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
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505



25 APR 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Director, National Security Agency/
Chief, Central Security Service
Under Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT:

Security Violations

- l. By the at ached letter, the DCI has been informed of numerous security violations on the part of member agencies of the Intelligence Community pertaining to delivery of intelligence-related material to the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense. These would appear to have arisen from either a lack of knowledge of the proper procedures or disregard of standard security practices, for which there can be no excuse.
- 2. It is especially disturbing and particularly embarrassing that these breaches have occurred on Capitol Hill, where it is vital that the Intelligence Community display the high level of security discipline which we claim to practice and demand. From the example cited by Senator Stevens, it would certainly seem that we are not practicing what we preach.
 - 3. I therefore request that you take the following actions:
 - -- immediately investigate the circumstances of the violations cited by Senator Stevens and report the results to me; and
 - -- ensure that all personnel involved in the delivery of classified information to the Hill are fully briefed and understand the procedures cited in Senator Stevens' letter.
- 4. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of strict adherence to all necessary security procedures. Every effort should be expended to prevent security violations of this or any other kind.

John N. McMahon

Attachment: Ltr from Senator Stevens dtd April 8, 1983

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Executive Registry

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 8, 1983

The Honorable William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

Once again the Committee must notify you of a series of violations to our security standards. As outlined in our letter of June 18, 1982, all classified information pertaining to intelligence and intelligence-related material must be delivered to room SD-122 or SD-119 and signed for by a staff member specifically cleared to receive such information.

None of my other offices either in the Capitol or in the Russell Office Building should receive classified information since staff members there do not have necessary clearances and no secure storage exists at these locations. Nor should classified data intended for Appropriations Committee use be delivered to another committee. Recent violations have involved deliveries by the Intelligence Community staff. the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency. In each of these cases, information was either left with uncleared personnel, was not signed for, or was delivered to another room or committee.

Please instruct your staff again of our policy so that we may ensure classified information receives the full protection to which it is entitled.

With best wishes.

Cordially

TED STEVENS

Chairman

Subcommittee on Defense

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