



United States Department of State  
Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs  
Washington, D.C. 20520

September 23, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL (with SECRET attachment)  
MEMORANDUM TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: CBW Arms Control

Attached is the redraft of the CBW Strategy Paper which incorporates agency comments made at and subsequent to the September 16 meeting of the CBW I.G. Please pass any further comments to Blair Murray (632-1129).

As agreed at the September 16 meeting, absent any major difficulties with the paper as it now stands, we plan to schedule a SIG for next week to discuss the issues it raises.

*R. Blackwill*

Robert D. Blackwill,  
Acting

Attachment:

As stated.

DISTRIBUTION:

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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**SECRET**Strategy for CBW Arms ControlI. Background

Soviet behaviour in general and Soviet unwillingness to take satisfactory steps to alleviate, or even respond to, US concerns about Soviet activities in the field of chemical and biological warfare have negatively affected US/Soviet relations and raised serious questions about the real nature of the Soviet threat -- not only to US security, but to world peace and security as well. The tense international climate which exists as a result has made the prospects for forward movement in the area of arms control extremely difficult at best, and reinforces the importance of adopting a firm and unyielding stance in support of strict and effective arms control verification and compliance. It also makes clear the need for a more realistic international appraisal of the sources of and solutions to the problems which are creating international instability and threatening the security of nations.

The area of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) offers opportunities for articulating a principled and consistent arms control philosophy and for countering the Soviet propoganda effort on arms control by focussing international attention on verification and compliance questions. The evolution of US policy regarding CBW arms control will be watched carefully by foreign audiences and must be orchestrated to convey the proper signals to our Allies, the Soviets and neutral/non-aligned States.

BW:

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When the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was negotiated in 1972, the US recognized that it was not adequately verifiable and that, in any event, more stringent verification measures were not acceptable to the Soviets. However, the US felt such an agreement to be in the national interest because the US had no intention of continuing a BW program of its own, because of the general abhorrence of biological weapons, and because the questionable military utility of biological weapons was thought to make violations unlikely and to minimize the military consequences of any violation which could occur.

Accumulating evidence has now made it clear that the judgment regarding probable compliance with the agreement

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Full title: Convention on the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction

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was optimistic. Intelligence available to the US, some of it very recent, has raised serious concerns that, since the signing of the BWC in 1972, the Soviets:

- have continued a BW-related research and development program and may have developed, produced and stockpiled biological weapons; and
- may have supplied mycotoxins (substances covered by the BWC) for use against anticommunist forces in Southeast Asia, and possibly used them in Afghanistan.

The US renounced biological and toxin weapons altogether in 1969, and is unlikely to reactivate its BW program under any circumstances.

CW:

The Warsaw Pact currently presents a very serious CW threat. Given the present imbalance, Warsaw Pact CW use would result in high NATO casualties and have a major impact on all military operations. Chemical weapons are considered by the Soviets to confer an important military advantage, and extremely tight security is observed regarding them. There have been numerous reports of the use of CW by the Soviets in Afghanistan and possible Soviet involvement in the reported use of CW in Southeast Asia. Some of the reports indicate the use of lethal agents, some of which (i.e., mycotoxins) are also covered by the BWC.

The US proposals for a CW agreement that have been under negotiation in recent years are aimed at a ban on the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing chemical stocks and their means of production, and call for verification, inter alia, by on-site inspection. The negotiations have been stalled as a result of Soviet intransigence on verification. US insistence on adequate verification, however, has been widely supported by the Allies and others.

Any agreement further limiting chemical weapons would involve verification difficulties comparable to those connected with the BWC. Furthermore, totally effective verification of a CW prohibition by NTM alone is virtually impossible with present and foreseeable technology. In any event, conclusion of a comprehensive CW prohibition in the foreseeable future is remote at best. Accordingly, an effective deterrent of the use of CW is required to redress the present imbalance in US vs. Soviet capabilities and to enable the US to negotiate from a strengthened position should it be decided to continue CW arms control efforts.

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Current US planning calls for extensive modernization of our CW capabilities as a deterrent against Soviet CW use. Whatever the US does with respect to CW arms control, we will be pressured by the Allies and Congress to link CW modernization to CW arms control in the manner of theater nuclear modernization. The US has an overriding interest in ensuring that CW modernization proceeds, and that the new munitions are eventually deployed. The US also has an interest in not being forced, as deployment becomes more imminent, to link that step to arms control. This suggests that the USG should, while the CW deployment issue is still remote, elaborate a position on CW arms control which can be sustained over the long term.

### Verification/Compliance

With respect to Soviet compliance with the BWC, the US has made a number of bilateral demarches to the Soviets seeking information concerning the outbreak of anthrax in 1979, reportedly caused by an accident at a suspect BW facility located in that city; the matter was also raised at the 1980 BWC Review Conference. Reports of the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan are under investigation by the UN by a specially appointed international experts group which is scheduled to submit a report to the UNGA this fall.

Focus at the UNGA on verification and compliance questions can allow the US both to embarrass the Soviets and to begin expounding a principled position on these issues which we can carry into other arms control fora. By the same token, a positive US stance in favour of verifiable and genuine arms control measures in this field will reinforce the impact of US compliance concerns in the international community. We must, therefore, carefully consider the position we want to adopt with respect to BW, CW and other arms control agreements as well. Promotion of cooperative measures, such as on-site inspection, will be a common element in US verification/compliance policy generally. Yet it must be recognized that there are limits to the utility of such methods, particularly in the BW/CW area. On-site inspection procedures would have to be carefully defined with regard to the composition of the inspection team, the number of challenge inspections permitted per year, the maximum time period between inspection request and the arrival of the team at the site, the areas to be open to inspection, etc. Collateral constraints and cooperative measures also would require careful formulation.

## II. Objectives

With respect both to BW and CW, US objectives are:

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- to support US and Allied CW modernization efforts;
- while protecting US intelligence sources and methods, to expose the magnitude of Soviet BW and CW programs and to get the Soviets to halt or curtail illicit activities;
- to make the Soviets pay an appropriate political price for these activities;
- to reduce Soviet credibility and counter Soviet propaganda in other areas; and
- to establish useful precedents and send appropriate signals regarding US policy in these and other arms control fora.

With respect to CW, an additional objective is:

- to shift the onus for the lack of progress in CW arms control from the US to the USSR.

### III. Strategy

In considering the various strategies for handling US policy on CW and BW set forth below, it is important to bear in mind both the linkages and differences which exist between the two issues.

With respect to BW, US strategy should be as follows:

- make one more bilateral demarche to the Soviets (to be done September 24);
- use the UNGA First (Political) Committee, particularly debate on the issue of reports of CW use in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea, and discussions in the CD and elsewhere to continue to expose the CBW activities of the Soviets and their friends to international criticism;
- support convening of a meeting of States Parties to the BWC to seek to strengthen its viability through improved verification and compliance mechanisms in the light of concerns over current lack of compliance, and to provide an additional forum for highlighting our concerns over Soviet non-compliance;
- failing a satisfactory outcome to these steps, the US might take the issue to the UN Security

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Council and/or withdraw from the BWC.

With respect to CW, there are two issues to be addressed in deciding our strategy on CW arms control:

- What our ultimate objective for any new arms control agreement in this field should be (i.e., a complete ban on CW production, development and stockpiling, or a more limited prohibition)?
- If it is decided to pursue CW arms control negotiations, what forum should be used to do so (i.e., US/Soviet bilaterals or multi-lateral negotiations in the CD)?

Given the unsatisfactory precedent of the BWC, a total ban on CW production and stockpiling is an ambitious goal. The question arises as to whether the USG might not better redirect its efforts toward negotiating less comprehensive limits on production, stockpiling and/or deployment. As the US is already party to an agreement banning CW use, and as the US has long supported the objective of a comprehensive CW ban, any more limited ban could appear (and would be portrayed by the USSR) as a step back, designed to legitimize an increase in US CW capacity rather than to reduce global capabilities. In addition, it is generally true that a total ban is easier to monitor than partial limits. Study indicates that this would prove to be the case with partial limits on CW production or stockpiling or deployment.

There are two alternative fora for CW arms control negotiations -- bilateral US/Soviet negotiations or multi-lateral discussions in the Committee on Disarmament. Different approaches have been suggested tailored to these alternatives channels:

- (1) The US could indicate willingness to resume bilateral CW arms control negotiations with the Soviets on the condition that they agree to discuss US concerns about Soviet activities in the CW/BW field; or
- (2) The US could announce that its attitude toward further CW negotiations will be affected by Soviet and international response to evidence regarding illicit BW/CW activities by the Soviets and their allies, but that the US could accept CD negotiations on a CW agreement, the initial focus of which should be on issues of verification and compliance.

Alternatively the US might announce that Soviet behavior and unwillingness to resolve US concerns about compliance

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with the BWC and international constraints on the use of CW, as well as Soviet intransigence on effective verification arrangements, make it unrealistic and impossible to pursue a CW prohibition at the present time.

In order to implement the strategy laid out above, policy decisions on the following points will be required:

- the convening of a meeting of States Parties to the BWC;
- the US objective for CW arms control, if any, i.e., a comprehensive ban or more limited constraints;
- the forum for discussion of CW arms control, if any, i.e., bilateral or in the CD.

Drafted by: NSC:SKraemer/OSD:WBode  
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