



United States Department of State

Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520

September 22, 1981

*Mr. McMahon
15151*

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MEMORANDUM TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Demarche on Soviet Compliance with
the Biological Weapons Convention

ACDA Director Eugene V. Rostow will be making the demarche to the Soviets, agreed at the September 17 meeting of the CBW Working Group, on compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The demarche will be made to Soviet Minister-Counselor A.A. Bessmertnykh here on Thursday, September 24. This demarche will be followed up in Moscow by our Charge who will convey the same points to an appropriate official at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

RBurt

Richard Burt

Attachment:

US Demarche on Soviet Compliance with the BWC

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State Dept. review completed

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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEMARCHE

-- The United States wishes to raise a problem of extreme importance for relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and for the future of arms control. It concerns Soviet compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

-- The United States and the Soviet Union have discussed one aspect of this issue -- the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk -- repeatedly in the past, most recently when the US Charge in Moscow talked with First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko in June. The United States wishes, however, to raise the issue of Soviet compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention one more time in an attempt to resolve the problem.

-- The United States has strong reason to believe that the Soviet Union is not in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. This concern is based in part on the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk. It is based in part on the presence in the Soviet Union of heavily secured military installations which have features which suggest that their function is related to biological weapons. It is also based on strong and compelling evidence of the use of mycotoxins by communist forces in Southeast Asia.

-- With regard to the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, previous exchanges have served only to heighten the suspicion that the outbreak was the result of Soviet activities inconsistent with the Biological Weapons Convention. The explanation provided by the Soviet Government that the outbreak was due to natural causes is inconsistent with information available to the United States. Among the reasons for continuing concern are reports that the inhalation form of anthrax was involved and the large number of deaths.

-- Underlying US concern over the outbreak of anthrax is its proximity to an unusual military facility known as Cantonment 19. Cantonment 19 includes animal pens, suggesting it is engaged in tests on animals. It includes structures enclosed in earthen revetments which appear suitable for the storage of explosives. Certain areas have extraordinarily strict security arrangements. The section within the Soviet military which is responsible for chemical and biological programs is known to be associated with a facility in Sverdlovsk. The United States is aware of other facilities elsewhere in the Soviet Union which have similar characteristics, suggesting that they may be engaged in illicit biological warfare activities.

-- The Soviet Union has failed to take advantage of repeated contacts on Sverdlovsk to provide information which might allay our concern. Instead, the Soviet Government has denied that the Biological Weapons Convention is involved and questioned

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US seriousness in raising the issue. The United States believes that the Biological Weapons Convention is involved and has repeatedly raised the issue precisely because it is serious about arms control and about the need to comply with arms control agreements. The uncooperative reaction of the Soviet Government is inconsistent with Article V of the Biological Weapons Convention.

-- Now new information about the use of toxin weapons in Southeast Asia has added an additional dimension to this issue. Three lethal toxins have been identified in a sample from Kampuchea -- substances whose use in war is clearly prohibited under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law, and whose possession or manufacture for such purposes is prohibited under the Biological Weapons Convention. The symptoms produced by these toxins are consistent with the bizarre effects reported by eyewitnesses and by victims of certain lethal attacks in Kampuchea. They are also consistent with the effects of attacks which have been reported in Laos and Afghanistan.

-- It is well known that the Soviet Union is supporting the Vietnamese in their invasion of Kampuchea. Soviet personnel have functioned in an advisory role on matters related to chemical warfare there, and numerous reports directly link the Soviet Union to attacks with lethal agents in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. These tricothecene toxins do not occur naturally in Southeast Asia. No known facilities in Southeast Asia could produce the toxins in the quantities necessary to cause the effects reported, although the Soviet Union could produce them. Research projects concerning tricothecene toxins have been identified at Warsaw Pact institutes previously associated with chemical and biological weapons research.

-- The Soviet Government has clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. According to Article I, each Party commits itself never to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes.

-- Article III forbids Parties to transfer such biological agents or toxins to any recipient or to assist or encourage any State in their acquisition or manufacture.

-- Article V requires the Parties to consult and cooperate in solving any problems which may arise with respect to the Convention.

-- In accordance with Article V of the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States requests a prompt meeting involving technical experts from the Soviet Union and the United States to examine these issues fully and to discuss means by which these concerns might be allayed.

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-- Specifically with regard to the use of toxins, the United States expects that the Soviet Government will act so as to prevent recurrence of these incidents. The United States also expects that the Soviet Union will cooperate fully with the UN investigation of chemical weapons use and that it will strongly encourage the governments of Afghanistan, Laos and Vietnam to cooperate fully as well.

-- The United States asks for a prompt and positive reply to these requests. The possibility of resolving this matter through bilateral diplomatic channels is almost exhausted, and the United States is prepared to take its concerns to other fora. The implications of a failure to resolve this matter are extremely serious for the future of arms control, as well as for US/Soviet relations.

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