


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CHAPTER V

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ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1950-1953

Chapter V: DEVELOPMENT OF A REFERENCE CENTER

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Chapter V

DEVELOPMENT OF A REFERENCE CENTER

The Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD),¹ during the period covered by this study (1950-1953), took no part in collection and had very little to do with dissemination in the sense generally intended by these words in the language of intelligence.² In actuality, through 1953, this Office was a central filing and reference facility for Central Intelligence (whose services were also open to other intelligence agencies in so far as they should choose to use them) which also carried on certain liaison functions related to dissemination and collection. OCD had been such an Office since May 1948. It had undergone several radical changes before that date, but thereafter, in spite of recommendations to the contrary, it was not importantly altered.

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Origins of "Collection and Dissemination"

The President's letter of January 22, 1946³ (like the National Security Act) did not directly authorize Central Intelligence to

¹ On Aug. 12, 1955, by CIA Notice 1-130-2 (Confidential), OCD's name was changed to Office of Central Reference (OCR). Since the name Office of Collection and Dissemination was used during the period covered in this study, however, it was retained in this and other chapters.

² Where "collection" denotes the actual collection of information in the field, and "dissemination" implies the responsibility for a decision as to who should and who should not receive the intelligence to be disseminated.

³ See Annex A.

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"collect," in the sense of conducting espionage abroad. It did, however, direct CIG to "correlate and evaluate intelligence^{/related} to the national security", and to assure dissemination of such intelligence to appropriate agencies within the government.¹ Under those clauses the principal actions required of the central group were to insure that intelligence coming under the heading of "national security" would be collected and that it would reach those assigned to correlate and evaluate it; and to set up machinery for appropriate dissemination.

This was the background of two separate offices, one for "Collection" and the other for "Dissemination" authorized by General Vandenberg on July 19, 1946.² Their functions are contained in an early organization chart.³

The Office of Collection was to:

"1. Act for the Director of Central Intelligence in the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the production of strategic and national policy intelligence as it affects the national security of the United States

¹ Paragraph 3-a. See also National Security Act Section 102 (d) 3; and (e); and NSCID-1, paras. 7, 10, and 11.

² See CIG Directive No. 14 of this date in O/DCI/NS files. See also Changes No. 1 to Order No. 6, 22 July 1946 in ibid. where OC is directed to act "in close conjunction with the Interdepartmental Coordination and Planning Staff. The latter is one indication of the fact that Collection and Dissemination were seen as functions of "coordination." In this connection, see also Dulles Report recommendation to assign these functions to a Coordination Division, (below p. 27 ff.)

³ See Annex B, Chart No. 1.

"2. In close coordination with the collection Agencies of other governmental departments, determine the means and methods most appropriate for obtaining foreign intelligence information to enable the Research and Evaluations Office,¹ Central Intelligence Group to produce strategic and national policy intelligence."

The Office of Dissemination was described as:

"The Agency of the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the dissemination of evaluated strategic and national policy intelligence produced by the Office of Research and Evaluations, Central Intelligence Group."

Thus the "collection" for which the earliest office was designed had to do with broad planning and coordination with respect to the intelligence-collection system of the Government rather than directly with field collection; while "dissemination" likewise was to be concerned with broad decisions to be reached on an inter-agency basis with respect to an allowable distribution for correlated and evaluated national intelligence. Both Collection and Dissemination were treated primarily as special forms of inter-agency coordination, an activity supervised in general, however, by ICAPS.

The separate Offices of Collection and Dissemination just described survived less than two months. On September 10, 1946, they were combined, taking the name "Office of Collection and Dissemination."² Combining of the two may have been suggested

¹ Renamed the Office of Reports and Estimates on October 27, 1946.

² See Changes No. 5 to CIG Administrative Order No. 6 of September 10, 1946, in O/DCI/RS files.

by the fact that the work to be done by "Dissemination" was the final step of the work done by "Collection", with the Office of Research and Evaluation (Reports and Estimates) filling in the middle step. For this reason, it would have been not illogical to make the Office of Collection and Dissemination part of the Office of Reports and Estimates, a move that was considered but not carried out. Instead, OCD was organized as a separate office under the Director, designed to work with and for the Office of Reports and Estimates on one side, and ICAPS and the non-CIG intelligence agencies on the other.

The new OCD was to have three functions: "requirements," "collection," and "dissemination." The first had to do with discovering what each intelligence agency wished to know; the second, with allocating responsibility for field collection so that it might become known; and the third, with making sure that intelligence produced by the Central Group on the basis of information so collected would be properly distributed.

The particular "Office of Collection and Dissemination" called upon to perform these functions at this time, however, was neither large enough nor well enough organized to carry out such a "mission." Like all other CIG components, it lacked not only the people, but the very considerable experience which would be required before a centralized service such as was in prospect could begin to make real progress.

The problem of "requirements" alone, for example, was to prove so formidable that several years would pass before an acceptable solution would be reached.¹ Any attempt at central direction of what intelligence must be collected and by whom would certainly entail complications. Relatively simple as the "dissemination" function might be, it was still more than the Office of Collection and Dissemination could cope with in the fall of 1946, as can be inferred from the fact that most of this work was to be done (for the time being) by the Offices of Communications, and of Reports and Estimates.² Even with respect to the elementary duty of distributing incoming intelligence within CIG (which was at first allocated to the Office of Collection and Dissemination) a conflict developed with the State Department, and OCD failed to carry out the full assignment.³

Origins of Central Reference System, 1946-1947

In any case, the Office of Collection and Dissemination as organized in the fall of 1946 did not represent, even in theory, a complete answer to the problem it was designed to solve. "Collection" in its title meant providing (to those undertaking

¹ See DCID 4/3 dated December 14, 1954, in O/DCI/HS files.

² See CIG Administrative Order No. 12, August 22, 1946, in O/DCI/HS files.

³ See Office History prepared by OCD (1952), p. 5, in O/DCI/HS files

"correlation and evaluation of intelligence related to the national security") all the information they needed for the purpose. But all the needed information would not have to be collected. Much of it was already deposited in the files of various intelligence and non-intelligence agencies of the government. For purposes of national security intelligence, all of this would need to be made accessible to those who prepared estimates.

This fact raised the question of whether those needing national security information were to have access to all files where such intelligence might be found; whether all files would (in fact or in duplicate) be deposited in a common library; or whether some compromise method would be adopted under which information on file could be requested and made available at the discretion of the holder. The first and second of these implied a considerable degree of control by Central Intelligence over all intelligence files. The third promised a certain amount of inefficiency by virtue of the fact that neither Central Intelligence nor any other participant in the national intelligence scheme could be assured that it had access to all collected intelligence on a given subject, or that its collection effort was not actually superfluous in view of material already on file somewhere within the government.

All this was recognized long before steps were taken to organize a central reference system. On April 12, 1946, for

example, one of the members of the Central Plans Staff of CIG wrote in part:

"... Once the basic EEI /Essential Elements of Intelligence/ are agreed on, and the raw material is available in Washington, the problems of coordination involve the following:

"a. Insuring that all interested parties know what is available

"This requires that every interested department be advised of all pertinent information received by any other department. Reading panels, exchange of accession lists, etc., are a temporary and inadequate method of meeting this problem. Ideally, there should be a unified classification and cataloging system, with the chief intelligence agencies each maintaining a master file showing the location of all intelligence information."¹

The author of this particular memorandum would have had the problem handled by an inter-agency committee made up of persons in position to understand it in all its aspects as related to their agencies, with a CIG member as coordinator. Such a committee could provide the means for building up a master file and generally directing total collection toward a unified purpose.

In terms of later developments, the concept inherent in the 1946 proposal just quoted might be described as a realizable ideal whose goal would have been an integrated library of intelligence open to all intelligence agencies, to which each agency would contribute freely all information at its disposal. When the central intelligence planners produced their first concrete solution of the reference problem, however, it was in the context of

¹ See Memorandum by 25X1A to Chief, CPS, April 12, 1946, in O/DCI/NS files under "ICAPS".

"correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence" rather than that of coordinating intelligence activities for the benefit of all concerned. This is shown in the fact that in the first plans from the "Reference Center," set down in December 1946, the Center was to be attached to the Office of Reports and Estimates "for administrative support."

Meanwhile, more detailed plans for a reference center were under study by those who would eventually be faced with the practical problems involved.¹

From their point of view, where theory ended and practical reality began, the problems of the "reference center" became those of an unusually complex library. This library would consist of a mass of miscellaneous material made up of thousands of small items² which would be used for a great variety of purposes by a fairly large number of people. Whatever might be policy decisions as to what agency controlled what aspects of the information to be systematized, the ~~mere~~ problem of systematizing it under any method of control was staggering. Generally speaking, this problem occupied the time of those charged with development of the reference center until January 1, 1947, when the CIA Library (under the

¹ See Office History of OCD (1952) p. 2, in O/DCI/MS files.

² Because such a large part of intelligence material was to be found in dispatches and reports from all over the world, few of them long, and each an independent item in itself.

title "Intelligence Documents Division") was actually begun as part of ORE.¹

On March 17, what became the Machine Division of OCD was organized along with the Library as the "Central Index." In June, the "Industrial Register" (known as the "Foreign Industrial Register") was added, and in July, the Graphics Register. Actual organization of the Biographic Register (although it was prominent in early plans) was delayed on account of special interagency problems that needed prior solution.²

The various OCD Divisions just enumerated represented the solution adopted for the total library problem. Because of the degree of specialization that would be required, what might be called quasi-independent satellite libraries were considered necessary: for foreign industrial installations where there was a special intelligence problem; for graphics, where (among other things) CIA had inherited a large and valuable photographic collection from the Office of Strategic Services; and for biography where the number of personalities and the type of information required about them, would be unusual in library terms. Along with these there would be the general library for all other material.

25X1A

¹ Planning for the Reference Center was primarily the responsibility of [REDACTED]

² See Office histories prepared by OCB (1952), in O/DCI/HS files.

Probably the most important solution, however, was represented in the machine aspect of the "Central Index." With respect to this activity, it may have been an advantage to CIA that the "Reference Center" had to start without assets or precedents. Had a functioning library already been in existence, utilizing hand *in manual?* techniques, it is altogether probable that those would have been continued. As it was, those planning the Reference Center were able to seek the most efficient available means of solving the monumental reference problem that faced them, unencumbered by habit or tradition. The solution they arrived at involved unlimited use of business machines for all processes where they could be applied. Because, as of 1946, no business machines existed that were designed for the particular problems facing CIC, the Reference Center planners were faced with the further requirement of developing modifications upon existing machinery that would serve their purpose.¹

Plans for a "Reference Branch" in accordance with the requirements just described were submitted by the Reference Center planners to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff in March 1947 and approved by ICAPS with modifications in June.² The "modifications," however, were of considerable importance

¹ Ibid., 2-4.

25X1A

² Memorandum by [REDACTED] to Chief of ICAPS, March 28, 1947, and Sheffield Edwards to Assistant Directors of ORE, OCD, OO, and OSO, June 25, 1947; copies in O/DCI/HS files, from OCD files.

because they had the effect of substituting a different principle for that on which the original proposals were based.

According to the March proposals, the "mission" of the "Branch" would be: ". . . to centralize various reference functions related to the intelligence activities of the United States Government, and to provide a reference library for CIG This Branch serves as Reference Center for CIA and the member agencies."¹

The "Statement of Mission" as approved by ICAPS in June, however, read: "To be the repository for all intelligence and intelligence information to be permanently filed by CIG, to maintain records of all available intelligence sources, intelligence information and intelligences; to provide a reference library for CIG; and to establish, in coordination with OCD,² procedures for utilization of its materials and catalogues by other agencies." Similarly, whereas the March proposals for the reference center would have had as the primary duty of the "Chief," "to establish reference activities for CIG and the member agencies" the proposals as accepted in June, directed him to "Establish the central reference activities for CIG, and maintain appropriate liaison, administrative and policy making activities."

¹ Italics ours.

² Meaning, of course, the pre-1948 OCD as described above.

The difference in emphasis is obvious. The original planners of the Reference Center saw the future of the still-unborn enterprise primarily as part of the Central Intelligence Group conceived as a partnership of several members all of whom the Center would serve. The approving authorities, on the other hand, preferred the idea of a Center which would serve "CIG" considered as a separate entity. It was to be the latter rather than the former concept that would prevail.

The Reference Center as planned in 1947, though not the counterpart of OCD as it developed in later years, strongly resembled it. The "Machine Division" of 1948-1953 was forecast in a "Coordinating Staff" which, among other things would "satisfy intelligence requirements calling for special machine techniques and methods." The "Library" was accounted for in two separate departments called the "Central Index" and the "Intelligence Documents Division" which between them were charged with most of the main library functions. The Biographic, Industrial, and Graphics Registers were specified in the 1947 plans, as such, with the same general duties they were to perform over the coming years. One difference to be noted is the inclusion of the "Contact Control Register" as part of OCD which, however, would eventually be transferred to the Office of Operations.¹ A proposed Table of

¹ See Chapter IV above, pp. 6-7.

Organization for the 1947 "Reference Center" called for 172 people.¹

As has been noted, the "Reference Center" began functioning as part of the Office of Reports and Estimates, but in 1947, it was transferred to the Executive for Administration and Management. The reason apparently had more to do with separation from ORE than any particular appropriateness in the connection with Administration and Management. For one thing, subordination of "Reference" to a producing office tended to direct the activities of "Reference" to that particular form of production.

What more immediately prompted the separation, however, was the complaint of the Reference Center that it did not receive enough administrative support from ORE. This was understandable in that the Reference Branch, so far as ORE was concerned, was incidental to its chief function of producing reports and estimates. When there was conflict between the immediate needs of the Reference center and those of the main producing mechanism, the reference center took second priority. The Reference Center plan was ambitious, including expensive machines and the people to operate them. Second priorities, particularly in budgetary matters, slowed the development of the plan. On the basis, therefore, of a statement that the Reference Center was a general administrative function and that it needed better

25X1A 25X1A
¹ See memoranda by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], March 28 and June 25, 1947, cited above.

administrative support than it could receive as part of the Office of Reports and Estimates, the Reference Center was able to negotiate the transfer.¹

Consolidation of Reference and Liaison in 1948

For another eight months after September 1947, the Reference Center existed as part of Administration and Management, while an "Office of Collection and Dissemination" functioned independently under the director and the cognizance of "ICAPS". At the end of that period, the flaws of the system had so impressed the authorities as to lead them to reorganize it.

According to a later recollection by the Office of Collection and Dissemination, the reorganization of 1948 stemmed from the following situation:

"Until May of 1948 the Agency's liaison functions were performed by an office with the title 'Office of Collection and Dissemination' whose sole functions were to coordinate requirements, service collection requests, and disseminate the incoming cables and reports. Considering the importance of these functions, the CIG planners had considered that ^{there} would be no competing claims from other assigned functions

"However, in spite of the plausibility of this scheme in theory, it was found that it did not work well in practice. The liaison people of the old OCD, separated organizationally from the researchers who generated the requirements and also from the reference people who knew what intelligence was already available, tended to divorce themselves from the day-to-day spadework of the Agency and to operate in an ivory tower of their own making. Their transactions with the workers in other offices were carried out almost entirely through channels

¹ See Office History by OCD (1952); and correspondence re Dulles Report recommendations on OCD in O/DCI/RS files under "ICAPS"

and by formal memoranda. The unavoidable consequences were inefficiency, time-consuming delays, and much invective."¹

The reorganization offered in May 1948 to remedy this situation was summarized as follows:

"1. Effective this date, the functions of the CIA activities listed below are consolidated:

Office of Collection and Dissemination
Reference Center
Central Records Division, Services Branch, A&M

"2. Dr. James M. Andrews, Chief of the Reference Center, is charged with the responsibility for effecting the consolidation.

"3. Personnel and facilities of the activities listed are placed under the supervision of the Chief of the Reference Center.

"4. Details of changes in organization and functions will be published separately at a later date."²

A second order merged the title "Reference Center" into the Office of Collection and Dissemination, and confirmed Dr. Andrews as Assistant Director for the new organization.³

This consolidation proved to be an event of importance in the development of the collection-dissemination-reference function in CIA. Its effect was to recognize a distinction between abstract principles of "collection," "dissemination," and "reference" and

¹ See OSD "Notes for the Clark Committee," Aug. 1, 1954, in O/DCI/HS files.

² See CIA General Order No. 6, May 3, 1948, in O/DCI/HS files.

³ CIA General Order No. 7, May 18, 1948, in ibid.

the practical realities that they entailed under current circumstances. Theoretically, Central Intelligence might do such things as conduct "constant research into the fields of collection of information," and recommend "new means, methods and techniques for improving the over-all intelligence coverage by United States governmental collecting agencies."¹ In point of fact, however, as seen after two years of actual experience, something like the following conclusions had emerged:

1. Dissemination was a routine function which need hardly occupy the time of a separate office. Major decisions as to the proprieties in dissemination of "national" intelligence belonged ultimately to the National Security Council, the DCI, and the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Once their decisions had been made, the work of a disseminator would be little more than that of routine distribution.

2. Collection, from the point of view of harmonizing that done by Central Intelligence and the four or more other agencies in the field, posed formidable problems, some of which were attacked through directives of the National Security Council, while others continued to be of major concern to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and its successor, the Office of Intelligence Coordination.² But while these broader problems were receiving attention as a matter of policy, it was

¹ See CIO Administrative Order No. 6, previously cited.

² See Chapter III, above.

necessary for someone to see that analysts received the information they needed in order to cope with the day-to-day problems of intelligence. This work was not particularly concerned with what went on in the field, for actual foreign collection was directed in close secrecy by the Office of Special Operations for Central Intelligence, and by its counterparts within the other agencies. This work was directed, rather at the routine business of making paper move from one point to another. Yet it had to be recognized that unless this paper moved in an orderly and expeditious fashion, confusion, waste, and eventual intelligence failures would be the result.

3. Reference was inseparably bound up with these homelier problems of "collection." The "collection" man presumably knew what analysts wanted and where to go for the desired material. But the "Reference" people held the remaining key to "collection" problems: namely, what was already known, and therefore required no "collection" effort. There was little use in having "collection" of this day-to-day sort operate in a void apart from the total library system being developed in the Reference Center.¹

As the system had developed up to 1948, there was no call upon Central Intelligence to take charge of the collection, dissemination, or reference system as carried on within any other agency, or even as it operated among them. An outside agency would grant a request for information from Central Intelligence

¹ See Office history of OGD (1952), in O/DCI/HS files.

or another Agency--but only within its own discretion.¹ Any attempt of Central Intelligence to "coordinate" to the extent of knowing all material that was available to the government, and seeking to exact it for any purpose, would involve the Director's right of "inspection,"² as well as the various directives enjoining each agency to exchange information fully and freely with each other agency. None of this was the business of an office concerned with the day-to-day problem of making paper move from place for day-to-day purposes. Hence the Office of Collection and Dissemination, as organized during the summer of 1948, was not only an instrument devoted to efficiency in the flow of paper, but it was bound to develop primarily into a service organization for its own parent Agency.

Its "Statement of Functions" as published in July 1948, called upon it to provide "the centralized services required for the maintenance of effective CIA and interdepartmental coordination in the establishment of intelligence requirements," and "the collection of information and intelligence to those who need to know;" but more specifically, the new OCD would coordinate "those direct

¹ For example, see below, pp. 25-26.

² Reference to Section 102 (c), National Security Act which provides that "... intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government . . . relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence" This clause originated in the Pearl Harbor investigations and was intended by Congress to give the DCI power to insure against dissemination failures in future emergencies. It appears not to have been invoked by any DCI.

contacts on the working level between personnel of CIA and of other agencies which must be maintained in order to ensure a free interchange of intelligence information and intelligence." Except to the limited extent that other Agencies might call upon the newly established collection services of Central Intelligence in preference to their own, the work of the Office of Collection and Dissemination would clearly consist, for the most part, in servicing requirements levied upon it by Central Intelligence and serving as a clearinghouse for interagency requirements where asked to do so.

The July 1948 "Statement of Functions" also specified that OGD "provide a repository in the CIA Library for documentary intelligence materials, affording loan and bibliographic services to all the IAC agencies; [render] archival services for correspondence received and originated by CIA; and [administer] the Executive Register and Top Secret Control offices of CIA;" gave it responsibility for certain changes in security classification; and directed it to provide business machine service for Central Intelligence and advice in this field to other agencies.¹

Thus, little more than two years after a central intelligence system had been established in the United States, it seemed clear that OGD would become more a facility for CIA alone than a central file where intelligence research could be carried on without the necessity of any further check. Aside from difficulties

¹ See OGD "Statement of Functions" dated July 1, 1948, in O/DCI/RS files.

already noted, the original plans for central filing were abandoned for practical reasons. Surveys undertaken in 1946 and 1947 had convinced those concerned with the problem, that such an inter-agency library would be too extensive and unwieldy for central management.¹ This reasoning was also accepted by the Dulles-Jackson Survey Committee of 1948-1949.² Had it not been for this practical consideration, it is conceivable that the CIA reference center might have been empowered to codify all intelligence held by the government as a service of common concern.³

With respect to one of the reference activities--biographical intelligence--this was actually done to a limited extent in the form of the eighth intelligence directive of the National Security Council. According to this Directive, "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of Biographical data on Foreign Scientific and Technological Personalities is assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency." It was further directed that all departmental

¹ See ICAPS correspondence, 1946-50, in O/DCI/NS files. All references are to the impracticality of the proposed operations. If other reasons also played a part in the decision, they are not reflected in the records of ICAPS.

² See below, pp. 27-36.

³ The closest analogy is probably NSCIB-16 of March 7, 1953, (See Annex E) in which exploitation of foreign-language documents for the "IAC Agencies" was made a primary responsibility of the DCI. A similar directive for Central Reference would doubtless have contained the same exceptions regarding the "maintenance of facilities necessary to meet departmental demands" and a similar committee to "assist the DCI in implementation of this directive."

agencies would continue to collect biographical data on that category of personalities, but would forward the information to Central Intelligence for indexing. Central Intelligence was then to keep it "readily available" for all concerned.¹

This directive did not, of course, fully settle the question of biographical intelligence. It gave Central Intelligence responsibility for part of the field but said nothing about the rest. Indeed, according to one contemporary critic who was not connected with Central Intelligence or any of the departmental agencies, ". . . this directive is another example of least common denominator compromises between CIA and the Departmental intelligence agencies. The results of such compromises are a hodge-podge of Directives giving CIA very little authority to coordinate intelligence aggressively as contemplated by the National Security Act of 1947."²

Nevertheless, the result of "NSCID-6" was at least to give the Biographical Register of OGD a somewhat unique standing in that it was the only component which could claim to be even in part a legally constituted "service of common concern."

¹ See NSCID-3 dated May 28, 1948, in Annex E.

² See memorandum by L. R. Hafstad, Executive Secretary of the Research and Development Board, to Robert Flinn, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 12, 1948, in O/DOI/RS files, under "ICAPS".

Organization of OCD, 1948-1950

With the one exception of the Contact Register, which was to be transferred to the Office of Operations two months later,¹ the functional statement of July 1948 set forth the organization that was to remain generally constant for the Office of Collection and Dissemination through the Hillenkoetter and Smith administrations.

This organization consisted of a Library; Biographical, Industrial and Graphics Registers; a Machine Techniques component; and a Liaison unit. Their duties, as set forth in 1948, were also to remain unchanged in any important particular over this same period. Briefly, these were as follows:²

(1) the Library was to serve as the repository for all intelligence received in documentary form and was to be "open" to all "IAC agencies." The Library would catalogue these materials; buy or borrow further material needed by analysts; prepare bibliographies and abstract material to be entered in the machine index; ascertain the extent of useful intelligence material in other libraries, and distribute material in accordance with instructions from the "Liaison Branch."

(2) the Biographic Register, in addition to its primary function of maintaining biographic data on foreign scientific and technological personalities, would act for CIA in obtaining biographic information on other personalities from appropriate sources and would maintain a machine index of all important foreigners. The Biographic Register was also authorized to initiate "recommendations designed to strengthen the overall structure of the government's biographic intelligence."

¹ See CIA General Order No. 9, August 26, 1948, in O/DCI/HS files; and Chapter IV, p. 16, Footnote 1, above.

² Paraphrased from the Official Statement of Functions of OCD, July 1, 1948, previously cited.

(3) the Industrial Register was to consolidate all material received relative to foreign industrial installations and to enter it in a machine index. It was to attempt to maintain free and unrestricted flow of this type of intelligence among the agencies; it was also to make recommendations designed to "strengthen the overall structure."

(4) the Graphics Register was to perform approximately the same services as the other registers with respect to photographs and moving picture film.

(5) the "Machine Techniques Branch" had, in effect, two functions: first, to study and develop indexing machinery and techniques, to keep machines in repair, and to train personnel for them; and second, to do actual machine indexing for other parts of CIA where appropriate.

Wrong choice of word

(6) the "Liaison Branch" performed a function described as "coordination" with respect to (a) "the free and unrestricted interchange of available intelligence information and intelligence;" (b) the formulation of intelligence collection requirements; and (c) the "issuing of CIA Collection Directives," and "dissemination of intelligence information and intelligence to all who need to know." This "Branch" was also to "ascertain," by "confirming survey of the successes and failures achieved, the capabilities of the several agencies to collect required intelligence information;" and initiate, as appropriate, "recommendations designed to strengthen the overall collection effort." Finally, it was to coordinate "those direct contacts on the working level which must be maintained between personnel of CIA and of the other agencies in order to ensure a free and unrestricted interchange of intelligence information and intelligence."

For the most part, these statements constituted a realistic description of a workable organization. The statements regarding the "Liaison Branch" of course, were less realistic than the others, but this "Branch" had been, until the "merger" a separate Agency Office. It is not surprising that its functional description should still contain elements of the broader tasks originally

intended for that "Office." It is also not difficult to perceive, from the description, that in the long run the "Liaison Branch" would become primarily concerned with practical liaison and with the routing and distribution of requests, documents, and finished intelligence.¹

Equally significant, in a sense, with the official Statement of Functions, agreed upon for the combined Office of Collection and Dissemination in May 1948, was the official statement of policy promulgated by the new Assistant Director (James H. Andrews) in a "Memorandum to All Hands, OGD" issued in November 1948.

Andrews began with the flat statement that "OGD's major function is that of providing service to the other offices of the Agency." He went on to say that "It must be the objective of everyone in OGD to see that prompt and efficient service is given to every worker from another office in CIA who requests it and never to deny a request save when, on practical grounds, it seems certain that compliance would work harm to the Agency by interfering with other services which are being and must continue to be performed The ritualistic approach was a favorite with the old OGD, which regarded itself as engaged in a constant struggle with the other offices for preeminence. No hint of this approach will be tolerated

¹ Because, for example, it had already become evident that "requirements" must come from those working with intelligence and merely pass through OGD; "collection directives" could be no more than collections requests which would be passed on in a routine fashion to those presumed to be able to fulfill them.

today. Channels and procedures are created to yield practical results: If they fail to yield the practical results needed by ORR or OO or OSO then they are inadequate and must be changed. Prerogatives are sterile, and must never be cited as reason for denial of a request." Andrews called upon "Branch and Division Chiefs" to "find solutions for the difficult requests which come to their offices. When they are unable to do so, when it appears impossible to comply with a given request because of conflict with security regulations or other considerations, the requester is to be assured that every effort will be made to get him the results he needs" ¹

In other comments on the "service" problem, Mr. Andrews went into the matter of cooperation regarding non-CIA requests. In this connection he stated that the Office of Collection and Dissemination should comply with all legitimate intelligence requests from agencies other than Central Intelligence but added that: ". . . the converse is not true and this is a real stumbling block for national intelligence. Directives prescribe free and unrestricted interchange of intelligence and intelligence information; but as matters now stand, every officer in every one of the departmental intelligence agencies from Directors and Chiefs of Intelligence down to section chiefs, freely decides on his own

¹ See memorandum, Andrews to "All Hands," dated Nov. 12, 1948, in OOR files.

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hook whether or not particular information requested by CIA is to be given out . . . the lower down you go, the more often you find officers who say, 'this is not for CIA; this is operational; this is departmental intelligence.'¹

The total statement of policy outlined in Andrews' two statements tended to permeate the Office and become a habitual order of business. The Office of Collection and Dissemination did not concern itself with problems of high interagency policy, nor with questions of prestige or prerogative as among the agencies or within Central Intelligence. As directed, it took the attitude that it existed to serve, which meant that the demands of service would take invariable priority over any ordinary objection to the service asked. Within the Central Intelligence Agency, this was a relatively easy policy to maintain; outside the Agency, it presented special difficulties. Had OCD chosen to do so, it could presumably have made an issue of the second problem, but it adopted the policy instead of seeking cooperation rather than attempting to insist on compliance.

By the end of 1948, the Office of Collection and Dissemination had absorbed the May reorganization. Accepting the two premises (that "coordination of intelligence activities" belonged to the Director; and that "collection" and "reference" should not

¹ See undated notes, in files of AE/OOR. [These appear to have been notes for a talk to employees, probably made about Nov. 1948.] *gnd:mlt*

be separated) the new argument seemed satisfactory for all practical purposes.

Changes Recommended by Tberstadt and Dulles Committees, 1948-1949

It was during 1948, however, when OCD was in the process of reaching its full development, that two committees investigated the Central Intelligence Agency, both of which came to much the same conclusions about OCD. The "Tberstadt Committee" (acting for the Hoover Commission) reported in December 1948 that: "The Office of Collection and Dissemination sometimes in the past has acted as a bottleneck, but under its new head it appears to be performing an efficient job . . . the name of [OCD] is a misnomer; it probably should become purely a reference service with its full energies devoted to this important work. Its liaison functions might be split off to form a separate small section."¹

The other 1948 survey group, the Dulles Committee, wrote its report on OCD under the heading "The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for the Coordination of Intelligence Activities." The Committee's opinion was that, of the "three functions" actually performed by the Collection and Dissemination Office (routing documents, maintaining a library, and determining the best means of

¹ Confidential report of Task Force on National Security Organization (of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch [the Hoover Commission] undated, about Dec. 1948, pp. 48-49.

procuring information), only the third was really a part of the coordination responsibility. "It is obvious," the committee stated, "that this function of coordination is designed to meet current requests and does not involve a broad responsibility continuously to monitor and coordinate the collection procedures and requirements of the various intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Such a responsibility would force the Office of Collection and Dissemination into the position of a central clearinghouse for all collection requirements and requests of all agencies. It would be impractical to have such an arrangement due to the mass of administrative detail involved and the resulting delay in the satisfaction of requests. In practice, direct inter-agency requests, not requiring coordination, may by-pass the Central Intelligence Agency completely."¹

The Dulles Committee considered that the collection and dissemination functions could be better handled as part of the total coordination responsibility generally delegated to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.

"It is our belief," the Committee concluded in this connection, "that the relationship between certain of the functions presently performed by ICAPS and the Office of Collection and Dissemination should be considerably closer. ICAPS is responsible for the promulgation of plans and policy in relation to the coordination of collection activities. As one of its tasks, the Office of Collection and Dissemination coordinates actual collection

¹ Dulles Survey Group Report, Jan. 1, 1949, (Top Secret, TS #28083), p. 48-49; in O/DOI/IS files.

and dissemination and in some respects is in a position to implement the general plans and policies for coordination. Constantly dealing with the 'working level' problems of collection, the Office of Collection and Dissemination is in a good position to make recommendations in regard to the improvement of collection procedures and the coordination of collection activities.

"We, therefore, recommend that the collection and dissemination functions of this Office be placed under the new Coordination Division, subject to future determination of the extent to which individual Offices may conduct their own dissemination . . . we further recommend that all of the library, index, and register functions be separated from the Office of Collection and Dissemination and be placed in a centralized Research and Reports Division"

The Dulles Committee's investigation of Central Intelligence occurred just after the "OCD" consolidation, so that the Committee saw the immediate result of the merger without having an opportunity to observe either how its three parts had functioned separately,² or what the consolidated office would be capable of doing after it had had a chance to achieve working unity. Consequently, (considering the importance of the Director's coordinating function in the Committee's view), it is not surprising that its members should have been disposed to think of Collection and Dissemination as functions of "coordination" and so to be managed apart from storage

¹ Ibid., p. 62.

² The Dulles Report was published on January 1, 1949, on the basis of final "Terms of Reference" issued March 19, 1948. Hence the actual investigation on which the Report was based took place during the intervening nine months. As has been noted above, the consolidation of OCD took place in the midst of the investigation period, on May 3, 1948.

of information, which appeared to be an adjunct of research. In the view of those who had watched the various experiments made with collection, dissemination, and reference since 1946, however, the Committee's arguments seemed incompletely based.

When the Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination forwarded his reply to the Dulles Report recommendations to the Director, early in 1949, he reflected this point of view in some detail. His statement was as follows:

1. The Dulles Committee proposes, in essence, that the reference functions of OCD be divorced from the liaison functions, that the reference functions be transferred to ORE, and the liaison functions be administered by ICAPS. The stated reason for this proposal is that the reference and liaison functions have little inter-relation, that the former are closely related to the research function of ORE, and that the latter are closely related to the coordinating function of ICAPS. The best reply to this seemingly logical proposal is that the Agency has already tried it out in practice, and found it unsatisfactory.

2. The Committee assistant who inspected the present OCD did not spend, in total, more than a few hours in the Office, so it is not surprising that he emerged with the impression that its functions were many, various, and unrelated. It had taken the Agency many months of hard work, trial, and error, to learn that the seemingly different functions of reference and liaison are, in fact, so closely related that they are better performed by a single administrative unit than by separate ones. It is too early to say that the present is the best of all possible organizational patterns for these functions, but it is not too early to say that it represents an improvement over the older and more obvious pattern which is now proposed anew.

3. It would be exact to state that the techniques of OCD are many and various, involving the use of much unique machine equipment, but it is only on paper that the functions appear unrelated. In truth they all serve

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a single and common end: to get and store intelligence information and make it available to those who need it.

4. In 1947 the Agency was organized with the Reference Center, embracing library and registers, in ORR; and with the liaison functions assigned to the separate Office of CCD. This is the same, in principle, as what the Committee now proposes. The only difference is that the Reference Center is now to be installed in one of the two Divisions into which ORR is to be split, and that the liaison functions are to be administered by a renamed ICAPS staff instead of by an Assistant Director.

5. The separation of liaison and reference functions did not work out well in practice. The administrative void between the two worked to the detriment of both. If an analyst in ORR called for a document known to be in the State Department's library, it was clearly the job of the inter-library loan people in CIA's library to get it for him; but if it turned out that the document was subject to stringent security restrictions then it became the job of a liaison officer to make arrangements, with appropriate officials of the State Department, for the document to be released. The two jobs were one and the same, but they required different approaches and different techniques. As the library and liaison people were under different administrations they failed to develop intimate knowledge of each other's daily problems and of the techniques and channels being developed to deal with them. Communications between them were by typed memoranda carried by couriers and messengers, with multiple carbon copies. Delays were many, and tempers were exacerbated. Reference Center and CCD were accursed by all who had to deal with them. Analysts who wanted fast action were prone to embark on independent liaison ventures of their own, thereby adding notably to the general confusion and inter-departmental misunderstandings.

6. The Reference Center, under ORR, found itself without adequate administrative understanding and support. The main business of ORR was to deal with critical problems of a substantive nature, and the specialists preparing an important estimate against a tight deadline naturally took precedence over library and register people whose problems could be put off till the morrow. The needs of the analysts had priority, and there was a tendency to postpone action on the more humdrum needs of the Reference Center. It seems inescapable that the

same situation would develop again if the library and registers were to be reassigned to ORE, or to a Research and Reports Division created out of ORE. In addition, there is now an Office of Scientific Intelligence which requires library and register services no less than ORE, and it would be unwise to make it dependent on its sister Office for these services. I believe that the CIA Library and the registers should serve all of CIA, and that they can best do so if administered separately and apart from any one of the consumer Offices or Divisions.

7. The original Office of Collection and Dissemination had no reference functions, but concentrated on the many facets of the liaison activity. As a separate Office, it had direct access to the Director of Central Intelligence, and this would now be denied if the ICAPS (or "Coordination Division") staff were interposed. This proposal is difficult to understand, for the Committee Report places very great emphasis on the need for more forceful efforts by CIA to achieve coordination with the other agencies, and it strongly expresses the opinion that direction of CIA affairs by tour-of-duty personnel can never win to the goal. Now the small staff of ICAPS, or of the proposed "Coordination Division" consists entirely of representatives of the State and Service Departments. These men are on tour-of-duty assignments. If capable and energetic they can render great service to the United States government, to their respective Departments, and to the Central Intelligence Agency. But it is impossible that they should, at one and the same time, and during relatively brief tours of duty, achieve success both (1) in handling the delicate and difficult problems of policy determination in inter-departmental relationships, and (2) in learning, understanding, and directing the myriad techniques of collection, bibliography, and dissemination. This second job is a career assignment in itself, and it is unlikely to be performed well by men who are tackling it for the first time and for a short time. This job is of so great common concern to all the offices of the Agency that it should have direct access to the Director.

8. The Committee also proposes that the Contact Branch of OO and the Information Control Section of OSO be given a greater degree of autonomy in the dissemination of their reports. It argues that these offices have better knowledge of the consumers who need their materials than does OCD, and in this the Committee is mistaken. No one

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knows better who needs what material than (1) the reference people who, on direct request from the consumers, are daily compiling bibliographies and statements of available information, and (2) the liaison people whose daily chore it is to maintain close contact with consumers in all the agencies, receive their requests, and ensure that they are acted upon to the best of CIA's ability. The Committee is also mistaken in its belief that Contact Branch and OSO do not now exercise autonomy over the distribution of their own products. CCD has not in many months overruled a Contact Branch decision as to where its reports should go and from whom they should be withheld, and the Information Control Section of OSO freely distributes to other agencies reports which it denies both to ORE and to CCD. This latter activity is dangerous, is damaging to the morale of ORE analysts, and is harmful to the prestige of the Agency. Liaison Officers are frequently asked by officials of other agencies, "Why doesn't CIA coordinate itself? CIA's left hand doesn't know what its right hand is doing." The Agency is now taking steps to remedy this situation, and it is certain that the remedy involves less autonomy rather than more autonomy for the several Offices.¹

The Director agreed with this argument so fully that when he forwarded his own comments to the National Security Council, he rejected the Committee's recommendations for the Office of Collection and Dissemination with a "Do not concur," adding: "The Office of Collection and Dissemination is retained as a collecting, disseminating, liaison, and reference branch as at present constituted."²

The National Security Council, on receiving the diametrically opposed recommendations of the Dulles Committee and the DCI

¹ See Memorandum by AD/CCD to DCI, Feb. 7, 1949, in OOR files.

² See Comments of the DCI on Dulles Report forwarded to NSC, Feb. 28, 1949, p. 17, in O/DCI/ER files.

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for disposition of OCD, endorsed the plan of the Dulles Committee to abolish the Office of Collection and Dissemination and divide its activities among other components of the Agency. There was one reservation, however: that "there may be other methods of organization which will accomplish the same objectives."¹

The Dulles Committee had hinted at some of these other alternatives. Although the Committee had been categorical in recommending that OCD's central library and specialized registers "should" be attached to the proposed centralized research and reports component,² it had been less emphatic about transferring OCD's Liaison Division to the proposed enlarged coordination office.

Particularly at issue were the Liaison Division's "middle-man" functions of assembling, coordinating, and assigning collection requirements received from the producing offices and agencies, and disseminating the information after it had been collected. The Dulles Committee suggested only that these and other functions of that Division "might" be transferred to the new Coordination office.³ Elsewhere in its report, however, the Committee had questioned whether it was "practicable" at all for any office in CIA to serve as a central clearinghouse for "all requirements and requests of

¹ NSC-50, July 1949.

² Dulles Survey Group, Report (previously cited), p. 62.

³ Ibid., p. 61.

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all agencies," offering the objection that such an inter-office and inter-agency coordination project would involve a "mass of administrative detail" which would result only in "delay in the satisfaction of requests."¹ Even a more limited clearinghouse in OGD, confined to channeling requirements to CIA's own field-collection offices (OO and OSO) and disseminating the material collected by them, was found objectionable by the Dulles Committee.²

In analyzing these collection offices, the Committee charged that OGD, by its middleman function, was "impeding" their work and preventing them from keeping in "intimate" touch with their customers in the other offices and agencies. The solution, the Committee said, was to give "greater independence and autonomy" to OO and OSO, allow them direct contact with those who had collection requirements, and give them direct control over the dissemination of information collected. To make this contact more effective, furthermore, the Committee recommended (for OSO but not for OO) that the State and Defense Departments assign liaison officers to be stationed in OSO's Information Control Section.³ Finally, however (after having argued that collection requirements and dissemination control should thus be decentralized), the Dulles Committee confined its formal recommendation to suggesting that the problem be left for "future

¹ Ibid., p. 49.

² Ibid., pp. 96, 112-113.

³ Ibid., pp. 96, 113.

determination." The Committee concluded by inviting OCD (because of its experience with "day-to-day working level problems") to make further recommendations in regard to "the improvement of collection procedures and the coordination of collection activities."¹

Organizational Proposals and Decisions Affecting OCD
July-December 1950

Confronted by the Dulles Committee's alternative views on the Office of Collection and Dissemination and by the NSC's limited endorsement of them, Admiral Hillenkoetter, as has been stated, decided to leave OCD essentially intact. His successor, General Smith (after having announced to the NSC in October 1950 that he intended to carry out the Dulles Committee's recommendations in general) came to the same general conclusion as his predecessor, not to subject OCD to a major reorganization. These successive decisions by Hillenkoetter and Smith were more, however, than a simple negative conclusion to preserve the status quo. Between July and December 1950 each of them had had under consideration certain reorganization plans for OCD, and each made a number of organizational adjustments without, however, disturbing OCD's position on the Agency's organization chart.

Thus, for example, early in July 1950 a plan for reorganizing OCD as the "Office of Reference and Dissemination" was

¹ Ibid., pp. 61, 62.

presented to Admiral Hillenkotter by his Management Staff.¹ This plan was based on a year of study by that Staff of the operations of OCD and of other offices directly involved. It had found that there were "serious deterrents of operating efficiency [which] could be removed by realignment of Agency functions," as between OCD and some five other offices of the Agency. Actually, only two of OCD's six major divisions (the Liaison Division and the Machine Methods Division) were to be affected by this proposed reorganization. The other components, including principally the central library and the three specialized registers, were not criticized by the Management Staff, and were expected to comprise the major activity of what would be renamed the Office of Reference and Dissemination.

Like the Dulles Committee, the Management Staff in July 1950 focussed its principal attention on OCD's Liaison Division, but its analysis and proposed solutions were quite different. The handling of collection requirements, first of all, would be transferred out of OCD, not to the collection offices (as the Dulles Committee had argued) but to the "joint control" of the requirements staffs of the two production offices--ORE and OSI. These requirements staffs would replace the Liaison Division as the middleman for CIA's

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¹ Memorandum by [REDACTED] Management Officer, to Acting Executive, "Proposed Plan for Realignment of Certain Agency Functions," July 3, 1950 (Secret), in ID/S file entitled "O&M 5."

dealings with all field collection components in Washington, not only those in CIA (that is, CG and CSO) but also the principal collection agencies in the State and Defense Departments. Conversely, the joint requirements staff would also be the control point for receiving the collection requirements of the departmental agencies intended for CIA's two field-collection offices. In order to make joint control by ORS and OSI effective, the two requirements staffs would be physically re-located in adjoining office space, and they would be expected to follow "uniform procedures" (still to be developed), so the Management Staff recommended.¹

On the other hand, the dissemination of material collected under this revised requirements-control procedure, together with the dissemination of CIA-produced finished intelligence, would be divorced from both the producing and collecting offices and be re-centralized as an "exclusive" function of the renamed Office of Reference and Dissemination.² This part of the Management Staff's proposals, too, was a departure from the Dulles Committee's recommendations, which had regarded collection and dissemination of a given type of material as two closely related processes belonging to the same office.

Other functions of the Liaison Division were also to be re-assigned, under the Management Staff survey of July 1950, but

¹ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

² Ibid., p. 5.

to two other offices of the Agency. That part of the Liaison Division's contact work that was concerned with gathering material from the files of other government agencies for CIA analysts would be transferred to the Office of Operations.¹ However, the Liaison Division's Control register of CIA contacts with government agencies would be transferred not to OO but to the Inspection and Security Staff, since that Staff (the survey found) already "in the final instance determines from a security standpoint whether liaison contact may be established or continued."²

Finally, the plan of July 1950 included a recommendation on OGD's administrative-support services, in particular those handled by its Machine Methods Division. That Division had originally been established to provide mechanized indexing and tabulation services centrally to all components of the Agency, intelligence, operational, and administrative alike. Recently, however, the machine work on the OO/C contact register had been decentralized to the Office of Operations. Similarly, it was now further proposed, in July 1950, that the work of indexing Agency employee records and preparing personnel rosters (chiefly on behalf of the

¹ The overall objective, it was proposed by the Management Staff, would be to consolidate the Agency's contacts with all overt informational sources, governmental and non-governmental alike, in the Office of Operations, and that office would be renamed the "Office of Overt Collection." Ibid., p. 5.

² Ibid., pp. 2-4.

personnel and finance offices) should be transferred to one of the administrative offices--the Special Support Staff.¹ However, OCD's main machine effort, on the indexing of intelligence reports and documents, would continue as before. Nor were any of OCD's other administrative services to be shifted. In particular, the Agency's courier and messenger service, its records management program, and the custody of its archives would be continued by the renamed "Office of Reference and Dissemination."²

Admiral Hillenkoetter found this "ORD" plan of sufficient interest to refer it for comment to the several Assistant Directors who would be directly affected by such a reorganization. He expressed a note of skepticism, however, at what appeared to him to be a "dismemberment of OCD" which might actually prove to be more costly than keeping the "status quo."³

Still other OCD organizational problems were under study, in the summer and fall of 1950, which were not mentioned either in the Management Staff's plan of July 1950 or in the earlier recommendations of the Dulles Committee. One such problem was the procurement of foreign-language publications, responsibility for which was divided between OCD's central library, OO's Foreign

¹ Ibid., p. 4.

² Ibid., p. 5.

³ Memorandum by DCI to Acting Executive [REDACTED] July 6, 1950, in ibid. Admiral Hillenkoetter questioned whether more personnel and funds, rather than fewer, would not be needed by this reorganization.

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Documents Division, and the Procurement Office, with the further complication that, in practice, most of the other operating offices were independently ordering some of their books and periodicals, both from foreign and domestic sources.¹

Another issue was the question of reconciling the concept of a central Agency library with the increasing demands for separate specialized libraries in some of the operating offices, along with the broader question, going beyond CIA's internal needs, whether and how far the Agency's indexing and reference services could meet the ideal of a Government-wide service of common concern, with or without a formal NSC charter.²

Somewhat related to this matter was the development of the Agency's facilities for exploiting "special intelligence", under way in 1950, which raised the question whether the library services on that kind of material should be controlled locally by the special-intelligence production office or managed centrally by OCD as an integral component of its central indexing and reference

¹ OCD draft history of Library, undated (about May 1952), Secret, p. 4, in O/DCI/HS files. Since November 1949 OCD had a financial "delegation of authority" from the DCI to approve requests for the procurement of "foreign and sensitive publications", and to obligate confidential funds, under Project OCD-17-50 (see DD/A tabulation of Delegations of Authority, 1948-51, in DI/S file "OCD 5"); but OCD's responsibility was not made exclusive until December 1950.

² OCD's formal responsibilities, by CIA Regulation, were to provide library service first of all to all Agency offices, and secondarily to other agencies. See CIA Reg. 70, July 1, 1950, in Annex B, below.

system, toward the ideal of "all-source" coverage for all authorized users.¹

Finally, the specialized registers of OCD were also confronted by organizational problems in 1950, and some of these problems had external ramifications as well. For example, plans were under consideration, in August 1950, to seek a NSC charter which would formally recognize the Industrial Register as a service of common concern,² and redefine the scope of its coverage of foreign industrial establishments in relation, for example, to the target intelligence work in the military departments. The Biographic Register, on the other hand, already (long before 1950) was operating in part under a NSC directive, but here again a further clarification of responsibilities was under study. While CIA's external responsibilities were limited, under that directive, to biographic indexing and research on foreign scientific and technical personnel, in practice the Biographic Register was regularly handling biographic requests from other agencies in all subject-matter fields covered by OCD's comprehensive holdings of intelligence documents.³ Paradoxically, however, each agency at

¹ This issue was resolved in 1951 by the establishment of a "Special Register" under OCD management, but located in OCI--controlled office space.


² See "Introduction" to CIA Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1952, dated Sept. 1, 1950, Secret, p. 17, in O/DCI/HS, filed under "Comptroller."

³ See CIA "Statistical Summary," Oct. 1950, Secret, in O/DCI/HS files.

the same time continued to maintain its own biographic intelligence unit, and even within CIA, the Biographic Register did not have exclusive responsibility for serving all biographic needs of the Agency.¹

Whatever might have been the final decisions of Admiral Hillenkoetter for resolving these many and varied problems of OCD as a supporting service organization, they depended in part on whether and how the production and operational offices might first be reorganized. These broader decisions waited on the arrival of the new Director.

A few days after he took office, early in October, Smith quickly committed himself to the Dulles Survey Group's recommendations for the reorganization of CIA generally, and from this commitment it could be assumed that OCD would surely be one of the offices to be abolished. In the next few weeks Smith announced, first, a new Office of Research and Reports (on November 13), and then a new Office of Intelligence Coordination (a few days later), and it appeared more likely than ever that these two offices would absorb OCD's reference and contact activities, respectively, along the lines of the Dulles Committee's recommendations. In support of these formal announcements, detailed plans were under consideration, including a new proposed organizational chart for ORR, which showed



OCD's library, its three registers, and its machine methods unit all re-grouped (along with OO's Foreign Documents Division) as branches of a new Reference Division located in ORR.¹

The Assistant Director for OCD, James M. Andrews, evidently expected the end of OCD momentarily. On November 24, 1950, he sought to persuade the Director's office, through a staff study,² not now to preserve the organizational unity of OCD but simply to prevent it from being absorbed by the new research office. He presented two alternatives under which OCD's principal activities might still somehow be conducted in close cooperation, and in any case managed independently of the control of any one "customer" office which OCD's facilities were serving. He now offered no objections to shifting the Liaison Division to the new Coordination Office but urged that, if such a move were to take place, the library and the registers should also be assigned to that office, rather than have them become what he called the "stepchild" or "Cinderella" of ORR. As a second, to him a "less desirable" alternative, Andrews favored placing the reference activities somewhere under the new Deputy Director for Administration, where they at least "would continue to have adequate administrative support," and yet would remain "independent of any of the offices which [they] must serve."³

¹ Proposed organization chart for ORR dated Oct. 31, 1950, Secret, in ORR folder "Reorganization of ORR, Jan. 1951," in O/DCI/H3 files.

² Memorandum by Andrews to CIA Executive, Nov. 25, 1950, Secret, in OCD files.

³ Ibid., especially tabs E and F on these two alternatives.

The final decision of the new Director, confirmed on December 1, 1950, was to leave OCD essentially intact, as the Agency's principal reference facility for the storage, indexing, and dissemination of intelligence documentary materials, and to postpone for further study and negotiation the detailed problems of OCD's inter-office relationships and the scope of its services. On December 1, 1950, OCD reappeared on the Agency's new organization chart,¹ grouped with the several production offices under the new Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, William H. Jackson; and its major functions, which were outlined in the accompanying charter of responsibilities, were reiterated with only minor changes.² The only change in OCD's charter was with respect to a small group of administrative-service tasks, including the Agency's messenger and courier service and the management of the Agency's administrative records and archives, which were withdrawn from OCD and transferred to the Deputy Director for Administration.³

Also left intact was the internal organization of OCD. As before December 1, 1950, OCD's major operating units consisted of the following divisions: the Agency's central library; two registers for handling reference and research on biographical subjects

¹ CIA Reg. No. 70, revised, Dec. 1, 1950, in O/DCI/HS files.

² Ibid. For a comparison of the wording of the December 1950 and July 1950 charters for OCD, see Annex G, below.

³ A few weeks earlier, OCD had also been relieved of machine-indexing work on Agency personnel records. Two other administrative activities remained in OCD after December 1950: top-secret control; and "custodian of registered documents."

and on industrial installations, respectively; a graphics register for servicing photographs and motion pictures of intelligence value; a machine unit to provide mechanical indexing and tabulation services to the library, the registers, and the "customer" offices outside OCD; and the Liaison Division, to serve as the intermediary channels for collection requirements, for the dissemination of collected information and finished intelligence reports, and for the working-level contacts¹ with IAC and non-IAC agencies in the Government.

While the broad outlines of OCD's organization and responsibilities and its status in the Agency remained essentially unchanged during the period of the Agency's major reorganizations between October 1950 and January 1951, the next two years did bring a number of less noticeable but significant changes in OCD's activities, and the recurrence of documentary problems which had troubled the Agency from its beginnings. Among the changes in 1951 and 1952, which are discussed below, were certain further adjustments in OCD's jurisdiction over particular types of materials, an expansion of its documentary holdings and in the demands on its resources, and an increase in its personnel strength to cope with its expanding workload.

¹ "Policy" contacts with other Government agencies, IAC and non-IAC alike, were reserved for control by the ICI, the DD/CI, the DD/P, and the DD/A, and other specified officials, see Chapter III, above.

Organizational Continuity and Expansion in OCD, 1951-1952

25X1A The next two years of General Smith's administration were, for the Office of Collection and Dissemination, first of all a period of expansion. Its staff almost doubled in size, from about [REDACTED] by early 1953, at a rate of growth somewhat greater than that of the production offices which comprised OCD's major group of customers.¹ To illustrate the increasing magnitude of OCD's reference problem, the total holdings of intelligence documents on file in OCD more than doubled in quantity between 1950 and 1953, reaching by February 1953 a total of something over a 25X1B [REDACTED] regularly classified intelligence reports,² exclusive of a sizable quantity of periodicals, top-secret and other specially classified reports, and other special categories of material of smaller bulk.

In several notable respects, it was also a period of organizational stability for OCD, in contrast with the major

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25X1B ² This figure is taken from the CIA Library's numerically arranged control card file, in which OCD's documentary holdings, serially numbered when accessioned, are recorded as having totalled about [REDACTED] items by October 1, 1950, and something over [REDACTED] items by the end of February 1953.

reorganizations which were occurring in most of the other components of the Agency. Thus, the decision to leave OCD intact, confirmed in December 1950, was allowed to stand by General Smith during the next two years, and by Mr. Dulles after him. Likewise, its status as one of the "intelligence" offices (rather than a member of the administrative group, for example), announced at the same time,¹ was reiterated in January 1952, when OCD and the production offices were re-grouped under a new, separate Deputy Director for Intelligence (DD/I).²

Continuity of leadership was another factor of stability in OCD between October 1950 and February 1953. Mr. James M. Andrews, who had been Assistant Director since the reorganization in May 1948 (and head of the Reference Center before that), continued in office under General Smith, and under his successor as well. Most of his principal assistants, except for his Deputy and a few of his division chiefs, were also men who had served with him during OCD's formative years. His Deputy, beginning in mid-1951,³ was [REDACTED] 25X1A who during the previous months had headed the Liaison Division; and his Executive was, first, [REDACTED] 25X1A and later (after about June 1952) [REDACTED] 25X1A both of whom had occupied positions of leadership in OCD since its beginnings in the

¹ General Order No. 38, Secret, Dec. 1, 1950, in CIA Records Center.

² Notice 1-52, Jan. 2, 1952, Secret, in CIA Records Center.

³ The position of Deputy AD/CD had been vacant for some months before.

Reference Center. There were also a number of changes among the division chiefs in 1951 and 1952. Again, most of them were not new appointments but the result of internal shifts and rotations of duty within OCD.¹

Nor was there any essential change in OCD's basic objectives, as they were outlined in the successive editions of the Agency's organizational manual between 1950 and 1953.² While there were further clarifications of OCD's specific jurisdiction over particular types of service (discussed below), its primary mission remained unchanged. As reiterated early in 1953, OCD had two interrelated responsibilities: to provide "central reference facilities for all components of the Agency"; and to provide "a central service for the coordination of intelligence requirements, the servicing of collection requests, and the dissemination of intelligence materials."

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¹ During the period 1950-1953 the divisions chiefs in OCD were as follows: The CIA Library was headed successively by [redacted] and (on his re-appointment as Executive of OCD in mid-1952) [redacted]; the Biographic Register, [redacted] and (in the spring of 1952) Mr. [redacted] the Industrial Register, [redacted], and (spring 1952) [redacted] the Graphics Register, [redacted] the Special Register, [redacted]; the Liaison Division, Capt. [redacted] (to April 1951), [redacted] (to summer 1951, when he became DAD of OCD), and [redacted] and the Machine Division, [redacted]. Two other principal assistants to the Assistant Director were [redacted] head of the Administrative Staff, and [redacted] the Operations Staff. (See OCD pamphlet, "Guide to OCD Facilities and Services...", Nov. 1950 edition and later revised pages, Secret; copies in O/DOI/HS files.)

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² See texts of Agency organizational manuals, July 1950, Jan. 1951, and March 1953, in Annex B, below.

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³ Ibid.

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This idea of centralization was further elaborated, and also further qualified, in the specific tasks outlined in OCD's charter. Its reference facilities were expected to insure that "all incoming positive foreign information and intelligence" was distributed, and that "the content of all available intelligence materials is immediately accessible to all offices of the Agency in support of intelligence production." These services, furthermore, were to be available as before to the Agency's operational and administrative components as well, and to "other agencies of the intelligence community to the extent possible." As a central clearinghouse for collection requirements, however, OCD's jurisdiction was less comprehensive. It was expected to handle only so-called "specific" requirements of the using offices (other than their "general" or "guide-type" requirements), and assign them to whatever collection agencies in or outside CIA were "best able to satisfy" them,¹ leaving "general" types of collection requirements as a matter to be handled by the Office of Intelligence Coordination.

*What about
foreign info?
mostly general*

The internal organization of OCD to meet these objectives underwent only a few changes between 1950 and 1953. Its central reference facilities included, as before, the CIA Library and the Biographic, Industrial, and Graphics Registers, and to those divisions was added, in 1951, a Special Register for handling communications intelligence. Each of them had various specialists, usually in separately organized sections and branches, for indexing

¹ Ibid.

informational documents and for undertaking reference and research on the accumulated material. The Machine Division, as before, provided those divisions with the apparatus with which their subject and other indexes were mechanically recorded and by which selections of documents could be rapidly located, listed, and reproduced for the using offices. In addition, the Machine Division shared responsibility with the DD/A's Organization and Methods Service for the further development and application of "machine techniques and special devices to problems of information control and bibliographic research."

The Liaison Division continued to be organized separately from OCD's reference divisions, but in practice its work was intimately related to their activities. It continued to have responsibility for the initial distribution of most categories of incoming intelligence documents received by CIA, numbering more than a thousand each day in 1951 and 1952. It handled specific collection requirements of the production offices that could not be met from OCD's accumulated holdings of documents or from existing files of other agencies accessible to OCD. Finally it provided a central control point for certain categories of Agency contacts with personnel of other Government agencies, and a central distribution point for the dissemination of CIA-collected and CIA-produced intelligence outside the Agency.

Although OCD's basic charter and its key personnel assignments underwent no major change between 1950 and 1953, there were a number of less conspicuous internal organizational changes beginning early in 1951, that were nevertheless significant in further clarifying OCD's jurisdiction as the Agency's central reference center. For example, the intra-agency distribution of current cable, radio, and airgram communications of the IAC member agencies was re-assigned from ONE to OCD, and that function was established as a separate Cable Branch in the Liaison Division early in 1951.

In June 1951 OCD's indexing jurisdiction (but not jurisdiction over collection requirements and dissemination control) was extended to special intelligence materials filed in OCD. In this move, a new division, called the Special Register, was established in OCD to provide indexing and reference service on those materials, on a compartmented basis but integrated as far as feasible with the standards and practices prevailing in OCD generally. As the other extreme of security sensitivity, OCD's Agency-wide responsibility for the procurement of books and periodicals was confirmed and clarified late in 1950, and by early 1951 a separate section for

¹ The Special Register, which had been established "the previous year," was transferred to OCD on June 21, 1951. (See draft history of OCD, undated, about May 1952, Secret, p. 8, in O/DCI/HS files.)

this activity was established in the CIA Library.¹ Finally, in the direction of accommodating the special reference needs of Agency components outside the production group, three separate branch libraries were organized in 1951, under the CIA Library's administration, as follows: one branch for the DD/P components (in K Building); another for the Medical Office (in Central Building); and still another for the new Office of Training (in Alcott Hall).² 1952
1953

The several examples of change and continuity in OCD between 1950 and 1953, outlined above, illustrate some of the internal and external aspects of OCD's development in General Smith's time, as part of the growing central organization for foreign intelligence. In seeking to provide centrally a variety of reference services, first to the production offices, next to the operational and administrative groups, and finally to the departmental intelligence agencies represented on the IAC, OCD (like the rest of CIA) was faced with the continuing problem of reconciling a quest for a theoretical ideal of centralization

¹ This function was re-centralized in OCD in December 1950. Previously "the various offices did their own ordering." (Ibid., p. 4.) In February 1951 the DD/A's Procurement Office assigned two employees (under its "administrative control" but under OCD's "operational control") to assist in "the processing of requests for library material." (See memorandum by Chief of Procurement to AD/CD, Jan. 30, 1951, Confidential, on meeting of the two offices on January 24, 1951, in DD/S file "OEM 5".)

² Two of these new branch libraries are mentioned in OCD history May 1952, p. 5, cited above. Still other reference libraries were informally maintained in the Operating offices outside OCD control.

with the fact that decentralization was the more normal pattern of operation in CIA and the IAC organization generally. The problem of central services in theory and in practice are further illustrated below, in relation to three fields, in particular, in which OCD had varying responsibilities and assets: collection requirements; dissemination control; and the indexing and storage of intelligence documents.

The Collection System and OCD, 1951-1952

The chief collection function of the Office of Collection and Dissemination, between October 1950 and February 1953 (as before), was to serve as a middleman between the actual collection agencies, mostly those controlled by the State and Defense Departments, and the intelligence production offices, particularly those in CIA. Conversely, there was no change in the several revisions of OCD's charter between December 1950 and March 1953, in the direction of giving OCD any continuing responsibilities for actual field collection.

While OCD's collection work was chiefly that of an intermediary between collector and producer, in practice it also undertook from time to time a number of ad hoc collection projects in the field. For example, late in 1950 OCD was authorized to send a survey and microfilming team to Western Europe to gather overt information on behalf of the Industrial and Biographical Registers,

from the files of U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department installations located there. This mission, which was successful in expanding OCD's basic files of biographical dossiers and industrial-plant data,¹ was followed by further attempts, in 1951 and 1952, to send similar "roving teams" on other subjects to particular locations in other parts of the world, so as to tap what OCD called "a large potential for overt collection" which neither the State

Department's [REDACTED] exploiting.² By the end of the period (February 1953), however, CIA had been unable to send further OCD missions overseas, largely because of the objections of the established collection agencies of the State and Defense Departments.³

The more normal collection function of OCD remained, therefore, the middleman operation, based in Washington, of serving CIA's collection requirements upon the departmental intelligence agencies. In this type of activity there was no basic change between 1950 and 1953, in OCD's broadly worded responsibility for the coordination of collection requirements, but the Agency's requirements system was reappraised and reorganized in various

¹ Report by AD/CD to DCI, Feb. 23, 1951, Secret, in O/DCI/ER, filed under "OCD."

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² Remarks by [REDACTED], DAD/CD, at DD/I staff meeting, April 22, 1952, in "IAD" minutes, Secret, in O/DCI/ER.

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³ Proposals by [REDACTED] DAD/CD, for an OCD "overseas overt collection function," summarized in OIC "Planning Book," early 1953.

details, beginning in January 1951, and OCD's jurisdiction in the system was further defined.

In the changes that followed, one major type of requirement (requirements for covertly collected material) was placed under a new inter-agency priority and coordination procedure.¹ Within CIA, certain direct relationships between the producing and collecting offices were recognized, and where middleman functions were necessary, they were re-divided between the Office of Intelligence Coordination (for "general" types of requirements) and the Office of Collection and Dissemination (for "specific" requirements), with certain exceptions assigned to still other offices.

The distinction between "specific" and "general" collection requirements was not an entirely new one. Up to 1950, jurisdiction along those two lines had been divided between OCD and the Coordination, Operations, and Policy Staff (COAPS), respectively. Operating under this arrangement, OCD's Liaison Division was handling (by October 1950) some 150 "specific" cases a month, of which about half were being passed on for action to the Agency's own field-collection components (OO and OSO), and the other half, to the collection components of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments.²

¹ The so-called Interagency Priorities Committee (IPC), established in July 1951 under the IAC to coordinate collection requirements levied on the clandestine operations components of CIA. See below.

² CIA "Statistical Summary", Oct. 1950, Secret, especially the unnumbered pages labelled "Liaison Division"; in O/DOI/ES files.

A typical "general" or "guide-type" requirement, on the other hand, was the collective statement of CIA's collection needs under the State Department's new "peripheral reporting system", for which COAPS had coordinating responsibility within the Agency in August 1950.¹

In practice there were exceptions and deviations from these established channels in 1950. With respect to "general" requirements, most of them were customarily handled outside CIA by the major collecting agencies themselves (notably the State Department and the three Service departments). Each of them prepared and periodically revised its own encyclopedic compilation of standing collection instructions to the field, with only occasional and marginal participation by COAPS.² Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its intelligence component (rather than COAPS) controlled the preparation of the priority list of "national intelligence objectives", in which general targets for collection were summarized for all intelligence agencies, including CIA.³

"Specific" requirements of CIA's using offices were also frequently levied outside OGD's coordination system. For example,

¹ Memorandum by DCI to all operating offices, Aug. 23, 1950, Secret, in O/DCI/HR, filed under "State Department". The difficulty of distinguishing between "general" and "specific" requirements is suggested by the fact that in an earlier draft of this directive (also dated Aug. 23, 1950; *ibid.*), the DCI had planned to ask OGD rather than COAPS to take responsibility for inter-office coordination of CIA's "peripheral reporting" requirements of the State Dept.

² See COAPS correspondence, in O/DCI/HR files.

³ See minutes of IAC meetings, 1950-53 *passim*.

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in 1950 the production offices (ORS and OSI) customarily passed some of their requirements directly to the departmental agencies in the form of requests for contributions to national intelligence reports under production in CIA.¹ Requirements on CIA's own collection agencies also frequently by-passed OCD. For example, in October 1950 only about 20% of the specific requirements submitted to the Office of Operations were channeled through OCD;² the rest evidently went directly to OO from the customer offices and agencies.

There were also several regularly established exceptions to this GOAPS/OCD division between general and specific requirements. With respect to certain specialized collection agencies, notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Armed Forces Security Agency, CIA's requirements on them (including in these cases both general and specific requests) were handled through altogether separate channels, by OSO, OSI, and the Advisory Council, respectively. Similarly, for both types of

¹ While requirements for "contributions" were essentially requests for research and analysis in existing files in Washington, they normally included specific questions that might only be answered by further field collection.

² In the CIA "Statistical Summary" for October 1950 (cited above), OCD reported having submitted 53 requirements to OO (see "Liaison Division" section), while OO reported having received a total of 276 requirements from all requesters in the same month (see "OO/Contact Division" section). As to covert collection requirements levied on OSO, OCD was the intermediary for 30 of them (*ibid.*), but OSO probably received requirements directly from other requesters as well, but no tabulation for OSO is included in this summary.

requirements, OCD had exclusive responsibility for dealings with non-IAC agencies of the Government which might be sources of foreign information.¹

With the liquidation of the Office of Reports and Estimates in November 1950 and the emergence of four separate production offices by January 1951, the need for inter-office coordination of their somewhat interrelated collection requirements took on a new urgency. The old question in a new organizational setting, how best to coordinate the needs of the producers, was referred for study jointly to the Office of Intelligence Coordination (successor to COAFS) and to the Management Staff.² Early in 1951 the Management Staff re-opened its proposal of July 1950, calling for a joint requirements staff for the several production offices,³ and in May and June 1951 this proposal was further modified in favor of an

¹ Requests to non-IAC agencies handled by OCD in 1950 represented a considerable activity, totalling 28 items in October 1950, compared with 72 requests levied by OCD on all the IAC member agencies combined. (See CIA "Statistical Summary" Oct. 1950, cited above, especially section labelled "Liaison Division.")

² OIC list of coordination projects, Jan. 27, 1951, attached to DCI staff conference minutes, 1950-53, in O/DCI/ER.

³ OIC "Status of Projects, Progress Report No. 2" March 5, 1951, in O/DCI/ER, filed under "OIC".

inter-office committee representing the production offices, to be called the National Requirements Board or the CIA Requirements Committee.¹

After several months of study, however, the pre-1950 pattern of requirements control was re-established in most of its essential features. General or continuing types of requirements would be channeled through the Office of Intelligence Coordination (successor to COAPS),² apparently without a formal committee,³ while specific or one-time requirements would be channeled as before through OCD. Exceptions to this procedure were the collection requirements intended for the FBI, the AEC, and the AFSA, for which the previously established special channels were continued, in OSO, OSI, and OCI, respectively. Requests on non-IAC agencies, finally, would be handled entirely through OCD.

¹ OIC, having met with the requirements officers of the several CIA offices, presented a proposal for a National Requirements Board at the DCI's staff conference on May 28, 1951. In a subsequent memorandum to the DCI, June 1, this proposed board was to be called the CIA Requirements Committee. (Minutes, May 28, June 1, 1951, and OIC Memo, June 1, 1951, in O/DCI/ER.)

² See Memo by OIC to DCI, June 1, 1951, cited above and IAC Progress report, June 12, 1951 (IAC-PR-11), Secret, in ONE files. For a time OIC had a separate "Collection Division" on its organization chart, but that Division was apparently never fully staffed. (See CIA organization charts of Jan. 1951 and March 1953, in Annex B, below.)

³ The CIA Requirements Committee evidently was active in June 1951, (e.g., see OIC memo of June 11, 1951, in O/DCI/ER), but later it seems to have been abandoned.

With these channels, however, the production offices also were given a greater degree of autonomy than had prevailed before. Their responsibility for initiating requests for information was generally agreed on in March 1951, as "an integral part of the responsibility for producing intelligence research,"¹ and their authority to have direct contacts with the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, in particular, was re-iterated by the Director in May, over the objections of the Assistant Director of OCD, who had objected that individual, direct contacts would result in departmental complaints of "duplication of liaison" by CIA.² Each production office established a requirements section, for coordinating the needs of its several research divisions and branches,³ and these requirements sections had the responsibility for presenting the total collection needs of their offices to OCD, to OIC, and to the Agency's two field-collection components (OO and OSO).

Most of the procedures and channels outlined above were addressed primarily to CIA's internal coordination problems. For at least one type of collection, however, that dealing with covertly acquired material, an inter-agency coordination mechanism was also

¹ OIC "Status of Projects" report, March 5, 1951, cited above.

² Minutes of DCI staff conference, April 4, 1951, SC-M-14, Secret, in O/DCI/ER.

³ OTR, for example, early in 1951 established a "Requirements and Control Division" to handle (among other matters) its interests in collection requirements. See remarks by Max F. Millikan, AD/ER, at the OTR orientation conference of Feb. 14, 1951; on disc recording, Secret, in OTR files.

worked out in 1951 under the guidance (initially) of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, and culminated in the establishment of an inter-agency subcommittee of the IAC, under the chairmanship of the Office of Special Operations.

The need for more selective and more specific requirements for covert collection action had been discussed in the Director's staff conference from time to time, early in 1951, and in March OIC undertook to prepare, experimentally and in collaboration with the production offices of CIA and other IAC agencies, a set of "priority targets" in terms of specific area and topical categories of information of high intelligence interest.¹ After several months of discussion, revision, and negotiation, the task of allocating priorities for clandestine collection action was established in a new subcommittee of the IAC, called first (in July 1951)² the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee, and later renamed simply the Interagency Priorities Committee (IPC).³ The Office of Intelligence Coordination was withdrawn as the office of primary concern for assembling covert collection requirements,

¹ See DCI Staff Conference Minutes, April 30, 1951, Secret, OIC Memorandum, March 28, 1951, Secret, in O/DCI/ER, and IAC Progress Report, May 8, 1951 (IAC-PR-12), Secret, in ONE files.

² Minutes of IAC meeting, July 26, 1951, IAC-M-36, Secret, in O/DCI/ER. The committee was also called at first the IAC Covert Requirements Committee. Ibid.

³ IAC progress reports, Aug. 1, Oct. 2, 1951 (IAC-PR-16, 18), Secret, in ONE files; and IAC-D-28/1, in O/DCI/ER.

except that it was given responsibility for internal coordination among CIA's production offices on such matters and the Office of Special Operations (rather than OCD or one of the intelligence production offices) was made chairman of the IPC.¹ The original charter as approved by the IAC on July 19, made IPC responsible both for assembling the priority needs of the several agencies and for "allocating" relative priorities among them,² but in the final version of the committee's functions (on July 26), the allocation function was reserved as a function of CIA's clandestine group to be exercised as a part of its normal operational responsibility for allocating clandestine resources to the most productive and feasible types of operations.³

With respect to CIA's other field collection organization, the Office of Operations, there were also some changes in the requirements system, in the direction of permitting closer contact between OO's collection control officers and the users of intelligence information in the producing offices. Beginning in June 1952, the Contact Division of OO was permitted to "by-pass" OCD's Liaison Division, and deal directly with the production offices,

¹ Minutes of DCI's staff conference, Aug. 15, 1951, SC-M-26, Secret, in O/DCI/ER files.

² Minutes of IAC meeting, July 19, 1951, IAC-M-35, Secret, in O/DCI/ER files.

³ Minutes of IAC meeting, July 26, 1951, IAC-M-36, Secret, in O/DCI/ER files.

particularly ORR and OSI. Under the revised system, OO expected to reduce what it called "the time lag experienced in the past in the receipt of . . . requirements through OCD," and hoped to be able "to interpret better the requirements for the [OO] field offices."¹

In summary, the character and extent of OCD's participation in the collection system between 1950 and 1953 varied from one type of material to another, from one type of collection source to another, and from one type of customer or using agency to another. In some cases, too, OCD's program for gathering information for intelligence production went under names other than "collection". The IAC document-exchange service of its Library, its extensive inter-library loan system, its book and periodical procurement operation, and the work of the analysts in the OCD Registers (for example, in discovering pertinent data "buried" in existing files throughout Washington) could all be regarded as phases of collection in the broader and more realistic sense of the term. The Liaison Division of OCD, on the other hand, with its numerous and varied contacts throughout the Government, both in and outside the IAC organization, remained as OCD's chief collection-control point and the Agency's chief contact point with the many overt collection sources throughout Washington. Finally, along with OCD's continuous program for promoting and stimulating better and fuller

¹ OO/C monthly operational report, June 1952, Secret, in O/DOI/HS files.

collection of documentary material for intelligence production, there was its parallel concern for dissemination, outlined further below.

Dissemination Policies and Channels, 1951-52

Dissemination represented both a positive obligation of the DCI and a system of negative controls to restrict the circulation of intelligence information on a need-to-know basis. Under the CIA statutes and under various NSC directives, the DCI and the member agencies of the IAC shared a common and continuing obligation to keep the policy and operational echelons of the Government informed with timely and accurate warnings and appreciations, and to insure the fullest exchange of pertinent information among the agencies participating in the production of intelligence. In a negative sense, dissemination also involved a policy of restrictions and controls to insure that the distribution of information was limited to those cleared personnel in the Government's security organization who needed to have the information for use in their assigned functions.

The Agency's dissemination channels, like the collection requirements system, had so many ramifications and relationships among the collecting and producing components, both those in the Agency and in the IAC organization generally, that it could not be said that the function was entirely centralized in any one office.

The Office of Collection and Dissemination came closest, however, to being the central control point for the external dissemination of CIA-produced intelligence reports and for the internal circulation of incoming "raw" reports collected from overt and covert sources by CIA and by the departmental intelligence agencies.

In broad outline, OCD's dissemination functions during the period October 1950 to February 1953 were not essentially different from those in the preceding formative years of the Agency.¹ Similarly, in a number of significant respects, responsibility for certain aspects of dissemination and for certain categories of material remained decentralized among other offices of the Agency. In a few cases, furthermore, responsibility for dissemination was shared by CIA with the departmental intelligence agencies.

Most types of CIA-produced intelligence reports came within the purview of OCD's dissemination system, and were distributed through channels operated by OCD's Liaison Division. There were several major series of reports so disseminated: the information reports on material collected by OO and OSO; the finished intelligence estimates, the current summaries, the intelligence surveys, and the economic, scientific, and topographic intelligence reports produced by ONE, OCD, OSI, and ORR; and the research reports, reference compilations, and bibliographical listings prepared by OCD's registers and central library.

¹ See General Order No. 22, "Dissemination of CIA Reports" July 21, 1949, Secret, and drafts of CIA Regulation R-50-7, June 22, 1953, in O/DCI/HS, filed under "OCD".

There were several major exceptions to this general rule of central distribution, for special types of reports produced by CIA, according to the practices prevailing in 1951 and 1952. The dissemination of maps, for example, was reserved to ORR's geographic-intelligence organization, Atomic energy reports were distributed by OSI and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, Special-intelligence reports were disseminated by OCD under inter-agency clearance channels established under the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board, while IAC Watch Committee warnings were circulated under special IAC-directed procedures. Counter-espionage reports on foreign intelligence services, produced by OSO, were also exempted from the OCD dissemination channels. Most of these exceptions stemmed from the fact that the reports were based on material of special security sensitivity.

There were also exceptions to the OCD dissemination procedure in favor of the producing offices. With respect to CIA-produced reports which represented coordinated inter-agency products, the producing offices normally disseminated drafts of their studies, directly and informally, to their co-workers among the IAC agencies, and occasionally they distributed advance drafts directly to the customer offices as well, such as to the NSC staff or to the other planning or operational offices which had requested the preparation of a particular report. Dissemination was implicit in the very processes of inter-agency research collaboration and implicit, too,

in the character of the Agency's "customer relations" with the planning and operational echelons of the Government which were being served by intelligence. While OOD was the central dispatching point and the central office of record for most of the finished reports produced under CIA leadership, basic decisions affecting dissemination were characteristically made earlier in the intelligence process. Questions affecting ultimate dissemination were implicitly decided, for example, when a research request was accepted in the first instance by the CIA production office, or when the report was actually drafted by that office, or when inter-agency agreement was reached on the substantive issues discussed and disclosed in the draft of an intelligence report.

The collection offices, likewise, were in a position to make dissemination decisions somewhat independently of OOD. All information secretly collected by OCO, for example, was subjected by that office to initial "sterilization" or "sanitization", before it was released for distribution by OOD, in order to conceal a specific source or to withhold specific information that might jeopardize secret operations. Similarly, the overt collection organization (the Office of Operations) had the prerogative of withholding information from circulation, in the interest of protecting its sources and methods.

Both of these collection offices, furthermore, had responsibilities for advance dissemination of priority material. At each

of CIA's overseas stations, the OSO component was expected to make advance disseminations directly to the ranking U. S. organization in that area, such as, for example, to the Foreign Service post

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██████████ or to the U. S. military occupation head-

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██████████ directly to the U. S. Senior Representatives in their areas, and to other U. S. organizations as well. The ██████████ also exchanged material directly (that is, "laterally") with the ██████████

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██████████ under various standing agreements. At the Washington headquarters, too, both OO and OSO (later the FI Staff) had special channels for making advance disseminations of especially urgent items, called "critical security items," to selected Defense and State Department message centers.¹ In still other types of cases, OO and OSO were authorized to by-pass OCD channels when "special source security or operational considerations make it inadvisable to use normal channels."²

Finally, there were variations in OCD's dissemination procedures for handling CIA reports to customer agencies outside the IAC and outside the Government's national security organization.

¹ Memorandum by AD/CD to DD/I, Oct. 16, 1953, Confidential, in O/DCI/ER, filed under "OCD".

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² Memorandum by ██████████ Planning and Coordination Staff, to Chief, Regulations Control Staff, Aug. 18, 1954, Secret, in O/DCI/IS, filed under "OCD".

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Thus, if a CIA-produced report or CIA-collected report was requested for or on behalf of government agencies not represented on the IAC or the NSC, the CIA Security Office had a voice in clearing the request. Somewhat similarly, if a CIA report was destined for the use of the 25X1C or some other friendly foreign government, or intended for an international body like 25X1C such cases were individually reviewed and cleared, beginning in January 1951, by the IAC.¹

For incoming material, too, OCD handled the largest bulk of the dissemination workload, and within OCD this workload was handled for the most part by the Liaison Division, with some assistance by the Library, especially with respect to the detailed logging and indexing of the material. Again, however, there were certain types of material that were handled through separate channels, controlled by other offices of the Agency. For example, incoming material in the form of departmental contributions to national estimates was received directly by ONE, continuing the practice established before 1950 by the Office of Reports and Estimates. Similarly, departmental research material especially assembled for the economic, scientific, and other topical intelligence reports sponsored by OER, OSI, and OCI was received directly from the IAC agencies concerned, and normally such special contributions were not circulated generally within the Agency by OCD. In all these cases, furthermore,

¹ See IAC minutes, 1951-53, *passim*, in O/DCI/ER files. Before 1951, this clearance job was handled jointly by the Office of Reports and Estimates and the Inspection and Security Staff.

the additional supplementary material that was frequently elicited orally by the production offices in the course of inter-agency conferences and discussions was also received without OCD logging and indexing, and hence without general dissemination throughout the Agency. Likewise, operational intelligence information obtained by the LD/P's clandestine group from other departments was not logged in through OCD and was handled, instead, by the Foreign Intelligence Staff (FI), from which the information was disseminated among the operational offices on a restricted, need-to-know basis. Finally, special types of material, notably that received from the National Security Agency, was circulated through separately secured channels controlled by OCI.

Both CIA's internal distribution channels and its external dissemination system for intelligence material took still other forms beyond the formal routing and dispatching that was characteristic of OCD's dissemination work. For example, informal dissemination was frequently achieved by oral briefings to the policy officers of the Government, and by means of liaison contacts among team members at work on inter-agency intelligence projects. Dissemination was also a function that was implicit in the very fact of OCD's growing accumulation of centrally filed intelligence documents, available generally to the entire intelligence organization.¹ These expanding documentary collections, along with the comprehensive

¹ Historical Staff interview with L. R. Houston, General Counsel, Nov. 17, 1955.

subject and area indexes to them, the bibliographical system for assembling and locating pertinent items in them, and the loan and copying service for achieving efficient circulation, all contributed to improving CIA's total dissemination apparatus. Although OGD's documentary system was normally described as a reference center rather than as a "dissemination" apparatus, it was probably the single most important dissemination tool for carrying out the Director's continuing obligation to insure exchange of intelligence information within the Government's security organization.

Documentary Reference Services, 1951-1952

The Agency's reference facilities for intelligence documentation, like its collection requirements system and its dissemination apparatus, remained centralized to a considerable degree in the Office of Collection and Dissemination during the period October 1950-February 1953. OGD's existing jurisdiction over the storage, indexing, and servicing of the Agency's ever growing accumulations of intelligence documents was first re-affirmed, in December 1950, and then extended, in 1951 and 1952, to include certain additional categories of material previously handled elsewhere in the Agency, and various measures were taken to make OGD's services more responsive to the needs of the rising offices.

Centralization was not the rule for all types of material, however. Certain categories of intelligence documentation remained

established, as before, under the control of particular production, operational, or administrative offices which had a special interest in the material on special responsibilities for safeguarding or exploiting it; and in a few cases certain new registers and libraries were established outside OOD for such special purposes. In balance, nevertheless, the concept of a central reference center managed by OOD was further advanced and developed during this period.

With this progress, finally, there occurred a further slow growth toward the acceptance of CIA's documentary centers as a "service of common concern" to the IAC organization generally. However, there was no organized move in the IAC or the NSC, for example, to discontinue or amalgamate any of the many separate departmental libraries and registers, nor was any formal directive issued to centralize any phase of the intelligence documentation process to CIA as a service of common concern. Nevertheless, the departmental intelligence agencies relied increasingly heavily on OOD's reference services, and some of them participated with OOD's staff in developing standard procedures, such as subject classification systems and exchange procedures, for better organizing and indexing intelligence documents from the viewpoint of the widening variety of clientele among the IAC agencies being served by OOD.

As part of the expansion of OOD in 1951 and 1952, three additional categories of documentary material were assigned to its reference jurisdiction: State and Defense Department cable and

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radio messages containing foreign intelligence information; communications intelligence material; and foreign-language books, periodicals, and newspapers. The first of these groups [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED], which had been handled previously by the Office of Reports and Estimates, was assigned for circulation, filing, and reference responsibility to OCD early in 1951, and established in its Liaison Division as a separate Cable Branch. In the second case, indexing and reference work on communications intelligence, which previously had been handled by the Advisory Council, was transferred to OCD later in 1951 and re-established in a new, separate division called the Special Register. Finally, as a result of surveys and negotiations begun in 1952 but not completed until the spring of 1953 when a new branch library was established, as part of the main CIA Library, the servicing of foreign-language publications, was re-assigned to OCD from OC's Foreign Document Division.

Other organizational changes in OCD's reference system were intended to make certain specialized parts of the holdings more directly accessible to specialized users. In particular, the CIA Library established separate branch libraries, in 1951 and 1952, to serve certain components outside the production group. One such branch was organized for the use of the Medical Office, in Central Building; another, for the new Office of Training, in Alcott Hall; and a third, for the primary use of the clandestine operations offices, in K Building. In a parallel move, meanwhile

the Library was able to elicit the cooperation of some of the using offices, chiefly in the production group, in participating directly in some of its day-to-day processing activities, especially in the abstracting of documents that contained highly technical details.

By 1953 OCD was able to report that, with the broadening of its jurisdiction, about 98% of the incoming "positive" intelligence documents regularly reaching the Agency were coming through OCD channels.¹ The concept of a central reference apparatus for all "positive" intelligence documents continued to exclude, of course, the extensive counter-espionage "notebook" files and the name-check files, maintained outside OCD under DD/P control.² Excluded, too, from OCD's jurisdiction were the relatively small but significant quantities of material characteristically regarded by the covert offices as "operational" material, as well as the several technical libraries maintained by DD/P's Technical Services Staff.

The production offices, too, regularly withhold certain categories of material from central processing by OCD, notably the numerous departmental contributions received for use in IAC-sponsored estimates, economic reports, and scientific studies

25X1A

¹ Historical Staff interview with [REDACTED], Executive, OCD, June 21, 1955.

² Ibid.; see also OSO report, "Role of CIA . . . in Collection . . .," Nov. 30, 1951, Top Secret, (TS #72247), in O/DCI/HS files.

produced by ONE, ORR, and OSI, respectively. The finished reports of those offices did, of course, regularly go to OCD for dissemination, indexing, and future reference, but the working materials remained in the production offices. Each of these offices, furthermore, maintained desk-side libraries and reading rooms for convenience of reference.¹

There were still other exemptions from OCD's central documentation system, in the work of the production offices. The Map Library, which had been located in the Office of Reports and Estimates since 1947, was transferred to ORR in December 1950,² where it continued to flourish with its own indexing, classification, and reference procedures and practices. In 1951, ORR established two additional specialized libraries, one for [REDACTED] and³ the other for "quantitative" data on the economy

¹ With respect to ONE's Reading Room, for example, see report of ONE's "ad hoc committee on the Reading Room," Feb. 27, 1953, Confidential, in ONE "Staff Memoranda" files.

² This move was consistent with the recommendations of the Dulles Survey Group in January 1949. On the other hand, however, the Eberstadt Task Force (of the Hoover Commission) had recommended that "some thought should be given to merging the map services . . . with the other reference facilities under the Office of Collection and Dissemination." See its "confidential" report, about Nov. 1948, p. 48, in O/DCI/ER.

³ [REDACTED]
June 1954. See ORR report, "Development of . . . ORR's" prepared especially chapter 3, p. 4; and CIA Regulation R-1-100, March 20, 1953, Secret.

of the Soviet Union.¹ In all of these cases, the files contained largely unique material not represented in OGD's central files, and the work of indexing and organizing the material was conducted in close coordination with the work of research and analysis, with the two types of responsibilities virtually combined as parallel tasks in the same production office.

Throughout the Agency generally other examples could be found of growing office files and accumulating desk-side libraries which served a particular section or branch and operated independently of OGD's central services. While these decentralized files were extensive in the aggregate, they were for the most part made up of duplicate material to be found in OGD rather than unique items. What made them unique was that the duplicates were selective (that is, on a particular subject), or they were specially organized and indexed for meeting a peculiar reference or research need. Whether these local files were technically duplicated or not, they nevertheless represented, in the aggregate, a space-consuming and time-consuming operation to maintain. In 1950 for example, OGD's holdings, already extending to some 25X1B file

¹ OGR's new "Economic Accounts Branch" was described, late in 1952, as constituting "the principal repository of quantitative economic data on the Soviet Bloc in the intelligence community." See OTR course outline for Agency Orientation Conference, Nov. 1952, Confidential, in O/DCI/HS files, and other stampings.

25X1B
cabinets in bulk, were paradoxically small in comparison to the some [redacted] cabinets held by the production, operational, and administrative offices.¹

While CIA's total holdings of intelligence documentation (this divided between OCD, and the production offices, and the operational offices) were extensive in bulk, they represented ultimately only a fraction of the available documentary information that might be useful or useable for intelligence work. The libraries and files outside CIA, some located elsewhere in the Government but most of them in private organizations on the outside, represented the larger bulk of source material of continuing potential value to U. S. intelligence. The approach to this kind of material was, in OCD, not to undertake extensive advance photocopying of all types of documents for all conceivable future needs, nor to undertake negotiations to acquire entire collections for future reference. Instead, the approach regarded as most feasible was to seek to understand, for example, where such collections were located, what types of useful information they contained, how they were organized and indexed, and how best they might be exploited on the basis of specific or continuing needs.

¹ CIA "Statistical Summary", Oct. 1950, Secret, especially subsection on Inspection and Security Staff. The production offices alone (ORS, OSI, and the Advisory Council at that time) accounted for some [redacted] file cabinets of material in comparison to [redacted] for OCD, while the operational offices (OO, OSO, and OPC) had documentary holdings totalling [redacted] cabinets, more than the others (above) combined. Ibid.

25X1B

This approach involved what in OCD was called resource surveys and bibliographical surveys, and was handled, principally, by a separate Resources Section, established in the CIA Library in 1952, and by the Graphics Register, previously established for keeping abreast of photographic and motion picture files.¹ The culmination of this survey approach was to develop a central bibliography and index room in the CIA Library, as an informational "nerve center" from which specific types of material could intelligently be ferreted out and requested. These bibliographical tools (primarily useful for exploiting material held outside OCD) and the punch-card indexes (useful for searching its own holding of documents), taken together, represented a degree of comprehensiveness in coverage not previously realized. This combined indexing apparatus, when used along with OCD's rapid-copying techniques (by "Intellofax" and by other more conventional photocopying methods) contributed much to OCD's growth as the Agency's principal documentary support organization.

The development of OCD's reference facilities as inter-agency support organization, available alike to the departmental intelligence agencies and to the CIA offices, was also advanced,

¹ The Graphics Register had its own pictorial files, built upon a substantial collection transferred to CIA by the State Department in 1948, but an equally important service was to locate and index pertinent items outside CIA in governmental and non-governmental collection generally, for future reference by CIA users.

between 1950 and 1953, but progress was made less by organizational change and formal directive than by a continuing CIA/OCD policy to proffer its services to the IAC member agencies, and to extend its assistance to them in all possible cases, limited only by priority demands for service from within the Agency. Under this policy, reaffirmed in January 1951 and March 1953,¹ there was no reference division in OCD that did not have an extensive clientele among the other agencies, and only in rare cases was it necessary to deny their requests because of priority demands within the Agency.

In certain phases of reference service, a number of attempts were made by CIA to formalize OCD's responsibilities to the other agencies, but in most cases no official agreements were reached nor any NSC directives issued, beyond continuing OCD's existing responsibility, under NSCID No. 8, for biographic work on foreign scientists. In August 1950, toward the close of Admiral Hillenkoetter's administration, studies were in progress to seek a NSC-approved charter for extending the Biographic Register's responsibilities to include non-scientific biographic subjects, and to strengthen the Industrial Register's jurisdiction so as to eliminate various duplicate files of industrial-plant data found to exist in other departments.² After General Smith became DCI, the problem of

¹ CIA Reg. 70, editions of Jan. 1951 and March 1953, in Annex B, below.

² "Introductory Statement" to CIA Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1952, Sept. 1, 1950, Secret, p. 17; attached to CIA Comptroller's "Historical Notes . . .," in O/DCI/NS files.

industrial-plant intelligence was evidently shelved as a matter of formal inter-agency discussion,¹ while the question of biographic intelligence was assigned to the Office of Intelligence Coordination to study, early in 1951.²

After a survey of the departmental facilities and a series of inter-agency discussions extending to September 1951,³ departmental agreement was reached to enlarge CIA/OIC's biographical responsibilities to include personalities "of economic concern", but the idea of "a completely centralized facility" was rejected as being "not at present practicable." The discussions revealed not only objections to centralization in one agency, such as CIA, but also difficulties, within a given department, in achieving even a limited centralization of all biographic and name-check files of a single department. Accordingly, the agreement was limited to expressing the hope, simply, that there might be "completely free access, subject only to legitimate security considerations . . . among the departmental biographic facilities,

¹ No evidence appears in the agenda or minutes of the IAC, between November 1950 and February 1953, to indicate that the Industrial Register's functions were discussed as an inter-agency matter. See IAC-D and IAC-H files, in O/DCI/ER.

² See OIC "Status of Projects, Progress Report" No. 2, March 5, 1951, Secret, in O/DCI/ER, filed under "OIC".

³ IAC monthly progress reports, Feb.-Oct. 1951, IAC-PR-6 to 18, Secret, in ONS files.

so that all the resources of the intelligence community will be exploited to meet the requirements of any department."¹

The further question, whether the general library in OCD should also be re-established as an IAC library of common concern, did not reach formal inter-agency discussion, either through OIC conferences or in IAC meetings.² In actual practice, however, the CIA Library was increasingly accepted by a growing clientele among the departments that regarded CIA as their primary reference center. In the case of the Air Force intelligence organization, informal agreement was reached by which Air Force documentation activities were substantially curtailed in favor of the CIA Library.³ Within the Library, and in OCD generally, the policy prevailed of serving all departments to the extent possible, and of soliciting their views for improved service. Some thought was given to inviting departmental representatives to be stationed in OCD, who would (according to William H. Jackson, the DDGI)⁴ thereby be able to provide "adequate representation" of the departmental customers. Informal consultation without personnel changes was, however, the rule followed in 1951 and 1952.

¹ IAC-PR-18, Oct. 2, 1951, Secret, in ONE files.

² See IAC-D and IAC-M files, in O/DCI/ER. 25X1A

³ Historical Staff interview with [REDACTED], Executive, OCD, June 21, 1955.

⁴ W. H. Jackson, undated paper (about Oct. 1950), "A Discussion of the Functions and Responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency" unclassified, p. 14, in O/DCI/HS files.

The question of centralizing documentary reference facilities, nevertheless, remained an open one. In February 1953, General Smith acknowledged the problem for the first time in his progress reports to the NSC, and ventured a number of conclusions and aspirations for the future.¹ He found that "with a few exceptions" all positive intelligence information was being distributed "among all interested IAC agencies," but that "the sheer volume of these materials presents formidable and as yet unsolved problems." No agency, he reported, was yet in a position "to record and store all this material and to make the information contained therein readily available to analysts requiring it." He did express the hope, however, that "current plans for improving central reference facilities" as well as further development of machine-indexing techniques, might provide the answer.²

A somewhat different view toward centralizing reference facilities was expressed later, by the Clark Committee of the Hoover Commission, in a review which was based in part on the CIA and IAC experience by 1953.³ Both CIA's libraries and those in the departmental intelligence agencies were found to be "efficiently

¹ DCI progress report to the NSC "The Foreign Intelligence Program," Feb. 6, 1953, documents No. IAC-D55/3/3 (final), pp. 12-13.

² Ibid.

³ Recommendations on "Intelligence Libraries," pp. 65-66 of public version of Clark Committee's report, "Intelligence Activities" published in June 1955 by the Hoover Commission (the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.)

operated," and to be benefited by "workable" exchange relationships if not by standard subject-indexing systems. A single central library, however, was rejected by the Hoover Commission, not because of objections of the departmental libraries but because of the expected resistance of the customer-analyst groups. A central library, the Commission said, "would foster the development of private desk-side libraries and the retention by individuals of material for protracted periods, with the resultant denial or delay in access to others" of the material needed.¹

¹ Ibid.