

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3



7 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Fifth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 6 July 1972,
1430 Hours, DCI Conference Room

1. Present were:

Members:

Chairman	Mr. Bronson Tweedy, D/DCI/IC
NSC	Mr. Andrew Marshall
State Department	Dr. Ray Cline
Defense Department	Mr. Seymour Weiss
	Dr. Albert Hall, ASD/I
	Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett, D/DIA
	Brig. Gen. Richard Breznahan, JCS (representing Lt. Gen. Seith)
Justice Department	Mr. Bernard A. Wells (representing Mr. Maroney)
CIA	Mr. Paul Walsh (representing Dr. Proctor, DDI)
25X1A9a	 (representing John Huizenga, D/ONE)
Executive Secretary	 25X1A9a

Observers:

NSC	Capt. George Pickett
State Department	Mr. Richard Curl
	Mr. Curtis Jones

2. Minutes of 13 June meeting. Approved without comment.

3. Evaluation of intelligence inputs to NSSM-69. The Chairman noted that all written comments (from State, JCS, CIA and DIA) had been provided to Mr. Marshall, who replied that work on the reexamination of the NSSM-69 study would begin after 10 July, when Mr. Fisher (the primary author) returns from vacation.

NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

4. India-Pakistan Crisis Study.

The Chairman invited comments. Mr. Marshall said he had no "lead-off" statement, and Mr. Weiss opened the discussion by saying that, reading the paper from the viewpoint of the policy maker, he was bothered by the handling of "intentions." They are not constant and change over time so to talk of them as if they were static was erroneous. He said that it is in the field of intentions that he gets least satisfaction from the intelligence community. He recognized it is the "toughest area" and that "noise in the intelligence background is a problem" but intelligence should "try to sift it out." He said he would be interested in knowing what the community thought of the adequacy of its sources of information, and thought the study should have examined this. 25X1A9a

██████████ said the CCPC study on South Asia, now nearing completion, addresses this and is to be added as Annex 10 to the India-Pakistan study.

General Bennett cited a 1964 political/military war game in which Mr. Weiss had participated. The problem was Southeast Asia and teams represented North Vietnam, China and the USSR. Although all participants spoke English and had the same background, they "demonstrated an inability to get a 'signal' through to the other side" and it was not possible to identify intentions.

Mr. Weiss agreed that we don't know how to divine intentions, and General Bennett rated his success at "zero."

Mr. Walsh said he considered the paper was overly harsh on intelligence with respect to intentions. Recognizing that it is a difficult analytic area, he did not consider the errors were as great as the study indicated.

Dr. Hall agreed that intentions should not be regarded as fixed; even our own change substantially. He considered the problem also posed opportunities, particularly in cases where something could be done in response to identification of intentions by intelligence. Recognizing that intentions in October may be different from those in April, he wondered whether we had understood the actual intent of the Indians early in the crisis period and had expressed it as clearly as we could. He noted the purpose of the study is to enable us to do better, so we should try in the area of intentions.

Mr. Weiss asked how we could have done better, and the Chairman replied that if the information had been available we would have used it, but that sometimes analysis was faulty.

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

25X1A9a

██████████ said that the extent to which Mrs. Gandhi was making the decisions herself was critical, so he couldn't understand the criticism that more attention should be given to what other forces were affecting the decisions.

Mr. Marshall considered the tendency had been to treat intentions as unchanging and there was no evidence that the problem of forecasting how intentions might change on the basis of events was addressed in those terms. He expressed surprise that any single person could so dominate decision-making as to make it unnecessary to examine what forces were working on Mrs. Gandhi.

25X1X4,

Mr. Walsh said that forecasting is a very ticklish thing, and he felt that intelligence had a good record for timely reporting as things unfolded.

The Chairman noted that "objectives" was the word usually used rather than intentions.

Dr. Cline said that projecting intentions was not the real problem posed in the India-Pakistan study. "That is a generic problem." The question from this study is "whether we conveyed to our principals a measured, carefully considered analysis of the period." He considered that too much was provided the WSAG, and the only formal papers were prepared early in the crisis. He didn't express this as harsh criticism of intelligence, but he felt that it "raises the question as to whether we gave good guidance as to what was happening -- there probably was overkill, too much reported, and too little inter-agency consultation."

Mr. Walsh said that the analysts in all the agencies were working pretty closely together, and Dr. Cline agreed but he noted that, although the "appreciations of analysts were about the same, too much was being communicated to the top."

The Chairman raised two points: first, since there possibly was a clogging of the channels, should there be a traffic cop; and, second, if there is an important message for the principals, it should be highlighted and not left subliminal. He considered both of these points were brought out in the draft memorandum for the NSCIC which had been sent to the members for comment.

Dr. Cline considered that if stress was put on the problem of intentions "we get away from the main value of this paper which is to find out if we made the most of what we knew."

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

The Chairman said it would be useful if recurrent themes could be identified as the group conducts other studies. He expected there probably would be only a few "lessons" and "they should come in clusters."

General Bennett explained that DIA intentionally avoided the use of the term "intentions" and he preferred to talk of "near term objectives or possible courses of action" and sharpen these as much as possible. He considered the analysts had moved closely together during the crisis but he did not think this was true prior to the crisis "when I was told DIA was more of a hawk than CIA." As to the "clogging of the channels," he felt that rather than this being the problem the real difficulty arose because in DOD there were so many spokesmen. He noted that four different officers represented the JCS Chairman on WSAG at various times and not all of them had a full background. He felt that achieving a common understanding was difficult because the principals did not have a common background. "The problem was more one of empty pipes than clogging." He asked about the "intelligence voice" by which the WSAG is served. He did not consider this "intelligence voice" should be a part of the WSAG, but felt that each WSAG session should start with a presentation of an "intelligence environment". In the India-Pakistan crisis, he believed it would have been helpful if CIA, DIA, and State had gotten together before each WSAG session to develop this "intelligence environment."

Mr. Walsh said this was the DCI responsibility, and even if other CIA men represented him, they presented the "same line." He considered it a "departmental role" to keep their principals up to speed.

General Bennett said he recognized the DCI role but he was thinking only of "a five minute presentation on which we all had coordinated - and the present system doesn't provide this."

Dr. Cline said that he had difficulty even finding out what was presented at the WSAG sessions.

General Bennett added that what he was suggesting was "only another way of presenting intelligence without demanding that those at the table already have a full background."

Dr. Hall said the India-Pakistan study was "one of the best I have seen" and part of its usefulness "is immersing us in it." He said the most important thing he had derived from the paper was the problem of communication when there is an opportunity for policy action. He saw the objective as one of finding how "we can do a better job of communicating what is going on so, if there is action needed, it can be taken." He considered the time for the intelligence warning was months ahead of the actual crisis, and he felt that "the determination of India to solve the problem was not conveyed."

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

The Chairman said the India-Pakistan situation was "something unique" in that the policy levels of government were "set in concrete" and this situation was not one which intelligence might have been able to change.

Mr. Weiss agreed, but he wondered if a clear intelligence message might have made a difference. He saw the policy makers as being faced with unacceptable alternatives and being reluctant to accept any of them.

Both the Chairman and Dr. Cline agreed there were still lessons to be learned by intelligence from the crisis period, but Mr. Walsh commented that if the policy makers "had made up their minds and were doing things we knew nothing about, then we were playing a charade."

25X1A9a
[REDACTED] wondered "who do we mean when we talk of communication with policy makers?" He said that during the crisis period he attended a series of Foreign Policy Council meetings along with several "third-level policy makers" and it was his impression there were no doubts in their minds as to what the intelligence community thought. He saw no evidence of a communications failure at that level.

The Chairman said the communications problem is with top policy levels where the participants have no time to read papers.

Dr. Cline noted that the WSAG is a finite group of people, and he saw the problem as being caused by a proliferation of reporting, with no single channel by which to assure answers to the hard questions got up to the top level. He felt "the deficiency is a lack of a systematic way to emphasize the key points in such a way as to elicit a reaction from the top level." He said that interface at the top level always seems faulty, and the problem is how to give these leaders a more finite expression of the key points in the intelligence picture.

Mr. Walsh said that one of the problems is that when Mr. Kissinger is briefed by the DCI, he feels he has the current picture, but because some of the material is so sensitive it is necessary to get Mr. Kissinger's permission to let DOD and State know about it.

Dr. Cline said he felt that the principals were not aware of any disagreements that may have existed in the intelligence community.

Mr. Walsh replied that the DCI, in his role as intelligence advisor to the President, does not have to coordinate his material with others--but he does. He considered the thesis in the paper was that all intelligence agencies are equal, so that "what is coordinated is good--but this may not be true."

5
Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

Gen. Bennett said that all he wanted was that disagreements be highlighted when they exist.

Mr. Walsh said that in the India-Pakistan situation the differences were not significant, but in the Vietnam situation, where there are differences, he knew that the DCI carefully indicated them.

Dr. Cline felt Mr. Walsh was over-stating the DCI role since the NSCIDs strongly indicate the need for coordination, adding "CIA intelligence is not necessarily national intelligence."

The Chairman brought attention of the group back to his proposed memorandum for the NSCIC on the India-Pakistan study and Dr. Cline said he had some changes to suggest.

Dr. Cline also proposed that less attention be devoted to content of the study and more to the impact the group wanted it to have on the NSCIC principals. He thought it should be made clear to the principals that the Working Group was recommending they read only the 35-page study and not the annexes. He also urged that an oral presentation be given to the NSCIC on the "big issues," perhaps by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Jones.

Dr. Cline said the function of the Working Group was to generate action inputs to the NSCIC. To highlight the issues, a short paper should be sent forward. He felt that additional studies probably would bring out the same issues, so the NSCIC should be asked to look at the issues brought out by the present study.

Dr. Hall supported Dr. Cline, and said the group should take into account the possibility the NSCIC might not meet, so the memorandum sent forward should clearly highlight the issues. He thought it would be useful to have the study briefed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Responding to a question from the Chairman, Mr. Marshall said he thought a NSCIC meeting could be arranged.

Mr. Marshall also said he would like to see the draft memorandum revised to come down harder on what the group felt were the major issues, which should be written up "in a more forceful way."

Again responding to a query from the Chairman, Mr. Marshall agreed to redraft the proposed transmittal memorandum, but indicated he would like to explore the issues with various members of the group. Dr. Cline said the task was primarily one of filling out the draft already prepared. He handed out proposed INR/State revisions of Paragraphs 6 and 7.

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

5. Follow-on Crisis Studies

25X1A2g The Chairman proposed the group authorize start of studies on the three topics submitted by Mr. Marshall, the Arab-Israeli ceasefire (August 1970), the Jordan/Fedayeen Civil War (September 1970), and [REDACTED]

Dr. Hall said he had discussed the [REDACTED] topic with the JCS Chairman, who requested that such a study be handled very carefully because of [REDACTED]. On the basis of this discussion, Dr. Hall said he considered intelligence aspects could be covered, but it would have to be carefully done.

25X1X4g Gen. Bennett noted that the other studies centered on information fed into Washington and how the national intelligence community acted.

25X1X4 [REDACTED] He felt the study would have to be limited strictly to intelligence matters and not involve operational factors. He proposed the study be limited to Washington level actions on the ground that going beyond this would require getting into areas "where others are more competent."

The Chairman said it would be very difficult to avoid treating intelligence actions which occurred in the field.

Mr. Walsh added that he was not certain we could separate intelligence from operations, since questions of ARVN capabilities were involved. Dr. Hall responded that this was not the kind of problem which gave the JCS Chairman concern.

25X1A2g Mr. Walsh also said that the analysts who would work on [REDACTED] were already "up to their necks in Southeast Asia work" and Gen. Bennett indicated DIA was in the same situation.

The Chairman said that work on the two Middle East studies would be a "full bag" and Mr. Marshall agreed, but he added he would like to proceed with developing terms of reference for the LAMSON 719 study.

25X1A2g

The Chairman suggested Mr. Marshall meet with DIA and CIA to talk about how the [REDACTED] effort could be best approached.

Mr. Walsh then suggested the Middle East studies be done sequentially rather than simultaneously, but Mr. Marshall said he would like to consider doing them together.

The Chairman asked Mr. Marshall to deal directly with the producing agencies on this matter.

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

6. Other Production Studies

The Chairman noted that at the 13 June meeting Dr. Cline's proposal for a study of Libya and his suggested study outline had not been discussed. He added that no new proposals had been submitted since the 13 June session, but he understood Dr. Hall was prepared to discuss one.

Dr. Hall proposed a study be made of the cruise missile problem, but wondered whether it should be done by DOD or the Working Group. "I am prepared to go either way," he said. A draft memorandum has been prepared in ASD/I, looking at the problem from the viewpoint of the consumer. Dr. Hall said the objective would be to look at what has been produced, how well the products satisfied the consumers, what action has resulted from the intelligence inputs, and what the results have been. The approach would be to assemble products turned out over the past two or three years, look at the means by which user priorities are fed back to the intelligence producers, and examine whether future consumer needs are being anticipated.

Mr. Marshall said he hoped it would be sponsored by the Working Group. The Chairman said he considered it should be under the group's auspices and Mr. Marshall could manage it.

Dr. Hall replied, however, that "we thought of doing it in-house because the DOD is dominant in this area."

The Chairman said that, while the consumers were largely military, all agencies of the community were involved in preparing intelligence inputs, and the production and collection tasks were shared. He favored having the study done under aegis of the Working Group.

Mr. Walsh noted the CCPC study of April 1972 would be of value to the study.

Dr. Hall said the group should regard each study in its "own light" and manage each one separately. He proposed the cruise missile study should be run out of his own office.

The Chairman indicated his vote would be for a "non-departmental" chairman, and when asked by Gen. Bennett what he meant, the Chairman explained that if a study were to be made of a political problem, he would not recommend that a State Department representative direct it.

Mr. Marshall said he was "not volunteering" to take over the cruise missile study, and Mr. Walsh expressed the feeling that the chairman should be someone who knew the problem so as to "avoid wheel spinning."

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

Dr. Hall said that in his view chairing the study in his office would not "involve users or producers directly."

Dr. Cline considered it proper to select the department which is most involved to provide the chairman, but that others should participate in an inter-agency approach. He favored a DOD representative as chairman for this study.

The Chairman expressed the agreement of the group and told Dr. Hall he had responsibility for the study.

Dr. Hall said he would request participation, with ASD/I, of DDR&E, DIA, CIA, and Navy as a user of the product.

Dr. Cline said he would like to send a representative to see what the group was going to do "since there are policy aspects involved," and Dr. Hall agreed.

Dr. Cline said he saw no need to discuss the paper he had submitted on Libya, but he stressed that the group should "think of production as a process, in which the actual papers are only the top of the iceberg."

The Chairman reported that IC/PRG had prepared a "Draft Study Outline for Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Production on a Selected Problem." The draft was handed out to the members for their consideration, but was not discussed further.

7. Other business: MBFR

General Breznahan asked that the group reconsider MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) as a study topic needing a hard look by the intelligence community.

The Chairman noted that in previous discussion of the topic, it had been decided that an intelligence interface on MBFR would not be timely and would not serve to clarify the MBFR problem.

Mr. Marshall felt the group should keep MBFR open as a follow-on to the NSSM-69 study, adding that "the capacity bottleneck is not my time."

Mr. Walsh said that two NSSMs and an item before the Verification Panel would be involved.

Mr. Marshall thought it would be worthwhile for the group to formulate "what we would try to get at" relating to MBFR.

Dr. Hall recommended wrapping up the NSSM-69 study first.

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

9
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

Mr. Weiss said the Verification Panel already has talked about MBFR and "how good our intelligence is is going to be a major topic."

General Breznahan commented that the Joint Staff felt such an intelligence study would be beneficial.

Mr. Walsh asked that the group keep in mind that the DDI is "in the business of producing intelligence, and not looking backward all the time."

General Bennett said he would like to see a study on how intelligence is used and not how good intelligence is.

Discussion ended when the Chairman noted it was 4 p.m. and time to adjourn. He said the timing of the next meeting probably would depend on how long it took to revise NSSM-69 on the basis of comments which had been submitted.

8. After close of the meeting, General Braznahan reported that Lt. General Louis T. Seith, who has replaced Vice Admiral Weinel as J-5, Joint Staff, also will replace Admiral Weinel as the NSCIC Working Group representative of the JCS Chairman.

~~SECRET~~


Executive Secretary

Distribution:

- orig - PRG subject (filed NSCIC WG-2)
- 1 - ~~25X1A9a~~ [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - PRG chrono

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020019-3

10
~~SECRET~~