



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

~~Secret~~



25X1

Status of the Polish United Workers' Party



25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

~~Secret~~

*EUR 83-10235
October 1983*

Copy 276

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret






25X1

Status of the Polish United Workers' Party



25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by 
the Office of European Analysis with a contribution
 of the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, East European Division,
EURA, 

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

*EUR 83-10235
October 1983*

Secret

25X1

Status of the Polish United Workers' Party

25X1

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 1 September 1983
was used in this report.*

Pressure is mounting from party hardliners and the Soviets to restore to the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) the traditional power and authority it has lost during the last three years. The abolition of martial law has removed any legal pretext for keeping the party from exercising its constitutionally guaranteed right to lead the state. The easing of the security situation has brought forward political and economic questions that make the military's involvement in politics seem less necessary.

Hardliners in the party apparatus and central leadership, disgruntled with Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and their exclusion from power, have publicly pressed for closer adherence to the Soviet model that has the party playing the "leading role." Although the Soviets are generally satisfied with Jaruzelski's role in protecting their interests in Poland, we believe they are uncomfortable with the precedent set by the Polish military's incursion into governing the state and have pressed for a speedy revival of the party.

The party's political decline beginning in 1980 reflected its longstanding lack of legitimacy and the instant credibility achieved by the Solidarity labor union, which quickly usurped the party's claim to speak for workers. The imposition of martial law in December 1981 accelerated the PZPR's decline, contrary to the hopes of some party officials that the military would provide a protective "umbrella" for the party's recovery. We believe that initially Jaruzelski was too preoccupied with security issues and reestablishing order to pay attention to the state of the party's health. But more importantly, he was unwilling, in our view, to return the reins of power to an organization he regarded as incompetent and corrupt, and he has relied heavily on military officers to ensure his political control.

As he has been forced by a gradual return to normal political and economic pursuits to turn his attention to the party, Jaruzelski appears to have become convinced that it can become an effective ruling organization only if it improves its style of governing. By no means liberal, Jaruzelski and his military colleagues are seeking to create a disciplined and competent party apparatus. He has used military officers to help purge the party bureaucracy, has called for the party to be better informed about society's moods and attitudes before making policy decisions, and generally has advocated that party bureaucrats interfere less in the day-to-day running of the country. At the same time, Jaruzelski seems to be trying to gain control of the party's leadership and apparatus by filling key positions with loyal followers.

Secret

EUR 83-10235
October 1983

Secret



25X1

Hardliners in the party leadership and apparatus have successfully resisted Jaruzelski's modest efforts to reshape the organization and its role in society. By all accounts, hardliners are blocking economic reform, resisting efforts to broaden consultations with society, and gradually returning the party to its old, inefficient bureaucratic ways.

Jaruzelski, who has always considered himself a military man and not a politician, appears disinclined to become deeply involved in internal party politicking. He probably will not be able to overcome hardline resistance to his efforts to reform the party, but he can delay the party apparatus' return to primacy. In the near term, however, such a delay will perpetuate frictions between military and civilian officials and hamper political and economic decision making. The civilian party apparatus may eventually regain its traditional political supremacy, but it is unlikely to rule well enough to break the cycle of instability, worker protest, and repression that has dominated Polish politics for more than three decades.



25X1

Secret

Secret



25X1

**Status of the Polish
United Workers' Party**



25X1

As security concerns fade in the wake of lifting martial law, the question of restoring the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) to its traditional position in the political system has come increasingly to the fore. The party suffered a severe political decline during the last three years, losing by its own admission more than 25 percent of its membership since August 1980 and being relegated under martial law to a secondary role in political and economic decision making. There has been growing pressure from hardliners, party bureaucrats, and the Soviets, however, to restore the party and, in particular, to return sole power to its civilian apparatus. The purpose of this paper is to explain the reasons for the party's decline before and during martial law, to analyze Jaruzelski's modest efforts to reshape the party and the way it rules the country, and to evaluate prospects for the party's return to the traditional position of political primacy.

The Party's Decline

The party's abrupt decline in power and authority following the rise of the broad-based Solidarity labor union in August 1980 (see graph) reflected in the first instance, we believe, the party's longstanding lack of legitimacy. The party, indeed, has frequently pursued policies widely regarded as incompatible with Polish national aspirations, most particularly close ties with a traditional enemy, the Russians. Revelations in late 1980 of the Gierek regime's mismanagement of the economy and pervasive corruption within the party—which, extended in varying degrees even to top party leaders such as Gierek, Kania, and Jaruzelski—undoubtedly demoralized many in the rank and file and further eroded the party's standing.

Solidarity, on the other hand, enjoyed virtually instant legitimacy, largely, we believe, because its leaders came from the populace and had close ties with the Catholic Church, the traditional wellspring of Polish nationalism. Moreover, the circumstances of the union's formation—a grudging concession by the

authorities under threat of strike—gave it great credibility as a representative of workers' interests. The legalization of Solidarity by the Polish courts in November 1980 provided official sanction that encouraged more people to join, even including some rank-and-file party members who no longer regarded the PZPR as the spokesman of the working class. Moreover, Solidarity had great success in broadening its appeal by becoming an advocate of major economic and political reforms.

25X1

Disagreements within the central party leadership over how to respond to the political challenge presented by Solidarity prevented the party, in our opinion, from taking command of the situation and intensified its disarray. Liberals argued openly that the only way for the party to take the political initiative away from Solidarity—and its advocacy of reform—was to implement reforms that would lift the country out of its deep political and economic crisis. Hardliners in the party leadership opposed the liberals' reform, largely, in our judgment, because they wanted to preserve party privileges and institutional primacy. The party apparatus at the lower levels, seeking, we believe, to protect its position, also opposed the decentralization of decisionmaking and the increased use of expertise that Poland's difficult problems demanded. First secretary Stanislaw Kania temporized, apparently convinced that agreement could be reached with Solidarity and trying to build support for a moderate reform program. In the end, the leadership took half measures, making minor adjustments in policy that did not threaten the position of the elite and only deepened the suspicions of Solidarity leaders that the regime was not interested in a rapprochement.

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

Adding to the party's disarray, liberals advocated far-reaching internal party reforms aimed at preventing a repetition of the corruption and mismanagement of the Gierek era. They publicly proposed a range of

Secret

Secret

Polish United Workers' Party Members and Candidates, 1944-82



300754 10-83

institutional changes intended to give the rank and file more control over the party leadership and apparatus. Such reforms as direct election of party officials, limited terms of office, and allowing direct contacts among lower levels of the party, they argued, would lead to a more competent, responsive party apparatus. The proposed changes, however, drew heated opposition from conservatives, who considered them unacceptable departures from traditional, Soviet-style concepts and, more practically, a threat to their jobs. Neither side was pleased by the compromise reforms that first secretary Stanislaw Kania was able to get endorsed at the Extraordinary IX Party Conference in July 1981, according to the Polish press. Reformers believed the changes were not enough—even though the measures were the most progressive ever passed by a ruling Communist party—and hardliners considered them too radical.

Jaruzelski's selection as party leader in October 1981 (see box) and the subsequent imposition of martial law in December accelerated the party's decline, especially at the lowest levels where, for all practical purposes,

the party ceased to function. Although some hardliners probably expected that the party would quickly regain its political primacy under martial law, military men instead moved into many key political and economic posts, ignored the party apparatus, and took over many party supervisory, decisionmaking, and inspection functions at all levels.

Jaruzelski, in our assessment, ignored the party immediately after the imposition of martial law largely because of his preoccupation with the task of reasserting control. This required heavy reliance on the security apparatus and, of course, the Army—Jaruzelski's political power base. Jaruzelski also appears to have ignored the party out of deep distrust for its ability to run the country. The depth of this feeling among military men was such that Gen. Mieczyslaw Debicki, appointed governor of the city of Warsaw in early 1982, at one

Secret

Jaruzelski's Party Career

Jaruzelski has had long service in the upper echelons of the party. He was elected to the Central Committee in June 1964 and became a full member of the Politburo in December 1971, three years after his appointment as Minister of Defense. He began to play a more prominent role in the leadership with his appointment as Premier in February 1981. His selection as First Secretary in October 1981 was unprecedented in the Communist world and came as a result of his predecessors' inability to curb Solidarity. Jaruzelski enjoyed the advantage of representing the only government institution in Poland that retained its credibility throughout the Solidarity era, the Army. Significantly, Jaruzelski was acceptable to the Soviets despite their perennial concern with keeping the military politically subservient. [redacted]



Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski

25X1

[redacted] point called the party a "pigsty." [redacted] Jaruzelski considered disbanding the party and building a new organization, rejecting the idea only out of a calculation that Moscow would not tolerate such a move. After the imposition of martial law, Jaruzelski relegated the party in his speeches to a secondary position, paying only lipservice to its "leading role" in society. He showed little interest in the details of PZPR activity, [redacted] and gave subordinates considerable autonomy in developing socioeconomic policies outside of normal party channels. Finally, Jaruzelski was unwilling to involve himself in internal party politicking to the extent his predecessors did, largely because, in our view, he considers himself first and foremost a soldier and not a politician. [redacted]

limited role for the party apparatus. Complaining that the distinction between the party and government bureaucracies had virtually disappeared under Gierek, some moderates have argued in the Polish press that the party should shed its traditional involvement in every aspect of policymaking and implementation and allow government experts responsibility for the day-to-day running of the country, especially the economy. In line with this view, Jaruzelski has publicly advocated upgrading the qualifications of party officials and bureaucrats, providing for broader discussion of policy options, and giving the government instead of the party a larger role in making lower level decisions and implementing policy. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Jaruzelski's Policies Toward the Party

As the pressures of long-delayed political and economic business have compelled Jaruzelski to give greater attention to the party, his actions suggest that he is sympathetic to the moderate viewpoint that the PZPR needs to improve its governing style dramatically before it can successfully resume its "leading role" in society. Party moderates have said that Poland can recover from its crisis only by "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism that involves not only political and economic reforms but also a more

Jaruzelski and his closest colleagues—for the most part from the military—are by no means liberals, but they publicly advocate the creation of a well-disciplined, competent party apparatus that is well attuned to the popular mood and able to devise and implement relevant socioeconomic policies. As a first order of business, Jaruzelski has used military inspection teams and, more recently, civilian bodies patterned on the military groups to root out corrupt and incompetent party bureaucrats. By the end of 1982, according

25X1

Secret

A History of Unpopularity

Rosa Luxemburg



Feliks Dzierzynski

Communists have historically commanded little popular support in Poland, largely because of their close identification with Russia. In the late 19th century, Communist leaders, such as Rosa Luxemburg and Feliks Dzierzynski, favored the continued incorporation of Poland in the Russian Empire and sought to subordinate Polish independence to the international class struggle espoused by their Russian comrades. The Red Army's invasion of Poland in 1920 was supported by the fledgling Polish Communist Workers' Party, totally compromising the party at a time of great enthusiasm for Poland's recently gained independence. The Polish Government subsequently restricted the activities of the Communist Party and prevented it from playing any significant role in the interwar period. Stalin's liquidation of the party and its leaders in 1938—ironically, for being overly nationalistic and infiltrated by the Polish intelligence service—probably confirmed the popular impression that the party was little more than a Soviet instrument [redacted]

The military exploits of the Communist underground movement during World War II—begun only after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union—did little to

make up for earlier Communist support of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the Soviet annexation of Poland's eastern territories. After the War, much of the Polish populace viewed the party as an alien body imposed on them by the victorious Soviet army and administered by Moscow's Polish agents. The party reorganized itself in 1948 and took its current name, the Polish United Workers' Party. [redacted]

Successive party leaders tried to win support by creating a more distinct Polish identity for the party. In 1956 Wladyslaw Gomulka enjoyed popular backing for a time when he successfully overrode Soviet objections and moved to create a unique "Polish road" to socialism that modified the Soviet economic and political model. Gomulka's support dissipated, however, as he adopted increasingly conservative policies, which culminated in his ouster by party rivals after the shooting of workers in Gdansk in December 1970. New First Secretary Edward Gierek promised reforms and presided over a Western-financed prosperity that appeared to win the support of the hopeful population. By mid-decade, however, popular dissatisfaction grew as prosperity ended and Gierek hesitated to undertake reforms. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

to the Polish press, the Army's inspectorate general had examined the work of party and government bodies in 10 of 49 *voivodships*. These inspections may have accounted for some of the 6,000 party officials who, according to the press, were replaced between September 1980 and July 1983. In their places, again according to the Polish press, Jaruzelski has sought to place bureaucrats with administrative and economic skills. His appointment of a trusted associate, Brig. Gen. Tadeusz Dziekan, to head the Central Committee's personnel department should, in our assessment, facilitate implementation of his cadre policy. [redacted]

We believe that Jaruzelski has taken the advice of his moderate advisers that the party can adopt well-considered policies only by being better informed on popular attitudes and allowing broader discussion of policy options. He has tried, for instance, to improve party reporting of the populace's attitudes by having reports from local organizations sent directly to him rather than through the intervening bureaucratic layers, where information in the past has been altered to reflect favorably on the apparatus.¹ [redacted]

Jaruzelski, according to his public remarks, also wants the PZPR to take into account during its policy debates the viewpoints of Poland's semiautonomous political parties—the United Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, and the Catholic lay organization, Pax. A joint meeting of the Communist and Peasant Parties in January 1983—the first since 1957—was clearly intended as an example of the consultative process he favors; although the session, [redacted] [redacted] did not allow the Peasant Party to have significant impact on regime policy. Jaruzelski, [redacted] also advocated in 1982 that other social groups hold 30 percent of the seats in the parliament after the 1984 national elections. Moreover, Jaruzelski has privately argued, [redacted] [redacted] that, while the PZPR should have the largest number of parliamentary seats, it should not have an absolute majority. This would force it to

¹ Jaruzelski apparently remains wary of the party's reporting abilities. According to a published interview with one of his close advisers, Jaruzelski maintains several nonparty reporting mechanisms and uses a military data analysis system to process the information. We believe that he also relies heavily on local defense committees for assessments of the popular mood. [redacted]

take into account the interests of the Catholic, peasant, and democratic groups. Thus far, Jaruzelski has not followed through on these privately expressed views. [redacted]

Jaruzelski has sought to give his new mass organization, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), some inspection and legislative functions formerly monopolized by the party.² Parliamentary legislation according the PRON constitutional status indicates the body will replace the party-dominated National Unity Front in proposing lists of candidates for parliamentary elections. Some midlevel party officials have suggested to US Embassy officers that the PRON could become involved in hearing citizens' complaints, inspecting local government and party activities, and proposing parliamentary legislation. Jaruzelski has also publicly advocated greater participation of local self-governing bodies—the municipal equivalents of worker self-management bodies—in the formulation and implementation of local decisions. [redacted]

Jaruzelski has sought to lessen the day-to-day involvement of party bureaucrats in running the economy through continued public support for economic reform. As outlined in the Polish press in mid-1983, the reform is aimed at stimulating efficiency and growth by granting enterprises new freedom to make decisions on production, investment, and hiring. Workers would have a voice—although still strictly limited—in enterprise decisions through government-sponsored workers' councils and trade unions. While there would still be central control of prices and, according to US Embassy reporting, provincial party officials would set general guidelines for economic policy, the close supervisory role of the party apparatus would be severely curtailed. [redacted]

² Jaruzelski founded the PRON in the first months of martial law to promote support for his policies and to serve as a surrogate for Solidarity in a dialogue with society. The PRON, while ostensibly representing "society," nonetheless, according to the Polish press, has numerous military men among its members. Despite the expansion of the PRON's national leadership to include nonparty intellectuals and artists, the Church's refusal to participate appears to have severely limited the movement's support. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

In addition to reshaping the role of the party apparatus, Jaruzelski also seems to be trying, in our view, to gain control of it to implement his own policies. He has removed from key leadership positions some hardliners such as Warsaw party head Stanislaw Kociolek, with whom he has political and personal differences, and whom he regarded [redacted]

[redacted] as committed to perpetuating a form of government that could no longer be effective in Poland. He likewise has removed liberal party leaders such as Politburo member Jan Labecki, whose strong reformist tendencies, he probably believed, tested Soviet tolerances and threatened efforts to construct a system that differs from Soviet practice. Jaruzelski has promoted competent technocrats and his own civilian and military followers such as economic expert Manfred Gorywoda and Gen. Florian Siwicki, who are, in our view, less associated with a particular ideological wing or faction of the party than they are loyal to him. His men, [redacted]

[redacted] are pragmatists and moderates who, while committed to a socialist system in Poland, want to change it enough to make it more efficient. [redacted]

Jaruzelski's changes in the top party leadership, according to US Embassy officers, have not been as extensive, however, as purges conducted by his predecessors. Since becoming party first secretary in October 1981, Jaruzelski has brought only four of his followers into the Politburo (see table), although he undoubtedly can count on some of the holdovers for support. Jaruzelski brought in three of his trusted men to the central committee secretariat in 1982 and expelled three incumbents, two of whom, Stefan Olszowski and Hieronim Kubiak, are respectively a noted hardliner and a liberal. Of the nine secretariat members, Jaruzelski is virtually guaranteed the support of six. [redacted]

Jaruzelski has also extended his control over the central party apparatus. In addition to naming General Dziekan to head the personnel department, Jaruzelski has appointed Brig. Gen. Czeslaw Dega to head the PZPR's foreign affairs department. The selection of Dega ensures that Jaruzelski can monitor party contacts with the Soviet or other Communist parties.

Earlier in 1983 when his critics threatened to use ideological questions to criticize him, Jaruzelski succeeded in having former Foreign Minister Jozef Czyrek appointed as head of the key Ideological Commission. [redacted]

Jaruzelski has also purged some lower level party officials, temporarily suspending the democratic election rules enacted at the Extraordinary IX Party Congress in July 1981 to facilitate changes. The rules—which include provisions for multiple candidacy elections, secret balloting, and limits on the terms of office—resulted in the election at all levels of the PZPR in 1981 of officials who primarily represented rank-and-file opinions and were less responsive to central party control. The temporary suspension of the election rules at the beginning of martial law, according to a press interview given by a Jaruzelski adviser, empowered the central leadership to replace noncompliant party officials. In Poznan Province, according to the party press, Jaruzelski in May 1982 replaced liberal party first secretary Edward Skrzypczak with an Air Force brigadier general despite protests of the provincial party committee and without observing the 1981 election procedures. [redacted]

Jaruzelski seems to have paid minimal attention to the party rank and file. The party's Central Control Commission, a watchdog body headed by Moscow-trained hardliner Jerzy Urbanski and whose vice chairman is a military officer, has been the main instrument of purging those members who, according to the press, did not maintain party discipline during the Solidarity era. In the second half of 1982, local organs of the control commission reportedly initiated a review of each full and candidate party member to judge his fitness for continued membership. Since the imposition of martial law, [redacted] as many as 125,000 of the party's members have been expelled. [redacted]

Resistance

Jaruzelski has had only modest success, in our view, in reshaping the party. The small changes he has made thus far in redefining the role of the party bureaucrats have been easily circumvented. Party bureaucrats,

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

The Polish Party Leadership as of September 1983

| Politburo | Date of Election | Secretariat | Date of Election | Secretariat Responsibility |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Kazimierz Barcikowski ^a | September 1980 | Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski | October 1981 | First Secretary |
| | | Kazimierz Barcikowski ^a | October 1980 | Organizational matters |
| Tadeusz Czechowicz | July 1981 | Jozef Czyrek ^a | July 1981 | Foreign affairs, ideology, propaganda |
| Jozef Czyrek ^a | July 1981 | Jan Glowczyk ^a | July 1981 | Propaganda |
| Zofia Grzyb | July 1981 | Manfred Gorywoda ^a | July 1982 | Economics |
| Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski | December 1971 | Zbigniew Michalek | July 1981 | Agriculture and the food economy |
| Stanislaw Kalkus | July 1982 | Gen. Miroslaw Milewski ^b | July 1981 | Administrative affairs, security |
| Hieronim Kubiak ^a | July 1981 | Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak | October 1981 | Organizational matters |
| Zbigniew Messner | July 1981 | Marian Orzechowski ^b | October 1982 | Ideology |
| Gen. Miroslaw Milewski ^b | July 1981 | Waldemar Swirgon ^a | October 1982 | Youth affairs |
| Stefan Olszowski ^b | August 1980 | | | |
| Stanislaw Opalko | July 1981 | | | |
| Tadeusz Porebski | July 1981 | | | |
| Jerzy Romanik | July 1981 | | | |
| Albin Siwak ^b | July 1981 | | | |
| Marian Wozniak | July 1982 | | | |
| Candidate members | | | | |
| Stanislaw Bejger | July 1982 | | | |
| Jan Glowczyk | July 1981 | | | |
| Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak ^a | February 1982 | | | |
| Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak | July 1981 | | | |
| Gen. Florian Siwicki ^a | July 1981 | | | |

^a Considered strong supporters of Jaruzelski.^b Prominent Hardliners.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

according to US Embassy reporting, have responded to Jaruzelski's efforts to give more latitude to the new trade unions, workers' self-management, and local self-government groups as well as the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth by seeking direct control of them. In some cases, [redacted] the bureaucrats have ensured that the groups are led by people who are no threat to the apparatus—contrary to specific instructions from the central party leadership that the party apparatus should not play too prominent a role in setting up the ostensibly independent bodies. [redacted]

Jaruzelski's unwillingness to give real independence to nonparty bodies, for instance, has, in our view, abetted efforts of party bureaucrats to continue wielding their traditional powers. Members of the party apparatus, according to US Embassy officers [redacted] are trying to supplant technocrats and reassert their authority over important management positions in key industrial enterprises. They are being aided, according to US Embassy sources, by entrenched factory managers and central government

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Prominent Moderates



*Kazimierz Barcikowski
Politburo member and
secretary with responsibility
for organizational matters.*



*Jozef Czyrek
Politburo member and
secretary with responsibility
for foreign affairs, ideology,
and propaganda.*



*Hieronim Kubiak
Politburo member and
university professor.*

Prominent Hardliners



*Stefan Olszowski
Politburo member and
Foreign Minister.*

Sovfoto/Eastfoto ©



*Tadeusz Grabski
Former Politburo member, now
a trade attache in East Berlin.*

Jeanette Harris ©

planners whose positions depend on the maintenance of the old system. The party bureaucrats fear, [redacted] that soon after economic decentralization will come political decentralization and even greater inroads on the power of the party apparatus. [redacted]

Resistance to Jaruzelski's efforts to change the party's role, in our view, is a key part of the hardliners' opposition to many of Jaruzelski's policies. Former Politburo member Tadeusz Grabski, in a widely

25X1
25X1

25X1

Secret

circulated letter addressed to his party organization in October 1982, indicated the range of hardline grievances against Jaruzelski and his policies. According to published accounts of his letter, Grabski, now exiled to a trade position in East Berlin, called for the crushing of all anti-Socialist opposition by force, a reorientation of the Polish economy toward the USSR, an end to economic reform, a tougher policy toward the Catholic Church, and a ruthless purge of liberal party members. In addition to Grabski, Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski and Stanislaw Kociolek, a former Warsaw party boss currently serving as Ambassador to Moscow, are prominent hardliners. Although shunted aside by Jaruzelski, both continue to oppose him. [redacted]

Resistance to Jaruzelski and his policies appears to have intensified in late May 1983. The hardliners, probably encouraged by Soviet press criticism of Jaruzelski's moderate advisers, pressed for a debate of ideological issues—an event that had been repeatedly postponed over the past year—at the XII Central Committee Plenum on 31 May 1983. They apparently hoped it would give them a platform to criticize Jaruzelski's treatment of the party as well as the approaching papal visit, something many hardliners surely opposed. Jaruzelski was able to defer the airing of ideological issues—now set for 14-15 October 1983—but was unable to overcome hardline resistance to the election of moderate Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, to the Politburo. The hardline opposition to Rakowski was [redacted]

[redacted] aided by the fact that the Soviets also adamantly opposed his promotion. The resulting stalemate over ideological and personnel issues, in our view, illustrates that, as long as Jaruzelski does not seem willing to engage in intraparty politicking in support of his policies, he cannot totally ignore hardliners who, given favorable circumstances, have enough clout to challenge him. [redacted]

The Soviet View

Soviet pressure on Jaruzelski to reinstate the party's "leading role" in decisionmaking has not meant, in our estimation, that Moscow fully endorses hardline opposition to him. The Soviet press did not associate itself with the criticism of Jaruzelski by Tadeusz

Grabski in October 1982. The unwillingness of Moscow to support internal critics of Jaruzelski is due primarily, in our view, to his success in suppressing Solidarity. Moreover, none of Jaruzelski's potential successors, such as Stefan Olszowski, [redacted] [redacted] are highly regarded by Moscow. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

25X1

Although Jaruzelski's role in the maintenance of internal stability and a pro-Soviet regime appears to be generally satisfactory from Moscow's point of view, the slowness of the party's recovery has probably frustrated the Kremlin. Moreover, the Soviets are probably uncomfortable with the precedent set by the Polish military's ascendancy over the party. A Western scholar with contacts in Poland told US Embassy officers in Warsaw that Soviet party secretary Rusakov, who is responsible for Bloc affairs, pressed Jaruzelski in May 1982 to set a timetable for a return to party rule. The publication of two articles in Soviet periodicals in May 1983 condemning political pluralism and attacking party moderates such as Vice Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski reflects, in our assessment, continuing Soviet impatience with both the slow pace of the party's recovery and persistent influence of those they distrust. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Moscow apparently is making increasingly clear to Jaruzelski that his next task is to restore the party [redacted]

25X1
25X1

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Soviet party secretary Zamyatin, who recently visited Poland, indicated in his public review of the situation there that Moscow would be paying close attention to the issues at the upcoming Polish plenum. The Soviets probably consider a clearly defined ideological program essential to rebuilding the party. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

Outlook

For the near term, internal party maneuvering, we believe, will be dominated by frictions between the regular party apparatus on the one hand and

Secret

Wojciech Jaruzelski and his military appointees serving in traditionally civilian positions on the other. The abolition of martial law and resolution of the most serious security problems have gradually lessened the need for extraordinary measures, in our view, and in turn Jaruzelski's claim to be party leader. Even though he may try to enhance his civilian credentials by divesting himself of the defense ministry later this year, Jaruzelski almost certainly will still be regarded as a temporary figure by many in the party who resent the intrusion of the military and suspect its intentions. Similarly, Jaruzelski's reluctance to engage in intra-party politicking could make it more difficult to cope with behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the hardline opposition. If Jaruzelski continues to avoid extensive personal involvement in party internal affairs, he may find it difficult to avoid criticism that he is not an effective party leader. Moreover, if there should be a dramatic upsurge of opposition activity, or if his economic policies fail, Jaruzelski will be increasingly vulnerable to criticism not only from his domestic critics but also from Moscow. [redacted]

Moscow probably would not object to Jaruzelski's further gradually consolidating his power if, in so doing, he also made progress in refurbishing party institutions. However, the Soviets are unlikely to approve his efforts to affect major leadership changes if these changes involve promoting to senior party posts people they distrust or demoting individuals attuned to Moscow's thinking. Moscow would be wary that such changes at the top would increase factionalism and adversely affect the regime's stability. [redacted]

Jaruzelski's position seems relatively secure for the next several years. He can bask in his success at having smashed Solidarity, and the Polish party has not been known to throw out its leaders except under duress. At the same time, he can argue that the potential for opposition activity requires that a figure closely tied to the military/security apparatus be at the helm. Finally, he can claim to have stopped the decline of the Polish economy and that a significant recovery will take place. [redacted]

Jaruzelski's continued presence on the political scene will delay the return of the civilian apparatus to its traditional position of political supremacy. At age 60 Jaruzelski could conceivably stay as party head for more than a decade. His prolonged occupation of the post of first secretary will probably intensify the factionalism that has traditionally plagued the PZPR and diverted the leadership's attention from problem solving. In particular, continued infighting over something as basic as the proper role of the party would detract from the regime's ability to solve Poland's pressing political and economic problems. Jaruzelski may prevent hardline policies from being implemented, but he will in turn find it difficult to secure approval and implementation of policies advocated by his moderate advisers. Even if Jaruzelski overcomes internal opposition, the Polish economy will, at best, struggle through the rest of the decade, and political stability will rest on the regime's coercive powers. [redacted]

If Jaruzelski were forced out, his successor would most likely be a hardliner, perhaps Foreign Minister Olszowski. The moderates and liberals, in our view, simply do not have the power to manipulate the top leadership and, indeed, are completely dependent on Jaruzelski for protection. His departure from the political scene would very likely be accompanied by the ouster of his military as well as civilian supporters in the government apparatus and party leadership. A forced removal of Jaruzelski would, we believe, deepen the antipathy of many in the military for the party apparatus; his successor would probably feel compelled to make major personnel changes in the military leadership. While such a step would be likely to heighten the military's resentment, there is very little the military could do, in our judgment, to resist. [redacted]

It is unlikely, in our view, that Jaruzelski will be able to induce the civilian party apparatus and his critics to acquiesce in any extensive consultative role for the

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

ostensibly independent political and social groups. The civilian party leadership and apparatus will continue to argue that they must be the sole holders of power for ideological reasons and because the Soviet model demands it. Soviet pressure on Jaruzelski to conform, combined with a gradual reassertion of authority by civilian bureaucrats at the middle and lower levels, will virtually guarantee, in our view, the party's gradual return to primacy.

25X1

Although the civilian party apparatus probably will regain its preeminent ruling position over the long term—and probably only after a prolonged stalemate—it will probably not, in our estimation, rule well or efficiently. The apparatus shows few signs, in our view, of eliminating the mismanagement, factionalism, and corruption that contributed to its decline in 1980-81. Nor is there any evidence that the organization is able to win legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The experiences of the Solidarity era and martial law, when the party stood on the brink of extinction, have taught the apparatus and leadership that liberal reforms threaten not only their own positions but also the traditional role of the party. Continued party incompetence and resistance to needed change, combined with a poor economic outlook, in our assessment, will probably mean that, over the long term, the cycle of instability, worker protest, and repression will continue.

25X1

Secret

Secret