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82-1337/9

21 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1 FROM : ☐
         Chairman Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee

    SUBJECT : Fourth Meeting of Strategic Technology Transfer SIG

    1. The fourth meeting of Strategic Technology Transfer SIG was held on 17 September. Mr. William Schneider, State, the new SIG Chairman presided over the meeting. (Copy of Agenda is

25X1 attached). ☐

    2. The Progress Reports were made and approved without comment. (Copies of the Training and VISA reports are attached) The New Agenda Items were covered with little group discussion. The US Trade Rep's member asked why they had seen no draft material on the COCOM List Review preparation and had not been invited to accompany the bilateral teams visits to COCOM capitals prior to the beginning of the negotiations in Paris. Chairman Schneider answered that they would receive the material and their interest would certainly be looked out for during the trips. (That's all that was said.) The DDCI covered the second agenda item rather completely, leaving little for the SIG members to question. The one comment that did surface centered around the Chairman's observations that the foreign Ambassadors he had talked with about the technology transfer problem appeared to be rather ignorant of the key role played by Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services. Mr. Schneider asked that the Intelligence Community consider what might be done to help allied intelligence services better educate their high-level policymakers on the problem and also ways that they could help their own export

25X1 control communities better. ☐

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State Dept. review completed

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SUBJECT: Fourth Meeting of Strategic Technology Transfer SIG

3.   The Fourth Agenda Item consisted of a short talk on Soviet Technology Acquisition efforts by ⬚ 25X1 ⬚ followed by a question and answer period. The presentation was broad-gauge, covering an outline prepared by the SIG staff (copy attached).

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Attachments:
  As stated

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AGENDA

1. Progress Reports

    a. Committee on Special Projects

       -- Visa Denials Question

       -- Raising the Priority of Technology Transfer
          in US Embassies

       -- Training USG Personnel in Technology Transfer

       -- Extradition Treaty Review

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2. New Agenda Items

    a. COCOM List Review Preparations

    b. Raising the Priority of Technology Transfer Issues
       in Allied Intelligence Services

3. Other Business

4. Personal View of the Soviet Technology Acquisition Effort

5. Close of Business

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INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT

Visa Controls Question

Sept. 15, 1982

The August SIG tasked the Committee on Special Projects to prepare an options paper on the question: should the U.S. Government adopt a policy of denying or restricting visas or entry to aliens on the grounds that their visit would result in the loss of strategic technology contrary to U.S. national interests?

In response to this tasking, the Chairman of the Committee formed a visa controls drafting unit consisting of Jerry W. Leach of the committee staff, Diana Morris of the Visa Office, and Jerry Schroeder of the Justice Department.

This group has made a comprehensive study of all legal mechanisms which the U.S. Government could use to deny visas or entry on technology transfer grounds. These are Sections 212a27, 212a28, 212a29, 212f, and 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 221g, previously thought to be a denial possibility, has been found not to be a live option.

The drafting group has just begun working on the question of placing restrictions on visits which carry some risk of illegal transfer.

When the complete set of denial and restriction options have been pinpointed, the drafting unit will contact all SIG agencies for discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of following particular courses of action. Out of this process will emerge the first draft of the policy options paper which will go first before the full Committee on Special Projects, hopefully in October. When satisfied with the paper, the Committee will pass it up to the SIG for decision.

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DISCUSSION PAPER

TRAINING USG PERSONNEL
IN
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MATTERS

Under the auspices of the Committee on Special Projects, a Working Group on Training USG Personnel in Technology Transfer Matters was convened on August 31, to address these issues (the list of attendees is attached).

Except for State's Foreign Service Institute,* there are few other formal training programs in technology transfer issues programs for USG representatives going abroad. This is the result of the small numbers of representatives from other agencies going abroad and the randomness of their rotation cycle. As a consequence, members of the Working Group agreed that it would be useful to establish a resource base, containing both training materials on technology transfer issue and points of contact throughout the bureaucracy, that USG personnel could use prior to their departure overseas. State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (Office of Technology Transfer Assessment) volunteered to establish and maintain this resource base for use by all agencies.

The Working Group members further agreed that they would exchange materials used in training their personnel in technology transfer issues. At this meeting the CIA shared some materials that could be useful in meeting this objective.

Finally, the Working Group discussed the idea of establishing a mini-course on technology transfer (lasting one week) that would occur four times per year. This mini-course would focus on training representatives from agencies concerned with technology transfer and who work at the intersection of domestic and foreign technology transfer issues. If implemented this mini-course would establish a pool of representatives who understand both the national and international issues associated with technology transfer and the various instruments which the USG has available to address this problem area. While increasing the awareness of these representatives, an additional benefit is the broad personal contacts that these personnel would make with others associated with this field.

While it was agreed that each agency would have to pay for their own personnel who attended this course, a more difficult problem is which agency would have the role of sponsoring the school. The Working Group will attempt to resolve this issue at its next meeting.

*The Working Group Chairman is working directly with FSI to enhance the technology transfer content of several courses.

Attachment:
  List of Attendees.

WG on Training

Bill Rennagel (chair)	State/PM	632-4231
Roger Diehl	FBI	324-4646
John McCaffrey	FBI	324-4713
	CIA	
William Truesdell	OJCS	694-3681
William Meehan	Customs	566-9464

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Attendance at August 31 Meeting.

SUGGESTED OUTLINE FOR ITEM 4

I. Soviet organizational attention to Western technology

    A. How the following Soviet institutions function in the process of acquiring Western high technology

        1. Politburo
        2. Ministries (particularly Trade)
        3. GKNT *VPK*
        4. Armed Services

II. Soviet priorities for the collection of Western technology

    A. Priority technologies and equipment

        1. Why is the prioritization as such?

    B. Priority countries targetted for Soviet acquisition efforts

    C. Soviet organization(s) which formulate collection priorities

III. Soviet technology collection in the U.S.

    A. Collection duties of the following Soviet organizations:

        1. KGB
        2. Washington Embassy and *— and UN?*
           San Francisco Consulate
        3. Soviet academic and business groups
        4. U.S. academicians and businessmen visiting the U.S.S.R.

    B. How intelligence information collected in the U.S. is:

        1. Processed in Moscow
        2. Used to support Soviet technology acquisition efforts worldwide

    C. Why the U.S. is continuously targetted for collection of information on strategic technology
      - Role of intermediaries in acquiring/diverting US tech.

IV. Soviet resource dependency strategy to acquire strategic technology

    A. The case of Japanese resource dependence on the U.S.S.R.

    B. How the pipeline may be another manifestation of this strategy

V. Summary observations on possible USG actions to inhibit technology leakage
    -what can USG do?.