OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

27 March 1981
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POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Brandt-Perle Meeting (U)

(U) <u>General</u>

Mr. Perle met with Gen Juergen Brandt, Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces on 25 March 1981. Also present for the discussion were MG Tandecki, LTC Groves and MG Bowman. Two general subjects, US Forces Issues and arms control, were discussed.

(C) <u>US Forces Issues</u>

Gen Bowman began by stating that we were looking for approval in principle of at least Issue number two--the Master Restationing Plan. Brandt returned to Apel's theme of the previous day--we should deal with the Foreign Ministry; we should have dealt with them in the first place. The result of our using the "wrong mailbox" was to hold up wartime Host Nation Support by two months. He expressed his unease about a "Master" restationing plan and stressed the practical environmental difficulties of moving twelve brigades. Gen Groves recounted the history of MRP and stressed it was a 30 year plan, and we realized that we probably won't accomplish all, but we have to start by meeting our most urgent needs. Mr. Perle asked about the military efficacy of restationing. Gen Brandt stated that it would certainly be militarily effective to transfer the Baumholder brigade east of the Rhine. When asked if it would be appropriate to see the Chancellor on the issue he replied, in principle yes, but one must realize that the Chancellor is not the Minister of Coordination, the Foreign Minister is. He suggested, in an apparent extension of Apel's remarks of the day before, that we have the Charge' approach the Foreign Ministry and request bilateral, inter-agency talks. The MOD would participate.

Perle then turned the discussions to wartime HNS which Brandt agreed was MOD business. Groves said he saw three things to be done: agree to the scope (all agreed that the model already defines the scope), develop a time-phased plan for its execution, and decide on a cost sharing formula. Brandt agreed and then opined that before he approaches the Finance Ministry, he needs an annual price and to develop that he needs to compute the cost of the whole project. He estimated that it would probably take until June of 82 to develop the necessary data. Groves countered that we could agree on a realistic annual funding target and implement from there. Brandt agreed that that was a possibility, and said Gen Heinz would probably call on Friday, 27 March, to confirm this first meeting.

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(C) Arms Control

Brandt stated that he was not sure whether they had ever made their position clear on ERW. He had told Congressman Stratton that the ERW has a "gloomy" connotation, and it is important that that connotation not be extended to LRTNF. We need to get LRTNF. He personally doubted necessity for consultations once LRTNF is out of the way. The US had never consulted when we introduced selectable yield weapons--we just switched warheads. The same logic applies to binary weapons if they are replaced on essentially a one for one basis. Using an argument that he attributed to Dr. Ikle, because of the Humanitarian Law which requires that force be used in proportion to its aim, we might have to introduce ERW to reduce collateral damage. Perle stated that his concern was, what was in 1979 pressure to start negotiations, next year could become pressure for concessions. Brandt replied that Germany's answer on the moratorium makes their feeling clear. Perle then stated that he was working very hard to delink LRTNF and SALT. He didn't wish to get in the position where the Soviets could give ground in LRTNF to increase Allied pressure on the US for SALT. Tandecki pointed out that such was not the previous administration's view, but in any case we must insure some balance. Perle agreed that there should be a bridge, but separate negotiations.

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