more effective operation. The plan that

Andrews, [REDACTED] and their staff worked on for

several months was subsequently approved and in May 1948, as we have seen, General Orders merged the two operations into a new Office of Collection and

Guidance, 34/

*Dissemination*

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Along with the Reference Center, the Central Records Division was also brought in from the A & M Executive and placed under the OCD umbrella, thus returning the Top Secret and registered document control functions. Actually, then, it was the Reference Center which had absorbed OCD but, according to one source, 35/ the latter title was retained because it was more widely recognized throughout the Intelligence Community. Thus, as previously described, the new OCD contained the six original divisions from the Reference Center plus a seventh, the Liaison ~~Branch~~ *Division*, into which had been compressed the old OCD liaison functions of requirements, collection and dissemination.

Such was the organizational development of OCD's liaison function up to the 1948 reorganization. There remains now the need to similarly trace the organizational development of the reference elements, from the beginning to 1948, in order to better understand the evolution of the Office of Collection and Dissemination.

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