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DIANM 2-75



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate for Estimates

ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR WARS OF LIBERATION

15 SEPTEMBER 1975

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ESTIMATIVE TERMS and DEGREES OF PROBABILITY

The table below explains the terms most frequently used to describe the range of likelihood in the key judgments of this estimate.

| Order of Likelihood | Synonyms | Chances in 10 | Per Cent |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------|
| Near Certainty | virtually (almost) certain we are convinced, highly probable, highly likely | 9 | 99 |
| | | | 90 - |
| Probable | likely | 8 | |
| | we believe | | |
| | we estimate | 7 | |
| | chances are good | | |
| | it is probable that | 6 | 60 - |
| Even Chance | chances are slightly better than even | | |
| | chances are about even | 5 | |
| | chances are slightly less than even | 4 | 40 - |
| Improbable | probably not | | |
| | unlikely | 3 | |
| | we believe ... not | 2 | |
| Near Impossibility | almost impossible only a slight chance highly doubtful | 1 | 10 - |
| | | | 1 |

NOTE: Words such as "perhaps", "may", and "might" will be used to describe situations in the lower ranges of likelihood. The word "possible", when used without further modification, will generally be used only when a judgment is important but cannot be given an order of likelihood with any degree of precision.


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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR WARS OF LIBERATION

This memorandum has not been coordinated with the Service Intelligence Chiefs.

APPROVED BY:

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "James M. Thompson". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "J".

JAMES M. THOMPSON
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for Estimates

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A Defense Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (DIANM) presents evidence gathered during research for an estimate, and more detailed analysis than would be appropriate in the estimate itself. A DIANM is intended for use primarily by members of the intelligence community rather than policy makers for whom less detailed estimative products are more useful.

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**SOVIET SUPPORT FOR WARS
OF LIBERATION**

(S) A judgment often encountered in the US intelligence community is that the Soviets have become less involved over the past few years in support for what they call "Wars of National Liberation." However, there is a considerable body of evidence contrary to that judgment. The evidence is too fragmentary and inconclusive to warrant a firm assessment of the exact degree of Soviet involvement in most specific liberation movements when they are considered in isolation. Yet, in vastly different movements and widely separated regions -- Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America -- the pattern of Soviet involvement is so similar that we believe it to be more than a coincidence. This Analytical Memorandum describes this pattern and concludes that the Soviets have not only continued their support for liberation movements, but have markedly increased their commitment in several areas.

Users of this Analytical Memorandum are encouraged to provide comments concerning its scope and content to the DIA Directorate for Estimates, attention: LtCol Robert Fuller, USAF, Soviet/East European Division, OX4-8105. The evidence referred to in this DIANM is available from the author.

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SOVIET SUPPORT FOR WARS OF LIBERATION

1. (S) Two recent dispatches from US Embassy Moscow set the tone of current official Soviet views on the support of "Wars of Liberation."

- In a speech at Lenin's birthday ceremony on 22 April 1975, Mikhail Suslov stated in forthright terms the two sides of the peaceful coexistence coin. He asserted that detente is *"deepening and becoming more stable"* and, at the same time, said that the provision of *"political and material assistance"* to peoples fighting for *"national and social liberation"* remains *"one of the most important principles"* of the Soviet foreign policy. He noted that while *"broad new prospects"* are opening up for a further stabilization of peace, these same opportunities enhance the *"further development of the world revolutionary movement."*

- In describing the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence in the foreword of a book, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, published in January 1975, Foreign Minister Gromyko said, *"in peaceful conditions it is easier to develop the revolutionary struggle of the working class in capitalistic countries as well as the liberation movements of suppressed peoples, and to achieve solution of international problems."* He also noted that *"active assistance"* to *"progressive"* and national liberation movements is *"one of the main tasks of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union."*

2. (S) Despite Moscow's inevitable preoccupation with major power relationships, Soviet leaders have consistently displayed a profound sensitivity to the revolutionary potential of the Third World. In general, Soviet Third World interests are:

- To supplant Western influence and presence;
- To secure access to support facilities; and
- To counter Chinese influence.

3. (S) The USSR's two-tiered foreign policy first elaborated in the 1920's and subsequently carried forth to the present day in the Third World, has simultaneously pursued both the improvement of normal state-to-state relations with legitimate leaders in power and the patient cultivation of revolutionary successors to those leaders. These two aspects endow Soviet foreign policy with a seemingly ambivalent mixture of cooperation and conflict. Thus, the Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence" means both good state-to-state ties and support for subversion and armed struggle. The decision on which to emphasize at any given time and in any place depends upon an analysis of the circumstances and opportunities that exist to serve Soviet interests.

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4. (S) Soviet leaders have long asserted Moscow's commitment to support "struggles" against Western or Western-oriented governments, and generally view insurgencies¹ as legitimate wars of national liberation. Some examples of Soviet statements in support of liberation struggles are:

- One of the basic aims of Soviet foreign policy "is to support the national-liberation movement and to realize an all-embracing cooperation with the young developing states." (Editorial in Pravda of 2 June 1971.)

- "The Soviet Union is promoting, firmly and steadfastly, a policy of revolutionary solidarity with the forces of national liberation in the Middle East, rendering them continuous political, moral, and material aid." V.V. Zagladin CPSU/International Department. (Moscow, Kommunist #13, September 1972.)

- "The USSR, pursuing Lenin's will, has always supported and will continue to support the peoples' liberation struggles." (Brezhnev, in a speech referring to the Persian Gulf, April 1974.)

- "The CPSU, our government, and all the Soviet people openly and unambiguously express solidarity with their class brothers struggling in foreign countries and solidarity with the liberation, anti-imperialist movements. And this position in no way contradicts the struggle for peace and for peaceful coexistence between states." (Brezhnev, in a speech in Moscow, October 1974.)

- In March 1975, Soviet General of the Army Shavrov expressed the Soviet view of increasing prospects for wars of national liberation in quantitative terms. Shavrov, speaking of the period since World War II, asserted that "of 468 wars and conflicts, 258 ended in defeat or with the forces of reaction not attaining their goals. This is the general correlation of results of the use of military force for the last 30 years. However, . . . it has sharply changed in favor of the national liberation forces in the last decade. While in 1956-1960, this correlation was 60:62 and in the following five-year period 66:61, by 1970 it has already come out as 60:46, and in the first half of the 70's, as 30:12 in favor of the forces of progress and national liberation."

5. (S) Soviet motives for supporting particular insurgencies have varied, but their long-term goal is to bring governments to power which are amenable to Soviet interests. Moscow's backing of insurgent groups offers the opportunity to cultivate potential national leaders, to place them in Moscow's debt, and thus to facilitate the accession of pro-Soviet regimes. The Soviets have also found support for insurgencies useful in exerting pressure when formal bilateral relations have failed

¹For the purposes of this Analytical Memorandum, an insurgency in a given country or region is defined as the activity of an organized armed group, rural or urban, dedicated to opposing, and destroying if possible, local or central government authority, with the ultimate goal of seizing power. The terms "insurgent" and "guerrilla" are used interchangeably in this paper.

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to achieve Soviet expectations, or when governments threaten to adopt anti-Soviet positions. Soviet support for wars of liberation is also motivated by a desire to compete with China,¹ and to weaken Western governments by forcing them to devote substantial national resources to combat armed opposition.²

6. (S) On the other hand, the Soviets have been circumspect in supporting insurgencies or opposition elements against regimes with which Moscow maintains cordial relations, and radical initiatives which might fundamentally impair these relations are likely to be sacrificed or shelved. Moscow has frequently used its official leverage to pressure friendly legal governments for the benefit of insurgents in nearby countries. Indeed, one reason for Moscow's desire to maintain an official presence in such states as Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zambia, and Guinea, regardless of the regime in power or its attitudes toward the USSR, is the access that such an enduring presence affords for infiltrating, training, and, where possible, controlling guerrilla groups' activities in neighboring countries.

Managing Insurgency

7. (S) The Soviets do not insist on total control of the guerrilla movements they support. They consider it sufficient that the insurgents share a common interest with them in weakening the position of the host governments and diluting Western influence and presence. Broad Soviet objectives are thus often served with only marginal control or intervention in the movement.

¹The China factor looms large in Soviet liberation policy and Moscow's support for wars of liberation is undoubtedly inspired, in part, by a concern not to be outdone by Peking. Nevertheless, the significance of Sino-Soviet competition should not be overrated. Moscow and Peking both have interests in insurgency support which are independent of their competition. Sino-Soviet differences over liberation support are often ones of degree, rather than substance, and seem to relate to strategy, tactics, and timing rather than differences in ideology. Despite their polemics, Moscow and Peking apparently agree that developing countries represent the "weakest link of the capitalist system." Both countries share broad common revolutionary interests, and both would profit from weakening the position of the West in the Third World. There has been simultaneous Soviet and Chinese support for the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao, the Fedayeen (the generally used term to describe the various Palestinian terrorists and guerrilla groups), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands(PAIGC), and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).

²Among other examples, the human and financial cost to Portugal of combating its African insurgencies was considerable. From 1960 to 1971, Lisbon tripled the size of its military and security forces to 245,000 men. These forces, 60 percent of which were tied down in Africa, represented almost 8 percent of the Portuguese labor force. The African insurgencies cost the Portuguese well over a billion dollars. Military spending, 60 percent of which was absorbed in Africa, had risen by 1971 to about 6 1/2 percent of the GNP and more than 35 percent of the total budget.

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8. (S) The primary Soviet administrative organ for directing guerrilla activities abroad is the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Organization for Africa, Asia, and the Americas, within the International Department, probably handles overall relations with individual Third World guerrilla movements. Its senior officials travel widely within their regions of responsibility and serve as members of Soviet delegations to most international conferences on Third World matters. They also provide policy guidance to insurgent representatives. In addition, Soviet embassies and local Communist parties normally have contacts with guerrilla organizations and serve as principal sources for funding and communications.

9. (S) Also, high-level insurgent delegations travel frequently to Moscow and Warsaw Pact countries to attend Soviet-sponsored international conferences. Presumably, one purpose of these trips is to discuss insurgency strategy and tactics. In addition, most insurgent groups maintain contact with a host of unofficial Socialist and international front organizations which offer opportunities for liaison.

Guerrilla Warfare Training in the USSR

10. (S) Because of its enduring effect on potential leaders, guerrilla warfare training in the USSR offers Moscow its best opportunity for influencing and gaining control of insurgent movements. Most major movements have had members trained in guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union, and many thousands of insurgents have received such training in the USSR. Most of the graduates return to their own locales to teach the newly-learned skills to others, thereby multiplying the effects of Soviet efforts.

11. (S) Recruits for guerrilla warfare training are ordinarily selected by the appropriate local Communist Party or Soviet representative, with primary focus on aptitude and loyalty. Usually, these recruits are expected to complete their initial training in their home countries or in nearby third countries. More intensive and sophisticated training required for selected guerrilla leaders is generally offered later in the USSR.

12. (S/NFD) Guerrilla warfare training is given at various locations throughout the Soviet Union. The basic course is laced with political indoctrination and averages 6 months in length. It consists of instruction in guerrilla tactics and organization, explosives, weapons training, cartography, sabotage, and communications. Subsequent refresher or advanced courses and leadership training may last a year or more. Details reported on representative programs follow:

- Insurgent Training Center at Simferopol.--During the mid-1960s recruits from Portuguese Africa and Rhodesia received guerrilla training in the USSR in the Crimean City of Simferopol. From the mid-1970s through 1973, such training was offered at Simferopol (and perhaps other sites) for some 500 insurgents from Rhodesia, 1,200 from Mozambique, 700 from Angola, and 500 from Portuguese-Guinea (Guinea-Bissau).

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- Guerrilla Training Base in Armenian SSR.--In 1972, a training base for insurgents was located about 2 kilometers south of Leninakan. The trainees were Palestinians who arrived at the base from Moscow where they had studied at the Druzhba University. The courses lasted 6 months with 34 trainees attending each course. Instruction covered night combat, guerrilla warfare, and the use of sabotage materials. The trainees also received a course in arms familiarization.

- Guerrilla Training Camp East of Moscow.--From 1972-1974, courses lasting about 9 months were offered once a year for various groups of Fedayeen. The courses were taught by Soviet instructors at a special training camp 250 kilometers east of Moscow. The instruction was designed for squad commanders of special forces units and was principally devoted to conventional warfare training. Special emphasis, however, was placed on sabotage techniques and guerrilla tactics. Included were familiarization with the operation of sabotage equipment, demolitions, booby traps, the manufacture of improvised charges, and the operation of rocket launchers.

- GRU "Special Center" for the Training of Insurgents.-- From 1973-1974 the "Special Center" of the GRU was responsible for training insurgents from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Training sites of the Special Center were located in the Moscow area, the Crimea, and Krasnodar Kray. The Center offered various programs for leaders of insurgent movements. Subjects studied included ideology; techniques and tactics of guerrilla combat; organization; clandestine methods of operation; use of arms, explosives, and radios; and topography. The Center was organized into three geographical sections: Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It was staffed by 70 to 80 GRU officers and about 30 civilians, all of whom served as instructors.

Each year the Special Center trained "several hundred" leaders of insurgent groups from about 24 countries. Rank and file members of these groups were not trained by the Center. All students attended the Center under aliases. The greatest number of trainees were from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of Latin American students were from Argentina, with the remainder from Chile, Haiti, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. The students from Africa who received training were leaders of the nationalist movements in the three former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. Also, some Palestinians attended. The Asian students were primarily from Malaysia, Burma, and the Philippines.

Instruction at the Center was conducted in small groups of about three or four students and tailored to the individual needs of each student. Although training usually lasted from 6 to 8 months, in certain cases it was as short as 3 months or as long as 1 year. There was close coordination between the Special Center and the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In some instances, the International Department invited Party leaders to the USSR for training. In other cases, these leaders went to the Soviet Union for a vacation or medical treatment and then were given training.

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- The Institute of Social Sciences¹--From 1971 through early 1975, the Soviets conducted guerrilla warfare training at the Institute of Social Sciences near Moscow. In 1971, trainees from Angola, Portugal, Mozambique, and Latin American countries attended such courses. In most instances, this training lasted several months and included instruction in the handling and maintenance of light arms, the handling and use of explosives, hand-to-hand combat, and guerrilla insurgency tactics.

In early 1975, a group of 10 Chilean students was given a 2-week course in military and paramilitary tactics which included the fabrication and use of various types of bombs. An undetermined number of Argentine students was also given similar training in a course which lasted 1 week. The training was carried out at a Soviet military garrison located about 1 hour from Moscow.

13. (S) In addition to guerrilla training offered in the USSR, local Soviet-supported courses are offered by Tanzania, the PDRY, Iraq, Syria, and Cuba, among others. Some reports suggest that such courses are also offered by Afghanistan and in Fedayeen camps in the Middle East. Cuban training programs, conducted in Guinea and the PDRY have provided direct support to Soviet-backed insurgents in nearby countries.² In addition, members of Soviet-backed liberation groups and Communist parties have attended guerrilla warfare training schools in North Korea and China.

The Pattern of Soviet Support and the Role of Intermediaries

14. (S) Soviet money, arms, and material assistance are usually limited to those guerrilla groups who display an "acceptable" political orientation and who hold out some prospect for Soviet influence over their activity. Soviet assistance to guerrillas is usually not "massive." The extent of the aid is undoubtedly affected by Moscow's hard-nosed, pragmatic calculations of cost, risks, and prospects.

15. (S) Today's Soviet-supported guerrilla forces appear to be better trained and equipped than in the past, although the amount of support furnished to

¹The Institute of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee is the formal name for an institution in Moscow known variously, and perhaps more commonly among non-Soviets, as the "International Institute of Marxism-Leninism" or the "CPSU School for Non-Bloc Communists." Apparently, around 1970 or early 1971, the school acquired an installation outside Moscow to provide training in guerrilla warfare. Training has been conducted in great secrecy.

²There is strong evidence of extensive collaboration between the Cuban and Soviet intelligence services. The Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) was originally organized along Soviet lines, with Soviet advisors, training, and funding. The DGI once had the function of supporting liberation movements. Although the DGI still exists, this function is currently the responsibility of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). However, Soviet advisors still assist the Departments of the PCC Central Committee which perform this function.

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insurgents is small compared to Moscow's state-to-state military assistance programs. Guerrilla movements usually require fairly modest levels of assistance to serve their operational needs and the Soviets try to provide appropriate, sufficient, and timely support in consonance with these needs.

16. (S) Moscow would probably prefer to support guerrilla movements directly from the beginning so that it could exert a greater degree of influence and ensure that supplies are delivered to their intended destinations. However, the characteristic Soviet pattern of support for guerrilla movements is first indirect, and then direct. The Soviets have usually chosen to conceal their involvement and reduce the risk of exposure during the early stages of an insurgency by supplying guerrillas through third countries. Moscow occasionally finds it expedient to remain uninvolved while third countries unilaterally support a movement, or while a movement progresses on its own. If a movement subsequently demonstrates cohesiveness and shows promise, Moscow may become more directly involved and increase its visibility.

17. (S) Where the likelihood of insurgent success is low, the Soviets limit the quantity and quality of aid. Moscow has withheld aid or limited it to guerrilla training in cases where insurgents are weak, divided, or lack popular support. Even during the later stages of an insurgency, the Soviets constantly assess costs, risks, and prospects in the light of the viability of the movement, the tactical support the insurgents require, and evolving Soviet interests.

18. (S) In the early stages of an insurgency, one procedure typically followed by the Soviets is to have third countries, such as Guinea and Tanzania, transfer military equipment from their own inventories to insurgent groups. The Soviets subsequently rebuild the inventories. Soviet willingness to replace the equipment amounts to support of these transfers by the USSR. Another procedure used early in support of guerrilla movements is for Moscow to route Soviet arms shipments to insurgents through military channels of third countries. Such shipments have frequently been earmarked in advance for intended guerrilla recipients.

19. (S) During the advanced stages of an insurgency, Soviet shipments of military equipment are routed directly to guerrillas with little handling by the third countries involved. These shipments, clearly marked, are typically delivered to third country ports and picked up at dockside by guerrilla representatives. The third country governments exercise little authority in the process and essentially lose administrative and distribution control. This procedure, in effect, constitutes "direct" shipping. Some specific examples are:

- Soviet shipments of arms to the Fedayeen, prior to 1972, were funneled primarily through Syria and to a lesser extent through Iraq and Egypt. Since 1972, an increasingly large proportion of Soviet shipments was apparently consigned to the Fedayeen and probably picked up directly by guerrilla representatives at Syrian ports.

- Initial Soviet arms shipments to guerrillas in Sub-Saharan Africa apparently followed the same pattern, with aid routed through the governments of Guinea

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and Tanzania for the insurgent movements in Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola.¹ By 1973, shipments to the PAIGC and FRELIMO, clearly marked for the intended recipients, were routinely delivered to ports in Guinea and Tanzania by Soviet ships, and picked up there by guerrilla representatives.

20. (S) Most third countries used for shipments of insurgent supplies are dependent on the USSR militarily and, to a lesser degree, economically. For example, Syria, Iraq, PDRY, Cuba, North Vietnam, Egypt, India, and Guinea have all received substantial economic aid and military assistance from the Soviets.

21. (S) Although other Communist countries participate in the support of liberation movements, their contributions are relatively small compared to those of the Soviet Union. Warsaw Pact countries do cooperate in foreign policy matters relative to the Third World. It is probable that Pact assistance is closely orchestrated, and that Soviet assistance is routed through other Pact countries.

22. (S) In addition to Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba, which apparently assist in arms shipments and training, a host of Soviet-controlled international peace, labor, and youth organizations serve as additional channels for supporting guerrilla activities. One example is a Paris-based organization, the Curiel Apparatus, which is involved in collecting funds, organizing support committees, recruiting agents, and training guerrillas.

23. (S) In addition to its emphasis on using intermediary countries, Moscow has recently shown an interest in increasing the cooperation among liberation movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, and Latin America. At present, most insurgent activities are national in scope, but cooperation between major guerrilla groups appears to be growing.² They often provide each other safe houses, assistance in transit, and financial and communication support.

The Role of Local Pro-Soviet Communist Parties

24. (S) Although the Soviets support various radical leftists without the involvement of local Communist parties, they believe that guerrillas are best led

¹These movements were: PAIGC (The African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands); FRELIMO (The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique); and MPLA (The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). The Soviets also provided arms and training to insurgents in Rhodesia and South-West Africa.

²For example, the Fedayeen operates an extensive international support network which probably maintains some form of contact with most of the principal revolutionary groups throughout the world. PFLO/PFLOAG has close ties with active covert cells in each of the smaller Persian Gulf states and with the Fedayeen. Close operational ties also exist among Argentinian, Chilean, and Uruguayan guerrilla groups.

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by local Communists. Virtually all Third World pro-Soviet Communist parties are to some extent funded by Moscow and most are consistently responsive to Soviet guidance. In any case, the local Communist parties perform three functions:

- Educate, unite, and organize mass support for the revolutionary program.
- Covertly create revolutionary situations (i.e., disrupt existing state functions and foment dissatisfaction among the populace), provide direction and support for Soviet-backed guerrilla groups, bring unattached dissident groups under Party control, and maintain an armed paramilitary component which could serve as a nucleus for insurgency.
- Support USSR-backed international socialism. This involves overt representational activities, such as meeting visiting dignitaries and attending international Party or front conferences, as well as covert activities, such as sending selected recruits to the USSR, or funneling money, material, and advisers into the country.

25. (S) Whether Soviet policy emphasizes friendly diplomacy or support for subversion and armed struggle, or a combination of both, is determined by the USSR in conjunction with the local parties or revolutionary groups. The degree of authority the USSR permits local Communists to exercise varies widely from case to case. Current emphasis is on the peaceful, legal route to power, but the Soviets have not rejected the option of violence in any Third World country where it appears vital to the likely success of a coordinated, approved national liberation movement.

26. (S) In the Soviet view, most Third World Communist parties are still insufficiently strong to guarantee "irreversible" gains, and Moscow has strongly criticized what it perceives to be premature armed attempts to seize power. In particular, Moscow apparently believes that armed struggle in Latin America is generally inappropriate at this time, because guerrilla movements lack popular support. Since 1971, the Soviets seem to have encouraged Cuba to unite Cuban-backed guerrilla groups with local pro-Soviet Communist parties and other movements into "revolutionary fronts." Some evidence suggests a Soviet willingness to finance such Cuban efforts. "Revolutionary fronts" are probably viewed by Soviet strategists as having more potential for future Soviet influence, and as more likely to succeed. At the 24th CPSU Congress, about the time the Soviets began encouraging Castro to develop "revolutionary fronts," there was increased optimism for the success of Latin American revolutionary movements.

The CPSU 24th Party Congress -- A Turning Point

27. (S) The 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, held at Moscow in March and April of 1971, gave an accounting of the regime's foreign policy achievements and expectations. Three broad areas of Soviet foreign policy were identified and ranked in order of priority. The ranking was the same as it had been at the 23rd Party Congress 5 years earlier. These areas were:

- To strengthen the world Communist system;

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- To support national-liberation movements and promote the world anti-imperialist struggle;

- To maintain the principle of peaceful coexistence in relations with states having different social systems.

28. (S) At the Congress, Soviet leaders displayed optimism about the heightened revolutionary prospects throughout the Third World and pledged new support for national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Their statements suggested that increased support was in order because of a continuing favorable shift in the world balance of power which offered new opportunities for revolutionary advancements. Since the Congress, official Soviet statements have increasingly emphasized the Soviet role as the principal guarantor of success for liberation struggles and have suggested that the growth of Soviet military power underwrites this role.

29. (S) Despite the appearance of moderation and restraint, and the adoption of a "peace program," there was a pervasive undertone in the Congress that suggested a harder line on "imperialism" and the necessity for accentuating the liberation struggle in a time of growing detente. Several events have indicated that this harder line was embodied in a positive program which was initiated to strengthen and improve liberation forces' prospects for success, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of these events were:

- March 1971 The 24th CPSU Congress. Official representatives of guerrilla movements attended a Party Congress for the first time.
- April 1971 The CPSU Coordinating Committee convened at Moscow immediately following the Congress, to discuss the "liberation" of southern Africa. Representatives from the Communist parties of Western Europe, New Zealand, the USA, and South Africa attended.
- April 1971 A conference of Western European support groups for "freedom fighters" of the Portuguese colonies was held in Holland to discuss the possibility of convening a conference to coordinate Warsaw Pact aid.
- June 1972 An Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers Meeting at Rabat addressed support of African guerrilla movements. Soviet Premier Kosygin and the CPSU sent a message of greeting to the OAU Chairman, reminding him of the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress to support the freedom fighters of Sub-Saharan Africa.

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30. (S) Official pronouncements have continued to confirm a shift to more assertive and bolder support for liberation groups in general, and Soviet assistance to some liberation movements has increased markedly.

Deepening Involvement

31. (S) Between 1971 and 1974 there were sharp increases in Soviet aid to liberation movements in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East; that to Indochina also increased during the period, although not to the highest levels of the 1960's. The aid to insurgents in Africa and the Middle East has continued; that to Indochina tapered off again in 1974. Moscow's growing influence over Havana's policies since 1971 suggests that Cuban support for Latin American guerrillas since then has been undertaken with tacit Soviet approval. Since 1973, Soviet indirect support for guerrilla activities in Dhofar has apparently increased, and there has been sporadic reporting which suggests Soviet involvement in Afghan-supported tribal efforts to destroy central authority in western Pakistan.

32. (S) *Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.* --Early Soviet support to the Portuguese African and Middle East guerrilla movements generally followed the indirect shipment method. In 1972, the Soviets substantially upgraded the quality and quantity of their aid to the Fedayeen, the PAIGC, FRELIMO, and the MPLA; training programs in the USSR were also expanded. In 1973, Moscow again increased the quantity and sophistication of its arms support for all these groups, except the MPLA which was temporarily ineffective. By this time, the Soviets had upgraded supply procedures and apparently most Soviet arms shipments were carried aboard Soviet ships for direct delivery to guerrilla representatives in third countries.

33. (S) The PAIGC declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau in September 1973, and the Portuguese formally relinquished power to it in September 1974. The PAIGC leaders signed economic and probably military aid agreements with the USSR in February 1975. In Mozambique, promises of substantial assistance from various communist countries, including the USSR, were made to the new transitional government which was formed in September 1974. Throughout 1974 and into 1975, Moscow increased its direct aid to Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO, and the Palestinians and, since late 1974, has sought to strengthen the military capability of the MPLA in Angola. Soviet support to the Angolan insurgents reached unprecedented levels in recent months and has included deliveries of Soviet armored vehicles and heavy weapons.

34. (S) Soviet backing for insurgents in the Portuguese territories contributed greatly to a train of events that produced the April 1974 coup in Lisbon. The new government shifted to the far left and the pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party assumed a greatly enlarged role. The government collapse in Lisbon resulted in early independence for the Portuguese African territories. Mozambique is governed by former guerrilla leaders whose movement received substantial assistance from the Soviets throughout its long struggle. In Angola, Moscow is well positioned to gain considerable influence if the MPLA succeeds in gaining control of an independent Angola.

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35. (S) In the Middle East, the USSR is the principal source of arms for the Fedayeen and the dominant non-Arab external influence over its governing body, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The increasing international acceptability of the PLO and the possibility of the eventual formation of a Palestinian entity, have resulted in additional leverage for Moscow in any Middle East peace settlement.

36. (S) *Indochina.*--The Soviets furnished large-scale military assistance, including sophisticated weapons, to the Viet Cong through Hanoi for a number of years. There is evidence that aid to the Viet Cong was treated by Moscow as distinct from official aid to Hanoi and that the Soviets administered the two programs separately. Although the Soviets may have had little control over the mechanics of distribution, there is evidence that Soviet shipments were earmarked with special Soviet designators for transshipment to the Viet Cong. There is also evidence that the Soviets designated shipments for the Pathet Lao and routed them through Hanoi for distribution. Soviet-supported wars of liberation victories in Indochina undermined US credibility in the region and have undoubtedly fueled Moscow's optimism about revolutionary prospects elsewhere.

37. (S) *Latin America.*--Despite their belief that armed struggle is premature in most Latin American countries, the Soviets have maintained contact with guerrilla groups in many of these countries through Soviet embassies in the area and local Communist parties. We believe that Moscow has provided financial support to guerrilla movements through these conduits as well as arranged guerrilla warfare training in the USSR.

38. (S) Foreign support for Latin American insurgencies has come primarily from Cuba. Cuban support was far greater in the 1960's than in the 1970's, but Cuba remains a direct source of modest support for various Latin American guerrilla movements and continues to provide funds, training, and guidance. Prior to 1971, Cuban support was apparently not approved by the Soviets, because of their belief that conditions were not then ripe for the scale of activity advocated by Havana.

39. (S) There is reason to believe that in late 1971 Castro accepted the Soviet position that state-to-state relations and wars of liberation should be pursued simultaneously. He subsequently adopted the strategy advocated by the USSR which cautions restraint and selectivity. There is abundant circumstantial evidence which suggests that Castro's present liberation policy is coordinated with the USSR and, at a minimum, receives its tacit approval. Indeed, Moscow has, in effect, underwritten Castro's revolutionary activities by furnishing Havana substantial military, economic, and political support.

40. (S) We cannot establish with certainty the nature and extent of Soviet guerrilla involvement in Latin America. But, given the importance of the role of intermediary nations in the pattern of Soviet liberation activity, the Soviet-Cuban connection in Latin American insurgencies is highly probable. We believe that most current Soviet involvement in such insurgencies takes the form of indirect support through Cuba.

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41. (S) Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Uruguay have all, at some time since 1971, experienced increased levels of guerrilla activity. Although most government counterinsurgency campaigns have contained this activity effectively, some of the infrastructure and the potential for guerrilla operations remain.

42. (S) *The Arabian Peninsula.*--The USSR is the principal source of arms for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), the most important insurgent movement in the Arabian Peninsula. The PDRY serves as the conduit for Soviet assistance to the movement. Moscow has steadily upgraded the quantity of weapons furnished to the Dhofar insurgents in Oman since 1970. A shift in the Soviet line toward greater Soviet commitment, and probably substantially increased Soviet aid, coincided with the tactical setbacks suffered by the insurgents in 1973-1974. In 1974, Moscow probably offered specific guidance to the PDRY and PFLO/PFLOAG on liberation strategy and tactics and, apparently for the first time, a Soviet vessel delivered to Aden ammunition specifically designated for the insurgents. Soviet advisers have appeared to be increasingly involved in supervising the distribution of such arms shipments.

43. (S) *Afghanistan/Pakistan.*--Tribal dissidence has long been endemic to Pakistan's western provinces (Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province). The Soviets have achieved very strong influence in Afghanistan and, since mid-1973, a number of reports have suggested Soviet involvement in the training and equipping of Pakistani tribal guerrillas through Afghanistan.¹ Because of the complexity of the issue, and the ambiguities in the reporting, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the nature and extent of the Soviet involvement, but we strongly suspect that the Soviets are aiding the Pakistani tribals through Afghanistan to some degree.

44. (S) *Ethiopia.*--There are indications that some Soviet military assistance to Syria, Iraq, the PDRY, Libya, and Somalia has been funnelled through these states to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Moscow extends military aid to each of these countries, and is undoubtedly aware that some of this assistance has been passed by these third countries to the insurgents. The USSR has apparently not discouraged such procedures.

Moscow's View of the Prospects

45. (S) As Moscow sees it, the "correlation of forces" -- the Soviet description of the interrelationship of all factors comprising the balance of international power -- is shifting in its favor, and the "objective and subjective conditions" for socialist revolution are improving. Detente has allowed the Soviets to improve Soviet Third World diplomatic ties which, in turn, facilitates Moscow's contact with and access to liberation movements through its embassies and other official missions. Moreover, increased Soviet involvement with insurgents and radicals seems not to have appreciably damaged Moscow's official respectability and influence in the Third World.

¹Tribal dissidents in Pakistan's frontier provinces have traditionally limited their demands to local autonomy.

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46. (S) Moscow views wars of national liberation as an integral part of the world revolutionary process and calculates that recent successes (e.g., in Portugal and its colonies and Indochina) and long-run trends in the Third World are favorable to the USSR. However, the Soviets are also aware of the obvious danger of moving too fast, believing that a wholesale endorsement of armed struggle could cause the West to close ranks, or perhaps to "over-react."

47. (S) Accordingly, the Soviets have been prudent in exploiting the West's difficulties and, while they have substantially increased their involvement in some insurgencies, their participation has generally remained discreet. Nevertheless, support for insurgency offers Moscow a very significant but low risk means of pursuing its ultimate goal of a worldwide Soviet imperium.

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