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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, NSCIC

SUBJECT:

Comments on NSCIC Working Group

Study of Intelligence Crisis Support

- 1. The Working Group has done an excellent job in identifying the principal problems emerging from the three case studies, and in emphasizing communication as the most important of these. Moreover, the mechanisms it suggests seem to me to be useful and workable.
- 2. I anticipate no problems in implementing Actions I and II by designating liaison representatives to NSC organizations and the NSC staff and by making members of my own staff responsible for overseeing the process of intelligence support. I am now in the process of organizing my staff and in doing so will include provision to handle what is proposed in Actions I and II.
- 3. The effectiveness of a liaison officer in communicating the needs of policymakers for intelligence will depend in considerable measure on his access to the basic concerns and actions of the policymakers. Thus, I would hope that the policymakers could permit intelligence liaison officers access even to sensitive matters so that intelligence support could be tailored to the need.
- 4. I fully endorse Action III, which calls for periodic issuance of community-wide summaries of the situation in crisis periods. This fits in with my plans for overall improvement of current/crisis situation reporting and clear identification of conflicting viewpoints without degrading the timeliness of the reporting.



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- 5. The response to Action IV will require that analytic and estimative production be increased rather than sacrificed in crisis periods to current reporting. I agree that estimates have been neglected in past crises. The new criteria I have established for the production of National Intelligence Estimates will make that product more useful and available in crisis periods. Improving communication of policy requirements, through our liaison arrangements, will also contribute to better analytical products.
- 6. Action V calls for a post-mortem in depth as soon as possible after each crisis. This requires maintenance of records during the heat of the action, which is a function of good management. Those in charge must understand the need for recordkeeping and enforce a record-keeping SOP on their officers. As soon as the crisis is over, the liaison and/or monitoring officer will be charged with interviewing the parties involved, reviewing the records and preparing the post-mortem.
- 7. By the time of the next NSCIC meeting, I expect to be prepared to brief the committee in more detail on my responses to Actions I through V.

Is! Vernon A. Walters James R. Schlesinger Director of Central Intelligence

cc: each member, NSCIC

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I - Attorney General, Deputy Sec/State, Deputy Sec/Defense, Chairman, JCS

PRG subject (file NSCIC WG Project 1-73)

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