

File Tech Transfer A

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Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union

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A few months ago a fisherman working off the coast of North Carolina picked up what turned out to be an intelligence gathering device neatly enclosed in a Soviet oceanographic current meter. This device and others like it are used to gather vital information about the U.S. Navy's activities and could be extremely harmful to us if employed in war.

At the heart of this device is a modern printed circuit board. It and several others have been brought to my office the past six months. Most were packaged for military purposes and all were designed for use in a wide variety of weapons systems, including ballistic missiles, "fire and forget" weapons, and guidance and control for aircraft, to name a few.

What surprised me most was that these sophisticated devices were not made in the United States. Nor were they produced in Europe or Japan. They were products of the Soviet Union.

Specialists in the Department of Defense tested these circuit boards carefully. They found many of the components, particularly the microcircuits, to be exact copies of "chips" made in the United States. In fact, a U.S. chip was put on the Soviet circuit board and worked properly. Such microelectronic circuits are used extensively in our strategic and conventional weapons systems. Clearly the Soviets have made remarkable progress in being able to copy and manufacture advanced electronic equipment of this kind.

Alarming Implications

How the Soviet Union got the manufacturing know-how and circuit design information to build these components is a story as complicated as its implications are alarming. The simple answer is that the Soviets have organized a massive, systematic effort to get advanced technology from the West. The purpose of this is to support the Soviet military buildup.

This unusual acquisition program follows two paths—openly whenever possible and clandestinely when not. The Soviets make a maximum effort to get technology from the West by claiming a need for equipment to be used in strictly civilian enterprises. An example is their effort to obtain modern medical equipment such as CAT scanners which require sophisticated computer technology to operate.

Using civilian cover, during the 1960s and 1970s the Soviets moved quickly to purchase electronics technology. Our bureaucracy was asleep to the danger of this, so nothing was done to prevent it. As a result, the Soviets were able to set up a number of specialized electronics factories — all of which are operated today as classified facilities.

Where they were unable to get either

the U.S. or those who participate in the International Control System (COCOM) to yield advanced technology, the Soviets employed a number of clandestine means. Businessmen, engineers, scientists and workers have been bribed. Innocent-looking corporations have been created to buy equipment later sent to the U.S.S.R. Diplomats and official visitors have been used to ferret out items of interest. Neutral and nonaligned states are targeted for exploitation. And, where all else fails, intelligence missions have been run by Soviet agents.

The Soviets obtain considerable benefit

present new evidence to our allies on how the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact are using Western technology to strengthen their offensive military capabilities. We want to conclude at that meeting a redefinition of the COCOM international control program.

I am also working to involve NATO. One of the peculiar aspects of the control system is that defense interests are poorly represented. For example, only the United States sends Department of Defense experts to COCOM, even though COCOM's main purpose is to safeguard technology

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from these complicated maneuvers. Each year they save billions of dollars in research and development costs by "borrowing" Western technology. They get hardware and know-how that is proven and trouble-free. These acquisitions can be, and often are, supported by additional developments in the West. Indeed, merely reading the full range of technical literature openly published gives the Soviets the ability to repair and maintain products they have acquired illegally.

But the most significant and troubling aspect of all this is how the Soviets use the equipment they have gathered to add to their military power. And this is our greatest concern.

An important part of our own national defense as well as the security of our allies and friends around the globe is the "quality edge" we have enjoyed for many years. This advantage is largely the result of the talent and skill produced by our free enterprise system. We have made use of this asset effectively in supporting our national defense programs. It is one of the pillars of our security.

Unlike some, who from time to time criticize our defense programs, the Soviets understand how important the quality edge is to us. Their actions prove that they mean to benefit from our technology. Thus, it is clearly in our best interest to prevent them from doing so and that is what this administration is trying to do.

President Reagan took the lead last July at the Ottawa summit conference when he appealed to our allies to tighten our international control system. We have worked hard to plan an effective high-level COCOM conference. The meeting, to be held in Paris next month, will be the first broad reconsideration of our technology control system in nearly 30 years. We will

that can be used for military purposes by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. At the national level, only the U.S. and France allow defense specialists to review regularly proposed technology exports to the Soviet Union. The result is that many judgments are made without expert participation, and a good deal of damage results, as in the case of highly advanced communication switching equipment obtained by the U.S.S.R. from Western Europe. Unfortunately this equipment can also be used to add greatly to the Soviets' command and control abilities. My hope is that the NATO countries can work together to help change the reviewing procedures for technology transfer issues.

Need Public Understanding

We cannot, however, achieve all we would like to without public understanding. In particular we need industry to take the lead and inform both management and employees of the dangers. In sensitive factories we need voluntary security committees to safeguard essential designs and manufacturing know-how. Industry associations can play an important part in protecting our national security by advising member companies on appropriate measures and internal safeguards.

Businessmen, in general, can be more supportive by recognizing the fact that the long-term interests in peace and security they share with their stockholders far outweigh the short-term gains which the sales of certain equipment offer. If we ignore this and proceed with business as usual, current sales may please some but they will yield the most unpleasant dividends in the future.

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