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3 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Sixth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 3 October 1972, 1430 Hours, DCI Conference Room

1. Present were:

Members:

Chairman	Mr. Bronson Tweedy, D/DCI/IC
NSC	Mr. Andrew Marshall
State Department	Dr. Ray Cline
Defense Department	Mr. Seymour Weiss
	Dr. Albert Hall, ASD/I
	Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, D/DIA
	Brig. Gen. Richard Bresnahan, JCS (representing Lt. Gen. Seith)
Justice Department	Mr. Bernard A. Wells (representing Mr. Maroney)
CIA	Dr. Edward Proctor, D/DDI
	Mr. John Huizenga, D/ONE

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Executive Secretary



Observers:


NSC	Capt. George Pickett
State Department	Mr. Richard Curl

2. Minutes of 6 July meeting.

Dr. Cline asked that Item 2, "India-Pakistan Crisis Study" be amended to add: "Several members expressed admiration for the quality of the study and appreciation for the effort it represented." He also asked the reference in Item 5 to written comments by "INR/State" on the NSSM-69 evaluation be changed to "State." General Bresnahan asked that the spelling of his name use "s" rather than "z."

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3. India-Pakistan Crisis Study.

The Chairman cited the comment in Para 2 of Mr. Marshall's memorandum that the Working Group "is initiating an analysis of lessons learned" and noted this was not yet underway, although such an analysis would be undertaken on the basis of this and subsequent crisis studies. The end product would be recommendation for changes in procedures, products, etc., involving both producers and consumers "if this is what we agree." He suggested that the minutes show Mr. Marshall would be the focal point for developing the conclusions which would arise out of the series of crisis studies. Admiral de Poix and Dr. Cline endorsed this, and Mr. Marshall agreed.

The Chairman's proposed addition to Para 5 was distributed and approved for inclusion in the memorandum.

Dr. Cline proposed to delete the third and fourth sentences of the last Item in Para 6 b and substitute the following:

"Would it be useful to undertake rapid production of national estimates during periods of crisis, supplementing existing relevant NIE's? If so, what should the production process and format be?"

Mr. Huizenga questioned whether a distinction should be made between NIE and SNIE publications, as the original wording of the memorandum does.

Dr. Cline said that in any crisis there would already be something on the record, and intelligence will be asked to update it. Should this be undertaken on a quick reaction basis using the NIE system -- this he considered the basic question. Admiral de Poix saw the question as to whether the estimative reaction to a crisis should take the SNIE form or some other format. Dr. Cline agreed, saying that if something other than an SNIE is wanted, what should be the format, the kind of coverage, etc. He considered the present text of the memorandum was too cryptic.

The group agreed to accept Dr. Cline's proposed substitution.

Mr. Weiss proposed the last item of Para 4 c be amended as follows:

"-- Differentiated types of products for the two phases of contingencies crises of the India-Pakistan type; a first phase of contingency policy planning and option generation, a second phase of crisis management."

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He said there was reason to believe the government soon would be charged with more comprehensive contingency planning tasks. The Chairman asked if that applied to the India-Pakistan area only, and Mr. Weiss indicated it not be so limited. He emphasized he was talking about two different aspects of contingencies -- one involving contingency policy planning and one actual crisis management after the crisis has arisen.

The group accepted Mr. Weiss' proposed amendment.

Dr. Hall said he considered the memorandum a good one and he thought the proposed changes were good, adding that use of merely the identifying initials should be avoided the first time reference is made to something.

The Chairman said the minutes would reflect the memorandum was approved, with the changes which had been agreed upon, and he would forward it to the Chairman and members of the NSCIC.

4. On-going Studies.

Mr. Marshall commented on the status of the studies for which he is responsible as follows:

NSSM-69: Much rework has been necessary because of extensive comments and the departure of the person who had done the main part of the work. Capt. Pickett has taken over the rewriting task and expects to have a re-worked draft by 1 November.

Arab-Isaeli Ceasefire: He is trying to get the team to provide him with an outline of the final report and a listing of the identified issues. A draft is expected by mid-November.

Jordan/Fedayeen Civil War: He is meeting next week with the task group for a progress report, but considers that [redacted] of CIA (group chairman) has the study well in hand and should have a draft by 1 November.

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Lamson 719: This has been difficult to get underway, but materials are being assembled. The problem is getting personnel to work on the project, and he has no estimate on a completion date.

Mr. Marshall said that although the participating organizations were energized for the first two studies (India-Pakistan and NSSM-69), there is an apparent slackening off and it is harder to get studies moving. He indicated he plans to talk with officials responsible for providing task group members, otherwise it may be the first of the year before drafts are ready.

Admiral de Poix (commenting on the next item) said that DIA felt new studies should be in series since it had few personnel qualified to contribute meaningfully. He suggested Yugoslavia be studied first, then Chile and then NSSM-108. The Chairman agreed these should not be done concurrently.

Dr. Proctor said he had a real problem concerning LAMSON 719 and suggested Mr. Marshall "talk around on this again." Dr. Hall asked why, and Dr. Proctor said that only a very few intelligence personnel were knowledgeable on LAMSON 719 -- perhaps only four or five in DDI -- and these were all deeply involved in SEA matters and could not be broken loose. He said he would not be surprized if DIA were not in the same position.

Admiral de Poix said DIA couldn't do the job without CIA support, and he suggested Mr. Marshall draw up the terms of reference for the study. Mr. Marshall responded that he thought he and General Bennett had agreed on the terms of reference but that he could go back and make this more explicit.

The Chairman suggested Mr. Marshall review the practicality of the LAMSON 719 study, and if getting it underway is likely to be indefinitely postponed the group might reconsider its sponsorship of the study. Dr. Hall asked when Mr. Marshall had expected to complete evaluation of LAMSON 719, and Mr. Marshall responded that no date had ever been set. He noted that because of the pressures on Mr. Fiske of DIA (task group chairman) and the inability to get help from CIA the project never had really gotten underway. He agreed the best thing would be to go around once again on all the problems.

Dr. Cline asked if this meant Dr. Proctor wanted to use only personnel who had worked on the project in an evaluation of it, and Dr. Proctor denied this, but said he was concerned about the time that would be involved in obtaining the necessary information from the experts.

Admiral de Poix asked if DIA was up-to-date on inputs expected from it on the crisis studies and Mr. Marshall said yes.

Dr. Hall reported on the status of the cruise missile study for which he is responsible. The task group has had several meetings and has distributed two questionnaires to users requesting assessment of the products as to content and usefulness. Answers are due back "about now" for review by the group, and it is planned the final report will be available by the end of October.

##### 5. Studies of Intelligence Production Proposed by Dr. Cline.

The Chairman expressed the hope the initiation of the studies on Yugoslavia, Chile and NSSM-108 could be approved in principle and that any expected problems would be raised.

Dr. Cline said he was not urging early production of these studies but understood that the group felt a study on a political

subject would be valuable since the studies already underway related to military matters. He noted that Yugoslavia is no crisis today, but will become such one day, and the study effort would provide "something to chew on." In the Yugoslavia study he felt that an investment in qualified outside scholars could well be used, and he hoped it would be possible to obtain the comments and views of an outside panel as well as from Foreign Service officers. This, he commented, would be a new procedure in the activities of the Working Group.

The Chairman said that "investment" was the key word, since it would involve a cash outlay. Dr. Cline said that the minimum would be to call in one or two qualified specialists to review the study draft and comment, and he felt that \$2,000 in consultants fees would cover this.

When the Chairman asked if State's Office of External Research could handle this Dr. Cline said that "a couple of thousand" would be no problem, but "something fancier" would be.

The Chairman said he considered that outside consultants would be valuable in this type study, and Mr. Marshall agreed. He said he would like to "go forward" with the Yugoslav study and since this would be a new type evaluation for examination by the group he considered it would be useful to get "outsiders" to participate.

Dr. Cline asked Dr. Hall if there was any chance of obtaining funds from his "dependencies" -- and Dr. Hall said "we can look" but if they were "dependencies" that meant they got their money from him.

Dr. Proctor said this was "worthwhile" and "we could find the money collectively, since only a few thousand dollars would be involved" -- which led Dr. Hall to respond that "it is easy to see who has money." Dr. Hall added, however, that he also considered it would be worthwhile.

Admiral de Poix asked if State had any particular experts in mind, and Dr. Cline said they could be selected by name from RAND, universities, etc. Dr. Hall said that if RAND was a source, OSD might be able to help, but Dr. Cline noted that the Air Force is "sometimes fussy" about using RAND on political problems.

The Chairman raised the question of timing, and Dr. Cline said he is prepared to make Kenneth Kerst, an INR Soviet expert, available immediately as chairman for the Yugoslav study. Dr. Proctor said he had a man available [redacted] and would like to get started on Yugoslavia as soon as possible. Admiral de Poix said DIA was "prepared to move." 25X1

The Chairman wondered if that meant both Yugoslavia and Chile studies could get underway. Dr. Proctor replied that Chile is urgent now and Yugoslavia will be later, and he favored doing only the Yugoslavia study since he has a man available for it. "This is one we may be able to follow through on in real time," he added.

Mr. Huizenga said the question is how does the community stand now to cope with a serious crisis that may arise at any time. He noted that Yugoslavia has not been an active problem, although there are a large number of current items. A big appraisal was made last summer in preparation for a NSSM, "but nothing happened, and you won't find there has been a lot of intelligence support." He felt the focus should be on how we stand, the quality of our product and our people. He added that we have good information on Yugoslavia, and good analysts, but the upcoming questions are the kind that are difficult to answer in advance since it is not easy to anticipate all of the situations which could possibly arise in Yugoslavia.

Dr. Cline emphasized it was necessary to review what has been done on Yugoslavia, since "this is a study of production." Mr. Huizenga agreed but felt this could be summarized and focus put on the problem areas.

Mr. Weiss said that truly detailed terms of reference must be developed since some of the questions set forth in the State proposal were not really pertinent to a careful definition of the approach which was needed. Dr. Cline said the Working Group cannot write terms of reference, but should appoint a team and put it to work.

Dr. Cline asked Mr. Marshall if he would "coach" the team, and Mr. Marshall noted that in his memorandum commenting on the State proposals he had recommended that Dr. Cline do this. Mr. Marshall agreed, however, to serve as overseer at start of the study and through agreement on the terms of reference.

The Chairman suggested that action on Chile and NSSM-108 be deferred until toward the end of the year. Admiral de Poix wondered whether NSSM-108 shouldn't be discussed, and Dr. Proctor replied that NSSM-108 was "an untypical mish-mash, too big, and no one really is doing anything about it."

Dr. Cline said the group shouldn't want to study "only what works well", but Dr. Proctor said he did not expect to see another study so broad in scope as NSSM-108. Admiral de Poix agreed that more of a look should be given to the NSSM-108 topic before any decision was made to do anything about it.

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Dr. Proctor said he would like to shelve the NSSM-108 project, but thought another look might be made in three or four months.

The Chairman asked the group members who would be involved in the project to reexamine the NSSM-108 proposal to see if they agreed with the deferral proposed by Dr. Proctor.

The Chairman again raised the matter of the Chile Study. Dr. Proctor agreed that such a study was important, but that he had no manpower for it. Dr. Cline said he could staff it.

The Chairman said further consideration of the project would be deferred pending a further review in December.

6. Manpower and Cost Trends in U.S. Intelligence Product in, FY1966 - FY1973.

The Chairman opened discussion by commenting that if the group accepted the study the minutes should so reflect, but that he thought the focus of interest was the summary and recommendations section.

Admiral de Poix said it struck him that "we are probably not going to be successful in reallocation of resources, so rather than look at that aspect we should produce something which would give us leverage that would result in the use of better techniques." He considered the community would have to bear down on this aspect because "the take is going to increase and other resources reduced." He cited what is happening in the photo reconnaissance field as an example.

The Chairman noted the study indicates either that analysts will need to be relieved of responsibilities or resources would be needed from somewhere.

Mr. Weiss said his reaction was that "this paper will leave a policy maker cold because it doesn't tell him where to put his resources and doesn't prove that you can't still further reduce production resources. The question is whether current resources are adequate and the paper doesn't address this."

Dr. Proctor replied that the paper was meant only for background use by the group, and was not meant to answer the questions Mr. Weiss has raised.

Dr. Proctor said that his concern was with the numbers, which are "off quite a bit" with respect to DDI/ONE. He said his overall cut in 1969 - 1972 was only 2 1/2 percent, and the study numbers "are wrong". His view was that statistical summaries should not be based on "slots" but on "average employment."

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Dr. Cline said he had the same problem since "the study put all of INR in production, and this is not true."

Dr. Proctor said he had no problem with the framework of the study.

Mr. Marshall said that based on the study alone one could not reach conclusions, and he considered some of the numbers "surprising."

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Dr. Proctor said the DDI numbers went down because of a decision to deemphasize the NIS program.

reported that all of the DOD figures came from the published FYDIP, the CIA data from CIA/PPB and the State figures were provided by INR.

Dr. Hall commented that he had checked and some of the DOD figures were "off." He said "the FYDIP is not correct for some of this data, but we can provide the proper figures."

Dr. Proctor queried whether the group wanted to use personnel slots, average employment "or what" as basis for the tabulations, and the Chairman said he thought "average employment" would be best. Dr. Cline said he was not certain whether State could provide "average employment" data for previous years, and he suggested that representatives of INR, DIA and CIA meet with PRG/IC and reach agreement on definitions "so all the figures can be used the same way."

Mr. Weiss asked how it was intended the product would be used. He thought the study represented a good start "but how about the other half?"

The Chairman said the present study was meant only as an introduction, an inventory preparatory to looking at the second dimension, and he would like views of the group on this.

Dr. Hall thought it would be useful to get a group together. He said "I don't think I am aboard the summary and recommendations." He felt the group should be charged with "pulling the meaning out of the numbers." He proposed a group take the report, add a section which discusses the implications of the data more deeply, and then decide on recommendations.

The Chairman said this would involve getting into substantive matters, and Dr. Hall agreed.

Mr. Marshall noted the study showed a large growth in Navy S&T manpower and costs and he wondered whether this was "real or merely an accounting shift."



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Dr. Proctor thought it would be well to annotate the nature and reason for the changes -- what was added, what was given up, etc. He noted there was a definitional problem and there would have to be "some arbitrary standards, arbitrary accounting, etc." He hoped the report would not become too detailed, but it should describe the implications and meaning of the changes in resources but still "avoid general budget justification statements."

Mr. Marshall noted the indicated per-man cost in General Intelligence production had increased 73 percent in the period studied, but per-man costs on S&T production were up only 35 percent, and he wondered why the difference.

Mr. Weiss thought more attention should be given to the effects of inflation, with greater use of "constant dollar" figures, and he noted this had been done in only one of the tables.

The Chairman said the consensus seemed to be that the study should be a historical examination to trace what has happened, and then see if this has resulted in a satisfactory situation. Mr. Weiss agreed, noting that "this is the hard question that needs answering."

The Chairman said a group would be formed and charged with correcting the numbers and tracking meaningful changes in numbers and trends.

#### 7. Survey of Current Intelligence Publications.

The Chairman opened the discussion by reporting that the DCI has had an active interest in current intelligence publications for a long time, "has seen a lot of paper," and had raised the subject with the Chairman about a month ago. When the DCI was told of the survey then underway he asked to see a copy on its completion. After reading the paper, the DCI had sent a memorandum requesting policy guidance to Dr. Kissinger as Chairman of the NSCIC and a memorandum to the heads of production organizations. The Kissinger memorandum, copies of which went to other NSCIC members, requested confirmation that the present scope and character of current intelligence coverage is in keeping with today's U.S. security and policy interests. The memorandum to the production chiefs asked that they review the requirements on which their current intelligence publications are based and examine the dissemination of these products against "need to know" criteria.

The Chairman emphasized that the DCI's communications did not indicate he felt things were "out of whack or in whack" -- he merely wanted the situation looked at.

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Dr. Hall asked when the letter was sent to NSCIC members, and Mr. Marshall replied "the 28th". (Mr. Marshall made no mention that Dr. Kissinger had assigned him the action).

The Chairman noted the survey was "not exhaustive" and he asked for comments and questions.

Admiral de Poix said that his reaction from reading the DCI's letter to him was that the DCI "felt things are in good shape." He added that his own feeling both from the letter and the survey report was that "things are not in as bad condition as I might have expected" because he had personally been concerned at "what is in my book every morning."

Dr. Proctor asked "what is going to be done further with this study?" He said his problem is with its structure -- "it takes the 316 first, and then whittles away at it at the end." He would have constructed it differently, making clear distinction between raw and finished intelligence. He noted that State had turned in only one report, but that State's field reporting -- such as the WEEKAs used to be -- was much like many of the reports included in the survey. He considered that many of the reports used in the survey were "raw intelligence" and he would not have included them. He said he would like to see the whole study restructured on a "finished intelligence versus raw intelligence basis" since he considered that some of the listed "current intelligence publications are not really that."

He said he would like to see clear distinction made between "current intelligence publications which were national, those which were departmental, and those which were for command needs. He also considered that publications which appeared in multiple versions should not be listed as separate items.

He felt that the total 316 was misleading. He had looked at the CIA tab, which listed 27 items, and he considered there were only 10 which were really current -- of which two were purely internal -- and "the others are not really current intelligence publications.

25X1  reported that producing organizations had been asked to submit what they looked upon as their current intelligence publications, and that all of the submissions fitted within the JCS definition of current intelligence.

Dr. Proctor said that the NSCIC definition should be used rather than that in the JCS dictionary.

Dr. Hall said he would favor having the collating done by the reviewers rather than by "those who turn it in."

Dr. Cline said that his operation didn't "fit what the others do -- because we brief orally from cables "rather than prepare current

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intelligence publications. He felt, however, that "serious definitional problems" exist in the survey.

Dr. Proctor commented that he did not mind looking at his dissemination because, over time, there can be a tendency to expand this beyond need-to-know limitations. He wondered whether "a re-do of the study might undercut what the DCI is trying to do."

The Chairman said he did not consider it would.

Mr. Marshall noted that the Navy has many publications on the list, and he thought "some notion of size might be useful."

Dr. Cline said he has some problem with the NSA listing since NSA is not considered a "production organization" and he thought the survey should include comments on "types of publication."


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At this point the Chairman adjourned the meeting since he and Dr. Hall had a 1600 hours appointment with the DCI.


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Following the meeting Mr. Curl, INR/State, advised that William Berry, special assistant to Dr. Cline, would be the INR representative on the group which will revise the current intelligence survey report, and John Thro will represent INR in the reexamination of the study on "Manpower and Cost Trends in U.S. Intelligence Production".

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Executive Secretary

Distribution:

- Original - PRG subject (filed NSCIC WG-2)
- 1 - Mr. Tweedy
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