

81-1973/2

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

STAT

STAT

SUBJECT: (Optional) DD/A REGISTRY  
FILE: Security 4

FROM:  EXTENSION:  NO. OIS 81-871/3  
DATE: 1 OCT 1981

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) DATE RECEIVED FORWARDED OFFICER'S INITIALS COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO:	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. ADDA	10/7		H	<p>Harry/Bill:</p> <p>The attached <u>Foreword</u> was taken from the first volume of Dr. Kissinger's memoirs. As you can see on page 3, he gave scant attention to how classified material used in the book was reviewed or cleared for him to publish. Subsequently, the press really jumped on the issue of double standards for the review and clearance of classified information which was to be used in the publication of books by former government employees. The whole issue died down, of course, with the passage of time, but it is this kind of negative publicity that the CIA does not need when Dr. Kissinger's second volume of memoirs is published.</p> <p>I think we are on the right track in asking to see the entire manuscript. If Dr. Kissinger is not willing to share the manuscript, then the next best alternative is to at least see chapters of the book or all the portions concerning declassified material so we can put it in the proper context.</p> <p>I am sending this to you only for the purpose of background information.</p>
2. DDA	10/7		D	
3.				
4.				
5. Return to: DIS 1206 Ames Building				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				

STAT

STAT

DIS: :mes (1 Oct 1981)

Distribution:  
 Orig. PRS - Adse w/att (To be returned to DIS)  
 1 - DDA w/att  
 1 - DIS Chrono w/o att

Attachment: a/s

## Foreword

FOR better or worse I was called upon to play a prominent role in the making and execution of United States foreign policy. First as President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs and later as Secretary of State under President Nixon and President Ford. This book is an account of our foreign policy during the first term of Richard Nixon's Presidency — from my appointment as national security adviser after the November 1968 election through the end of the Vietnam negotiations, roughly coincident with Nixon's second inauguration in January 1973. Inevitably, it is history seen through my eyes — a portrayal of what I saw and thought and did — and inevitably I have had to select and compress. A complete record in the historian's sense must await the publication of other documents, memoirs, and biographies — not all of American origin.

The period covered in this volume was marked by domestic division and international turmoil; it witnessed America's passage into a world in which we were no longer predominant though still vastly influential. It was a painful transition, not, I hope, without achievement, that began the process of a new and in the long run perhaps even more seminal American contribution to the prospects of free societies. For some, the treatment in this volume of controversial matters, especially the Vietnam war, will be the view from a side of the barricades unfamiliar to them. It is put forward here as honestly as possible, with the intention to reconcile, not to score retrospective debating points. As a nation we can transcend our divisions only by recognizing that serious people manned both sides of those barricades.

In a subsequent volume I intend to cover the period from January 1973 to January 1977, during most of which I was Secretary of State. That volume will discuss such matters as Watergate and the resignation of Richard Nixon; the October 1973 Middle East war and the "shuttle diplomacy" that followed; international economic problems such as the oil crisis and the North-South dialogue; Southern Africa; the fall of Salvador Allende and our Latin American policy; the Communist takeover of Indochina; negotiations on SALT II; the evolution of our relations with China; the Presidency of Gerald Ford and the 1976 election campaign; and others. On some topics I may hark back to events in the 1969-1972 period that were omitted here for reasons of space or continuity. Readers who hold this weighty volume in their hands may find it

hard to believe that anything was left out, but will perhaps be grateful that some matters were indeed deferred to a second volume.

In writing this account I have tried to keep reliance on memory to a minimum; I have been able to refer to much documentary evidence and, for part of this period, to a diary I kept. I intend to leave an annotated copy of this volume with my papers for the use of scholars who may someday pursue the period in greater detail.

One of the paradoxes of the age of the memorandum and the Xerox machine, of proliferating bureaucracies and compulsive record-keeping, is that the writing of history may have become nearly impossible.

When an historian deals with previous centuries, the problem is to find sufficient contemporary material; when he writes of modern diplomacy, the problem is to avoid being inundated by it. If a scholar of impeccable credentials and unassailable objectivity were given free run of the millions of documents of any modern four-year period, he would have the greatest difficulty knowing where to begin. The written record would by its very volume obscure as much as it illuminated; it would provide no criteria for determining which documents were produced to provide an alibi and which genuinely guided decisions, which reflected actual participation and which were prepared in ignorance of crucial events. Before the era of instantaneous communication, instructions to a negotiator had to be conceptual and therefore they gave an insight into the thinking of statesmen; in the age of the teletype they are usually tactical or technical and therefore are silent about larger purposes and premises. Official files of our period would not necessarily disclose what decisions were taken by "backchannels" bypassing formal procedures or what was settled orally without ever becoming part of the formal record. A participant's account of conversations can easily be ex post facto self-justification. (Dean Acheson once said that he never read a report of a conversation in which the author came out second best in the argument.) By a selective presentation of documents one can prove almost anything. Contemporary practices of unauthorized or liberalized disclosure come close to ensuring that every document is written with an eye to self-protection. The journalist's gain is the historian's loss.

The participant in great events is of course not immune to these tendencies when he writes his account. Obviously, his perspective will be affected by his own involvement; the impulse to explain merges with the impulse to defend. But the participant has at least one vital contribution to make to the writing of history: He will *know* which of the myriad of possible considerations in fact influenced the decisions in which he was involved; he will be aware of which documents reflect the reality as he perceived it; he will be able to recall what views were taken seriously, which were rejected, and the reasoning behind the choices made. None of this proves that his judgment was right — only what it was based

upon. If done with detachment, a participant's memoir may help future historians judge how things really appeared, even (and perhaps especially) when in the fullness of time more evidence becomes available about all dimensions of the events.

I owe a deep debt of gratitude to those who helped me in the preparation of this book. Peter W. Rodman, friend, confidant, and invaluable associate for a decade and a half, supervised the research, undertook major research himself, and helped with editing, checking, and many other chores. Without him this work could never have been completed. William G. Hyland, another trusted associate and longtime friend, contributed enormously to the research, especially on Europe, East-West relations, and SALT. Rosemary Neahr Niehuss and Mary E. Brownell, also colleagues of mine in government, were exceptionally skilled, dedicated, and helpful in their research and review of the manuscript.

Winston Lord and William D. Rogers permitted me to impose on their friendship to read the entire book. They made innumerable wise suggestions and an invaluable editorial contribution. Others who read portions of the manuscript were Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, David Ginsburg, Richard Helms, John Freeman, Samuel Halpern, Jessica Catto, and John Kenneth Galbraith. I will not pretend that I took all the suggestions of such a diverse group. But I thank them warmly for their efforts.

Harold Evans, assisted by Oscar Turnill, read through the entire volume with a brilliant editorial eye; they taught me what skilled and intelligent editing can contribute to organization and to lightening prose. Betsy Pitha and the late Ned Bradford of Little, Brown were meticulous and helpful in going over the manuscript. The index was expertly prepared by Melissa Clemence. Catherine De Sibour, Kathleen Troia, and Jeffrey Yacker assisted with the research.

I owe appreciation to Daniel J. Boorstin, the Librarian of Congress, and the men and women of the Manuscript Division: John C. Broderick, Paul T. Heffron, John Knowlton, and their dedicated staff. They have my gratitude for their courtesy and assistance with my papers, of which they are now the custodians. The working arrangements they provided were a great boon to me and my staff. Treatment of classified materials in this book has been worked out with the office of the national security adviser, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, to whom I express my appreciation. President Nixon has kindly given his permission to cite some materials from his Presidential files.

I am especially grateful to my personal assistant, M. Christine Vick, who took charge of organizing the handling of the manuscript, and typed it through several drafts, even while managing to keep my day-to-day business in order. Cheryl Womble and Mary Beth Baluta assisted in the typing with dedication. All worked many extra hours.

My wife Nancy encouraged me with her advice and love; as always she served as my conscience.

I have dedicated this volume to Nelson A. Rockefeller. He was my friend for twenty-five years until his untimely death in January of this year.

I alone am responsible for the contents of this book, as indeed I am for my actions as described herein.

Washington, D.C.  
June 1979

KISSING

BOSTON, June 8 — In the foreword to "White House Years" Henry Kissinger wrote: "Treatment of classified materials in this book has been worked out with the office of the national security adviser, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, to whom I express my appreciation." The acknowledgment seemed routine. It was not.

The passage caught the eye of a publisher, Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House. He wrote Brzezinski and asked "how the clearing of the Kissinger book was actually accomplished." The staff secretary of the National Security Council, Christine Dodson, replied:

"Prior to the publication of his book Dr. Kissinger forwarded to Dr. Brzezinski's office a very small part of the manuscript then prepared, in the form of disconnected brief excerpts. These excerpts were reviewed for possible classification problems; they were edited to indicate what we would require to clear the publication of those excerpts.

"The edited manuscript was returned and further oral comments were made to a member of Dr. Kissinger's staff to the effect that after the required changes, we were clearing what we saw and that N.S.C. clearance of the book would have to await a review of the total manuscript.

"Dr. Kissinger never submitted any further materials for review. It is our judgment, therefore, that the passage you quote from the book's foreword vastly overstates, at least by implication, the degree of classification review to which the book was subjected by Dr. Brzezinski's office."

Government employees do not usually use language as colorful as "vastly overstates" in official correspondence. Evidently the National Security Council staff, and perhaps Brzezinski, felt that they had been used. They resented Kissinger's bland little effort to deceive the public into believing that his use of classified material in the book had their official approval.

## ABROAD AT HOME

# The Kissinger Secrets

By Anthony Lewis

The interesting point in the episode is what it shows about the disparate treatment of former Government officials who write books about their experience. Robert Bernstein was curious about the handling of classified material in the Kissinger book because of what had happened to one of his authors, Frank Snepp. The contrast was staggering.

Kissinger, who had been privy to the highest secrets in the American system, made wholesale use of classified documents in his book. Some experts say that it discloses more current or recent national security material than any ever published.

As Miss Dodson's letter indicates, the Government was given a chance to make only a partial judgment on small portions of the manuscript. What was used was largely Kissinger's unilateral decision. Yet he has not been denounced by any official for allegedly compromising national security. He has not been sued. No court has lectured him. And he is expected to make more than \$5 million on the book.

Frank Snepp was a fine C.I.A. officer in Vietnam. Afterward he wrote a book, "Decent Interval," criticizing American policy at the end of the war. Because he did not show the manuscript to the agency, as he had promised to do, the Government sued him for damages. It did not allege that he had disclosed

any classified information at all. But it said the precedent of publishing without approval was dangerous.

The Supreme Court found that Snepp had violated a "fiduciary obligation" to show officials his manuscript — an obligation arising not from his promise but from the secret nature of his work. Without giving Snepp's lawyers a chance to argue the point, the Court summarily decided that the Government was entitled to take all of Snepp's earnings on the book, about \$140,000.

If the law declared by the Supreme Court in the Snepp case applies to anyone else, it surely must apply to Henry Kissinger. Hardly anyone had greater access to secrets and hence had a greater "fiduciary obligation" to show the Government his manuscript — all of the manuscript — before publication.

Here is a chance for the Justice Department to collect upwards of \$5 million. Will it sue Kissinger? I think we shall wait a long time until either the Department or the Supreme Court treat Henry Kissinger as they do the powerless Frank Snepps of this world.

There is also an important historical point about the treatment of classified material in "White House Years," a point made by Theodore Draper when he reviewed the book for the quarterly *Dissent*. On inquiry at the State Department, Draper found that Kissinger's quotations from secret documents had been declassified — but only those quotations, not the entire documents. Thus no one else could see the context of these passages to judge whether Kissinger had dealt with the material fairly.

"This system is a political and intellectual outrage," Draper wrote. "It enables political figures to control the history of their own deeds or misdeeds. No partial quotation can be properly understood without its context. . . ."

"What is declassified for one should be declassified for all. Whether or not the present declassification system is good or bad is not here the question; the real issue is whether Government officials should be permitted to make a mockery of it."

# Kissinger Overstated Clearance On Memoirs, U.S. Official Says

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger "vastly overstated, at least by implication," the extent to which hitherto classified information had been cleared for publication in his memoirs, according to correspondence made public yesterday.

The assessment was made by an official of the National Security Council in response to an inquiry by the publishers of another book whose author was successfully sued by the government for failing to obtain proper clearance.

Kissinger, in the foreword of his book "The White House Years," wrote that "treatment of classified materials in this book has been worked out with the office of the national security adviser, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, to whom I express my appreciation."

On May 21, however, the staff secretary of the NSC, Christine Dodson, wrote to the head of the publishing firm Random House that Kissinger submitted only "a very small part of the manuscript" for review, and this was "in the form of disconnected, brief excerpts."

After some "required changes" were specified, she wrote, "Kissinger never submitted any further materials for review. It is our judgment, therefore,

that the passage you quote from the book's foreword vastly overstates, at least by implication, the degree of classification review to which the book was subjected by Dr. Brzezinski's office."

The NSC letter was sent to Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House, which had published "Decent Interval," a book by former CIA officer Frank Snepp critical of American policy in Vietnam.

In a far-reaching ruling in February, the Supreme Court held that Snepp had breached his position of trust with the CIA by failing to submit the book to the agency for prepublication review.

The court majority also said that "even in the absence of an express agreement" such as the one Snepp signed with the CIA, the government can impose restrictions on the release of confidential information, even when no government secrets are compromised.

Snepp has been ordered to relinquish his profits from the book, which are currently estimated at about \$140,000.

Kissinger, who is expected to make about \$3 million from his book, could not be reached for comment. "The White House Years" was published last fall by Little, Brown & Co. Kissinger owns the worldwide book and serialization rights.