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# Dealing With South Africa in the Next Decade



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An Intelligence Assessment

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ALA 83-10191X  
December 1983

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# Dealing With South Africa in the Next Decade





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**An Intelligence Assessment**

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This paper was prepared by  Office  
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## Dealing With South Africa in the Next Decade

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### Key Judgments

*Information available  
as of 15 November 1983  
was used in this report.*

The struggle to maintain white rule in South Africa ensures, in our view, that Pretoria will follow domestic and foreign policies that are frequently at odds with US interests in the region. Consequently, the United States will be confronted over the next decade with a persistent dilemma: how to influence the behavior of this determined, self-reliant state without becoming identified with those actions that the US opposes but is unable to prevent.

### South Africa in the Next 10 Years

Demographic trends have outpaced the government's efforts to divide and co-opt segments of the black African majority. Despite a vigorous resettlement program that since 1948 has sent millions of blacks to the tribally based homelands, blacks comprise a growing majority in the government-declared "white areas." Furthermore, we expect the black labor force to continue to grow faster than the economy's ability to employ blacks. Although greater than expected economic growth could permit living conditions for blacks to continue to improve without affecting the well-being of whites, redressing fundamental racially based inequities in South Africa would mean a sharp drop in the standard of living of South African whites, a sacrifice we believe they would not make as long as they hold power.

The basic structure of white supremacy in South Africa has changed remarkably little since the 19th century, despite its elevation from practical policy to high ideology. The apartheid system is administered through a mass of legislation—perhaps as many as 2,000 laws and regulations—that governs race relations from the bedroom to the workplace.

Since the Afrikaner-dominated National Party took power in 1948, the dynamics of maintaining white rule have caused a steady growth of the absolute power of the state as well as the centralization of power within the government. P. W. Botha, who became Prime Minister in 1978 after serving as Minister of Defense for 14 years, has created a new policymaking apparatus in which military personnel predominate. The old centers of power—the parliamentary and party caucuses and the state bureaucracy—appear to have given way to a new generation of pragmatic "security technocrats" who have modernized racial domination. Moreover, harsh methods of control have been replaced by more sophisticated techniques of riot control, subtler employment of police and military power, and a greater tolerance for semipolitical activity by nonwhites—as long as it remains a safety valve for dissent.

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The government's strategy of reform has sought to co-opt Coloreds, Indians, homeland leaders, and a limited number of urban blacks into a nonwhite middle class that would act as a buffer against a black revolution. In November 1983, South African whites approved by a 2-to-1 majority a new constitutional structure designed to give Coloreds and Indians a limited role in the political system through participation with whites in a three-chambered Parliament and multiracial Cabinet. Although the constitutional reform package also provides for a greatly strengthened executive presidency that will help maintain white control, the Afrikaner-dominated National Party split over the general issue of reform in 1982. Because we believe that Botha will try to heal the wounds in the Afrikaner community caused by the debate over the new constitution, it may be some time before the government attempts to deal with the blacks, although some adjustments that are characterized as reform are likely to occur.

South Africa's dealings with black majority regimes along its borders appear to be governed by two general objectives: preventing attacks by anti-South African insurgents and preempting any challenge to its regional hegemony. Over the past few years, South Africa has become bolder and more self-assured and ambitious in its use of coercion to achieve these goals. Pretoria often appears to be trying to force its neighbors into dealing in a less openly hostile manner with South Africa, and Pretoria's support for insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique suggests that Pretoria may be aiming to oust their leftist regimes and return these countries to buffer-state status.

We believe this hawkish regional policy reflects the military's preeminent role in Pretoria and its open fascination with an Israeli-like policy of acting decisively and unilaterally in "doing what must be done." The relative success of their tough policies may be blinding them to the limits of their power and to the capabilities of the USSR to respond on behalf of the targeted black regimes.

#### **Dealing With South Africa**

During the next 10 years, the relationship between the United States and South Africa probably will expand—not to the degree that most South Africans would like, but undoubtedly to a greater extent than many in the United States will be comfortable with. Economic ties between the two countries probably will continue to strengthen, although they are unlikely to become critical to either party. Moreover, continued conflict in southern Africa will create more opportunities for Soviet meddling and make it easier for Pretoria to make common cause with the United States in an anti-Communist campaign. In addition, the fundamental moral and racial issues that underlie internal developments in South Africa will make them of continued high interest to broad segments of American society.

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The success of US policy initiatives in southern Africa, in our judgment, probably will require South African cooperation or, at least, acquiescence, in as much as Pretoria will continue to dominate the region economically and militarily for the next 10 years. Consequently, the United States will find it difficult to avoid being seen by Pretoria's opponents as the handmaiden of South African interests. Moreover, the leadership in Pretoria, in our view, seeks to strengthen the identity of US and South African interests by playing up the Soviet threat and seeking to make common cause with Washington in an anti-Communist campaign. We believe that this dynamic will continue for the next 10 years, making it difficult for Washington to disentangle its interest in opposing Soviet adventurism from Pretoria's interest in maintaining white rule.

Pretoria's determined stance of self-sufficiency will continue, in our view, to leave South Africa relatively unresponsive to US carrots and sticks. We also expect the South Africans will continue to react with ambivalence toward US initiatives to promote regional stability. Washington's interest and engagement in southern African affairs will be welcomed by Pretoria as long overdue acknowledgments of South Africa's importance to the West. But Pretoria's skittishness about the reliability of Western commitments—many white South Africans believed they were abandoned by the United States when it did not support South Africa's intervention in the Angolan civil war—will reinforce its avowed self-reliance and resistance to infringement on its freedom of action in domestic and regional affairs.

Pressure from outsiders often seems to drive South Africans deeper into their psychological *laager*—the circle of wagons formed by Afrikaner settlers under attack by African warriors—and makes them defensive and incapable of acknowledging error or of compromising. The South Africans resist even the appearance of being pushed around, perhaps from a deep-seated fear of the impact that it might have on South African blacks. Thus, negotiations with the South Africans will continue to be facilitated if allowances are made for their apparent need to save face.

In view of the fairly limited leverage the United States has and will probably continue to have over Pretoria, the application of carrots and sticks will be most effective, in our judgment, if it is done consistently: that is, South Africa's cooperation is rewarded case by case and its recalcitrance punished case by case. Our monitoring of South African attitudes toward Western governments in general makes it plain that Pretoria perceives it as weakness and vacillation if day-to-day dealings remain on a business-as-usual basis after South Africa has been unresponsive to a high-level demarche on a particular issue.

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Pretoria's dominant role in the region and its strong economic links to the West make it easy for Pretoria's opponents to believe that the United States is backing Pretoria against the interests of black South Africans and black Africa as a whole. Although the United States probably can never completely escape being tarred by its relations with South Africa, US firmness and consistency in dealing with Pretoria could, in our judgment, mitigate considerably the negative consequences since antiapartheid critics could at least correlate warming trends in US-South African bilateral relations with "improvements" in South African behavior.



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## Dealing With South Africa in the Next Decade

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### Introduction

Over the next 10 years, we expect increasing tension and policy clashes in the relationship between South Africa and the United States. The struggle to maintain white rule in South Africa ensures, in our view, that Pretoria will follow domestic and foreign policies that are frequently at odds with US interests in the region. Consequently, US policymakers will be confronted with a persistent dilemma: how to influence the behavior of a determined, self-reliant state without becoming identified with those actions that the US opposes but is unable to prevent.

This assessment is divided into two parts. Part one examines the probable course of South Africa's political system and regional relations during the next decade. The second part considers the probable evolution of US-South African relations over the next 10 years, assesses South African perceptions of these relations, and suggests a number of considerations to be held in mind when dealing with Pretoria.

### Part I: South Africa in the Next 10 Years

#### The Setting

**Demographic Trends and the "Black Problem."** For the next decade, the growth in the relative size of the black population and in black urbanization will make it increasingly difficult for the white minority regime to retain control. The black population—already 73.5 percent of the total—is growing rapidly while the birth rates of all other population groups have dropped sharply. The whites' struggle to maintain power in the face of increasingly adverse racial ratios is complicated further by their own limitations. Even now, the segment of the white population able to run the government, private enterprise, and other key South African institutions is remarkably small. Only 2 percent of the whites were university graduates in 1970, compared with 17 percent in the United States in 1980.

### Population Trends

Millions/percent

	Mid-1983		Project for 2000	
	Million	Percent	Million	Percent
Blacks	22.7	73.5	34.5	76.9
Whites	4.7	15.2	5.8	12.9
Coloreds (mixed race)	2.7	8.7	3.5	7.8
Indians	0.8	2.6	1.1	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>44.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: US Census Bureau, 1982.

Pretoria has tried to cope with the burgeoning black population by relocating blacks into the 10 tribally based homelands that South Africa has created out of 13 percent of its territory. This vigorous resettlement program—since 1948 some 2.3 to 3.5 million blacks have been removed from the "white areas" and sent to the homelands—has succeeded in retarding the process of black urbanization: between 1960 and 1980, the proportion of blacks living in the homelands increased from 40 to 50 percent. Nevertheless, 9 million blacks now comprise 57 percent of the urban population and we expect their number to continue expanding, even in the face of the government "influx control" program, at a minimum rate of 4 percent annually at least until the year 2000. Thus, even if a tacit alliance between whites, Coloreds and Indians should be formed, blacks will still outnumber non-blacks in the "white" urban areas by almost 2 to 1 in 1990, a decisive failure for the "white homeland" envisioned by apartheid theory.

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**The Limitations of Economic Growth.** South Africa's gross domestic product is only about a third as large as Canada's even though their populations are roughly equal. South Africa's 4.7 million whites, however, enjoy one of the highest living standards in the world while most of the 26.2 million nonwhites lead lives of grinding poverty. Roughly half of the 22.7 million blacks engage in traditional agricultural practices in rural homelands where conditions are similar to those in the poorest African countries. Most of the other blacks, along with most of the 3.5 million Asians and Coloreds, provide cheap labor for the modern economy. Government census statistics on occupational categories indicate that the percentage of blacks earning a respectable middle-class living is extremely small, probably no more than 4 to 5 percent of the black population. [redacted]

Living conditions for many South African blacks, nonetheless, improved significantly during the 1970s. These improvements reflected an economic expansion—fueled by a dramatic rise in the price of gold—that averaged almost 4 percent annually, the related growth in the size of the black urban population, and government's efforts to improve conditions for urban blacks as part of its policy of building a nonwhite middle class. Black employment in mining, manufacturing, and other sectors of the modern economy grew by 25 percent to 2.8 million workers between 1970 and 1981.<sup>1</sup> Real wages for blacks in these jobs grew significantly faster than for whites, and the whites' share of the national income dropped from 70 to 59 percent during the period. [redacted]

Relative progress by blacks during the period of 1970-81 has led many observers, as well as government reformers, to argue that economic growth in South Africa would make it possible to reduce significantly racial inequities without affecting the well-being of whites. Advocates of economically induced reform believed that economic growth not only stimulated reform—by increasing nonwhite participation in the modern sector because there were not enough whites to meet the demand for skilled labor—but made reform relatively painless, by permitting reallocation

<sup>1</sup> Approximately 4.5 million black workers, however, were unemployed or working as subsistence farmers in the homelands, employees on white-owned farms, domestic servants and part-time workers holding odd jobs. [redacted]

of government spending to meet black needs without requiring sacrifices by the white population. The economic recession that started in 1981 and the prospect of stagnant economic performance during the remainder of the 1980s have reduced prospects that black living conditions would continue to improve during the next decade as they did for the past decade. [redacted]

Even the economic expansion of the 1970s, however, did not provide many answers to South Africa's "black problem." The spread between the average annual current income of whites and that of blacks grew from \$3,881 in 1970 to \$9,500 in 1981. This gap in absolute incomes probably will continue to widen even if the ratio of white to black incomes falls because of higher annual proportional increases in black wages. Moreover, since we estimate South African whites still control 94 percent of the country's capital assets, the bulk of any gains from restored economic growth probably will continue to flow to whites. [redacted]

Moreover, we believe—based on recent Embassy reporting and our own analysis—that approximately 30 percent of South Africa's black workers are unemployed. Even if the mineral-based economy were to grow at a rate of 5 percent annually between now and the year 2000—considerably faster than we expect—black unemployment would rise to at least 35 percent because of the high rate of black population growth. More violence can be expected in South Africa as unemployment increases among black males in the 15-to-24 age group whose ranks are expanding at the rate of 3 percent annually. Dissidents from this group largely sustained the months of rioting that began in Soweto in June 1976, and they probably have provided the bulk of recruits for anti-South African black nationalist groups. [redacted]

Massive sacrifices by the white population would be required to reduce racial inequities significantly. A government-commissioned study published in 1981 found that because of the vast disparities between the white and nonwhite educational systems, Pretoria

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would need to earmark \$5.5 billion annually—more than 5 percent of its GNP—for an indefinite period to bring the nonwhite systems up to par with the white system. This is more than 11 times greater than the \$476 million budgeted for nonwhite education in 1982, which already represented a major increase in government spending. [redacted]

Likewise, clearing up the current housing shortage—estimated by a South African research organization to be about 600,000 units—and building the 150,000 to 200,000 units needed annually to keep up with black population growth would require an annual capital outlay of about \$1.3 billion for construction alone, almost half of what South Africa now spends for defense. Expenditures of these magnitudes for housing and education alone would mean a sharp drop in the standard of living of South Africa's whites, a sacrifice we believe they would not make as long as they hold power. [redacted]

#### How the System Works

**Survival Politics.** Despite repeated predictions of their inevitable demise, time does not appear to be running out for South Africa's whites, at least in the next 10 years. In our view, the South African governing elite, including its increasingly influential military component, are no longer reeling from the shocks of the mid-1970s—the collapse of white rule in Angola and Mozambique and the urban black riots that began in Soweto—and are instead imbued with a renewed self-confidence that borders on arrogance. Encouraged by the economic and military weakness of its neighbors and the relative quiescence of the black population inside South Africa, Pretoria unabashedly proclaims its determination to do whatever it deems necessary for white survival: Prime Minister Botha acknowledged freely in 1981 that the National Party principle of “white self-determination” means “white domination.” Virtually all knowledgeable observers believe that because of the luxuries and privileges they enjoy and their fear of revenge from dispossessed blacks, whites will cling tenaciously to power. [redacted]

White politics in South Africa primarily reflect the character of the dominant Afrikaners, a people whose will to rule was born in rebellion against British colonial rule in the early 1800s and forged in the conquest of vastly more numerous black Africans.

Most Afrikaners to this day share the fierce independence characteristic of the newly liberated. Although South Africa became independent in 1910, it was not until the National Party victory in 1948 that the Afrikaners seized control of South Africa from the English-speaking minority, widely viewed by Afrikaners as the handmaidens of British capital. Although Afrikaners make much of their European heritage, Afrikaner politics, as one observer has noted, “are African politics, and are about tribal survival, pride, masculinity, and muddling through.” Thus, Afrikaners are a remarkably cohesive group that permits dissent only over the methods by which white rule is preserved, not over whether white rule should be maintained. As an ethnic group that achieved power only after they achieved unity as a people, the Afrikaners have few illusions about the danger posed to them by the numerically superior blacks. [redacted]

**Maintaining White Rule.** The Afrikaners gave a clear vision of their “native policy” when they first trekked into the interior and settled in Natal in the early 1800s. From the beginning the Afrikaners sought to strike a balance between the need for labor on their farms and the security requirements of a small white settlement surrounded by masses of Africans. Establishing the enduring South African principle that only blacks performing some essential economic service could reside in white areas, the Volksraad (Assembly) of Natal decided in the 1830s that no burgher could have more than five African families on his farm. Most Africans were excluded from white areas by assigning them to reserves or drawing lines of demarcation they were forbidden to cross. After the British annexed Natal in 1843, the Afrikaners moved farther inland and gave formal expression to their view that Africans were enemies, so clearly alien in culture and habits that the idea of assimilation was unthinkable. In the highveld republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, racial discrimination was legalized with prohibitions against interracial marriage and political rights for blacks. [redacted]

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The basic structure of white supremacy in South Africa has changed remarkably little since the 19th century, despite having become elevated from practical policy to high ideology. Black residence in white South Africa is conditional on possession of a job and a government-approved residence. A mass of legislation—it has been estimated that the apartheid system has required some 2,000 laws and regulations for its administration—governs race relations: influx control and pass laws attempt to keep economically irrelevant blacks in the homelands; race classification, mixed marriages, immorality, and group areas acts are designed to ensure the social and geographic separation of the races; and so forth. Although some blacks are now recognized as permanent urban dwellers, political rights are available only in the homelands. Afrikaners still pursue “divide and rule” policies toward the black majority by building client relationships with the homeland leaders as a counter to the urban blacks. The homelands serve not only as repository for “surplus” blacks, but create a tension within each tribal group between the urban haves and the rural have-nots, a conflict that further fragments the blacks politically. [redacted]

The shape and character of the state and the regime, however, have changed significantly. We believe that the dynamics of maintaining white rule in the post-World War II era have caused a steady growth in the absolute power of the state as well as the centralization of power within the government. Since taking power in 1948, the Afrikaner-dominated National Party has greatly strengthened the role of the government, partly to provide employment for Afrikaners unable to compete with English-speakers in the private sector. We estimate that between 35 and 40 percent of economically active Afrikaners are employed in the public sector. [redacted]

P. W. Botha, who became Prime Minister in 1978 after serving as Minister of Defense for 14 years, has created a new decisionmaking structure, centered around the State Security Council, to rationalize and integrate economic, social, and foreign policies so that they better serve the ultimate goal of white survival. The old centers of power—the parliamentary and party caucuses and the state bureaucracy, which was the archdefender of apartheid ideology—appear to have given way to a new generation of pragmatic “security technocrats.” [redacted]

Pretoria under Botha, in our view, has modernized racial domination: harsh methods of control have been replaced by more sophisticated techniques of riot control, subtler employment of police and military power, and a greater tolerance for semipolitical activity by nonwhites—as long as it remains a safety valve for dissent and is not perceived as threatening to spark revolution. Recently, in allowing a number of banning orders to expire, the newly appointed police commissioner argued that the damage to South Africa’s international image by the bannings outweighed the security benefits and that, from a strictly professional point of view, he did not need to ban these people to control them. Thus the new “security technocrats” in Pretoria have the same goal as the “apartheid ideologues,” namely the need to maintain white control. They differ, however, over the means of maintaining power, believing that it is better, in the words of Police Commissioner Coetsee, to avoid “unnecessarily” contentious actions or “counterproductive” brutality. [redacted]

*The Politics of Racial Reform.* The struggle within Afrikanerdom between advocates of a *verligte* (enlightened or reformist) and a *verkrampste* (hardline or conservative) strategy for dealing with the nonwhite population has dominated South African politics over the past several years. In the wake of the 1976 urban black riots, Prime Minister Vorster’s government allowed a limited relaxation of apartheid restrictions in such areas as sports, urban home leaseholds by blacks, penalties for passbook violations, job discrimination and segregation of public facilities. Prime Minister Botha’s early *verligte* talk—he once admonished whites that they must “adapt or die”—led many observers to conclude that South Africa had finally taken its first steps toward accommodating the black majority. As the debate has intensified and spread among Afrikaner elites, however, we believe it has become clear that the quarrel is not over long-term objectives; Afrikaners remain collectively committed to maintaining white political dominance and protecting their privileges and identity. Progressive and conservative Afrikaners alike rule out any one-man, one-vote formula in a unitary state, believing that whites would quickly lose regardless of any guarantees. [redacted]

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
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**Figure 1**  
**South African Decisionmaking Apparatus**



**Note: Principal characteristics**

—Primacy of the State Security Council: Revitalized by P. W. Botha in 1979, the SSC is now the only regularly functioning locus of authority. Most observers believe that its brief covers all matters of national importance, but, at a minimum, it certainly passes on key military, security, and foreign policy questions.

—Leading Role of Military officers head the Secretariat and reportedly have been assigned to all 15 interdepartmental committees while DFAI personnel sit on seven. Press reports suggest that 75 percent of the Secretariat staff are military personnel. More importantly, military thinking seems to predominate South African decisionmaking, a reflection of Prime Minister Botha's long tenure as Defense Minister.

\* Statutory members include Prime Minister P. W. Botha, Defense Minister Magnus Malan, Foreign Affairs Minister "Pik" Botha, Justice Minister H. J. Coetsee, Police Commissioner Johann Coetsee. Head of National Intelligence Service Neil Barnard, South African Defense Forces Chief Constant Viljoen, Director General of Foreign Affairs Van Dalsen, and Director General of Justice J. P. J. Coetzer. Ad hoc members include Minister of Constitutional Development Chris Heunis, Finance Minister Horwood, and Minister of Corporation and Development P. J. G. Koornhof.

— Formal line of authority  
= Informal line of authority

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The government's strategy of reform has sought to co-opt Coloreds, Indians, homeland leaders, and limited numbers of urban blacks into a nonwhite middle class that would act as a buffer against a black revolution.

Although the government has extended limited autonomy to some black townships, its strategy for blacks has been largely economic—namely, to create a

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"stake in the system" for those blacks allowed to stay in the cities.<sup>2</sup> Black unions, whose members now comprise about 7 to 8 percent of the black labor force, can register and bargain collectively in industrial councils that decide wage demands. With the exception of a few jobs in the mining industry, job restriction regulations that formerly prohibited black entry into most skilled occupations have been largely abolished. [redacted]

Daily mixing of blacks and whites in the commercial centers of white cities is a fact of life in South Africa, but the government plainly sees the potential dangers certain economic trends pose to continued white rule. The national commission on black labor stated in 1979 that:

Control over the rate of urbanization is, in the light of circumstances in South Africa, an absolutely essential social security measure. Even though . . . the abolition of such control would lead to faster economic growth, the price to be paid for it in terms of direct and indirect social costs would be too high. [redacted]

Black union activity—potentially the most dynamic area of black political activity inside South Africa—is monitored closely, and union leaders are promptly arrested when the political overtones of union activity become too strong. Afrikaners share their government's determination to limit the impact of economic integration: public opinion polls reveal that while two-thirds of Afrikaners would approve the dropping of many barriers to blacks in the economic sphere, only 20 percent are prepared to see mixed marriages legalized or racial divisions ended in the schools or in residential areas. Moreover, Afrikaners are almost unanimously opposed to even limited power-sharing arrangements with South African blacks. [redacted]

<sup>2</sup> Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 and its subsequent amendments lay down the conditions under which a black is permitted to live and work in "white" South Africa—rather than in the 13.7 percent of the country designated as tribal homelands under the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act. In essence, section 10 states that, to remain in a white area, a black must have lived continuously in the area since birth, or lawfully for at least 15 years, or worked for the same employer for 10 years, or be the offspring under the age of 18 of a qualified resident, or have permission from a labor bureau. If a person does not qualify, and does not have a properly stamped pass book to prove it, he or she can be "endorsed out" to the relevant tribal homeland within 71 hours. Failure to leave is a crime. In 1982, over 200,000 blacks—one every two and a half minutes—were arrested for being "illegally" in South Africa. [redacted]

Most of the current debate over reform centers on the provisions of the new constitutional structure that give Coloreds and Indians a limited role in the political system through participation with whites in a three-chambered Parliament and multiracial Cabinet. Although whites will maintain an absolute majority on matters of "common concern," the separate nonwhite chambers of Parliament will have more authority to legislate on matters relating to the "communal affairs" of the Coloreds and Indians. The prospect of even this limited power sharing precipitated a split in the National Party in 1982 when Andries Treurnicht, then the leader of the party's right wing, resigned from the Cabinet and along with 16 other Nationalists formed the Conservative Party—the first Afrikaaner parliamentary opposition party in the 35 years since the National Party came to power. The new constitution also creates a strong executive president who will have broad veto powers as well as authority to assume total control during a national emergency. [redacted]

To defuse rightwing criticism and allay misgivings among his supporters, Prime Minister Botha promised earlier this year to hold a referendum on the constitutional reforms among white voters. Although the white electorate approved the reform proposals by a two-to-one majority, we believe that many Afrikaners supported the government out of loyalty to the National Party and its leaders, rather than genuine support for even the carefully limited modifications of the political system. Although some Colored and Indian political groups have cautiously supported Botha's proposals, the majority of both racial groups probably oppose them as they are now formulated. Blacks see the reform as yet another trick designed to fracture the nonwhite majority. Implementation of the reforms—their defeat in the referendum probably would have ended Botha's tenure as Prime Minister—will confer near dictatorial powers on the state president, making it easier for whites to mobilize during crises, but make little progress in accommodating black aspirations. [redacted]

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***Violent Stasis or Violent Change?*** We believe an escalation of violence is a certainty in South Africa, but we do not believe the country is on the verge of revolution. The government's security apparatus is too effective; divisions among the whites do not seriously threaten the consensus on the necessity for white political domination; and the black population is too fragmented, apathetic, and powerless. Maintaining white rule, however, undoubtedly will involve more violence since the security forces cannot prevent repetitions of incidents such as the car bombing in Pretoria earlier this year which claimed 19 lives and injured over 200. But, unlike white colonialists throughout Africa, the Afrikaners—the self-proclaimed “white tribe” of Africa—believe they have nowhere to go and show little inclination to relinquish what they have, even in the face of growing violence.

[REDACTED]

Many white South Africans, in our judgment, fear that even limited racial change will be the first step on a long slippery slope of reform that will begin by compromising white authority and end by destroying it. The violent eruption of postindependence tribal conflict in Zimbabwe and the perceived radicalization of the new black government has reinforced *verkrampte* views about the dangers of black majority rule and dismayed *verligtes* who may increasingly feel that the chasm between the races has grown too wide to be bridged by gradual reform. We believe that Prime Minister Botha and his Afrikaner supporters may lose their taste for further reform, and not move to accommodate the black majority. Despite the politically courageous act of splitting Afrikanerdom, Botha is not receiving much positive reinforcement: his reform proposals has been at best halfheartedly supported by Afrikaners, treated with skepticism by the nonwhite population, condemned by many on the English-speaking left, and greeted with little enthusiasm by most of the international community. Moreover, we believe that Botha will try to heal the wounds in the Afrikaner community caused by the debate over the constitutional proposals and thus, it may be some time before the government attempts to deal with the blacks, although some adjustments that are characterized as reform are likely. Although several Colored and Indian leaders claim that they will use their new parliamentary positions to advance the cause of blacks, we do not expect much from their efforts.

[REDACTED]

### **Southern Africa's Superpower**

#### ***The Increasingly Confident Use of Coercive Power.***

Underlying Pretoria's foreign policies is the same fundamental objective that dominates its domestic policies: the maintenance of white rule in South Africa. Any threat to white rule from black Africa was remote, however, until developments between 1975 and 1980 made Pretoria's neighborhood far more dangerous and hostile. This five-year period saw friendly, white-controlled governments in key neighboring states replaced by leftist black regimes, a dramatic growth of the Communist presence in the region, and a surge of black civil unrest and insurgent activities inside South Africa. This created the specter of what South Africa's white minority fears most—a combination of internal revolt and external attack, both Communist backed.

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Despite its involvement in the Angolan civil war, its occasional operations against insurgents of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in southern Angola and southwestern Zambia, and its military support for Rhodesia, Pretoria during this traumatic half decade of change continued a policy toward its black neighbors that emphasized cooperation, coexistence, and economic interdependence. Essential to Botha's “constellation of states” scheme, which he unveiled in April 1979, was Pretoria's calculation that the economic advantages of cooperating with South Africa would induce its neighbors to join in a formalized regional detente.

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Black states in the region almost immediately rejected any political and security involvement with South Africa and took steps to reduce their economic dependence on Pretoria by forming their own counter-grouping, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The failure of Pretoria's constellation scheme was accompanied by what Pretoria viewed as an even more disturbing development in neighboring Zimbabwe: the unexpected landslide victory in February 1980 of Robert Mugabe, labeled a “Marxist terrorist” by Pretoria. Mugabe's victory was a profound shock to South Africa, bringing home to whites of all walks of life the depth of their own

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historical predicament and hardening their outlook on external and internal policy issues. [redacted]

[redacted] the failure of regional detente and the coming to power of the vehemently antiapartheid Mugabe also seriously weakened the position of moderates in Pretoria—particularly careerists in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information (DFAI)—and shifted influence to the more hawkish military careerists whom Botha moved into key positions in the revamped decisionmaking structure dominated by the State Security Council. [redacted]

The view that came to dominate in Pretoria after mid-1980 was encapsulated recently by a South African policy adviser who asserted that conflict between South Africa and its neighbors is inevitable. The adviser, whose views the US Embassy believes reflect the thinking of senior officials, said that nearby black regimes had to support anti-South African insurgent organizations if only to maintain their credibility as African leaders. Other officials have gone further, suggesting that efforts by Pretoria to encourage regional stability and to obtain its neighbors' good will through economic inducements only risks strengthening fundamentally hostile regimes. Logic of this sort plainly underlies Southern Africa's shift since 1980 toward a more pronounced reliance on coercive means of influence over its neighbors. [redacted]

Pretoria's tough attitude is supported by its overwhelming power advantages in the region. South Africa can mobilize over 400,000 men, almost double the combined military strength of Pretoria's immediate neighbors. Moreover, unlike Rhodesia which relied heavily on black troops, South African active duty forces are 97 percent white. South Africa is virtually self-sufficient in all but the most technologically advanced armaments, and now aggressively promotes its weaponry on the international market. [redacted]

Pretoria also dominates the regional economy, accounting for over three quarters of the total GNP of the area south of Zaire and Kenya. With the exception of Angola, Pretoria's neighbors are vulnerable to South African economic pressure: the black-ruled states depend heavily on South African trade—a quarter of Harare's exports and about 40 percent of

Maputo's exports go to Pretoria—while South Africa sends only 5 to 6 percent of its goods to its neighbors and is an important supplier of foodstuffs for the region. South African rail lines are critical to the regional network and represent an important source of economic leverage. South African-backed insurgents in Angola and Mozambique routinely attack alternative transportation routes and ensure that landlocked countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe remain susceptible to South African squeeze tactics. [redacted]

We believe that Pretoria is growing bolder and more self-assured in its use of coercive power. Although the military's preeminent institutional role in Pretoria makes adoption of a hardnosed policy almost certain, two events probably have contributed further to Pretoria's assertiveness:

- In late August 1981, a South African mechanized infantry force of 4,000 to 5,000 men invaded Angola, killed about 1,000 Angolans, killed four and captured one Soviet adviser, and created a buffer zone in south-central Angola that it continues to hold. The inability of Luanda's Soviet and Cuban protectors to prevent this infringement of Angolan sovereignty—as well as the lack of any effective international pressure to withdraw—has demonstrably led Pretoria to redefine the limits of its room to maneuver in the region.
- The South Africans are ardent admirers of Israeli tactics, and, as one South African strategist close to the military has observed, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in early 1982 may have changed South African notions of the "rules of the game." Prime Minister Botha has compared himself to former Israeli leader Begin, depicting each as willing to do whatever is necessary for his country's security despite US disapproval. [redacted]

The leadership in Pretoria also knows that an aggressive regional policy plays well domestically. A recent poll showed that 80 percent of the white population supports military strikes into countries harboring anti-South African insurgents; most whites even said they would support government food embargoes

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**Figure 2**  
**South Africa: Regional Power Advantages**



<b>Angola</b>	
Estimated GDP (1980)	\$3.9 billion
Total armed forces	33,500
Cuban military personnel	25,000-30,000
Combat troops	15,000-20,000
Soviet military personnel	1,200
Advisers	300-500
East German security advisers	200-600
<b>SWAPO</b>	
Total forces	6,000-8,000
Estimated number active in Namibia	100-200
<b>UNITA</b>	
Total forces	35,000
Armed regulars	15,000
Mostly armed guerrillas	20,000
<b>Botswana</b>	
GNP (1981)	\$0.6 billion
Total armed forces	3,200
<b>Mozambique</b>	
Estimated GDP (1981)	\$1.5 billion
Total armed forces	18,000-20,000
Soviet military personnel	500-800
Cuban military personnel	800-1,000
East European military personnel	50-180
Zimbabwean troops	2,000-3,000
Tanzanian military advisers	180
<b>Namibia</b>	
South African military forces	10,000-20,000
During major operations	22,000 or more
Territorial forces	3,000
<b>South Africa</b>	
GNP (1982)	\$77.6 billion
Total active duty	93,500
Permanent force (approximate)	23,900
Draftees (approximate)	60,500
Citizen Force (active reserve)	125,000
Army Commando (local home defense force)	175,000
<b>Tanzania</b>	
GDP (1981)	\$5.2 billion
Total armed forces	41,850
Soviet military advisers	130
<b>Zambia</b>	
GDP (1981)	\$3.4 billion
Total armed forces	14,300
Soviet military advisers	50
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	
GNP (1981)	\$5.4 billion
Total armed forces	41,500
Date of data, August 1983	

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against such countries. After the Pretoria car bombing, the bloodiest incident in the African National Congress's terrorist campaign, South African jets attacked alleged ANC facilities in a suburb of Maputo, Mozambique, a gesture of retribution largely for internal consumption. [redacted]

Although pressure from specific Western governments has sometimes caused Pretoria to modify its coercive activities in the region—for example, official US representations probably led South Africa to stop tightening the economic screws on Zimbabwe in late 1981—the overall record of South African actions suggests that Western pressure has had little enduring or fundamental effect in softening South Africa's policy toward its neighbors. The threat of an expanded Communist presence in the region—such as more Cuban combat forces in Angola or Mozambique—also has done little to deter Pretoria. On the contrary, we believe that the military's fascination with an Israeli-like policy of acting decisively and unilaterally in “doing what must be done” has grown in recent years. Senior military officers have frequently expressed their contempt for the “Vietnam syndrome” that they believe had crippled US policy by making Washington unwilling to use military force. They have insisted that South Africans will not make the same mistake. [redacted]

**An Ambitious Agenda.** Pretoria's overwhelming power advantages, which are reinforced by deeply ingrained racial attitudes of white superiority, cause most white South Africans to have very demanding standards for what they believe constitutes proper neighborly behavior. At a minimum, South Africa's dealings with individual black states appear to be governed by two general objectives: attacking anti-South African insurgents and preempting any challenges to its regional hegemony. But as South Africans have perceived fewer obstacles to their domination of the region and have become more confident in their use of power, we believe they have become more ambitious and pursue, when the opportunities present themselves, several ancillary goals as well. [redacted]

At the center of South African regional concerns is the extent to which its neighbors provide support to anti-South African insurgencies—the ANC,

SWAPO, and to the much-less-threatening Pan Africanist Congress. Repeated public threats by South African political and military leaders that Pretoria would employ a “proactive” or forward defense strategy, which would include strikes against terrorist bases wherever they are found, have been carried out. The most notable examples have been the attack in June 1981 on ANC safehouses in Swaziland; the raid in January 1982 on ANC facilities in the Maputo area; the operation in December 1982 against ANC personnel in Maseru, Lesotho; the retaliatory airstrike against Mozambique in May 1983; and the sacking of ANC offices in Maputo in October 1983. Even though all the neighboring states, except Angola, restrict ANC military activity in their countries, South Africa's anxieties about its black majority are probably so severe that no neighboring black African state can escape Pretoria's suspicion that it is supporting ANC guerrillas, and all are therefore vulnerable to South African retaliation in the wake of a serious terrorist incident. [redacted]

Pretoria's increasing skepticism about the possibilities of peaceful coexistence with neighboring black states has led it to adopt a second major regional priority: keeping its neighbors—particularly those it regards as most hostile—weak, susceptible to South Africa's economic and military leverage, and distracted by their own internal conflicts. This short-term, power-oriented strategy for survival is also compatible with deeply rooted racial attitudes: encouraging any stable and prosperous black-ruled state on its border would challenge white South African contentions that “uncivilized” black Africans need the guiding hand of whites to survive in the modern world. Pretoria's policy of creating instability and maintaining dependency throughout the region—often referred to by observers as its “destabilization policy”—is evident in the pattern of South African support for regional insurgencies, its ready use of its economic and transportation leverage, and its use of covert action, such as its probable involvement in the sabotage attack on the Zimbabwean Air Force in June 1982. [redacted]

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In addition to satisfying its security concerns, Pretoria also wants the neighboring black regimes to deal with South Africa more "normally" or at least in a less openly hostile manner in the public realm. Although DFAI officials acknowledge that black African states must indulge in anti-South African rhetoric, if only for domestic political reasons, most white South Africans, including several cabinet members, appear sensitive to verbal and diplomatic slights from neighboring countries. Senior officials frequently complain to US officials that South Africa's neighbors do not give South Africa respect commensurate with its standing in the region. Pretoria was visibly irritated, for example, when Zimbabwe did not invite Pretoria to send a delegation to attend independence ceremonies when Mugabe took power. [redacted]

Pretoria's striving for what amounts to tacit diplomatic relations with its neighbors appears to have become stronger as well. It tried to exploit Zimbabwe's fuel shortage in January 1983 and to force Harare to negotiate at the ministerial level over a long-term fuel-supply contract. In its recent dealing with its neighbors on the ANC issue, South Africa has tried to institute regular meetings between South African security officials and their counterparts. In addition, Pretoria reportedly suggested to Luanda—as part of its proposal to trade cessation of hostilities and South African withdrawal from its Angolan salient for the removal of Cuban, Angolan, and SWAPO forces to positions above the Mocamedes-Menongue defense line—that a joint South African-Angolan commission be created to monitor the resulting demilitarized zone in Angola. Pretoria's evident desire for formalized relations with its black neighboring states marks a return to earlier visions of a regional entente—albeit an entente now based primarily on South Africa's coercive power rather than the inducements of cooperation. [redacted]

South African support for insurgent movements against its neighbors now appears to be driven by more far-reaching objectives. Pretoria probably began with fairly limited objectives: aiding the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) provided South Africa with bargaining chips against support for SWAPO and the ANC. Moreover, these guerrilla groups disrupted

Zimbabwe's and Zambia's transportation routes, and helped keep Pretoria's most hostile neighbors, Angola and Mozambique, enfeebled and distracted. South Africa's low-level flirtation with Zimbabwean dissidents probably stems from the same motivation. [redacted]

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Insurgent battlefield successes over the past year, however, may have strengthened a growing belief in Pretoria that the insurgents could ultimately achieve military victories, leading some South African officials to envision the restoration of buffer states in Angola and Mozambique. [redacted]

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[redacted] Attempting to create puppet regimes on their borders—including a new Ovamboland carved out of southern Angola and northern Namibia, a partition scheme sometimes raised by senior military officers—would appear to be a dubious and expensive enterprise, one which risks greater Soviet and Cuban involvement and probably would require massive South African assistance. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, many in the South African leadership appear bullish about the prospects of replacing hostile black regimes: [redacted]

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[redacted] Hardliners in Pretoria may persuade more cautious colleagues to support an adventurist policy of regional king making, particularly if the regimes in Luanda and Maputo remain incapable of containing the insurgents. At a minimum, Prime Minister Jonathan's rule in Lesotho may be in jeopardy. Pretoria has periodically slowed cross-border commerce with Lesotho and stepped up its involvement with anti-Jonathan insurgents to express its unhappiness with the outspoken Lesothan Prime Minister's overtures to the East and his purported leniency toward the ANC. [redacted]

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Even if South Africa stops short of trying to replace hostile black regimes throughout the region, governmental paralysis in the neighboring states, fueled by South African-backed insurgencies, enables Pretoria to take uncompromising positions on regional issues. South African pressure on Lesotho forced Maseru in August 1983 to announce that it would expel all South African refugees residing there, even though Pretoria was demanding action against only those involved with the ANC. [redacted]

[redacted] unlike two years ago when South African military leaders thought it would be better militarily to get out of Namibia and defend South Africa on the Orange River, South Africa's creation of a buffer zone in southern Angola and Savimbi's growing insurgency has led the military to dig in its heels on Namibia and make the Rio Cunene its first line of defense. Buoyed by the success of its hardline approach, South Africa, in our view, now appears willing to concede little of significance to its neighbors, particularly on issues such as Namibia, which have significant domestic political impact. [redacted]

**Pax Pretoria or Regional Instability?** South African enthusiasm for an assertive, no-nonsense regional policy appears to be great, and we expect it to continue. Buttressed by very strong support from the white population, South African officials have been expressing their regional goals in a significantly more forceful manner. Traditional offers of nonaggression pacts and economic assistance are no longer coupled with statements committing South Africa to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries, but are linked instead to strong warnings to its neighbors that if they behave in an intolerable manner, they will suffer the consequences. The institutionalization of a hawkish, military point of view in the South African decisionmaking apparatus and the development of a "survival state" mentality within the country's white population make it likely that South Africa will continue to expect the worst from its black neighbors and to pursue policies toward them that emphasize coercion over conciliation. [redacted]

As a result, we believe that southern African affairs will remain tumultuous. Pretoria will maintain military pressure on the ANC and SWAPO while keeping the main sponsors of these groups weak by supporting

such groups as UNITA and RENAMO. Any spectacular terrorist attack inside South Africa probably will trigger cross-border retaliation, in effect punishing the independent black African states for the inability of the region's security forces, both black and white, to prevent violent expressions of antiapartheid sentiment by South African blacks. Despite the turmoil caused by Pretoria's heavyhanded tactics, the political makeup of southern Africa probably will continue unchanged, even though it is an uneasy equilibrium between a bullying South Africa and its weaker, destabilized neighbors. [redacted]

In our view, South Africa has over the past several years provided ample evidence of its ability to foment instability in the region. A major question for us, however, is whether it can retain control of the situations it has created. The relative success the South Africans have had with their tough approach to regional affairs could blind them to the limits of their power and to the USSR's capabilities for responding on behalf of black regimes in southern Africa. If Pretoria, for example, should try to put RENAMO into power, an embattled Machel might call in Cuban combat troops to save his regime or, if he is deposed, to lead a Soviet-backed insurgency against the new RENAMO regime. In either event, the South Africans might expend so many resources on their regional adventures that they endanger internal security. Moreover, the self-assurance of South African whites might ebb quickly if white battlefield losses were to surpass the modest levels associated with the Namibian conflict (now 50 to 100 killed per year, far fewer than those lost to motorcycle accidents in South Africa). [redacted]

On balance, we expect the South Africans to avoid being drawn into an escalating cycle of internal and regional violence. Pretoria's "security technocrats" seem well aware of the twin dangers of provoking too much superpower involvement in southern Africa—the only real threat to South Africa's regional hegemony—or of drawing too heavily on the resources of the white population. Prime Minister Botha has complained that it is "big power" intervention that prevents southern Africa from solving its problems. [redacted]

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Furthermore, South Africa's military leaders realize that terrorism succeeds by sapping the will to resist and are trying to inculcate the proper attitude in South African whites. The Army Chief of Staff has warned in public statements that South Africa "must prepare for a long war. The public must know this and accept it and must not lose the will to exist." [redacted]

Pretoria already has demonstrated considerable sophistication in the techniques of maintaining the status quo—witness its policy toward Namibia since United Nations Resolution 435 was passed in 1978 or its handling of South African blacks since the Soweto riots in 1976. While individual military officers or commands may be tempted to stretch the limits of their orders and engage in unauthorized activities, such as probably occurred in the case of the coup attempt in the Seychelles in 1981, the leadership's awareness of the delicate requirements of maintaining white rule, in our judgment, will prevent South Africa from adventurist policies that ultimately prove to be self-defeating. [redacted]

#### An Instability/Reform Checklist

We believe the chance that regime-threatening political instability will arise in South Africa over the next decade is less than 1 in 10. We believe that the odds are not much better that South African whites will take significant steps toward accommodating the black majority and relinquishing power. Despite the low probability of either eventuality, many observers are firmly convinced that the status quo cannot be maintained. Some fervent critics of apartheid will continue to predict imminent revolution—as they have ever since the Sharpeville shooting and riots in 1960. Others will insist that a process of genuine reform is already under way, and that the current drive to accommodate—or, as most would argue, to co-opt—the Indians and Coloreds will serve as a model eventually acceptable to South African blacks. We believe, however, that white rule in South Africa will continue for the next 10 years, essentially untouched either by revolution or reform. [redacted]

To highlight what we perceive as possible signals of significant change in South Africa, we have drawn up a checklist of instability and reform indicators for developments in South Africa. None of these indicators should be interpreted in isolation, but an answer

of "yes" to several of the following questions should warn the reader that the analysis provided above is off the mark. [redacted]

Because we believe that South Africa's adventurist regional policies might backfire—causing Pretoria to overextend itself and weaken its ability to cope with internal tension—our first set of indicators covers regional affairs:

- Have South African-backed insurgencies come to power in Angola or Mozambique? Are the South Africans heavily involved in the dissident movement in Zimbabwe? If pro-South African regimes have appeared in the neighboring states, are substantial South African forces stationed in those countries?
- Has the Soviet and Cuban presence in southern Africa grown significantly? Are Cuban—or possibly East European—forces directly engaging South African troops in Angola or Mozambique? Have relatively moderate countries such as Zimbabwe or Zambia tilted more heavily toward Moscow?
- Has the hostility between Pretoria and its neighboring states edged toward open warfare? Are Pretoria's neighbors providing active military support to the ANC? Has the character of its border conflicts changed from one of sporadic clashes and reprisal raids to one of more extended engagements of attrition? Has the casualty rate for South African whites increased beyond the modest levels now associated with the Namibian conflict? [redacted]

Signs that the forces of instability within South Africa have become stronger and that South Africa has entered a prerevolutionary phase would be indicated by affirmative answers to the following:

- Has a largely unified, well-organized, and well-led black opposition movement—for many observers, a necessary prerequisite for a revolutionary turnover in power—emerged in South Africa? Are emerging black groups openly defying government efforts to regulate their behavior?

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- Have the number and severity of violent incidents multiplied? Are there instances of persistent rural or urban instability that the government has been unable to suppress? Has the ANC—or some other externally based group—succeeded in establishing a permanent insurgent presence inside South Africa?
- Are there more incidents of spontaneous or orchestrated black protest such as civil disorders, strikes, boycotts, or work stoppages? Do incidents in one part of the country trigger similar outbursts elsewhere? Has the crime rate soared?
- Are there indications that white resistance is wearing down? Are security-related white casualties increasing? Are whites refusing induction in increasing numbers? Have whites started to emigrate in significant numbers? Are whites transferring substantial amounts of capital outside the country? Are the newly granted executive powers being misused by the government? Are the security forces becoming harsher and more capricious in their efforts to suppress black political activity?
- leaders of externally based anti-South African insurgent groups? Has Pretoria released prominent leaders such as the ANC's Nelson Mandela from prison?
- Assuming that the constitutional proposal granting limited political rights to Indians and Coloreds is implemented, does Pretoria then move to provide the same sort of accommodation of South African blacks or at least to those with permanent urban rights? Does Pretoria proceed to grant equal rights to Indians and Coloreds by merging the three-chambered Parliament into one legislative body with all the racial groups voting on a common role?
- Has a new coalition party of Afrikaners and English-speakers emerged to take the lead on reform from the Afrikaner-based National Party? Has Pretoria repealed the laws prohibiting multiracial political parties and other forms of interracial political cooperation? Are South African political exiles granted amnesty and invited back into the country to join the reform process?

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Because of the difficulty of differentiating between the rhetoric of reform, "reform" aimed at co-opting segments of the nonwhite population, and genuine measures of racial reform, our checklist on social change in South Africa focuses on indications that genuine change is under way:

- Are there significant changes in the apartheid system, narrowly defined to include regulations governing residential segregation, influx control, race classification, and "petty" apartheid? Has the government stopped implementing homeland legislation and resettlement programs? Is the government taking significant steps to redress the inequities in government spending?
- Are existing government restrictions on black political activity being dropped? Are black labor unions allowed to expand their areas of activity without suffering reprisals against their leaders? Are homeland leaders like Zulu Chief Buthelezi permitted to form local multiracial governments? Are new forums for genuine negotiations on power sharing being created? Is Pretoria starting to talk with the

## Part Two: United States-South African Relations

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### Strong Ties but Little Leverage

During the next 10 years, the relationship between the United States and South Africa will probably expand—not to the degree that most South Africans would like, but undoubtedly to an extent that many in the United States will not be comfortable with. In the absence of new restrictive US legislation, economic ties between the two countries probably will continue to strengthen. Moreover, continued conflict in southern Africa will create more opportunities for Soviet meddling and make it easier for Pretoria to make common cause with the United States in an anti-Communist campaign. In addition, the fundamental moral and racial issues that underlie internal developments in South Africa will make them of continued high interest to broad segments of American society.

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US concerns notwithstanding, we believe that Pretoria's determined stance of self-sufficiency leaves South Africa relatively unresponsive to US carrots and sticks. [redacted]

**Economic Links.** The strategic minerals of interest to the United States that are mined in South Africa are chromium, manganese, vanadium, and platinum-group metals. The first three are important to steel production—particularly specialty steels for aircraft, missile, and defense-related industries—and the space program. The platinum-group metals are used in auto emission control systems and chemical, petrochemical, and electrical industries. South African imports provide from 30 (manganese) to 55 (vanadium) percent of US consumption of these important minerals. In addition, other commercially important minerals from South Africa include gold, antimony, industrial diamonds, and asbestos. [redacted]

South Africa strives to be the number-one supplier of minerals to the West, and South African officials frequently stress the stability of the country as compared with other mineral-producing countries. The fact that the Soviet Union is the major alternative supplier of chromium, manganese, platinum, and vanadium also is frequently cited. [redacted]

US stockpiles reduce vulnerability to stoppages in the flow of South African minerals. West European countries and Japan, however, are just as reliant on South Africa for their supplies of chromium, manganese, and platinum, and more so for vanadium, but have either inadequate or no stockpiles. [redacted]

Pretoria, for its part, has moved to reduce its susceptibility to possible oil embargoes, its only significant resource vulnerability. South Africa has stockpiled sufficient oil to meet at least two years' demand at normal rates of consumption—and about five years with rationing—and is the world's leader in oil-from-coal technology. By the mid-1980s, South Africa's abundant coal reserves should provide 40 to 50 percent of the country's oil needs. [redacted]

Pretoria is unlikely, however, to use its mineral resources as weapons against the West, except in response to extreme provocation. Pretoria has an

unblemished record in fulfilling contracts and supplying minerals at market prices, and has never retaliated economically for the West's adherence to the arms embargo against South Africa. Moreover, minerals and mineral products, including gold, account for more than 60 percent of the value of South African exports, and mining alone accounts for 16 percent of total employment. [redacted]

The United States has long been one of South Africa's largest trading partners, accounting, like Japan and the United Kingdom, for 10 to 15 percent of Pretoria's trade over the past five years. As of 1981, US direct investment in South Africa totaled \$2.6 billion and indirect investment in the form of bank loans, stocks and other South African financial securities was \$3.7 billion. Nevertheless, South Africa accounts for only 1 percent of US worldwide totals of investment and trade. Furthermore, US trade with black Africa is approximately three times greater than that with South Africa, largely reflecting US imports of Nigerian oil. [redacted]

For Pretoria also, bilateral economic relations are not critical to the national economy. US direct investment represents just 2 to 3 percent of South Africa's total industrial plant, and US firms employ only 60,000 to 70,000 blacks, less than 1 percent of the labor force. [redacted]

In summary, Pretoria's economic ties to the United States are important, but not critical to either side. However, the failure of the West European countries and Japan to stockpile against possible supply interruptions creates a Western perception of economic vulnerability. Pretoria, on the other hand, has consistently sought economic self-sufficiency as a hedge against sanctions and is prepared, economically and psychologically, for a total trade embargo. Pretoria's trading partners, in our judgment, are not. [redacted]

**Linked in Opposition to Communism.** Political instability and armed conflict of the sort we believe will be endemic to southern Africa will enhance Soviet and Cuban opportunities to build their influence and

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undermine that of the West, primarily through military assistance to black states threatened by Pretoria. The black African states view white minority rule in Namibia and South Africa as the destabilizing dynamic in the region. Most black leaders have an exaggerated notion of the degree of leverage Washington has over Pretoria and are often tempted to use the United States as a scapegoat for regional problems. [redacted]

Pretoria, on the other hand, views itself as an oasis of stability in a continent awash with chaos. White South Africans of all walks of life maintain that European colonial rule ended too soon, leaving black Africans incapable of dealing with the political and economic challenges of the 20th century. Insisting that racism does not underlie their belief that black Africans are "immature," South Africans argue that "Africa is dying" without the civilizing influence of white rule, and that independent black African states have become impoverished and chaotic "Marxist" states that are easy prey for Communist adventurers. [redacted]

South African leaders identify the Soviet Union as the country's principal adversary. They see Moscow as taking advantage of every opportunity—from backing anti-South African insurgents to arming hostile governments on its border—to strike at South Africa. By derivation, Pretoria argues, the Soviets are attacking the West—for whom continued South African dominance of the region is described as "vital," even if the West does not acknowledge it. Pretoria seeks to make common cause with Washington in an anti-Communist campaign, and has even claimed that the regional roles of the two countries are essentially the same—that South Africa promotes stability and democratic forces against Communist subversion in southern Africa in a manner similar to the US role in South and Central America. [redacted]

The United States has tried to limit Soviet opportunities in southern Africa by encouraging negotiated solutions to regional problems and promoting detente between South Africa and its neighbors. In our judgment, the success of US policy initiatives in the region will require South African cooperation or, at least, acquiescence, since Pretoria will continue to dominate the region economically and militarily for

the next 10 years. Consequently, the United States will find it difficult to avoid being seen by Pretoria's opponents as the handmaiden of South African interests. [redacted]

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Ironically, continued conflict in southern Africa serves both Pretoria and Moscow because it contributes to a closer identification of black southern Africa with the USSR and of South Africa with the United States. The leadership in Pretoria, in our view, plays up the "Soviet menace" to strengthen the identity of US and South African "strategic" interests and to deflect Western attention from the apartheid issue. We believe that this dynamic will continue for the next 10 years, making it difficult for Washington to disentangle its interest in opposing Soviet adventurism from Pretoria's interest in maintaining white rule. [redacted]

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*"Radishes and Twigs."* Pretoria's self-reliance and growing self-confidence—Foreign Minister Botha flatly asserted recently that "this is our region"—renders South Africa, in our judgment, relatively invulnerable to US leverage. In the absence of unexpected, regime-threatening developments—such as a race war inside South Africa or direct Soviet military action against Pretoria—that might prompt white leaders to seek US intervention, we expect South Africa's fear of incurring US displeasure to only marginally constrain its behavior. Unlike other "pariah states" which depend on US security assistance, Pretoria is not beholden to any other country for its security, and, in our view, believes that it can better tolerate, in the short run at least, an interruption of its economic ties abroad than could its trading partners. [redacted]

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The ability of the United States to achieve far-reaching objectives in southern Africa—particularly if they touch on South African domestic affairs—will for the most part remain limited. South African whites bitterly resent suggestions from outsiders on how to run their affairs, and this resistance will be strengthened if pressure is applied for rapid, wholesale changes. The experience of the late 1970s also leads us to believe that heavy Western pressure to force the

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pace and scope of change could be counterproductive from another standpoint—black expectations for change can easily be raised unrealistically, with the result that dashed hopes become part of the baggage of black skepticism and suspicion of the West. [redacted]

**Dealing With South Africa**

**Ambivalence Toward the United States.** Despite their growing international isolation since the Afrikaners came to power in 1948, white South Africans tend to identify with the West, viewing themselves as the last bastion of European or “civilized” values in Africa. They emphasize their World War II contributions and their continuing role as guardians of the important Cape sea route and as suppliers of strategic minerals. Afrikaners are especially drawn to Americans and often argue that only historical circumstance—namely, the vast numbers of black Africans versus the numerically inferior Indians on the American continent—caused US and South African paths to diverge. [redacted]

This self-perceived bond to the West is coupled to a sense of betrayal, however, that gives the relationship a “love-hate” aspect. White South Africans bitterly resent US criticism of apartheid, often argue that Americans should not view black South Africans as if they were black Americans, and believe that Pretoria’s role as an outpost for Western, Christian, and democratic values is undervalued. Moreover, Pretoria clearly is wary about entrusting vital South African interests to the West: Defense Minister Malan has remarked darkly that “South Africa has ample proof that she could not rely on the West to assist her in any conflict.” Numerous white leaders have repeatedly and strongly complained that they were abandoned by the United States when it did not support South Africa’s intervention in the Angolan civil war. [redacted]

Because most South Africans, in our view, feel simultaneously drawn to, and betrayed by, the United States, South African attitudes toward US initiatives to promote regional stability will be profoundly schizophrenic. Washington’s interest and engagement in southern African affairs will be welcomed as long overdue acknowledgments of South Africa’s importance to the West. But Pretoria’s skittishness about the reliability of Western commitments will reinforce

its avowed self-reliance and resistance to infringements on its freedom of action in domestic and regional affairs. [redacted]

Pretoria’s caution with respect to US initiatives will be further strengthened by the widespread South African perception that US policies can shift quickly with the passing of each administration. South Africa, for example, ignored for the most part the Carter administration’s pressure for internal reform, partially because it believed that future administrations would follow less idealistic policies toward South Africa. In South Africa, where conflicting views are rarely expressed by government officials, the perception that Washington often speaks with many voices is often taken as evidence of confusion and indecision, and an invitation to procrastinate in the hope that unwanted pressure from the United States will simply go away. [redacted]

**The Importance of “Face.”** Sharing in many ways the nationalism of a newly liberated people, the Afrikaners are fiercely independent and bluntly reject US advice on internal matters—Prime Minister Botha recently dismissed a major policy statement by the US Under Secretary of State as based on a “central misconception.” Pressure from outsiders often seems to drive South Africans deeper into their psychological *laager*—the circle of wagons formed by Afrikaner settlers under attack by African warriors—and makes them defensive and incapable of acknowledging error or of compromising. The South Africans resist even the appearance of being pushed around, perhaps from a deep-seated fear of the impact that it might have on South African blacks, and appear to place great stress on being treated with the respect they believe is their due as regionally powerful actors. Thus, negotiations with South Africa will continue to be facilitated if allowances are made for their apparent need to save face. [redacted]

The past pattern of South African behavior also leads us to conclude that dealings with leaders in Pretoria will be easier when they believe that their Western opposites are as strong willed and forceful as the

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Afrikaners believe themselves to be. Informed observers have noted the apparent similarity between South African and Soviet diplomats: both adamantly insist on maximalist positions and often do not negotiate seriously until convinced of their opposite's determination; offers to bargain and to compromise are often seen as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to be exploited rather than explored. We believe, therefore, that before the South Africans will enter general negotiations they need to develop personal respect for those they are dealing with—that of one "man" for another in South Africa's male-dominated society.

**Symbolism and Consistency.** Despite the ambivalence at work in South African views toward the United States, Pretoria nevertheless often appears anxious to be accepted by the United States because of its symbolic role as the leader of the West. Hence, US agreement to what might otherwise be viewed as insignificant steps—such as the provision of training to South African coast guard members or the opening of two honorary South African consulates in the United States—often have been seized upon by the South African press as indications that South Africa's international isolation may be ending. On the other hand, the international sport world's ostracism of South Africa is felt deeply by South Africans in all walks of life. Exploiting the South Africans' desire to be accepted even in a symbolic sense represents, in our judgment, one of Washington's few sources of leverage vis-a-vis Pretoria.

Dealing in this realm, however, is a delicate matter, since withholding or withdrawing symbolic incentives does not, by definition, harm the South Africans very much. Because Pretoria seems fully aware that US carrots and sticks are fairly insubstantial, the greatest mileage can be extracted from them, in our judgment, if the South Africans believe they are being applied consistently: that is, if South Africa's cooperative behavior is rewarded case by case and its recalcitrance punished case by case. Our monitoring of South African attitudes toward Western governments in general makes it plain that Pretoria perceives it as weakness or vacillation if day-to-day dealings remain on a business-as-usual basis after South Africa has been unresponsive to a high-level demarche on a particular issue.

**Avoiding Pretoria's Embrace.** Political issues in southern Africa are to a great extent racial politics in a life-or-death situation; neither white South African nor black Africans appear to hold much hope for compromise solutions. US efforts to seek meliorative approaches, since the legitimacy of each side's position is accepted for negotiating purposes, risks alienation from those equally adamant in condemning either white minority rule or black majority rule. This appears to be an inescapable dilemma for US policymakers.

In contrast to the very modest official US presence in southern Africa, the paramount reality for most black Africans is the far more substantial private US economic links to South Africa. US efforts to distance itself symbolically from South Africa—which, incidentally, undermine Washington's influence with Pretoria—probably will remain unconvincing to most of Pretoria's opponents as long as US-South African economic relations remain largely undisturbed. We believe that Pretoria's understanding of this dynamic underlies its policy of striving to be the West's number-one supplier of critical minerals.

For the United States, therefore, avoiding the appearance of tacit collusion with South Africa is far easier said than done. Pretoria's dominant role in the region and its strong economic links to the West make it easy for antiapartheid critics—as well as white South Africans—to believe that the United States is backing Pretoria against the interests of black South Africans and black Africa as a whole. In our view, the United States probably can never completely escape being tarred by its relations with South Africa. However, firmness and consistency in dealing with Pretoria could, in our judgment, mitigate considerably the negative consequences, since Pretoria's opponents could at least correlate warming trends in US-South African bilateral relations with "improvements" in South African behavior.

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