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[REDACTED] of CIG's only business machine capability in the Center and [REDACTED] previous exposure to the "contact" business. After V-E Day in mid-1944, [REDACTED], then with the General Staff Corps,* had been recruited by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to set up West Coast offices and conduct a "Survey of Foreign Experts"--that is, to locate organizations and individuals in the western states with knowledge of Far Eastern countries and to index their capabilities. As a result of the operation, a file of some 10,000 5x8 cards was amassed, each of which indexed, among other things, the source's area, language, and professional knowledge. After the war, a complete set of the cards was placed in the OSS

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* [REDACTED] served on the staff of Col. Alfred McCormack, Military Intelligence Chief, General Staff Corps.

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Archives 72/ and it was a selected portion of these cards which became the base for CCR's files. It is not so surprising, then, that the contact control operation was initially placed in the new Reference Center--partly, one would assume, because of ██████████'s experience and the enthusiasm he had conveyed to Alfred McCormack;* but most certainly because the "index" would thus become part of the Center's vaulted machine controls. In actual fact, at the time there was no other place to put the activity. It was very shortly afterward, however, that the Contact Branch of the new Office of Operations was established** and the battle was joined. Where the mission of OO/Contact

* Col. McCormack had left the General Staff Corps to become the first Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence. In an April 1946 memorandum to the D/CIG, McCormack was one of the few to urge that the U.S. continue its wartime domestic collection effort.

** October 1946.

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was to "open up" U.S. organizations in order to tap the flow of intelligence information from their foreign representatives, CCR's job in OCD was to machine index for rapid retrieval the information producing capabilities of the individual sources involved. From the outset, this functional dichotomy was anathema to the officers of the Contact Branch's Field Division. In their opinion, ^{very few} no one, apparently not even their own headquarters people, could properly protect the identities of their U.S. sources. As later noted by the Contact Division's historian, "it was obvious...that the field officers would never consent to the inclusion of their sources' identities in an index available to all of the outside intelligence agencies; or, to venture into a completely different area of dispute, to other elements of CIA." 73/ The contact control index, or CCR, remained in OCD for two more years before the OO/C position prevailed and, as we have seen, the operation was transferred out of OCD and absorbed by OO's Contact Branch.

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The second function to be transferred out of OCD during the last half of 1948 was the map activity carried out by the Map Division of the Graphics Register. In June of 1947, the State-OSS map library and geographic intelligence functions had been transferred to CIA and in August ^{they} were re-established in ORE as the Map Intelligence

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Branch under [REDACTED] From its inception, the Graphics Register had carried out a closely-allied function in its Map Division: the codification and machine indexing of essential information on foreign maps of intelligence value held by governmental and non-governmental institutions in the U.S. It was this activity which, in September 1948, was moved out of OCD and merged [in] with the Map Library Division of ORE's Map Branch. Again, however, the machine support responsibility remained with OCD's Machine Division. 74/

By the close of 1948, OCD's rate of growth was still increasing despite the two functional excisions. In December the on-board personnel

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strength had risen to 305 against an authorized total of 394, as compared to 92 people and an authorized total of 224 just 12 months previously. Operationally, the divisions were eliminating the functional flaws but service demands were increasing even faster than personnel strength. Key reassignments continued to be rather frequent. In August,

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██████████ was brought into OCD as Chief of the Industrial Register where ██████████ had

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been Chief pro tem. In September, ██████████ returned to the Air Force to be succeeded as OCD's

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Deputy Assistant Director by ██████████

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on loan from the Army; and ██████████ replaced

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██████████ as Acting Chief of the Biographic

Register. In December, ██████████

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who had been first the Navy and later the CIA desk officer in the old OCD's liaison operation, was named Chief of the Liaison Division, replacing the division's

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
first chief, ██████████

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With one exception, the key assignments remained unchanged during 1949. The single exception was the arrival of [REDACTED] who became Chief of the Biographic Register on 3 January 1949, 75/ retaining [REDACTED] as his deputy. [REDACTED] in GR and [REDACTED] in IR still had no deputies--at least in the titular sense. In the new Liaison Division, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] served as [REDACTED] deputy; [REDACTED] worked under [REDACTED] as Assistant Librarian; and [REDACTED] continued as [REDACTED] deputy in the Machine Division. By 1949, the Executive and Coordinating Staffs had been replaced by the Administrative Staff and the Operations Staff; the former headed by [REDACTED] (although she would not be formally appointed until December of 1950 76/), and the latter by [REDACTED]. In the Library, [REDACTED] had succeeded [REDACTED] in January 1949 as Top Secret Control Officer (TSCO), CIA Records Administrator and Custodian of Registered

25X1A9a Documents. [redacted] the original TSCO had transferred to ORE when the Central Records Division had been merged with the reorganized OCD in May 1948. (77*) In February 1949, Central Records Division itself was reorganized within OCD. The mail and courier activity became the responsibility of OCD's Administrative Staff and the Administrative Records, Top Secret Control and the Records Management (CIA Archives) functions were assigned to the Library.

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During the first eight months of 1949, OCD's on-board strength had risen more than 12% to 343 people and the authorized T/O had been increased by almost 15% to 449. In addition, the Office's operations were finally beginning to achieve the

* Throughout the first 25 years of reference service history, there have been only five Top Secret Control Officers (excluding the original TSCO, [redacted] who never joined OCD): [redacted] from January 1949; [redacted] from April 1950; [redacted] from September 1954; [redacted] in 1967; and [redacted] from 1968.

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functional effectiveness that comes with experience. After its late start, for example, the Graphics Register, with 24 people, handled over 1400 requests for still photos and motion picture film during Fiscal Year 1949. Within its field of responsibility--preparing biographic reports and providing other types of biographic support--the Biographic Register was amassing files on all types of foreign personalities and not simply on the foreign scientific and technological personalities for whom it was held responsible by NSCID No. 8. During Fiscal Year 1949, the Register's staff of 62 people [had] responded to 1229 requestors; the Industrial Register, also with 62 people on board, [had] answered 628 queries; and the reconformed Liaison Division, with 25 people, [had] provided 2413 collection and liaison services. The Library's broader reference function naturally resulted in a far larger request total of over 22,000 for the same fiscal period. It also had the largest working staff of 97 people. Cumulatively, the OCD

components during Fiscal Year 1949--that is, after two to three years of operating experience, depending upon the unit--serviced a total of 28,245 requests, almost 3,000 of which were received from non-CIA requesters. In addition, the Liaison Division received and disseminated over 263,000 documents (including cables and airgrams)*--an increase of almost 23,000 over the total of the previous fiscal year. 78/ 79/

It was thus evident by 1950 that OCD had become a reality within the profession; that its functions had been soundly conceived and developed. In short,

* It is interesting that 22 years later, in FY 1971, the 12-month total for collateral documents received had stabilized at almost exactly the same figure--260,000 (exclusive of cables which, in later years, were held for only several months). The all-time collateral document peak of 409,000 was registered in FY 1963. From that point forward, however, the true work measurement had to include the Special Intelligence documents which the office began receiving in 1963 and which, in FY 1971, alone totalled more than 582,000 items.

the planners had accomplished what they had set out to achieve--~~that is,~~ the creation of a first-of-its-kind, centralized intelligence reference facility. By that year, the office had grown into an on-going and youthfully successful operation. Constant change, both major and minor, would, of course, continue to occur and the system was still a far cry from the comparatively sophisticated machine that would evolve in future years. Nonetheless, OCD had become an effective and viable operation. The basic problem was no longer one of trying to make the machine work and prove its value. Rather, the major difficulty was the operation's inability to keep pace with the soaring request load. ^{TP} The divisions' administrative files for 1950 reflect a heavy use of overtime, the need for additional personnel, and the development of backlogs in pending requests, filing and reproduction. In the Library, where the March document flow reached a total of 23,000--a 37% increase over the 1949 monthly average--a seven-day work week was implemented and the staff members were given an option of Saturday

or Sunday work. In the Biographic Register, the Regional Branch (for nonscientific personalities) had become seriously overloaded, particularly because of the heavy volume of requests being levied by the Special Research Center in "Q" Building (later the Office of Current Intelligence) and the recently formed Office of Policy Coordination. In the other divisions, conditions were similar and action was taken to pare back responsibilities. In July, plans were approved to relieve OCD of the Agency's machine records functions, as recommended by the Management Staff's survey team. Since the CIA machine system had begun in OCD (in the pre-merger Reference Center), the office had been assigned responsibility for applying machine techniques to the Agency's accounting and administrative record keeping. By 1950, nine such programs were being performed by the Machine Division's Administrative Project Branch, ranging from personnel statistical records and payroll accounting to stock inventory and machine utilization records. On 17 July 1950, Acting Executive ██████████

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██████████ approved the transfer of all administrative

support by machine techniques from OCD to Management's Special Support Staff (SSS) in "L" Building. It is doubtful that the move lightened the work burden on OCD since 11 slots were also transferred. [REDACTED]

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who had been Chief of the Machine Division since its inception, [also] moved with the function to SSS, presumably to serve as supervisor-planner for all Agency machine operations.* He was subsequently succeeded as MD's chief ^{by} ~~as~~ his former deputy,

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[REDACTED] P Other functional transfers were effected. By the end of the year, IR had arranged to transfer to the Air Force responsibility for foreign airfield activities and had initiated formal proposals to transfer its files on foreign transportation and communications systems to the Army Map Service.**

* By 1950 there were already six separate CIA machine installations: OO's Contact Division in South Building; OCD in M Building (by far the most extensive operation); the Special Research Center in Q; OSO's Communications Division in L (where SSS would also be established); and MD's Board of Geographic Names unit in South Interior Building.

** The transfers to AMS were never effected and the functions remained with IR.

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The situation was further aggravated by the outbreak of the Korean War and all of OCD was forced into a six-day work week from mid-July to early October. To help absorb the ballooning workload, Dr. [REDACTED] in May had requested an additional 29 people--2 for LD, 13 for the Library, and 14 for BR's Regional Branch, thus raising OCD's authorized total to 471. In addition, the size of the division's files were already beginning to signal future space problems. By June [of] 1950, the Intellofax file contained almost 315,000 documents compared to the December 1949 total of 150,000 unindexed reports. In BR, the 25,000 personality dossiers of December 1949 had increased to about 95,000; IR's industrial installation files had grown from 25,000 to almost 50,000 during the same period; and late-starting GR had, by mid-1950, amassed files containing 250,000 ground and 20,000 personality photos.

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Key personnel assignments remained relatively static during 1950. In June, [REDACTED] OCD's Deputy Assistant Director, returned to the Army and was not immediately replaced. In December, two former BR officers, [REDACTED] transferred out of OCD, the former to Administrative Services and the latter to OPC.

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Despite its growth problems, the overall success of the OCD operation by the end of 1950 was indisputable. In addition to the technical and analytical expertise which had been developed by desk personnel, OCD's success was attributable, in no small degree, to the office's machine systems' growth. By the close of the year, Intellofax had become effectively operational. The system would never cease to be a target of customer criticism but it nonetheless represented a technological breakthrough. Irrespective of its early flaws and the shortcomings that would draw fire throughout its existence, the Intellofax System provided the intelligence analyst with a tool which had never previously been available anywhere. It presented, for the first time, a solution to the analyst's historical problem: the painstaking and time-consuming effort necessary to pull together all available intelligence material bearing on a given problem. Whatever its shortcomings, Intellofax did provide the intelligence analyst, to a very considerable degree, a mechanical means of readily obtaining access to all pertinent intelligence

documents, thereby meaningfully increasing the time available to him for pursuing his primary function -- the production of intelligence.

The Intellofax equipment and procedures that were originally in use [would] change^d drastically in future years. For at least two years after it became fully operational, concurrent "shake-down" tests [would be] conducted and even during the first year of full operation (1950), drastic changes were effected.

At the outset, for instance, it had been planned to electronically transmit the Intellofax tapes to requesters. Late in 1949 and early in 1950, the first Faxcard transmitters and receivers were delivered by

25X1A5a1 [REDACTED] and installed -- the former in the Library and the latter in M and Q Buildings. In theory, the selected Faxcards (IBM punched cards) could be reproduced by Facsimile machines onto the Intellofax tape which, in turn would be fed into the transmitter and electronically sent to the receiver closest to the requester. Within months, however, technical and human difficulties developed. First, transmission presented security problems which, at that time, could not be quickly solved. In addition,

customers balked at having to load the paper tapes into the receiving machines and insisted that inter-office mail would generally provide sufficiently speedy service for the transmission of their requested Intellofax tape runs. Considering the multitude of other technical matters demanding attention, and the apparent lukewarm attitude of the customer sector, the decision was made about mid-1950 to abandon the transmission phase of the Intellofax System. It was never resurrected. The basic Intellofax System, however, [would] continue^d to develop* as the first machine-based document retrieval system within the intelligence profession, largely sustaining Dr. Andrews' earlier observation in a status report to the DCI when he suggested

It is quite possible that the central reference system being built by CIA will ultimately prove the most important central intelligence service which the Agency provides. 80/

* The Intellofax System [would] endure^d for 17 years until 1967 when, largely for reasons of economy and redirection of effort, it [would be] replaced by AEGIS (Already Existing General Information System) which, in truth, was indeed far more general and far less detailed than Intellofax.



In retrospect, it would appear that probably the most significant acknowledgement of OCD's success status was the decision to leave the office untouched when the Agency was sweepingly reorganized in late 1950 and 1951 -- particularly the production offices. During ^{1950,} ~~that year,~~ it will be recalled, the departing DCI, Admiral Hillenkoetter, had postponed all reorganization until his successor had had the opportunity to consider the recommendations made by both the Dulles Survey Group and the Agency's own Management Staff. With regard to OCD, the Dulles team had urged complete dismemberment of the office, while the Management task team had recommended transfer of OCD's liaison and administrative machine functions to other Agency components (the remaining functions to be carried out by a renamed "Office of Reference and Dissemination"). After his arrival in October, Smith committed himself to the Dulles Committee's recommendations and quickly thereafter (on 13 November) announced the formation of a new Office of Research and Reports (ORR), the establishment of the Office of National Estimates and, a few days later, the

Office of Intelligence Coordination (OIC).* In view of the DCI's announced approval of the Dulles findings, the end of OCD and transfer of its functions to the new offices was expected momentarily. In fact, the machine unit, the Library and the Registers were actually regrouped as branches in a proposed organizational chart for the new ORR.

As previously noted, however, General Smith's final decision in December was to leave OCD intact and the office was grouped with the production offices under the new [REDACTED] Only minor changes 25X1A9a were made in OCD's charter: responsibility for the Agency's Records Management Program (CIA Archives) and mail and courier service were shifted to the Deputy for Administration.

* OIC was the expanded "Coordination Division" proposed by the Dulles group to replace COAPS, the five-month old successor to ICAPS.

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For the remainder of General Smith's tenure and for most of Allen Dulles' administration, OCD fortunately remained undisturbed by the organizational changes that would reshape the Agency. The situation permitted OCD to continue its progress toward full development and the changes that did occur were internally inspired. During a relatively uneventful 1951, it will be recalled that the Liaison Division was partially reorganized: the Cable Branch was set up in February and, in June, the military desks were combined into a single Defense Branch. It was also in June of 1951 that the compartmented Special Register (SR) was established in "Q" Building as OCD's seventh line division, replacing the Collation Division of the fledgling Office of Current Intelligence. The operation was placed under OCD authority to assure indexing and retrieval compatibility between OCI's special intelligence and the collateral material. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was named SR's first chief. The

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year also marked the beginning of OCD's limited involvement in direct field collection. In

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February, [REDACTED] Chief of BR's Scientific Branch, completed a survey of files in 11 U.S. military intelligence headquarters in Europe. During the trip, he arranged for the

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[REDACTED] of the Industrial Register led an Overseas Microfilming Team to Europe. For about two years the team [would] operate out of [REDACTED] not only exploiting files of industrial intelligence interest (over 1,000 reels were microfilmed) but also coordinating some of the Agency's overt requirements

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* [REDACTED] was later chosen to head up OCD's new Statistical Division, formed in November 1957 from SR's Statistical Branch. The following year he accompanied the operation when it was transferred to the Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC) and renamed the Data Management Division. [REDACTED] was chief of NPIC's Production Services Group when he retired in 1969.

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with U.S. field collectors, particularly with State's Publications Procurement Officers. Although there would be ^{was} only one more large scale, direct collection effort mounted by OCD,* such operations were the beginning of OCD's low-key program of dispatching representatives to the field on ad hoc collection or coordination missions.**

Key personnel changes, although [also] minimal during 1951, completely changed the leadership of the Liaison Division. In April LD's Deputy Chief,

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25X1A * During a ten-week period in 1955, [redacted] and [redacted] of BR would exploit the biographic files of U.S. installations in [redacted] and other [redacted] cities. The 25X1A9a

25X1A6a [redacted] operation resulted in the acquisition of hard copy or microfilm records on almost 8,000 foreign S&T personalities. 25X1A6a

** After the Agency absorbed State's biographic effort in mid-1961, the program would be expanded to assure two or three annual trips abroad, primarily to coordinate biographic collection with Foreign Service posts and improve communications between CIA reference analysts and their Foreign Service counterparts.

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[REDACTED] was named OCD's new Deputy Assistant Director, replacing [REDACTED] who had returned to the Army the previous year. In August the Division's chief [REDACTED] (by then Captain [REDACTED], was recalled to sea duty and was succeeded a month later by [REDACTED]

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In January of 1952, OCD's status as an "intelligence" office was reiterated when it was regrouped with the production offices under the new Deputy Director for Intelligence, [REDACTED] Although undisturbed by the altered chain of command, OCD continued its painful expansion, beset by soaring request loads and inadequate staffing. As the Agency's offices expanded, so too did their demands on the Office of Collection and Dissemination. A total of over 27,000 requests for intelligence information were received by five of the OCD divisions in 1951 (not including the Machine Division and the new Special Register), an increase of 29% over the 1950 total of less than 21,000. Personnel and space growth was almost constant. In

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