

# National Security Record

## Report on the Congress and National Security Affairs

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION • 513 C STREET, N.E. • WASHINGTON, D.C. • 20002 • (202) 546-4400

NO. 45

MAY 1982

## Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements

On June 29, 1982, the United States and the Soviet Union will formally begin strategic arms reduction (START) talks. This development comes just after both the U.S. and the Soviets have formally articulated initial bargaining positions on arms reduction.

The United States has proposed that both nations substantially reduce their nuclear weapons capabilities, including a reduction by one-third in the total number of nuclear warheads deployed by each side on long-range ballistic missiles.

The initial Soviet response has been harshly negative. Soviet leader Brezhnev, while indicating a willingness to discuss arms reduction, dismissed the U.S. proposal as "unrealistic" and "designed to insure American superiority." At the same time, Brezhnev, seeking to take advantage of the unilateral arms reduction sentiment found in some sectors of the U.S. and Western European populace, called for a strategic arms freeze to begin as soon as possible.

Nuclear weapons possess the most awesome destructive capability of any weapons in the history of mankind. This stark reality has periodically prompted many individuals and groups to passionately pursue arms control agreements.

However admirable the objective of averting nuclear war may be, the narrow-minded pursuit of seemingly attractive arms limitation proposals may, in reality be a dangerous and misguided mission. In fact, a vague or unverifiable arms agreement would actually lead to a more unstable and unpredictable nuclear environment, and thereby increase the possibilities of a nuclear war.

This necessity for any proposed nuclear arms agreement to be clear and verifiable is particularly relevant at the present time, given the intense public interest that has arisen in conjunction with the proposal for a "nuclear freeze."

Especially in light of the apparent increase in attention to the nuclear freeze concept, as well as the recent Reagan and Brezhnev statements, it is very important that the true situation with respect to verifying Soviet compliance with existing arms nuclear treaties be understood. In the area of nuclear arms, there is no margin for error. Research and development on, or actual possession of, a new or strategically decisive weapon system could well mean the difference between victory and defeat, survival and destruction.

That is why the naive assumptions made by some advocates of a nuclear freeze must be examined. In particular, nuclear freeze advocates have not dealt adequately with the necessity of strict and complete verifiability of any

freeze agreement. Without such verifiability, freeze advocates are relying on Soviet compliance with an international agreement—a dangerous assumption given the historical record of Soviet activities over the past 65 years.

In the previous edition of the *National Security Record*, the flawed premises and mistaken assumptions and logic behind the nuclear freeze concept were analyzed. However, the more basic fatal flaw behind the nuclear freeze approach is simply the failure to understand the nature of the other party to such an agreement, as well as its ideological and practical approach to international treaties.

On a practical and historical level, the record is littered with treaties and agreements unobserved or broken by the Soviets. At least it can be said that the Soviets are consistent and do not discriminate; they have broken treaties of all kinds and on all levels. But for the purposes of examining the practicality of a freeze proposal, one should focus particular attention on Soviet compliance with a wide range of arms agreements, from bilateral non-aggression treaties to strategic arms agreements to restrictions on chemical warfare.

### HISTORY OF SOVIET ARMS VIOLATIONS

The entire history of the U.S.S.R. reveals it has been untrustworthy as a participant in any agreement that restricts its military forces. The Department of Defense has published a detailed accounting of Soviet violations of agreements it made during the first 45 years of the existence of the Soviet Union.

In May 1920, the Soviets signed a treaty with the independent Georgian Republic pledging non-interference in its internal affairs; less than one year later, Soviet troops invaded the country and incorporated it into the U.S.S.R. The Soviets signed similar bilateral agreements with Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Afghanistan; eventually the Soviet Union took military action against all of these treaty partners and imposed new Soviet-oriented governments on them.

In recent years the Soviets have demonstrated a particular unwillingness to abide by any agreements dealing with their armaments programs. On a wide range of issues the Soviets have stretched agreements to their limits and then often proceeded to break them, not only in spirit, but in substance. For example:

**Nuclear Test Ban:** The Soviets have conducted at least eight underground nuclear tests of over 150 kilotons in direct violation of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

**Radioactive Debris:** The Soviets have on at least thirty oc-

casions vented radioactive debris from underground tests in clear violation of the 1973 limited Test Ban Treaty. These actions resulted in radioactive debris spreading outside the Soviet Union.

**Detente Pact:** The Soviets violated the 1972 Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this case, the Soviets reneged on their 1972 pledge to engage in mutual consultations in the event that nuclear war was threatened, and they sought unilateral advantage by encouraging the Egyptian attack on Israel. They also threatened unilateral intervention against Israel.

**Cuba:** Despite the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement not to station offensive forces in Cuba, the Soviets have proceeded to incrementally station such forces there. Since 1970, the Soviets have deployed Golf and Echo class submarines carrying long range nuclear missiles, as well as nuclear capable MiG-23 fighter bombers and long range Bear bombers.

**Poland:** High Reagan Administration officials have charged that the December 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland was directed by the Soviets, and that the Soviets have directly threatened military action against Poland, intimidated its leaders, and ordered basic human rights of the Polish people to be violated by the Polish Communist Party and Polish Army. ACDA Director Eugene V. Rostow even went so far on NBC-TV on December 22, 1981, as to charge that the Soviets have violated the UN Charter by their aggressive actions in Poland. Other high Reagan Administration officials have also accused the Soviets of violating the 1975 Helsinki Accord by their suppression of the basic human rights of the Polish people.

The most conspicuous area of Soviet violations of arms agreements has occurred with respect to the major effort over the past decade to limit weapons under SALT. At the same time, in the past several years the Soviets have wantonly violated treaties governing the use of chemical and biological weapons, which are the most gruesome weapons available. The lack of any Soviet restraint in the control of arms completely undermines the credibility of Soviet adherence to a nuclear freeze at existing weapons levels.

## SALT I VIOLATIONS

To begin with, two important facts should be noted. First, agreement on the nature and extent of Soviet treaty violations has been hampered by the fact that SALT I contains numerous ambiguities in its terms; these ambiguities were insisted upon by the Soviets, and, unfortunately, the U.S. acquiesced. Second, U.S. detection of possible Soviet SALT violations has been considerably hampered over the years by a Soviet campaign of deliberate massive camouflage, concealment, and deception. For example, as a result of Soviet deception at the time of SALT I, U.S. intelligence miscounted the basic Soviet ICBM and SLBM levels which were the key verification parameters of SALT I. Four years ago, in a *Backgrounder* study, "Examining SALT Violations and the Problems of Verification," The Heritage Foundation drew attention to this problem, which has only grown much worse since that time.

### 1. SALT I: VIOLATIONS OF THE ABM TREATY

Soviet SAM testing in ABM mode for SAM upgrade;  
Soviet deployment of ABM Battle Management Radars for nationwide defense;  
Soviet ABM camouflage and concealment;  
Soviet falsification of ABM deactivation;  
Soviet creation of a new ABM Test Range without required prior notification;  
Soviet development of a rapidly deployable, mobile ABM, also for nationwide defense.

### 2. SALT I: VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

Soviet deployment of the heavy SS-19 ICBM as the replacement of the light SS-11 ICBM; this is the most dangerous of all Soviet SALT violations;  
Soviet failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time, and falsification of official deactivation reports;  
Bringing back ICBM equipment to deactivated ICBM complexes;  
Keeping 18 SS-9 ICBMs at an ICBM test range illegally operational;  
Soviet deployment of IIRX silos with a configuration too similar to a missile-launch silo;  
Soviet massive use of deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception; this actually increased after 1972:  
—Encryption of missile telemetry  
—Camouflage of ICBM testing, production, deployment  
—Concealment of SLBM submarine construction, berthing, dummy subs, berthing tunnels;  
Constructing over 68 strategic submarines, when only 62 were allowed;  
SS-20 IRBM deployment, which should count as ICBM deployment;  
Violation of Brezhnev's pledge not to build mobile ICBMs;  
Deploying SS-11 ICBMs at SS-4 MRBM sites, probably having a covert soft launch capability.  
Keeping about 1,300 to several thousand old ICBMs stockpiled for both covert soft launch and rapid reload of silos for refire.

## SALT II VIOLATIONS

A SALT II Treaty was signed by the Carter Administration, but it was never approved by the United States Senate. Nonetheless, the Carter Administration took the position that the U.S. would observe the terms of the treaty unless and until the Soviets "undercut" the treaty. Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration has chosen to go along with this approach, and has failed even to ask the Soviet Union for a specific public statement, such as the U.S. has given, of intent to observe the treaty. In fact, the Soviets have ambiguously stated several times that they are not bound to comply with SALT II until the U.S. ratifies it.

At present, the U.S. has pledged to observe the treaty provided the Soviets also adhere to its terms. This prompts the obvious but often neglected question of whether the Soviets are now in fact violating SALT II. The evidence clearly indicates that Moscow has once again been consciously ignoring treaty limitations.

First, the Soviets have reportedly continued, and even increased, their missile telemetry signal encryption activities, despite SALT II provisions which require the accessibility of all telemetry needed by the U.S. to verify certain parameters. This continued encryption violates Article XV and its Second Common Understanding. The SSN-20 Typhoon SLBM is reportedly being encrypted almost totally, which actively interferes with U.S. ability to determine whether the Typhoon SLBM is a banned heavy SLBM. The Soviets are also reportedly almost totally encrypting the SS-18 Mod X, interfering illegally with the U.S. ability to determine the number, size, and type of warheads carried on it. Moreover, the Soviets reportedly are almost totally encrypting the telemetry on their SSN-19 SLCM. This encryption interferes with the U.S. ability to determine whether this SLCM has a prohibited range longer than 600 kilometers or carries multiple warheads. Finally, high levels of SS-20 encryption reportedly continue. This encryption hampers U.S. ability to determine whether SS-20 range is being extended or whether fewer warheads are being tested.

Second, the reported Soviet stockpiling of over 100 mobile SS-16 ICBMs circumvents the SALT II provisions which ban SS-16 production and deployment. This action directly violates the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty. Moreover, up to 200 mobile SS-16s have reportedly been illegally deployed at the Plesetsk test range.

Third, and most serious, the Soviets are reportedly