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*REVISED
BY JBL*

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A. The Liaison Function

Throughout their histories, the Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) and its forebears performed two basic functions: liaison and reference. These functions were conceived together during the earliest planning for the Central Reference Group (CIG), and they were considered vital to the proposed development of the new central intelligence concept.

Operating in tandem from the time of their inception, the liaison activities (requirements, collection and dissemination) in effect sustained the reference function, which was embodied in the original Reference Center. The latter was envisioned as a focal point where the intelligence officer would find "all" of the pertinent information bearing on a given problem. The liaison function, on the other hand, represented the beginning of the requirements-collection-dissemination-reference cycle.

1. Background

When President Truman established the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and the CIG under a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in January 1946, he directed the DCI to correlate and evaluate intelligence "relating to national security" and to assure appropriate dissemination. 1/ The principal actions thus required to execute the basic directive were collection (both in the field and from the files of other agencies), evaluation and dissemination. Two of these actions--collection and dissemination--were embodied in the liaison function. In other words, someone must determine what information was needed by the intelligence producers, assure that it would be collected for them, and see to it that it reached them.

2. OC and OD

To carry out these activities, the DCI, General Vandenberg, established the Office of Collection (OC) and the Office of Dissemination (OD) as two

of the first four offices of CIG created in July 1946 to provide centralized "services of common concern." 2/ Both Offices were directly under the DCI but operated "within the cognizance" of the Interdepartmental Coordination and Planning Staff (ICAPS).

The Office of Collection was responsible for collecting intelligence "required for the production of strategic and national policy intelligence" by the Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE--later Office of Reports and Estimates) and for coordinating the collection of necessary foreign intelligence with other government agencies. The Office of Dissemination was to assure proper distribution of the "strategic and national policy intelligence" produced by ORE. (Responsibility for disseminating the flow of incoming intelligence documents from the other intelligence agencies was assigned later.)

At first neither Office was involved in "collection" and "dissemination" in the sense in which the

terms are traditionally understood in the profession-- that is, actually collecting information in the field and deciding to whom the intelligence should or should not be disseminated. Rather, the "collection" activity had to do with broad planning and coordination within the U.S. intelligence collection apparatus, while "dissemination" was similarly concerned with broad decisions reached on an interagency basis regarding permissible distribution of evaluated national intelligence. In short, liaison activities were treated as unique types of interagency coordination, an activity supervised in general by ICAPS.

The first detailed CIG organizational charts, issued in July 1946, show the "tentative organization and functions of the components of CIG down to and including the branch level." ^{3/} The scope of responsibilities assigned to OC_A ^(Figure 1) and OD_A ^(Figure 2) on these charts is rather surprising and, as it developed, were quite short-lived, particularly with regard to the former.

The Office of Collection had six branches. Two, the Information Control Branch (OC's Message Center for receiving and distributing raw intelligence) and the Personnel and Administration Branch, were supervised by the Executive. In addition, there were four operating branches, one each for Security, Requirements, [redacted] and "Special Intelligence." Thus, in addition to the basic requirements and collection activities, the original OC was assigned broad security powers,* including, but not restricted to Top Secret Control and custodianship of registered documents; responsibility [redacted] and vaguely defined activity in the field of "Special Intelligence."

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The Office of Dissemination had three branches: Distribution, Intelligence Control, and Surveys and Reports. The first of these handled mail and reproduction services. The Intelligence Control Branch applied to dissemination the "over^{all}fall

*For example, the Security Branch's primary responsibility was to prescribe "such information controls, counterintelligence measures, and overall security measures as may be required to secure the operations of the CIG."

security measures prescribed by the Security Branch of the Collection Office"--for example, authentication of document classification and security control of dissemination procedures. The main job of the Surveys and Reports Branch was to assist ORE, primarily in the dissemination of evaluated strategic and national policy intelligence produced by the latter office. The Branch was also assigned, ^{Notes} inter alia, responsibility for the maintenance of an "intelligence operations room" and a briefing and presentations capability.

Personnel records for both Offices are incomplete for the period. The Acting Assistant Director

for Collection was [redacted] and

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25X1A9A [redacted] was assigned to the Security

Branch, presumably as Chief. Navy Capt. [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted] was the Acting Assistant Director for

Dissemination. Other key personnel assignments

to OD included Army Colonel [redacted] 25X1A9A [redacted] 25X1A9A

25X1A9A [redacted] [redacted]

initial CIG assignment in February 1946 had been

that of Acting Assistant Chief of the Central Planning Staff, predecessor of ICAPS.) Both operations were housed in what was then known as the "New" War Department Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, N.W., the site of today's State Department headquarters building.

Such were the functions and organizational structures of the original Offices of Collection and Dissemination as officially described in July 1946. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the Offices actually got under way in executing all the functions initially assigned to them. Possibly, some were never more than "paper assignments." The charts themselves, as well as the Administrative Order to which they were attached, were labeled "tentative." The Administrative Order further declared that

Because of limited personnel presently available, the Office of Collection and the Office of Dissemination...activities will necessarily be restricted largely to planning for future operations. 5/

Single
Space

One month later, another Administrative Order setting forth the "Interim Policy and Procedure for Dissemination" still specified that ORE would continue to disseminate its own intelligence products until OD had obtained sufficient personnel to function adequately. 6/

Personnel orders attest to the assignment of people and rooms and daily security check duties, but whether the Offices actually achieved an operational mode cannot be determined. They remained in a constant state of change, and within a relatively short period they lost many of their originally assigned functions and finally their separate identities as well.

The first change concerned OC's relationship to the Office of Special Operations (OSO). Included in OC's Statement of Mission was the following:

Single

In conjunction with [ICAPS] and [OSO], conducts constant research into the field of collection of information and recommends new means, methods and techniques for improving the overall intelligence coverage by U.S. governmental collecting agencies. 7/

The original clandestine services people would have none of this, however. They considered their collection operation sacrosanct. As a result, a change order appeared in August 1946 that deleted the words "and the Office of Special Operations" from the OC statement of mission. 8/

3. A Single OCD Emerges

On 10 September 1946, presumably because management had recognized as artificial the administrative barrier separating the two closely aligned functions, the Offices of Collection and Dissemination and all their functions were merged into a single

Office of Collection and Dissemination. 9/
Excepted from the merger were the functions of
the former OD "pertaining to maintaining an operations
room, and briefings and presentations in connection
therewith," which were transferred to ORE.

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STATINTL later, OCD lost the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and the Security Branch.

The former was transferred to the newly activated
Office of Operations (OO) in October 1946. 10/
The latter was abolished in July 1947, and its
functions were transferred to the Executive for
Inspections and Security (I&E). 11/ Left unexplained
by available documentation is the nature and fate
of the original OC's Special Intelligence Branch.

The mission of the new OCD was generally
the same as before, although, in retrospect, it
appears to have been made slightly more realistic.
It was as follows:

Summary

To determine the collection and dissemination requirements for strategic and national policy intelligence information and intelligence; and to formulate and supervise the implementation of operating plans, policies and procedures in connection therewith. 12/

The new Office was subdivided into three functional branches. The Requirements Branch was responsible for determining what each agency wanted to know; the Collection Branch assigned field collection responsibility; and the Dissemination Branch assured proper distribution of ORE-produced intelligence.

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[redacted], the former OD chief, was named the first Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination (AD/CD). His Deputy (DAD/CD) was

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[redacted] also from OD. [redacted]
the only holdover from OC, was named to head the

new Collection Branch, and ^{25X1A} [redacted] of OD,
the Requirements Branch. The Dissemination Branch
was set up under ^{25X1A} [redacted], who had originally
been assigned from State to CIG and slotted as
the Acting Administrative Officer. ^{25X1A} [redacted]
Chief of the former OC, was reassigned to the
Office of the Director and shortly thereafter
returned to the War Department.) 13/

4. The Fledgling's Role

The Office had emerged from its incubation stage and was struggling to solve the problems inherent in all newly achieved operational capabilities. Not surprisingly, the most immediate collection and dissemination problems involved OSO and OO. Especially irritating to OSO, for example, was the fledgling OCD's habit of simultaneously levying collection requirements upon overt and covert sources. OSO rightfully held that overt possibilities (nonclandestine overseas sources as well as headquarters files) should be exhausted before their limited

covert resources were approached. Among other matters worrying both OSO and OO was the ever-present danger of having one of their sources compromised by OCD Collection Directives levied on other agencies concerning reports that had originated with OO/Contacts Branch (OO/CB) or OSO.

A more basic problem, however, was defining OCD's role in collection and dissemination--particularly with regard to the latter. From the outset, OCD's collection function was generally understood to be one of broad planning and coordination with respect to the government's intelligence collection system--i.e., a liaison activity--rather than direct involvement in field collection. In other words, OCD was a middleman allocating responsibility for field collection of required intelligence.

There were, however, officially recognized exceptions to even this rather mundane role. OSO dealt directly with the FBI and other counterparts

and would, in fact, accept from OCD only requirements of demonstrated importance that could not be collected through overt channels. Similarly, OO often bypassed the OCD mechanism and worked directly with its own sources, as would the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) a short time later. Moreover, even within the "middleman" sphere, OCD's authority was dichotomized in that it handled only "specific" collection requirements. Responsibility for "general" or "standing" types of requirements belonged to ICAPS.

The dissemination role of OCD was surrounded by confusion from the beginning. To avoid another Pearl Harbor, the National Security Council (NSC) had placed a positive obligation upon the DCI to keep the policy and operational echelons of the government informed with timely and accurate warnings through the fullest exchange of information. This was basically a positive charge devoid of exceptions. Thus, the CIG Administrative Order that, in August 1946, set forth an interim policy for the dissemination of CIG-produced intelligence,

in effect directed that all such intelligence would be disseminated by OCD "in close collaboration with ORE and interested offices and staffs." 14/ The intelligence dissemination principle, however, also implied a negative system of controls to safeguard the information. The Administrative Order had also stated that desirable changes would be made to meet organizational requirements. The "interested offices and staffs" began pressuring for the "desirable changes"--i.e., negative controls to safeguard the intelligence to be disseminated.

In the process that would take place over the next few years, OCD's role as a disseminator of "all" intelligence would change to that of disseminator of only that intelligence that could safely be disseminated on a "need to know" basis. The function moved toward decentralization. Offices such as OSO and OO naturally wanted to protect their sources and methods, and their material was "sanitized" prior to dissemination, or, as in the case of the former's counterespionage reports, withheld altogether.

Within a short period of time, many other types of reports would be exempt from the OCD changes. Nonetheless, most types of Agency-produced reports, as well as the largest bulk of incoming material, came within the purview of OCD's dissemination system. Dissemination, even with all the exceptions, rapidly became the largest and most meaningful of OCD's functions. It was, in fact, soon described as "the single most important tool for carrying out the Director's continuing obligation to insure exchange of intelligence." 15/

Dissemination was to remain an OCD function long after the other two original activities-- requirements and collection--had been transferred to other offices.* Given the broad and ill-defined terms of its original mandate, and the fact that only some of the functional conflicts were essentially resolved during its first year of operation, OCD

*Domestic collection (from U.S. Government sources) went to OO/CD in July 1961; the requirements function to the Collection Guidance Staff (CGS), O/DDI, in June 1963; and the remaining pure liaison activities to CGS and the [redacted] (formerly OO) in January 1967.

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came to be recognized simply as an intermediary between the collector and the producer;* and as a distribution center within CIG and a central clearing house for the routing of intelligence within the government.

By early 1947, then, the operation in the new OCD had settled down as much as any operation could in that early, tumultuous period. If the Office's mission was more plebeian than was originally envisaged, its services were nonetheless vital to the government's new centralized intelligence operation. In January 1947, when General Vandenberg presented his yearend report for 1946 to the NIA, he highlighted, among other things, the increasing workloads of OCD's Collection and Dissemination Branches. He noted that the former was already handling collection requests from seven government agencies in addition to the internal CIG requests and that the other agencies had "come more and

*There would be minor exceptions in the future when, as in 1950 and 1955, OCD was to engage in direct field collection by sending survey and microfilming teams to Western Europe to collect overt industrial and biographic information.

more to call on [OCD] to assist in locating and supplying their required intelligence material." 16/

5. Early Growth

By March 1947 the Office's on-board strength stood at 43, against an authorized ceiling of 61, 17/ and in June Admiral Hillenkoetter's first report to the NIA emphasized CIG's (that is, OCD's) expenditure of "much time" for the coordination of U.S. collection efforts "through clearing house arrangements and central reading panels." 18/ At about this time--mid 1947--OCD's by now noticeably lumbering operation was moved from the War Department location on 21st Street to South Building in the 2430 E Street, N.W., complex and to M Building on 26th Street, N.W., near Constitution Avenue. 19/

Intense recruitment and training programs were beginning to alleviate OCD's staffing problem, though the Branches were still hard pressed to keep up with the rapidly mounting volume of business. Throughout the second half of 1947, personnel and work statistics continued to climb. By October

the on-board strength had risen to 62 and the authorized ceiling to 73. 20/ In the same month the Office received about 325 Requirements, compared to 175 in August, and it issued almost 400 Collection Directives against the August total of 250. 21/

B. The Reference Function

If the basic mission of the new intelligence concept for centralization of the national security alarm system was to collect intelligence and make it available to the estimators, then the very fact of availability presupposed the existence of an information storage capability--that is, a reference center. Thus, in establishing CIG, President Truman also directed the new department to perform "such services of common concern as...can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." 22/ One of the services intended--along with the more glamorous covert activities--would logically be a reference service, and five months later, in the first DCI's June Progress Report to the NIA, 23/ the center is identified by name for the first time--by the first of several names, in fact. Specifically, Admiral Souers included a "Central Register of Intelligence Information" as one of the nine problems "for which immediate solutions are well advanced" and which could be more efficiently operated centrally by CIG.

1. Design of a Reference Center

The "immediate solution" of the policy planners had been to assign to ORE responsibility for developing the center, and in August 1946, ORE's first Administrative Order 24/ in part directed its Executive Staff to "prepare for the earliest practicable activation of the projected...Intelligence Library"-- characteristic terminology of a time when the reference center concept envisioned a "total library" containing information for all intelligence purposes.

The CIG planners rightfully considered the creation of such a reference center a vital part of the system. They also recognized the problem that faced them in determining the nature of the beast to be developed--that is, either a system that guaranteed access to the files of participating agencies; or a common library where, in fact, all national security intelligence would be deposited; or a compromise arrangement according to which required intelligence would be released at the holder's discretion. In other words, would it be an interagency effort operated for the benefit of all concerned or a CIG-oriented system developed

within the context of "correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence [by ORE]"? At the policy level, early signs indicated a preference for the latter.

Such policy matters notwithstanding, the practical planners* who were designing the reference center were faced with a task for which there was no precedent or experience upon which they could draw. The problems were formidable, and the solutions had to be created, not borrowed. For a library of such hitherto unknown complexity, for example, the chore of systemizing the mass of information for specialized control was, in itself, almost overwhelming.

It is not particularly surprising that the Central Planning Staff had elected to place the reference activity in a production office such as ORE as a secondary function rather than make it an independent office as they had done with collection and dissemination. First, it probably

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* [redacted], an ORE senior officer and later Executive, OCD, and [redacted] O/DCI Adviser for Organizational Management, were primarily responsible for planning the reference center.

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did not seem illogical at the time to assign such a support function to the office that it was primarily intended to support--although this fact in itself would later prove detrimental to the center's development. Further, the assignment of the activity to ORE was regarded, at least theoretically, as temporary in nature. Witness the ORE Instruction that stated that:

This Reference Branch will be a temporary responsibility pending organizational development and availability of space for later efficient independent operation of a CIG Reference Center. 25/

Simple

Placement notwithstanding, in October 1946 there appeared the first official definition of the proposed reference center--almost indirectly, as it were. [REDACTED]

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abroad.* As part of the new operation, the Directive required the DCI to establish within the "Center Register a contact register of all existing and future business...contacts, from which clearances must be obtained by participating agencies before new contacts are approached." The Directive thus secondarily established the Contact Control Register, which would remain a part of the reference complex for about two years, and also defined both Registers.

The Central Register, that is, the reference center, was defined as:

A file to be established by and in the Central Intelligence Group in which will be recorded--in a form mutually agreed upon--the location, nature, reliability, etc., of all foreign intelligence information related to the national security in the possession of and acquired by the government. The

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general function of the Central Register is to provide a central and easily administered means of facilitating access by one agency to information in the physical possession of another agency and the exchange of valuable information by and between authorized agencies.*

The ~~statement~~ statement of mission is interesting in retrospect--not simply because it represents the first definition of the new reference center but more because its wording presaged a problem that would concern the early policy planners. The main thrust of the first mission description, particularly in its final sentence, clearly implies that the Register was envisioned as a common effort operated by and for all agencies. Influencing the CIG planners, however, was the increasing

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*The definition was proposed by Harry [redacted], then Assistant Director for Collection (see page [redacted]), apparently in response to a request from Commander [redacted] originally on the Central Planning Staff, for suggested definitions of terms used in a draft of the [redacted]. 28/
[redacted] was one of the prime architects of OO's Contact Branch.

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conviction that the reference center should be maintained primarily by and for CIG; that is, operated within the context of ORE's "correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence," with secondary service to other agencies. It was the latter philosophy that would shortly prevail.

At any rate, by January 1947, in the same 1946 Yearend Report to the NIA 29/ in which he highlighted OCD's increasing interagency activities, General Vandenberg was also able to state that

The administrative preliminaries to the creation of an interagency reference center have been underway for some time. Delays have resulted from my desire to initiate the project only when adequate and competent personnel are available, but several related projects which have been given consideration have been so developed that when the time

Swiftpace

comes they will easily fall into
the Reference Center pattern.
Among these are the Biographic
Data Compilation Plan, the Central
Contact Register...and Intelligence
on Foreign Industrial Establishments.

The "administrative preliminaries" had begun,
of course, during CIG's initial structuring phase
in mid-1946 when the CPS had established the first
four operating offices and had placed the reference
element in one of them--that is, as the Reference
Branch of ORE. Recruitment of key officers to
design the center was begun in the late summer
of 1946, and [redacted] was brought back
to CIG* from State Department in November--this
time permanently. 30/ He was assigned to ORE
and given the job of developing the reference
center. At the same time, ICAPS was working to

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[redacted] had previously been with CIG for
about three months. In February 1946, he was
detailed, with two others from State and six from
the War and Navy Departments, to man the hastily
formed Central Reports Staff and prepare the
President's Daily Summaries. [redacted] subsequent
selection for the reference center assignments was
undoubtedly influenced by his prewar EAM work with
New York's Museum of Natural History and his OSS
wartime experience.

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resolve interagency problems, including those involved in reference center planning, such as development of a coordinated biographic intelligence plan; acquisition and centralization of data on foreign industrial establishments (the "FIE plan"); and a programmed study by library and business machine experts (when recruited) to design an "interagency filing system and reporting manual." 31/

A planning staff was gradually being assembled to design the new facility within ORE, and among the key personnel first recruited were [redacted]

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[redacted] joined CIG in November 1946; [redacted] and

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[redacted] in March 1947. Before the close of 1946, the staff had been bolstered by the addition of four cleared IBM specialists, who were brought in as consultants. 32/ Since the main emphasis of the early planners was on mechanization of a "super library," the group would thus also be staffed with experienced librarians, such as Joseph Becker, Chief Librarian of OO's Foreign Document Division (FDD), who would join the staff in June 1947.

As we have seen, the planners' mission was to design a truly centralized reference facility where, for the first time, an intelligence officer could find any type of information necessary to conduct any kind of intelligence operation--in other words, a "total library." A further requirement was that it be as completely mechanized as possible, not only to handle the large volume of incoming intelligence material but to assure the requesting officer of prompt all-inclusive retrieval.

During the early planning stage, the staff, quartered in Q Building, wrestled with the fundamentals of organization and procedures. Immediately apparently to them was that there existed no such "total" reference facility--either within or outside the government--which was even remotely similar in extent to the one they had been directed to design. Many reference facilities were in operation, but they were all narrow in scope and parochial in content; they served one master, not an entire community of diverse users. Storage and retrieval mechanization, where it existed at all, was relatively

primitive. In short, there was no precedent to follow, no model from which to borrow. Whatever was developed by the staff would have to be created. Theirs would be the prototype.

It also quickly became evident to the planners that the information storage and retrieval requirements of the proposed reference center were too complex for a single library--both for effective management and for conventional library indexing systems. They therefore decided that there should be a central repository for traditional library materials and a series of semiautonomous "satellite" libraries for specialized materials containing biographic, industrial, photographic and domestic contact data; that all would be machine-controlled to the maximum extent possible; and that all would be under single management.


There thus evolved, at first on paper, an initial organizational structure of an Intelligence Documents Division (Library), a Contact Control Register (CCR), a Biographical Intelligence Register

(BIR), a Foreign Industrial Register (FIR), a Graphic Materials Division (GMD), and, providing machine support to all, a Central Index. In addition, there would be the Executive and Coordinating Staffs.

2. Initial Organization

On 1 January 1947 the CIA Library, then known as the Intelligence Document Division, was organized. The Central Index (later the Machine Techniques Branch and then the Machine Division) came into being on 17 March, and the Industrial, Graphics and Biographics Registers were in operation by June. (Figure 3)

Because the proposed mission of the Reference Branch was to receive, classify, record, prepare for retrieval and file all incoming intelligence material, work had also begun on developing systems and procedures. The incoming volume of the material was so heavy and the media diversification so great that the problem of systemizing the mass of information was, in itself, a formidable task. In essence, the diverse types of media had to be sorted out and a coding system developed.



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Since the system had to cover a wide range of subjects of interest to the entire community, the group set out to adapt to its purposes portions of extant classification schemes--mainly the War Department's Basic Intelligence Directive (BID), which was not a storage and retrieval coding system, per se, but rather a guide for field collection of intelligence. At the outset, the group sought to design, as directed, an "interagency filing system" and worked with representatives of other departments, but the intransigence* of the latter, their unwillingness to adapt to a common system, made the effort increasingly fruitless. Although it was to take more than a year, the planners eventually developed the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC)--a classification system for coding the area and subject content of intelligence documents. *italics*

*Something less than a willingness to cooperate frequently characterized the attitudes of the other departments during CIG's formative period. In a December 1946 report to the Chief of ICAPS, one of the CIG members frankly stated that many of the difficulties encountered by ICAPS representatives' uncertainty regarding CIG's permanence and [then] ill-defined mission; lack of vision by some subordinates who feared transfer of functions to CIG would jeopardize their own positions; the fear of service departments to surrender important operations to a quasi-civilian organization; and frequent changes in policy of IAC members as announced at ICAPS meetings. 33/

Simultaneously, the machine specialists were working to mechanize the system, seeking a solution that would combine the advantages of IBM punch cards and rapid electronic reproduction of document descriptions. The Finch Telefax equipment (a facsimile printer) supplied the missing element, and the planners began the development of what would become the CIA Intellofax System. The system permitted machine retrieval of data from the files through the medium of Faxcards--that is, an IBM card, code-punched according to the ISC for subject and area, upon which a description or abstract of the document had been printed, and which was delivered to the searcher in the form of a continuous Intellofax Tape.

It would take until July 1949 before the system would become fully operative, but the ground-work was laid by the early planners. Similar classification systems and internal operating procedures had to be developed for each of the specialized libraries--or registers. Procedures were designed to redirect the heavy flow of incoming

intelligence documents through the processing machinery of the Reference Branch. (All incoming material was then being routed by OCD's Dissemination Branch to ORE's "Information Center" for distribution.)

The arbitrary placement of CCR in the Reference Center at the beginning probably resulted from two factors: the availability of CIG's only business machine capability in the Center and [redacted] previous exposure to the "contact" business.

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After V-E Day in mid-1944, [redacted] then with the General Staff Corps,* had been recruited by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to set up West Coast offices and conduct a "Survey of Foreign Experts"--that is, to locate organizations and individuals in the Western States with knowledge of Far Eastern countries and to index their capabilities. As a result of the operation, a file of some 10,000 5"x8" cards was amassed, each of which indexed, among other things, the source's area, language and professional knowledge. After the war, ^g _f

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a complete set of the cards was placed in the OSS Archives, 34/ and it was a selected portion of these cards that became the base for CCR's files. It is not so surprising, then, that the contact control operation was initially placed in the new Reference Center--partly, one would assume, because of [redacted] experience and the enthusiasm he had conveyed to [redacted] but most certainly because the "index" would thus become part of the Center's vaulted machine controls.

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Actually, at the time there was no other place to put the activity. It was very shortly afterward, however, that OO/CB was established (October 1946), and the battle was joined. Where the mission of OO/CB was to "open up" US organizations in order to tap the flow of intelligence information from their foreign representatives, CCR's job in OCD was to machine index for rapid

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[redacted] had left the General Staff Corps to become the first Special Assistant to the [redacted] for Research and Intelligence. In an April 1946 memorandum to the DCI, [redacted] became one of the few to urge that the United States continue its wartime domestic collection effort.

retrieval the information producing capabilities of the individual sources involved. From the outset, this functional dichotomy was anathema to the officers of OO/CB's Field Division. In their opinion, no one except themselves, apparently not even their own headquarters people, could properly protect the identities of their US sources. As later noted by the Contact Division's historian,

it was obvious...that the field officers would never consent to the inclusion of their sources' identities in an index available to all of the outside intelligence agencies; or, to venture into a completely different area of dispute, to other elements of CIA. 35/

The contact control index, or CCR, remained in OCD for two more years before the OO/CB position prevailed and the operation was transferred out of OCD and absorbed by OO/CB.

3. Growing Pains

As the planning continued, the Reference Branch staff grew slowly--painfully so--and as personnel reported for duty, they were assigned to one of the Branch components. A skeletal organization was gradually developed, and the literally few people in the library and each of the Registers began putting the untried plans into operation. Internal procedures and proposed systems had to be tested and improved. Bases of information, upon which to build the centralized reference repositories, had to be developed.

To a very considerable extent, the new staff members achieved these objectives by visiting every similar organization, both governmental and private, that they could identify. In each instance, systems and procedures were studied to determine their possible applicability to the partly developed CIG reference system. More important, such visits helped accelerate the establishment of data bases. Many of the parochial files that

were reviewed were integrated into the Reference Branch data base, either by indexing the material and storing it on machine cards, or by outright transfer of the hard-copy file to the central collection. Biographic data in both forms, for example, was obtained from the Department of State and the Service Departments.

Library equipment and collections, either in whole or in part, were obtained from numerous government libraries, such as the Library of Congress, and from such unlikely sources as the Civilian Production Administration of the Office of Housing Expediter. Similarly, the industrial and graphics specialists added sizable increments to their data bases as, for instance, the entire OSS photo collection, which GMD inherited from State. While the EAM and systems experts accompanied the substantive specialists on their visits to other government agencies, their efforts were concentrated on private industry, investigating all possibly applicable electrical, electronic and photographic hardware. In some cases, shelf items were applicable. In other cases, necessary equipment was created or converted from available models.

In short, the activity of the earliest Reference Branch personnel was hectically multifaceted. Newly arrived upon the scene, they simultaneously struggled to implement and improve procedures; receive, index and file for retrieval the routine flow of material that had begun to come in; relieve ORE and other CIG elements of the files they had amassed; locate and integrate into their system large data collections from other agencies; and respond to the information requests that had begun to arrive.

This earliest developmental period, of course, took well over a year, and some of the more comprehensive subsystems, such as Intellofax, were not fully implemented for about ²~~two~~ years. During the developmental period, the embryonic Reference Branch could, at best, barely limp along, pending full development of the basic systems and, more importantly, the acquisition of adequate staff.

In retrospect, it is difficult to determine the developmental status of any one of the units at any given time during the first year. As noted

above, all six components of the Reference Branch officially became operative between January and June 1947. A memorandum issued by the DCI's Assistant Executive Director on 25 June informed all Assistant Directors (ADs) that the Reference Branch was prepared to begin operations in all its stated functions. The announcement went so far as to instruct the ADs to "make such adjustments in current operational procedures as may be necessary to conform therewith." 36/

Officially, then, the Reference Branch was operational. The operational capability, however, must have been minimal. With all the developmental tasks that had to be carried on, there were undoubtedly too few people available during the first half of 1947 to achieve any meaningful operational capability. In fact, as late as 31 March 1947, an ORE personnel roster shows a total of only 28 people assigned to the Reference Branch. 37/ With such severely limited manpower, the major effort must have been on in-house development. Nonetheless, as a result of the superb efforts

of the early planners, the central reference facility was becoming fairly well established within the first several months of its existence--certainly in blueprint, if not in operating fact.

In January 1947 the operation was moved from Q Building to the first floor of Central Building in the 2430 E Street complex (the remainder of ORE occupied the second floor), and in February, [redacted] was named Acting Chief, Reference Branch, ORE. 38/

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Late in the first quarter of 1947 the staff completed their planning, and on 28 March, Dr.

[redacted] submitted to ICAPS the proposed Statement of Mission and Table of Organization for the Reference Branch, as approved by ^{25X1A}[redacted], then AD/RE. On 25 June, ICAPS approved the plan, with certain changes in the functional statement.

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The changes were important with regard to the scope of the reference center's responsibility. Previously, there had been indecision on the part of the early policy planners as to whether the

centralized reference facility should be an interagency partnership or whether it should be operated by, and primarily for, CIG, with secondary responsibility allocated to the other intelligence agencies. The modifications by ICAPS clearly indicated that the policymakers had opted for the latter arrangement. The Statement of Mission submitted to ICAPS in March had echoed the original concept implied in the first CIG definition of the proposed reference element, which envisioned the facility as a common effort operated by and for all the intelligence agencies.

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Specifically, the proposal stated that the mission of the Branch would be

...to centralize various reference functions related to the intelligence activities of the United States Government and to provide a Reference Library for CIG.... This Branch serves as a Reference Center for CIG *and the member agencies.* [italics supplied] 39/

However, the approved ICAPS version of June officially

declared that the mission of the Branch was

To be the repository for all intelligence and intelligence information to be permanently filed by CIG, to maintain records of all available intelligence sources, intelligence information and intelligence; to provide a reference library for CIG; and to establish, in coordination with OCD, procedures for utilization of its materials and catalogs by other agencies. 40/

Moreover, whereas the March submission proposed as the primary duty of the Chief the establishment of reference activities for CIG and the member agencies, the June ICAPS version directed him to "Establish the central reference activities for CIG, and maintain appropriate liaison administrative and policymaking activities." 41/ It was now indelibly clear that the policymakers were no longer undecided about the Reference Center's

scope of responsibility. With regard to this very fundamental principal, they had finally decided that the Center would be not a community partnership effort but a wholly CIG owned and operated facility, the services of which would also be available to other agencies, circumstances permitting. Throughout its history, the reference element, whatever its organizational title, would serve first as a mechanism for its parent organization and second for the other agencies, with the latter service dependent upon budgetary realities.

The Reference Branch organizational structure approved by ICAPS was identical with that developed by the planners and was by then (June) actually in rudimentary operation. With the T/O pegged at ^{25X1A} [] positions, the Branch's components and their position allocations (indicated parenthetically), were the Office of the Chief [], the Executive and Coordinating Staffs [], and six operating components: the [] GMD [], the Intelligence Documents Division or Library [], and a Central Index [] to provide Branchwide machine support.

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Although officially designated the Reference Branch of ORE, the new operation was more generally known as the Reference Center, a name it was actually given when it was transferred from ORE to the CIA Executive for Administration and Management (A&M) in September 1947.

4. Character of the Reference Center

Over the years, countless changes in systems, procedures and objectives of the Reference Center were to be effected; divisions appeared and disappeared; and eventually much of the operation was computerized. The fundamental central reference system as originally conceived would nevertheless prove sound in principle-- that is, the channeling of "all" intelligence documentation to the reference facility for general and specialized indexing and storage by the central library and the specialized registers; category retrieval of documents on demand; and, as will be discussed below, the presumably unplanned development of area expertise for substantive analysis and the production of finished or semifinished

intelligence within fields of specialty. In fact, the prototype reference center of June 1947 would remain essentially unchanged in structure and system for two decades. Even after the reorganization of the functionally arranged Office of Central Reference (OCD's new title after 1955) into the graphically arranged Central Reference Service, the same basic principles of operation would prevail.

Early organizational structures contemplated reflect what was apparently a fundamentally different functional concept on the part of the earliest policy planners--that is, development of a reference system exclusively involved in the indexing and retrieval of documents and books, or, in other words, a machine-supported general and specialized reference activity devoid of any substantive analysis capability. If the need for analysis was not apparent to the early policymakers and planners, it became almost immediately evident to the first reference specialists. They quickly discovered that the input and retrieval aspects of a machine-based operation could not be divorced

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from analysis; that even their primary decisions to code or not to code, to correct factual errors in dates and name spellings, and to select pertinent extracts were actions that constituted basic analysis. However slowly, such decisions became increasingly intellectual, involving detection, evaluation and interpretation, and even before the end of the first year it had become evident that the process was not one of perfunctory indexing for storage and retrieval.

Rather, analysis had clearly begun to emerge as an integral and inseparable part of the reference analyst's job. In fact, after the Reference Branch had been in existence for only ⁹~~nine~~ months, the AD/RE, Theodore Babbitt, stated that analysts in BIR should maintain a reports-writing capability. At the outset, it had apparently been agreed that the State Department would bear primary responsibility for preparing biographic reports for CIG. The Department's Biographic Information Division (BI), however, lacked sufficient manpower to carry out the responsibility, and BIR, to fill the gap, had begun writing biographic reports for CIG requesters

(rather than transmitting batches of pertinent raw documents). It was this "emergency" production effort that Babbitt said should be maintained. 43/

Babbitt reportedly held that BIR should have the capability of preparing biographic studies "in addition to its regularly allotted functions"--that is, locating, indexing, recording and retrieving biographic information--and that the Register should recruit people "capable of doing biographical research work." 44/

That the character of the reference analyst's job was changing was indelibly recorded in November when an officer from A&M, reporting on her manpower survey of the Reference Branch, approved initial T/O but recommended that

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A substantial saving in personnel could be achieved if Reference Center register activity was confined exclusively to punch card recording. The establishment of files and the extracting and annotating of reports for file purposes

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which occurs in FIR, BIR, and CCR are
time-consuming and require the services
of many professional employees. 45/

The trend toward analysis in the reference analyst jobs was to continue, however, with the eventual development of effective and highly regarded officers who were recognized authorities in their support specialities--for example, industrial officers, graphics specialists and biographic officers. The apex of distinction in this respect would accrue to the Biographic Register, which would become the most prestigious component in OCD, culminating in the DCI's Directive of October 1961 46/ and subsequent DDI action, authorizing BR to produce finished intelligence--the only reference register ever so empowered.

The approval by ICAPS of its mission and functions marked the first milestone in the early development of the Reference Branch. At about the same time, and equally important to its development, the Branch was finally allocated sufficient working

area. Space limitations in Central Building had begun to inhibit even the slow growth of that early period, since the relatively small number of newcomers that the recruitment program was beginning to produce could not be integrated into the operation but had to be "held" in A&M. Finally, after secure wire-mesh storage facilities were installed, the Reference Branch moved on 12 June 1947 into the fourth wing of the first and second floors of M Building on 26th Street near Constitution Avenue.

5. Unification Leads to Progress

At last unified in adequate quarters, the Branch began to show small but meaningful progress. By the end of the month, on-duty strength had risen to 48, and in late July it stood at 59. 47/ Developmental and operational activities were accelerated. With regard to the former, Intellofax* negotiations moved beyond the initial May contact with ^{25X1A} [redacted] and

*Actually, the name "Intellofax" would not be coined until about mid-1949, when the system was implemented.

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by July involved

By late August the Library's Classification Unit had completed the general framework of the "all-inclusive" subject and area classification schedule (later the ISC), and interagency subcommittees were attempting to develop additional classification segments for coding military subjects (especially for Navy and Air Force) not covered by the initial plan.

In the same month, the Branch began indexing FBIB's Daily Reports by subject and area for OO and ^{was} ~~were~~ drawn further into the new business of providing administrative support by automating personnel records for A&M's Personnel Division. The "search and find" visits to other installations increased in number, and in June alone, over 100 meetings and visits were logged. As a result of the contacts, additional large file increments were added to the Reference Branch's specialized information bases. For instance, CCR, which had started its data base with the inherited OSS Survey of Foreign Experts File (on U.S. sources of foreign intelligence), now arranged for a steady flow

of new data from the domestic contact offices of OO, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Military Intelligence Division. By August it had developed machine control on over 1,100 foreign intelligence sources in the United States. Similarly, the Intelligence Documents Division had arranged to take over the entire reference collection of the deactivated Office of Housing Expediter (OHE);* FIR began building its data base by acquiring the Industrial Card File (on Russian installations) from the Army's Special Document Section at Fort Holabird, Maryland; and BIR had obtained and was indexing State's Category File (biographic information arranged by organizational affiliation) and was completing priority work on "Project 1640"--locating and centralizing under machine control information on all foreign scientists available in U.S. agencies. During the same June-August 1947 period most, but not all, of the reference components were capable of conducting servicing operations.

*The overall plan was subsequently abandoned when the OHE material proved to be almost thoroughly domestic. Only selected items were actually transferred.

In general, then, by the end of August 1947 all six elements of the Reference Branch were staffed, however minimally, and in various stages of operation. Their internal procedural patterns had been designed, their data bases established, and all, with the exceptions of FIR and GMD, were actually answering requests. As a branch of ORE, the new reference facility was developing slowly--but apparently too slowly--for in September it was transferred out of ORE and re-established as a separate office under the Executive for A&M. From this point on, the Reference Branch was officially, as well as popularly, designated as the Reference Center.

6. Relocation

The reasons motivating the administrative relocation are not at all clear. It will be recalled that assignment of the Reference Branch and its development to ORE had been specified as

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a temporary responsibility pending
organizational development and
availability of space for later
efficient independent operation of
a CIG Reference Center. 48/

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Perhaps management, that is, [redacted], had
come to the conclusion that the reference facility
had been developed to the point where it could
strike out on its own. After all, it was a "common
concern" utility for all of CIA (which replaced
CIG in September 1947) and the entire intelligence
community and not the functionary of any single
office. More probable, however, is that as a
stepchild in a production office, the Branch tended
to channel its reference activities into that
particular form of production; and that the reference
activity, regarded as incidental to the parent
office's primary function of production, received
short shrift in budgetary and manpower allocations.

Identical views were historically reviewed
seven years later by James M. Andrews, the man
who directed the merged reference-collection-dissemination
operation:

5. SP.
It very quickly became evident that the Reference Center could not hope to fulfill its mission of developing advanced techniques and equipment, and of serving all offices and staffs of the Agency, as long as it was located in ORE. Being only one of several divisions in a single office, it failed to receive from ORE the support in terms of budget and manpower which were needed in order that it might have the strength to achieve its objectives... 49/

In considering all the elements that might have played a part in dictating the transfer, it would not be whimsical to assume that [] had more than a detached interest in the Reference Center. Having worked so closely with [] in developing the Center, he would presumably be anxious to guarantee to the Center's operators a maximum opportunity to prove its conceptual soundness.

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Whatever the reasons, it is indisputable that the reference activity eventually did fare better as a quasi-independent function under A&M

than as a subordinate activity in a production office. In fact, in his recollections, Dr. Andrews also stated that

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...in this new location, the Reference Center received far more administrative support, and was able to commence building up its manpower both in quality and in quantity. Contracts were let for the development of special machine equipment, and a serious attack was made on the major problems which were awaiting solution. 50/

There was not, of course, any immediate developmental surge for the Reference Center. It took some time before the administrative benefits resulting from its new status became apparent, but progress did continue at a slightly accelerated tempo during the final quarter of 1947. By December, for instance, although the Reference Center on-board strength had only risen to a total of people, against an authorized total of , further developmental and operational progress had been achieved.

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With regard to the single most important developmental target (Intellofax), the design of the "all-inclusive" unified coding scheme and hardware for the retrieval and bibliographic printout system had been brought to near completion. The community-oriented document coding plan had been developed by Library and machine personnel to the point where it was ready for implementation, but continued reluctance on the part of other agencies to adapt to the common system had virtually decided Agency planners to go ahead on their own. Similarly, the design of special machines to handle the coded documents had reached a crucial point by the end of the year. The systems experts had inspected equipment produced by RCA, Eastman Kodak, and many other companies, and had investigated systems and machines in use in other agencies. None met the Center's requirements as well as the proposed ^{25X1A} [] approach. An overall plan and funds to develop and produce the special equipment were approved ^{25X1A} on 4 December, and the contract was let with [] the following month.

Operationally, the Registers were also beginning to function with primitive effectiveness. By the end of the year, their data bases, although still unimpressive in size, had nonetheless grown to usable proportions. Some of these document collections were already under machine control, while others were manual files, pending final development of the master coding scheme. The Intelligence Documents Division (Library), for instance, had hand filed 150,000 documents by source; among the Registers, IBM punched card techniques controlled [redacted] BIR, about the same number of foreign industrial installations in FIR, and almost [redacted] [redacted] in CCR.

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From these data bases, the Registers had begun to provide CIA and the other IAC members with the reference service that would characterize their operations for decades to come. With a staff of 23, for example, the Intelligence Documents

Division in November serviced 299 requesters, and in December a significant CIA Instruction 51/ centralized the accountability and procurement of all foreign and domestic books in the new library--ending uncontrolled independent purchasing by Agency components. Similarly, the Registers had also moved into a primary operating mode. Most active were CCR, BIR and FIR, whose December personnel totals stood at 21, 15 and 10, respectively. BIR was now unofficially recognized as the focal point for biographic information on foreign scientists and technologists (S&T), and preliminary NSC action had been initiated to formally delegate the S&T biographic responsibility to CIA--that is, to BIR.

Least capable of providing more than token service was GMD. The last of the Registers to be developed, GMD, working with Central Index specialists, had completed its procedural and coding plans and had only recently begun to function with its staff of eight. The Central Index had only five people on board but, with the help of at least four IBM consultants, had made considerable

progress. In addition to completing the hardware design of the main index, setting up a storage and retrieval system, and sharing in the development of the "unified" document coding scheme with Library personnel, the small staff was machine indexing current material [] at the rate of 500 cards per day, after having eliminated the three-month backlog it had inherited in August; was keypunching machine indexes to map and pictorial material for GMD; and was automating personnel records for A&M's Personnel Division, as well as coordinating the utilization of machines for the entire Agency.

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From the outset, the Central Index was directed by [] Previously, [] had worked briefly for IBM before joining the State Department and serving a consular tour in Poland. His forte was organization and administration. His deputy,

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[] with 15 years of experience in his field, was the machine systems expert. []

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[] originally with the ONI Library, had transferred to CIG in December 1946 as chief librarian in OO/FDD and six months later was reassigned as the Reference Center's Chief Librarian (later,

(CIA Librarian), with complete authority for the Library's planning, staffing, organization and management. CCR had also been under single leadership since its inception. [redacted] [redacted] in November 1946, along with [redacted] and was immediately appointed by the latter to organize CCR. [redacted] was chief of GMD, having served in that position since July 1947, and [redacted] was apparently the key officer in FIR.

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Among all the Registers, BIR alone was still without continuing leadership at the close of the year. From about May, [redacted] had served, apparently without title, as the focal point for activities in BIR. He was replaced in January 1948 by [redacted], from the Department of State, who served as Acting Chief for the first quarter of the year and subsequently returned to the Department.* For the remainder

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of 1948, [redacted] and, from about September, [redacted] [redacted], served as Acting Chiefs until the appointment

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[redacted] returned to CIA in mid-1961, after the Agency had absorbed State's biographic operation, to serve as Program Coordinator for the expanded Biographic Register.

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of



as Chief in January 1949.

Thus, by the end of 1947, its first full year of operation, the Reference Center was fairly well established and its continued development would remain uninterrupted by the reorganizational upheavals that were destined to sweep the Agency during the next several years.

C. The "New OCD"

25X1A9A The year 1948 began a new era, not only for the Reference Center but for the entire collection-dissemination-reference function. It was at this point that two major events occurred that had a major impact on the function's development-- the advent of James M. Andrews and the decision of A&M to merge OCD and the Reference Center because of the former's procedural ineffectiveness and the close interrelationship between the two activities.

For ⁸~~eight~~ months after the transfer of the Reference Center to A&M the Center continued to operate in close collaboration with OCD, receiving the intelligence collected by the latter office and performing the final function of the collection-dissemination-reference cycle. By early 1948 the flaws in the overall system had become apparent. In 1946, CIG planners had decided that the liaison functions of requirements, collection and dissemination were sufficiently important to require a separate

office where such functions could be concentrated upon exclusively. Although plausible in theory, the scheme did not work out in practice because the arrangement isolated OCD's liaison function from both the people who generated requirements (production) and the reference people who know what was already available. Thus, liaison tended to operate in a vacuum and its staff became increasingly divorced from the realities of both production and reference. Further, their contacts with other offices had become formalized and ritualistic, creating too much paperwork, delay and inefficiency.

1. Merger of OCD and the Reference Center

The ²~~two~~-year-old fledgling needed corrective surgery, and the DCI obliged. By the time James Andrews arrived in January 1948 to become Chief of the Reference Center, []'s Management Branch, under [] had already completed plans for merging the Center and OCD. Scarcely ³~~three~~ months later, on 3 May, the Reference Center and OCD were combined into a single Office of

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Collection and Dissemination,* under Dr. Andrews
as Assistant Director. ^{25X1A} 52/ [redacted], the
former AD/CD, returned to the Navy.

Dr. Andrews, an enthusiastic advocate of
the use of business machines (electrical accounting
machines or EAM) for the indexing and retrieval
of information, had been brought in from Harvard
University in January 1948 to head the Reference
Center. Characteristically, when the OCD-Reference
Center merger was effected, Dr. Andrews obtained
carte blanche authority to change the merger plans,
and the organizational surgery was performed accord-
ing to the blueprint that he and his staff developed,
and not according to the plan prepared by Robert
25X1A [redacted] and his management officers--"much to [redacted]
chagrin," according to one source. 53/

25X1A

*Along with the Reference Center, A&M's Central
Records Division, Services Branch, was also merged
into the new OCD. Of the services involved,
however, the messenger and courier service and
management of the Agency's administrative records
and archives were transferred back to A&M's
successor (Deputy Director of Administration) in
December 1950, while OCD retained Top Secret
Control and "custody of registered documents."

The new OCD was the organizational as well as the functional model that would remain basically unchanged for almost 20 years. Collection and dissemination were functionally geared to the vitally intertwined reference activity under a single direction. The new office contained the six original reference divisions, plus the collection and dissemination activities from the original OCD, now designated the Liaison Division (LD). Thus, the reconstructed OCD contained the Machine Division (MD), the Library, the Biographic (BR), Industrial (IR), Graphic (GR) and Contact Control Registers, and the new LD.*

It was also at this time that the mail and courier activities of A&M's Central Records Division were transferred to OCD, thus also returning the

*To avoid excessive detail, the traditional titles of OCD's subdivisions will be used henceforth, even though titular changes continued to occur for two years--e.g., for most of 1948 the Central Index would be known as the Machine Methods Branch before final designation as the Machine Division; the Registers' names would be shortened; and organizational indicators differed until the CIA General Order of September 1949 54/ directed Agency adoption of the Federal vertical departmental organizational structure (office-to-division-to-branch).

Top Secret and registered document control functions.

On 21 May, three weeks after the merger, Dr. Andrews

appointed an Air Force colonel, [redacted]

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as his Deputy and [redacted] his Executive

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Assistant Director^{or} (EAD). 55/

2. You Gain Some, You Lose Some

By the end of May, other events of developmental significance had occurred. First, the Library's community-oriented document coding scheme, now officially called the Intelligence Subject Code,^{italics} was put into experimental operation. Early in 1948 the system planners had finally concluded that the document classification scheme had crystallized to a degree that justified its use on a trial basis and that the Intellofax System--that is, the ISC and the necessary hardware then under development--gave reasonably sure promise of providing a satisfactory mechanical solution to the reference problems. On 15 March 1948 the first edition of the *Intelligence Subject Code Manual* was published, and in April the Library began the ISC indexing of intelligence documents and the preparation of descriptive abstracts for selected documents.

Pending the development of the Intellofax hardware, the indexed documents were stored manually. In brief, the ISC was a six-digit numerical framework, which permitted the subject and area indexing of intelligence documents for machine retrieval. The first manual, of course, was experimental and constant changes were necessary to adapt the new system to consumer demands, a process that slowed down operations. By October 1948, however, the volume of output had increased to the point where the coding operation was keeping pace with the flow of incoming documents.

The second significant development in early 1948 was the first official assignment of a Community-wide reference responsibility to the new OCD. On 25 May the NSC issued NSCID No. 8, which formally delegated to CIA--that is, to BR--primary responsibility for the maintenance of data on foreign scientists and technologists. 56/ This assignment would remain the only formally delegated Community reference responsibility for OCD and its successor organizations.

OCD's July 1948 "Statement of Functions" was far more realistic than preceding charters, and the organizational set-up was more workable. Furthermore, the mission statement clearly indicated that OCD would become essentially a facility for CIA alone rather than a truly centralized file where the intelligence officer could find all the necessary information without having to check other sources. The narrowness of this mission was influenced by several factors. First, as the system had developed up to 1948, there had been no call for Central Intelligence to establish a collection or reference system for the entire Intelligence Community. Second, any attempt to "coordinate"--that is, to determine the contents of other agencies' files in order to obtain pertinent information--would have involved the Director's "right of inspection" (apparently never invoked by any DCI) as well as the issuance and enforcement of interagency compliance directives. To these and other policy reasons was added a clinching, practical argument: Surveys conducted in 1946

and 1947 had clearly indicated that such an interagency "library" would be too extensive and complex to permit effective central management.

Thus, the dilemma that had plagued early CIG planners had now been resolved. Finally cast aside was any idea of an OCD "super" file. Instead, the decision had been made to continue the system's development within the context of "correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence"-- that is, as produced by ORE.

Although arranged somewhat differently, the functions of the OCD units remained basically unchanged. The Library continued to serve as a general repository for the machine-indexed collection of intelligence documents; BR, GR and IR maintained files and provided service within their respective fields of responsibility; and MD provided machine support and developed new EAM techniques as required. LD continued its liaison functions of requirement, collection and dissemination.

By mid-1948 OCD's growth impetus had accelerated noticeably. Its divisions' operating procedures had been improved to the point where they were all functioning fairly effectively. In addition, the Agency's recruitment program was beginning to provide a steady flow of new people, and by the end of July, OCD had an on-board strength of 268. The office was, in fact, in the early stages of a 10-year growth period, and the expansion was not even affected by the loss of two functions in the latter half of 1948.

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The first operation to be transferred out of OCD was CCR. Effective 26 August, CCR was reestablished within OO/CB's Source Development Division (originally the Control Division). Responsibility for providing machine support for CCR's operations remained with OCD. 57/ did not accompany the operation to OO but shortly afterward joined the newly established Office of Policy Coordination (OPC--established on 1 September 1948 to handle covert psychological operations).

The second function to be transferred out of OCD during the last half of 1948 was the map activity carried out by the Map Division of GR. In June 1947 the State-OSS map library and geographic intelligence functions had been transferred to CIA, and in August they were reestablished in ORE as the Map Intelligence Branch under [redacted]

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[redacted] From its inception, GR had carried out a closely allied function in its Map Division: the codification and machine indexing of essential information on foreign maps of intelligence value held by governmental and nongovernmental institutions in the United States. It was this activity that, in September 1948, was moved out of OCD and merged with the Map Library Division of ORE's Map Branch. Again, however, the machine support responsibility remained with OCD's MD. 58/

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By the close of 1948, OCD's rate of growth was still increasing, despite the two functional excisions. In December the on-board personnel strength had risen to [redacted] against an authorized

total of ^{25X1A} [] as compared to 92 people and an authorized total of ^{25X1A} [] just 12 months previously. Operationally, the divisions were eliminating the functional flaws, but service demands were increasing even faster than personnel strength.

Key reassignments continued to be rather frequent. In August, ^{25X1A} [] was brought into OCD as Chief of IR, where ^{25X1A} [] had been Chief pro tem. In September, Colonel ^{25X1A} [] returned to the Air Force. He was succeeded as DAD/CD by ^{25X1A} [] on loan from the Army; and [] 25X1A as Acting Chief of BR. In December, Commander ^{25X1A} [] 25X1A [], who had been first the Navy and later the CIA desk officer in the old OCD's liaison operation, was named Chief of LD, replacing John B. ^{25X1A} []

By the end of 1948 the "new OCD" was already proving itself to be an effective office--a viable, service-dedicated organization. In November,

Dr. Andrews flatly identified service to Agency requesters as the Office's "major function" and specified that such requests would never be denied unless "compliance would work harm to the Agency by interfering with other [vital] services...." Burying the old ritualistic approach for all time was his warning that "No hint of this approach will be tolerated today." 59/ Channels and procedures, as far as Dr. Andrews was concerned, were worthless if they failed to yield "practical results." In short, Dr. Andrews held that OCD existed to provide service to CIA customers and would not concern itself with questions of policy, prestige or prerogatives.

The organizational structure of OCD was to remain basically unchanged throughout the administrations of DCI's Hillenkoetter (May 1947-October 1950) and Smith (October 1950-February 1953), despite the impact of major investigations by the Eberstadt and Dulles Committees. (Figure 4)

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3. Threats to OCD's Existence Surmounted

The Eberstadt Committee* in its December 1948 report acknowledged that OCD appeared to be an efficient operation under its "new head" although it had sometimes acted as a "bottleneck" in the past. It suggested, however, that the title "OCD" was a misnomer, that it should become purely a reference service, and that its liaison functions should be "split off." 60/

The Dulles group's survey report of January 1949** similarly recommended that OCD's collection and dissemination functions be transferred to a new "Coordination Division" (an expanded ICAPS) and that the "library, index and register functions" be placed in a "centralized Research and Reports

*The Hoover Commission's Task Force on National Security Organization headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt.

**The committee of consultants chaired by Allen Dulles had been established by the NSC in February 1948 to survey CIA and the U.S. intelligence community. It began its survey of OCD about mid-1948.

Division (ORE)." The survey team was thus urging return to an organizational setup that had already proved unworkable. The Dulles Committee, however, had begun its investigation immediately after the OCD reorganization and therefore had neither the opportunity to observe how the functions (collection, dissemination and reference) had operated separately, nor what the consolidated Office was capable of achieving after its "shakedown" period. Under such circumstances, the Committee's conclusions were understandable--i.e., viewing collection and dissemination as functions of coordination (ICAPS) to be managed apart from reference, which they considered adjunctive to research (ORE). 61/

Dr. Andrews' reply to the Dulles Committee report was immediate and devastating. In his memorandum of rebuttal to the Director, he zeroed in on the obvious fact that the proposed functional separation had already been tried and found wanting. He cited the reasons why the arrangement had failed and emphasized, contrary to the Committee's view,

the close interrelationship of liaison and reference. It was only after lengthy and often painful experience, Dr. Andrews held, that the Agency had indisputably learned that the two functions were indeed so closely related that they were performed best by a single, independent administrative unit. In his words, it was

too early to say that the present is the best of all possible organizational patterns for these functions, but it is not too early to say that it represents an improvement over the older and more obvious pattern, which is now proposed anew. 62/

The Director agreed and in his February 1949 comments to the NSC rejected the Dulles Committee's recommendations. 63/ The NSC, on the other hand, endorsed the Committee's plan. It was, however, a limited endorsement, since it contained the reservation that "there may be other methods of organization which will accomplish the same objectives." 64/

As for personnel, with one exception the key assignments in OCD remained unchanged during

1949. The exception was the arrival of John M.
25X1A [] who became Chief of BR on 3 January 1949.
25X1A []
65/ He retained [] as his deputy.
25X1A [] in GR and [] in IR still had no deputies--
at least in the titular sense. In the new LD,
25X1A []
Marine [] served as Commander
25X1A []
25X1A [] deputy; [] worked under
25X1A [] as Assistant Librarian; and George
25X1A []
25X1A [] continued as [] deputy in MD.

By 1949 the Executive and Coordinating Staffs
had been replaced by the Administrative Staff
and the Operations Staff; the former was headed
25X1A []
by [] (although she would not be formally
appointed until December 1950 66/), and the latter
25X1A []
by [] In the Library, William J.
25X1A []
[] had succeeded [] in January
1949 as Top Secret Control Officer (TSCO), CIA
Records Administrator and Custodian of Registered
25X1A []
Documents. [] the original TSCO, had transferred
to ORE when the Central Records Division had been

merged with the reorganized OCD in May 1948.*

67/ In February 1949, Central Records Division was dissolved, and its functions were distributed to other OCD offices. The mail and courier activity became the responsibility of the Administrative Staff, and the Administrative Records, Top Secret Control and Records Management (CIA Archives) functions were assigned to the Library.

During the first ⁸eight months of 1949, OCD's on-board strength rose more than 12 percent, to [] people, and the authorized T/O increased by almost 15 percent, to [] In addition, the Office's operations were finally beginning to achieve the functional effectiveness that comes with experience. After its late start, for example, GR, with [] people, handled over 1,400 requests for still photos and motion picture film during FY 1949.

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*Throughout the first 20 years of reference service history, there were only four Top Secret Control Officers (excluding the original TSCO, [], who never joined OCD): [] from January 1949; [] from April 1950; John R. [] from September 1954; and [] in 1967.

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Within its field of responsibility--preparing biographic reports and providing other types of biographic support--BR was amassing files on all types of foreign personalities and not simply on the foreign scientists and technicians for whom it was held responsible by NSCID No. 8. During FY 1949 the Register's staff of responded to 1,229 requesters; IR, also with on board, answered 628 queries; and the reconformed LD, with people, provided 2,413 collection and liaison services. The Library's broader reference function naturally resulted in a far larger request total of over 22,000 for the same fiscal period. It also had the largest working staff, people.

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Cumulatively, the OCD components during FY 1949-- that is, after ²two to ³three years of operating experience, depending upon the unit--serviced a total of 28,245 requests, almost 3,000 of which

were from non-CIA requesters. In addition, LD received and disseminated over 263,000 documents (including cables and airgrams)*--an increase of almost 23,000 over the total of the previous fiscal year. 68/

4. Achievement of a Goal Brings New Problems

It was thus evident by 1950 that OCD had become a reality within the profession; that its functions had been soundly conceived and developed. In short, the planners had accomplished what they had set out to achieve--the creation of a first-of-its-kind, centralized intelligence reference


*It is interesting that 22 years later, in FY 1961, the 12-month total for collateral documents received had stabilized at almost exactly the same figure--260,000 (exclusive of cables, which, in later years, were held for only several months). The all-time collateral document peak of 409,000 was registered in FY 1963. From that point forward, however, the true work measurement had to include the Special Intelligence documents, which the office began disseminating in 1963 and which, in FY 1971₂ alone, totaled more than 582,000 items.

facility. By that year, the office had grown into an on-going and youthfully successful operation. Constant change, both major and minor, would, of course, continue to occur, and the system was still a far cry from the comparatively sophisticated machine that would evolve in future years. Nonetheless, OCD had become an effective and viable operation.

The basic problem was no longer one of trying to make the machine work and prove its value. Rather, the major difficulty was the operation's inability to keep pace with the soaring request load. The divisions' administrative files for 1950 reflect a heavy use of overtime, the need for additional personnel, and the development of backlogs in pending requests, filing and reproduction. To help absorb the ballooning workload, Dr. Andrews in May requested an additional 29 people--two for LD, 13 for the Library, and 14 for BR's Regional Branch, thus raising OCD's authorized

total to ^{25X1A} The situation was further aggravated by the outbreak of the Korean War, and all of OCD was forced into a ⁶~~six~~-day work week from mid-July to early October.

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In July plans were approved to relieve OCD of the Agency's machine records functions, as recommended by a survey team from the Management Staff, which had conducted a yearlong study of

OCD. Because the CIA machine system had begun in OCD (in the premerger Reference Center), the office had been assigned responsibility for applying machine techniques to the Agency's accounting and administrative record keeping. By 1950, nine such programs were being performed by MD's Administrative Project Branch, ranging from personnel statistical records and payroll accounting to stock inventory and machine utilization records. On 17 July 1950, Acting Executive [] approved the transfer of all administrative support by machine techniques from OCD to Management's Special Support Staff (SSS) in L Building. It is doubtful that the move lightened the work burden of OCD, inasmuch as 11 slots were also transferred. [] moved with the function to SSS, presumably to serve as supervisor-planner for all Agency machine operations.* He was succeeded as MD's chief by his former deputy, []

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*By 1950 there were already six separate CIA machine installations: OO/CD in South Building; OCD in M Building (by far the most extensive operation); the Special Research Center in Q' OSO's Communications Division in L (where SSS would also be established); and MD's Board of Geographic Names unit in South Interior Building.

The MS plan that resulted in the transfer of functions from MD to SSS also called for the re^uestablishment of LD's collection requirements function under the "joint control" of the requirements staffs of ORE and OSI and proposed that LD's functions of obtaining information from the files of other government agencies and maintaining its Control Register of CIA contacts with other government agencies be transferred, respectively, to OO and the Inspection and Security Staff. The MS plan proposed to reconstitute the remaining MD and LD functions, along with the Library and the three Registers, as the Office of Reference and Dissemination (ORD). This was called the "ORD Plan." The DCI (Admiral Hillenkoetter) asked for the comments of the Assistant Directors who would be involved, but he expressed his own concern that the proposed "dismemberment of OCD' would be more costly than the existing arrangement.

Other OCD organizational problems, under study from mid-1950 onward, included centralized procurement of foreign language publications, the creation of consumer-oriented branch libraries, and the handling of "special intelligence" documentation. Resolution of these and other problems regarding OCD depended, to a considerable degree, on the impending reorganization of the production offices, which was being held for consideration by the incoming DCI.

Gen. Walter B. Smith succeeded Admiral Hillenkoetter on 7 October 1950. He announced formation of a new Office of Research and Reports (ORR) on 13 November and, a few days later, an Office of Intelligence Coordination (OIC). In this production office reorganization, ORE was replaced by ORR (first under Theodore Babbitt and shortly afterward, Max F. Millikan) and the Office of National Estimates (ONE), under William L. Langer. Less than ~~two~~ 2

months later, on 15 January 1951, the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) was established under Kingman Douglass. The Office of Scientific Intelligence (organized in December 1948) was not changed. The new OIC replaced the Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff (COAPS), which in turn had replaced ICAPS in July 1950.

General Smith, immediately after taking office, announced his intention of implementing the Dulles Plan. It therefore appeared certain that the new ORR and OIC would absorb the functions of OCD. OCD's reference and machine support functions even appeared in a proposed ORR organizational chart.

After a month of deliberation, however, General Smith decided to leave OCD essentially intact, as Admiral Hillenkoetter had. On 1 December 1950 it was announced that OCD would remain as it was,

both organizationally and functionally. On the same date, the new CIA organizational chart showed OCD grouped with the production offices under the new Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI), William H. Jackson. The only functional changes were minor and involved the transfer of administrative support activities to the DDA (see footnote on page

Key personnel assignments remained relatively static during 1950. In June, the DAD/CD, returned to the Army and was not immediately replaced.

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Despite its growth problems, the overall success of the OCD operation by the end of 1950 was indisputable. In addition to the technical and analytical expertise that had been developed by desk personnel, OCD's success was attributable, in no small degree, to the office's machine systems' growth. By the close of the year, Intellofax

had become effectively operational. The system would never cease to be a target of customer criticism, but it nonetheless represented a technological breakthrough. Irrespective of its early flaws and the shortcomings that would draw fire throughout its existence, the Intellofax System provided the intelligence analyst with a tool that had never previously been available anywhere. It presented, for the first time, a solution to the analyst's historical problem: the painstaking and time-consuming effort necessary to pull together all available intelligence material bearing on a given problem. Whatever its shortcomings, Intellofax did provide the intelligence analyst, to a very considerable degree, a mechanical means of readily obtaining access to all pertinent intelligence documents, thereby meaningfully increasing the time available to him for pursuing his primary function--the production of intelligence.

The basic Intellofax System continued to develop* as the first machine-based document retrieval system within the intelligence profession, largely sustaining Dr. Andrews' earlier observation in a status report to the DCI when he suggested:

It is quite possible that the central reference system being built by CIA will ultimately prove the most important central intelligence service which the Agency provides. 70/

5. Growth

Beginning with General Smith's administration, OCD embarked on a long period of organizational and functional stability that was also characterized

*The Intellofax System endured for 17 years, until 1967, when, largely for reasons of economy and redirection of effort, it was replaced by AEGIS (Already Existing General Information System), which, in truth, was indexed far more general and far less detailed than Intellofax.

by rapid growth, especially during the first two years (1951 and 1952). In that relatively short time span, the Office's staff almost doubled in size, from about people in 1950 to nearly by February 1953, and the files more than doubled to a total of over a million regularly classified documents--a total that included neither the large holdings of Top Secret and specially classified material nor the Library's already extensive unclassified collections.

With the operation stabilized and the "central reference" concept generating a rapidly increasing workload, management renewed its concern for OCD's organizational problems. The problems, none of which had been mentioned in either the Dulles recommendations or the "ORD Plan," revolved about OCD's jurisdiction over certain types of materials, expansion of its documentary holdings, and further demands for specialized services.

As a result of management's studies, a few small changes were made that largely resolved the problems. Relatively inconspicuous as the changes were, they nonetheless significantly bolstered OCD's jurisdiction as the Agency's reference facility. For example, the responsibility for distributing all IAC cables within CIA was transferred from ORR to OCD and re-established as a Cable Branch in LD in February 1951. In June 1951 the military desks of LD were combined into a single Defense Branch.

Similarly, OCD's Agencywide responsibility for the procurement of foreign language publications was affirmed in December 1950, and early in 1951 the function was centralized within the Library.*

*Procurement had previously been split among the Library, OO/FDD, and the DDA's Procurement Office. In addition, most operating offices had ordered such publications independently.

In June 1951 the Special Register (SR) was established on a compartmented basis--that is, physically located within OCI's "Closed" area in Q Building--as OCD's seventh line division, replacing the Collation Division of OCI. The operation was placed under OCD authority to assure indexing and retrieval compatability between OCI's special intelligence and the collateral material. 25X1A
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 was named SR's first Chief.

In the same year, OCD responded to increasing demands from Agency components outside the production area by establishing three branch libraries--one in K Building to serve DDP components; one in Central Building for the Medical Office; and the third in Alcott Hall for the Office of Training. The satellite branches were designed to make the main Library's specialized holdings more immediately accessible to offices located away from the main collection.

The year 1951 also marked the beginning of
OCD's limited involvement in direct field collection.

25X1A9A In February, [redacted] Chief of BR's Scientific
Branch, completed a survey of files in 11 U.S.
military intelligence headquarters in Europe.

During the trip, he arranged for the transfer or
microfilming of almost 300,000 dossiers or cards
on foreign S&T personalities. In August, [redacted]

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[redacted] led an Overseas Microfilming Team
to Europe. For about ²two years the team operated

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out of [redacted] not only exploiting files of
industrial intelligence interest (over 1,000 reels
were microfilmed) but also coordinating some of
the Agency's overt requirements with U.S. field
collectors, particularly with State's Publications
Procurement Officers. Although there was only
one more large-scale, direct collection effort
mounted by OCD,* such operations were the

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*During a 10-week period in 1955, [redacted].
[redacted] BR exploited the
biographic files of U.S. installations in [redacted]
[redacted] cities. The operation
resulted in the acquisition of hard-copy or microfilm
records on almost 8,000 foreign S&T personalities.

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beginning of OCD's low-key program of dispatching representatives to the field on ad hoc collection or coordination missions.*

Key personnel changes, although minimal during 1951, completely changed the leadership of LD. In April, LD's Deputy Chief, [redacted] was named OCD's new DAD, filling the vacancy left when Norman [redacted] returned to the Army in 1950. In August the division's chief, [redacted] (by then Captain [redacted]), was recalled to sea duty. He was succeeded a month later by [redacted]

In January 1952, OCD's status as an "intelligence" office was reiterated when it was regrouped with the production offices under the new Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), Loftus Becker. 71/ Although

*After the Agency absorbed State's biographic effort in mid-1961, the program was expanded to assure two or three annual trips abroad, primarily to coordinate biographic collection with Foreign Service posts and improve communications between CIA reference analysts and their Foreign Service counterparts.

undisturbed by the altered chain of command, OCD continued its painful expansion, beset by soaring request loads and inadequate staffing. As the Agency's offices expanded, so did their demands on OCD. A total of over 27,000 requests for intelligence information were received by five of the OCD divisions in 1951 (not including MD and the new SR), an increase of 29 percent over the 1950 total of less than 21,000. 72/ In May, the approved ^{25X1A} OCD on-duty ceiling was increased from ^{25X1A} 73/ still 66 short of the "hands" Dr. Andrews estimated as essential.

The struggle to keep pace with the rapidly growing workload was aggravated by the fact that OCD services were no longer restricted to the routine question-and-answer activity. In response to customer demands, the OCD divisions had begun to render the more sophisticated services that would become their future trademark. In May 1952, for instance, IR had begun to produce Plant Summaries to facilitate

the work of ORR analysts, and in June, BR produced the first OCD reference publication, Soviet Men of Science, a compilation of 18,000 biographic briefs on Soviet scientists, which had been ~~one~~^{1 1/2} and ~~one-half~~ years in the making. 74/

Amidst its burgeoning growth, it is not surprising that OCD began to develop problems stemming from work overload, command faults and procedural inadequacies. Freedom from Agency organizational changes fortunately permitted OCD's front office to concentrate on correcting internal problems. In order to meet changing and increasing customer demands, for instance, it was still necessary to make continual changes in the various machine systems--not only in the main Intellofax system but in each of the divisions' subsystems. In addition, there was the need to develop an entirely new system for SR. The major problems, however, centered in BR and IR, where disharmony and low morale had reached major proportions by mid-1952.

In BR, the problem was brought to a head by the proposed imposition of a "Four-Way Index" scheme. Plagued by an alarming backlog of unindexed documents, the Register's top management had developed a quick indexing system whereby every name on each document would be carded and coded according to four different identifying items, thereby virtually eliminating the dossier system of storing all documents on one personality in one machine-controlled jacket. The rank and file violently objected to the proposed system on the grounds that name-servicing from a file of raw documents would be so time-consuming that it, too, would become hopelessly backlogged. In the ensuing confrontation, Dr. Andrews apparently elected to continue with the dossier system, and

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[redacted] transferred to the DDP. In July, Dr. Andrews
named [redacted] to replace [redacted] as BR's
chief. 75/

Actually, the BR problem was far more complex and was attributable more to an underlying flaw in the Register's operations than to any single

personality or processing plan. It will be recalled that NSCID No. 8, promulgated in 1948, specifically delegated to CIA, that is, to OCD/BR, responsibility for maintaining biographic data on foreign S&T personalities, as opposed to State's longstanding responsibility for providing biographic service on foreign political types. The allocation of servicing responsibility existed in name only, however. In actuality, State could not provide adequate political biographic support to the Agency because its biographic operation was geared to the Department's own needs--both with regard to the size of its Biographic Information unit (State/BI) and the nature of its biographic files, which contained data only on "prominent" people and not on lower echelon types who were of interest to CIA's intelligence operations. State's inability to satisfy the Agency's political biographic needs had led to the development of the capability in BR's Regional Branch, which, according to one source document, accounted for 65 percent of BR's requests at that time. Thus,

despite Dr. Andrews' actions to settle the BR "crisis," the basic cause of the problem remained: duplication of effort because the State's inability, under existing budgetary restraints, to provide political biographic support to CIA. Initial steps were taken by representatives of both departments to solve the problem, and within ²~~two~~ months, OIC had developed a plan to eliminate the duplication. Not surprisingly, the proposal called for consolidation of the function within State/BI. According to the major terms of the plan, BI, in addition to servicing the Department, would be responsible for providing CIA requesters with complete biographic service on foreign political, sociological and cultural personalities. In return, all pertinent documents in the files in BR's Regional Branch would be transferred to BI and the Regional Branch would thenceforth concentrate on foreign economic personalities (particularly for ORR). In addition, the Agency would fund the project to the equivalent

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of about positions. Dr. Andrews objected to the plan, citing procedural awkwardness--for example, inaccessibility of dossiers for CIA analysts and machine complications--and, most importantly, predicting that CIA would lose control over funds allocated to the BI project. He further opined that the trend toward consolidation of biographic service was virtually inevitable and that the Agency would be unwise to take any step that would perpetuate the existing dispersal. Despite Dr. Andrews' nonconcurrency, the plan was approved in November by Loftus Becker, the DDI, and by W. Park Armstrong, Jr., the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence. 76/ In March 1953 BR began an area-by-area transfer of the political biographic responsibility to State/BI. The transfer of responsibility was completed by mid-July, and the physical shift of pertinent files shortly thereafter.

In addition to the personnel changes affecting BR, numerous other key changes were made by the AD/CD during June and July 1952. When [redacted] [redacted] shifted to the DDP in June, he was replaced 25X1A9A by Joseph Becker as Executive, OCD. Becker, in turn, was succeeded as CIA Librarian by [redacted] 25X1A during the same month. In July, [redacted] 25X1A Jr., was designated as [redacted] 25X1A Deputy in the Liaison Division and [redacted] was named Deputy CIA Librarian.

At the same time that Dr. Andrews was dealing with the BR problem, he was also addressing himself to his other major source of trouble--IR--where apparent internal strife had rendered the division operationally ineffective. As a result of a survey he had ordered, Andrews apparently came to the conclusion that IR needed rejuvenation and redesign, particularly a redefinition of its mission, a new administrative policy, and a general reorganization.

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In August, the chief of IR, Jr., transferred to ORR and was replaced by Joseph Becker, who served as Acting Chief, IR, in addition to his other duties. 77/

6. Physical Problems--The Stadium

As the size of OCD and its customer offices had increased, so too had their need for space. Cramped into M Building (the old "temporary" government office building close to Constitution Avenue on 26th Street, N.W.) was practically all of OCD, ORR, OSI, and other elements. The already creaking M Building was dangerously overtaxed, and the need for additional space in the area was urgent. Unfortunately, the only available, nearby space was in Riverside Stadium, an unused skating rink across from M Building at 350 26th Street, N.W. The interior of the Stadium was one vast, unbroken expanse, poorly lighted, badly ventilated, and in sad disrepair. Nonetheless, a major program

of repair and renovation was undertaken to make the unlikely site suitable for office use, and on the weekend of 4 April 1952, most of OCD moved into "The Stadium" (or "Rista"), ~~and was open for business on Monday.~~ 78/

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Resettling people in the Stadium 79/ in the course of one weekend (along with their office equipment and furniture, the Registers' already bulky files, and MD's heavy equipment) without noticeably disturbing service was a herculean task. Virtually all OCD personnel were involved in the operation. Many worked until midnight for three successive days, and by Monday noon, 7 April, OCD was again in full operation, having achieved a considerable logistical feat. 80/

A few OCD elements were not shifted to the Stadium. The Library's main files and the Office of the Assistant Director stayed in M Building.

SR continued to operate within OCI space in Q Building, and GR remained in Building 14 at 23rd Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. (There were also six OCD people working ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ the branch libraries at K Building and Alcott Hall. 81/ Nonetheless, with the exception of BR, which soon moved "up the hill" to North Building on E Street, Riverside Stadium remained "home" to most of OCD for ~~nine~~ ⁹ years, until the Office's relocation in the new Headquarters Building.

It proved to be an unsettling home. The old building was fraught with safety and health hazards. Despite the extensive and very costly rebuilding operation preceding the move, the building was to remain in a constant state of disrepair for most of the years of OCD's occupancy. One month after the move, a four-page memorandum to the Chief of General Services listed 19 deficiencies in the building. Most of the defects were serious

in nature, such as faulty plumbing, buckled floors, defective electrical wiring, noninstallation of fire extinguishers, and grossly inadequate ventilation. Not the least of the complaints concerned bad odors emanating from "a stagnant pool of water under the north end of the building" and, at the other end, from the adjoining stables!

Then there were the ladies' rest rooms, where the defective plumbing and the absence of mirrors, soap dispensers, and bolts on doors inspired the following message "To The Powers That Be, From The Gals In OCD":

Oh, the restroom isn't restful anymore,
There's water six feet deep upon the floor,
The walls are blue and slimy,
The faucets dry and grimy,
And the restroom ain't the best room anymore.

If you like privacy behind the little door,
Then this room, girls, you surely will deplore:
We cannot comb our hair,
For the mirror, it ain't there--
Oh, the restroom ain't the best room anymore. 82/

Most critical, however, was the oppressive heat that developed in the badly ventilated building with the advent of summer. During the worst of the hot spells, a nurse from the Medical Staff took up her duty station within the Stadium from about 1100 hours onward, as did a technician swinging a sling cyclometer to obtain temperature and humidity readings. Their daily tours were not lengthy, however. All personnel were frequently released by noon, leaving behind a volunteer skeleton force.

General Services Administration (GSA) arranged an emergency installation of air conditioning equipment and GSA work crews gradually overcame the host of other defects. It was months, however, before the situation could be described as even close to normal. In fact, as late as August 1955, water leaks repeatedly flooded the EAM punched card file room and the microfilm laboratory 83/ and, in one instance, the building had to be sand-bagged when the flooded Potomac River threatened

to overflow its banks. In time, conditions became more bearable and, with constant attention, the old building served its purpose until the move to Headquarters.

7. Stability

During 1953 numerous changes occurred in OCD, none of which were major or particularly significant. In January the International Conference Branch (ICB) was established in LD, and in March 25X1A9A [redacted] Chief of LD's non-IAC Branch, was made chief of IR, relieving Joseph Becker of his additional, temporary duties. With the procurement of foreign language publications now centered in CIA as the result of NSCID No. 16, in July the Foreign Publications Branch in the Department of State was abolished and reestablished in CIA as the Foreign Branch (later the Acquisitions Branch) of the Library. Before the year had ended,

the Library had begun microfilming all incoming, single-copy intelligence documents. BR had reorganized on a geographical basis into the Soviet and non-Soviet Branches and had begun publishing a new report series--Biographic Intelligence Bulletins.

In retrospect, if any particular year can be singled out, 1953 was the year in which OCD came of age. Many changes would, of course, occur in the future. By the end of 1953, however, the organizational structure was established and all the machine-based systems had been developed. There would be changes in the key personnel, either through rotation or reassignment, but basically the men who directed OCD in 1953 constituted the team that continued to lead OCD for the next 10 years. With its 1953 T/O ceiling at an all-time high of (except for a few short years beginning with 1964 when FDD would be part of OCD), Dr. Andrews and his key officers had soundly developed OCD into a unique, effective centralized reference facility.

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