

20 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham, [redacted]

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SUBJECT: History of NSCIC Working Group  
Activities ~~1972~~ Dec 71 thru 1972

**\*NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File\***

1. At the first meeting of the NSCIC Working Group in December 1971, members were asked to submit to the Chairman a list of their intelligence needs and their ideas on how to tackle the problem of product evaluation.

2. On the basis of member submissions - NSC did not reply - PRG prepared for the Chairman a work program of 12 projects, grouped under headings of consumer needs, product evaluation, and production improvement. The Work Program proposal was sent to members and at the second meeting in February 1972, the Group elected to go ahead with five projects, four from the work program list, and one proposed by Mr. Marshall, NSC staff.

3. Only one project did not involve a study: the group approved the idea of the DCI sending a letter to Dr. Kissinger asked for his views on how well the DCID 1/2 reflected the intelligence needs and priorities of the White House and the NCS. A second phase of this was for Mr. Marshall to solicit comments from the NSC staff. The letter was sent on 24 February but no formal reply was ever received. Comments were provided by Mr. Marshall.

4. The three <sup>from study</sup> projects approved from the work program were: a study of intelligence reaction to a political-military crisis (the India-Pakistan conflict of 1971); a survey of intelligence activities [redacted] and a study of resources devoted to production by the U.S. intelligence community.

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5. The fifth project approved was one identified by Mr. Marshall as being of prime interest to Dr. Kissinger. It was a review of the intelligence inputs to NSSM-69.

SIX 6. <sup>to date</sup> (Under the first chairman), the Working Group sponsored ~~seven~~ studies of an informational or background nature - intended for self-education ~~as~~ <sup>and on the</sup> basis for identifying possible future <sup>areas on</sup> studies. The Justice member asked for a report on US intelligence activities relating to international narcotics traffic; Dr. Proctor

*which NSCIC would have been helpful.*

produced a report on the production of economic intelligence in OER; PRG prepared a report, based on submissions from the community, on current intelligence production during the month of April 1972; PRG also produced reports on resources and manpower devoted to intelligence production. The Group's concerns about who was doing what in the economic intelligence production area were not satisfied by the OER report and a follow-on project to report on coverage in other departments and agencies ended up in the Economic Intelligence Committee -- where it is still in work, over a year later.

7. Seven case studies were approved for work: five have been completed, one is still in work, and one was cancelled due to difficulties in getting analysts assigned to work on it. The major effort was the three crisis studies, which resulted in a summary report from the Working Group to the NSCIC, identifying problem areas and recommending actions.

8. Mr. Marshall was the most active member in identifying topics for Working Group consideration. Dr. Hall and Dr. Cline also made several contributions; they both identified the India-Pakistan crisis as a prime target for study, and Dr. Cline originated the request for the survey of economic intelligence production. Dr. Cline also proposed several area studies of intelligence production, from which the Group selected Yugoslavia.

9. The CIA representatives were not active contributors in identifying topics for study, but were vocal in discussions and written comments on topics proposed by others. They were certainly influential in some of the decisions not to pursue a particular topic.

10. The Working Group met five times in 1972, first in February, and last in October. The decision to hold a meeting was based on whether there was an on-going study ready for consideration. Except for the second meeting, held in February, to consider a work program, no meetings were held unless there was action needed on a completed study.

11. ~~THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION~~ ~~WAS~~ ~~AT~~ ~~WORKING~~ ~~GROUP~~ ~~MEETINGS~~ ~~AS~~ ~~AT~~  
The DDS&T attended the first meeting only, and did not make any contribution thereafter. The Justice Department was represented by Mr. Wells at the last three meetings, and subsequently advised in May of 1973 that they would no longer participate except when subjects within their area of responsibility were on the agenda. <sup>ITS</sup>

12. A variety of topics were surfaced, either at the meetings, or in correspondence, which were not taken under active consideration at the time, but which may still warrant consideration. Attached at Tab A is a list of these subjects. Also attached at Tab B is a detailed breakout of Working Group projects and their disposition. At Tab C is a list of the task groups that performed the studies.

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
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TAB A

Topics for Possible Consideration by the  
NSCIC Working Group

1. Studies proposed to the Working Group, on which no action was taken:

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b. Review of NIE-11 series

One of original work program proposals. Would be a review of responsiveness of present NIE-11 series to needs of high-level consumers. Intended to provide guidance to intelligence community for upcoming NIE-11 publications. Project was to be done under chairmanship of Mr. Marshall. Mr. Huizenga objected and project dropped.

c. Expected major requirements for new or different intelligence in the near-to-mid term future

One of original work program proposals. Group considered project too general in nature.

d. Survey of consumer reaction to intelligence products

A questionnaire type study to survey consumer reactions to scope, quality, timeliness and usefulness of designated products, and to identify specific areas of dissatisfaction. Group's general reaction was that questionnaires had never been very satisfactory.

e. Survey of intelligence analyst situation

Intended to respond to President's charge to upgrade intelligence analyst personnel and analyst methods. Some interest expressed by group but no action taken.

f. R&D relating to intelligence production

No action taken.

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g. Follow-on studies to NSSM-69 study

Marshall suggested MBFR and then one on a political type NSSM. He later defined this as NSSM-128, Nuclear Test Ban Policy. Cline suggested a study of intelligence production on NSSM-108, Review of US policy toward Latin America. No follow-on NSSM studies were approved, but group did not close door on them.

h. Study of intelligence production - an audit of the product of various elements of the intelligence community to assess professionalism, originality, degree of duplication

Hall proposed this one and suggested that four topics be explored: S&T, political intelligence and analysis, force posture estimates and analysis, and economic intelligence and analysis. Group considered project too vague and asked him to work up a terms of reference for a study of this type, which never was done.

i. Study of intelligence production on Chile

Proposed by Cline, to use analysts plus a panel of users. He also suggested Libya, but later settled for Yugoslavia.

2. Topics or areas for study identified by Mr. Marshall in various memos to this office, and in meetings.

a. In memo of 7/27/72 he listed the elements of a comprehensive product improvement program:

- programs to provide more training to analysts
- R&D programs on new methods of analysis
- quality control operations (by independent offices)
- product assessment within producing agencies
- active and aggressive effort to study consumer needs

b. A study of communication channels - why isn't the message getting through, how to channel the many unstructured channels into something definitive and collect it together.

c. Evaluation forms and polling techniques

[Note: Dr. Malkin used questionnaires and personal interviews as part of his cruise missile study. It might be useful to explore the details more fully than were covered in the report.]

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d. A recurring theme in his conversations and memos is his interest in R&D programs on new methods of analysis:

- use of outside consultants to train selected analysts in advanced analytical methodologies
- his group on decision-making (foreign)
- 25X1A9A [redacted] was a member of this group but says it never progressed very far.
- psychologists study of the inference processes of analysts
- use of Bayesian techniques

e. His desire for different products

[redacted]

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- development of wrap-up products for critical areas
- presentation of products containing conflicting viewpoints
- improved treatment and communication of uncertainty from analysts to consumers

f. Consumer needs

He has been interested for some time in using [redacted] Delphi program with groups of high-level consumers and also suggested trying this with the Working Group members

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g. Development of a few highly classified case studies on political/military crises which explore how the crisis management problems look to key decision makers. To be developed for training purposes.

h. An effort to examine how intelligence could more effectively assist in the design and carrying out of military demonstrations; increase its monitoring of the effects of US crisis moves.

3. Consistent Marshall complaints

a. CIA does not devote energy to finding out what particular customers really need and what they think of the product.

b. CIA doesn't tailor its products to special needs of particular negotiations - NSC interested in negotiations with other governments.

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## Status of Case Studies Initiated by the NSCIC Working Group

Title	Initiation Approved	Action Officer	Study Completed	Disposition
1. India-Pakistan Crisis Study	2/4/72	Marshall	6/16/72	Sent to WG members 6/20/72. Considered at 7/6/72 meeting. Draft memo to forward study to NSCIC given to Marshall to revise. On 10/5/72 study and cover memo sent to Chairman, NSCIC. Comments of NSCIC members requested and meeting to consider report scheduled, and rescheduled and finally canceled. See item 3.
2. Intelligence Support to NSSM-69	2/4/72	Marshall	1/12/73	Original report sent to WG members 6/8/72. Study redrafted on basis of member comments. Delays occurred due to departure of original drafter of study and study not sent to members until 1/12/73. At 4/4/73 meeting it was agreed that study raised no issues requiring NSCIC guidance, and study should be sent to DCI to forward to production offices for in-house use. On 4/6/73 memo to production heads forwarding study sent to DCI for signature. Not signed.
3. Arab-Israeli Crisis Study	6/6/72	Marshall	1/30/73	Sent to WG members 3/2/73. Summary of results of three crisis studies and action recommendations considered by WG at 4/4/73 and 4/25/73 meetings. Sent to NSCIC on 5/16/73.
4. Jordan- Fedayeen Crisis Study	6/6/72	Marshall	2/16/73	Study to WG members 2/26/73. See comments in item 3. above.

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## Status of Case Studies Initiated by the NSCIC Working Group (cont'd)

Title	Initiation Approved	Action Officer	Study Completed	Disposition
5. MAMSON-719 Crisis Study	7/6/72	Marshall	cancelled	Project died for lack of people to do the study.
6. Review of Intelligence Products related to the Cruise Missile Threat	6/6/72	Hall	2/1/73	Sent to members 2/26/73. Chairman recommended that study not be sent to NSCIC, but to DCI with request that he ask intelligence production managers to take appropriate action. At 4/4/73 meeting group agreed not to send report to NSCIC, but to ask DCI to disseminate. This action has been held pending consideration of amendments to WG terms of reference.
7. Intelligence Production on Yugoslavia	10/3/72	Marshall		Project delays in getting started due to study group chairman's occupation with other work. At 4/4/73 WG meeting, Marshall indicated study coming along well and completion expected in June. Later estimate for completion was August or September.

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10 July 1973

Status of Background or Information Studies  
Initiated by the NSCIC Working Group

Title	Initiation Approved	Action Office(r)	Study Completed	Disposition
1. US Intelligence Activities relating to International Narcotics Traffic  25X1	2/4/72	PRG/IC	3/21/72	Sent to WG members on 3/23/72; copy to DCI on 4/4/72. No further action taken by WG pending completion of CCPC study. [CCPC study dated 17 October 1972]
[Redacted]				
2a. same as above, other than CIA	4/12/72	Proctor Cline	25X1A9A 25X1A9A	Action for study given to EIC, terms of reference disseminated 26 July 1972, due date estimated for end of September. Action officer was [Redacted] Chairman, EIC WG. [Redacted] reports study due out soon.]
3. Resources devoted to Production by the US Intelligence Community	2/4/72 (already in work)	PRG/IC	3/28/72	Sent to WG members 3/30/72; copy to DCI on 3/31/72. Provided as back- ground for future studies. Additional copies given to IC staff, CIA, and INR/State.
4. Survey of Current Intelligence Publications	4/12/72	PRG/IC	9/21/72	Sent to WG members 9/22/72, considered by Group on 10/3/72. Study remanded to task group for additional work. Group chaired by rep. of chairman with members from State, CIA, DIA and NSA. Group completed its reexamination of materials. No further action taken. DCI took actions.

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Status of Background or Information Studies  
Initiated by the NSCIC Working Group (Cont'd)

Title	Initiation Approved	Action Office(r)	Study Completed	Disposition
5. Terms of reference for studies to evaluate the quality of US foreign intelligence products	4/12/72	Hall		Dr. Hall, Cline, Proctor and Marshall met once on 25 April and decided to wait until India-Pak and NSSM-69 studies completed. Chairman handed out proposed study outline at 7/6/72 meeting; no action ever taken.
6. Manpower and Cost Trends in US Intelligence Production, FY 66-73 (Revision of 10 Aug 72 report prepared in PRG and submitted to NSCIC)	10/3/72	PRG/IC		Task group formed to reconcile objections raised by members to data sources and figures. Died due to inability to obtain new inputs from DOD.

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Task Group Membership  
NSCIC Working Group Case Studies

- 1. India-Pakistan: Chairman: Curtis Jones, INR/State  

OCI/CIA  
DI/DIA

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- 2. NSSM-69: Study done by Lucas Fischer, OMB, on detail to Mr. Marshall. He formulated issues and used panels to critique.[redraft done by Pickett,]  

Panel members:

  - Dr. Vincent McRea, OST
  - Dr. Charles Sorrels, OMB
  - Mr. Willard Mitchell, OSD/ISA
  - Mr. John Knubel, NSC

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OSD/SA  
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OSR/DDI/CIA

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Col. Paul Murray, Jr., OSD/ISA
  
- 3. Arab-Israeli: Chairman: Robert Baraz, INR/State  

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DIA  
, DDI/CIA
  
- 4. Jordan-Fedayeen: Chairman:  OCI/CIA 25X1A9A  

Capt. E. C. Connelly, USN, Joint Staff, J-5  
Albert Vaccaro, INR/State

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DIA

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DDI/CIA
  
- 5. Cruise Missile: Chairman: Dr. Myron Malkin, OASD(I)  

RADM C. W. Cummings, Navy  
Capt. R. C. Avrit, DDR&E  
John H. Kelly, INR/State

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DIA

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DDI/CIA
  
- 6. Yugoslavia: Chairman: Kenneth Kerst, INR/State  

CIA and DIA have representatives,  
OSD/ISA representative dropped out.  
[outside consultants planned also  
for this study.]

Topics which have been identified in the past which could start a future work program for the NSCIC Working Group

1. NSC/White House desire (identified by Mr. Marshall) for developing a capability in intelligence community to do studies



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APPROACH: with Working Group approval, General Graham would be tasked to develop a couple of experimental studies via his Intelligence Sub-Group, to be critiqued by the Working Group consumers.

2. Study to identify what the needs of intelligence producers are for guidance from top-level consumers, what the mechanisms are through which they presently receive such guidance, how well they work, where they would change them.

APPROACH: with Working Group approval, General Graham would be tasked to make this study through the Intelligence Sub-Group, and the Working Group members would be tasked with getting the responses, to be issued to the intelligence community as guidance from the NSCIC.

3. Survey of consumers to find out what national intelligence products satisfy user needs.

APPROACH: with Working Group approval, General Graham would be tasked to develop, through his sub-group, a systematic program for obtaining the information in a form most useful to the producers. Questionnaires and other polling techniques would be developed. These would be structured to the greatest degree to give the producers the best information on specific products, or types of products. Specific questions would be developed for use in interviewing top-level consumers ; specific consumers or types of consumers would be named from whom reactions are particularly sought.

The Working Group members would take the next action, using the materials and guidance

developed above. Members would be individually responsible for either obtaining directly (in the case of top-level consumers) or supervising members of their staffs in getting the answers requested.

Upon receipt of the responses, General Graham's Sub-Group would reconvene to go over the material, identify gaps or fuzzy areas on which answers are not clear or more information is wanted. Working Group members would be asked to get the additional information.

Goal: to get as complete a profile on current products as possible by 1 October 1973.