

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

4 Dec 1981

We provided these comments on the Draft Nitze Report to Paul Walsh, but they of course were not able to accommodate most of them in their Final Report.

We will be sending you a memorandum early next week summarizing our comments on the Final Report and a proposed memorandum for you to use in forwarding the report to the Secretary of Defense.



Lawrence K. Gershwin

Date

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NFAC 7599-81

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 250/81
24 November 1981
Copy *Ray*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Paul Walsh
System Planning Corporation

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Draft Mission Capabilities Task Force Study, November 1981

1. We believe the task force accomplished the objective of taking a first step to assess how the Soviets would view the capabilities of their forces to perform the strategic missions called for by their strategy. We recognize that the study was an ambitious and complex undertaking completed in a very short time. As an initial experimental effort, the study results should inform intelligence analysts as well as those responsible for the interagency net assessment of the US-USSR strategic balance recently directed by the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. We find especially valuable, the excellent assessment of how the Soviets see the future strategic competition (Section IV). Also, the revelation of information gaps and analytical uncertainties in the study should contribute to our further collection and analytical efforts on this important subject. ☐ 25X1

2. We have noted in the attachments a number of deficiencies in the analyses used, in the findings and in the presentation of material in the draft report. The most important of these are

--The suggestion that the exchange calculations used replicate Soviet analyses of the capabilities of their forces. This impression should be corrected early in the report, as noted in the attachments.

--The use of some important assumptions that minimize US capabilities. We believe these assumptions are at variance with Soviet perceptions and planning factors.

--Some key judgments and conclusions conveyed with much greater confidence than justified in view of the serious gaps in the intelligence information available and the uncertainties in the results of the exchange calculations. The experimental nature and tentativeness of the findings of this study should be explicitly noted. ☐ 25X1

3. We realize that many of our comments and suggestions cannot be accommodated at this stage of the study. They may have some utility, however, as part of a critique of the study aimed at further efforts to replicate how the Soviets assess the capabilities of their nuclear forces. ☐ 25X1

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Lawrence K. Gershwin

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ATTACHMENTS

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