The Regions of Zaire:
A Handbook

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The Regions of Zaire:
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Introduction

Information available as of 14 December 1983 was used in this report.

Since independence in 1960 Zaire's central government and the regions have struggled over who would reap the benefits of the country's mineral wealth—particularly the copper and cobalt of Shaba and the diamonds of the Kasais. Although the struggle was violent and bloody from 1960 to 1965 and at times thereafter, it has been muted over most of the 18 years that President Mobutu has been in power, largely because of his skill in manipulating regional antagonisms for the benefit of the central government. There is, nevertheless, a persistent, underlying concern in the capital, Kinshasa—and in the Western capitals that provide Zaire with the bulk of its external support—that the departure of Mobutu someday will revive the regional chaos of the early 1960s.

Mobutu's way of dealing with the regions has been designed essentially to prevent them from threatening his grip on power. He frequently reshuffles regional military commanders and governors to keep them from developing independent power bases in the regions. He fosters regional and tribal rivalries to undermine potential opposition. He has also tried to reduce the influence of the regions by creating and developing "national" institutions.

By exploiting the resources of the regions for his own and Kinshasa's use and by neglecting their development needs, Mobutu has generated widespread disrespect for himself and the Equateurian elite that dominates his government. The regions view Kinshasa as an economic sinkhole that drains the country's vital foreign exchange earnings. Because of this diversion of resources to Kinshasa, the infrastructure is in tatters. Even in Shaba, the source of most of the country's wealth, calls by GECAMINES, the mining parastatal corporation, for rehabilitation and renovation fall on deaf ears in Kinshasa.

The central government's presence in the regions, tenuous at best since independence, has deteriorated in recent years. Several of the regions are so physically and psychologically isolated from Kinshasa that they are part of the country in name only. Kivu and Haut-Zaïre are so cut off from the rest of the country by bad roads that they trade more with neighboring countries than with other parts of Zaïre. Deteriorating roads, shortages of fuel, and limited contact among the outlying regions and between them and
Kinshasa lessen the likelihood that a revolt would spread. These factors complicate Kinshasa’s ability to maintain authority in the regions but may also help to prevent the coalescence of a regional challenge to the regime.

The regions are divided in other ways. The peasant farming regions of Bandundu and Equateur have little in common with industrialized Shaba and Bas-Zaïre. Rigid ethnic identification has caused widespread inter-tribal distrust, particularly between the Lundas and Lubas in Shaba and the Kasais, the scene of bloody feuds in the past. Suspicion that the recent formation of an illegal second political party is merely a front for Luba leaders has lessened the movement’s otherwise potentially broad appeal to Zairians discontented with Mobutu.

A major factor holding Zaïre together is the ingrained political caution of the average Zaïrian. Many believe that Mobutu has prevented Zaïre from sinking back into the chaos of the 1960s. Although Zaïrians grumble about Mobutu and his corruption, he is the leader they know and to whom they have learned to adapt.

Mobutu almost certainly will not significantly change his divide-and-rule policy toward the regions, but regional strains are likely to increase once Mobutu departs. Under the most likely succession scenario, others from the present ruling group would take over, and, like Mobutu, they would almost certainly not scrap a regional approach that has enhanced their wealth, power, and prestige as well as Mobutu’s.

There is little current interest in secession in Shaba or any other region, and, even after Mobutu departs, a secession would be unlikely to succeed because none of Zaïre’s tribes is large enough or can control enough territory to create an economically viable independent state. At the same time, because the cohesiveness of Zaïre as a national entity is likely to remain tenuous at best, the central government will have to continue to struggle to keep its grip on the regions.
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Historical Overview: The Struggle Between the Center and the Periphery in Zaire

The Belgian Inheritance
Colonial practice in the former Belgian Congo fostered and exacerbated regional and tribal antagonisms. The Belgians favored the tribes that were quickest to adapt to Western customs at the expense of those more tied to traditional ways. They gave special status to the Batetela, Baluba, Zande, and Bangala, whom they regarded as "martial races." The colonial police recruited heavily from these tribes, which gave them an advantage over their tribal enemies. Intertribal resentments often erupted into violence, especially between the Balubas and Lunda, who historically had battled for control of the mineral-rich Katanga (now Shaba) and Kasai regions.

Belgian policy limited opportunities for cross-regional contacts and perpetuated tribal jealousies among neighboring groups and xenophobia toward more distant ones. Smaller tribes that were willing to ally against the dominant tribes of their regions found that poor communications prevented effective cooperation. Congolese political parties in the 1950s were merely extensions in a few major cities of the cultural associations of large tribes such as the Kongo and the Baluba. Belgium's hasty retreat from Africa left the Congolese devoid of any experience in national politics.

Chaos After Independence
Independence in June 1960 sparked a scramble by regional leaders to fill the political vacuum left by the Belgians. A series of civilian governments failed to agree whether the country should have a unitary system—favored by the smaller tribes—or a federal one, which would have benefited the dominant tribes in the more economically advanced regions like Katanga and Bas-Zaire. Key groups in Katanga wanted to maintain regional autonomy so they could get a share of the profits of the Belgian mining conglomerate, Union Minière.

Katanga's declaration of independence in July 1960 triggered five years of chaos. South Kasai (now the southern part of Kasai Oriental) declared its independence the next month and allied itself with Katanga. The Katangans, Kasaïans, and their Belgian expatriate allies called for Western help in combating the left-leaning central government in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), and Belgian troops helped evict Congo's armed forces from Katanga. Katanga was able to become economically independent of Congo for a time by shifting its trade southward and by obtaining funds from Belgian companies eager to continue their mining operations.

The central government was unable to form a stable coalition to deal with the country's problems. The government became deadlocked when President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba each tried to dismiss the other. Army Chief of Staff Mobutu announced in September 1960 that he was taking power for the next three months to give the country some stability and to end Communist meddling. He returned power to civilian control in early 1961.

The United Nations sent 19,000 troops to assist the new government in its campaign against the Katangan secessionists. Unhappy with the domination of the Katangan government by Lunda, Baluba tribesmen rebelled in northern Katanga. This weakened the secessionist cause, which folded formally in

1 "Congo" became "Zaire" in the early 1970s when President Mobutu attempted to instill a sense of national pride by substituting "authentic" African place and proper names for their European-imposed equivalents. Other name changes at the time included "Shaba" for "Katanga" and "Mobutu Sese Seko" for "Joseph Desire Mobutu."

From 1908 until 1957 a Belgian governor general in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) ruled Congo through Belgian administrators in six provinces. There were no elections for whites or blacks until a limited form of local government was introduced in 1957. At the time of independence only one African had risen to a high position in the civil service.
January 1963. To avoid punitive retaliation by the Congolese Army, most Katangan gendarmes fled into neighboring Angola.\textsuperscript{3}

Fissures soon developed elsewhere in the country. Civilian governments were unable to quell a peasant insurrection in the Kwilu subregion of Bandundu in 1963-64 and a rebellion in Kivu, the Kasais, and Katanga in 1964. The government quashed these movements in 1965 with the help of UN forces and mercenaries. Mobutu seized power again—this time permanently—in November 1965 after a power struggle between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Moise Tshombe—who had led the Katangan secession—had again brought the governmental machinery to a halt.\textsuperscript{26X1}

Regional Strains Under Mobutu
The first two years of Mobutu’s rule were plagued by new outbreaks of violence caused by regional strains. Mobutu called in European mercenaries to put down a mutiny by a Katangan regiment in 1966, and in 1967 the Army quelled a second mutiny by Katangans. Remnants of the Katangan gendarmes, mostly Lunda tribesmen, fled to Angola and in 1968 formed the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC). The most serious threats to Mobutu’s rule came from the invasions of Shaba Region by FLNC guerrillas in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{25X1}

Shaba I. The first invasion of Shaba began on 8 March 1977, when approximately 2,000 FLNC guerrillas invaded from Angola and soon occupied all of the major towns in southwestern Shaba. Their drive stalled 50 kilometers from Kolwezi—the region’s major copper-mining town.\textsuperscript{25X1}

The grassroots uprising that the FLNC expected to set off among their fellow Lunda tribesmen in Shaba never materialized, and the FLNC failed to establish a large military presence in the region. Belgium, France, and the United States airlifted supplies to Zaire, and about 1,500 Moroccan troops buttressed the ineffectual Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), easily driving the FLNC back to Angola and Zambia.\textsuperscript{25X1}

The unusually good civilian-military relations in Shaba that immediately followed the ouster of the rebels soon soured, in part because members of the region’s large Lunda minority suspected that Mobutu blamed them for the invasion. A general breakdown in war relief aggravated Shaban discontent with the regime: medicines never arrived, workers found their places of employment closed, and harvests were low because the government’s troops had stolen seeds for their own use.\textsuperscript{25X1}

Shaba II. The second invasion of Shaba began on 12 May 1978 when the FLNC returned in force through northwestern Zambia. The rebels occupied Kolwezi for six days before being driven out by 700 French Legionnaires and the FAZ. Brussels sent a 1,200-man airborne rescue team, which received US logistic support. A 2,400-man Intra-African Force mainly from Morocco—but also including soldiers from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Togo—later replaced the Western troops.\textsuperscript{25X1}

Shaba II devastated the economy of the region. The rebels killed approximately 100 Europeans and hundreds of Zairians. GECAMINES estimated that the damage to Kolwezi alone came to $57 million.\textsuperscript{25X1}

Budding Opposition in Recent Years. The regional issue receded after the Shaba invasions, but in 1980 an incipient political opposition developed with a strong regional base. In November of that year, a group of 13 former members of parliament published an open letter to Mobutu that questioned the legality of the constitutional ban on allowing more than one political party and declared their intent to form a new political party. Mobutu promptly had them arrested and exiled to their home villages.\textsuperscript{25X1}

\textsuperscript{3} The Kwilu rebels preached a blend of Marxism and tribal traditionalism like that advocated by Lumumba, who had been murdered in 1961. They were unable to organize the peasants effectively because of tribal cleavages, although the rebels’ call for independence for the region had wide support.\textsuperscript{25X1}

\textsuperscript{4} The rebel youths in Kivu, the Kasais, and Katanga called their movement the Simba rebellion (after the Swahili word for lion) to project an image of strength. They accused the government of corruption and inefficiency and also sought revenge for Lumumba’s death. They were eventually defeated by 600 Belgian paratroopers who were airlifted to the area by the United States.\textsuperscript{25X1}
Almost all of these anti-Mobutu activists are either from Shaba or the Kasais, the richest and traditionally the leading regions in the struggle against the central government, although at least one of their most prominent supporters is from Kivu. After a year in exile in their respective regions, the 13 were freed—only to be rearrested in March 1982, one month after announcing the formal creation of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). Although all 13 were sentenced to 15 years in jail, they were again freed (11 are still in the country; two have fled) under Mobutu's general amnesty in May 1983. Mobutu is closely monitoring their activities because he still regards them as a threat to his regime. He recently banished several of the group's leaders again to their home villages.

Mobutu's Approach to the Regions

Despite the two invasions of Shaba, the struggle between the center and the periphery has been largely muted over most of the 18 years that Mobutu has been in power. This is testimony in part to his success in building up central authority in Kinshasa under a system of highly personalized rule that combines the African tradition of the paramount chief with Western-style institutions. At least as important has been Mobutu's skill in manipulating regional antagonisms and otherwise working to keep the regions weak and disorganized so as to preempt potential challenges from the periphery.

One method Mobutu used to diminish the influence of the regions was to give greater authority to "national" institutions. In 1967 he scrapped the multiparty political system, which was mired in regional squabbles, in favor of a single national party—the Popular Movement for the Revolution (MPR). He centralized authority over the armed forces in the same year by imposing a formal chain of command.

Soon after coming to power, Mobutu also decreed that a person chosen as governor of a region could not be from that region.* This made it difficult for any
governor to build a local base of support because he would almost always be distrusted as an outsider. For the same reason, Mobutu has also generally followed a similar practice in appointing outsiders as military commanders in the various regions.

Mobutu's policy of frequent reshuffling of senior military and civilian personnel—to keep potential rivals off balance—is harmful to the regions. Regional governors and military commanders with little prospect of longevity have few incentives to institute reforms or other new programs. On the contrary, the prevailing attitude among persons in positions of authority in Zaire is to try to rake off whatever they can as quickly as possible; the government does little to discourage this practice.

The relatively few senior bureaucrats who are stationed in the regions are viewed by the local populations as rapacious "foreigners" who levy taxes, take what they can get, and offer nothing in return. Officials at the village level usually are recruited locally, but they have little influence or status because they lack authority and are underequipped, understaffed, and underpaid, according to American scholars.

Mobutu has filled the highest levels of the government with fellow Ngbandi tribesmen from his home region of Equateur who care little about the other regions—or their own, once they have become entrenched inKinshasa. Kinshasa's mismanagement of resources and neglect of the development needs of the regions have caused widespread disrespect for the government and resentment against Mobutu and the Equateurian elite.

Mobutu also fosters regional and ethnic rivalries to undermine potential opposition. This tactic has been successful because Zaire's military and civilian leaders still think of themselves primarily in tribal or regional terms.

* He also consolidated the country's administrative units into eight regions by clustering many small units together and redrawing provincial boundaries.
The Home Regions of Zaire's Ruling Elite

- **Key positions**: Executive branch\(^a\), Governors, Military/security\(^b\), Other\(^c\), Entitled positions if apportioned according to population.

- **Equateur**: Executive branch, Governors, Military/security, Entitled positions.
- **Kasais**: Executive branch, Governors, Military/security, Entitled positions.
- **Haut-Zaïre**: Executive branch, Governors, Military/security, Entitled positions.
- **Bas-Zaïre**: Executive branch, Governors, Military/security, Entitled positions.
- **Shaba**: Executive branch, Governors, Military/security, Entitled positions.
- **Bandundu**: Executive branch, Governors, Military/security, Entitled positions.
- **Kivu**: Executive branch, Governors, Military/security, Entitled positions.

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\(^a\) Includes all Executive Council (cabinet) members and Presidential Office Directors.

\(^b\) Includes incumbents in key general officer slots and directors of intelligence agencies.

\(^c\) Includes major ambassadorial, legislative, judicial and parastatal positions.
Bandundu: The Country's Breadbasket

The agriculturally important region of Bandundu has been beset since independence by a depressed economy, deteriorating roads, increasingly inadequate medical and educational services, and a corrupt and incompetent administration. Many Bandunduans have reverted in recent years to subsistence farming. The region has been in even further eclipse since the cabinet shuffle in November 1982 in which a Bandunduan (N'Singa Uduiu) lost the prime-ministry to an Equateurian (Kengo wa Dondo).

The inability or unwillingness of Bandundu politicians in key national posts to represent local interests has made Bandundu a hotbed of anti-Mobutu feeling that erupted into serious violence in 1963-64 and 1978. Although we believe economic prospects in Bandundu are as bleak as in any region of Zaire, memories of past atrocities and a fatalistic public outlook work against a return to violence any time soon.

The People and Their Quality of Life

Bandundu's 3.7 million people, equivalent to 14 percent of Zaire's population, live in a landlocked area roughly the size of Nevada. As elsewhere in Zaire during the 1970s, harsh living conditions in the region's cities led people to migrate back to the countryside.

Religion and magic strongly influence daily life throughout Bandundu's three subregions. Catholicism and Protestantism thrive, as does Kimbanguism, an indigenous combination of Christianity and traditional African beliefs.

There are five major tribes in Bandundu. The Bayaka tribe in the Kwango subregion, and the Bayanzi, Bambala, and Basuku tribes in the Kwilu subregion, are descended from Bantu speakers who migrated to the region from what are now Cameroon and Nigeria about 2,000 years ago. The linguistically distinct Kundu people populate the Mai-Ndombe subregion.

Despite Bandundu's relative proximity to Kinshasa (130 kilometers away), the lack of public assistance is evident in almost all areas. According to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, funds earmarked for Bandundu are siphoned off at every level by underpaid bureaucrats, and managerial incompetence and corruption are pervasive. Former Prime Minister N'Singa arranged for his home village of 40 people to receive electricity ahead of cities of 50,000 or more, according to the US Embassy.

Bandunduans suffer from many diseases and other ailments. Tuberculosis, trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), and malaria are common. Malnutrition among women and children is increasing rapidly, partly because of local customs forbidding pregnant women to eat meat, fish, or eggs. Protein intake is only about half of the minimum requirement stipulated by the World Health Organization; caloric intake is about 85 percent of what is needed, according to the same source.

Hospital facilities are far from adequate. The general hospital in the region's capital, Bandundu City, lacks the most basic equipment and sanitary conditions. The hospital in Kikwit operates at double its planned capacity. Several West German churches are building a $1.6 million modern hospital northwest of Bulungu, but transportation problems in the area will limit access.

The educational system is in shambles. All of Bandundu City's primary, secondary, and technical schools are understaffed and underequipped. The US Embassy reports that Protestant and Catholic schools...
Population Distribution and Tribes in Zaire's Bandundu Region

Population per sq. kilometer
- under 10
- 10-20
- 20-30
- over 30

Booli Selected tribe

Region boundary
Region capital
Bandundu subregion boundary
Bandundu subregion capital
Major road
Railroad

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

700743 (AO1373) 12-83

25X1
are the most highly regarded, but even these suffer from inadequate financing and supplies. Paychecks for teachers often arrive late or not at all—many are stolen by bureaucrats. Teachers went on strike briefly last year to protest this situation.

Other basic services are lacking as well. Kikwit, the region's economic hub, has no running water, round-the-clock electricity, or Air Zaire service. The mail arrives biweekly. The region's other towns have even fewer services.

The Economy

Farming in the savanna area of Bandundu, which supplies Kinshasa with over 60 percent of its domestically produced food, is badly neglected. The Chinese and Belgians abandoned their efforts to develop sugar plantations in the early 1970s, largely because Zaire rarely repays its debts. Private and public investment have nearly dried up since then. Seven of Lever Brothers' 12 palm oil plantations, which as recently as the mid-1970s employed thousands of workers, have closed. Food scarcities have forced Lever to divert part of its labor force to the cultivation of food crops. Coffee and rice plantations also report difficulties, according to the US Embassy.

Agriculture in Kwilu—which produces much of the country's staples of manioc and corn—also is depressed, but there is hope. The federal government has embarked on a multimillion-dollar agricultural project designed to stimulate commercial development. West Germany, the International Development Agency, various private companies, the Jesuit Order, and local Roman Catholic dioceses are also financing training, seed production, cattle breeding, and transportation projects associated with the venture.

Bandunduns are buffeted, however, by declining prices for agricultural output, especially manioc. Many impoverished Bandunduns ignore government-imposed pricing schemes and engage in smuggling and black-market practices.

The nonagricultural sectors are in worse straits. International financial institutions report that the region's deteriorating transportation networks severely hinder industrial and agricultural development. The twice-weekly Air Zaire flight is unreliable; basic goods are trucked in from Kinshasa or sporadically barged up the Kwilu River; fuel shortages have become acute. Bandundu City has no functioning factories except a brewery soon to open.

Rising consumer prices are a major public concern. Those dependent on the cash economy are worse off now than at independence. Real wages in Bandundu had dropped in 1978 to only 15 percent of their 1960 level. A typical month's wages today will buy a pair of cotton trousers.

Many unemployed workers have left the cash economy altogether to pursue subsistence farming, which now accounts for 75 percent of the region's economic activity. Others have joined the swelling ranks of jobseekers in Kinshasa.

Politics

Bandundu has long been a wellspring of political opposition to Kinshasa. In the 1920s the Kimbanguist religious movement was a focus of resistance to European and governmental authority. During the early 1930s workers from the Bapende tribe went on strike in Kwilu to protest economic hardships resulting from the worldwide depression.

Kwilu was wracked in 1964 by a rural insurgency led by Pierre Mulele, a member of the Mumbunda tribe. Mulele, who preached a blend of Marxism and tribal traditionalism, had joined left-leaning Patrice Lumumba and Antoine Gizenga in opposing the government of Joseph Kasavubu. Although Mulele called for violent and far-reaching change, his peasant guerrilla administration closely paralleled the rigid hierarchy that characterized Belgian bureaucratic
practice. He was unable to unify the peasants because of tribal rivalries. The forces of the United Nations and mercenaries helped Prime Minister Tshombe end the rebellions in Bandundu and other regions in 1965, but at a cost of thousands of casualties.

The Zairian Army attacked suspected anti-Mobutu insurgents in 1978 in Bandundu in retaliation for the murder of a government official by members of the Mumbunda tribe. At least 350 people were killed in the town of Idiofa. According to American historians who interviewed local residents, several members of Mulele's family were buried alive, and US Peace Corps volunteers were forced to watch the public hangings of 12 Kimbanguist church leaders suspected of being involved in the murder.

Bandunduans remain contemptuous of the political leadership in Kinshasa, but the public blames Mobutu's advisers primarily for their plight, according to an officer from the US Embassy who recently toured the region.

Key Figures

Although Bandundu has long been heavily represented in Mobutu's cabinet, local residents bitterly complain of a lack of national responsiveness to regional needs. None of Bandundu's officials based in Kinshasa has been admitted to the Equateur-dominated "inner circle" of Mobutu's advisers.

The most prominent figure in the Mai-Ndombe subregion is N'Singa, the executive secretary of the country's sole legal political party. He spent much of his time as Prime Minister meddling in the politics of the subregion. He was instrumental in moving the administrative capital in 1970 from densely populated Kikwit—in the rebellious Kwilu area—to Bandundu City, which lacks the infrastructure needed to support the bureaucracy adequately. Although the move led to major political and economic dislocations, it served N'Singa's patronage needs by transferring jobs and putting his home area on the map.

The most competent political figure from the subregion of Kwilu probably is Kamitatu Massamba, a former Prime Minister and leader during the early days of independence whom Mobutu brought back into the cabinet after imprisoning him for plotting against the government in 1966. Another Kwilu notable, former Education Minister Mungul Diaka, who has returned from his self-imposed exile in Brussels, retains a small local following. Wealthy businessman Takizala Luyana also maintains a wide network of local political ties.

Kwango subregion has no political leaders of the stature and influence of those from other parts of Bandundu. Aside from the influx in 1976 of 10,000 Angolan refugees, who quickly integrated with their Bayaka tribal cousins, Kwango has played no significant role in the region's politics.

The Governor of Bandundu, Konde Vila Kikanda, is a politically adept and experienced administrator from Bas-Zaire. His effectiveness in securing tangible public assistance from the central government is limited, however, by his lack of a following in Bandundu, corruption and neglect by his superiors in Kinshasa, and poor communications.

The Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), the country's sole political party, has little grassroots support in Bandundu. The people of the region are generally cynical about the political process.

Key Political Issues

We believe that memories of the violence of the 1960s help to quell the still rebellious tendencies in Bandundu, although a parliamentarian from Idiofa was among the 13 whom Mobutu arrested last year for trying to form a second political party. Public fear of the security services and of informers for the ruling party tends to limit antiregime activity to mere grumbling. Bandundu-based supporters of the Congo Resurrection Action Movement, a tiny insurgent organization, are now inactive and, in our view, pose no threat to the regime.

Charges by Angola that Zaire is allowing guerrillas of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to operate from bases in Bandundu have strained bilateral relations. Although Zaire may
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<tr>
<td>Bo-boliko Lokonga Muse Mihono</td>
<td>Former Prime Minister, Former Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Walia</td>
<td>Strong international trade union ties; honest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamanda wa Kamanda</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Justice</td>
<td>Mupende</td>
<td>Former OAU Assistant Secretary General; former Foreign Minister, UN African nationalist; leftist; favors continued US economic and military aid; unpopular with Mobutu’s advisers and Prime Minister Kengo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamitatu Massamba</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, and Environment</td>
<td>Mongongo Bayaka</td>
<td>Cofounder of an independence movement in 1959; popular in Kwilu; pre-Mobutu Prime Minister; jailed by Mobutu, 1966; pro-US; French ties; Sorbonne Ph. D.; rival of Prime Minister Kengo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konde Vila Kikanda</td>
<td>Governor of Bandundu</td>
<td>Muyombe</td>
<td>Experienced territorial administrator; intelligent; politically adept; from Bas-Zaïre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandungu Bula Nyati</td>
<td>Governor of Shaba</td>
<td>Mosengele-Monunu</td>
<td>Mobutu loyalist; studied in USSR; former Foreign Minister; Minister of Information and Public Works; former Governor of Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Mukobo Mudende Popolo</td>
<td>Commander, Kamanyola Division</td>
<td>Musongo</td>
<td>Only major military officer from Bandundu; has law degree from University of Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namwisi Ma Nkoy</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Finance and Budget</td>
<td>Bayanzi Mumbala</td>
<td>Strong technical leader; in cabinet for regional balance; honest; apolitical; former Governor of Equateur, former Planning Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N’gole Iliki</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Planning</td>
<td>Basakata</td>
<td>Former Finance Minister; reputedly a good economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N’Singa Uduu Ongwan Kebi Untube</td>
<td>MPR Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Basakata</td>
<td>Poor leader; pro-West; politically favors his tribe; ambitious; economic reformer; did not make policy as Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitikala Ibole</td>
<td>Member of MPR Central Committee</td>
<td>Bolia</td>
<td>Former Governor of Haut-Zaïre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takizala Luyana</td>
<td>Former regional governor</td>
<td>Bahungana</td>
<td>Kwilu’s dominant politician; experienced administrator; son of a village chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoka Mangono</td>
<td>Former Foreign Minister</td>
<td>Monunu</td>
<td>Close to N’Singa, but not Mobutu; poor leader; lawyer; anti-Kengo; former Minister of Land Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bandundu Factsheet

Vital Statistics

Area: 295,658 square kilometers
Life expectancy (years): 1956—37, 1975—44
Rural population (percent), 1975: 85
Principal city: Kikwit
Principal tribes: Bayaka, Bayanzi, Bambala, Basuku, Kundu

Economics

Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 14 percent
Principal crops: palm oil, coffee
Principal industries: none
Leading minerals: none

Administration

Governor: Konde Vila Kikanda (from Bas-Zaire)
Administrative capital: Bandundu
    Area: 222 square kilometers
    Population: 1970—74,467, 1982—100,000

Mal Ndombe subregion
    Area: 127,243 square kilometers
    Capital: Inongo
    Administrative zones: Inongo, Mushie, Oshwe, Kutu, Kiri, Bolobo

Kwilu subregion
    Area: 78,219 square kilometers
    Population: 1970—1,370,454
    Capital: Bulungu
    Administrative zones: Bulungu, Bagata, Idiofa, Masi-Manimba, Gungu

Kwango subregion
    Area: 89,974 square kilometers
    Capital: Kenge
    Administrative zones: Kenge, Popokabaka, Kasongo-Lunda, Kahemba, Feshi
sympathize with UNITA’s goals, the government denies any official support to Angolan guerrillas. We have no evidence that Kinshasa has directly aided UNITA in recent years. Logistic difficulties make Army policing of the border area problematical, however, and guerrillas may operate out of Bandundu undetected.

Prospects

Bandundu’s economic slide will not end soon. Declining urban standards of living in Bandundu and neighboring Kinshasa, brought about in part by budgetary austerity and the devaluation of the zaire, will continue to encourage a return to subsistence farming and further decrease contacts between the capital and the countryside.

Bandunduans are unlikely, however, to confront the government regarding their deteriorating economy or any other strictly regional issue. Local intellectuals who support the banned second political party have little in common with Bandundu’s peasant farmers. Guerrilla movements have little appeal in the region. The average Bandunduan is likely to remain politically apathetic for the foreseeable future.
Bas-Zaire: Zaire's Outlet to the Sea

The corruption and poor administration characteristic of Mobutu's rule have hindered economic development in Bas-Zaire. Although Mobutu favors the region over some others in his allocation of development projects because of Bas-Zaire's importance as the country's sole outlet to the sea, Kinshasa has not been generous in its support.

The Terrain, the People, and Their Quality of Life

Bas-Zaire is Zaire's smallest region, roughly the size of Delaware. Most of its terrain, a plateau that gently descends from a maximum elevation of 750 meters, consists of brush or tree savanna. The western sub-region of Bas-Fleuve has a few dense forests.

There are approximately 1.8 million people in the region—about 7 percent of the country's population—and ethnic ties are stronger in Bas-Zaire than in any other region, according to several scholars. Bakongos, who proudly trace their ancestry back to a kingdom that ruled the area for centuries, are the main ethnic group. The Bayombres, the second most important group, predominate in Bas-Fleuve. Most of Bas-Zaire's tribes speak Kikongo or Lingala dialects. As elsewhere in the country, French is spoken only by the few that have a formal education.

Christianity—both Catholic and Protestant—thrives alongside Kimbanguism, a Christianized form of animism. Clergymen exercise influence by organizing youth groups, settling jurisdictional disputes, and playing the role of advisers.

Despite Bas-Zaire's economic importance to Kinshasa, the central government provides few public services. According to US Embassy reports, the private sector has taken up some of the slack. For example, a local Belgian firm that produces palm oil has established and maintains 1,300 kilometers of rural roads, 22 canteens, and several clinics and dispensaries.

Health problems abound. A survey conducted in 1981 by Tulane University found 20 percent of Bas-Zaire's population suffering from acute malnutrition. The problem is increasing especially rapidly among women and children. Although Bas-Zaire has the potential to become self-sufficient in food crops, farmers export food needed to feed the local population, according to the US Embassy.

Malaria is prevalent throughout the region, and sleeping sickness and blood flukes are common along the Congo River and near the Angolan borders. Hospitals suffer from inadequate financing and supplies.

The educational system has fared no better than the health services. Teachers in Bas-Zaire, as well as the rest of the country, went on strike last year to protest the diversion of their paychecks by bureaucrats. Schools lack chalk, books, desks, and other basic equipment.

The Economy

Bas-Zaire's transportation network is relatively well developed, largely because all of Zaire depends on the region's port at Matadi for most of its imports. The heavily traveled, dangerously narrow road from Matadi to Kinshasa is one of few in the country in relatively good repair, according to the US defense attache. Kinshasa plans to construct a railroad between Dilolo and Songololo and a paved road along the Matadi-Boma-Banana route. Japanese plans to finance and build a large suspension bridge across the Congo River near Matadi may be jeopardized because of Mobutu's diversion of previous Japanese aid.
Bas-Zaire, alone among Zaire's western regions, is a source of minerals. Crude oil from an offshore well is refined near Moanda on the coast and piped to Kinshasa. A large bauxite reserve girdles the region just west of Matadi.

Energy output from the Inga hydroelectric power plant in Bas-Zaire could aid development. The government is offering cheap electricity in an industrial zone to attract foreign capital. A Swiss aluminum consortium may benefit from the offer if it can raise $640 million to outbid Japan for a smelter project.

Several agricultural development projects bolster farming in Bas-Zaire. The region's scant rainfall—lowest in the country—is supplemented by the second-highest number of water supply projects in Zaire. A project to revitalize the flagging sugar industry operates near Mbuza Ngungu. An agribusiness consortium recently sounded out the World Bank on plans to promote farming along the Congo River. The Soviets also have expressed interest in this project.

Bas-Zaire is plagued, however, by many of the problems that hinder agricultural development throughout Zaire. In the early 1970s, the US Embassy estimated that at least a third of the region's palm crop was diverted by corrupt Army commanders to the black market. Drought in 1978 devastated virtually every crop.

Political Issues

Security Jitters
Last December, longstanding fears that guerrillas of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo would invade Zaire from bases in Angola led the Army to call a full alert in Bas-Zaire and Shaba. Although this proved to be a false alarm, Bas-Zaire would be vulnerable if the FLNC could muster its forces.

The Army's litany of chronic difficulties in Bas-Zaire— inadequate vehicle maintenance, fuel thefts, untrained troops, poor morale, logistic shortcomings—would make selective sabotage and interdiction relatively low-cost options for the FLNC. In addition, Gendarmerie and Army shakedown operations have damaged civil-military relations. We agree with US Embassy assessments that Kinshasa would be economically crippled in a matter of hours by attacks on Bas-Zaire's oil storage facilities, refinery, pipeline, railway, and the Matadi-Kinshasa road.

Despite these considerations, we believe there is little likelihood of an imminent invasion. The FLNC has not demonstrated a serious interest in attacking Bas-Zaire, and its main forces are clustered far to the southeast in Zambia and Angola. They suffer from many of the problems that plague Mobutu's forces—low morale, factional divisions, shortages of key supplies, and questionable leadership.

Furthermore, we have no evidence that the local population supports the Shaban exiles. Bas-Zairians do, of course, complain of inflation, corruption, and overall economic neglect. Like their compatriots in other regions, however, they seem willing to put up with economic inequities rather than risk a return to the chaos of the immediate postindependence years.

Refugees
The approximately 200,000 Angolan refugees in Bas-Zaire strain already overburdened social service networks. The US Embassy notes that the United Nations has helped most of the refugees to resettle with members of their extended families. Some, however—particularly those associated with the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda—have resorted to shaking down local residents for sanctuary and supplies.

Local Politics
Bas-Zaire has a long history of political activism. Protest movements in 1919-23 and 1933-38 included religious-mystical currents that persist in Kimbangism. The Bakongo Alliance of the 1950s, led by later Prime Minister Joseph Kasavubu, evolved from a Kikongo cultural group into an influential political...
### Prominent Personalities in Bas-Zaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayona Bameya</td>
<td>State Commissioner for University and Higher Education and Scientific Research</td>
<td>Hunianga</td>
<td>Former First President of Supreme Court; former law school dean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiakwama Kia Kiziki</td>
<td>State Commissioner for State Investments</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Former Minister of Finance, Government Investments, and National Economy; former managing director of national insurance parastatal; close to Prime Minister Kengo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisombe Kiaku Muisi</td>
<td>Senior Legislative Council member</td>
<td>Mundibu</td>
<td>Wealthy businessman; former Governor of Kinshasa; difficult to deal with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitemeko Mambu Manze</td>
<td>Senior member of legislative delegation</td>
<td>Mundibu</td>
<td>Wealthy businessman; rival of Kisombe; from Cataractes, the subregion that is predominant in the delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konde Vila Kikanda</td>
<td>Governor of Bandundu</td>
<td>Muyombe</td>
<td>Experienced territorial administrator; intelligent; politically adept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makolo Jibikilayi</td>
<td>Governor of Bas-Zaire</td>
<td>Luluua</td>
<td>Former Governor of Bandundu; former Minister of Public Works, Public Health and Social Welfare; opportunist; from the Kasais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mananga Dintoka Pholo</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Labor and Social Security</td>
<td>Bakongo</td>
<td>Corrupt; former Justice and Energy Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavua Mudima</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Navy</td>
<td>Mundibu</td>
<td>Probably pro-US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Molamba Pene Lowa</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Muyombe</td>
<td>Former Commander of Kinshasa Military District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimy Mayidika Ngimbi</td>
<td>Director, Office of the President</td>
<td>Bakongo</td>
<td>Capable attorney; member of Mobutu's inner circle of advisers; SETI's university classmate; oversees GECAMINES for Mobutu; helps him resist reforms; economic adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshobo Ingana</td>
<td>Former General Commissioner for Sports and Leisure</td>
<td>Bakongo</td>
<td>Connected by marriage to ex-Justice Minister Vunduawe, which made him disliked by Kengo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umba Di Lutete</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation</td>
<td>Bakongo-Muyombe</td>
<td>Former Ambassador to the United Nations; held several other ministerial portfolios; close ties to Nimy; coffee exporter; protocol conscious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Movement. In 1980 Mobutu ordered 60 Bas-Zairians arrested for illegally organizing an opposition political party, and resentment against the regime has simmered under the surface since then. All but three of Bas-Zaire's 32 legislators oppose Mobutu, but we believe that they are in no position to challenge him effectively.
Bas-Zaire Factsheet

Vital Statistics

Area: 53,441 square kilometers
Population: 1970—1,504,361, 1976—1,741,080, 1982—1,860,499
Rural population (percent): 1975—68.7
Life expectancy (years): 1956—38; 1975—45.7
Principal city: Matadi
   Population: 1976—162,396
Principal tribes: Bakongo, Bambata, Basundi, Bayombe, Kakongo, Muserongo

Economics

Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 12.6 percent
Principal crops: palm oil, sugar, rubber, coffee, cocoa, fish, forestry
Principal industries: hydroelectric power plant, petroleum refining, port facility
Leading minerals: bauxite, offshore oil

Administration

Governor: Makolo Jibikilayi (from the Kasais)
Administrative capital: Matadi
   Area: 61 square kilometers

Bas-Fleuve subregion
   Area: 14,246 square kilometers
   Population: 1970—522,053
   Capital: Boma
   Administrative zones: Tshela, Lukula, Seke Banza, Boma

Cataractes subregion
   Area: 39,134 square kilometers
   Capital: Mbanza-Ngungu
   Administrative zones: Luozi, Songololo, Mbanza-Ngungu, Kimvula, Kasangulu, Madimba

The most prominent political figure from Bas-Zaier is Nimy Mayidika, director of Mobutu’s office. He is the only non-Equateurian in Mobutu’s “inner circle,” but he has done little—if anything—for Bas-Zaier. Aside from his official duties as Mobutu’s bureaucratic watchdog, his main job seems to be to add to Mobutu’s personal fortune by siphoning off revenues from parastatal enterprises.

Prospects

Discontent with Mobutu will continue in Bas-Zaier, but we doubt that it will flare into violence, given the incompetence of the FLNC and overall public apathy. Although Bas-Zaier will continue to suffer from Kinshasa’s neglect, it probably will remain less neglected than most of the other regions because of its importance as the country’s logistic hub.
Equateur:
Mobutu’s Home Region

President Mobutu and nearly all of his advisers come from Equateur,⁴ but the region has benefited little because the Equateurians in Kinshasa are more interested in personal gain than in their home region. As a result, Equateur’s large peasant class is at least as dissatisfied with the regime as people in the rest of the country. Such discontent is unlikely to coalesce into an anti-Mobutu movement, however, because of intertribal mistrust and political apathy. We expect that Equateur will remain poor, economically stagnant, politically lethargic, and largely neglected by Kinshasa.

The Tribal Factor

Tribal frictions are the key to understanding the people of Equateur, as in much of the rest of Zaire. According to US Embassy reporting, Equateurians welcome Kinshasa’s practice of naming outsiders to local government positions because they find them less objectionable than persons from rival tribes within the region.

Tribal jealousies are accentuated by Mobutu’s tendency to rely heavily for support on his Ngbandi tribe, a minority that other Equateurians resent as pampered foreigners.⁵ The group’s penchant for corruption is ascribed by other Zairians to an age-old tradition in which theft—of articles, animals, and women—was a prerequisite for manhood.

The principal rivals of the Ngbandis are the Mongo, the largest tribe (3 million) in Equateur and the second largest in Zaire. Despite their numbers, the political effectiveness of the Mongos has been limited by their tendency to divide into small, autonomous political units. Mobutu nevertheless keeps a wary eye on the few Mongos he has permitted to rise to key positions in the military.

Other Equateurian Bantu-speaking groups—the Binza, Ngombe, Adula, and Budja—live in the forests along the Zaire River. Mobutu grew up among these people and maintains close ties to them.

Economic Stagnation

Even during the colonial era—when it was known as the Forgotten Corner—Equateur had fewer schools, hospitals, and roads than the other regions. Since 1973 when nationalization forced out foreign businessmen, commercial activity has plummeted. The handful of internationally funded development projects in Equateur are too riddled with corruption to be effective.

Most of the region’s agricultural activity consists of subsistence farming, although some cotton, cocoa, coffee, rubber, and palm oil are grown for the market. The region apparently has no mineral wealth.

What few resources the regime has allocated to Equateur have been squandered on unproductive showcase projects such as the presidential retreat at Gbadolite. Once a backwater village, Gbadolite has been transformed into a bustling town with paved streets, electric lights, running water, fashionable boutiques, an international-class hotel, a marble and stained-glass cathedral, a zoo, and an international airport.

Gbadolite was built by Mobutu and his wealthy Ngbandi friends largely for their own benefit. Many of the region’s few small industries are owned by persons fronting for Mobutu.

Even Gbadolite is not without its economic problems, however. The explosion of economic activity has led to skyrocketing inflation, forcing local workers to leave low-paying jobs in town in order to maintain subsistence plots or to eke out a living growing cash crops.

⁴ Equateur, so named because it lies on the Equator, is roughly the size of California. It is sparsely populated, and its rate of population growth is among the lowest in the country. Information on the region is also relatively sparse.

⁵ Equateurians pejoratively refer to Ngbandis as Sudanese, but their language belongs to the Niger-Congo group.
A US academic study published in 1979 points out that one of the main impediments to economic development in Equateur is the bureaucracy. Every level of the hierarchy provides opportunities to rake off a share of government revenue. As a result, according to the study, public works projects are not funded, workers are not paid, equipment cannot be purchased, and nothing gets done.

**Deteriorating Social Conditions**

Health problems abound in Equateur, as throughout Zaire. A local Belgian doctor has claimed that 90 percent of the males have gonorrhea. The country's highest levels of malaria, blood flukes, and sleeping sickness have been reported in northwestern Equateur. Kwashiorkor, a disease that stems from protein deficiency, is endemic among children because of poor nutrition; leprosy is prevalent; and tuberculosis is on the rise.

The central government rarely furnishes hospitals in Equateur with even minimal supplies. The few medicines it does send to the region are usually diverted to the black market.

The educational system is also in disarray. Catholic and Protestant missions sponsor about the only reliable educational and health services. Less than half of the children attend school. Some teachers have not been paid in four years.

In 1980 local university students participated in a national strike to protest inadequate educational facilities and dismal living conditions. The government arrested 95 leaders of the strike, accused them of collusion with jailed parliamentary dissidents, and tortured them. The government then forcibly conscripted many of these students into military service and sent them to a camp in remote Kotakoli, Equateur. The students were recently freed, but the Kotakoli experience has dissuaded them and their colleagues from engaging in further protests even though living conditions and instructional facilities have deteriorated further since the strike.

**Equateurian Dominance in the Central Government**

We know little about local politics in Equateur, but Mobutu has given Equateurians—mostly Ngbandis—key roles in Kinshasa. Equateurians head most of the important ministries, the military and intelligence services, the sole political party, the legislature, and important private and parastatal business concerns. Except for the Director of the Presidential Office, all of Mobutu's most trusted "inner circle" hail from the region.

Mobutu's inner circle is currently dominated by Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo, who is a Ngbandi-metis (part European), and a longtime supporter of the President. Kengo is allied with Mobutu's national security adviser, Seti Yale, another Ngbandi-metis.

Kengo's strongest opponent, another Ngbandi, former Deputy Prime Minister Vunduwe te Pemako, has lost out in the struggle for power. Vunduwe resigned his cabinet post in January 1983, ostensibly to protest the hamhandedness of Kengo's campaign against corruption. Although he was confined to house arrest for several weeks, Vunduwe is now serving on Mobutu's reelection committee.

Mobutu's system of favoring Equateurians is not without drawbacks for himself as well as the country. Non-Ngbandis resent the growing wealth of Mobutu's cronies and chafe at being passed over for jobs and promotions. Mobutu's reliance on self-serving, Equateurian yes-men also isolates him from the poverty and concerns of the people in the country as a whole.

**Outlook**

Equateur's prospects are bleak. Local leaders are more likely to be co-opted by Kinshasa than to help the impoverished peasants of the region. Although Equateur will continue to provide leadership cadre for Zaire so long as Mobutu remains in power, the region itself will probably continue to lack political influence or economic importance. The public's minimal expectations of what the government can do will tend to perpetuate widespread apathy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atenda Mongebe Ongwano</td>
<td>Former Administrator General, National Research and Information Center</td>
<td>Akula</td>
<td>Former chief of Mobutu's recently disbanded civilian intelligence service, CNRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba Saolona</td>
<td>Chairman, Association of Zairian Companies (ANEZA)</td>
<td>Ngbakametis</td>
<td>Member of the &quot;inner circle&quot;; business front for Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bokana W'Ondangela</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Public Works and Territorial Development</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>Mobutu loyalist; technocrat; former Deputy Director of President's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Bolozi Gbudu Tanikpma</td>
<td>Chief, Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Corrupt; married to Mobutu’s sister; pro-Israel; a hardliner in the &quot;inner circle&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomboko Lokumba</td>
<td>Ambassador to the United Nations</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>Wealthy businessman; former Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Justice Minister, and Ambassador to United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Bosange Pompese Bakole</td>
<td>Chief, Presidential Military Office</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>Young; combat experienced; has Mobutu’s confidence; former Commander of the Special Presidential Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Boteti Nk’ea Nkanga</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>Ties to Mobutu’s “inner circle”; honest; intelligent; cooperative with Western officials; lacks formal military training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Danga Ngbokoli</td>
<td>Commander, Third Military Region</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Pro-West; close to Mobutu; was born in Mobutu’s village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekila Liyonda</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Women’s Affairs and Social Affairs</td>
<td>Libinza Mongo</td>
<td>Director of Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) Women’s Bureau; member of MPR Central Committee; lawyer; one of first Zairian women to receive a European education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Eluki Monga Anunda</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
<td>Budja</td>
<td>Mobutu loyalist; may be pro-West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engulu Baangampong Bakaole Lodanga</td>
<td>Member of Political Bureau of MPR Central Committee</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>Former Minister of Agriculture, Territories, Political Affairs, and Public Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Esilay Yoka Lokole</td>
<td>Former Commander, First Military Region</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>“Father figure” in the military; currently suspended while being investigated for corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inonga Lokongo L’Ome</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Transport and Communications</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>Mobutu loyalist; no independent political following; lawyer; was in cabinet for tribal balance until Kengo removed him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kengo wa Dondo</td>
<td>First State Commissioner (Prime Minister)</td>
<td>Ngbandi-metis (Polish father)</td>
<td>Leader of “inner circle”; close to Mobutu and Seti; has been relatively effective in implementing economic austerity measures advocated by International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kititiwa Tumansi Benga Ntundu</td>
<td>Governor of Equateur</td>
<td>Warega</td>
<td>Former head of several ministries; Mobutu loyalist; experienced diplomat; from Kivu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Prominent Personalities in Equateur (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice Adm. Lomponda wa Botende</td>
<td>Secretary of State for National Defense and Territorial Security</td>
<td>Mongo Libinza</td>
<td>shows tribal favoritism; friendly toward US officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makolo Wa Mpongbo</td>
<td>Director, National Documentation Agency, the civilian intelligence service created in November 1983</td>
<td></td>
<td>Former Ambassador to France, security services chief in 1980; wealthy businessman; pro-West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masegbio Nzanzu Mabele</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Culture and Arts</td>
<td>Ngombe</td>
<td>Former Secretary of State for Primary and Secondary Education; former professor of literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mata-Nkumu Wa Bowango</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Social Affairs</td>
<td>Makanza</td>
<td>Was respected by her staff for her honesty — rare among cabinet members; former Minister of Posts and Telecommunications and of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga</td>
<td>President; State Commissioner for National Defense and Veterans' Affairs; President of the MPR, Zaire’s sole legal political party; Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Pro-West; reported to be worth from $3 billion to $5 billion; declared himself president in 1965 when civilian leaders reached an impasse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moleka Liboke</td>
<td>Vice President, ANEZA</td>
<td>Elema</td>
<td>Nonaligned member of the “inner circle”; business front for Mobutu; related to Mobutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndolela Si Kikonde</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Primary and Secondary Education</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Friend of Mobutu and Vunduawe; has doctorate in sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndjoli Balanga</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Environment, Preservation of Nature, and Tourism</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>Appointed in March 1983 to same position he held in 1970s; friend of Mobutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkema Liloo</td>
<td>Former Administrator General, National Intelligence Service</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>Moderate member of “inner circle”; pro-West; capable foreign policy expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Nzimbi Ngbale</td>
<td>Commander, Special Presidential Brigade</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Mobutu’s nephew; his Israeli-trained brigade, which serves as Mobutu’s palace guard, is paid 35 percent more than regular Army units to ensure personal loyalty to Mobutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nzondomyyo A Dokpe Lingo</td>
<td>President, Legislative Council</td>
<td>Ngbaka</td>
<td>Close to Mobutu; authoritarian; experienced legislator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakombi Ekope</td>
<td>Former Governor of Kinshasa</td>
<td>Akula</td>
<td>Extremely pro-Mobutu; former Interior Minister; old political hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakombi Inongo</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Information, Mobilization, Propaganda, and Political Action</td>
<td>Akula</td>
<td>Former member of Mobutu’s inner circle; has served in other ministerial and party positions; was expelled from party for criticizing Mobutu; rebuttal to a book by Nguza brought him back into favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambwa Pida Nbangui</td>
<td>Governor, Bank of Zaire</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Close ties to Belgian bankers; respected economist; pro-US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seti Yale</td>
<td>Chairman, National Security Council; Special Presidential Adviser on National Security</td>
<td>Ngbandi-metis</td>
<td>Mobutu’s principal adviser, confidant, and a relative; anti-US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vunduawe te Pemako</td>
<td>Former Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Pro-US; former leading moderate in the “inner circle”; rival of Kengo and Seti; cousin of Mobutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Yeka Mangbau</td>
<td>Commander, First Military Region (Shaba)</td>
<td>Budja</td>
<td>Recently replaced General Esale as Shaba Commander during anticorruption drive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secret
Equateur Factsheet

Vital Statistics

Area: 402,154 square kilometers
Life expectancy (years): 1956—40.2, 1975—47.8
Rural population (percent), 1975: 84.1
Principal city: Mbandaka
   Population: 1975—139,739
Principal tribes: Mongo, Ngbandi, Budja, Ngbaka

Economics

Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 17.5 percent
Principal crops: palm oil, coffee, rubber, cocoa, cotton
Principal industries: brewery
Leading minerals: none

Administration

Governor: Kititwa Tumansi Benga Ntundu (from Kivu)
Administrative capital: Mbandaka
   Area: 460 square kilometers
   Population: 1970—107,910

Equateur subregion
   Area: 102,304 square kilometers
   Capital: Basankusu
   Administrative zones: Basankusu, Bomongo, Bolomba, Ingende, Bikoro, Makanza, Lukolela

Tshuapa subregion
   Area: 132,957 square kilometers
   Capital: Boende
   Administrative zones: Boende, Djolu, Befale, Bokungu, Monkoto, Ikela

Mongala subregion
   Area: 101,508 square kilometers
   Population: 1970—739,813
   Capital: Lisala
   Administrative zones: Lisala, Bumba, Mobayi, Businga, Bangandanga

North/South Ubangi subregions
   Area: 64,925 square kilometers
   Population: 1970—776,980
   Capitals: Gemena, Gbadolite
   Administrative zones: Gemena, Kungu, Libenge, Bosobolo, Budjala, Badolite

25X1
Haut-Zaire: Remote but Resilient

Haut-Zaire is isolated from Kinshasa because of distance, poor transportation links, and the disinterest of the central government. A burgeoning black market in coffee, cotton, ivory, and gold has developed with Uganda and Sudan—with whom Haut-Zaire has closer economic and social ties than to the rest of Zaire—demonstrating the resilience of the region's otherwise flagging economy.

The People and Their Quality of Life

Haut-Zaire's roughly 4 million people, about 14 percent of the country's population, live in a region approximately the size of France. Principally Bantu, Sudanic, Nilotic, and Pygmy, Haut-Zairians have ethnically and culturally more in common with their cousins in Sudan, Uganda, and the Central African Republic than with other tribes in Zaire. Most Haut-Zairians speak Swahili dialects; officials in Kinshasa generally speak Lingala. This linguistic difference accentuates the region's isolation.

Government services are negligible because of corruption, administrative incompetence, and, perhaps most important, Kinshasa's disinterest in this remote region. As in Shaba and most other regions of the country, what few public services are available are the result of self-help or the work of missionaries and domestic and foreign corporations. Officials complain of irregular pay, inadequate funds to support local programs, and the laxity of the central government in responding to their needs.

Religion, magic, and rigid ethnic identification strongly influence daily life. Catholicism and Protestantism thrive largely because of missionary efforts to improve living conditions, but witch doctors and sorcerers also abound.

The region's problems are aggravated by periodic influxes of refugees from Uganda carrying epidemic diseases. The highest levels of malaria, trypanosomiasis, and schistosomiasis in Zaire are found near the Ugandan border. The region also has the country's highest percentage of leprosy cases. An outbreak of cholera in Kisangani was controlled only after flooding of the Congo River swept away some of the infected homes. Hospitals suffer from inadequate financing and supplies.

Haut-Zaire's educational system is plagued with the same difficulties found throughout the country, including poorly trained teachers and a lack of basic facilities—chalk, blackboards, desks, and books. Qualified teachers are leaving the region in despair, further reducing the level of instruction and student performance.

Students at the University of Zaire at Kisangani have expressed dissatisfaction with the deteriorating educational system and the Mobutu regime. They have not engaged in overt political action, however, because they fear security service informers and the loss of their paltry government subsidies. Many brighter students are leaving schools to seek jobs.

The Economy

The land in Haut-Zaire is extremely fertile, but Kinshasa's neglect of transportation links with the region and low, government-set prices have led agricultural producers to look to the flourishing black market at Zaire's northeastern border with Sudan and Uganda for their livelihoods. Haut-Zaire's legal coffee economy has declined in part because the Greek planters who own the largest plantations are not interested in reinvesting their profits in the region. As a result, they overwork their land and do not diversify their crops. By contrast, small-scale Zairian planters are always short of cash and credit and are dependent upon foreign-owned operations for milling services. Few of them are able to make a living in the legal market.
Illegal coffee trading has evolved into big business over the past decade. Until the mid-1970s Haut-Zairians smuggled their coffee through Uganda to foreign markets. Because of insecurity within Uganda, however, Ugandan and Zairian planters now move their coffee through Haut-Zaïre to the Sudan. Kinshasa's efforts to intervene against black marketing and to recoup lost tax revenues have had limited results. High-level government officials quietly have joined the ranks of the smugglers, ensuring that the roads to Sudan are kept in adequate repair and that the government's efforts to crack down on smuggling have had little effect.

Coffee is not the only item of contraband moved out of Haut-Zaïre. Gold smuggling into Burundi by pygmies and Wamande peasants has cut into the profits of Kilo-Moto, a parastatal company that mines 80 percent of the country's gold. Senior military and civilian officials—including one of President Mobutu's sons—dominate illegal trafficking of ivory with West African and Arab merchants, according to US Embassy sources.

The widespread smuggling has been a mixed blessing for the region. On the one hand, the easy hard currency profits have stimulated economic life, leading scores of expatriates to return to rebuild plantations and start new commercial enterprises. On the other hand, the influx of cash has had a number of deleterious effects. Students have been lured to leave school by get-rich-quick schemes. People generally have become more cynical about their government as they watch officials profit from illegal trade. Violence has been another byproduct, as rival gangs fight for control of the smuggling trade. Finally, smuggling is costing the government millions of dollars in lost foreign exchange earnings and uncollected taxes.

Political Issues

Refugees
Thousands of refugees fled to Zaïre from Uganda following the overthrow of Idi Amin, and the low-level insurgency there since then has maintained a continuing flow. The number of Ugandan refugees in Haut-Zaïre as of January 1981 was 129,000, according to the US Embassy; an additional 46,000 refugees registered with the UN that summer.

Ugandan military operations have often spilled across the border. Uganda charges that Zaïre harbors antigovernment rebels and demands that the refugees be moved farther from the border. The lack of discipline in both armies makes policing the border area difficult, and has strained bilateral relations.

Haut-Zaïre's already large refugee population could serve as a magnet for other Ugandan refugees who live along the Rwanda-Uganda border. Yet another influx would strain the government's already ineffective social services, however, and would deplete the resources of tribal, business, and missionary groups that take up some of the slack.

Discontent With Mobutu
As elsewhere in Zaïre, the people of Haut-Zaïre generally dislike the central government because of its inability and disinclination to respond to the region's needs, according to the US Embassy.

Residents characterize Kinshasa as at best a hindrance to development and at worst the source of its many problems. Haut-Zaïre's chronic underrepresentation in Mobutu's cabinet adds to local feelings of powerlessness and alienation. Many believe that Mobutu holds a grudge against the region. Mobutu was greeted with sullen silence in 1979 when he visited Kisangani, once the country's third most important city.

There have long been a number of talented Haut-Zaïrian officers in the military, such as Armed Forces Chief of Staff Singa Boyenge and former Minister of Defense Babia Wili Malobia. Mobutu's tendency to favor his fellow Equateurs in staffing senior command positions has created resentment among Haut-Zaïrians in the military. Mobutu's policy of deliberately fostering personal rivalries among military leaders has led to the formation of cliques at the most senior levels of command and increased discontent among middle-level Haut-Zaïrian officers.

Discontent in Haut-Zaïre has not taken the form of antigovernment action, however, since the traumatic violence of 1964 spilled over into Haut-Zaïre. Even though Haut-Zaïrian officers resent Equateurian predominance, they appear to be loyal to Mobutu.
## Prominent Personalities in Haut-Zaïre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Babia Wili Malobia Zongbi</td>
<td>Former Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Zande, Babua</td>
<td>Leader of Haut-Zaïre officers who oppose Equateurian predominance but are nonetheless loyal to Mobutu; pro-West; rival of Army Chief of Staff Eluki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duga Kugbe-Torea</td>
<td>Governor of Kasai-Oriental</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Member of Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) Central Committee; former Minister of Territories; reputedly a tough politician, opportunist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etitimoto Ekangamengo</td>
<td>Second Parliamentary Secretary</td>
<td>Mosoko</td>
<td>Only woman in permanent bureau of national legislature; lacks parliamentary experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasongo Mutuale</td>
<td>Ambassador to the United States</td>
<td>Mokusu</td>
<td>Competent and well informed; not a power in his own right; former Minister of Civil Services and Posts, Telephones, and Telegraphs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Kikunda Ombala</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Air Force</td>
<td>Lokole</td>
<td>Member of MPR Political Bureau; formerly Mobutu's pilot, temporarily suspended in 1983 for corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozagba Ngbuka Bomanga</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Territorial Affairs</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Babia's cousin; from Mobutu's tribe; former Minister of Public Health, Social Welfare, and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nendaka Bika</td>
<td>First Vice President of MPR Central Committee</td>
<td>Babua</td>
<td>Member of “Binza Group” that helped Mobutu come to power; former Surete chief, once arrested for subversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Singa Boyenge Mosambay</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Armed Forces</td>
<td>Babua</td>
<td>Pro-West; leader of Haut-Zaïre officers loyal to Mobutu; popular owing to skill and courage shown in resisting Shaba invasions; may retire soon; former Governor of Shaba; friend of Nendaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukadi Bulayi Madumbe</td>
<td>Governor of Haut-Zaïre</td>
<td>Basonge</td>
<td>Supported by Kabinda tribal leaders; former Minister of Land Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamundu Agenong-ha Kasongo</td>
<td>Governor of Kasai-Occidental</td>
<td>Alur</td>
<td>Pro-West; former Governor of Kasai-Oriental and Bas-Zaïre, where he was unpopular and involved in scandals associated with US PL-480 aid; former Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones, Public Works, and Agriculture; served as deputy chief of intelligence when Nendaka headed Surete</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Haut-Zaïre Factsheet

Vital Statistics

- **Area:** 503,239 square kilometers
- **Life expectancy (years):** 1956—39.3, 1975—46.9
- **Rural population (percent), 1975:** 82.4
- **Principal city:** Kisangani
  - **Population:** 1975—291,888
- **Principal tribes:** Zande, Babua, Lokele

Economics

- **Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979:** 18.6 percent
- **Principal crops:** manioc, livestock, corn, rice, vegetables, potatoes, cotton, coffee, cocoa, peanuts
- **Principal industries:** smuggling of ivory, coffee, and gold
- **Leading minerals:** gold, iron

Administration

- **Governor:** Sukadi Bulayi Mudumbe (from the Kasais)
- **Administrative capital:** Kisangani
  - **Area:** 1,910 square kilometers
  - **Population:** 1970—229,596

Tshopo/Haut-Zaïre subregion

- **Area:** 197,657 square kilometers
- **Population:** 1970—714,545
- **Capital:** Wanie-Rukula
- **Administrative zones:** Basoko, Banalia, Bafwasende, Opala, Yahuma, Isangi, Ubundu

Bas-Uele subregion

- **Area:** 148,331 square kilometers
- **Population:** 1970—588,768
- **Capital:** Buta
- **Administrative zones:** Buta, Bondo, Aketi, Ango, Bambesa, Poke

Haut-Uele subregion

- **Area:** 89,683 square kilometers
- **Population:** 1970—795,619
- **Capital:** Isiro
- **Administrative zones:** Rungu, Niangara, Dungu, Wamba, Watsa, Faradje

Ituri subregion

- **Area:** 65,658 square kilometers
- **Population:** 1970—1,027,891
- **Capital:** Bunia
- **Administrative zones:** Irumu, Aru, Mahagi, Djigu, Mambasa
The most prominent Haut-Zairian who might challenge Mobutu is Nendaka Bika, former security chief and a member of the group who helped Mobutu come to power. Nendaka has been quietly consolidating his power base among intellectuals, the military, and political allies in other eastern regions under the cover of his extensive commercial interests. Mobutu once arrested Nendaka for subversion and continues to keep a close watch on him.

Prospects

Geographically and socially cut off from the rest of the country, Haut-Zaïre is not as dependent on Kinshasa as Zaïre's other regions largely because of the resilience of its black-market economy. In our view, the region's entrepreneurs will continue to flourish outside the legal market structure. Although this will mean a loss of both tax revenue and respect for the central government, it assures Haut-Zaïre a large measure of autonomy.
The Kasai Regions:
Home of Diamond Mining
and Dissidents

The two Kasai regions (East and West) of Zaire historically have been a problem for any central government—Belgian or African—that has attempted to impose its authority over them. After independence, bloody intertribal warfare and a secessionist movement forced Kinshasa to amalgamate several small provinces in the Kasai area into two regions—Occidental (West) and Oriental (East). Although ethnic frictions remain, most people in the Kasais are united in the belief that President Mobutu does not like, trust, or care about them. They comprise, therefore, fertile ground for political opposition.

The Kasais are also the center of diamond mining in Zaire—the non-Communist world’s leading producer of industrial diamonds. Kinshasa hopes that an agreement arrived at in March 1983, which permits DeBeers, the South African–based company that controls the international diamond cartel, once again to market most of Zaire’s diamonds, will revive the industry. Despite stepped-up government policing measures, diamond smuggling will continue to drain much of the country’s output.

The People and Their Quality of Life

Tribal Rivalries

Tribal frictions have long been a central part of life in the Kasais, whose approximately 4 million people make up 14 percent of the country’s population. Jealousies among the five key tribes—the Baluba and Batetela in Kasai-Oriental, the Lulua and Basalampasu in Kasai-Occidental, and the Bakuba in both regions—have fostered some of the worst violence in the country’s history. These troubles have forced several administrative reorganizations and redrawings of regional boundaries.

The Baluba have been relatively successful in business and government because of their personal drive and acceptance of modern ways. Their success was particularly evident when Zaire was under Belgian rule.

The Belgians used the relatively disciplined Baluba to administer the Luluaka Valley, the homeland of the Lulua.

When the colonial government’s control weakened as independence approached in 1959-60, the Lulua rose up against the Baluba. The resultant bloodletting forced hundreds of thousands of Baluba to flee to neighboring Shaba and Kasai-Oriental and led Baluba chief Kalonji Ditunga in 1960 to form the secessionist Mining State of South Kasai. The secession failed in 1962 when disillusioned Baluba forced Kalonji to accept the authority of the central government and join a new governing coalition.

The Batetela played a major role in the politics and violence that split the country in its early years of independence. The assassination in 1961 of Patrice Lumumba, the country’s first Prime Minister and a Batetela, sparked widespread antiwhite violence by his tribe. Many young Batetela joined the “Simba” rebellion, which terrorized most of the Sankuru subregion of Kasai-Oriental in 1964. (See the Historical Overview.) Since then, many Batetela have moved to Kinshasa and have been assimilated despite having to overcome Kinshasan prejudice because of their comparatively higher level of education.

The cultures of all five of the Kasai tribes remain rooted in their remote, jungle backgrounds. The Baluba and Batetela practice polygyny, magic, and other ancestral customs. Most neighboring tribes believe that the Basalampasu, who dominate southern Kasai-Occidental, still practice cannibalism. The King of the Bakuba is currently campaigning to get the males of his tribe to wear trousers.
Population Distribution and Tribes in Zaire's Kasai Regions

[Map showing regions and tribes in Zaire's Kasai Regions]
Diamond Production in Zaire

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gems</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>11,323</td>
<td>10,681</td>
<td>10,603</td>
<td>8,440</td>
<td>9,890</td>
<td>7,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Bureau of Mines. (Figures include estimates of smuggling and therefore may differ from official SOZACOM data.)

Standard of Living
Living conditions in the Kasais are comparable to those in Zaire's other regions. Radios, newspapers, fuel, electricity, potable water, medical facilities, and industrial jobs are virtually nonexistent. The buildings and streets in the cities are in severe decay. Soil erosion threatens to wipe out entire city blocks. Prostitution, alcoholism, and armed banditry are rampant.

The government spends little on maintaining or developing public facilities. A shortage of schools forces teachers to instruct children outdoors. Most rural development projects are run by Catholic and Presbyterian missionaries. Private enterprise provides some social services in Kasai-Oriental, but not in Kasai-Occidental.

Economy

Diamond Mining
Zaire's diamond production—which accounts for about 5 percent of the country's export revenues—is centered in the Kasais. Societe Miniere de Bakwanga (MIBA), owned jointly by the Zairian Government and Belgian businessmen, operates a 103,000-hectare concession at Mbuji-Mayi in Kasai-Oriental. Large numbers of individual, private miners work deposits at Tshikapa in Kasai-Occidental.

MIBA accounts for 95 percent of the country's diamond production, but only about 5 percent of MIBA's output are gems. A higher percentage of Tshikapa's diamonds are gems, but production from Tshikapa totals only 350,000 to 400,000 carats a year.

MIBA's production has fallen from 15 million carats in 1964 to only slightly more than 6 million carats in 1982 because of aging plant and equipment, shortages of spare parts, and dwindling ore reserves. About 75 percent of MIBA's production is "boart," an industrial-grade powder. Another 20 percent is of "near gem" quality and can be used for industry or in low-quality jewelry.

Zaire's decision to leave the DeBeers diamond marketing cartel in May 1981 imposed heavy costs on the Kasai diamond mines. DeBeers created a surplus in the world market for industrial diamonds, according to press reports, which cut average prices for MIBA's output by about one-fourth to little more than $2 a carat by the end of 1981. Zaire's diamond revenues fell from $68 million in 1980 to $45 million in 1981 because of the glut, a strike, and the inefficient and corrupt practices of SOZACOM, the parastatal company which had taken over the marketing of Zaire's diamonds.

Zaire took steps to reverse the slide in diamond earnings in March 1983 by signing a new agreement with DeBeers's British subsidiary, Britmond, to purchase MIBA's future output. Britmond guaranteed a

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floor price of $8.55 per carat for MIBA’s diamonds, which Kinshasa hopes will be enough to enable MIBA to renovate and expand its mining facilities. The return to the DeBeers marketing system should reduce fraud, which was common when the industry was under SOZACOM’s control.

Zaire also has announced regulations that permit private companies to open buying offices and to compete with purchasers on the black market. Private buying offices have been opened by British, American, Belgian, and Haitian businessmen as well as by DeBeers and at least one business associate of Mobutu. They reportedly have funneled $25 million in hard currency into legal banking channels during the first few weeks of the new system’s operation. Confiscatory taxation policies, unrealistically low government-set prices, inefficient harvesting methods, and a deteriorating transportation system have induced many farmers to turn to illegal but more lucrative diamond mining and smuggling. Moreover, the impoverished Lulua farmers in Kasai-Occidental often are forced to sell their entire crop, including their own food stocks, to diamond-rich Baluba merchants to pay off debts. This contributes to high rural malnutrition and tribal tensions. The Lulua farmers fear further economic dependence on the Balubas and, according to the US Embassy, refuse to accept electricity from Kasai-Oriental.

We doubt, nevertheless, that these marketing changes will bring significant new benefits to the Kasai regions. Although the new system may reduce smuggling and bring some additional employment opportunities if MIBA expands, it may also encourage illegal prospecting on MIBA’s holdings. MIBA officials claim that illegal prospectors diverted 6 million carats per year to the black market between 1969 and 1977, plundered the richest reserve lodes, rendered MIBA’s operations less efficient, and undercut MIBA’s attempts to increase sales when world demand was high. Further illegal prospecting could lead to violence involving the prospectors against MIBA’S police and Zairian gendarmes. The new system may also tempt members of the Zairian Armed Forces to shake down the black-marketeers and to step up their own illegal mining. Military officers worry that an influx of traders and miners could also cause infiltration of insurgents into the area.

Political Strains

Mobutu’s autocratic style of rule has only aggravated Kasai discontent. His government has slighted the Kasai regions in filling university, government, and military slots, thus adding to both Baluba and Lulua resentment of Kinshasa.

In 1981 several Kasaians in the National Assembly joined other national legislators in forming the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), an organization that aroused Mobutu’s ire. Eight Kasaians were among the 13 key UDPS leaders who were jailed for over a year for forming this illegal political party.

Mobutu’s national security adviser, Seti Yale, and Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo are using a new Baluba political organization, the Revolutionary Committee for Coordination and Action (CRCA), to influence Kasai-Oriental politics and to monitor the activities of the recently released UDPS leaders. The CRCA members are young opportunists who do not represent significant local interests, but Mobutu might use them as functionaries because their political weakness would make them pliable tools.

Agriculture

Although a meat and grain exporting area under Belgian rule, the Kasais have not recovered from a postindependence slump in production and now import corn from Zimbabwe and South Africa. In an effort to reverse the agricultural decline, the government sponsored a large maize project in Kasai-Oriental in 1980, which increased production from 23,000 metric tons in 1980 to 32,250 metric tons in 1982.
## Prominent Personalities in the Kasai Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duga Kugbe-Toroa</td>
<td>Governor of Kasai-Oriental</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
<td>Former Minister of Territories, Commerce, and Finance; reputedly a tough politician; opportunist; from Haut-Zaïre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabaidi Wa Kabaidi</td>
<td>Governor of Kinshasa</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Former secretary general of the youth wing of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR); former legislator from Kasai-Occidental; also has ties in Kasai-Oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalanga Ilunga</td>
<td>Chief Justice of the Supreme Court</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Former President of the Court of Appeals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalonji Ditunga</td>
<td>Member, MPR Central Committee</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Malopwe (emperor) of Baluba tribe; led secessionist movement in 1960-62; recently criticized for vote fraud in Kasai-Oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kande Buloba Kasumpata</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Labor and Social Security</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Professor at the University of Kinshasa; former judicial adviser in the Office of the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kande Dzambulate</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Information, Culture, and Arts</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Pro-US; friend of Mobutu; former journalist; former member of Mobutu’s inner circle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasongo Mukundji</td>
<td>First Vice President of Legislative Council</td>
<td>Batetela</td>
<td>Served in political, labor, diplomatic, and parastatal positions; helped by political connections of his wife, a Baluba; viewed by colleagues as a conciliator and patient negotiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukusa Mwengula</td>
<td>Presidential Delegate General, Zairian Government Minerals Marketing Company (SOZACOM)</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Close adviser to Mobutu; strongly resists meeting IMF’s terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabika Kalanda</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Scientific Research</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Shrewd political operator; former chief of Zairian Control Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makinda Watawata</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Primary and Secondary Education</td>
<td>Mushele</td>
<td>Lawyer from Kasai-Occidental; former magistrate; MPR Central Committee member;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makolo Jibikilayi</td>
<td>Governor of Bas-Zaïre</td>
<td>Lulu</td>
<td>Former Governor of Bandundu; former Minister of Public Works, Public Health, and Social Affairs; opportunist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Malu Malu Dianda</td>
<td>Commander, Kitona Base</td>
<td>Lulu</td>
<td>Only important military commander from Kasais; was Chief of Staff of OAU peacekeeping force in Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malumba Mbangula</td>
<td>Former Governor of Bas-Zaïre</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Popular Kasai-Occidental politician; good administrator; fired as Governor of Bas-Zaïre in recent anticorruption campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwamba Ndumba</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Transport and Communication</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Former Secretary of State for Agriculture; President of Tabazaïre, a tobacco firm; apolitical; pro-US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prominent Personalities in the Kasai Regions (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ngalula Mbandanjila</td>
<td>Leader of Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS)</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Pro-US; authored 51-page UDPs letter criticizing Mobutu; cofounded National Congolese Movement, a pre-Mobutu political party; served as Governor of South Kasai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukadi Bulayi Mudumbe</td>
<td>Governor of Haut-Zaïre</td>
<td>Basonge</td>
<td>Supported by Kabinda tribal leaders; former Minister of Land Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahibasu Mubiay</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Health</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>One of the first Zaïrians to earn M.D. after independence; has extensive experience in health administration in Shaba, Kasai-Oriental, and Haut-Zaïre; political ally of Prime Minister Kengo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshisekedi Wa Mulumba</td>
<td>Leader of UDPs</td>
<td>Luba</td>
<td>Most outspoken critic of Mobutu within Zaïre before being jailed in 1982 for trying to form a second political party; had served in cabinet and ambassadorial positions for Mobutu; pro-US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamundu Agenong’ha Kasongo</td>
<td>Governor of Kasai-Occidental</td>
<td>Alur</td>
<td>Pro-West; former Governor of Kasai-Oriental and Bas-Zaïre, where he was involved in scandals involving PL-480 funds; held several ministerial posts; was deputy chief of intelligence under Nendaka Bika, a political rival of Mobutu; from Haut-Zaïre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tribal frictions between Baluba and Batetela legislators have limited the effectiveness of the parliamentary delegation from Kasai-Oriental. The delegation also has been weakened by the expulsion of the UDPS dissidents and has not been able to replace them with politicians of equal caliber. 

Seti advocates a get-tough policy for the Kasais, but the Zaïrian Armed Forces are unprepared to implement it. Military units in the Kasais suffer from the same transportation, communications, equipment, and discipline problems that plague most military units elsewhere. 

Security Concerns

Kasaïan dissatisfaction with the Mobutu regime could once again lead to open rebellion, according to Kasai-Oriental Governor Zamundu Agenong. Economic stagnation and election-rigging last year against supporters of the UDPS have increased discontent. The armed forces can expect little help from the local population in combating dissidence or insurgency. Civil-military relations are poor because of extortion of the population by military personnel and the belief—which we have been unable to confirm—of the local population that soldiers massacred hundreds of students and miners in the region in 1979 and 1980.
Kasai-Occidental Factsheet

Vital Statistics

Area: 156,967 square kilometers; approximately the size of Georgia
Population: * 1976—1,918,115, 1982—2,226,482
Life expectancy (years): 1956—30.4, 1975—39.9
Rural population (percent), 1975: 74.4
Principal city: Kananga
   Population: 1975—316,770
Principal tribes: Lulu, Bena-Luluwa, Bakuba, Babindji, Tshokwe, Basalampasu

Economics

Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 6.4 percent
Principal crops: cotton, peanuts, manioc, coffee, palm oil, timber
Principal industries: brewery
Leading minerals: diamonds

Administration

Governor: Zamundu Agenong’ha Kasongo (from Haut-Zaïre)
Administrative capital: Kananga
   Area: 378 square kilometers
   Percent of regional population: 1970—18

Kasai subregion

Area: 95,631 square kilometers
Percent of regional population: 1970—34
Capital: Luebo
Administrative zones: Luebo, Mweka, Tshikapa, Ilebo, Dekese

Lulu subregion

Area: 60,938 square kilometers
Percent of regional population: 1970—48
Capital: Tshimbulu
Administrative zones: Demba, Dimbelenge, Dibaya, Luiza, Kazumba

*Zairian demographers believe that the government overestimated the population of the Kasais in the 1970 census.
Kasai-Oriental Factsheet

Vital Statistics

*Area*: 168,216 square kilometers; approximately the size of Tunisia or the state of Washington
*Population*: ¹ 1976—1,556,178, 1982—1,822,659
*Life expectancy (years)*: 1956—39.2, 1975—46.9
*Rural population (percent)*, 1975: 69.5
*Principal city*: Mbuji-Mayi
  *Population*: 1975—283,219
*Principal tribes*: Baluba, Basonge, Bena-Kanioka, Batetela, Bakuba, Milembwe, Luntu

Economics

*Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product*, 1979: 5.5 percent
*Principal crops*: coffee, cotton, rice, corn, manioc, livestock
*Principal industries*: agricultural processing plants
*Leading minerals*: diamonds

Administration

*Governor*: Duga Kugbe-Torao (from Haut-Zaïre)
*Administrative capital*: Mbuji-Mayi
  *Area*: 64 square kilometers
  *Percent of regional population*: 1970—14

*Kabinda subregion*
  *Area*: 63,821 square kilometers
  *Percent of regional population*: 1970—60
  *Capital*: Kabinda
  *Administrative zones*: Kabinda, Lubao, Tshilenge, Kamiji, Gandjika, Mwene-Ditu

*Sankuru subregion*
  *Area*: 104,331 square kilometers
  *Percent of regional population*: 1970—26
  *Capital*: Lusambo
  *Administrative zones*: Lusambo, Lodja, Lomeia, Kole, Katakoko-Kombe, Lubefu

¹ Zairian demographers believe that the government overestimated the population of the Kasais in the 1970 census.
The people of four whole villages in Kasai-Occidental resettled in Angola in 1980 to escape harassment by the military, according to the US Embassy.

Prospects

Kinshasa’s unwillingness or inability to devote more resources to the development of the Kasais will continue to hinder economic development. Although the resumption of the diamond marketing agreement with DeBeers probably will increase revenues, in our view little of this money will be returned to either region. Even a major expansion of MIBA’s operations, however, cannot begin to dent the high unemployment rates in the Kasais because MIBA does not need many more workers. The social ills that attend high unemployment—crime, migration, malnourishment, and social unrest—will continue unabated.

Political alienation in the Kasais makes the local populations sympathetic to nascent anti-Mobutu movements. Although memories of past chaos will make Kasaïans wary of resuming armed rebellion, support for political dissent almost certainly will continue.
Kinshasa:
Smallest Administrative Region, Capital, and Microcosm of Zaire

Kinshasa, the capital and smallest administrative region of Zaire, is the center of commerce and manufacturing in the country and the home of the country's wealthy elite. The average Kinshasan is no better off, however, than his destitute country cousins. Most Kinshasans face the same problems as city-dwellers in the rest of the Third World—crime, unemployment, abysmal social services, and overcrowding.

The gap between the rich and the poor in Kinshasa is reflected in the contrast between the Ville and the Cite. The Ville, a narrow strip of land along the river, is made up of the luxury villas and apartments of the country's political and business elite. The Cite, which covers 202 of Kinshasa Region's 9,965 square kilometers, is a sprawling slum in which most of the people of Kinshasa live. Ramshackle store fronts line the road from N'Djili Airport in the suburbs to the Cite, and seemingly endless rows of shacks crowd the dusty, dirt paths that cross it. The sides of the road are cluttered with people, some hustling cigarettes, magazines, or trinkets, others pulling rickshaw-like carts or begging.

Economic Imperatives

Most of the approximately 3 million people who live in Kinshasa, roughly 10 percent of Zaire's population, are migrants or the children of migrants from Zaire's outlying regions, according to several academic studies. The rich and affluent generally have some connection with President Mobutu's regime. The 75 percent of Kinshasans who are poor, defined as those who devote at least 70 percent of their income to food, lack the means for decent housing, medical care, or education. Most of them left farming to try to find work in the city.

Most new jobs in Zaire are found in manufacturing plants in Kinshasa, according to business surveys. Major employers produce cigarettes, beer, textiles, wood products, footwear, chemicals, and semifinished metal products.

Poor transportation to the interior has resulted in underutilized facilities and increased unemployment. Zaire's single, government-run union, however, is more interested in higher wages for those already working than in expanding the number of jobs.

Those who obtain employment find that inflation erodes their incomes. After a currency devaluation in 1981, inflation averaged 14 percent per month for several months. From 1976 through 1982, the cost-of-living index increased 22-fold for low- and middle-income workers. Many Kinshasans make ends meet through petty trading, second jobs, borrowing from relatives, and various kinds of illegal or corrupt deals.

Kinshasa gets almost all of its food from outlying regions of Zaire and from foreign sources: the part of Kinshasa Region outside the Ville and the Cite produces less than 1 percent of Zaire's agricultural output. In late 1981 many Kinshasans went hungry because Zaire's shortage of foreign exchange prevented the purchase of fuel for trucks to transport food. Breakdowns in the flour mill at Matadi also have led to shortages. With UNESCO assistance some Cite dwellers have marginally alleviated the problem by farming tiny plots of land.

In addition, France is funding truck-farming and fish-culture projects in the region's small food-producing areas.

Kinshasans usually satisfy local petroleum requirements by diverting stocks originally allocated by the government for other regions. Waiting lines at gas stations frequently spring up unexpectedly, however, and kerosene needed for cooking is often scarce.
Social Implications of Population Pressures

Zairian demographers calculate that Kinshasa's population grows 10 percent annually. More than half of the city's 3 million inhabitants are less than 15 years old.

The government has done nothing to alleviate shortages of housing. In Kinshasa’s poorest district, six to seven persons are crowded into each residential room, according to a USAID study. During the first decade of the Mobutu regime, the only construction projects funded by the government were Mobutu's residence, showcase projects for the military, and an OAU convention center. Since then housing that was purportedly earmarked for the poor has been given to well-connected military officers. Most junior officers in Kinshasa are not provided with housing and must rent overpriced shacks on the civilian market.

Kinshasa's educational system has deteriorated because of the enormous rise in the school-age population. The average Kinshasan schoolroom crowds in 25 students, compared with 37 in rural schools. Children of the affluent avoid the problem by attending boarding schools outside the city.

Most urban families cannot afford tuition, transportation, schoolbooks, or the admission fees they are charged illegally. As a result, dropout rates are high. Those who graduate generally get an inferior education and find few good jobs available. Socioeconomic mobility scarcely exists: the children of the poor generally stay poor.

Those who turn to petty crime face a sobering punishment. Kinshasa's overcrowded prisons are virtually unfit for human habitation. Some prisoners have starved to death. Almost all female prisoners acquire venereal disease because wardens force them into prostitution.

Security Precautions and Problems

Mobutu has focused his military resources on defending Kinshasa and himself from attack. He has built his residential compound 10 kilometers outside of the central city at Camp Tshotshi, garrison of the Special Presidential Brigade (BSP). The BSP is loyal to Mobutu for reasons of tribal kinship as well as relatively high pay. The Israelis and West Germans have provided training for the BSP.

The 31st Parachute Brigade, a second elite unit headquartered near N'Djili Airport, is tasked with defending key urban locations jointly with the BSP in case of attack. French officers command the 31st Brigade, whose 2,200 soldiers are younger and less experienced than the 2,000 troops in the BSP. The 31st Brigade reported 561 desertions last year.

The pay, training, equipment, and discipline of the BSP and the 31st Brigade set them above other units of the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), as well as other military, intelligence, and police units assigned to defend Kinshasa. The Gendarmerie—the national police—is not trained for crowd control and cannot muster enough vehicles to respond to emergencies. The US defense attache in Kinshasa reports that security personnel at N'Djili Airport are incompetent, unreliable, and corrupt. The 1st Armored Battalion at nearby Mbanza-Ngungu needs at least four to six hours to get to Kinshasa because it lacks efficient means of transport.

Mobutu's military chief has complained that Kinshasa is too heavy with senior officers who spend most of their time doing personal business rather than their jobs. Half of Zaire's officers are stationed in Kinshasa.

Vulnerabilities

The city's dependence on unguarded power and transportation links make it particularly vulnerable to sabotage. A handful of people armed with explosives could deprive Kinshasa of food, fuel, electric power, and imports, according to the US Embassy.
We believe that Zaire's military and security services could not defend Kinshasa without external assistance. In such a contingency, Mobutu would probably search for foreign troops to bail him out as the Moroccans, with French and Belgian assistance, did during the invasion of Shaba Region in 1977, and as troops from France, Belgium, and an Intra-African Force did in 1978. Belgian troops also helped the Zairian Army during a coup scare in February 1979.

The French have long worried that military forces loyal to Mobutu could not defeat a coup attempt from within the military.

We believe that the ability of Mobutu's guards to protect him is suspect. Burglars were able to steal several valuable personal items from Mobutu's residence in July 1981. It is not unusual for military and civilian guards to sleep at their posts.

Local Politics

The central government tends to dominate local politics in Kinshasa. Local political leaders are generally transplanted regional notables whose futures depend on their connections with the Mobutu regime.

Mobutu carefully monitors the actions of the regional governor and has sacked two of them in the past two years. The most important action of the newest governor, in the view of the US Embassy, has been to lead a parade in support of Mobutu.

Mobutu permits the city council to play only a consultative role in governing the city. Local political issues tend to be narrowly focused—clean water for a neighborhood, increased anticrime patrols—and are handled by patronage networks.

Kinshasans fielded 209 candidates in October 1982 for 21 seats in elections for the national legislature. The election of eight Equateurians in a region that is heavily populated by people from Bas-Zaire and Bandundu led to charges of fraud.

Students pose the greatest local political challenge for Mobutu in Kinshasa. University students have struck five times since 1969 over issues such as nonpayment of stipends, increased tuition, housing, transportation, and quality of education. Each time, Mobutu has interpreted this unrest as disguised opposition to his regime, and he has sporadically closed the colleges and universities in Kinshasa. As a result of clashes with the police, students have been injured, arrested, and conscripted into military service. Although most of their complaints persist, students generally have been cowed by Mobutu's repressive tactics.

Prospects

We see little chance of an anti-Mobutu movement developing in Kinshasa in the near term. Although the regime's security establishment fears that disturbances sparked by some incident in Kinshasa could spread throughout Zaire, antigovernment activity in the city this year has been minor. Groups that might be inclined to act against Mobutu are in disarray and unable to mount sustained actions:

- The major insurgent and exile organizations are too weak, fragmented, and far away from Kinshasa to pose a direct threat.
- Dissident politicians are in disgrace, in exile, or under close surveillance. Mobutu has taken extensive precautions to prevent supporters of ex-ministers, tribal leaders, and members of the proscribed second political party from coordinating their activities.
- Workers have no charismatic leaders or independent union that could direct their dissatisfaction against the regime. The rank and file know that employers could easily replace striking workers and that the government can and will suppress demonstrations, according to field analyses. Students operate under similar constraints.

- Military officers are generally unable to develop independent power bases because of Mobutu's skill in juggling their assignments. Mobutu tolerates corruption in the armed forces in part to provide pretexts for him to remove officers without fear of lower level grumbling or retaliation.

- The typical urban dweller or migrant is too busy eking out a living to have time for politics. Academic studies have found that the urban poor, as in most Third World countries, are politically cautious and are rarely directly involved with radical antiregime movements. Many migrants to the city feel that their political roots are back in the rural bush.

- Most Kinshasans fear that rebellion could revive chaos like that in the 1960s and that they would lose what little they have.

Over the longer term, we believe that the economic gulf between the Ville and the Cité is likely to widen. The government, faced with demands from the International Monetary Fund for fiscal austerity, probably will cut back the few social services it now provides. Inflation will continue to ravage low- and middle-income groups, but the elite will probably find the means to maintain their comfortable lifestyle.
Kivu: Isolated, Deteriorating, Resentful

Kivuans view President Mobutu’s regime as sending nothing but tax collectors to the region. Although they resent Kinshasa’s draining of local resources, only a few support the locally based insurgent group that occasionally has been an irritant to the regime. Like all of Zaire’s other regions except Mobutu’s own Equateur, Kivu is underrepresented in the cabinet and senior military positions. Neglect by the central government contributes to Kivu’s economic, social, and political isolation.

The People

Kivu’s 4.8 million people constitute about 17 percent of the population of Zaire. The Nande are the largest tribe in the region, with over 1 million people. Nande tribesmen live mainly in Bukavu, Kivu’s principal city, and in the mountains north of Bukavu along Zaire’s eastern border. They are mostly farmers, whose principal crops are coffee and vegetables.

The Shi are Kivu’s second-largest tribe, numbering about 300,000 people. They live in southern Kivu, one of the most densely populated areas in Africa. The Shi are generally perceived by other Africans as indolent, unambitious, and secretive. Government administrators try to rule the highly structured Shi society through traditional chiefs, but the Shi stoutly resist any external authority.

The Lega dominate the hilly rain forest of Maniema (western Kivu), one of Zaire’s most primitive areas. The Lega and their neighbors, the Wazimbis, apparently still practice cannibalism.

The Bembe, who are closely related to the Lega, inhabit the northwestern shore of Lake Tanganyika. They have been stereotyped by their neighbors as independent, contentious rebels. What outsiders would regard as a heated argument is for the Bembe a measured discussion. They are more democratic than most African tribes and keenly resent Mobutu’s authoritarian rule. The Bembe supported the rebellion led by Pierre Mulele in the southern and eastern provinces in 1964 and the insurgency conducted by the leftist Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP) in the eastern regions in the 1970s.

Zaire’s only Muslim community, the Tetela-Kusu tribe, is centered in western Kivu. Arab and Zanzibari merchants, seeking slaves and ivory, converted the local populace to Islam in the mid-19th century. Belgium delegated administrative responsibilities to the Tetela-Kusu, broadening their exposure to Western education and a money economy. Because it is a minority that spreads across three regions, the group tends to identify with national rather than regionally oriented politics.

Refugees

Refugees from neighboring Rwanda and Burundi are a constant source of ethnic friction in Kivu. Some 1 million refugees—mostly Hutu and Tutsis—have acquired wealth and influence at the expense of other local tribes. They believe they deserve to be treated as well as other residents of Zaire. The refugees’ position is insecure, however, because the regime and Kivuans believe the outsiders want to split off part of Kivu from Zaire. Mobutu avoided a possible confrontation by permitting the group to vote in national elections last year.

Zaire’s relatively open-border policy will continue to pose problems for Kivu. The internecine rivalry of the Hutus and Tutsis could lead to bloodshed in Zaire like that which has ravaged Rwanda and Burundi. The aristocratic Tutsis dominate local businesses, to the irritation of other Kivuans—particularly the Hutus, Shi, and Nande. Refugees from Uganda could also add to ethnic restiveness.
Population Distribution and Tribes in Zaire's Kivu Region

Map showing the population distribution and tribes in Zaire's Kivu Region. The map includes a legend indicating population density with symbols for region boundary, subregion boundary, and selected tribes. The map covers areas such as Haut-Zaïre, Nord-Kivu, and Sud-Kivu, with cities and regions marked.

Legend:
- Region boundary
- Region capital
- Kivu subregion boundary
- Kivu subregion capital
- Major road
- Railroad

Secret

52
Instability in any of Kivu’s four neighbors—Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda—would strain Kivu’s already limited ability to assimilate refugees into its tattered socioeconomic system. Disturbances across the border could also shut off trade channels and increase the costs of imports.

Quality of Life

As elsewhere in Zaire, Kivu’s public health picture is grim. Government-run hospitals are barely able to provide care for even the simplest illnesses and injuries, and missions and private firms take up only part of the slack. Shortages of medical supplies—even bandages—are common. The region occasionally has epidemics of malaria, cholera, measles, polio, and plague. Kivu has the world’s highest rate of bilharzia (schistosomiasis), a parasitic disease. Tuberculosis, leprosy, malnutrition, and venereal disease are also increasing. Nearly 70 percent of the population suffer from intestinal parasites. The infant mortality rate is 25 percent.

Kivu’s educational system has improved since the government stopped interfering with the administration of parochial schools in the late 1970s. Although unpaid salaries and shortages of supplies are constant irritants in parochial and state-run schools, literacy has increased. Bukavu is the educational center of eastern Zaire, hosting three institutes of higher learning, including the country’s best teacher-training center.

The parochial schools emphasize liberal arts to the exclusion of vocational training, creating a large number of unemployed, dissatisfied graduates with few practical skills. In 1979-81, Kivuan teachers struck to obtain back pay, but students counterdemonstrated to demand their right to an education.

The prisons in Kivu are deteriorating, according to international human rights groups. Amnesty International and the Red Cross in 1981 reported instances of beating and torture. Conditions declined further last year because of insufficient supplies and funds. Malnutrition and illness are common. Most inmates would starve if their families failed to deliver food.

Economic Decline

Industry

Nationalization in 1973 of companies owned by expatriates enriched African businessmen but disrupted the economy of Kivu. Most of Kivu’s important firms have been returned to expatriates, but economic recovery has been slow. Imports are generally available only through black-market channels at exorbitant prices.

The region’s principal private employer is the Mining and Industrial Company of Kivu (SOMINKI), which is domestically owned. The firm is the second-largest producer of gold in the country; it also produces 80 percent of the country’s tin. Mineral production has been declining because of shortages of diesel oil and spare parts, exhaustion of deposits, falling worker productivity, and personnel reductions, as well as low world prices.

SOMINKI has supplanted the government as the provider of social services in parts of the region, according to the US Embassy. The firm maintains 2,000 kilometers of roads; funds a $500,000 rice project; and provides health care, housing, and imported foods to its 15,000 employees. SOMINKI uses part of its foreign exchange earnings to purchase gasoline, equipment, and spare parts for the government and other businesses. The government rarely repays SOMINKI for this service.

Agriculture

Agricultural production has declined in Kivu since independence largely because Kivuans scrapped the efficient, albeit authoritarian, Belgian system of large plantations and, with it, the maintenance of roads. This change, along with the political unrest of the 1960s,* led to agricultural collapse.

*Ex-Katangan gendarmes and white mercenaries attacked Bukavu in July 1967 because of the government’s diversion of military paychecks and its general maladministration. Although troops put down the rebellion after three months, it permanently damaged the region’s economic infrastructure.
Kivu's few cash crops tend to be cultivated for foreign-owned exporting firms. Private farmers cannot survive the fluctuations in world demand for their products and of foreign exchange needed to import equipment. Transportation difficulties discourage crop rotation and production for more than local markets. Low domestic prices induce farmers to turn to more lucrative gold smuggling or to resort to subsistence farming, the region's main agricultural activity.

Northern Kivu continues to be an important coffee-growing region, but smuggling and underinvoicing of exports deprive the Bank of Zaire of potential foreign exchange earnings from coffee sales. Moreover, coffee growers use the legal market only to qualify for import licenses. The black market is much more profitable because of high export taxes, foreign exchange controls, and red tape.

Production of quinine is also profitable when world market conditions are favorable. Kivuans cultivate quinine for Pharmakina, a West German firm based in Bukavu. Overreliance on quinine sales, however, has left the local economy ill prepared for market downturns. Moreover, excessive cultivation of quinine has exhausted the soil, which otherwise could be used for growing food. This has led to a protein deficiency disease among children in the area.*

Kivu is also the world's largest producer of papain, a papaya extract that is used in meat tenderizers and pharmaceuticals. A Belgian-owned firm produces 100 tons per year, over half of the world consumption.

Potential for Tourism
Kivu could become a tourist attraction if the region's transportation, security, and health problems could be solved. The region includes three of Africa's most scenic lakes and the Ruwenzori Mountains—"the Mountains of the Moon"—which reach 4,900 meters. From the Kivu shore of Lake Tanganyika, one can reach Ujiji, the site of the 1871 meeting between Stanley and Livingstone. The region's national parks boast the world's largest population (500) of wild gorillas.

*Students have been increasingly debilitated by insufficient diet; one source reports instances of children fainting from semistarvation. The present generation is generally shorter than its parents.

Kivu's deteriorating road system has prevented the development of tourism. Drivers can average only about 30 kilometers per hour on the few existing roads. Tires generally wear out after 3,000 kilometers.

Politics
Kivuans generally feel ambivalent toward the regime, according to US diplomatic observers. They credit Mobutu with rescuing them from the terrorism of the Simba rebellion of 1964 yet recognize that many of their hardships result from Kinshasa's neglect, particularly its failure to provide the region with basic services. Many Kivuans resolve this seeming contradiction by blaming Mobutu's advisers, none of whom come from Kivu.

The government remains wary of the activities of the small People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), but we believe that the threat posed by the insurgents has diminished. Although the PRP gained press in 1975 by kidnapping American students, the government's counterinsurgency campaign in the early 1980s reduced the activities of the 200- to 300-member group to banditry and the smuggling of gold into Burundi. Despite fears of government duplicity, at least 400 former PRP rebels accepted the government's offer of amnesty and resettlement in Kivu last year. The government is likely to try to discredit the rebels further by publicizing a PRP attack on a remote village early this year. Such attacks, however, are rare. Local support for the insurgents is very limited because Kivuans do not relish a return to the violence of the 1960s.

The Zairian Armed Forces are ill prepared to combat a threat more serious than that currently posed by the PRP. The Navy's six patrol boats on Lake Tanganyika frequently break down. The Army's Kivu-based 13th Brigade lacks fuel, ammunition, rations, uniforms, and equipment. The sad state of the local roads also limits the brigade's ability to respond when needed. Civil-military relations are poor because underpaid troops and gendarmes prey on civilians.
Prominent Personalities in Kivu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Itambo Mukina</td>
<td>Commander, Second Military Region</td>
<td>Warega</td>
<td>Pro-West; corrupt; dabbles in local politics—rare for a military officer;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wa Kambala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ally of Ambassador to Belgium Bomboko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiemba Wa Lumona</td>
<td>Leading Protestant pastor</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Served as governor of Kasai-Occidental, where he was disappointed with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kinshasa's treatment of his region and was unhappy with tight controls im-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>posed on him by the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisanga Kabongelo</td>
<td>First Parliamentary Secretary</td>
<td>Warega</td>
<td>Former professor; in legislative leadership to maintain tribal balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kititwa Tumansi Benga</td>
<td>Governor of Equateur</td>
<td>Warega</td>
<td>Former head of several ministries; Mobutu loyalist; experienced diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nundu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukuku W’Etonda</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Posts, Telephone, and</td>
<td>Bembe</td>
<td>Political ally of Bemba Saolona, prominent Equatorian businessman who is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telegraph</td>
<td></td>
<td>a confidant of Mobutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwando Nsimba</td>
<td>Governor of Kivu</td>
<td>Tabwa</td>
<td>Pro-West; noncontroversial; has some local political following; former</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>personnel director of GECAMINES; from Shaba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay Pay Wa Syakasighe</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Economics, Industry,</td>
<td>Nande</td>
<td>Prosperous businessman, in pharmaceuticals; protege of Bisengimana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and External Commerce</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rwema, former Director of Presidential Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outlook

We believe that the feeble attempts of Kivuans to spur economic growth will continue to be plagued by the systemic weaknesses common to all of Zaire's regions: limited local authority, unqualified personnel, financial mismanagement, lack of infrastructure, and fluctuating markets. Carpetbagging bureaucrats, insensitive to local problems, will continue to line their own pockets at the expense of the people of the region. For its part, Kinshasa probably will do little to reverse these trends.
Kivu Factsheet

Vital Statistics

Area: 259,117 square kilometers
Life expectancy (years): 1956—34.7, 1975—44.3
Rural population (percent): 1975—86.9, highest of any region
Principal city: Bukavu
  Population: 1975—146,504
Principal tribes: Nande, Shi, Lega, Bemba, Nyarwanda, Tetela-Kusu

Economics

Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product, 1979: 14.1 percent
Principal crops: cotton, rice, coffee, tea, plantains, bananas, cassava, corn, papain, quinine
Principal industries: breweries, port, tourism
Leading minerals: tin, gold, wolframite, tungsten, methane gas

Administration

Governor: Mwando Nsimba (from Shaba)
Administrative capital: Bukavu
  Area: 60 square kilometers

Nord-Kivu subregion

Area: 60,470 square kilometers
Population: 1970—1,473,380
Capital: Goma
Administrative zones: Goma, Beni, Lubero, Rutshuru, Masisi, Walikale

Sud-Kivu subregion

Area: 66,337 square kilometers
Population: 1970—1,130,676
Capital: Uvira
Administrative zones: Kabare, Kalehe, Shabunda, Uvira, Mwenga, Fizi, Walungu, Bugarura

Maniema subregion

Area: 132,250 square kilometers
Population: 1970—622,966
Capital: Kindu
Administrative zones: Kindu, Lubutu, Punia, Pangi, Kibombo, Kasongo, Kabambare
Shaba: Source of Wealth and Political Unrest

Shaba Region is simultaneously the source of Zaire's wealth and the cause of many of President Mobutu's problems. Shaba's wealth derives from copper and cobalt mines that are the principal sources of the country's foreign exchange. The problems stem from the longstanding resentment of the local population over what is viewed as Kinshasa's plunder of Shaba's resources.

Mobutu needed foreign troops to turn back invasions of Shaba in 1977 and 1978 by ex-Katangan gendarmes who received at least tacit support from much of the local population. Even today, a substantial number of Shabans probably would prefer an independent Shaban state to rule by Kinshasa.

Former gendarmes in exile in Angola and Zambia have been trying for years to develop a capability to mount a third invasion of Shaba, but we doubt that they will be able to conduct anything more than sporadic guerrilla attacks. Even limited military attacks could be too much for the ineffectual Zairian Army to contain, however, and could wreak havoc with the mining industry.

Major Tribes

The 2 million Baluba constitute Shaba's largest tribe. They are split geographically and politically from the Baluba in the Kasais, most of whom moved west centuries ago during a precolonial Luba Kingdom. Shaban Baluba still regard the Baluba who fled from Kasai to Shaba during the Luluwa uprising in 1959-60 as intruders.

The 400,000 Lundas are Shaba's second-largest tribe. Lundas led the Katangan secessionist effort in the 1960s, and Mobutu regards the tribe as a continuing political and security threat. There are also large numbers of Lundas in Zambia and Angola. The ex-Katangan gendarmes who invaded Shaba in 1977 and 1978 were also mainly Lundas, and they mounted their attacks on both occasions through Lunda territory in Shaba. Shaban Lundas chafe at the lack of significant development assistance from Kinshasa and their lack of representation in the national Cabinet.

The small Bayeke tribe has traditionally enjoyed some importance in southeastern Shaba. The Yeke Kingdom was founded in the 19th century by warrior-traders from Tanzania. The group longs for a return to autonomy from the central government under its own monarch. Its chief served as the minister of interior in the independent Katangan regime of 1960-63.

Social and Economic Conditions

Despite the region's mineral wealth, most Shabans suffer the same abysmal living conditions as the people of other regions. Urban residents face high unemployment, rising prices, inadequate wages, and shortages of food and fuel. Medicines and trained medical personnel are in short supply even in the cities, and a cholera epidemic has raged since last year.

Kinshasa has done little to alleviate Shaba's miseries. Such social services as exist are provided by the General Quarries and Mines Company (GECAMINES), the largest firm in Zaire. GECAMINES has its own interest in maintaining a stable, reliable, and well-fed work force.

Shabans are disgruntled because earnings from their region are siphoned off to pay for consumer luxuries.

a GECAMINES was created in 1967 when the government nationalized the Belgian-owned Union Minière du Haut Katanga. GECAMINES lost its monopoly over copper and cobalt production when Kinshasa permitted other firms to enter the industry in 1972, but it still dominates the economy of the region.
and prestige projects for the Zairian elite in Kinshasa. They also complain that bureaucrats and gendarmes from other regions frequently take advantage of Shabans.

A lack of economic opportunities for the local population is a major source of discontent. Unemployed university graduates have pressed for senior management positions in industry for years, but expatriates continue to resist on the grounds that this would damage productivity and drive out essential European technicians.

Minining

Mining in Shaba still provides most of Zaire's foreign exchange earnings, despite the decline over the past few years in world demand for copper and cobalt. Minerals sales in 1979 topped $1 billion. GECAMINES's share alone provides half of Zaire's foreign exchange and about 30 percent of the government's revenues.

The Kolwezi area produces 75 percent of Zaire's copper, 90 percent of its cobalt, and all of its zinc. Shaba's copper production is down from its peak in 1972-73 but still accounts for about 10 percent of production in non-Communist states. Shaba is the world's major source of cobalt and accounts for over 55 percent of the output of the non-Communist world.

GECAMINES has been unable to realize its potential earnings because of corruption and interference by Kinshasa. Mobutu appears to have diverted $100 million worth of cobalt in 1980 and again in 1981.

Managers of SOZACOM, the parastatal minerals marketing company, have also siphoned off GECAMINES's earnings.

For political reasons, Kinshasa forced GECAMINES to mill and distribute 140,000 tons of corn to Shabans between 1974 and 1982. This nonproductive use of GECAMINES's resources deprived the government of tax revenues and foreign exchange.

The International Monetary Fund and Western lenders have demanded that Kinshasa reduce its meddling in the management of GECAMINES. Kinshasa has responded by redefining the GECAMINES-SOZACOM relationship. GECAMINES now holds title to its production until point of sale and has direct access to a greater percentage of its earnings, with the balance going to the Bank of Zaire. Kinshasa has also replaced several senior managers and instituted new accounting methods. GECAMINES will also cut back its food distribution programs.

Smaller mining firms in Shaba have also fallen on hard times because of falling world demand. Japanese businessmen recently decided to sell to Kinshasa their interest in SODIMIZA, a copper mining company which has become unprofitable. The foreign-backed Societe Miniere de Tenke-Fungurume decided not to exploit the world's largest unworked copper deposit pending an increase in demand.

Transportation

Transportation problems limit Shaba's ability to export its products and to import food. The rail lines through Angola and Mozambique are frequently sabotaged by South African-supported insurgents, and the line from Zambia to Dar es Salaam is inefficient and in ill repair. Shabas thus must depend mainly on the southern route through Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa and secondarily on Zaire's own decrepit Voie Nationale, a combined rail and river-barge network from Lubumbashi to Matadi.

Energy

A chronic shortage of petroleum hampers transportation and impedes all aspects of Shaban economic activity. Many firms operate with less than one week's reserves and face a mounting debt to suppliers. To the delight of black-marketeers, the government's rationing policies have virtually eliminated fuel allocations for private automobiles.
Shaban industries have barely tapped the electric power lines that extend 1,000 miles from the Inga dam in Bas-Zaïre to the copper belt of Shaba. GECAMINES's management believes power from the Inga-Shaba project is too expensive. As an alternative, GECAMINES may rejuvenate hydroelectric generators in Shaba or import energy from Zambia.

There are potential pitfalls in Mandungu's strategy. Many of the chiefs on whom he is relying were appointed by previous civil authorities and have little support within their tribes. Many are also semiliterate and unsophisticated.

Agriculture
Shaba, which even normally has to import food because of its poor soils, is facing a food crisis this year. Local production is down, and imports have dropped primarily because of drought in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The US Embassy estimates that local production of food, mainly corn, will yield only 67,000 of the required 160,000 tons. Shaba's yield from its southern fields has plummeted from 25,000 to 15,000 tons because heavy rains washed away seedlings. Much of an expected bumper crop of northern Shaban corn probably will be diverted to the Kasai regions, where prices are higher. Smuggling of corn from Zambia will ease some of the shortfall but will further drive up prices. The price of corn already has increased eight times since last year and has forced villagers to replace less nutritious manioc or to go hungry.

Opposition Groups
Most political figures with roots in Shaba are active opponents of the Mobutu regime. They can be grouped into two categories: dissidents, most of whom are in exile, and insurgents.

Dissidents. The most prominent critic is former Prime Minister Ngoua Karl-i-Bond, a Lunda who has lived in Belgium under self-imposed exile since 1981. Ngoua has gained international notoriety as the spokesman for a loose coalition of anti-Mobutu dissidents based in Brussels. He has been unable, however, to mend fences with many Shaban Lundas who have not forgiven him for being so closely identified with the Mobutu government in the 1970s. Mobutu has undercut other potential Shaban support for Ngoua by including in his cabinet several pliable representatives of the major Shaban tribes.

Insurgents. Lundas are the main ethnic group in Zaire's principal insurgent group, the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), which consists of 1,000 to 2,000 troops in Zambia and 5,000 to 6,000 troops in Angola. The FLNC espouses vaguely socialist ideals, seeks independence or autonomy for Shaba, and wants to unseat Mobutu. Its most recent president was Jean Tshombe, a relative of Moise Tshombe, the leader of the Katangan secession. Jean recently returned from exile, but he is generally regarded as a political lightweight.

Key Political Actors

The Governor
Shaba's Governor, Mandungu Bula Nyati, is Zaïre's most prominent regional administrator, but in Shaba he is regarded as an outsider because he comes from Bandundu. Mobutu recognizes Mandungu's talents and has spared him from the frequent shufflings to which other regional governors have been subjected. Mobutu has often assigned him to represent Kinshasa in talks with Shaba's neighbors on how to deal with Shaban dissidents, refugees, and insurgents.

Mandungu has been working with churches, businessmen, and traditional village leaders to improve social and economic conditions. He hopes to encourage agricultural production by returning some power—but also responsibility—to traditional chiefs.
**Prominent Personalities in Shaba**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laurent Kabila</td>
<td>President, People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) Central Committee</td>
<td>Baluba-Lolo</td>
<td>The PRP is composed primarily of Babembe tribesmen based in Burundi and Tanzania. The group is small, weak, and disorganized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalume Mwana Kahambwe</td>
<td>Second Vice President, Legislative Council</td>
<td>Baluba</td>
<td>Spokesman of Baluba legislators; conciliator; patient negotiator; has ambasadorial experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilolo Musampa Lubeba</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Civil Service</td>
<td>Baluba</td>
<td>In cabinet for tribal balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandungu Bula Nyati</td>
<td>Governor of Shaba</td>
<td>Mosengele-Monunu</td>
<td>Mobutu loyalist from Bandundu; studied in USSR; former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Information, and Public Works and former Governor of Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munongo Mwendi M'Siri</td>
<td>Former State Commissioner for Territorial Administration</td>
<td>Bayeke</td>
<td>Grand chief of Bayeke; President of Zairian-Italian Oil Refining Company; was Minister of Interior for secessionist Katangan regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monga Numbi</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, FLNC</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Appears to command the allegiance of most FLNC members; oversees all aspects of FLNC activity; handles FLNC relations with Soviets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwando Nsimba</td>
<td>Governor of Kivu</td>
<td>Tabwa</td>
<td>Pro-West; competent; honest; hard-working but not forceful or controversial; former personnel director of GECAMINES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nguza Karl-i-Bond</td>
<td>Leader of anti-Mobutu opposition group based in Brussels</td>
<td>Lunda</td>
<td>Former Prime Minister; pro-West; skilled negotiator; Shabans see him as a Kinshasan; sentenced to death in 1977 but pardoned in 1978; went into self-imposed exile in Belgium in 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyembo Shabani</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Agriculture</td>
<td>Baluba</td>
<td>Former Minister of National Economy, Industry, External Commerce, and Investments; respected among intellectuals; competent bureaucrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampasa Kaweta Milombe</td>
<td>State Commissioner for JMPR, Sports, and Leisure</td>
<td>Lunda</td>
<td>Shrewd political operator; leader of youth wing of Zaire's only political party for 10 years; supported a unified Zairian state during Katangan rebellion; former Minister of Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umba Kyamitalu</td>
<td>State Commissioner for Mines and Energy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Former chief of GECAMINES; currently trying to undercut anticorruption moves of present GECAMINES chief Robert Crem; tribalist; educated at the University of Missouri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The youth wing of the Popular Movement for the Revolution.
The FLNC's invasions of Shaba in 1977 and 1978 failed only after the regime was bailed out by Belgian, French, and African troops. The FLNC continues to infiltrate and recruit in the region, but it is not yet ready for another invasion. Like the Zairian Army, the FLNC is plagued by factional divisions, shortages of money and equipment, and problems with morale.

The Popular Revolutionary Party, a 200- to 300-member group composed principally of members of the small Babembe tribe from eastern Shaba and Kivu, is the only insurgent organization that has conducted guerrilla operations inside Zaire since 1978. The group's ability to make trouble for the regime is limited by its lack of supplies, equipment, and popular support. Many of its members occupy themselves with smuggling across the border with Burundi.

Outlook

Most Shabans abhor Mobutu and are completely estranged from the central government in Kinshasa, but are unlikely to join the FLNC or any other insurgent group because of the rebels' poor track record and because of fear of government reprisals. Although many FLNC guerrillas are growing restive with their continuing inactivity, we do not foresee a major attack any time soon.

The FLNC lacks the weapons, organization, and logistic capabilities to sustain another campaign into Shaba. Its troops are poorly led and are splintered by ideological and ethnic disputes. Many rebels have deserted because food, clothing, and funds are scarce. The Soviets and Libyans have promised military assistance but delivered little.

In view of these apparent weaknesses, we believe that in the near term the rebels will limit their attacks—if any—to sabotage and hit-and-run operations—probably against Shaba's mining facilities. Such actions could damage Zaire's fragile economy by driving out many of the 20,000 expatriates who still play key managerial roles.

The Zairian Army would have difficulty defending Shaba even against such limited attacks, according to US military attaches in Zaire. Government troops in Shaba, the Kamanyola Division and the 21st Infantry Brigade, are ill trained, ill equipped, and undisciplined.

We doubt that the recent Israeli training and reorganization of the Kamanyola Division will alleviate such difficulties any time soon.

Endemic corruption by senior commanders adversely affects morale and readiness. Soldiers supplement their meager pay—part of which is frequently skimmed by officers—by extorting from villagers and travelers. The military’s disdain for Shabans leads to a false complacency in the Army's assessment of public animosity toward itself and of the potential for popular support for the insurgents.

The economy of Shaba will continue to be plagued by problems beyond Zaire's ability to control:
- The costs of imports, particularly of raw materials and spare parts, will continue to rise.
- The nationwide liquidity and credit crunch will worsen in the next round of IMF-imposed belt tightening.

Shaba also faces unrest in the mines that could seriously damage the economy. The Army earlier this year arrested workers who threatened strikes and industrial sabotage if GECAMINES's management continued to favor Baluba tribesmen from Kasai in filling senior positions.

Workers may again shut down SODIMIZA, as they did last November, to protest rising prices for corn.

Unrest in Shaba would have a limited impact in the West. Most industrial countries could easily absorb disruptions in cobalt production for a year. The supply cushion would probably extend for several years because of the existing market glut, the ease of changing suppliers, and unused mine capacity outside Zaire. The West could also conserve, recycle, and substitute for cobalt over the longer run. Although roughly half of US cobalt imports come from Zaire, the United States could do without Shaban cobalt for several years.
Shaba Factsheet

Vital Statistics
- **Area**: 496,730 square kilometers; approximately the size of Spain
- **Life expectancy (years)**: 1956—42.4, 1975—50.0, highest of any region in Zaire
- **Rural population (percent)**: 1975—54.0, lowest of any region
- **Principal city**: Lubumbashi
  - **Population**: 1975—480,875
- **Principal tribes**: Baluba, Bayeke, Lunda, Babemba

Economics
- **Regional contribution to gross domestic agricultural product**, 1979: 10.2 percent
- **Principal crops**: cotton, coffee, tobacco, rice, livestock
- **Principal industries**: oil, soap, textile, and cigarette factories; corn, manioc, wheat and flour mills; fisheries
- **Leading minerals**: copper, cobalt, platinum, gold, tin, uranium, zinc, manganese, silver

Administration
- **Governor**: Mandungu Bula Nyati (from Bandundu)
- **Administrative capital**: Lubumbashi
  - **Area**: 747 square kilometers
  - **Population**: 1970—318,000

**Tanganika subregion**
- **Area**: 135,028 square kilometers
- **Population**: 1970—696,363
- **Capital**: Kalemie
- **Administrative zones**: Kalemie, Kongolo, Kabalo, Nyunzu, Manono, Moba

**Haut-Lomani subregion**
- **Area**: 108,204 square kilometers
- **Population**: 1970—602,368
- **Capital**: Kamina
- **Administrative zones**: Kamina, Kabongo, Malemba-Nkulu, Kaniama, Bukama

**Haut-Shaba subregion**
- **Area**: 131,443 square kilometers
- **Population**: 1970—394,316
- **Capital**: Kipushi
- **Administrative zones**: Kipushi, Pweto, Mitwaba, Kasenga, Kambove, Sakania

**Lualaba subregion**
- **Area**: 121,308 square kilometers
- **Population**: 1970—596,273
- **Capital**: Dilolo
- **Administrative zones**: Mutshatsha, Kapanga, Sandoa, Dilolo, Lubudi
Secret