

B-7010, SHAPE, B-1

SHAPE H-70-82

16 July 1982

THRU: The Permanent Secretary of the Co-ordinating
and Planning Committee

TO: The Head of the United States Clandestine Service

SUBJECT: SACEUR Intelligence Requirements

I am writing to you, after consultation with the Executive Group of the Co-ordinating and Planning Committee, to define more closely my intelligence requirements in time of war.

My main concern lies in the early recognition of Warsaw Pact preparations for conflict. The period leading up to war can be expected to be one of heightened tension during which most of our normal sources of intelligence (diplomatic, commercial, etc.) will have been severely curtailed. Enemy activity may well be cloaked by a Cover or Deception plan which may leave little time for their intentions to become obvious; however, their preparations will surely include the co-ordinated move forward of reserve formations from the Warsaw and Soviet border Military Districts. There may be movement of supplies and nuclear warheads as well. I need to know about such detailed movement.

This period will be a time of considerable activity between SHAPE and NATO HQ. I must have sound, reliable intelligence to support my submissions to the NATO political authorities if I am to obtain timely authorisation for the various states of readiness. In my view, this intelligence comes best from multi-national, human intelligence sources, and it is for this reason that I will be looking to my Allied Consultative and Co-ordinating Group (ACCG) to assist in providing it. Of other possible sources available to me, technical means, as single source intelligence, may tend to lack credibility, and until hostilities commence I cannot use military assets.

The requirements above deal in the main with the Central Region and with the period before General Alert. Once hostilities begin, I envision two further requirements. Although Unconventional Military Forces will be providing intelligence at this time, they will be largely limited to operations in the country-side. For information on enemy activity in the towns I would again look to the ACCG. Finally, I see a need to know what is happening in the neutral or semi-neutral countries around Europe. Information on local attitudes and degrees of Soviet influence will be important from such countries as Finland, Yugoslavia, Syria and Libya, though this list is not exhaustive.

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES

Not referred to OSD - On file
release instructions apply.

26 July 1982

In conclusion, may I say that this letter is not intended to cut across established channels but rather to produce some positive guidance which I understand would be appreciated generally by the Clandestine Services of the Alliance.

The sensitivity of this matter is appreciated and knowledge of this letter is limited to only three of my staff.



BERNARD W ROGERS
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER