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Revised on Moscow/Belgrade trip.

INPUTS FOR THE "CRITIQUE OF INTELLIGENCE"
AT THE NSCIC WORKING GROUP MEETING
ON 20 NOVEMBER 1974

*PROVIDED
GEN WILSON
AS TALKING
PAPER
JST*

1. The NSCIC Working Group agreed at its 30 October meeting that consideration of a work program should be preceded by a candid discussion of what the members consider is effective and what is not effective in the manner with which the Intelligence Community responds to the needs of intelligence consumers. What is sought at the 20 November meeting of the Working Group is an expression of the personal views of each member as to what he and his organization like and don't like about the intelligence products now being provided. The Working Group Chairman invites views on any aspect of Intelligence Community performance which any member wishes to raise.

2. The following are suggestions as to topics which might be included in the development of points to be raised on 20 November.

a. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Intelligence Community output -- by area, by topic, and by type products.

b. Indicate particular substantive problems or geographic areas to which the Community should be devoting more -- or less -- attention than is now the case.

c. Should inflation and tightening fiscal constraints compel a reduction in available intelligence resources, indicate what kinds of reporting or kinds of estimates or other products must be retained -- or could be done without.

d. Intelligence officers are prone to say they seldom get useful feedback from consumers to give them a measure of how responsive any particular intelligence product was to customer needs. Each member could indicate how he or his principal provide -- or could provide -- such feedback. A general discussion of how such feedback could best be arranged also would be helpful.

e. Policy decision result from consideration of feasible alternatives. Ways by which intelligence reports could better contribute to the identification -- or even prioritization -- of these alternatives could be discussed.

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f. Each member could indicate how well key intelligence estimates serve his needs and the needs of his organization.

--Do they forecast far enough into the future to be of maximum usefulness?

--Do they give adequate attention to alternative developments?

--Is the analytic methodology up to the complexity of the subject matter of the estimate?

g. Indicate the extent to which current intelligence reporting meets current information needs.

--Suggest any changes which might be made in published material.

--Suggest any changes which might be made in the frequency or coverage of oral briefings.

h. Identify the extent to which intelligence inputs are responsive -- or not responsive -- to policy needs in crisis situations.

--What is particularly liked about the manner in which intelligence organizations currently cope with reporting and analysis in crisis periods?

--In what specific ways could this performance be improved?

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