

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

General Bernard Rogers
Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Dear General Rogers,

With reference to your recent letter to me [redacted]

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[redacted] on the subject of SACEUR intelligence requirements, you may be assured that I welcome this and any future opportunities to discuss this subject with you. I was particularly pleased that your letter calls for focus upon the key intelligence need -- early recognition of Warsaw Pact intent and preparations for conflict.

In Deputy Director John McMahon's interim reply to your letter, mention was made of the study being given to the concerns which you expressed. As I and my colleagues understand them, these concerns bear upon, first, your need for sound reliable intelligence from human sources on which to base your submissions to NATO political authorities in a period leading up to an outbreak of hostilities in Europe. Thereafter, you would have further need for information on enemy activities in occupied cities and for intelligence on countries around the periphery of conflict centered in Europe.

We have studied these concerns in the context of this Agency's programs and contributions to what we term "early warning" [redacted] as denoting, [redacted] intelligence capabilities which come into play either prior to or after the commencement of hostilities. You should be aware that we make important distinctions between these two sets of capabilities. [redacted]

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To begin with early warning, the requirements outlined in your letter are similar to those of our own National Command Authority and which this Agency is servicing in two major ways:

- We coordinate and support field operations of the U.S. military intelligence services which have the objective of developing sources capable of reporting early warning information.
- We conduct our own operations to maintain existing reporting assets and to develop new contacts and sources in a position to detect changes in policy suggesting Pact preparations for aggression.

The military intelligence sources in the first of these categories are specialized in the collection of early warning and order of battle information which has a tangible and physically observable nature. Their utility would be greatest during the transition from peacetime to war. This Agency's own sources, on the other hand, can and do provide intelligence during peacetime while having potential for detecting early actions of Warsaw Pact governments to prepare for aggression against NATO.

The risks and difficulties in acquiring either kind of source are the same and practically ensure that, at any given time, we will have fewer of them than we need. This scarcity justifies in my opinion the emphasis this Agency places on the search for sources whose access is valuable in peacetime, no less than in periods of tension. Military intelligence programs are designed to meet somewhat different needs and priorities. This difference in emphasis, as we see it, promotes prospects for achieving effective early warning intelligence capabilities.

During a period of heightened tensions of the kind depicted in your letter, we would make a concerted effort to task all relevant human sources then available to us and to collate their reporting with collection from a variety of highly-capable technical sources available to the Intelligence Community. Generally speaking, the tensions themselves should not impede--and may well enhance--collection from established sources. We are reasonably confident that the net results of these efforts will be data and assessments of sufficient reliability and credibility for use by our National Command Authority and NATO's political and military leadership.

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