

Top Secret
[redacted]KH E
File
NSC-25726

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

LIBYA: Military Aid Program

by [redacted] CIA

Since late 1978, Libya has provided grants totaling about \$700 million for arms deliveries and financial disbursements to a number of governments and to about 60 insurgent and dissident groups in the Third World. In addition, over 13,000 foreigners have been trained in Libyan camps. This aid, however, has only marginally strengthened the capabilities of most recipients and Libya's influence. [redacted]

Libyan leader Qadhafi provided an estimated \$500 million in weapons and money over the last three years to select governments, mainly in the Middle East and Africa, and trained about 3,000 government troops, mostly from the sub-Sahara. Although Syria received the most aid--\$283 million, its relations with Libya remain tenuous. [redacted]

Iran became the second-largest beneficiary of Libyan military aid with the delivery in 1981 of some \$150 million worth of tanks, artillery, air defense weapons, ammunition, and spare parts. Libya's assistance reflects months of negotiations that began with the war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. It is based on Tripoli's aid to Iranian dissidents before the Shah's fall and on Qadhafi's empathy for another pariah state--regardless of the impact on relations with other Arab countries. Libya bestowed \$50 million in financial aid in 1979 on Uganda; the Libyans also sent troops to Uganda to help former President Amin defend against the Tanzanian incursion. [redacted]

Virtually all of Libya's smaller government clients are in sub-Sahara Africa. Several, including Burundi, serve as bases or transshipment points for Libyan-supported insurgencies in other countries in the region. Djibouti and other moderate states that have accepted small amounts of Libyan arms or limited training aid usually have done so to gain leverage with traditional Western suppliers. [redacted]

--continued

13

Top Secret
[redacted]

25 February 1982

Top Secret
[REDACTED]

25X1

Primary recipients among insurgent and dissident groups have included radical and more moderate Palestinians, Lebanese leftists, North African dissidents and expatriates, the Somali Democratic Salvation Front, and--before independence in 1980--guerrillas in Zimbabwe. Many of these groups, with little military or paramilitary capability, have benefited from Libyan instruction. In the last three years, several thousand trainees--possibly more than 10,000--were processed in Libyan camps. [REDACTED]

25X1

Libya also has provided some \$175 million in weaponry and funds to these groups. Most of the arms and ammunition are suitable for small unit and paramilitary operations. In some cases, they represent the bulk of an insurgency's inventory. [REDACTED]

25X1

Training Assistance

Training of insurgents and dissidents at numerous sites in Libya has become an increasingly important feature of Qadhafi's program. The total estimated cost of this training is \$60 million. [REDACTED]

25X1

Libyan military and paramilitary training emphasizes basic tactics, some familiarization with armor and crew-served weapons and--for nongovernment groups--guerrilla tactics, including sabotage and assassination. Specialized courses, including pilot training, are given to small groups of select clients at special facilities. [REDACTED]

25X1

The training program still relies heavily on foreign instructors, although Libyans have assumed growing responsibilities for basic training since the late 1970s. The Soviets help provide specialized or advanced training and may assist in running the overall program. Some foreigners probably receive training in conjunction with Libyan trainees from East European instructors, while Palestinians, Egyptians, and Tunisians usually instruct non-Libyan trainees. [REDACTED]

25X1

Effectiveness of the Program

Libyan assistance has only modestly improved the capabilities of Qadhafi's clients. Most governments have not depended on Qadhafi for the bulk of their arms,

--continued

Top Secret
[REDACTED]

25X1

25 February 1982

Top Secret
[REDACTED]

although Libyan funds have allowed a few states to buy weapons that they themselves could not have afforded. Aid provided to insurgents and dissidents thus far has not helped any of them to assume power. [REDACTED]

Tripoli generally has not been able to convert its increased assistance into greater influence. Qadhafi's continued failure to fulfill his pledges have seriously harmed the program. In addition, potential retaliatory measures by more moderate states have led some governments to reconsider the value of accepting aid from Libya. [REDACTED]

Nonetheless, Qadhafi continues to be driven by deep-seated ideological motivations. He believes that in the longer term he will fulfill his mission of leading the Third World in a global revolution that will end the dominance of the East and the West. [REDACTED]

Outlook

Qadhafi evidently intends to continue his increased military aid program despite its limited returns. Continuing sharp declines in oil revenues, however, could impose limits on future arms deliveries and financial transfers. Moreover, opposition by moderate states to Qadhafi's subversive efforts--especially if the governments or insurgents he supports seem actually to be posing greater threats--could grow. [REDACTED]

If these conditions materialize, Libyan aid disbursements probably would become more uncertain, further undermining Qadhafi's reliability as a supplier. Nonetheless, Qadhafi's zeal to support anti-US regimes and radical groups indicates that he will have no shortage of customers for his military goods and money. [REDACTED]

Top Secret
[REDACTED]

25 February 1982