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
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Islam and Politics: A Compendium



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April 1984

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Islam and Politics: A Compendium [Redacted]

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This paper was prepared by [Redacted] Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. [Redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESAs, on
[Redacted]

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Preface

*Information available
as of 2 April 1984
was used in this report.*

This directory is designed as a reference aid for the policymaker or analyst interested in charting the course of the Islamic revival since the Iranian revolution in countries with significant Muslim populations. We have chronicled the extent to which Islam, especially in its militant and radical forms, is an influence on the politics of those countries and offer a brief prognosis of each nation's prospects for future stability, with emphasis on the role of Islamic fundamentalism. [Redacted]

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Our study examines all countries with Muslim populations that comprise a significant part of the social fabric. Although the Muslim heartland of the Middle East is undoubtedly the locus of the most politically active fundamentalist movements, it contains less than one-fourth of the world's nearly 1 billion believers. We did not set a minimum percentage of Muslims to total country population for inclusion in the study; such a restriction would have eliminated the approximately 80 million Muslims who live and practice their faith in China and the Soviet Union. We did omit many countries with small pockets of Muslims that are statistically as well as politically insignificant. [Redacted]

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We examined a large number of intelligence reports and State Department communications received over the past five years. Academic monographs and foreign and US press reports provided additional details and often useful analysis. Population statistics were estimated as of July 1983 by the Center for International Research, US Bureau of the Census. In many countries, we estimated the Muslim populations based on the best available data because their governments have not enumerated their populations by sect or released statistics on them. [Redacted]

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Unity, Diversity, and Turmoil in the Islamic Mosaic

The latest Islamic revival, begun in the early 1970s, reached its apogee with the revolution in Iran in 1979 and now affects the lives of close to 1 billion people and more than 60 governments worldwide. Although Islam increasingly thrives as a set of social and religious values transcending national boundaries, its political content has often meant domestic pressure on the government establishment and tensions between nations. [redacted]

Islam has developed a confrontational dimension that has both invigorated its reassertion and alarmed Western policymakers. In many countries with significant Muslim populations, disillusionment with alien, secular ideologies such as democracy, Communism, and socialism is widespread. Military setbacks in the Arab heartland states have added to a sentiment of failure, despite the fact that colonial domination is over. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Goals

Fundamentalist Islam is, according to academics, an offshoot of the overall phenomenon of religious revival and has increasingly taken on both militant and radical forms. Based on our analysis of fundamentalist organizations in 71 countries with sizable Muslim populations, we see common philosophical goals among them:

- **Constitutional Reform.** All groups press for a return to preeminence of the Shariah (Islamic legal system) rather than civil codes for the rule of the state.
- **Search for Social and Economic Justice.** Fundamentalists want society restructured to protect the underprivileged and to institutionalize an equitable distribution of the fruits of labor.
- **Reform of Leadership.** The "just ruler" who serves his populace before himself is a consistent theme in fundamentalist belief.
- **Purity Within Society.** All fundamentalist groups condemn the lax morals of contemporary society, the breakdown of family unity, deviation from the

dietary prohibitions of Islam, the immodest dress of females, and the mingling of the sexes in school and commerce. [redacted]

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Despite these common goals and attempts to internationalize the scope of fundamentalism through associations, havens in exile, and external funding of small radical cells, international links between fundamentalist groups are hampered by mutual intolerance and domestic issues [redacted]

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Characteristics of the Islamic Revival

A Third World Phenomenon

Although Muslims exist under democracies, monarchies, sultanates, and socialist and Communist states—virtually every form of government—we see the revival principally as a developing country phenomenon. It is born out of the anxieties and frustrations of the disproportionately youthful Third World countries striving to demonstrate their autonomy from the postcolonial influences of the developed world. We believe that the revival was partly fueled by the oil-rich Muslim heartland countries in the mid-1970s, but it also exists indigenously without external assistance and will continue even if the world petroleum market declines or collapses. [redacted]

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Our analysis shows that all governments in the Muslim world, whatever their political ideology, are vulnerable to the destabilizing criticism made by domestic opposition or by imported Islamic activists. Many of these governments are debt ridden and lack the resources for independent economic development. They must seek funds from radical Muslim states yet cultivate the financial largess of both superpowers. Internally, they must provide their youthful population with employment and their masses with social welfare programs. [redacted]

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The Muslim Brotherhood

Within the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) is the most prominent fundamentalist Islamic organization. Founded in 1928 by Shaykh Hassan al-Banna, it became an important political group in Egypt in the 1940s. After World War II it spread to other Arab states, both through returning Arab students who had studied in Egypt and through Egyptian exiles who sought haven in other states, especially in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. Many Egyptian Brothers remain as teachers of Arabic in neighboring nations, conveying their philosophy along with their academic knowledge to young, impressionable Arabs. [redacted]

During its sometimes tempestuous history, the Brotherhood has adapted to the exigencies of regime suspicions by active cooperation with governments or, at the other extreme, by fighting underground as terrorist groups, infiltrating armies, co-opting student organizations, and publishing propaganda. This flexibility of tactics and the clandestine nature of its methods have perhaps given the Brotherhood a more sinister reputation than it deserves. Only in the Syrian "branch" is the Brotherhood a declared revolutionary force determined to overthrow the secular regime. In other countries such as Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan, the governments have used the Brotherhood to counter threats from leftists and Arab nationalists. [redacted]

We have little evidence that the innumerable groups of religious revivalists calling themselves the Muslim Brotherhood that exist not only in Arab states but in

such non-Arab countries as West Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Malaysia are linked in any way. It may only be the name that is a common feature. [redacted]

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A common set of objectives, as opposed to true fraternal links, underlies Brotherhood pronouncements in all countries:

- Substitution of the Shariah for Western legal systems.
- An economy based on Koranic principles, including the abolition of interest and the replacement of tax codes by the traditional zakat (alms tax) to help the poor.
- The relegation of women to the home to fulfill their divinely ordered function of bearing and raising children. [redacted]

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We expect the Brotherhood's ideology to remain attractive, especially among disadvantaged youth in developing countries, as an Islamic fundamentalist counterpoint to the perceived threat of Westernization. The presence of a secret society will create tensions between the Brotherhood and the host governments, particularly in secular states that are deeply suspicious of the aims of a potentially destabilizing organization. [redacted]

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Reaffirmation and Purification

We believe the Islamic revival has been principally a reaffirming and purifying force sweeping nominally Muslim societies rather than a proselytizing force attempting to convert nonbelievers as it was in past centuries. The lax practice and distortion of orthodox Islam has been moderated as both governments and the opposition have used Islamic terminology and symbols to introduce reforms in society. This attitudinal change has spurred an unprecedented intellectual

revival in Islamic centers, international dialogues and disputations, and a plethora of publications and study groups. The profound communications and transportation explosion of the late 20th century has sparked almost instantaneous awareness of the powerful message of Islam by millions of villagers on the ubiquitous transistor radio, cassette player, and television. [redacted]

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Islamic Sectarianism

Islam has undergone numerous splits, rivalries, and conflicts over the interpretation of the Koran and Muhammad's messages on social and religious behavior among believers. The major division is between the two branches, Sunni and Shia. Numerous subsects or schools of interpretation are included in these two basic divisions. [redacted]

Sunni

More than 80 percent of all Muslims are Sunnis. They are followers of the Sunnah, the way of the Prophet, and recognize the first four caliphs (successors to Muhammad) as temporal leaders of Islam. Within two centuries after the death of Muhammad, however, no central authority interpreted Islamic religious law. Instead, four schools of interpretation evolved, based on the individuals who first espoused a doctrinal version of the hadiths, the "six books" of traditions under the Prophet. These schools (Hanbali, Hanafi, Shafii, and Maliki) are considered equally valid, and a Sunni Muslim may follow any one of them. [redacted]

Although Sunni Muslims have religious scholars and clerics, they place greater stress on community consensus than on the pronouncements of religious elders. The religious establishments in Sunni states have rarely posed a political threat to the regime, as they accept a secular leader's right to rule the state. They have often legitimized authoritarian rule by their support and, at the same time, moderated the leader's secular policies. [redacted]

Shia

Shia Islam is based on the belief that the legitimate leadership of the Islamic community rests exclusively

among the descendants of Muhammad's son-in-law Ali, who was the fourth infallible imam. Over time the line of succession came into dispute, with Shia Islam dividing and subdividing into innumerable sects, usually over interpretation of when a new infallible imam would appear to bestow true knowledge upon mankind. [redacted]

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Shias accept the doctrine of the indivisibility of religious and political decision making in a literal sense. This makes it easy for Shia adherents to accept authoritative figures who interpret all laws—civil and religious—in the spirit of an imam in the line of Ali. [redacted]

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Political Repercussions of the Split

The Sunni-Shia split has, throughout the history of Islam, been one of its most divisive and, at times, most bloody characteristics. In the 19th century this split produced "reformist" or "fundamentalist" movements. In the last decade, Shias—who are a minority except in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and North Yemen—have fared poorly politically against the more flexible Sunni majority. But, with Iran's revolution, its proselytizing convictions, and the funds to support its missionizing, new sectarian tensions have come to other Muslim communities. To the Sunni or secular leadership in countries such as Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Kuwait, Shias have been perceived as a politically destabilizing threat that must be dealt with—sometimes delicately, sometimes with political repression. [redacted]

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The purification element of Islamic activism has omitted, almost without exception, any condemnation of the concurrent technological revolution within the Third World. Instead, it exists alongside knowledge and control of advanced scientific techniques, agricultural and industrial modernization, and, more ominously, nuclear knowledge and sophisticated military

applications. Some of the most militant fundamentalists have impressive Western educations in technical areas. [redacted]

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Sufi Brotherhoods

Sufism is a variant on orthodox Islam with broad appeal, particularly in Africa. Sufi elements also appear in the Soviet Union and in South and Southeast Asia. Sufism is not a "sect" as such but rather an Islamic order with followers banded together, usually under one historic teacher who often becomes a saint after death. [redacted]

The Sufi tradition, which began several centuries after Muhammad's death, is characterized by two components: personal spiritual growth and union with Allah through mystical ecstasy. It is condemned by orthodox Islam and fundamentalism, which both stress more rigid adherence to the Koran and the Shariah. [redacted]

Sufi religious orders in North Africa evolved into numerous groups who believed that religious power came from saints, tombs, and the descendants of original teachers. In the rest of Africa, Sufi fraternities have stressed special rituals and charms and have given cohesion and social order, especially in rural areas. They have often represented particular ethnic interests and, in some cases, commercial ties. [redacted]

Qadiriya and Tijaniya are the two most popular Sufi orders in Africa:

• **Qadiriya.** Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani was a Persian mystic and miracle worker who died in 1166 in Baghdad after attracting hundreds of disciples and followers. His conservative teachings came to be laced with Sufi mysticism and ecstasy-producing ceremonies through the centuries. 25X1

• **Tijaniya.** The Tijaniya Brotherhood sprang up in the 19th century partly as a rival to the powerful Qadiriya. Founded by a Moroccan cleric, Ahmad al-Tijani (1737-1815), it spread through Islamic Africa spearheaded through territorial conquests by specific Sufi leaders. After waning, it reemerged in the 20th century. It now is probably the largest brotherhood in Africa with many largely autonomous branches ranging from western Upper Volta to Sudan and Ethiopia. [redacted] 25X1

Politically, the Sufi orders have had little influence on the predominantly secular leadership of African states. Sufism, however, has proved to be a resilient restraining factor against the proselytizing of either Saudi Wa'hhabis, radical Libyans, or fundamentalist Iranians, all of whom regard Sufism as a heretical form of Islam. [redacted] 25X1

The Threat to Stability

Our analysis of fundamentalist groups worldwide indicates that many of them, frustrated by their inability to participate in their own domestic political process, have turned to militancy and terrorism to unseat unpopular secular leaders or "impure" Muslim leaders. The ideologically motivated battle of the fundamentalists against indigenous leaders who have associated themselves too closely with Western secularism is often bloody and dangerous—as irrational or destructive as the assassination of Egypt's Sadat or the terrorist bombing of peacekeeping forces in Beirut. [redacted]

Although fundamentalist groups can cause national crises overnight with terrorist acts, they usually lose

more than they gain as the government undertakes repressive measures against them. [redacted] 25X1

The Government Response

We have observed that governments' political responses over the past few years have followed patterns of both co-optation and repression. [redacted] 25X1

Co-optation

Governments have set up varying forms of "establishment Islam" in which they: 25X1

- Emphasize personal acts of piety and public religious observances by government leaders.

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- Engage in widespread building of mosques and Islamic educational institutions.
- Establish Ministries of Religion, Islamic Affairs, or similar structures in which religious figures can be co-opted into the government establishment.
- Nationalize the clerics by making them civil servants.
- Sponsor Islamic cultural events such as Koran reading contests.
- Mandate more stringent observance of the Islamic social code such as banning gambling, alcohol, and nightclubs.
- Send religious leaders on representational trips to international Islamic conferences or meetings.

In our view, these steps have short-range usefulness in legitimizing the political leader and his regime but have done little to dampen fundamentalist zeal. Co-optation may have radicalized many Muslim youths who resent what they perceive as the government's hypocrisy.

Repression

The alternative government response has been repression, which includes:

- Banning of radical literature, censorship of publications, and seizure of imported Islamic literature.
- Disbanding student organizations and banning group meetings.
- Trying, jailing, and even executing fundamentalist opposition.
- Targeting fundamentalist groups for security surveillance and infiltration; setting up networks of informers, agents, and provocateurs.
- Publicly equating fundamentalism with fanaticism and antigovernment activity.

Ruthless suppression has had its successes, most noticeably in the Communist states. Other secular states, such as Syria, Iraq, and Indonesia, have also found that repression keeps opposition manageable. We believe, however, that suppression of the fundamentalist opposition may eventually backfire, as it did against Sadat in Egypt. Increasing numbers of fundamentalists may form extremist groups in exile, gain financial assistance from Libya or Iran, and increase their terrorist acts against secular or even moderate Muslim rulers.

The Future: Fundamentalism Limited as a Political Force

We expect the Islamic revival to continue to exert pressure on the leaders of Muslim countries but not to create revolutionary changes either within the state or in the relations between countries. Governments, which can exploit Islam for political expediency, economic enhancement, and genuine social change, probably will continue a course of pragmatic accommodation with it. No government ignores its politically divisive implications. Although we believe that violent acts by Muslim extremists will continue to plague the states of the Muslim world over the near term, we do not expect the forces of fundamentalism to unite in the unique conditions that produced the Islamic Republic of Iran. 25X1

Although the Iranian revolution unquestionably strengthened the Islamic revival, we believe that the inherent divisiveness and multisectarian and mutually intolerant character of the Muslim world, including the presence of ethnic, tribal, and national rivalries, will work against a unified movement that could coalesce against US interests. We know of no charismatic leader who transcends national lines. Although we expect Iran and Libya to continue their efforts to export a more militant brand of Islam and Saudi Arabian coffers to spill out millions to support friendly, conservative states, we believe their influence will continue to be limited, especially where the two superpowers are largely inimical to their aims. 25X1

Implications for the United States 25X1

Our analysis shows that Islamic resurgence has often generated anti-Western attitudes and policies and a suspicion of Western intentions. The fundamentalists are hostile to the United States on several counts:

- It is a predominantly Christian country with a constitutionally mandated separation between church and state.
- Its materialism and immorality (as perceived by the fundamentalists) are offensive.

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- It is a benefactor to the power elite of regimes throughout the Muslim world. For Islamic militants opposing their own rulers, the United States shares the role of villain.
- The fundamentalists see the United States as favoring Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- Fundamentalists blame the United States for failing to propose an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem. [redacted]

An attempt by the government of a Muslim country to diminish Islam's normally important role in government decisionmaking could obscure important indicators of a serious challenge to the government. For example, the stilled voice of the clerics under the Shah in Iran contributed to a US misassessment of the Shah's staying power. On the other hand, an overreaction to our problems with predicting the Iranian revolution might lead us to misperceive a threat to US interests resulting from Islamic resurgence. In most cases, governments probably will continue to co-opt the clerics and integrate Islamic resurgence in a fashion that will not harm US interests. [redacted]

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Most militant fundamentalist groups display a xenophobic fear that the West, specifically the United States, will translate what the groups see as disdain for Islam into active interference and confrontation. This perception has impaired US initiatives for peace in the Middle East and has bred an intransigence and intolerance among the fundamentalists that we believe is a legacy of years of Islamic animosity to the Christian world's predominance in world affairs.

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"Neither East nor West" is a recurrent and popular theme in current Islamic ideology, but the fundamentalists usually find the Soviet Union's message more appealing than that of the United States because of its stronger support for revolutionary change against entrenched regimes. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a glaring exception to this record. [redacted]

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
We believe that the Islamic factor will be a potentially destabilizing force for many Muslim nations with which the United States has strategic relations and that it will require increased sensitivity on the part of US policy to contain subversion by fundamentalists. Although we do not believe that extremist religious groups will be able to seize control of governments anywhere in the Islamic world in the near term, they are capable—as evidenced by the assassination of Sadat—of taking violent action against close US allies. [redacted]

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Muslim Population



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The Middle East

**The Middle East:
Crisis at the Epicenter**

The Islamic revival has had its greatest impact in the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam. In its radical fundamentalist forms, it provides a divinely inspired Islamic answer to the social dislocations of modernization. In states where religious expression is inextricably associated with political action, moreover, Islamic radicalism and militancy are paths for social change. Petroleum wealth has added to the equation—as both the engine of rapid modernization and the fuel for the spread of fundamentalism. [redacted]

In foreign relations, Islam provides the cement binding disparate societies together in their rhetorical, if not actual, conflict with the Jewish state of Israel in their midst. Common Islamic bonds intensify the Middle Eastern fixation on the Palestinian dilemma. Despite these bonds, Islamic unity is perennially wracked by the region's theological variations of fundamentalist belief, variations that have led from mistrust to hostility to outright warfare. [redacted]

Two nations in the Middle East can claim to be genuinely fundamentalist. Saudi Arabia, a tribal kingdom ruled by the Saud family, which united with the religious hierarchy a century ago, contains the holiest shrines of Islam, proclaims the Shariah as its legal system, and, using its oil wealth, has attempted to influence other Muslim nations with its version of fundamentalist principles. The second, Iran, is not Arab but underwent a revolution in 1979, which is considered by all experts to be by far the most serious Islamic movement of the 20th century. The successful Shia assumption of political power, wrested by the masses from an entrenched autocrat and powerful military, has evolved into a theocracy that continues to attempt to influence and destabilize neighboring Muslim states. [redacted]

The religious policies of most other regimes in the region range from orthodox to modernist, seeking policies by which the leadership can retain political power yet accommodate, co-opt, and even coerce the common religion. Jordan and Egypt have set out ambitious modernization plans, heavily dependent on

Saudi and US financial aid, while the rulers emphasize their Islamic credentials and fully support "establishment" Islam. The lesser Gulf monarchies, starting from the basis of highly traditional and underdeveloped societies, are heavily dependent on foreigners for technological advancement, which makes them vulnerable to militant Islam and its rejection of the West. Within the last few years, these rulers have tried to balance Westernization with traditional values by stricter enforcement of Islam's social and ethical codes and increased linkages with other Muslim states. North Yemen has proclaimed itself an Islamic Arab socialist republic but has had only marginal success at mixing modernization with traditional Islam. [redacted]

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The Arab secular regimes, which have never recognized Islam as a basis for government—the Ba'athist socialists of Syria and Iraq, the embattled regime of divided and war-torn Lebanon, and Marxist South Yemen—all face in varying degrees the threat of politicized Islam undermining their unpopular regimes. [redacted]

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
Ideological failures and a crisis of legitimacy continue to provide fertile ground for Islamic militancy throughout the region. Shaped by the postcolonial demarcations of foreign powers, without genuine wars of independence to hone true nationalism, most Middle Eastern countries are searching for an identity to match their cultural roots. Most reformist political trends—Islamic socialism, Arab nationalism, Marxism—have failed to bring about lasting peace and stability. To increasing numbers of youth (more than half of the populations of almost all countries are under 20), Islamic ideals are appealing. Radical revolutionary criticism of the country's leadership and its hypocrisy, corruption, failure to spread the wealth, and inability to bring about social justice is increasing. Since political channels of expression are few in states that are either monarchical, authoritarian, or feudal, opposition is increasingly expressed in religious terms. [redacted]

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Sunni and Shia Muslim Distribution in the Middle East



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Young activists who see deep-rooted Islamic values being challenged or abandoned by their rulers are gaining militant converts, stressing opposition to developments such as the broader role of women in their changing societies. Their militancy also has taken the form of sectarian or tribal strife, concealing with the mantle of Islamic purification more ancient differences.

Not surprisingly, the Iranian revolution sent waves of alarm through the leadership of neighboring states. It had widespread appeal among the Muslim masses of the Middle East, Sunni as well as Shia, for several reasons:

- It demonstrated that the masses can overturn a powerful regime, removing its legitimacy by sustained struggle.

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Table 1
Middle East

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect (Percent)	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Bahrain	393,000	100	Shia—65 Sunni—35	Shaykhdom	Growing, especially among Shias	Iran	Sectarian unrest
Cyprus	653,000	18	Sunni	Republic divided into Greek and Turk political entities	Minimal	None known	Greek-Turkish enmity
Egypt	45,800,000	93	Sunni—93 Shia—less than 1 Sufism	Authoritarian republic	Strong mass appeal, many groups	Saudi Arabia	Islam prime source of dissension
Iran	42,500,000	97	Shia—91 Sunni—6 Sufism	Islamic theocracy	Dominant philosophy; state supported	None known	Continued fundamentalist fervor
Iraq	14,500,000	95	Shia—55 Sunni—40	Socialist, one party	Increasing	Iran, Syria, Libya	Repression, sectarian strife
Israel	4,000,000*	11	Sunni	Parliamentary democracy	Signs of revival	None known	Islamic population may become more assertive, troublesome
Jordan	2,600,000	92	Sunni	Constitutional monarchy	Weak, some government support	Saudi Arabia	Probably stable
Kuwait	1,700,000	99	Sunni—69 Shia—30	Shaykhdom	Increasing; some government sponsored	Iran	Probably stable; terrorism a threat
Lebanon	2,600,000	74	Shia—40 Sunni—27 Druze—7	Parliamentary democracy	Religious revival not a major factor in civil war	Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia	Partition between Muslims and Christians possible
Oman	978,000	100	Ibadhi—75 Sunni—25 Shia—less than 1	Absolute shaykhdom	Latent	Saudi Arabia, South Yemen	Probably stable
Qatar	267,000	100	Sunni (Wa'hhabi)—89 Shia—11	Shaykhdom	No evidence	Saudi Arabia, Iran	Stability
Saudi Arabia	10,400,000	100	Sunni (Wa'hhabi)—95 Shia—5	Islamic monarchy	Government sponsored	Iran	Probably stable
Syria	9,700,000	90	Sunni—75 Alawite—11 Druze—3 Shia—1.5	Authoritarian socialist	Clandestine, rising among Sunnis	None known	Continuing tensions, repression

Table 1
Middle East (continued)

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect (Percent)	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Turkey	49,200,000	99	Sunni—79 Alevi—20 Sufism	Military rule	Growth in religious interest	Iran	Sectarian tensions persist
United Arab Emirates	1,400,000	100	Sunni—95 Shia—5	Federation of shaykhdoms	No evidence	None known	Probably stable
Yemen, North	5,700,000	100	Zaydi Shia—52 Sunni—48	Military rule	Growing, many small groups	Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, PLO	Chronic instability
Yemen, South	2,100,000	100	Sunni	Marxist	No evidence	No evidence	Probably stable

^a Israel proper.

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- It was a Third World victory in which both super-powers were powerless to stop its momentum.
- Regardless of its subsequent tarnish theologically, it was an Islamic victory after decades of defeat in the region at the hands of other ideologies.

Consequently, most Arab nations have rated "fundamentalists" and "Shias" as first-priority internal security threats. Arab calls for militant unity against Israel and solutions for Palestine remain popular, but the catalytic effect of the Iranian revolution has injected a new appeal that is potentially destabilizing to the regimes of the Middle East in the long run.

Bahrain

Population/Ethnic Composition: 393,000. 313,000 native Arabs; 80,000 foreigners, primarily Indians and Pakistanis.

Religious Composition: Approximately 65 percent Shia and 35 percent Sunni Muslim. About 20 percent of Shias are of Persian extraction.

Government: Ruled as a traditional Arab emirate by the Sunni Muslim Khalifa family since the late 18th century, then became constitutional monarchy with independence in 1971. The current Amir, Isa bin

Sulman Al-Khalifa, has ruled since 1961 in consultation with family members and a Council of Ministers, many of whom are Khalifas. Bahrain had a National Assembly from 1973 until 1975, when it was dissolved by the Amir. Political parties are prohibited.

Religious Policies of Government: Islamic state with the reputation among the more conservative Gulf states for laxity in applying Shariah (religious law) and for toleration of decadence (permitting discos, mixing of the sexes, and sale of alcohol). The government permits Christian sects to maintain places of worship but frowns on proselytizing. Since a coup attempt in 1981, Bahrain has accelerated its policy of removing Shias from sensitive positions in government, in particular from the security services.

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: The government maintains separate Sunni and Shia religious courts as well as secular ones; Islamic Affairs Ministry has separate Sunni and Shia departments. Although the ruling family is

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
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
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Egypt: President Sadat's defiant assassins on trial



Saudi Arabia: Rapid modernization in a tribal shaykhdom



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Sunni, the Amir contributes to religious organizations and consults with religious leaders of both sects. Both Sunnis and Shias hold government positions, including Cabinet posts.

Sunni and Shia fundamentalist societies and public displays of devotion to Islamic practices are increasing. Some evidence that a corresponding growth in clandestine, antiregime, religious-based factions exists as well.

Status of Fundamentalism: Support for fundamentalist causes is growing within the Shia community and to a lesser extent among the Sunnis; membership in

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Iran-Iraq war: A conflagration threatening the region and beyond



Lebanon: A Shiite woman warrior, exporting the revolution or ensuring national disintegration?

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Fundamentalist Organizations:

- **Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB):** Based in Iran, the clandestine IFLB was responsible for the coup attempt in December 1981. The IFLB seeks the overthrow of the Khalifas and the establishment of an Iranian-type Islamic republic in Bahrain.
- **The Islamic Enlightenment Society:** An overt Shia religious club centered in the Shia villages of north-west Bahrain, it is the largest fundamentalist group; it is headed by Shaykh 'Isa Ahmad Qasim. It probably is a front for the clandestine Islamic Call (Da'wah) Party (ICP).

- **Islamic Call (Da'wah) Party (ICP):** The clandestine ICP, apparently an offshoot of the Iraqi Da'wah Party, operates in Bahrain, primarily against the Bahraini regime.

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Foreign Involvement: Iran supports Shia dissident groups, the IFLB, and the ICP; little known of exact amount of financial support

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Recent Developments:

- 16 December 1981: Attempted coup against ruling Khalifa family.

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- 20 December 1981: Bahrain signed a bilateral security pact with Saudi Arabia immediately after the coup attempt was uncovered and has encouraged broader cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council on security and intelligence matters. []

Prognosis: Bahrain's Shia dissidents, the best organized in the Gulf, are likely to repeat their attempt to remove the Khalifas. The government's seemingly tolerant policies will do little to win it Shia approval or assuage the deep-seated tensions between the Sunni and Shia communities. Gestures of conciliation to Shia moderates and threats of punishment to religious militants will not remove the sources of sectarian unrest. Shias will continue to resent the dominant Sunni minority and to use religious organizations—whether legitimate or clandestine—as vehicles for their protests. []

Cyprus

Population/Ethnic Composition: 653,000. 78 percent Greek; 18 percent Turk; 4 percent Armenian, Maronite, other. []

Religious Composition: 18 percent Sunni Muslim (118,000); 78 percent Greek Orthodox; 4 percent Maronite, Armenian, Apostolic, other. Muslims are exclusively Turks, concentrated in the northern 37 percent of the island. []

Government: Republic, but divided into two separate ethnic-based political entities. Greeks control the only internationally recognized government in the south. Turks established a federated state in 1975 and in November 1983 proclaimed an independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Turkey is the only country that has recognized the new Turkish Cypriot entity. []

Religious Policies of Government: Both communities are officially secular and tolerant of all religious practices. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Mufti of Cyprus has no political function, serves only as official expounder of Islamic law. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Islamic resurgence appears minimal, only as a social accompaniment to Turkish separatism. []

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Fundamentalist Organizations: None reportedly active, although Cyprus has long served as a haven for religious refugees and exiles. []

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Foreign Involvement: No significant foreign involvement among Muslims. []

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Recent Developments:

- January 1984: Turkish Cypriot "government" unsuccessfully sought recognition by Muslim states at the Casablanca meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization. []

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Prognosis: Greek and Turkish enmity will continue, with Islam playing a role only as an identifying cultural symbol for Turkish separatism. []

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Egypt

Population/Ethnic Composition: 45.8 million. 90 percent eastern Hamitic; about 10 percent Greek, Italian, Syro-Lebanese. []

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Religious Composition: 93 percent Muslim (42.6 million); 7 percent Christian Copt and other. Muslims are 93 percent Sunni, less than 1 percent Shia. Strong undercurrent of Sufism in rural areas. []

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Government: Monarchy indirectly ruled by Great Britain until toppled by military coup led by Maj. Gen. Muhammad Naguib in 1952. He was replaced as President in 1954 by Col. Gamal Abd al-Nasir. Nasir espoused Arab socialism and Egyptian nationalism with Soviet support. After defeat by Israel in 1967, Nasir's leftist policies were somewhat discredited. His Vice President, Anwar Sadat, became President when Nasir died in 1970. Sadat was assassinated by Muslim extremists in October 1981 and was succeeded by his Vice President, Hosni Mubarak. Republican government under a strong executive with elected legislature dominated by government party, an independent judiciary, and regular legislative and presidential elections. []

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Religious Policies of Government: Secular government. President Nasir subordinated the role of the ulema, reduced their power and wealth by making them civil servants, secularized religious courts, and banned the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. The military defeat by Israel in 1967 resulted in a popular revival of religion among Egyptians. In 1970 Sadat took political advantage of this trend by supporting Islamic fundamentalists to counter leftist influence in government and among youth. The government continued its sponsorship of official forms of Islam, extensive mosque building, and co-opting the religious hierarchy until September 1981 when Sadat sharply reduced his tolerance for fundamentalism and ordered massive arrests of extremist leaders. Mubarak has continued official ban of Islamic radicals but maintains a truce with the Muslim Brotherhood. He has also moved to install moderates in religious institutions and to improve strained relations with other Muslim states caused by the peace treaty with Israel.

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Egypt is the intellectual center of Islam. A wide spectrum of Islamic thought exists, and, as a result, numerous groups have proliferated. The official Muslim establishment is employed directly or dominated by the state and has no separate power base. The Grand Shaykh of Al Azhar, a presidential appointee, oversees Al Azhar University, the center of Islamic intellectual activity. The Ministry for Religious Trusts controls the purse strings for both Muslim and Coptic welfare activities. The Grand Mufti, another presidential appointee, is theoretically highest authority on Islamic law but performs largely ceremonial role. Both are highly esteemed moderates. The relatively moderate fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood also indirectly influences government policy.

Status of Fundamentalism: Religious revival has gone on in Egypt sporadically in the 20th century. Latest revival opposed Sadat's liberal social and economic policies and has strong antiregime flavor that appears destined to affect any government's future social and economic policies. Islamic fundamentalism finds particular appeal among educated youth, both urban and rural, and is even common in the lower levels of armed forces.

Fundamentalist Organizations: There are two major moderate organizations and a large number of extremist offshoots that have gone underground:

Moderates:

- **Muslim Brotherhood (MB):** Egypt's earliest Islamic fundamentalist organization, has evolved from early radicalism of 1930s into a moderate organization dedicated to development of an Islamic state. Membership is estimated at 500,000; organization appears tight and disciplined; name of nominal leader is Umar Talmasana. MB is banned but unofficially tolerated because it poses no threat to government.
- **Jama'iyat al-Shari'ah (Legal Society):** A smaller, moderate offshoot from Muslim Brotherhood which formed in 1970s.

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Extremist Groups: They range from small groups of less than 100 to groups up to 5,000 strong. All advocate violent overthrow of the government. Membership is drawn mostly from young professionals and students. Activities range from pamphleteering to violent confrontations with Coptic Christian minority. The following is a partial list of known groups:

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- **Al-Takfir Wa al-Hijrah (Repentance and Holy Flight).**
- **Al-Jihad (Holy Struggle).**
- **Al-Jihad al-Jadid (The New Holy Struggle):** The name of an umbrella organization of radicals who assassinated President Sadat. Most members arrested, some executed.
- **Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party)** with its youth wing, **Shabab Muhammad (Youth of Muhammad)**, is part of a multistate network founded in 1948 and dedicated to establishing a caliphate in Islamic countries. Clandestine, underground group whose leadership in Egypt was arrested.
- **Jama'at ahl-Bayt (People of the House).**
- **Jama'at Quwwat al-Quran (Forces of the Koran).**
- **New Islam.**
- **Hizb Allah (God's Party).**
- **Tanzim al-Qutbiyun (Supporters of Sayyid Qutb).**
- **Al-Tala'ia al-Islamiya (The Islamic Vanguard).**
- **Group for the Promotion of Virtue.**

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Foreign Involvement: The government suspects external funding and encouragement of fundamentalist and radical societies. Saudi Arabia is believed to have been the original banker of Muslim Brotherhood activities, and both Iran and Libya are rumored to have funneled money to militant antiregime groups. Thus far, we have no proof of anything more than moral encouragement to radical groups. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- 1977: Two extremist groups, Al-Takfir Wa al-Hijrah and Al-Jihad, kidnaped and assassinated the Minister for Religious Trusts; government, in major crackdown, captured and executed leadership of the two groups.
- 1979: Fundamentalist students staged strikes in reaction to government passage of liberalized women's rights law and signing of peace treaty with Israel; President Sadat abolished fundamentalist-dominated student unions.
- November 1979: Islamic societies staged massive prayer service in Cairo.
- September 1981: Sadat attacked Muslim Brotherhood and jailed hundreds of extremists and other dissidents.
- 6 October 1981: Sadat assassinated by Al-Jihad al-Jadid followers who called for general uprising. [redacted]

Prognosis: Islam will continue to be a dominant source of dissension, and the Islamic right will remain the most politically explosive force opposing the government, particularly if Mubarak fails to effectively address basic social and economic concerns. [redacted]

Iran

Population/Ethnic Composition: 42.5 million. 63 percent Persians; 18 percent Turkic (Azarbayjanis, Turkemens, Qashqais); 3 percent Arab; 16 percent other (Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiariis, Baluch, Gilanis, Mazandoranis, Armenians, Assyrians, and Jews). [redacted]

Religious Composition of Population: 97 percent Islam (41.6 million) of which 91 percent is Shia and 6 percent is Sunni (mostly in southwest, southeast, and northwest areas among the Turkomans, Arabs, Baluch, and some Kurds). Sufi orders are still active.

Other religions include Christians, Jews, Bahais, and Zoroastrians. [redacted]

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Government: Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who had ruled with one interruption since 1941, was overthrown in bloody revolution, and Islamic Republic was established in 1979 under leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The 270-member Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) has legislative powers, with Council of Guardians reviewing all legislation for fidelity to the principles of Islam. Judicial authorities are religious jurists. [redacted]

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Religious Policies of Government: The constitution provides that Shia Islam is the official religion. Other Islamic denominations "enjoy complete respect," and the recognized minority religions (Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism) are "free within the limits of the law to perform their religious rites." There appears, however, to be persecution and discrimination of some religious groups. The government has moved forcefully against the Bahai faith, which is not officially recognized. The government enforces Islamic tenets by a number of official and "revolutionary" organizations, including the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard), which is also a defensive force that outnumbers the regular army. Many smaller groups such as Hezbollahi and Komitehs function domestically to restrict women's activities, indoctrinate youth, and prevent any signs of Western orientation in dress and entertainment. [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to

Government: The government is run by clerics who are divided along theological, political, geographic, generational, and educational lines. Those politically active clerics who support Ayatollah Khomeini's regime are divided roughly into three groups: the Line-of-the-Imam (Khat-elman) and Hojatieh factions and opportunists like Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, who are not firmly affiliated with either group. Other senior ayatollahs oppose the Khomeini regime in varying degrees, but they have been outmaneuvered by Khomeini's supporters. The Islamic Republic Party seems to dominate the government but does not fully

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control the executive and legislature. On the neighborhood and village level, the political power of the local "Komiteh" (made up of mosque clergy and devout male followers) is pervasive. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: The revolution is the most conspicuous example of fundamentalist fervor translated into the overturn of a secular state. A genuinely popular movement when it triumphed, its Shia character continues to have strong emotional and symbolic appeal among the lower classes who are its power base, buttressed by fundamentalist clerics and the charismatic domination by Ayatollah Khomeini. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: The government and its political arm, the Islamic Republic Party, are fundamentalist. Other organizations include:

- **Hojatieh Society:** Society for the propagation of Islam, anti-Bahai, formed in 1950s. Currently, a faction favoring strict Islamic law, use of Western technology to help the economy, limited clerical intervention in secular affairs, and export of the revolution.
- **Line-of-the-Imam:** Faction that emphasizes the more revolutionary aspects of Iran's revolution and favors good relations with the USSR, centralized economy, and a single clerical successor to Khomeini.
- **Qom Theological Circle:** Influential clerics in Iran's theological capital who maintain links to clerics throughout the country.
- **Combatant Clerics' Association:** Groups of urban local associations who support the regime's policies. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Foreign involvement in Iran by non-Shia Muslims is nonexistent. Instead, Iran is an exporter of its version of Islam and has attempted, for example, to subvert the leadership in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. The government sponsors proselytizing missions to Africa and South and Southeast Asia, with little success thus far. It is currently implicated in backing radical Shia terrorists in Lebanon, a chief target for export of the Iranian revolution. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- 1980: Khomeini created the Basij, a militia force of 20 million youths led by the Revolutionary Guard. 25X1
- Late 1982: The Tudeh (Communist) Party, only non-Islamic political group, banned with mass arrests and executions of members.
- December 1982: Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized that Iran is "no longer in a revolutionary situation" and that the regime should concentrate on guaranteeing civil liberties because the opposition has been curbed. Committees to implement this decree and some reforms apparently taking place. 25X1
- July-August 1983: Rival conservative clerics sponsored antiregime demonstrations in cities of Esfahan and Mashhad, attacking government's radical social and economic policies. [redacted] 25X1

Prognosis: No successful challenge to the regime is likely while Ayatollah Khomeini lives. Fundamentalist fervor is not likely to significantly weaken, even after Khomeini's death, and any new government will almost certainly have a strong Islamic character. [redacted]

Iraq

Population/Ethnic Composition: 14.5 million. 70.9 percent Arabs; 18.3 percent Kurds; 2.4 percent Turkomans; 8.4 percent Assyrians and others. [redacted]

Religious Composition of Population: 95 percent Muslim (13.8 million), 5 percent Christians and others. 55 percent Shia, 40 percent Sunni. In general, the Shias predominate in eastern and southern provinces, the Sunnis in western and northern provinces. Iraq is a major center of Shia Islam because it is site of its holiest shrines in Najaf and Karbala. [redacted]

Government: Monarchy overthrown in 1958 by military coup led by Abd al-Karim Qasim. Ba'th Party (Arab Socialist) overturned Qasim in February 1963, losing power by end of 1963. Ba'th Party regained power in coup of 1968, then series of countercoups until Ba'thist Saddam Husayn's ascension in 1979.

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Authoritarian, secular, but Sunni-dominated government, with Saddam's Tikriti clan associates preeminent. []

Religious Policies of Government: Since the Ba'th Party returned to power in 1968, it has struggled to consolidate power in a country plagued by Sunni-Shia factionalism. The party charter establishes Islam as a state religion. All minority religions are tolerated. The government proclaims a policy of nondiscrimination toward the Shias, who nonetheless are underrepresented in the upper ranks of the military and government. Shias lag well behind Sunnis economically and socially despite recent government efforts to improve their lot. []

The Ba'thist regime has adopted a carrot-and-stick approach to the Shia problem. It has curried the support of Shia religious leaders, expanded economic and educational opportunities in Shia areas, and recruited Shias into the Ba'th Party. At the same time, it has ruthlessly suppressed all overt manifestations of Shia discontent, has executed some Shia leaders, and continues to supervise all Shia clergy and administer Shia shrines. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: The Ba'th Party is predominantly Sunni, partly because Sunni-dominated security services dealt more harshly with Shias, who controlled the party in the 1950s. As a result of subsequent party dominance by Sunnis, many Shias view the Ba'thists as merely the latest in the long line of Sunni oppressors: []

There are numerous interlocking and shifting Shia opposition groups. Although minor anti-Ba'thist demonstrations have occurred sporadically for years in Shia areas of Iraq, such demonstrations increased after Ayatollah Khomeini gained power in Iran. Shia dissident activities have increased since early 1982 but remain episodic and more an irritant than a threat. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalist opposition to Ba'th secular regime centers in Shia groups, but there is evidence that Islamic backlash is occurring among some Sunnis as well. Economic deprivation, prolonged warfare, and rapid cultural change are

all factors for Islamic resurgence. Nearby Iranian revolution has, however, held limited appeal to faction-ridden fundamentalists who lack a charismatic and unifying leadership. [] 25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: Innumerable small groups of antiregime dissidents use fundamentalist rhetoric to galvanize struggle against Saddam's rule. They are badly splintered, reflecting tribal and regional power bases; leadership is shifting with frequent organizational renaming; the government internal security apparatus ruthlessly breaks up clandestine groups. The umbrella organization is Da'wah (Call) Party with its action arm the Mujahedin, which has headquarters in Tehran and London and close ties to Khomeini's regime. Most groups exist only on paper. Da'wah itself is split by its two leaders, who are brothers. Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim is based in Tehran and holds the fundamentalist view that Iraq should become an Islamic state. Mahdi al-Hakim is based in London and is inclined toward creating a secular government heavily imbued with Islamic principles. [] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: Iraq's dissidents vie for support from Iran, Syria, and Libya, all of which provide limited financial aid and training to groups. Iran and Syria aid competing factions in Iraq and continue to provide shelter to exiles. [] 25X1

Recent Developments:

- June 1979: Saddam ordered execution of Sayyed Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, most widely respected Shia cleric, for demonstrating during Muharram. 25X1
- September 1980: Iraq invaded Iran in war continuing to present, with Saddam appealing to conservative Arab states for assistance against Khomeini's counterattack and call for an Islamic state in Iraq.
- Fall 1982: While in Iran, exiled Shias proclaimed interim government under leadership of Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, leading Shia dissident.
- Spring 1983: Saddam in speech at Najaf called for "revival of heavenly values" and reasserts his family's claim of descent from the Prophet. 25X1
- May 1983: Saddam executed six members of al-Hakim family for their Da'wah Party activities. [] 25X1

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Prognosis: Fundamentalist opposition to regime remains badly splintered, despite the regime's economic disarray and political unpopularity. Should Iraq lose its war with Iran, fundamentalist militancy would play a role in a future state—probably for destabilization, when it would compete with Kurds seeking autonomy and Communists seeking control. [redacted]

Israel

Population/Ethnic Composition: 4 million in Israel proper. 85 percent Jews; 15 percent Arabs. In occupied West Bank and Gaza territories, population is estimated to be about 1.29 million, 96 percent Arab. [redacted]

Religious Composition: In Israel proper, 85 percent Jewish, 11 percent (475,000) Muslim; 4 percent Christian and other. More than 95 percent Muslim in occupied West Bank and Gaza territories. [redacted]

Government: Secular republic founded in 1948 as a homeland for Jews. Parliamentary democracy with no constitution, but strong unicameral legislature and multiparty system. Elections are held every four years. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who had ruled since 1977, resigned in September 1983 and was replaced by Yitzhak Shamir. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Although established as a homeland for Jews, official policy is tolerance of all creeds. Unofficially, Muslims are discriminated against and forbidden to serve in the armed forces. They were largely ignored until takeover of West Bank in 1967 significantly increased the Muslim population. For the last decade government has paid greater attention to Muslims (built mosques, helped pilgrims on hajj) in attempt to create bulwark against rising Arab nationalism. Government places heavy emphasis on surveillance of possible extremist groups. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Arabs, who are predominantly Muslims, have suffered land expropriation, economic discrimination, and social and political isolation. No Islamic party is represented in parliament, which has only a few token Arab representatives. Arabs have political influence only in towns such as Nazareth, which is largely Arab. As second-class citizens, Arabs have strongly identified with Palestinian cause. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: The last few years have seen reinvigoration and renewal of Islam among Arabs both in Israel proper and in West Bank. [redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations:

• **Muslim Brotherhood:** Formally established in 1980. Little known of extent of membership although it is believed to be confined generally to Arab-populated areas in Galilee. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: None known. [redacted]

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Recent Developments:

- 1979: Fundamentalist movement started among Arabs at Hebrew University, beginning with study groups and radical speeches. 25X1
- 11 December 1980: Prime Minister Begin banned an Israel Arab Congress to be held at Nazareth.
- February 1981: Government arrested 60 militant youths of the Muslim Brotherhood. 25X1
- 19 March 1983: Militant Israelis tried to break into Temple Mount and occupy Al Aqsa mosque, both sacred to Islam. Police discovered bomb cache destined for Arab schools. [redacted] 25X1

Prognosis: Government is increasingly alarmed by possibility of clash between extremists from both Jewish and Arab Muslim population. Incidents of civil disorder are likely to increase during next few years as fundamentalist Islam and PLO causes become intertwined. [redacted]

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Jordan

Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.6 million. 98 percent Arab. More than half of the population is of Palestinian origin; most of the rest are of Bedouin origin. [redacted]

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Religious Composition: 92 percent Sunni Muslim (2.4 million); 8 percent Christian. [redacted]

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Government: Constitutional monarchy since state was founded in 1950 as a successor to the former Emirate of Transjordan, controlled by Great Britain. First king, Abdallah, was assassinated in 1951. After brief rule by his son Talal, grandson Hussein assumed the

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throne in 1952. Hussein rules as absolute monarch with advice of an elected House of Representatives and an appointed Senate. He abolished political parties in 1957. []

Religious Policies of Government: Religious minorities are tolerated under constitution. Otherwise Jordan is a de facto Islamic state. Hussein's claimed direct descent from Prophet Muhammad legitimizes his political and religious rule. Government supports and thoroughly co-opts conservative Islam through Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Holy Places, and Religious Trusts and subsidizes clergy. At the same time, the government has attempted to co-opt the fundamentalist movement by recognizing relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhood and allowing Brotherhood exiles from other Arab countries to live in Jordan. The government also uses highly effective internal security force and informant system to monitor radicals. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: No politically independent Muslim hierarchy exists; all clerics are part of the state's system institutionalized through the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Religious bureaucracy even extends into the ranks of the military to reinforce piety and loyalty to the King. High-ranking officials in Muslim Brotherhood may play a consultative role in the government's domestic and foreign policy. Fundamentalists hold several seats in Jordan's lower house of Parliament. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalist revival, which got a boost from the Iranian revolution, does not appear to threaten the regime. The government encourages limited fundamentalist activity to compensate for lack of other allowable political activity as well as to legitimize Hussein's rule. []

Fundamentalist Organizations:

- **Muslim Brotherhood (MB):** A legal, nonrevolutionary organization with about 3,000 members, mostly from universities and trade unions, that seeks eventual Islamic state. Leader is lawyer Abd al-Rahman Khalifa. The MB recruits actively among educated, middle-class youth. It does not pose a threat to government and is allowed only so long as it confines its activities to addressing religious, not political, issues.

- **Islamic Liberation Party (ILP):** Espouses violence to establish an Islamic state and overthrow of neighboring moderate Arab governments. Banned since 1952, underground membership is now about 200. 25X1
Ten members were arrested in 1977 for infiltrating the Army, plotting to assassinate King Hussein. Reportedly has cells in other Arab nations. Head is Abd al-Hafiz Sha'rawi. Closely watched by Jordanian security.

- **Da'wah:** A nonpolitical, proselytizing group of reformists led by Muhammad Mustafa al-Rapati. Still nonconfrontational to regime. [] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: Saudis are the major benefactor as they try to preserve moderate monarchy. The government is suspicious of Iranian financial assistance; the MB harbors radicals from other Arab countries, particularly Syria. The government suspects that some small radical splinter groups have left the MB because it is too moderate. One prominent radical cleric, Shaykh Tamimi, who is reportedly a member of the ILP, has links with Iran. [] 25X1

Recent Developments:

- Early 1981: The government suspected that some MB members had established paramilitary training camps in remote areas.
- September 1982: A small number of ILP members in the Army were arrested.
- 1983: ILP members, Shaykh Tamimi and his son, arrested several times for making inflammatory speeches, detained without trial. [] 25X1

Prognosis: Although Hussein pursues a careful policy that blends conservative Islamic legitimacy with evolutionary modernization, if corruption among the elite increases and income gap widens, militant Islam could possibly become more influential and threaten the monarchy. [] 25X1

Kuwait

Population/Ethnic Composition: 1.7 million. Kuwaitis comprise less than 40 percent of the population; foreign population includes 300,000 Palestinians as well as a large number of Iraqis, Iranians, Syrians, Egyptians, and South Asians. [] 25X1

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Religious Composition: 99 percent Muslim (1.6 million), mostly Sunnis; Shias comprise 30 percent of the native population. [redacted]

Government: A shaykhdom ruled by the Sabah family since the mid-18th century; Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah has reigned since 1977. Kuwait has a constitution and an elected 50-man National Assembly, but no political parties. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: A conservative Islamic state with Shariah as a source, but not the only source, of legislation. Like all the Gulf states, Kuwait has a Ministry of Awqaf (religious endowment) and Islamic Affairs. The government has introduced Islamic commercial banking and recently applied more restrictive religious laws. Women have comparatively greater freedom than in more traditional Gulf states. Non-Muslims may worship in private, but proselytizing by non-Muslims is forbidden. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Ruling family is sympathetic with religious conservatives; Amir consults religious establishment on policies of concern to it. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Islam in Kuwait has a powerful emotional appeal that cuts across ethnic and class lines. Since the mid-1970s, signs of Islamic revival have included stricter religious observances, greater use of Islamic attire by women and wearing of beards by men, inclusion of religious courses at the university, and increased interest in religious "clubs." The Khomeini revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq war have provided Kuwait's Shias with a morale boost but not an incentive for revolution. Rather, some continue to seek power within the system. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: While political parties are banned, the government allows social and cultural clubs that must be apolitical:

- **The Social Reform Society:** A popular, overt Sunni fundamentalist organization which publishes the magazine *Al-Mujtama'*. [redacted]

- **The Social Cultural Society:** The Shia equivalent of the Social Reform Society, an overt club with no apparent signs of antiregime political activity. [redacted]

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In addition, two clandestine organizations exist:

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- **The Salafiyin:** A clandestine, ultraconservative Sunni faction that may be connected to the group that took over the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979.

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- **Muslim Brotherhood:** A clandestine chapter is in Kuwait. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: The Iranian Embassy tries to influence the Social Cultural Society, the Iranian community, and the Kuwaiti Shias. [redacted]

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Recent Developments:

- 1981: Four Shias (three of whom were considered Khomeini supporters) won seats in the National Assembly, as did five Sunni fundamentalists.
- 12 December 1983: Shia terrorists, majority Iranian-trained Iraqis, bombed US and French Embassies and Kuwaiti Government buildings. The government arrested and tried 21 youths, sentencing six to death. [redacted]

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Prognosis: Rising Islamic fundamentalism and Shia unrest probably can be handled adequately by security forces. Isolated acts of terrorism, particularly by expatriates, will continue to be a major threat to the shaykhdom. [redacted]

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Lebanon

Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.6 million. 93 percent Arab; 6 percent Armenian. [redacted]

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Religious Composition: Lebanon's ethnic homogeneity does not extend to its religious beliefs. According to best estimates, 74 percent (1.7 million) of the population is Muslim; 7 percent is Druze (an occult offshoot of Islam); 27 percent Christian (Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Maronite, Protestant, and Armenian). Muslims are divided between Shias (40 percent) and Sunnis (27 percent). Within the last decade, Shias, who had been the most backward, rural, and dispossessed of the religious groups, have become the largest single religious grouping. [redacted]


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Religious Distribution in Lebanon



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Government: Gained independence from France in 1945. The government was formed as a coalition of religious groups. Civil war in 1975-77, followed by occupation, first by Syrian then by Israeli troops. The government's army disintegrated as religious militias sprang up to continue fighting. Bashir Gemayel was elected President in 1982, but he was assassinated before taking office. Current President, Amin Gemayel, is a brother of Bashir. The Cabinet representing the various factions advises the President [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Initial policy of "confessionalism" and a National Covenant kept Christian-Muslim balance, with Christian control of government and religious freedom guaranteed. Although Muslim population now outnumbers Christians, it still occupies a secondary political position. The militancy between religions has increased since the civil war broke out and has turned into arming of separate religious militias, which the government has been powerless to control. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslims have always had an official role in government—albeit secondary to Christians—but disunity among Muslims has hampered attempts to strengthen political influence. Moderate Shia Muslims of the 1970s lost popular support to radicals who wished to gain political power for the dispossessed and underrepresented Shias. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Although civil wars have encouraged a sense of religious revival among both Muslims and Christians, fundamentalism does not play a dominant role in Islamic militancy today; it is more a case of both moderate and conservative versions of Islam being militantly radicalized over the issue of political influence in the nation's future. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations:

- **Amal (Hope):** Led by Nabih Barri, who has largest secular following in Shia community; a moderate group that favors the central government but demands more power for Shias; based in Beirut suburbs.

- **Islamic Amal:** Led by Husayn Musawi, this is a terrorist-prone breakaway group from Amal; Iranian backed; aims for conversion of Lebanon into an Islamic state linked to Tehran; based in the Bekaa Valley.

- **Husayn Suicide Commandos:** A subgroup of Islamic Amal led by cousin of Husayn; based in Bekaa Valley; probably about 200 men.

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- **Hizb Allah (Party of God):** Terrorist prone; Iranian backed; based in Bekaa Valley.

- **Union of Muslim Students:** Led by radical Sayyed Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah; terrorist prone; has operational and ideological links with Islamic Amal; based in Beirut suburbs. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: Since 1978 Iran has been giving covert aid to Amal. Iran views Lebanon as its chief candidate for export of its revolution. Using Syria as staging area, Iran continues to supply thousands of Iranian Revolutionary Guards to train Lebanese Shias in religious ideology and terror tactics. [redacted]

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Recent Developments:

- June 1982: Israel invaded southern Lebanon.

- September 1982: Recently elected President, Maronite Bashir Gemayel, assassinated.

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- April 1983: US Embassy bombed, 70 killed; various radical Muslim groups claim credit.

- September 1983: Serious factional fighting between Druze and Christian groups followed Israeli withdrawal to Awali River.

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- October 1983: American and French peacekeeping contingents of Multinational Force bombed, with over 250 casualties. Groups calling themselves "Islamic Jihad Organization," "Free Islamic Revolutionary Movement," "Dawn Movement of the Arab Nations," and "Sabra and Shatila Organization" claim responsibility. [redacted]

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Prognosis: Outlook remains grim for any form of national reconciliation, especially with extent of external influence appealing to radicalized elements of both Muslim and Christian faiths. Lebanon remains vulnerable to civil war and potential for partition. A minority of radical fundamentalists will pursue their goals of an Islamic state, causing turmoil among the majority of Muslims who only want reform of the confessional system. [redacted]

Oman

Population/Ethnic Composition: 978,000. 750,000 native Arabs; about 200,000 foreigners, mostly Indian and Pakistani workers [redacted]

Religious Composition: Virtually 100 percent Muslim. 75 percent are Ibadhis, a sect that broke with mainstream Islam before the Sunni-Shia split occurred; most of remainder are Sunni; less than 1 percent are Shia, mostly Iranian workers. [redacted]

Government: An absolute monarchy ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Bu Said since the overthrow in 1970 of his father in a British-assisted coup. Qaboos has appointed an advisory council and permits tribal and town councils but has not allowed a constitution, elected parliament, or political parties [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Ibadhi Islam is relatively tolerant and moderate. The government is conservative in its religious policies and does not interfere with religious beliefs or the influence of the religious establishment on local society. The Sultan's predecessors once claimed religious title of Imam, but he does not press claims to religious authority. Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs reinforces official Islam. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Ibadhi Council of Qadis (religious judges) advises the Sultan on Islamic affairs and passes on the conformity of individual decrees with Islamic law. Qaboos is careful not to disturb the religious-state compact or encourage sectarian rivalries. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: There is no evidence of active, antiregime religious-based opposition movements, although the government historically has had

to contend with religious rebellion encouraged by claimants to the role of Ibadhi Imam. (The current Imam is in exile.) [redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations: No significant fundamentalist organizations are known to exist in Oman. The exiled Ibadhi Imam has many loyalists in the interior, but prospects for the revival of an Imam-led rebellion such as occurred in the 1950s appear remote. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: Leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, based in South Yemen, has had little appeal for Omanis and no success in recruiting them. Occasional evidence of pro-Khomeini propaganda surfaces. [redacted]

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Recent Developments: Oman is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, has signed a security pact with Saudi Arabia, and has a military-economic accord with the United States—none of which have religious overtones or have raised religious objections in Oman. [redacted]

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Prognosis: Religion could once again become the vehicle for discontent if economic and professional expectations of new middle class, and returning students in particular, are not met; if resentment of foreign workers grows (and it will, particularly in the military); if awareness of corruption becomes more widespread; and if oil revenues fall and pace of development slows. [redacted]

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Qatar

Population/Ethnic Composition: 267,000. 20 percent native Arabs; 34 percent South Asians, 25 percent other Arabs, 16 percent Iranians; 5 percent others. [redacted]

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Religious Composition: 100 percent Muslim. Approximately 89 percent Sunni Wa'hhabis, 11 percent Shia, many of Persian extraction. [redacted]

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Government: Traditional Arab shaykhdom ruled by Thani family since 19th century. Current Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani has been in power since 1972. There is a provisional constitution but no

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political parties and no elective body. Decisionmaking is based on family consensus and consultation with leading families and Council of Ministers, majority of whose members are Thanis. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Conservative Islamic state. Shariah is source of legislation. Non-Muslims may hold religious ceremonies in private but are not permitted to proselytize or establish permanent places of worship. Ruling family has reputation for personal laxness in observing Islamic practices. Government is making conscious effort to reduce potential threat to regime from fundamentalist critics—it has restricted gambling, the sale of alcohol, and celebration of non-Muslim holidays. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Government makes decisions in consultation with religious hierarchy and with an eye to Saudi Arabian policies. (The ruling families of Qatar and Saudi Arabia share common tribal and religious backgrounds.) Jafari Islamic Canonical Council serves as adviser to the government and interpreter of religious law. Qatar has secular as well as religious courts. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of active Islamic resurgence in society which is already conservative. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations:

• **Muslim Brotherhood:** A small chapter that apparently restricts its activities to fundraising; no sign of antiregime activities. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: The security forces closely monitor the Iranian Shia community for signs of antiregime activities. A member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar signed a security pact with Saudi Arabia following coup attempt by Shias in Bahrain in late 1981. [redacted]

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist-related developments. [redacted]

Prognosis: Fundamentalist threat is not significant. Government will support more rigid application of Islamic law but will also continue its development plans. Greatest threat of unrest may come from

expatriate Shias if number of foreign workers is cut back. They will be deported if implicated in suspicious political activities. [redacted]

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Saudi Arabia

25X1

Population/Ethnic Composition: Approximately 10.4 million. Of the native population 90 percent Arab; 10 percent Afro-Arab mixture. Non-Saudi workers number 3 million of whom about half are non-Arab. [redacted]

25X1

Religious Composition: 100 percent Muslim. 95 percent are Sunnis of the puritanical Wa'hhabi sect; 5 percent Shia. Over 300,000 Shias live in the Eastern Province, where they make up approximately 70 percent of the population. [redacted]

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Government: An Islamic monarchy since 1932 when 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud (also known as Ibn Saud) united Bedouin tribes and joined forces with the prominent ulema of the Al Shaykh family, whose progenitor established the orthodox sect of Wa'hhabi Islam. Upon 'Abd al-'Aziz's death in 1953, his son King Sa'ud ruled until 1964 when he was deposed by the royal family in favor of another son Faysal. King Faysal was assassinated in 1975. He was replaced by the next son, Khalid who died in 1982. King Fahd, another son, now reigns. There is no legislative body or political parties. [redacted]

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Religious Policies of Government: Saudi Arabia is the birth place of Islam and contains the two holiest cities of Islam. Officially, there is no separation of church and state. The King serves as both sectarian and religious head; Shariah serves as framework for law, and religious notables dominate the judiciary. Koranic doctrine is sometimes liberally interpreted in the interests of rapid modernization. Government coopts and cooperates with the religious hierarchy but, through extensive security apparatus, monitors mosques and schools for evidence of antiregime activity. Government has numerous religious cabinet-level components and a powerful Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Trusts. Religious police controlled by the Interior Ministry rigorously enforce puritanical social code. The government established Islamic banks in 1970. [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to

Government: The Saudi royal family derives much of its political legitimacy from the support of the religious community. The regime does not always accept the views of religious leaders on social issues, but it routinely confers with them and usually seeks to coordinate positions on domestic policy. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: [redacted]

[redacted] We perceive no signs of organized antiregime activity among Saudi youths that could threaten the regime in the near term. A creeping Islamic revivalism among Saudi university students, however, is being encouraged by imported Egyptian teachers. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Iranians continue to try to subvert Shias in Eastern Province. Saudi Arabia is, on the other hand, heavily involved in other countries as the original exporter of Islam (in a conservative version) to the less developed world. It is the founder of the Muslim World League, the Islamic Conference, and the World Association of Muslim Youth. The government uses its wealth to encourage and sometimes press other Islamic states to institute more conservative social and political measures and to promote solidarity against leftist movements and Israel. It provides sanctuary to Muslim Brotherhood members exiled from other Middle Eastern countries. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- November 1979: Attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca, the holiest Islamic shrine, by antiregime, radical fundamentalist youth. Government forces recaptured the Mosque after two weeks of fighting and executed 30 militants, both Saudis and foreigners.
- November 1979, February 1980: Violent demonstrations by Shias in Eastern Province. Saudi National Guard put down unrest, killed at least 60.

- The fall of 1982 through the winter of 1983: Government crackdown on suspected Shia dissidents in Eastern Province; at least 300 Shias arrested. [redacted] 25X1

Prognosis: Many members of the religious community—especially younger, more militant clerics—will continue to criticize the regime privately for what they regard as hypocritical inconsistencies between Islamic ideals and the self-indulgent lifestyles of numerous royal family members. [redacted] 25X1

Isolated antiregime incidents by Sunni fundamentalists or Shia dissidents are possible and would be difficult to anticipate. The regime would act forcefully to quash religious-oriented unrest. It is unlikely that isolated incidents would trigger any widespread antiregime activity that would jeopardize the royal family's hold on power. [redacted] 25X1

Syria

Population/Ethnic Composition: 9.7 million. More than 90 percent Arab; rest is divided between Kurdish, Armenian, and Jewish. [redacted] 25X1

Religious Composition: Approximately 90 percent Muslim (8.8 million); 9 percent Christian of different sects; 1 percent Jewish. Muslims are predominantly Sunni, but three subsects or minorities play a significant role in the country's intragroup conflicts: Alawites, 11 percent of population and a majority in the Latakia region of the northwest; Druze, 3 percent, and a majority along the Jordan border; Ismaili Shia, about 1.5 percent, scattered [redacted] 25X1

Government: Ba'th Party came to power as military-dominated Renaissance Socialist Party in 1963 and has ruled ever since without opposition parties. President Hafiz al-Assad emerged with a moderate Islamic program in 1970 but has remained an authoritarian leader who has placed his fellow Alawites throughout the military and bureaucracy. [redacted] 25X1

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Religious Policies of Government: Although a socialist, secular state, government has backed down when ulema have resisted total secularization. It has co-opted many religious leaders but cracks down harshly on any signs of fundamentalist opposition. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Religious leaders continue to press Islamic demands and to resist secularization, although they avoid outright opposition. Many wealthy Muslims from pre-Ba'th days actively support underground fundamentalists against regime. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalism is used by the numerically dominant urban Sunnis as a vehicle to undermine rule by what they consider to be a small, rural heretical minority of Alawites []

Fundamentalist Organizations:

• **Muslim Brotherhood (MB):** Spread from Egypt in 1940s; fought for independence against French; then fought against secularism and Westernization; outlawed during Syrian union with Egypt, 1958-61; reappeared in late 1970s to early 1980 in more militant role; it stepped up opposition tactics and tried to assassinate Assad; it was again forced underground in 1980. MB is the principal source of antiregime activity. Many MB members went into exile to neighboring Arab states and Europe. Membership is concentrated among Sunni students and merchants.

• **Combat Vanguard of the Mujahedin:** A radical offshoot of the MB. It wants an Islamic republic based on private property and a multiparty system. []

Several other underground organizations exist, but little is known of them:

- **Muhammad's Brigades** (Kata'ib Muhammad)
- **Muhammad's Youth** (Shabab Muhammad)
- **Islamic Liberation Party:** Started in Jordan. More radical than the Muslim Brotherhood. []

Foreign Involvement: None known. []

Recent Developments:

• Spring 1980: Islamic opposition staged major offensive in the north. Regime response was swift and brutal; hundreds were killed, and the rebellion

collapsed. Government introduced new laws to make membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable by death.

• February 1982: Attempted armed insurrection in the northern city of Hamah by Muslim Brotherhood and sympathizers brought severe repression: thousands were killed; parts of the city were destroyed; houses were searched and seized. [] 25X1

Prognosis: Islamic opposition, which is weak and divided, is unlikely to topple the Ba'thist regime. The most likely near-term scenario is an indefinite stalemate and paralysis of the political system. [] 25X1

Turkey

Population/Ethnic Composition: 49.2 million. 85 percent Turkish; 12 percent Kurdish; 3 percent other (mostly Arabs and Albanians). [] 25X1

Religious Composition: 99 percent (48.7 million) Muslim; less than 1 percent Christian. Muslims are predominantly Sunni, but about 20 percent are Alevis, a sect syncretically composed of Shias, Sufis, and shamans located in eastern and central Turkey. []

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Government: Republic founded in 1923 after the collapse of the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), the first President, turned country into Western, secular, one-party state. He died in 1938. Civilian and military governments have alternated since then. The current military regime took over the government in 1980. President Gen. Kenan Evren held legislative elections in November 1983, signaling another return to "civilian" rule. [] 25X1

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Religious Policies of Government: Ataturk radically altered the role of Islam in Turkey by converting a Muslim society into a secular state. He smashed the Shariah courts; abolished the Sufi brotherhoods, the caliphate, and Muslim schools; and replaced Arabic with Turkish and Muslim dress with Western garb. After World War II, the government allowed Islam to reenter politics in a limited fashion. Until 1980 successive governments allowed a steady relaxation of [] 25X1

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some secularist measures, while co-opting the ulema; subsidizing mosques and Islamic schools; and trying to put Islam under state control. The military government has once again relegated religion to private life. New civilian government is moving cautiously toward moderate Arab states. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to

Government: Religious institutions are controlled by the government. The Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation Party (NSP) was banned after the military takeover of 1980 because of its disruptive influence in the many coalition governments in the late 1970s. Sufi brotherhoods still flourish as a social force but have little political impact. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: The growth in religious interest and practice during the last decade, including a return to the Sufi brotherhoods, has generally not escalated into fundamentalism. A healthy mutual respect remains between the state and the religious establishment. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: Dozens of small terrorist groups exist, most based on minor sectarian or regional differences, and many without names.

- **Suleymanci:** The largest known fundamentalist sect. It follows the teachings of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959) and is now led by Kemal Kacar, his son-in-law. It advocates an Islamic state and return to Shariah law and the caliphate. The Suleymancis openly teach Koranic classes, propagate banned extremist philosophy; operate small illegal colleges; have links with the banned Justice Party; have infiltrated the military; and operate openly among Turkish migrant workers in Western Europe. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: The Turkish Government has been worried about the impact of the Iranian revolution and has arrested and prosecuted allegedly Iranian-backed Shia extremists. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- July 1980: Sunni-Alevi clashes in Corum resulted in deaths.

- September 1982: Draft constitution made religious training compulsory for Muslims in public schools; referred to Allah in text; and subjected Ataturk's secularism to public debate.

- September 1982: Arrest of Sufi and NSP leaders for fomenting dissension. 25X1

- March 1983: Government arrested and tried 33 suspected members of Iranian-backed Shia group. [redacted] 25X1

Prognosis: Islam will continue to be a major social and political force. Sectarian hostility may reappear in the future, forcing the government to reinstitute strong security measures. [redacted] 25X1

United Arab Emirates

Population/Ethnic Composition: Approximately 1.4 million. About 21 percent native Arabs; 79 percent foreign residents, mainly workers (including 250,000 Indians, 300,000 Pakistanis, 50,000 Iranians, and 50,000 Palestinians). [redacted] 25X1

Religious Composition: Virtually 100 percent of the native population is Muslim, with Sunnis comprising 95 percent and Shias 5 percent, concentrated mostly in the northern emirates; 30 percent of the total population (mostly Asian workers) is non-Muslim. [redacted] 25X1

Government: A federation of seven small shaykhdoms formed in 1971 following the British withdrawal from the Gulf. Abu Dhabi's ruler, Shaykh Zayid, has been President since 1971; Dubai's ruler, Shaykh Rashid, has been Vice President and Prime Minister since 1979. The federal government has a provisional constitution, a Supreme Council composed of the rulers of the seven shaykhdoms, and an appointed 40-member National Assembly. [redacted] 25X1

Religious Policies of Government: A conservative Islamic state governed by Islamic law. The government is less doctrinaire in applying religious principles to secular practices and does not impose Islamic practices and prohibitions on non-Muslim foreigners. There is no overt discrimination against the Shia minority. Christians are permitted to worship but not to proselytize Muslims. [redacted] 25X1

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to

Government: The ruling families make decisions based on family consensus and in consultation with leading merchant families and religious leaders. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of active Islamic resurgence in an already conservative society. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: Muslim Brotherhood has a small branch, not active politically. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Because of once lax immigration procedures and the large number of expatriates working in the shaykhdoms, the UAE is an unintentional haven for Arabs and others who espouse radical political and religious ideas. No evidence exists that religious groups are seeking to impose their practices on the UAE, although the government is increasingly concerned about the activities of Shia religious leaders (mostly Iranian in origin) in the northern emirates and is also suspicious of some of the wealthy Iranian merchants. [redacted]

Recent Developments: Although there are calls to expand religious education and enforce strict separation of the sexes, there has been no ground swell of sentiment for the government to crack down on "permissive practices." [redacted]

Prognosis: Islamic fundamentalism is unlikely to be a significant influence for change in the UAE. Natives may become frustrated by aspects of modernization, and they may dislike the moral and social values that accompany it, but they mistrust even more the alternatives to their way of life—secular leftist politics or Islamic fanaticism. [redacted]

North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic)

Population/Ethnic Composition: Approximately 5.7 million. 90 percent Arab; 10 percent Afro-Arab mixture. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 100 percent Muslim. 48 percent Sunnis of Shafii school in the south and west coastal areas; 52 percent Zaydi, a variant of Shia, which is doctrinally close to Sunni, in the north. Highly conservative, traditional, and rural Islam; high tolerance between Sunnis and Zaydis. [redacted]

Government: A military republican group overthrew the feudal Imamate in 1962 and espoused an Arab socialist state. Civil war between the tribal-royalists and the military-republicans continued for eight years. A compromise was struck in 1970, with a constitution providing for Yemen to be "Arab and Muslim." The military took full control in 1974-75, but two presidents were assassinated in 1977 and 1978. Current President, Col. Ali Abdallah Salih, has ruled since 1978. North Yemen still remains deeply tribal with marginal central government control over the regions. Political parties are banned. [redacted]

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Religious Policies of Government: Constitutionally, North Yemen is an Islamic Arab nation, with Shariah the source of all laws and Islamic scholars given high administrative posts. Government attempts to combine conservative Islam with socialist form of development. Education remains Islamic. Government uses co-optation, surveillance, harassment, and arrests to control activities of Muslim Brotherhood. [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Fundamentalists have high-ranking posts in government and some political clout. [redacted]

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25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalism as a quasi-political manifestation is growing in a state already largely fundamentalist in character. [redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations: Fundamentalist organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and numerous other externally supported radical groups, are flourishing. They are considered a sufficient threat that President Salih postponed legislative elections until 1984. Groups are not coordinated or united with a common leadership.

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• **Muslim Brotherhood (MB):** Has widespread support, both in the universities and among rural tribesmen, and has infiltrated government posts. MB is anti-Communist, anti-West, and critical of government policies that are too secular. It won half the elected seats in a quasi-legislative body charged with writing a new constitution.

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Other groups that may have Muslim Brotherhood links include:

- *Al-Takfir Wa al-Hijrah* (Repentance and Holy Flight): An extremist spinoff of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
- *Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami* (Islamic Liberation Party): An extremist group with Palestinian and Syrian support.
- *Yemini Wa'hhabis*: Saudi-backed small paramilitary organization.
- *Al Jabhah al Islamiyyah* (Islamic Front): A government-supported paramilitary group recruited from Shia tribesmen to help fight South Yemeni insurgents. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Government believes the Muslim Brotherhood to be backed by Saudi Arabia, which wants to use it to constrain President Salih's flirtations with Moscow. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinians also support other fundamentalist organizations as indicated above. Little is known of the extent of Iranian influence, but government worries that several northern tribes are being influenced by militant Iranians. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- September 1981: Presidents of South Yemen and North Yemen agreed to a cease-fire and to discuss unification of two Yemens with Islam as state religion. The cease-fire broke down shortly thereafter.
- October 1982: Demonstrations by pro-Iranian youths.
- Early 1983: President Salih postponed elections for legislature until 1984, because of concern over Muslim Brotherhood strength. [redacted]

Prognosis: The government may have to make increasing adjustments to Islamic sentiments in order to preserve its tenure. [redacted]

South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen)

Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.1 million. 75 percent Arab; 25 percent non-Arab mixture of Negroid and South Asian. [redacted]

Religious Composition: Almost 100 percent Muslim or former Muslim. Sunnis predominate, are of the Shafii school, historically subservient to Shiite Zaydi Imams of North Yemen. [redacted] 25X1

Government: The only Marxist government in the Middle East. British protectorate ended in 1967, leaving leftwing National Liberation Front in power to battle the remaining royalists. The current ruling elite is still the same group of revolutionaries. The government has been torn by coups between pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and more moderate leaders but has remained a Marxist state on the Soviet model. Current President is Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, who deposed a pro-Soviet rival in April 1980. [redacted] 25X1

Religious Policies of Government: The government still recognizes Islam as the state religion, and the Constitution guarantees religious freedom, but it has worked since independence to remove Islam politically, culturally, and socially from Yemeni life. Officially, the government is trying to unite Islam and socialism but is replacing Islamic schools with state education. The government recently gave religious leaders civil service salaries as a move to ensure their loyalty. [redacted] 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Although officially there is no religious establishment, Islam is still the social and cultural fabric of the rural tribesmen. [redacted] 25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: Some evidence Islam is losing strength among the urban elite. The government retains close surveillance over religious activities, restricts external influence. [redacted] 25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: Muslim Brotherhood may exist deep underground, as there have been numerous arrests of alleged Brothers. [redacted] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: The government supports Arab radical movements and takes in exiles, among which there may be some fundamentalists. [redacted] 25X1

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Recent Developments:

- September 1981: Presidents of South Yemen and North Yemen agreed to a cease-fire and to discuss unification of two Yemens with Islam as state religion. The cease-fire broke down shortly thereafter.
- September 1982: Two youths found giving antiregime sermons in Aden mosque were arrested and executed.
- September 1983: The government gave religious leaders civil service salaries.

25X1

Prognosis: The South Yemeni radical secular regime has made only slight accommodation to Islam and will continue to restrict fundamentalist activity. Because of disastrous economic plight, the government has begun to reach accommodations with more conservative Arab states to get aid and may introduce additional measures to allow freer practice of Islam.

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Maghreb

**Maghreb:
The Arab Edge of Africa**

Until a few years ago, Islam was a moderate unifying force along the northern tier of Africa, where regimes range in ideology from the traditional Islamic Republic of Mauritania to Libya's "Islamic Socialism" to avowedly secular Tunisia. Since then, fundamentalist Islam has taken root, especially among the urbanized middle-class youth, and is causing increasing security problems for three of the five sovereign Maghreb states—Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. The other two, Libya and Mauritania, are ruled by military dictators, both ardent Muslims whose control over their populations effectively crows any political opposition. [redacted]

The growth in fundamentalism has gone hand in hand with Arabization of the region. The minority Berbers in Algeria and Morocco, and in Mauritania the Blacks, have been forced to shed some of their traditional beliefs and values to conform with the Arab leaders' unification policies. These policies of Arabization are now unraveling at various rates, as the opponents attack the regimes for their failure to provide the promised economic and social justice that was to be a concomitant of modernization. Under the banner of Islam, dissidence is even spreading to the ranks of junior military officers, and Maghreb leaders have been forced to undertake unprecedented surveillance and arrests of suspected extremists. [redacted]

In Libya, Qadhafi has used Islam as justification for his support of opposition groups in other countries. While he has not succeeded in exporting his aberrant brand of Islam beyond Libya's borders, his meddling activities have destabilized the immediate region and even set off revolutionary alarms far beyond the African continent. [redacted]

Algeria

Population/Ethnic Composition: 20.7 million. Arab-Berber mixture predominates, with Kabyles the largest Berber group; European minority of about 75,000. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 99 percent (20.5 million) Sunni Muslim, majority of conservative Maliki school. Small group in M'zab area follow the puritanical Kharidjite sect. Islamicized since 7th century. Sufi Islam extremely popular in rural areas with more orthodox Islam practiced in major cities. [redacted]

25X1

Government: Successful revolution for independence from France ended in 1962. Experimental socialist government under first president, Ben Bella. Boumedienne, who overthrew Ben Bella in 1965, ruled leftist military-dominated regime until his death in December 1978. The military chose next president, Col. Chadli Bendjedid, who was first elected to office in February 1979. One-party socialist state, moving from left to centrist, nonaligned. [redacted]

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Religious Policies of Government: Islam is state religion, although other faiths are officially tolerated. Ministry of Religious Affairs supports and controls all mosques, religious schools, and imams. Government program of Arabization has indirectly heightened Islamic character of society since 1970 and perhaps increased fundamentalist tendencies. Government has responded quickly to fundamentalist threat, which it perceives as significantly unsettling, by emphasizing its commitment to Islam in visible projects and continuing in a more Islamic direction while using repressive measures to limit religious activities. Muslim Brotherhood outlawed. [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Islamic establishment fully controlled by government; mosques almost all under state supervision. [redacted]

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Status of Fundamentalism: Increased piety is evident, especially among Arabized youth. Fundamentalist youth becoming critical of regime for economic, moral, and ideological failures; activism has increasingly turned into violent confrontations either with less devout students or with gendarmerie. [redacted]


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Muslims in the Maghreb



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Fundamentalist Organizations: Movement yet remains small, only few groups known:

- *Al-Qiyam* (The Upright): Originally inspired by Muslim Brotherhood but banned in 1968 by government afraid it had become too popular among the establishment.
- *Al-Da'wah*: Believed to be reincarnation of *Al-Qiyam*. Receives support from sister organization in Saudi Arabia. Often surfaces under different names, including *Front Islamique* and the *Mouvement Islamique en Algerie*. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: The government fears that Libya and/or Iran may be supporting radical organizations. Long history of support for establishment Islam from Saudi Arabia and Egypt [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- Late 1979–Early 1980: Student strikes and demonstrations against government policies and conflict between French-speaking and Arab-speaking students; Muslim Brotherhood role suspected by authorities.
- Early 1980: Demonstrations in three eastern cities; youths attacked hotels, bars, prostitutes.
- May 1981: More confrontations at universities between fundamentalists and others.
- October 1981: Rioting fundamentalists seized mosque in oasis town, held it for three days until police regained control.
- November 1982: Clashes at University of Algiers; one student killed, followed by widespread arrests in December, including members of the official religious establishment. [redacted]

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Table 2
Maghreb

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Algeria	20,700,000	99	Sunni Sufism	Socialist; military; authoritarian	Rising threat, confrontation with government	Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Egypt	Increased fundamentalist agitation
Libya	3,500,000	97	Sunni Sufism	Islamic socialism; authoritarian	Latent	None known	Conservatives could overthrow Qadhafi
Mauritania	1,600,000	100	Sunni Sufism	Islamic republic; authoritarian	Weak but growing	None known	Religious-based tensions may increase
Morocco	22,900,000	99	Sunni Sufism	Conservative monarchy	Growing, especially among students	Libya	Fairly stable
Tunisia	7,000,000	98	Sunni Sufism	Republic; authoritarian	Growing, still non-violent	None known	Increased fundamentalist agitation
Western Sahara	87,000	100	Sunni Sufism	Sovereignty dispute unresolved	Conservative religious values pervasive	None known	Increased fundamentalist activity

25X1

Prognosis: Domestic issues such as Arabization are undercutting the government's traditional efforts to co-opt fundamentalist causes. Religious confrontations will continue, with government forced to use increasingly repressive tactics and devise methods to ensure that Islam remains a state monopoly. [redacted]

Libya

Population/Ethnic Composition: 3.5 million. 97 percent Arab/Berber mixture, divided into three main tribal groups. Remainder are Greeks, Turks, Egyptians, Indians. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 97 percent (3.4 million) Muslim; remainder mixture of Christian and other. Most Muslims are Sunnis, with strong Sufi influence in remote rural areas. [redacted]

Government: Independence from Italy by UN decision in 1951. Idris was first king. Colonel Qadhafi and other military officers overthrew Idris in 1969 and declared an "Islamic revolution." [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Government under Qadhafi is Islamic socialism mixed with populism, with all institutions theoretically ruled by "peoples' committees." Libya was first country to bring entire body of jurisprudence under the Shariah. Entire social and political system and much of economic structure is based, in theory, on Qadhafi's interpretation of Islam. Regime restrains other versions of Islamic philosophy. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Authority of religious establishment was thoroughly dismantled by Qadhafi, and most leaders went into exile. Religious leaders who remain are repressed and stay out of politics. [redacted]

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Libya: Col. Mu'ammar Qadhafi melds Islamic symbols with his philosophy of conquest [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Only unsubstantiated evidence suggests that some mosques criticize the "heresy" of Qadhafi policies and that some students charge that Qadhafi has misinterpreted Islamic principles. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations:

- *Muslim Brotherhood:* Fragmentary evidence indicates that it may have some cells in Libya.
- *Al-Takfir Wa al-Hijrah* (Repentance and Holy Flight): From Egypt.
- *Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami* (Islamic Liberation Party): Fanatical groups, may have several hundred adherents each, chiefly in universities and secondary schools. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: No external funding has been given to Libyan Islamic institutions. On the contrary, Qadhafi attempts to spread his version of the Islamic revolution by financial aid and promises to train "fighters" to overturn regimes. Qadhafi has tried, and

failed, to promote pan-Islamic unity by declaring union (at different times) with Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Chad, and Syria. He has also actively proselytized in Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and the rest of Africa. [redacted]

25X1

Recent Developments:

- January 1982: Arrest of fundamentalists accused of plotting against regime; most were from Al Fatah University. [redacted]

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Prognosis: Qadhafi is vulnerable to assassination or overthrow as his "Islamic revolution" has deeply alienated many conservative Libyans. Should he be replaced, most probably by someone from the military, Libya could once again undergo a radical restructuring of its institutions. Islam is certain to remain an integral part of government and politics. [redacted]

Mauritania

25X1

Population/Ethnic Composition: 1.6 million. 30 percent Moor (Arab-Berber); 30 percent Black; 40 percent mixed Moor-Black. North predominantly nomadic Moors, south predominantly Black agriculturalists. [redacted]

25X1

Religious Composition: Virtually 100 percent Sunni Muslim, ranging from fundamentalist to orthodox to nominal, replete with saints and mystic pre-Islamic beliefs. Qadiriya and Tijaniya Sufi brotherhoods extremely popular. [redacted]

25X1

Government: Islamic Republic established at time of independence from France in 1960. First president, Moktar Ould Daddah, was overthrown in bloodless coup led by Col. Ould Salek in July 1978. Junta replaced Salek with Lt. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla in 1980. Haidalla briefly established civilian cabinet but reverted to rule by military council in 1981, promising eventual party participation and "return to democracy." [redacted]

25X1

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Religious Policies of Government: Concept of Islamic Republic reinforced since independence but with a distinctly Mauritanian flavor. Other religions are tolerated if practiced by non-Mauritanians. The government has replaced French civil law with Shariah

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Morocco: Warriors waving the Koran go on "Green March" to Western Sahara [redacted]



25X1

and has created a Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. President Haidalla is a devout Muslim. The government sponsors a Mauritanian Islamic Cultural Association to support imams, educate youth spiritually. Mauritania is a member of the Islamic Conference and Arab League. The government introduced measures to counteract fundamentalists:

- Emphasis on Shariah, including public flogging, amputation.
- Ban on alcohol.
- Introduction of Islamic workweek. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Islamic leaders and teachers have little political influence but encourage government reassertions of Islamic principles and criticize secular government policies or encouragement of Western modernization. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalism is a weak but growing force. Radicals do not exert sufficient pressure on government, chiefly for lack of issues in conservative state [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: Muslim Brotherhood has penetrated Mauritania, chiefly via Senegalese immigrants. Most active among urban youth who agitate for stricter application of Shariah. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: No evidence of current foreign support for radical fundamentalist activity although Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have all provided small funding in the past. [redacted]

25X1

Recent Developments:

- June 1982: Authorities raided a Bahai sect headquarters, arrested Mauritanian members, and expelled most foreign members.
- 25 December 1982: Government decreed that nation will abide by Islamic workweek. [redacted]

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25X1

Prognosis: As backward Mauritania struggles to overcome a paucity of human and technological resources, both racial and religious tensions will increase, perhaps between new fundamentalists and more traditional Muslims. [redacted]

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Morocco

Population/Ethnic Composition: 22.9 million. 99 percent Arab-Berber mixture. [redacted]

25X1

Religious Composition: Almost 99 percent (22.7 million) Muslim; 1.1 percent Christian; 0.2 percent Jewish. Muslims are Sunnis of the Maliki school. Orthodox Islam at official and educated elite level; folk [redacted]

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25X1

Islam dominates in rural areas, with variety of saint cults and Sufi brotherhoods that incorporate animism and other pre-Islamic beliefs. [redacted]

Government: Constitutional monarchy with King Hassan II, who has ruled since 1961, asserting paramount executive powers. King allows multiparty system. Chamber of Representatives dominated by King's own National Assembly of Independents. Conservative, pro-West regime. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: King rules as spiritual leader by virtue of claim of direct descent from Prophet Muhammad, thus combining political rule with spiritual legitimacy. Ministry of Islamic Affairs controls religious education, sponsors Friday sermons, builds mosques. Government is tolerant of Sufi brotherhoods, saint cults, religious minorities as long as they avoid criticism of the government. Fundamentalists who distribute antiregime material have been arrested. The government is making strenuous efforts to co-opt Islamic revival by encouraging revival of Sufi brotherhoods to counteract imported fundamentalism, increasing piety of the King, and introducing other measures in schools, military, press, and legal system. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Religious establishment, institutionalized in 1961 as League of Moroccan Ulema, is promonarchy. Co-opted to ensure legitimization and perpetuation of regime. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Perhaps 5 percent of students are militant fundamentalists, with limited number of fundamentalists in the armed forces as well as other segments of society. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: Small groups have proliferated in urban areas among youth, with estimates of about 70 to 80 organizations with combined membership of 45,000. Only several thousand in groups that espouse violence as means to "purify" Islamic character of Morocco:

Islamic Youth Movement: Largest youth group. Founded in 1972 with covert government support. Co-optation backfired in 1975 when radical members

assassinated a prominent socialist leader. Movement now operates clandestinely, and government-disowned leader Abd al-Karim Moti is in exile. 25X1

Other known small groups are *Mujahidin Movement* and *Islamic Revolutionary Committee*.

Muslim Brotherhood: Active only in the north. Has links with European chapters. Recruits among elite. Seeks to gain power through nonviolent conversion of population. [redacted] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: Iranian Islamic revolution has had profound effect on Moroccan youth, although we have no evidence of active Iranian proselytizing. Libya supports small fundamentalist groups. [redacted] 25X1

Recent Developments:

- Mid-1980: Government raided a fundamentalist sect headquarters and arrested 85; one policeman was killed.
- January 1982: Demonstration in Tangier by 800 over issue of government interference with Friday prayer leader.
- January 1982: Government sanctioned creation of "Popular Islamic Renaissance," another attempt to link orthodox Islam with the regime. [redacted] 25X1

Prognosis: Regime remains strong, opposition in disarray, but economic downturn is causing more outbursts of social grievances and alienation of some elite. Among the opposition, fundamentalists have potential for disrupting regime through appeal to diverse social, regional, and occupational groups. [redacted] 25X1

Tunisia

Population/Ethnic Composition: 7 million. 98 percent Arab, less than 1 percent each European and Jewish. [redacted] 25X1

Religious Composition: 98 percent (6.9 million) Muslim, of whom about 92 percent are Sunni from Maliki and Hanafi school [redacted] 25X1

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Government: Chief of State is Habib Bourguiba, 80, who came to power after successful revolution in 1956 and is President for Life. Government officially a republic, characterized as secular and modernist; dominated by strong executive and official ruling party which in last election received 95 percent of votes. Pro-West [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Constitutionally, Islam is a state religion, and the Chief of State must be Muslim. Most Westernized and secularized of the North African states. Judicial system is secular. Religious schools are absorbed within public education system; religion is compulsory subject but taught as civics course. Mosques are subsidized by government. Official tolerance toward non-Islamic religious beliefs. [redacted]

Bourguiba has adopted policies to counter rising fundamentalism and to let other social forces compete with it:

- He released all the labor union members who had been imprisoned after the bloody 1978 riots and allowed the national labor union to reestablish its independence and autonomy by electing a new leadership to replace puppet group appointed by the government in 1978.
- He revived the banned Tunisian Communist Party, a small pro-Soviet intellectual group, to make it the officially sanctioned opposition for the late 1981 elections.
- He may have been responsible for fraud allegations against fundamentalist leader Ghodbani and rumors that he had accepted funds from Libya in order to discredit him.
- He arrested all of the Islamic fundamentalist leadership in the summer of 1981 and had long prison terms assigned to them.
- He has adopted more Islamic coloration to the extent that he has made occasional mosque appearances. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to

Government: Religious establishment is not tied into political structure. Religious societies are abundant, based on both Islamic and pre-Islamic folk beliefs and led by holy men, who have never posed political threat or opposition to regime. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: Started in the 1970s with officially sponsored societies. By the 1980s fundamentalism was gaining popularity, chiefly among urban students and intellectuals. Most fundamentalists still moderate and represent minimal threat to the regime, although membership in radical organizations and number of sympathizers is growing, chiefly in Tunis. Fundamentalist movement is still nonviolent, although there have been sporadic clashes with leftists at universities. Fundamentalism finds appeal in society where generation gap is the chief problem; it is opposed to lack of political liberalization and Bourguiba's seeming refusal to make any concessions. Indications that fundamentalist leanings may be increasing in military's officer corps. [redacted] 25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: Dominant organization, with at least two radical offshoots, is the *Mouvement de Tendance Islamique* (MTI, the "Brethren") with roughly 200 hardcore members and at least 10,000 sympathizers at the University of Tunis. [redacted] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: No known external ties, financial support, or evidence of outside manipulation of MTI in other fundamentalist organizations, although the regime has claimed support from Libya to discredit MTI's appeal. [redacted] 25X1

Recent Developments:

- Summer 1981: Government arrested, imprisoned, and put on trial 89 MTI members, including top leadership, as fears mounted that it would become opposition party.
- Summer 1981-present: More radical, clandestine fundamentalist groups, with sharp splits between pro- and anti-Khomeini factions, have appeared since crackdown against MTI.

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- April 1982: Fundamentalist youth groups held pitched campus battles with leftist students, resulting in injuries and arrests.
- 1983: Continued crackdown and arrests of fundamentalists continued throughout year. [redacted]

Prognosis: Of all North African countries, Tunisia is most likely to experience religious agitation in the next few years. Bourguiba's rigidity in dealing with fundamentalists may eventually backfire in creating more clandestine, possibly terrorist, groups that might attract outside support. Bourguiba may soften his punishment of Islamic fundamentalists, but society will increasingly be divided between secular modernism and Islamic tradition. Current radical activism may fade if youth join the middle-class, moderate majority and if regime provides an orderly transition to post-Bourguiba rule [redacted]

Western Sahara

Population/Ethnic Composition: 87,000. 100 percent Arab-Berber mixture. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 100 percent Sunni Muslim, with some saint cults and Sufi brotherhoods. [redacted]

Government: Legal status of territory and question of sovereignty unresolved. Major population centers controlled by Morocco since Spanish withdrawal in 1976.

Religious Policies of Government: Same as those for Morocco. King Hassan rules as spiritual and secular leader. The Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs controls religious education, sponsors Friday sermons, and maintains mosques. The government is tolerant of Sufi brotherhoods and other variations in orthodox Islam as long as they avoid criticism of the regime. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Religious establishment is, for all practical purposes, an integral part of the Moroccan Government. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Conservative religious values are pervasive. A few fundamentalists have been arrested for antiregime activity among the Moroccan population [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: No evidence of any. [redacted]

25X1

Foreign Involvement: Polisario Front insurgents, backed by Algeria, contest Morocco's claim to the territory, but Islam has not been a factor. [redacted]

25X1

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Prognosis: Potential for increased fundamentalist activity as the downturn of the Moroccan economy begins to affect Western Sahara. [redacted]

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Islam in South Asia

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**Islam in South Asia:
Faith Without Fervor**

South Asia, with nearly 300 million Muslims, about three times as many as in the entire Arab heartland, has witnessed a perceptible upswing in revival of personal piety, some governmental tolerance and even encouragement of Islamic ritual observances, but no significant role for Islamic fundamentalism outside of President Zia's "Islamization" experiment in Pakistan. Several reasons are behind this lack of Islamic militancy:

- *Politically and geographically*, the region is dominated by India, the second most populous nation in the world and overwhelmingly Hindu. In most states of the subcontinent, secularism and nationalism take precedence over religious beliefs among the people. Islamic fundamentalism has been unable to inspire resistance to forms of political control—whether military or civilian—which continue to restrain and sometimes restrict oppositionist movement.
- *Culturally*, Islam was superimposed by Muslim conquerors on ancient beliefs among populations whose cultural identities remain tied to ethnic and tribal loyalties predating the arrival of Islam in the eighth century. The resulting religious and cultural diversity has worked against a cohesive Islamic fundamentalist movement. Linguistically, the subcontinent is a mosaic of non-Arabic languages that have accentuated the ethnic differences. The sense of *umma*, a larger Islamic community transcending national boundaries and united by the shared use of the Arabic language, is missing. Pakistan's breakup in 1971 demonstrated this weakness in South Asia.
- *Economically*, South Asia's poverty is not conducive to fundamentalist activity. Overall, per capita income is only 2 percent of Saudi Arabia's, 6 percent of the average for the entire Arab heartland. Largely illiterate peasant farmers eking out a meager subsistence have little time—or inclination—for religious agitation. The lack of wealth may, at least according to some academic theories, limit the funds to spawn Islamic activism. Moreover, the lack


of oil wealth has precluded modernization on the scale of most other Islamic countries. The issue of Islamic traditionalism versus Westernized modernity and its attendant debasement of Islamic values has not evolved. 25X1

Not only has fundamentalism failed to become a major political force in most of South Asia, in many respects it has been more divisive than unifying.

- In Pakistan no consensus exists as to what an "Islamic state" should be. This problem, which has dogged the nation since its birth, helped cause a civil war and eventual dismemberment of the country and still hinders efforts to attain national integration. Zia's "Islamization" program, intended to convert Pakistan into a purer version of an "Islamic state," has even contributed to destabilizing sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shias and may be a contributing factor to the disturbances in Sind Province.
- In Afghanistan, Islam has been so integral a part of society that, until the Communist coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in 1979, the country had not been touched by the politicization of Islam. After the Soviet invasion, resistance groups rallied under an Islamic banner, although even Islam has been unable to unite the disparate and mutually hostile tribes. None of the champions of Islamic unity (Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran) have openly mobilized support for the resistance fighters.
- In India recurrent communal strife, including Hindu-Muslim confrontations, threaten to undo Prime Minister Gandhi's skillful and sustained political balancing act. 25X1

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Muslim Distribution in South Asia



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Table 3
South Asia

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect (Percent)	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Afghanistan	14,200,000	99	Sunni—87 Shia—12 Sufism	Communist	Strong among opposition	Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan	Continued insurgency
Bangladesh	96,500,000	85	Sunni Shia—less than 1 Sufism	Martial law	Quiescent	Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya	Reasonably stable
India	731,000,000	12	Sunni—11 Shia—1 Sufism	Parliamentary democracy	Quiescent	None known	Communal conflicts endemic
Maldives	168,000	100	Sunni	Authoritarian	Limited	Egypt, Libya	Stable
Pakistan	94,000,000	97	Sunni—80 Shia—16 Ahmadi—less than 1 Sufism	Martial law	Officially sanctioned	Saudi Arabia	Continued ethnic and sectarian conflicts
Sri Lanka	15,600,000	8	Sunni Shia—less than 1	Parliamentary democracy	None as yet	None known	Communal tensions

25X1

Afghanistan

Population/Ethnic Composition: 14.2 million. 50 percent Pashtun; 25 percent Tajik; 9 percent Uzbek; 9 percent Hazara. Tribal identification remains extremely strong, more important than national identity. []

Religious Composition: 99 percent Muslim (14 million) 87 percent Sunni of Hanafi school; 12 percent Shia, mainly from Hazara tribe. Islam is laced with pre-Islamic tribal beliefs and practices and influence from Sufi brotherhoods. []

Government: Afghan monarchy ended in 1973 with military coup led by Gen. Daud Khan, a reformer. Daud was unseated in 1978 in bloody coup by pro-Soviet Afghan Army forces, bringing Nur Mohammad Taraki to power. Taraki overthrown by rival Communist faction leader Hafizullah Amin in August 1979. Soviet Union invaded in December 1979, killed Amin, and installed Babrak Kamal as puppet president. The government currently faces insurrection and foreign occupation. []

Religious Policies of Government: Islam has always been de facto state religion. When reformers came to power in 1973, religious activities were curtailed and powerful landowning clergy were persecuted. Under Amin, persecution escalated to mass arrests and executions, even of rural Muslim clergy. Babrak's regime has tried to undercut resistance fighters' claims that the government is anti-Islamic by co-opting remaining religious establishment, restoring Islamic colors to national flag, publicizing Babrak's personal piety. []

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Islam is used as a political symbol by both the resistance and the government in the continuing power struggle. Most of the influential Muslim clergy are dead or in exile. Government makes extensive use of remaining mullahs, co-opts them by trips to Soviet Union and other inducements. []

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Afghanistan: Muslim resistance fighters make Soviet occupation a costly venture [redacted]



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Status of Fundamentalism: An Islamic underground has existed since the early 1970s in political shadings ranging from ultraconservative neomonarchists to radical fundamentalists. Much of conservative, nationalistic Islam now calls itself "fundamentalist" opposition, using Islam as a rallying cry against the Soviet-led regime. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- December 1979: USSR invaded, killing President Amin and replacing him with pro-Soviet Babrak Kamal. Throughout period from invasion to present, warfare has continued between insurgents and government.
- Spring 1980: Babrak government restored use of green Islamic colors in the national flag.
- Summer 1981: Babrak announced a revised land reform program designed to accommodate Muslim establishment's traditional landholding patterns. [redacted]

25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: Many of the hundreds of resistance groups are fundamentalist. The leading fundamentalist groups are:

Group	Leader	Ethnic Composition	Area of Strength
Hizbe Islami (Gulbuddin)	Gulbuddin Hekmatyar	Pashtun	Eastern Afghanistan
Hizbe Islami (Khalis)	Younus Khalis	Pashtun	Nangarhar Province
Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic League)	Burhanuddin Rabbani	Tajik	Northeast Afghanistan

25X1

Prognosis: Islam will dictate the language but not the content of the conflict between the Soviet-controlled Babrak regime and the resistance. The fratricidal discord among the resistance groups may decrease over time, but, even if the Soviet occupiers should decide to withdraw from Afghanistan, fundamentalists, moderates, and secular rivals would continue to compete for a role in any future government. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: Pakistan provides substantial assistance and haven to refugee and exile resistance groups. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt also provide limited financial assistance to selected resistance groups. [redacted]

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Bangladesh: Poverty overrides religious activism [redacted]



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Bangladesh

Population/Ethnic Composition: 96.5 million. Almost all Bengalis; fewer than 1 million tribals live near border with Burma. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 85 percent Muslim (82 million), 14 percent Hindu; 1 percent Buddhist; about 200,000 Christians. Muslims are predominantly Sunni, with extensive Sufi practices of saint worship and *pirs* (priests) interwoven. [redacted]

Government: Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, created after splitting from Pakistan in 1971. Military and civilian regimes, separated by bloody transitions, have alternated since then. Present head of state, General Ershad, has declared country will return to civilian rule and has called for general elections in 1985. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Established as a secular state when it split from Pakistan. The government uses secular law in criminal and civil matters, religious laws of Islam and other faiths in personal matters. Since 1977 constitutional changes have instituted new Islamic provisions. Martial law government has reasserted Islamic identity, but on muted level. It uses conservative Islamic symbols to placate population but avoids support for Islamic political parties.

Although poor, it has spent money on mosque building, educating imams, and small zakat fund. Ershad has emphasized his Islamic credentials, first head of government to make the hajj. Many cabinet-level officials are practicing Muslims and have pressed him to introduce more conservative Islamic practices. He made Friday the official holiday in 1982, established Ministry of Religious Affairs and Islamic Advisory Council in the spring of 1983. Aligned with Saudi-led "moderate" group of Muslim countries. [redacted]

25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Religious leaders, both Sufi *pirs* and Sunni *imams*, remain important part of nation's cultural identity, but they have little influence politically although many government leaders consult *pirs* for spiritual advice. The religious establishment tends to stay out of politics although under civilian rule they were in political opposition parties. [redacted]

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Status of Fundamentalism: In 1979 elections alliance of fundamentalists won 10 percent of popular vote and under martial law remain quiescent. [redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations: Several Islamic political parties still exist informally under martial law:

- *Islamic Democratic League:* More orthodox, conservative, Sunni.
- *Jamaat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society—JI): Far right politically; now semisecret society. Claims 700 active members, 100,000 “associates”; wants Islamic state, admires Iranian theocracy. Antimodern with some lower-class appeal. [redacted]

Other nonparty groups include:

- *Islami Chatra Shibir* (Islamic Youth): Small core of dedicated Koran readers, mostly youths from rural lower-middle class, pro-Iranian sentiments, linked with JI party.
- *Jamaat-i-Tabligh* (Proclamation Society): Organization stressing purity of Islamic devotions, nonpolitical. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Saudi involvement in social, economic, and educational programs—a university, technology training center, mosques. The government has accused both Libyans and Saudis of funding JI. [redacted]

Recent Events:

- 14 January 1983: Ershad made emotional speech saying nation should be heading toward an Islamic state and that Arabic must be taught in elementary schools.
- February 1983: Student clashes in Dhaka between secular and Muslim students. Numerous arrests, 300 injured, situation degenerated into rioting and clashes between students and police. [redacted]

Prognosis: Although fundamentalist activity remains quiescent, fundamentalists could try to mobilize strong support over a wide spectrum of society as a symbol of opposition to authoritarian, military domination. Any such attempt would clash with the overwhelming sentiments of Bengali mass culture, always on the defensive against politicized Islam. [redacted]

India

Population/Ethnic Composition: 731 million. 72 percent Indo-Aryan; 25 percent Dravidian; 3 percent Mongoloid and other. [redacted]

Religious Composition: Most middle-class and elite Muslims left India for new state of Pakistan in 1947, leaving behind a large uneducated, poor, rural Muslim minority. 12 percent of population is now Muslim (88 million); 84 percent Hindu; 2 percent Christian; 2 percent Sikh. Muslims predominantly Sunni of Hanafi school, with approximately 10 percent of Muslims Shia. Sufism important in rural areas. Muslims are scattered geographically, stratified by class, divided linguistically. Only in Kashmir state are they a majority of population; in states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, and Kerala they comprise about 20 percent of population. [redacted]

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Government: Federal republic since independence from Great Britain in 1947. Parliamentary democracy, under prime minister with multiparty system, although Congress Party dominates. Indira Gandhi, daughter of first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, became Prime Minister in 1966. She imposed a controversial “state of emergency” in 1975. Gandhi was ousted in 1977 election by coalition Janata Party. She was reelected in 1980 and is current Prime Minister. [redacted]

25X1

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Religious Policies of Government: Constitutionally secular, with religious freedom guaranteed. Government gives Muslims representation, offices, and protects Islamic family laws but has not granted representation in proportion to actual percentage of the population. Government effectively co-opts and rewards cooperative Muslim politicians. [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: A number of conservative Muslim organizations exist, usually co-opted by and supportive of government. Traditionally, Muslim voters have supported the dominant Congress Party for protection and have failed to institute a nationwide Muslim political organization, in part for fear of Hindu backlash. Muslims are geographically, culturally, linguistically, socially, and economically diverse. Clergy are weak and divided among Sunni, Shia, and Sufi. After excesses of emergency rule in 1975-77, which Muslims believed was discriminatory, Muslim voters shifted to Janata Party and helped to defeat Gandhi.


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India: A Muslim minority seeks economic and political protection [redacted]



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Recent Muslim defections from Gandhi's Congress Party have been on grounds that it has not provided enough economic help or security in Hindu-Muslim clashes. Some Muslim radicals have aligned with India's two Communist parties. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism/Religious Revival: No significant move toward an Islamic revival or increased fundamentalism. Indian Muslims are only marginally affected by outside events, more concerned with retaining minority rights and avoiding communal strife. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: *Jamaat-i-Islami*, is divided into two branches—*Jamaat-i-Islami-e-Kashmir* and *Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Hind* for the rest of India. The Kashmir branch has a youth wing, *Jamaat-i-Tulaba*. It has about 3,000 members, concentrates on educational and literary work, and upholds religious orthodoxy. It was banned during the 1975-77 emergency, then later reinstated. It has little influence on either political or religious attitudes of Indian Muslims. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: New Delhi is suspicious of external funding of Muslim organizations, fearing links with Pakistan and Iran, and closely observes and restricts activities of suspected radical groups. Saudi

Arabia has made small contributions to Islamic organizations for mosque building, but we have no evidence that the Saudis or any other Muslim state have contributed funds for political purposes. [redacted]

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Recent Developments:

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- August 1980: Autonomous agitation in Kashmir instigated by *Jamaat-i-Islami Hind*.
- August 1980: Hindu-Muslim violence, starting in densely populated Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, reached 20 urban areas, hundreds killed. 25X1
- 1981-early 1982: Mass conversions of thousands of Harijans (Untouchables) to Islam in Tamil Nadu created governmental nervousness and caused a Hindu revival movement to spring up.
- Mid-to-end 1982: Numerous Muslim-Hindu riots throughout northern India became major problem for government forces.
- February 1983: Election in Assam instigated riots and mass killings of Muslims as well as other groups (Assamese, Bengalis) in most serious outburst of religious violence since independence. [redacted] 25X1

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Prognosis: Hindu-Muslim strife and riots are containable, but possibility exists that Muslims may eventually unite over an issue such as governmental abandonment of secular policy and equal treatment of minorities. Any strong and coordinated Muslim outburst would almost certainly provoke a strong—and bloody—Hindu backlash. [redacted]

Maldives

Population/Ethnic Composition: 168,000. Mixture of Sinhalese, Dravidian, Arab, black. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 100 percent Sunni Muslims, orthodox, of Shafii school. [redacted]

Government: Independent from Great Britain since 1965. Sultanate was replaced by republic in 1968. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom received 98 percent of vote in 1978 election and remains as President with near absolute authority. Political parties are legal but nonexistent. Moderate, nonaligned. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Although government has avoided declaring Maldives an Islamic Republic, Islam is state religion, and all Maldivians must be Muslim for citizenship purposes. Legal system is based almost entirely on Shariah; Islamic customs such as fasting during Ramadan are enforced, and Islam serves as social code. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Conservatism of religious establishment is reflected in government policies; as yet, it has not objected to government efforts to modernize and liberalize slowly. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Conservative religious values are pervasive; little sign of further fundamentalist revival. Some youths have campaigned unsuccessfully for women to wear veils. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: No evidence of any. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: The government cooperates with other Muslim states, chiefly with Egypt, for higher education of its officials, but remains leery of radical Islamic states such as Libya. The government, however, recently set up the Institute of Islamic Studies with Libyan aid. [redacted]

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [redacted]

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Prognosis: As Maldives modernizes, there may be some backlash by the conservative clergy or by youths trained abroad, but the government is likely to pursue a measured modernization to avoid conservative resistance. [redacted]

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Pakistan

Population/Ethnic Composition: 94 million. 56 percent Punjabi; 23 percent Sindhi; 15 percent Pashtun; 6 percent Baluch. [redacted]

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Religious Composition: 97 percent (91 million) Muslim; 3 percent other, mainly Christian. Muslims are predominantly Sunnis of Hanafi school, but other Sunni sects also represented. Ahmadis, less than 1 percent, are a heretical sect, mainly urban intellectuals whom government considers non-Muslims. Shias, mostly tribal groups in the north and many urban tradesmen, comprise 15 to 25 percent of population. Strong elements of Sufi saint worship in rural areas, particularly in Sind Province. [redacted]

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Government: Pakistan, with western and eastern sections, was founded in 1947 as Islamic Republic when it was partitioned from India as a homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims. Founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah died in 1948, and his successor Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1951. Series of ineffectual prime ministers until Gen. Ayub Khan came to power in military coup in 1958 and instituted martial law. Ayub Khan, a modernist, ruled until 1969 when demonstrations forced him to transfer authority to Gen. Yahya Khan. The government fell after civil war and separation of East Pakistan in 1971. New government was led by socialist Z. A. Bhutto. Bhutto was removed in 1977 by military coup led by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, who executed Bhutto and currently rules under martial law. [redacted]

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
Religious Policies of Government: Alternated throughout history between search for identity as Islamic state and greater separation of religion from political life under Khan and Bhutto. Currently, [redacted]

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Pakistan: President Zia presses ahead with Islamization policies [redacted]



President Zia is restructuring Pakistan to conform to his version of an Islamic state. He also uses Islam to legitimize military rule and to justify banning all political party activity. Governmentally decreed Islamization includes: return of hudud (stoning, flogging, amputation) punishment; Islamic prohibitions such as ban on alcohol, night clubs, Western dress by government workers, gambling; Shariah form of legal system; revision of textbooks; compulsory zakat tax; Islamic banking system; and curtailment of women's rights. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Zia's appointed legislative body, the Federal Advisory Council, is dominated by religious figures but has no authority. The Islamic Ideology Council (IIC), comprised of fundamentalists, recommends measures (often revolutionary and radical) to steer the country toward a more Islamic course, but its recommendations are not binding on Zia. Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), a semiautonomous political force with deeply fundamentalist values, has links to the government, influences labor affairs, student activity, and refugee affairs and is used as an informal link with other Islamic states. Mainline Muslim clergy, although deeply divided by doctrinal factions, have considerable political influence. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Military government favorable to fundamentalists took control of government in 1977; religious revival is a government-sponsored phenomenon, officially sanctioned and encouraged. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: *Jamaat-i-Islami*, a former fundamentalist political party founded in the 1930s by Maulana Abdul Maudoodi, dominates the fundamentalist scene. It is now headed by Mian Tufail Mohammad, a distant relative of President Zia. It has a membership of several thousand, but active sympathizers and supporters may number 1 million. It appeals to middle- and lower-class merchants, civil servants, students, and mullahs. Its youth wing, *Islami Jamaat Tulaba* (IJT), provided the shock troops to begin the agitation that toppled Bhutto and remain militant radicals who have great influence on college campus organizations. Nonpolitical fundamentalist organizations also abound, most important of which include:

- **Ahl-e-Hadis** (People of the Traditions): Most puritanical of Islamic sects; it has had members on both the Islamic Ideology Council and the Federal Advisory Council.

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- *Nadvis* (The Association): It seeks moderate course and reconciliation between the puritanical Ahl-e-Hadis and the regular Hanafi orthodoxy.
- *Tehrik-i-Nifaz-Jaffaria* (Movement for the Promotion of Shiism): A Shia Muslim organization that opposes some of Zia's Islamization policies. []

Foreign Involvement: Jamaat-i-Islami, in addition to serving as an informal link between the government and other Muslim states, maintains longstanding ties with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The JI, according to the US Embassy, receives financial support from Saudi Arabia. []

Recent Developments:

- April 1979: President Zia executed former Prime Minister Bhutto over protests from many Arab and Muslim leaders.
- July 1980: Thousands of Shias demonstrated in Islamabad against imposition of zakat tax; Zia relented and exempted them from payment.
- June 1982 and December 1982: Shia-Sunni clashes in Kurram Tribal Agency; dozens killed.
- February-April 1983: Sunni-Shia riots in Karachi resulted in deaths, injuries, and extensive property damage.
- August-September 1983: Two months of ethnic violence in Sind Province; agitation against martial law rule. Local Sufi religious leaders joined in. []

Prognosis: Zia's vision of Islamization is not matched by the realities of his society, which still suffers an identity crisis, troubled by regional rivalries and increasing sectarian conflict. Zia is beset by opposition from the radical fundamentalists who believe he has compromised too much in Islamic terms, and by the remnants of the Westernized elite and the socialist left who see his Islamization as nothing but an excuse for military rule. Unless he can bring real economic benefits to the lower and middle classes and avoid damaging external conflict, class cleavages and separatism could undo his attempts to restructure Pakistani society along fundamentalist Islamic lines. []

Sri Lanka

Population/Ethnic Composition: 15.6 million. 74 percent Sinhalese; 18 percent Tamil; 7 percent "Moors" (Malays, Arabs, Indians). []

Religious Composition: 69 percent Buddhist; 15 percent Hindu; 8 percent Christian; 8 percent Muslim (1.3 million), predominantly Sunni, handful of Shias in merchant class. []

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Government: Independent since 1948. Parliamentary democracy. President Junius R. Jayewardene, in office since 1977, heads United National Party (conservative, free trade, moderately pro-West, non-aligned). Numerous small opposition parties but none strictly Muslim in character. []

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Religious Policies of Government: Officially tolerant of all religions, including Islam. []

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslims either of merchant class in urban areas or poor East Coast Moors. Muslims are generally religiously unobtrusive. They have attained prominence politically through appointment of two Muslims as cabinet ministers (Foreign Affairs and Transport) and through parliamentary representatives. Religious establishment is thoroughly co-opted. []

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Status of Fundamentalism: The Islamic revival has had little impact, reflecting both minority status of Muslims in Sri Lanka and insularity of the country. Muslims share Buddhists' concern about the effects of modernization on society, but their concern has not taken a detectable fundamentalist turn, even among youth groups. []

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Fundamentalist Organizations: None, but two radical political groups draw upon members from lower-middle-class Tamil-speaking Muslims: JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna), a radical leftwing militant group prominent in early 1970s and now in decline, and quasiterrorist cluster of Tamil separatist groups called Tamil Tigers. []

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Foreign Involvement: Iran has made overtures to establish links with Sri Lankan Muslims but has received no encouragement from government or Muslims. No other evidence of external support of Muslims. []

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Recent Developments: Periodic communal violence between Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority has often spilled over into anti-Muslim sentiments:

- July 1982: At western seacoast town of Galle, a dispute between Muslim landlord and Sinhalese tenant escalated into two days of rioting, arson, and death and injuries. The government quickly imposed a state of emergency and press censorship.
- July 1983: Worst Sinhalese-Tamil violence in 35 years evolved from Tamil terrorist attacks. During Colombo riots, Tamil-speaking Muslims' property destroyed; west coast Muslims threatened to align with Tamil cause.

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Prognosis: The Islamic fundamentalist cause is not likely to attract significant support from Sri Lankan Muslims, and religious-based communal differences will continue to be overshadowed by Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic tensions.

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Southeast Asia and Islam: A Secondary Force

Islam, practiced in Southeast Asia by either a majority or an entrenched minority in all countries, cannot compete with nationalism as the preeminent political force. Independence from Western colonial powers created a series of states propelled by a sense of national identity. The majority established secular forms of government that provided for religious expression but excluded the clerical establishment from participation in political decision making. [redacted]

About 200 million Muslims live in the region. The range of Islamic fervor ranges from sporadic armed resistance to the central government (in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, northern Sumatra in Indonesia, and border areas in Burma) to newly independent Brunei, which, until January 1984, had been one of the world's few remaining sultanates. Despite this overall religious enthusiasm, Malaysia is the only state where fundamentalism has influenced the government to modify its domestic policies to accommodate Islamic sensitivities and to actively encourage propagation of the faith. [redacted]

Throughout the region, resurgence of personal piety has been widespread among Muslims since the Iranian revolution—and the injection of Middle Eastern petrodollars—and is found in all social groups, particularly among the young. As a social phenomenon, the revival is growing among those states with Muslim majorities (Indonesia and Malaysia). Even in two key states where the Muslims are a troublesome minority (Thailand and the Philippines), the government has had to adopt a series of cosmetic measures to demonstrate its tolerance of the minority's religious beliefs. [redacted]

Islam also is a key destabilizing force among the ethnic groups of Southeast Asia, where communal disturbances often have roots in tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, usually the Chinese minority. Tensions between Malaysia and both the Philippines and Thailand continue over alleged Malaysian assistance to Muslim insurgent groups. In newly independent Brunei, a quiet exodus of the

Chinese professional class is going on in anticipation that anti-Chinese feelings may erupt into confrontation or, at a minimum, increased discrimination against non-Muslims. Burma's new minority laws, on the other hand, discriminate against Muslims and have already caused communal disturbances. [redacted]

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Governments of the region have so far suppressed the resistance of Muslim secessionist groups—Thailand's new policy of "Peace in the South," Marcos's manipulation of a badly fragmented Moro (Muslim) secession movement, and Soeharto's virtual elimination of Muslim rebels seeking greater autonomy in northern Sumatra. Few of the rebellions have gained significant assistance from the international Muslim community except for rhetorical support in Islamic Conference gatherings. Regional internal security forces have cooperated to cut off funds, arms shipments, and rebel leader movements, although they cannot stem the flow of some youths going abroad for training in the radical Middle Eastern states. [redacted]

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With the exception of Malaysia, all states in the region are pursuing secular policies designed to ensure rapid economic development. The models range from an outright love feast with Western capitalism in Singapore, to authoritarian mixed economies in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, to Burma's inept and uneven march to socialism, and to the Communist states of Indochina. [redacted]

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
Political Islam

The two Muslim majority states have dealt with politicized Islam in diametrically different fashions. Indonesia, numerically the world's largest Muslim state, has been depoliticized under the 19-year rule of ex-General Soeharto in the name of stability and economic development. In three successive national elections, Muslim parties have received close to 30 percent of the vote, yet Soeharto has not allowed meaningful political participation by them. Instead, he has co-opted the Muslim establishment, built

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Muslim Distribution in Southeast Asia



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mosques, subsidized private Muslim education, and issued carefully orchestrated warnings about “fanaticism” endangering ethnic relations in a heterogeneous society. The result has been overall obedience but festering resentment, especially among the educated young.

In Malaysia, where the politically preeminent Malays barely outnumber the Chinese, the largely ethnic issue of Malayization of government is inextricably linked with Islam. When Mahathir bin Mohamad became Prime Minister in 1981, he embarked on a

program of institutionalizing Islam throughout society which has created a curious coexistence of personal, social Islamic revival, government-sponsored orthodoxy, and the constant threat of communal breakdown. To quiet fundamentalist demands of a strident minority party of rural Malays, he co-opted into a government post the most popular leader of a Muslim youth group with mass appeal. The result has been a split between the old-guard orthodox Muslims and the frustrated fundamentalists.

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Table 4
Southeast Asia

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect (Percent)	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Brunei	209,000	60	Sunni	Sultanate Independence in January 1984	Already orthodox; no evidence	Limited	Some chance of postindependence instability
Burma	35,500,000	7	Sunni small Shia community	One party; authoritarian	Limited activity	Limited	Islam only a political irritant
Indonesia	166,000,000	90	Sunni Shia—less than 1 Sufism	Military-run; multiparty	Many small underground groups	Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia	Stability with co-optation or repression
Malaysia	15,000,000	50	Sunni Shia—less than 1 Sufism	Parliamentary democracy	Increasing with widening appeal	Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, PLO	Islam continuing potent political force
Philippines	54,300,000	4	Sunni	Authoritarian	Weak	Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Syria, Malaysia	Low-level insurgency will continue; instability
Singapore	2,500,000	15	Sunni	One-party democracy	No evidence	None known	Stability
Thailand	50,700,000	4	Sunni	Military dominated; constitutional monarchy	Weak	Libya, PLO	Irritant of Muslim separatists; stable

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Chams: "The Muslims the World Forgot"

The Chams are remnants of an ancient Indochinese Hindu kingdom that had converted to Islam in the 14th century, only to be displaced by the Vietnamese in the 15th century. They have somehow survived in Kampuchea and Vietnam through most of the 20th century, but just barely. In Kampuchea they were prime targets of the Communist Khmer Rouge as part of a campaign to wipe out religion. Journalists estimate that several hundred thousand may have been eliminated mercilessly. The Vietnamese, after their invasion of Kampuchea, used the Chams for propaganda by restoring religious freedom, rebuilding mosques, placing Chams in government jobs and

high-ranking positions in the occupying army, and by using Chams as international spokesmen for their "beneficent" rule of minority groups. [redacted] 25X1

After the Communist takeover of South Vietnam in 1975, however, approximately 100,000 Chams who live scattered throughout the Mekong Delta have had their religious and ethnic identity slowly eliminated through a vigorous assimilation policy. Imports of Korans are banned; the hajj is forbidden; mosques have been converted to community centers. Cham refugees from both countries have been largely ignored by international Muslim organizations. [redacted]

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Indonesia: President Soeharto successfully constructs a secular state in a Muslim society

[redacted]



25X1

Malaysia: Islam reinforces Malay identity in a multiracial society

[redacted]



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Brunei

Population/Ethnic Composition: 209,000. 65 percent Malay; 24 percent Chinese; 11 percent European, Indian, Arab, and Dyak. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 60 percent Sunni Muslim (125,000); 32 percent Buddhist or animist; 8 percent Christian. Muslims are the most orthodox in Southeast Asia. [redacted]

Government: Independence attained from Great Britain on 1 January 1984. Constitutional hereditary sultanate. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, who acceded to the throne in 1967, rules with appointed councils. No parliament. Political parties banned after abortive revolt in 1962; elections (for district representatives only) banned since 1965. [redacted]

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Philippines: Southern Muslims want autonomy, but get only minor political representation

[Redacted]



25X1

Religious Policies of Government: Islam is the state religion. Legal system is based on Islamic law. Government strictly enforces Islamic prohibitions with "religious police" who patrol for infractions. Government advances Islamic cause through policies such as sponsoring more Islamic programming on radio. Two previous Islamic political parties have been banned.

[Redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: The ulema are thoroughly co-opted by the government and have ceremonial importance only. Their views are respected by the government, but they have little input. [Redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Little evidence of increase in the already orthodox practices of society. [Redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. [Redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Country is wealthy enough so that external influence of Saudi Arabia, Libya, or Iran is not needed or desired. [Redacted]

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [Redacted] 25X1

Prognosis: The return of 2,000 students after full independence may exert influence either for more modernization or for more tightening of Islamic prohibitions. Distinct possibility of instability with Islam a contributing factor. [Redacted] 25X1

Burma 25X1

Population/Ethnic Composition: 35.5 million. 72 percent Burman; remainder consists of various ethnic minorities (Karen, Kachin, Shan, Chin, Chinese, and Bengali Indians). [Redacted] 25X1 25X1

Religious Composition: 85 percent Buddhist; over 7 percent Muslim (2.5 million); rest are Christian or animist. Most Muslims are Sunni; about one-fourth are Rohingya of Arakan Province bordering on Bangladesh; rest are scattered, with small Shia community in Rangoon. [Redacted] 25X1

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Government: Independent since 1948. First President U Nu overthrown in 1962 coup, which brought General Ne Win to power. Unicameral legislature. One official party (Burma Socialist Program Party). Ne Win retired in 1981 but retained effective control of country as chairman of BSPP. Current President is U San Yu. Government is socialist, neutral in external politics. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Buddhism was state religion under U Nu; Ne Win has championed secular state, with strict separation of church and state. Government restricts outside Muslim influence, bans all preaching by visiting clergy, bans imports of Islamic literature, and tries to isolate and contain Muslim minority. Strict government policies stop short of outright harassment, but, through Nationality Act of 1982, the government has made most Muslims a second-class minority. In 1978 government crackdown on illegal Bengali Muslim immigrants spilled over to Bengali settlers in Arakan; 200,000 fled to Bangladesh. Under international pressure, 187,000 were repatriated in 1979. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Six officially recognized "Establishment Islam" groups represent Muslims in relations with the government; basically nonpolitical, including a Shia organization in Rangoon. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Small resurgence in religious observance reported in press during 1980-81. For the Rohingyas, the issue is Islamic autonomy, whereas other Muslims are agitating for restoration of civil rights and freedom of religion; some have joined other ethnic insurgencies for common goal of unseating government. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations:

- **United Islamic Organization Burma (UIOB):** A resistance group formed to protect ethnic minority rights. Its military guerrilla arm is known as Muslim Liberation Front (MLF), reportedly about 200 armed men; may have some Thai support.
- **Maghribs:** Reportedly about 200 armed men.

- **Muslim Action Group:** Leader is Maung Maung Tar; of Iranian descent, runs a small, pro-Iranian group about which little is known.

- **Rohingya Patriotic Front of Arakan:** Muslim militants wanting to establish separate Islamic state; their military wing, the Rohingya Liberation Army (RLA) has about 400 armed men. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: Iran has established a small Shia Islamic Center in Rangoon. UIOB also has some limited financial support from World Muslim League and Organization of Islamic Conference (Saudi Arabia), perhaps also from Iran. [redacted]

25X1

Recent Developments:

- 1980: Government allowed Muslims to make hajj for first time since 1962.

- April 1981: 1,500 Burmese Muslims fled to Malaysia after new citizenship law denied their civil rights.

25X1

- October 1982: Nationality Law passed against minorities.

- August 1983: Anti-Muslim incidents broke out in numerous small towns, 250 arrested. Muslim organizations protested, threatened to cancel religious festival, but government moved in to protect worshippers at mosque. [redacted]

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Prognosis: Fundamentalism among Muslim minority is unlikely to become more than a political irritant to the government but has added to traditional separatist feeling among Burmese minority groups. [redacted]

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Indonesia

Population/Ethnic Composition: 166 million. Majority of Malay stock with numerous subdivisions, most important being Javanese (45 percent); 3 percent Chinese; less than 1 percent Indian and Arab. [redacted]

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Secret

Religious Composition: Numerically the largest Muslim country worldwide. More than 90 percent Muslim (149 million); 5 percent Christian; 3 percent Buddhist/Hindu. Muslims are Sunni, but many Sufi beliefs; Muslims on Java practice syncretic blend of pre-Islamic Hindu/Buddhist and animistic beliefs; orthodox Islam (perhaps 20 percent) practiced more rigorously on islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and in southern Sulawesi. [redacted]

Government: Independence from Netherlands in 1949. Brief parliamentary democratic period, followed by Sukarno's authoritarian leftist rule. Attempted Communist coup in 1965 provoked military reaction; General Soeharto assumed political control and has ruled since 1966 with periodic elections reaffirming his mandate until 1988. Soeharto's regime is a military/technocratic alliance, moderate, pro-West, and anti-Communist. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Secular state with Islam as the dominant religion. Official tolerance of all religions, but no proselytizing allowed, and the government promotes nonsectarian state ideology. Ministry of Religion encourages establishment of Islam, monitors any signs of fundamentalism or dissent. The government supports many Islamic organizations, Koran-reading contests, and mosque building. Externally, the government supports moderate Islamic positions and is active in Islamic organizations. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government:

- Traditionally, small minority of religious leaders and Muslim politicians have lobbied for Islamic state and failed.
- Several regional Islamic rebellions in mid-1950s called *Darul Islam* are represented now by one small armed guerrilla group in north Sumatra.
- Four Muslim parties were integrated forcefully into one Unity Development Party (PPP) in 1973; it usually wins about 28 percent of election votes; leadership is co-opted by government.
- Religious hierarchy is neither organized nor united; no religious figure or PPP Muslim has widespread appeal with masses or influence in central government.
- Council of Ulemas (MUI) set up by government in 1975; co-opted but occasionally takes issue with government. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Since mid-1970s, there has been a strong social and cultural renaissance of Islam and a vigorous upswing in Islamic observance, particularly among the elite, rising middle class, and youth. Extremist fundamentalist groups have flourished, some as cults, others as underground radical opposition. [redacted]

25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: Numerous groups have emerged, then been suppressed by the government, which tends to lump them together as *Darul Islam*. Most prominent current groups:

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- *Islam Jema'ah* (Society of Islam): Reformist, non-political sect, numbering about 50,000 mostly urban youth at height; formed in early 1970s, banned twice, most recently in 1979; now underground. [redacted]

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- *Kommando Jihad* (War Command): Umbrella term for group of militant fundamentalists operating underground. Responsible for terrorist acts, some assassinations, plots against Soeharto and other Cabinet members.

- *Istaqomah*. West Javanese zealots believed to be linked with the Kommando Jihad. Led by Imron ben Zein, executed for series of terrorist assassinations and bombings. Leadership was mostly killed or arrested after hijacking attempt was thwarted by government in 1981. [redacted]

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- *Warman group*: Small group of terrorist bandits calling themselves "Sons of Darul Islam" operating underground in Sumatra and Java. Warman was killed in manhunt in 1982.

- *NII* (Islamic State of Indonesia): Reportedly founded in 1976 by former Darul Islam members and sympathizers. The leadership was arrested in 1981 and brought to trial in 1983 in a series of court cases. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: None of the fundamentalist groups are known to have extensive outside links. Government is suspicious of Iranian delegations and of any indication of Libyan influence. [redacted]

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Recent Developments:

- 1977-78: Series of bombings, church, and nightclub attacks by Kommando Jihad in Sumatra and Java.
- March 1978: Islamic youth group stormed Parliament building and set off bombs at session to install Soeharto.
- Mid-1979: Government exposed Warman terrorist plot to kill Soeharto at National Grand Mosque.
- March 1981: Airplane hijacking by Istaqomah ended in Thailand with storming by Indonesian commandos; all hijackers were killed; leader Imron ben Zein was seized in Java as "mastermind."
- March 1982: Election rally in Jakarta, broken up by Muslim youths, led to two days of sporadic rioting.

Prognosis: Muslim groups, although factionalized and unorganized, are main focus of political opposition to regime. They may polarize into more radical opposition groups to create communal violence in which Islam plays a role. Present secular regime will not compromise and may become more repressive of fundamentalist groups.

Malaysia

Population/Ethnic Composition: 15 million, divided between Peninsular Malaysia and the states of Sarawak and Sabah on the island of Borneo. 50 percent Malay; 35 percent Chinese; 10 percent Indian; 5 percent mixtures and tribal groups.

Religious Composition: On Peninsular Malaysia, Malays are Muslim, nearly all Chinese are Buddhists, Indians are Hindu. Sarawak: 24 percent Muslim; 36 percent animist; 24 percent Buddhist and Confucian; 16 percent Christian. Sabah: 38 percent Muslim; 17 percent Christian; 45 percent animist. Nearly all Muslims (7.5 million) are Sunni. Small Shia pocket in Kuala Lumpur.

Government: Independent from Great Britain since 1957. Malaya joined with Borneo states to form Malaysia in 1963. Constitutional parliamentary democracy, secular rule, pro-West, conservative. The government rules through 11-party coalition dominated by predominantly Muslim Malay UMNO with regular elections and two opposition parties. Most recent election, in 1982, reelected Mahathir bin Mohamad, a devout Muslim, as Prime Minister.

Religious Policies of Government: Islam is the state religion, but the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion. The government promotes moderate, official Islamic "orthodoxy," emphasizing Muslim compatibility with development. The government, through the Islamic Affairs Council and National Council of Religious Affairs promotes policy of *dakwah* (propagation) which indirectly assures Malay political dominance. *Dakwah*, which has stressed reform within Islamic groups and conversion of non-Malay citizens, has appealed not only to urban, middle-class, well-educated youth and Malay elite, but to poor rural Malays as way to compete against perceived Chinese economic dominance. The government co-opted Anwar Ibrahim, popular leader of ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia), who has joined the government party (UMNO) and has been made Minister of Culture, Youth, and Sports. The government has advanced more fundamentalist society by:

- Increasing sponsorship of mosque building, Islamic education subsidies, Koran reading contests, hajj sponsorships.
- Helped found Islamic Conference.
- Supporting PERKIM (government-sponsored Malaysian Muslim Convert Association) activities in conversion of non-Muslims (Chinese, Dyaks); also massively subsidized by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait.
- Drawing up new "morals" law that adopts many cosmetic Islamic features.
- Agreeing to transmit Saudi network of Islamic broadcasts to all of Southeast Asia.
- Announcing that it will establish an International Islamic University, the first in Southeast Asia.
- Allowing Libya to have Embassy, unique in Southeast Asia.

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to

Government: Islamic Malay (ruling elite) community has disproportionately heavy influence on state policies. Sultans of each state within the Federation act as ceremonial guardians of Islam. Conservative religious officials at village level emphasize moderate orthodoxy. PERKIM, major Islamic welfare organization, has powerful backing.

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Status of Fundamentalism: Islamic identity was actively asserted, starting in early 1970s, through:

- Increased government support of orthodox Islamic policies.
- Spread of radicalism under *dakwah* policy. Fundamentalism strongest in rural areas but also exists among urban Malays. []

Fundamentalist Organizations:

- **PAS** (Islamic Party of Malaysia). Malay Islamic chauvinist party in northern Peninsular Malaysia. Iran-backed extremist wing calls for Islamic state and, by implication, expulsion of Chinese. PAS currently in disarray, factionalized.
- **ABIM** (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia). Founded in 1971. Largest fundamentalist organization with 40,000 members. Membership concentrated among elite youth, although it has mass base and support. It had extensive connections with Islamic groups in Middle East until government barred such ties in 1981.
- **Darul Arqam** (House of Arqam—Companion of Muhammad): Founded in early 1970s. Small group of Arabist extremists who sponsor religious retreats and communes. Nonpolitical, but anti-Western. Claims 50,000 members.
- **Jamaat-i-Tabligh** (Proclamation Society): Originally formed of Muslim Indian members but extended to include Malays. Proselytizes among rural population, antimaterialist, anti-Western. No apparent political leanings, although some radicals may be involved in isolated violence.

Other small extremist groups may exist in small cells:

- **API** (Islamic Unity Force).
- **P.A.S.:** Another radical underground group, not the same as PAS.
- **Islamic Revolutionary Party:** Mainly Malay students in England. []

Foreign Involvement: Maintains closest links to Middle East states of any country in Southeast Asia. Saudi Arabia broadcasts Islamic programs from base in Kuala Lumpur. Libyan Embassy aids Islamic

Center in capital. PLO representative in Kuala Lumpur is only one in Southeast Asia. Iran sends missions annually. [] 25X1

Recent Developments:

- 1978: Muslim youths desecrated Hindu temples in Kerling. 25X1
- October 1980: Muslim fanatics attacked police station at Batu Pahat, 24 killed. Triggered government drive against "deviants."
- 1981: Thousands of Thai Muslim refugees fled to Malaysia. Thais charged Malaysia with training Thai Muslim insurgents.
- Fall 1982: Government announced formation of Southeast Asia's first "Islamic Bank."
- January 1983: Muslim terrorists shot at Soviet Embassy, claiming to be "International Muslim Brotherhood." [] 25X1

Prognosis: Revivalist spirit will continue, but, with its large Chinese minority, Malaysia will never have thoroughly Islamic society. The government, in order to keep constant threat of Malay-Chinese communal violence in bounds, must control fundamentalist assertiveness it ironically helped sponsor. []

25X1

Philippines

Population/Ethnic Composition: 54.3 million. 95 percent Malay, 1.5 percent Chinese, 3.5 percent other.

[] 25X1

Religious Composition: 93 percent Christian, predominantly Catholic; 4 percent Sunni Muslim (2.2 million); 3 percent Buddhist or animist. Muslims divided into four tribal groups known collectively as Moros, most located in southern islands, where they make up 33 percent of population. Some scattered throughout cities. []

25X1

Government: Independent from United States since 1946. Originally a democratic republic, with series of elected presidents. Current President Ferdinand Marcos has ruled since he was first elected in 1965. 25X1

Marcos imposed martial law in 1972; revised Constitution for more parliamentary form of government in

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1973. Again revised in 1981 when martial law was lifted. Regime is authoritarian with some constitutional safeguards. Pro-West, anti-Communist. []

Religious Policies of Government: Secular state, with Christianity as dominant religion. Freedom of religious expression guaranteed by the Constitution. The government has been struggling with Muslim separatism and civil war among the southern Moros since independence. Government efforts to resettle Christians in Muslim areas since late 1940s caused communal hostilities and banditry. Armed rebellion among Muslims began when martial law was imposed in 1972. The government granted token form of autonomy to Muslim regions and has tried to co-opt and to offer amnesty for rebel leaders. Minister of Muslim Affairs monitors developments in the Moro provinces. Internationally, the government has moved closer to Arab positions because of oil dependency and Philippine export of workers to Persian Gulf states. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslim elite in south remains subordinate to Christian ruling class. Some are co-opted, but limited Muslim autonomy restricts political influence. Muslim masses at bottom of national economic ladder. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalism is not a feature of the antigovernment rebellion, although, in quest for external support, Moro National Liberation Front leaders have subscribed to concept of Islamic revival. Fundamentalism has been used to unite a disparate group of nominal Muslims and to use Muslim identity to attack the regime. []

Fundamentalist Organizations:

- Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF): Separatist organization that uses Islamic traditions in quest for a Muslim autonomous region. It was formed in the 1960s from numerous armed bandit gangs. Armed strength currently estimated by the government at 12,000 to 17,000 but largely inactive. Movement is on the decline because of combat losses and loss of the international support that it had in the mid-1970s. Exile leader Nur Misuari claims to head movement, although his claim is contested by other rebels, some of whom are more willing to negotiate with Marcos for limited autonomy.

No evidence of strictly fundamentalist groups. [] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: MNLF received overt and covert aid from both Libya and Saudi Arabia for years, with Malaysia as conduit. Islamic Conference granted MNLF observer status. Iran and Syria have provided limited financial and material support. [] 25X1

Recent Developments:

- January 1979: Marcos held elections as way to fulfill 1976 agreement to grant more autonomy to Muslim regions. MNLF boycotted elections.
- January 1981: Army embarked on short-lived plan to relocate 30,000 Muslims in south.
- February 1981: MNLF faction ambushed and killed 124 Philippine Constabulary troops. The Army killed 2,000 MNLF members and arrested 4,000 in retaliation.
- January 1982: Air Force planes strafed Japanese vessel suspected of transmitting \$10 million worth of arms from Libya to MNLF. 25X1
- March 1982: Marcos made highly publicized trip to Saudi Arabia to improve ties to Middle East. [] 25X1

Prognosis: Government is dealing with insurgency that will never go away entirely unless autonomy and economic parity with rest of country are achieved. MNLF strength and influence probably will continue at a low level. Less likely, but possible, would be a tactical alliance with Communist resistance forces now threatening regime. [] 25X1

Singapore

Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.5 million. 77 percent Chinese; 15 percent Malay; 6 percent Indian and Pakistani; 2 percent other. [] 25X1

Religious Composition: Most Chinese are Buddhists; 15 percent (375,000) Malay Muslims; a few Christians, Hindus, Taoists, Confucianists. [] 25X1

Government: Republic and constitutional democracy. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has served and been reelected since independence from Great Britain in 1959. People's Action Party is only one represented in unicameral legislature. [] 25X1

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Religious Policies of Government: Official and unofficial religious tolerance in secular state. The government shows some deference to Islamic sensitivities—has Shariah court for family laws; maintains separate registry for Muslim marriages; funds Muslim welfare societies; and sponsors mosques at public housing sites. The government also watches through security agency for signs of religious dissent or discord, is extremely sensitive to Muslim restiveness or imported Islamic radicalism. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Islam is an ethnic issue, totally identified with the Malay minority. Malays, who comprise nearly all of the Muslim community, are at the bottom of the social-economic ladder, and the religious establishment has no political significance or influence with the government. []

Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence that it has reached Singapore. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known to exist. Leadership of Malay and Indian extremist group called Singapore People's Liberation Organization (SPLO), which may have had some Islamic ideology, was caught, tried, and quickly jailed. []

Foreign Involvement: None known. []

Recent Developments:

- 1979: Ten people arrested, tried as "Muslim fanatics."
- January 1982: Four people arrested for distributing pro-Muslim, antigovernment leaflets from Singapore People's Liberation Organization at a Muslim holiday rally. []

Prognosis: No near-term threat of Muslim extremism, even though there is some dissatisfaction among Malays with the social engineering done by Chinese-dominated government. []

Thailand

Population/Ethnic Composition: 50.7 million. 75 percent Thai; 14 percent Chinese; 11 percent minority tribes and Malays. []

Religious Composition: 95 percent Buddhist; 4 percent (2 million) Muslim; less than 1 percent Christian. Nearly all Muslims are located in southernmost provinces bordering Malaysia, although a few live in Bangkok. Muslim population forms 80 percent of population in the southern provinces, which were once part of a separate Pattani empire that spanned territory now within Thailand and Malaysia. [] 25X1

Government: Constitutional monarchy with parliamentary system of government, numerous political parties. Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda has been Prime Minister since 1980. The armed forces are, unofficially, final arbiters in political decisions. [] 25X1

Religious Policies of Government: Freedom of religion is guaranteed constitutionally. The King acts as defender of all faiths, although he is a practicing Buddhist. Muslims had been a neglected, unassimilated minority. The government has recently made determined effort to eliminate causes for disaffection. It has built mosques and an Islamic Center in Bangkok; established special educational quotas, Muslim welfare societies, and Shariah representatives in courts; and sent students to the Middle East. [] 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Armed Muslim rebellion movement in the south is small and fragmented. Groups espouse either total independence or union with Malaysia. Muslims have never organized a political party. Muslims in other parts of the country coexist well with traditionally tolerant Thai society. [] 25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: No significant fundamentalist activity since rebellion by Thai Muslims in late 1940s, although more Muslim students are studying in the Middle East. [] 25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: Not strictly fundamentalist, but largest separatist and dissident organizations are: [] 25X1

- **PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization):** Founded in 1968, based in Malaysia with about 13 distinct gangs operating in Thailand. [] 25X1

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- **BNPP** (Pattani National Liberation Front): Founded in 1947 to lobby for independent Islamic state. May now be merged with PULO.
- **BRN** (National Revolutionary Front): Founded in 1960s. More secular than other groups, perhaps with links to Thai Communist Party.
- **Paperi** (Islamic Young People's Organization): Youth group, perhaps a dummy set up by Communists to attract Muslims.
- **Jamaat-i-Tabligh** (Proclamation Society): Evangelical group originally from India, gathering adherents from other Southeast Asian states; nonpolitical but strong support among peasants in southern Thailand.
- **Party Angkatan Revolusi Tentara Islam Pattani**: Subfaction of BRN with membership of 30 to 40 people in December 1982. [redacted]

Prognosis: Government cannot fully assimilate Muslims into Thai society but shows signs of removing support for the separatists by attentive administration and attempts to reach bilateral agreement with Malaysia not to harbor separatists. Separatists in turn are too hopelessly divided to unite against government and may fade away or remain localized threat. [redacted]

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No group numbers more than 1,000. Some are armed terrorists and bandits with little political support. Estimated 10 to 20 percent of Muslim population sympathizes with their radical aims. The groups often receive asylum in Malaysia, where they may have links with fundamentalist Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: Libya, which built large Islamic Center in Bangkok, is suspected of aiding and training separatists. Some rebels getting military training in Syria by PLO. [redacted]

25X1

Recent Developments:

- 1980: Alleged Muslim threats to assassinate the King and Queen never materialized; the government set up special police force to operate against banditry; rash of unattributed bomb attacks in Bangkok. About 2,000 Thai Muslims fled to Malaysia during counterinsurgent operations.
- Late 1981: The government launched "Peace in the South" campaign, appointed popular Gen. Han Lilanon as commander for the area. [redacted]

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Sub-Saharan Africa

**Sub-Saharan Africa:
Mostly Moderate Islam**

In Africa 27 countries outside the Arab-dominated northern tier contain approximately 120 million Muslims, ranging up to 100 percent in Somalia. The remaining Sub-Saharan African nations outside our survey contain only negligible Muslim populations, usually non-African immigrants. [redacted]

The forms of African Islam are almost as wide ranging as the percentages. Devotees of mystic Sufism intertwined with pre-Islamic animism prevail in the region, while, at the other extreme, a vocal minority of Muslims in Nigeria are strongly influenced by militant fundamentalism. Although the political voice of Islam is generally weak and fundamentalists are a tiny minority of all Muslims in the region, a limited Islamic revival is under way in several states. [redacted]

Arab support is paying off in an increase in Islamic social consciousness and activism. Practically all of the states of the region are sending increasing numbers of Muslims on hajj as well as to Middle Eastern universities and religious schools. The impact of returning students on their societies has yet to be reliably measured but may add to the tensions as a new generation assumes political leadership. We believe they may compete with the Christian-educated majority who have received religious and technical training in the West. [redacted]

In the future, Muslim zealots, supported and financed by Libya, conservative Saudi Arabia, or Iran, could emerge to change the formula for rule by already weak governments with fragile political institutions:

- The ranks of older, Western-oriented African statesmen are thinning, and their ability to steer a moderate political course backed by personalized authoritarian rule is coming to a close. Military regimes led by ideologically naive officers often take their place, with subsequent instability.

- Economic crisis bedevils almost all of Africa, bringing with it generational, tribal, sectarian, and urban-rural tensions that could fracture along Islamic versus non-Islamic lines if money from the wealthy Muslim states is involved. [redacted]

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The predominantly Muslim states adjacent to the northern tier face the greatest threat from Libyan ambitions. Religious as well as militant fundamentalist influence has thus far been checked as a political force, although in Chad and Sudan, Libyan military intervention or support on behalf of rebels continues to aggravate chronic tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. [redacted]

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
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In West Africa rising fundamentalism among younger Muslims in northern Nigeria threatens to intensify existing regional and north-south tensions and contributes to national instability. The rise in fundamentalist fervor in Nigeria, in turn, threatens to slowly seep through to other countries of the region—particularly to Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Mali—with an appeal that will survive with or without Libyan support. The Libyan influence has been particularly strong in Benin, which has been used as a transit point for Libyan-supported dissident groups from other West African states as well as a venue for “Islamic brotherhood conferences” designed to spread the Libyan revolutionary philosophy. [redacted]

25X1

In East Africa, where Islam is practiced by only a minority of the populations of all states except in the Comoros Islands, fundamentalist activity has not been a major element in the political equation. Islam there is principally associated with the Asian minority populations, usually the economically envied middle class. In Tanzania an ethnic-religious division between the Muslim islands of Zanzibar and Pemba and

Muslim Distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa



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the mostly non-Muslim mainland contributes to constant tensions. The rise in Islamic consciousness adds to the desire of the islands for more autonomy.

Religious Composition: Approximately 12 percent (455,000) Muslim, predominantly Sunni, or nonorthodox; 8 percent Christian; 80 percent animist. Muslims are represented in three major tribal groups concentrated in the north.

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In the Horn countries, the pragmatic variety of Islam practiced by large Muslim populations exists alongside the chronic political instability of the region—antagonistic ethnic groups, border wars, and internal rebellions. Islam remains only a bystander to the main conflict.

Government: One-party Marxist military regime. Col. Mathieu Kerekou has served as President and Defense Minister since 1972.

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Benin

Population/Ethnic Composition: 3.8 million. 99 percent African. Yoruba, Fon, Bariba, Adja major tribal groups.

Religious Policies of Government: Official tolerance for all religions despite Marxist character of state. Government does not permit politicized Islamic activity.

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Table 5
Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Benin	3,800,000	12	Sunni Sufism	Marxist; military	Not yet evident	Nigeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia	Instability
Cameroon	9,300,000	16	Sunni Sufism	One party; presidential	Nonexistent	None	Uneasy stability
Chad	5,000,000	45	Sunni Sufism	Military	Not yet evident	Libya	Civil war
Comoros Islands	442,000	97	Sunni	Islamic republic; authoritarian	Not yet evident	Libya, Gulf states	Repression
Djibouti	316,000	92	Sunni Sufism	One party; parliamentary	Small fundamentalist minority	Libya	Ethnic conflict
Ethiopia	31,300,000	40	Sunni Sufism	Marxist; military	Insignificant	None	Secessionist movements
Gambia, The	700,000	90	Sufism	Republic	Insignificant	Libya	Probably stable
Ghana	13,400,000	12	Sunni Sufism	Military; leftist	None known	None	Instability
Guinea	5,400,000	65	Sufism	Military	Dormant	Saudi Arabia, Libya	Postsucces-sion insta-bility
Guinea-Bissau	827,000	30	Sufism	One party; leftist military	Increasing conversions	Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya	Uneasy stability
Ivory Coast	8,900,000	25	Sunni Sufism Wa'hhabis	Pro-West; authoritarian	Limited	Libya	Postsucces-sion insta-bility
Kenya	18,600,000	7	Sunni Shia minority	One party; civilian	Nonexistent	Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Aga Khan	Fragile stability
Liberia	2,100,000	15	Sunni	Rightist Military	Insignificant	Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt	Instability
Malawi	6,600,000	12	Sunni Sufism	Rightist one-man regime	Nonexistent	Limited	Possible post-succes-sion instability
Mali	7,400,000	90	Sunni Sufism Wa'hhabis	Military; socialist	Limited	Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria	Uneasy stability
Mauritius	1,000,000	17	Sunni	Multiparty; socialist	Limited	Gulf states, Libya	Fragile instability
Mozambique	13,000,000	11	Sunni	Military; people's republic	None	None	Insurgency, instability
Niger	6,100,000	85	Sunni Sufism	Pro-West; military	Not yet evident	Nigeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia	Libyan target—instability
Nigeria	85,200,000	47	Sunni Sufism Wa'hhabis	Pro-West; military	Strongest in Africa	Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia	Instability

Table 5
Sub-Saharan Africa (Continues)

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Senegal	6,300,000	82	Sunni Sufism Shia minority	Pro-West; civilian	Fairly significant	Libya, Iran	Continued stability
Sierra Leone	3,700,000	25	Sunni Sufism Shia minority	One party; pro-West; civilian	Growing	Libya, Iran	Postsuc- cession insta- bility
Somalia	6,200,000	100	Sunni Sufism	Military; socialist	Many exile groups	Libya, South Ye- men, Iran, Ethiopia	Postsuc- cession insta- bility
South Africa	27,000,000	1	Sunni Shia minority	Parliamenta- ry for whites	Increasing among Coloreds	Saudi Arabia, Iran	Stability, rising ethnic dissidence
Sudan	20,600,000	73	Sunni Sufism	Pro-West; military	Increasing on campuses; many exile groups	Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya	Instability; potential civil war
Tanzania	20,500,000	35	Sunni Sufism Wa'hhabis Small Shia minority	One-party republic	Limited	Libya, Iran	Potential Christian- Muslim conflict
Uganda	13,800,000	10	Sunni Sufism	Civilian, one party	Not yet evident	Libya	Insurgency
Upper Volta	6,600,000	20	Sunni Sufism	Pro-West; military	Revival among youth	Libya	Uneasy stability

[Redacted] 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslims, long dominant in commercial life, hold some key cabinet and military positions such as Foreign Minister and Army chief. Religious establishment is in disarray and too docile to criticize government openly. [Redacted]

Africa and their allegedly lax and corrupt Muslim leadership. [Redacted]

25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: Although Islam is gaining converts, fundamentalist ideas have yet to penetrate or affect Muslim population. [Redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Benin accepts significant Libyan financial contributions for mosque construction and other religious uses and serves as a transit stop for Libyan-recruited West Africans flown to Libya for political indoctrination and paramilitary training. Saudis have given limited aid via mosques and imams. [Redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations: League for the Elimination of Heresy (Jama'atul Izalatul Bidi'a): Clandestine militant group based in Nigeria, has about 25 members among Hausa community in capital of Porto Novo. Leader is Ghana-born Mohammed El Aqul Said, now imprisoned in Nigeria, a reformist who preaches against the secular governments of West

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [Redacted]

25X1

Prognosis: Continued instability due to internal problems—economic, regional, and ethnic—as much if not more than external pressures. Internal Muslim factor will not play significant role. [Redacted]

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Cameroon

Population/Ethnic Composition: 9.3 million. 99 percent African divided among approximately 200 tribes. [redacted]

Religious Composition: About 16 percent (1.5 million) Muslim, mainly in northern provinces; 50 percent animist; 34 percent Christian, in southern provinces. [redacted]

Government: Unitary republic under one-party presidential regime. President Ahmadou Ahidjo, a northern Muslim, ruled from 1960 until November 1982 when he resigned in favor of then Prime Minister Paul Biya, a southern Christian. Presidential elections are scheduled for 1985. Biya has continued Ahidjo's moderate, pro-West policies. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Officially tolerant of all religions, government balances ethnic and religious groups by awarding positions in civil service and commerce. Islamic Cultural Association, a conservative voluntary association of elites, was founded by government to monitor activities of the Islamic community. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: While some northern Muslims continue to be represented in Biya's government, he has gradually removed others closely associated with the Ahidjo regime. Press reports suggest that northern Muslims are growing apprehensive about their future role in the government and the current pace of change. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Nonexistent at present. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None of any consequence known to exist. [redacted] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: Government is suspicious of Libyan overtures and closely watches Libyan influence in neighboring Chad. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- 1979: Muslim-inspired incident in north against village authorities. [redacted]
- 1984: Mutiny attempt by disaffected northerners in Presidential Guard [redacted]

Prognosis: President Biya must watch carefully for signs of ethnic, regional, or religious tensions in the wake of the failed northern mutiny. Continuing economic successes will help moderate Muslims resist fundamentalist appeals. [redacted] 25X1
25X1

Chad

Population/Ethnic Composition: 5 million. 80 percent African, 20 percent Arab. [redacted] 25X1

Religious Composition: 45 percent (2.2 million) Sunni Muslim; 45 percent animist; 10 percent Christian. Muslims are fairly orthodox; northern Toubou groups follow the Sanusi school established in Libya in 19th century. Other Muslim tribes, influenced by West Africa, are followers of Sufi brotherhoods, predominantly Tijaniya. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Government: Civil war and series of coups and countercoups between feuding (mainly Muslim) factions since independence from France in 1960. Constitution suspended in 1975 and never reinstated. Legal system is combination of French civil law and Chadian 25X1
customary law. The latest upheaval was in 1982 when Col. Hissein Habre, who had served as Defense Minister, deposed pro-Libyan President Goukouni 25X1
Weddeye. Both Goukouni and Habre are Muslim, reflecting the postcolonial Islamic feuding. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Since assuming leadership in 1982, President Habre has tried to 25X1
reduce tensions between southern Christians and northern Muslims. He has not been able to overcome deep-rooted ethnic and religious rivalries that plague his government [redacted] 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslim rebelliousness against earlier 25X1
Christian domination has disintegrated into internal feuding, putting Islam into the background. Islamic leadership now has little voice in the government policy in a divided country. Imam Moussa is widely revered as clerical leader among Muslims, but he has no political ambitions. [redacted] 25X1

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Status of Fundamentalism: No indication of present or potential fundamentalist fervor. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of fundamentalist opposition in country already deeply conservative in observance of Islam. [redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. [redacted]

25X1

Foreign Involvement: Libyan involvement in Chad in recent years originally manipulated Islam as a symbol of resistance. Libyans armed Muslim dissidents in the early 1970s, invaded in 1980 to prevent President Goukouni's overthrow, and continued military support for Goukouni's rebel forces in 1983. Libyan aims are to install a friendly regime in N'Djamena, using Chad as a springboard for regional subversion. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known outside of officially sponsored Islamic societies and associations. [redacted]

25X1

Foreign Involvement: Libya has attempted to obtain diplomatic presence, while at same time maintaining contact with small Comoran opposition group based in Tanzania. Comoros also receive small amount of aid from conservative Persian Gulf states. [redacted]

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Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [redacted]

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [redacted]

25X1

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Prognosis: Chad faces continuous destabilization from external threats of Libya, grievous economic conditions, and lack of national unity. Islam, itself divided, distantly follows factional warfare as an element of instability. [redacted]

Prognosis: Abdallah's repressive regime will continue use of conservative Islam to reinforce rule. Antiregime activities could be fundamentalist in nature. [redacted]

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Djibouti

Comoros Islands

Population/Ethnic Composition: 442,000. Mixture of Arabs, Malays, and blacks. [redacted]

Population/Ethnic Composition: 316,000. Divided between two mutually hostile ethnic groups, the Afars and the Issas (ethnic Somalis). [redacted]

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Religious Composition: 97 percent (429,000) Muslim; most of rest animist. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 92 percent (291,000) Sunni Muslim; 8 percent Christian. Majority of Muslims belong to Qadiriya, a Sufi brotherhood. [redacted]

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Government: Independent from France since 1975. First President, Ahmed Abdallah, was overthrown by radical Ali Soilih a month after he took office. Soilih's brutal and anti-Muslim regime was, in turn, overthrown by Abdallah returning from three-year exile in France. Abdallah established "Islamic Republic" in 1978, engineered six-year term as President and a rubberstamp parliament. Political parties banned in 1979. [redacted]

Government: One-party parliamentary republic under President Hassan Gouled, who has ruled since independence from France in 1977. Since 1981 the Peoples Progress Assembly is the only legal political party. [redacted]

25X1

Religious Policies of Government: Islam is official religion, but the government is officially tolerant of other religions as long as they do not proselytize. Government observes Islamic day of rest. A combination of Shariah and French civil law is used in courts. Ministry of Justice is combined with Islamic Affairs. [redacted]

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Religious Policies of Government: Officially, tolerance for all religions. In actuality, Abdallah rules in the name of Islam, with Islamic law in courts, brutal punishment for mild Islamic infractions. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Religious establishment has close ties with conservative regime. Grand Mufti, although not officially in government, rules on governmental decisions. Ministry of Muslim Affairs advises and supports regime. [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Religious establishment has no significant political influence even though it is represented with cabinet-level post. []

Status of Fundamentalism: For society as a whole, no evidence of fundamentalist zeal. Within the Army, a small group of nationalist/fundamentalist zealots is led by Capt. Zakaria Ibrahim, who has presidential ambitions. They are closely monitored by security personnel and pose little threat to the regime. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known, and not welcome in traditionally conservative state. []

Foreign Involvement: Fundamentalist group in Army may receive support from Libya. []

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. []

Prognosis: If Gouled is ousted, he might possibly be replaced by military officers who would move to reduce French and other Western influence. Islam probably would not be a major factor unless Libya could exploit the situation. []

Ethiopia

Population/Ethnic Composition: 31.3 million. Oromo (Galla), Amhara, and Tigray tribes predominate and compete with each other. Somalis comprise 6 percent of population. []

Religious Composition: 40 percent (12.5 million) Muslim; 35 percent Christian, 25 percent animist. Somalis are 100 percent Muslim. Some urban Muslims are orthodox, but majority are Sunnis with Sufi allegiances to two main brotherhoods, Qadiriya and Tijaniya. []

Government: Monarchy under Emperor Haile Selassie, a Christian, until overthrown in 1974 by army coup. Executive power now in hands of military council, run by Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam. No political parties. The government is pro-Soviet. []

Religious Policies of Government: Under monarchy, Ethiopian Coptic orthodoxy was established state religion. In 1975 church was disestablished and patriarch replaced. Revolutionary regime is secular. All religions officially tolerated and considered equal although minor persecution and harassment of fundamentalist Protestant groups. [] 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Under Christian-dominated government, Muslims suffered discrimination. Since the revolution, Muslim establishment has slightly more freedom but no political power and remains too disunited to become a pressure group. [] 25X1 25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalist activity believed to be insignificant. [] 25X1 25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. [] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: No known foreign involvement among fundamentalists. [] 25X1

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [] 25X1 25X1

Prognosis: Islamic agitation is not a likely development since the government prides itself on its treatment of Muslims. In addition, it would be almost impossible for Muslims to unite in opposition since the various ethnic groups' deep distrust of each other transcends their common religious beliefs. [] 25X1
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The Gambia

Population/Ethnic Composition: 700,000. 99 percent African. [] 25X1

Religious Composition: 90 percent (630,000) Muslim; 10 percent animist or Christian. Muslims are members of Sufi brotherhoods; majority practice Tijaniya, but Qadiriya and Muridiya also represented; all are fairly conservative and orthodox. [] 25X1

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Government: Republic, independent from Great Britain since 1965. Formed confederation with Senegal in 1982. President Jawara has been successively reelected since 1965; briefly overturned in coup by young officers in 1981 but reinstated by Senegalese military intervention under a mutual defense treaty. []

Religious Policies of Government: Secular. Tolerant of Sufi activity. President Jawara converted from Christianity to Islam in 1973. The government supports Muslim Association in an effort to monitor and control religious activities. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Sufi brotherhoods work with the government, form part of the establishment. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Increase in Muslim membership, but mainly as revival of conservative values. Perhaps some clandestine support for the exiled Senegalese radical Niasse's proposal for a combined Senegal-Gambia Islamic state, but not politically significant. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: Supporters of Niasse number only a handful. []

Foreign Involvement: Libya was suspected of implication in 1981 coup, but since that time there has been no evidence of Libyan influence. []

Recent Developments: No known fundamentalist developments. []

Prognosis: Possible friction between Tijaniya Brotherhood dominance in Gambia and increasing influence of rival Muridiya Brotherhood in Senegal could threaten confederation. []

Ghana

Population/Ethnic Composition: 13.4 million. 99 percent African. Ashanti, Fante, and Ewe are major tribes. []

Religious Composition: 12 percent (1.6 million) Muslim, concentrated in pockets in thinly populated north and in southern cities; 45 percent animist; 43 percent Christian. Muslims are Sunnis, but majority are practitioners of folk Islam mixed with pre-Islamic beliefs. []

Government: After independence in 1957, President Kwame Nkrumah evolved from multiparty parliamentarianism to one-man rule with radical socialism as theme. Nkrumah overthrown in 1966 with latest change in government a coup in 1981 by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings after ineffective two-year experiment with civilian rule. Rawlings, a Christian, heads the seven-man "Provisional National Defense Council," with leftist ideology. []

Religious Policies of Government: Officially tolerant secular regime. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Little known about political influence of Muslim establishment or its position in military-dominated government. []

Status of Fundamentalism: No known fundamentalist activity. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. []

Foreign Involvement: No known foreign involvement among fundamentalists. []

Recent Developments: No known fundamentalist developments. []

Prognosis: Islam unlikely to be a significant factor in future political developments. []

Guinea

Population/Ethnic Composition: 5.4 million. 99 percent African, with three major tribes—Fulani, Malinke, and Susu. []

Religious Composition: 65 percent (3.5 million) Muslim; 35 percent animist. Muslims are of the Sufi Brotherhood Qadiriya; practice nonorthodox, folk Islam. []

Government: Independent from France since 1958. One-man, one-party regime until 1984 under Ahmed Sekou Toure, who initially attempted a leftwing, revolutionary socialist society with strong links to

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USSR. In search of greater economic assistance, Toure turned to more pragmatic, Western orientation. After Toure's death, military seized power. []

Religious Policies of Government: Islam is state religion. Ministry of Islamic Affairs and an official Islamic Council support and monitor Islamic developments. Toure took active part in international Islamic affairs, although he was not a devout Muslim. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslim establishment has no political role. Brotherhoods active in 1950s were suppressed. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Fundamentalist activity forbidden by highly authoritarian regime; probably dormant. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. []

Foreign Involvement: Toure used contacts with both Libya and Saudi Arabia purely for economic aid; after becoming disenchanted with Libyan meddling, he turned toward more conservative Arabs, inaugurated world's fourth-largest mosque with Saudi aid. [] 25X1

Recent Developments: No known fundamentalist developments. []

Prognosis: More open influence of Islam may emerge now that Toure regime has passed, but more likely development is breakdown of Army factions and fights between moderates and leftists in both military and government []

Guinea-Bissau

Population/Ethnic Composition: 827,000. 99 percent African; most of rest mulatto. 30 distinct tribal groups. [] 25X1

Religious Composition: 30 percent (248,000) Muslim; 66 percent animist; 4 percent Christian. Most Muslims practice unorthodox Sufi rites, incorporating animistic rituals and centering around priests or "marabouts." []

Government: Independent from Portugal since 1974. Constitutional government by Muslim-Christian mulatto minority overthrown by coup led by present President, Gen. Joao Bernardo Vieira in 1979. He now leads one-party leftist regime. [] 25X1

Religious Policies of Government: Official tolerance of all religions. Islamization of animistic tribal groups continues without any religious persecution by government. [] 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslims serve in many high-ranking positions in government but do not press religious influence on government policy. [] 25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: No fundamentalist activity evident, just increasing Islamization of animist groups. [] 25X1 25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. [] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: In the late 1970s the government received aid from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait for national mosque. At one time it considered making Arabic official language. In later years it has received some financial assistance from Libya. [] 25X1

Recent Developments: No known fundamentalist developments. [] 25X1 25X1

Prognosis: Continued uneasy stability, but Islam does not appear to be a factor in political future. [] 25X1

Ivory Coast

Population/Ethnic Composition: 8.9 million. 99 percent African, about 60 tribal groups. [] 25X1 25X1

Religious Composition: 25 percent (2.2 million) Sunni Muslim; 65 percent animist, 10 percent Christian. Muslims are mostly northerners from Dioula (Mandingo) tribe. Now also found in urban centers with increased migration by non-Ivorians. All practice folk Islam, nonorthodox, with exception of some urban Wa'hhabis. [] 25X1 25X1

Secret

Government: Independent from France since 1960, with benevolent authoritarian rule by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny since then. One-party, unicameral legislature. No established constitutional succession. Pro-West, strongly anti-Communist, and anti-Libyan.

[redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Officially tolerant of all religions. Suspicious of Muslim minority only in context of fear of Libyan influence spilling over from neighboring Ghana or Upper Volta.

[redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslim Cultural Center, a conservative voluntary association of elite with political ties, cooperates with the government. Muslim elite are in top governmental positions including the armed forces.

[redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Increase in numbers of conversions to Islam and limited fundamentalist activity among the Wa'hhabis.

[redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: Few Muslim sects with limited following. Some Wa'hhabi groups in cities are critical of folk Islam and very anti-Western.

[redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Libya training small number of Ivorian dissidents but has limited influence in officially hostile environment. Iranians have made representational visits

[redacted]

Recent Developments:

- 1981: President Houphouet-Boigny became more suspicious of Muslim potential for opposition, put suspected activists under surveillance.

[redacted]

Prognosis: President Houphouet-Boigny's death could throw country into period of uncertainty that might result in instability, some agitation by poorer elements, including foreign Muslim minority who have come from Sahel seeking jobs in major Ivory Coast cities.

[redacted]

Kenya

Population/Ethnic Composition: 18.6 million. 97 percent black (major tribes are Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic, and Hamitic); 2 percent Asian; 1 percent European, Arab, and other.

[redacted]

Religious Composition: 7 percent Muslim (1.3 million); 56 percent Christian; 36 percent animist; 1 percent Hindu. Approximately half of the coastal inhabitants—blacks, Asians, and Arabs—are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school; a few coastal blacks are Shias. About 40 percent of the Asians are Muslims, mostly from Pakistan or Indian provinces of Gujerat or Punjab. A minority are Shias, mostly in main cities of Nairobi and Mombasa and are divided into three sects:

25X1

- Khoja Ismailis are from Aga Khan group, number about 4,000, and are nonorthodox modernists.
- Bhora (6,000) are nonorthodox.
- Ithna-Ashari (4,000) are orthodox Shias.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Government: Independent from Great Britain since 1963. First President, African nationalist Jomo Kenyatta, banned opposition parties in 1969 and ruled as one-party leader until his death in 1978. Current President, Daniel T. arap Moi, has ruled since then.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1 25X1

Religious Policies of Government: Secular state with strong Christian influence because of colonial heritage. Officially tolerant of all religions but forbids "destabilizing sects," a measure intended to discourage tribalism. Islamic fundamentalist groups, however, could fall under this rubric.

[redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslims are politically weak and have little voice in government policy. Country's only political party has no Islamic cadre or caucus; no Muslims hold ministerial rank, although some hold second-echelon cabinet positions; Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims prestigious but influences the government only on religious, not on political or secular issues; only Parliament, which has a disproportionately high Muslim representation of 15 percent because unicameral system gives high representation to heavily Muslim northeastern provinces, gives Muslims any political influence.

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

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Status of Fundamentalism: No apparent interest in Islamic revival among Kenyan Muslims.

[redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations: Only unsubstantiated evidence that Muslim Brotherhood may have attempted to establish a chapter. []

Foreign Involvement: Although Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf states have all attempted to increase their influence among Kenya's Muslims, they have made little headway. Iranian clergy have preached among Swahili Shias in Mombasa but with little effect. Most visible foreign involvement has been from the Aga Khan, who has supported the Khoja Ismailis as well as the Government of Kenya, with whom he has traditionally had warm relations. He has funded hospitals and schools for non-Muslims as well as Muslims and has extensive business interests in hotels, newspapers, restaurants, and forwarding companies. []

Recent Developments:

- Late 1980: North Frontier District Liberation Front attacked government installations, trying to wrest the Muslim Somali district from Kenya.
- August 1982: Coup attempt against President Moi degenerated into looting and destruction of Asian property, most of it belonging to Muslims. []

Prognosis: It is remotely possible that traditional Kenyan religious harmony could be upset by economic deterioration. Islam would not be a factor. Separatist sentiments in the north, which is Muslim, could be exacerbated by Somali meddling. []

Liberia

Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.1 million. 97 percent indigenous black; rest Americo-Liberians whose ancestors arrived in 19th century and became the elite. []

Religious Composition: 15 percent (314,000) moderate Sunni Muslim; 75 percent animists; 10 percent Christian. Muslims mainly from Mandingo tribe. []

Government: Military coup of April 1980 suspended previous constitutional democracy, assassinated President Tolbert, transferred political power from Americo-Liberian elite to indigenous tribal groups, installing Gen. Samuel Kanyon Doe as head of state. Doe, a Christian, installed martial law and People's Redemption Council, suspended political parties and legislature, but has promised return to civilian rule in 1985. []

Religious Policies of Government: Secular government under military rule has no particular religious policy other than public expressions of tolerance. [] 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslim elite are politically passive and unimportant. One Muslim businessman, Mohamet Sylla, has been influential with palace. Liberian National Muslim Council (LNMC) is apolitical, conservative, Saudi-supported group that sponsors mosques, clinics. [] 25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: No known significant fundamentalist activity [] 25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations: Out of a handful of groups, only one, the Islamic Call Society, is receiving some funds from Libya, but has little political significance. [] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: Libya has widespread economic projects in Liberia and has tried to influence political and military aspirants to power. Funding for mosques and religious projects provided by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. [] 25X1 25X1

Recent Developments:

- 1980: Libya made political overtures when Tolbert was toppled. 25X1
- Mid-1981: Liberia closed Libyan mission when suspicions arose of coup plotting against Doe. [] 25X1

Prognosis: Deteriorating economy is eroding public support for Doe's reforms, but, should regime be threatened, it would not have discernible Muslim ingredient; more likely threat from military dissatisfaction. [] 25X1 25X1

Malawi

Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.6 million. 99 percent black; 1 percent Europeans and Indians. [] 25X1

Religious Composition: 12 percent (793,000) Sunni Muslim; small Christian minority; rest are animists. Muslims incorporate pre-Islamic animism with folk Islam. [] 25X1

25X1

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Government: Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda has ruled since independence from Great Britain in 1964 and is President for Life. Strong rightwing one-man regime with unicameral legislature, judiciary, and form of elections. Pro-West, extremely anti-Communist. []

Religious Policies of Government: Secular government is intolerant of any religious activity that suggests criticism of the state. Government leadership is essentially anti-Muslim. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Islam generally has not touched the elite, although one of the contenders for eventual succession to President Banda is a Muslim. []

Status of Fundamentalism: No fundamentalist activity known to exist and, if it did, it would be quickly repressed by regime. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None of any significance. []

Foreign Involvement: Some scanty evidence that Libyans are courting the political opposition. []

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. []

Prognosis: When Banda dies, government leaders will seek to ensure a peaceful transition and exclude radical Islam from influencing the docile population. []

Mali

Population/Ethnic Composition: 7.4 million. 99 percent black; 1 percent Arab (Lebanese and North African). Many tribes, with Mande the most prominent. []

Religious Composition: 90 percent (6.7 million) Muslim; 9 percent animist; 1 percent Christian. Majority of Muslims are of the Tijaniya Brotherhood and follow mystic Sufi practices liberally mixed with traditional animism. Small minority among Arab elite are Wa'hhabi fundamentalists. []

Government: Independent from France since 1960. Military overthrew civilian government in 1968, installed Gen. Moussa Traore, a Muslim, as president.

Traore established a "civilian regime" in 1979, socialist-oriented, with shared military-civilian powers. One political party allowed—the Democratic Union of Malian People. []

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25X1

Religious Policies of Government: Secular state, officially tolerant of all religions, but religious activities considered fundamentalist are banned. Government banned Wa'hhabi group in 1979, but they remain politically active and influential through connections in the party. Government has established Malian Association for the Unity and Progress of Islam to control Muslim community and to mediate disputes between Sufi brotherhoods and Wa'hhabi fundamentalists. []

25X1

25X1 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Brotherhoods have little political clout but widespread social prestige. Wa'hhabi group has informally put pressure on the government for reformist laws on social behavior. []

25X1

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Status of Fundamentalism: Limited increase in piety among elite. []

25X1 25X1

Fundamentalist Organizations:

- **Followers of Issa Dembele:** Preach Malian nationalist and socialist doctrines mixed with Islamic reform. Leader travels widely abroad to gain support from regime's exiled opponents. 25X1
- **Grouping of Democrats:** Led by Medina Soumbounou, exiled in Libya; promotes an Islamic Coast Union of Togo, Benin, Mali. 25X1
- **League for the Elimination of Heresy:** Libyan-backed, based in Nigeria, has branch in Mali but not known if it has any popular strength. [] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: Mali, as "poor Islamic cousin," has extensive relations with Arab countries. Wa'hhabi group includes many wealthy businessmen of Arab blood with extensive ties throughout Arab world. Many elite youth educated in Riyadh and Cairo. Missionary activity and conservative Saudi influence reflected in "Islamic Reform Movement," an organization of businessmen active in education and social services. Libya provides limited official aid to debt-ridden Mali but is also trying to encourage unrest among Tuareg nomads in north. []

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Recent Developments:

- 11 May 1983: Government banned sale of alcohol, except in international hotels, and banned bars and brothels. In July ban partly lifted, exempting some 23 bars. []

Prognosis: Possibility of coup attempts by younger officers, perhaps with backing from Libya, but little indication that Islam would play a major role. Wa'hhabi group will press reforms that could lead to clashes with Sufi brotherhoods. []

Mauritius

Population/Ethnic Composition: 1 million. 68 percent Indian; 27 percent Creole; 3 percent Chinese; 2 percent Franco-Mauritian minority elite. []

Religious Composition: 17 percent (170,000) Muslim; 51 percent Hindu; 30 percent Catholic Christian (blacks, Creoles, and whites). Muslims are predominantly of Indian origin. []

Government: Independent from Great Britain since 1968. Pro-Western Labor Party coalition lost in elections to left-leaning Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) under Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth in mid-1982. MMM split led to new elections in August 1983 with Jugnauth leading a Hindu-dominated coalition, including the Labor Party, to victory over the MMM. Jugnauth has become more pro-West to gain aid. []

Religious Policies of Government: Secular state with official tolerance for all religions. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: One small Muslim party, Muslim Action Committee, backed the coalition running government from 1982 to 1983 and was helpful in getting Arab funds for development and for spreading Islamic culture. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Some fundamentalist fervor among young Muslims who are also attracted to radicalism and would accept Libyan support. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: Unknown. []

Foreign Involvement: Libyan funds and influence have been flowing to the leftist opposition and were helpful in earlier election victory for the MMM. [] 25X1

Recent Developments:

- June 1982: MMM won election as alliance of majority of Muslim population and leftist Creoles and Hindus. 25X1
- August 1983: Faction of the MMM that represented Muslims lost election against Hindu-dominated alliance. [] 25X1 25X1

Prognosis: Communal strife between Muslims and Hindus remains a danger to the stability of the regime as economic situation worsens. [] 25X1

Mozambique

Population/Ethnic Composition: 13 million. 99 percent black African, but mulattos and whites figure in government leadership. Bantus and Yaos are chief tribal groups. [] 25X1 25X1

Religious Composition: 11 percent (1.4 million) nominal Sunni Muslim of Shafii school; 67 percent animist; 22 percent Christian. [] 25X1

Government: People's republic since independence from Portugal in 1975, with Samora Machel, a Christian, as President. Ten-man Politburo and 23-man Council of Ministers. Black nationalists make up core of government, but many hardline Marxists are particularly influential. [] 25X1 25X1

Religious Policies of Government: The government largely ignores Muslim minority, although officially tolerant. [] 25X1 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslims have no significant representation in government, military, or higher bureaucracy and have little influence on government leadership. [] 25X1 25X1

Status of Fundamentalism: No known fundamentalist activity. [] 25X1 25X1 25X1

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Fundamentalist Organizations: None at present []	Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence that fundamentalism on the rise, but upsurge of fundamentalism among Hausa tribe in Nigeria could spill over. []	25X1
Foreign Involvement: No evidence of external funding for formation of fundamentalist groups. []	Fundamentalist Organizations: Libyan-financed League for the Elimination of Heresy, based in Nigeria, planned to establish branch in Niger. []	25X1
Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. []	Foreign Involvement: Libya, considering Niger one of its prime targets, has provided gifts such as national mosque, but Niger remains extremely wary of Qadhafi's designs because Libya simultaneously has armed dissident Tuaregs, promoted unsuccessful coup in 1976, and advanced territorial claims against government. Saudis generously support Muslim establishment and associations. []	25X1
Prognosis: Machel's 1982 socialist experiment has failed completely in economic field. He has been making overtures to Western Europe for assistance but still relies on Communist countries for arms. Islamic factor unimportant in insurgency. []	Recent Development: • May 1982: Acted as host to Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference. []	25X1
Niger	Prognosis: Although regime is shaky because of economic problems, more threat of overthrow by tribal or ethnic forces than by Islamic ones []	25X1
Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.1 million. 75 percent black; rest is mixture of Berbers, Arabs, and Europeans. []	Nigeria Population/Ethnic Composition: 85.2 million. 99 percent black, principal tribal groups are Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Kanuri. []	25X1
Religious Composition: 85 percent (5.2 million) Muslim (includes Berbers, Arabs, and most blacks); most of remainder is animist; small Christian population. Four major tribal groups: • Hausa: Sunnis of Maliki school; urban dwellers belong to Sufi Tijaniya brotherhood. • Djerma: Conservative Sunnis. • Fulani: Conservative Sunnis. • Tuareg: Sunni overlay combined with pre-Islamic beliefs and Sufism. []	Religious Composition: 47 percent Sunni Muslim (40.1 million; largest Muslim population in West Africa); 34 percent Christian; 19 percent animists. In northern Nigeria, over 90 percent Muslim. Although predominantly Sunni, Sufi brotherhoods of Qadiriya and Tijaniya exert strong influence in some areas. Small Wa'hhabi minority in south. []	25X1
Government: Moderate, pro-Western military regime, ruled since 1974 by Maj. Gen. Seyni Kountche, a Muslim Djerma tribesman, with a military council. No political parties allowed. []	Government: President Shagari, a Fulani Muslim, elected with the restoration of civilian rule in 1979, ushered in moderate government with bicameral legislature and multiparty elections. Shagari reelected in 1983 but ousted in military coup at end of year by fellow Muslim northerner, Major General Buhari. []	25X1
Religious Policies of Government. Secular, but the government and President Kountche have emphasized Muslim credentials to enhance national unity and to get Arab aid. First West African country to act as host to Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference. The government supports Islamic Association, biggest and only recognized conservative Muslim voluntary association, backed by Saudi Arabian funding. []	Relation of Islam Religious Establishment to Government. Islamic groups have never played an important political role. Neither Qadiriya Brotherhood in urban areas nor Tijaniya Brotherhood among Tuareg tribesmen in north have political influence. []	25X1
Relation of Islam Religious Establishment to Government. Islamic groups have never played an important political role. Neither Qadiriya Brotherhood in urban areas nor Tijaniya Brotherhood among Tuareg tribesmen in north have political influence. []		25X1

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Religious Policies of Government: Nigerian governments traditionally have been secular and tolerant of all creeds. The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, a quasi-government agency, coordinates Muslim affairs. The government also uses Islamic conservative associations to monitor Muslim community. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslim elite basically conservative and supports government, fearing both Communism and Libyan extremism. []

Status of Fundamentalism/Religious Revival: Most intensive fundamentalist activity among all West African states. Northern campuses and urban unemployed youths are focus for fundamentalist activity, with followers lobbying for more orthodox application of Islamic values while stopping short of calling for an Islamic state. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: Many, but most important are:

- **Society for the Victory of Islam (Jama'atul Nasril Islam):** Founded in the 1960s by Alhaji Abubakar Gumi, a Hausa, who is the principal spiritual leader of Nigerian fundamentalism. Multiethnic membership includes civil servants and traditional elites. Undertakes welfare activities and liaison with Muslim community for the Federal Government.
- **The Islamic Trust:** Founded by Abubakar Gumi; includes members of corrupt Kaduna group representing commercial and political elites of the north. Since 1979 it has been the principal channel for disbursing Saudi funds in Nigeria. The Trust leaders still have voice in current government.
- **League for the Elimination of Heresy (Jama'atul Izlatul Bidi'a):** Largest fundamentalist group in Nigeria, numbering perhaps several thousand. Its youthful membership is prone to violence. It was originally based among Muslims in central Middle Belt states and is now spreading to Hausa communities in other West African countries. Some Libyan funding. Hostile to traditional brotherhoods.

- **Muslim Student Association:** Most radical fundamentalist group in Nigeria. Multiethnic membership; strongest on two principal northern university campuses. Strongly opposed to the West, traditional brotherhoods, and Christianity. Seeking ties with other Islamic groups, particularly the League for the Elimination of Heresy. 25X1

- **Yan Izalla:** Followers of the late Maitatsine Marwa, a Cameroonian cleric in Kano city. Membership estimated at 10,000 or more before riots in December 1980 in Kano that took thousands of lives, including Marwa's. Established branches in northern Nigeria that continue to be active. Militantly antigovernment. 25X1

- **Anwaru Islam, the Ansaudeen, and the Ahmadiya:** Yoruba Muslim groups formed during colonial period. Play an important role in western region's policy of universal education. The Ahmadiya, the largest of the groups, is a source of interethnic friction and has been barred from the pilgrimage to Mecca by Saudi and northern Nigerian Muslims due to doctrinal disputes. [] 25X1

Foreign Involvement: Saudi Arabia has been chief sponsor of fundamentalist groups, chiefly to counter Libyan influence. Nigeria is also a target for Iranian influence. Iran sends delegations, trains students, and is suspected of being involved with dissidents in riots in north in late 1982. [] 25X1

Recent Developments:

- 1979: Communal violence erupted in university towns between Muslim and Christian students.
- 1980: Religious riots in Kano took several thousand lives; government suspected Libyan involvement and expelled Libyan diplomats and temporarily suspended relations with Tripoli.
- April 1982: League for Elimination of Heresy and a Nigerian Muslim student society took over mosque in Bauchi, clashed with police.
- October 1982: Three days of riots in Kaduna, northern Muslim town.
- March 1984: Followers of the late Maitatsine Marwa riot in northeastern city in Yola. [] 25X1

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Prognosis: Significant potential for Muslim-inspired unrest and anti-West actions. Fundamentalist groups have yet to declare attitude to new government. []

Senegal

Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.3 million. 99 percent black; 1 percent European. Wolof, Peul, Mandingo, and Serer are principal tribal groups. []

Religious Composition: 82 percent (5.2 million) nominally Sunni Muslim; 5 percent Christian; 13 percent animist. Sufi Muslims are most highly organized in West Africa, chiefly cluster around Tijaniya and Muridiya brotherhoods, with devotion to local saints and teachers. Some Shias, mainly Lebanese traders, in capital. []

Government: Democratic republic independent from France since 1960. Unicameral assembly, multiparty system, dominated by moderate Socialist Party. No Muslim party exists. President Abdou Diouf, a Muslim, succeeded President Senghor, a Christian, in early 1981. Diouf continues moderate, pro-West constitutionalism. []

Religious Policies of Government: Secular government is officially tolerant of all religions, especially accommodating of brotherhoods and their leaders. Government also backs the Union for Islamic Progress, a conservative voluntary association with powerful political ties. President Diouf has emphasized his Islamic credentials in international meetings. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Islamic Brotherhoods vie for political influence and economic privileges from government. Tijaniya orthodox group includes many top government officials, including President Diouf. Muridiya Brotherhood—the largest brotherhood—its chief rival, has some influence in the military and controls the peanut monopoly, chief export item. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Fairly significant. Some Muslim leaders are turning from conservatism to a more reformist and even radical position. []



Senegal: Pilgrims wait outside a Sufi Brotherhood shrine []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None have yet successfully broken away from the traditional Tijaniya and Muridiya Brotherhoods. Reform movement led by Ibrahim Niasse dissipated with his death in 1977. His son Ahmad Niasse tried to establish Libyan-backed political party on "Islamic Revolution" platform in 1979. Party was banned, and Niasse moves in and out of exile. []

Foreign Involvement: Libyan influence in both major brotherhoods, usually as a radical wing, but Libyans have failed to make significant inroads in these mass-based groups. Attempts by Iran to influence and

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propagandize Shias in capital city of Dakar have alarmed the government and caused the ouster of Iranian Embassy employees. []

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. []

Prognosis: Continued political stability unless Diouf attempts to restrict the Muridiya Brotherhood's economic dominance. []

Sierra Leone

Population/Ethnic Composition: 3.7 million. 99 percent black; small Lebanese population. []

Religious Composition: 25 percent (925,000) Sunni Muslim; 70 percent animists; 5 percent Christian. Muslims' beliefs nominal, mixed with animist and tribal practices; small Shia community in capital. []

Government: One-party presidential regime, ruled by Dr. Siaka Stevens since 1968. Stevens, a Christian who is in his mid-eighties, periodically reshuffles cabinets. Politics in Sierra Leone center on rivalry between two main tribes: the predominantly non-Muslim Mende in the south and the partly Islamized northern Temne. Stevens's ruling party has a large following among the Temne and other northern tribes, including his own small Limba tribe. []

Religious Policies of Government: Secular government is religiously tolerant. Government recently joined the Islamic Conference. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: No direct political role for Islam, but many senior government officials are Muslim. Series of associations and congresses provide religious education and hajj funding. []

Status of Fundamentalism: Young people are beginning to be attracted to revivalist Islam and to confront old conservative imams. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. []

Foreign Involvement: No evidence of Libyan influence among fundamentalists. Government does, however, seek oil and aid from both Libya and Iran to avoid financial crisis, and Sierra Leone is a target country for Iran. []

Recent Developments:

• August 1983: Freetown held Iranian-financed Islamic Conference, highly contentious with Iranians attacking Sunnis and Saudis. []

Prognosis: Islam is not yet a factor in chronic instability but could be seized upon by disaffected youth in both university and military, especially if external aid is forthcoming from Nigeria or Libya through Islamic connections. []

Somalia

Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.2 million. 85 percent Hamitic, divided among six major tribes; 14 percent black; scattering of Arabs and Europeans. []

Religious Composition of Population: 100 percent Sunni Muslim, following Shafii school. Earliest converts to Islam in Africa. Most are Sufi followers, belong to Qadiriya and Salifiya brotherhoods. []

Government: President-parliamentary system dominated by President Mohamed Siad Barre, who has ruled since 1969. []

Religious Policies of Government: Religion is recognized as part of social fabric. Several well-known Muslim leaders have been appointed to high-level civil service jobs in an effort to co-opt Muslim leadership; government has Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs. Regime now stresses Islamic credentials in international meetings. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Influence of Islamic leaders restricted to tribal groups. They have almost no national appeal. []

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Status of Fundamentalism: Internally, fundamentalism has had little influence; externally, it is used by exile groups seeking to overturn Siad. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations:

- Somali Democratic Salvation Front (once known as Somali Salvation Front): About 3,000 dissidents who use religious and Marxist doctrines in effort to overturn Siad. Financial and military support from Ethiopia, Libya (chief donor), and South Yemen for border attacks and terrorism.
- Somali National Movement (SNM): Isaak tribal dissidents supported by Ethiopia number several hundred; strongly anti-Marxist, conservative Muslims who reportedly enjoy some support in Somali Army and among Isaak civilians. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Foreign support confined mostly to aid for Somali Democratic Salvation Front and SNM from Libya. Saudis contribute minor sums for religious aid to mosques and Muslim social organizations. [redacted]

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [redacted]

Prognosis: Siad is vulnerable to a coup because of deep tribal animosities, growing unrest in the Army, and the constant external pressure on him by Libyan- and Ethiopian-supported dissidents. Islam does not play a role in these problems. [redacted]

South Africa

Population/Ethnic Composition: Approximately 27 million. 16 percent white; 9 percent Colored; 3 percent Indian; 72 percent African. [redacted]

Religious Composition of the Population: Approximately 20 percent of the Indian population (180,000) and 10 percent of the Colored population (200,000) are Muslim; a few thousand Africans are Muslim. The majority of the Indian Muslim community is Sunni; the composition of the Colored Muslim community is 40 percent Sunni, and 40 percent Shia. The majority of the white, Colored, and African are Christian. [redacted]



South Africa: A tiny Muslim community becomes more vocal in the antiapartheid issue [redacted]

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Government: For whites, there is a modified parliamentary democratic system. Coloreds and Indians will receive some political rights in 1984. Africans have political rights only in their tribal "homelands." [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Freedom of religion is guaranteed by law. The ruling National Party maintains that it conforms to a policy of "Christian Nationalism." [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Leaders of the Islamic communities traditionally have been hostile to the government's policy of apartheid. The Muslim Judicial Council, an independent and conservative body of prestigious clerics, cooperates with the government while cautiously pressing for reforms beneficial to Coloreds and Africans. [redacted]

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Status of Fundamentalism: Following the Iranian revolution, Shia fundamentalism gained greater support in the Colored community, especially among university and secondary school students. Pro-Khomeini rallies were held at the Universities of Cape Town and Western Cape in February 1980. The *Muslim News* took an increasingly pro-Khomeini and anti-US stance on political issues, as well as a strong fundamentalist position on religious issues. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known at present [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: The Saudi Government has provided Muslim congregations with funds for the building of mosques and the education of clergymen. Since 1980, radical Muslim students, clergymen, and journalists have traveled to Iran. [redacted]

Recent Developments:


- 1980-81: Muslim Colored students played an active role in secondary school boycotts. Several Muslim student leaders were detained for 30 to 90 days.
- 1983-84: Muslim students took a strong stance against government reforms that gave political rights to Coloreds and Indians but not to Africans. [redacted]

Prognosis: Radical Shia students and intellectuals will continue to oppose the government's reform initiatives and to seek converts in the African community. Pro-Khomeini radicals may become a catalytic force in African communities. The South African Government will continue to arrest dissident community leaders and to harass radical religious organizations, including Muslim ones. [redacted]

Sudan

Population/Ethnic Composition: 20.6 million. 39 percent Arab; 52 percent black; 6 percent Beja; 2 percent foreigners; 1 percent other. Arabs are concentrated in the north, blacks in the south; animosity between the two has led to recurring civil strife. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 73 percent (15 million) Sunni Muslim, mainly in Arab north but with pockets in the south; 23 percent animist; 4 percent Christian, all in the south. [redacted]



Sudan: President Nimeiri smashes liquor bottles and institutes Shariah laws [redacted]

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Government: Independent from Anglo-Egyptian rule since 1956. Parliamentary rule overthrown by revolution in 1969 led by current President Marshal Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri. Nimeiri's regime has resisted three coup attempts and grown more moderate and anti-Communist through the years. Strong presidential rule. Only one legal political party, the Sudan Socialist Union. All other political parties banned. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Constitution of 1973 states that both Islam and Christianity are religions of Sudan; it implicitly recognizes Islam as the majority religion but not the state religion. Nimeiri's policy has been to try to co-opt or neutralize major Islamic organizations, to be personally devout, and to stress Islamic credentials with Arab states, particularly conservative ones. His most recent religiously controversial move has been to decree Islamic law in Sudan. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: The Muslim Brotherhood has participated in government since 1979, and its leader, Hasan al-Turabi, is a special adviser to Nimeiri for foreign [redacted]

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affairs. Many other MB figures serve in government. MB members also occupy significant number of seats in the National People's Assembly. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: Press reports indicate increased religiosity on university campuses; MBs have controlled the Khartoum University student council for years. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: Ansar, Khatmiyyah, and Muslim Brotherhood formed temporary coalition in 1970s to overthrow Nimeiri but split apart:

- **Ansar:** Sect claims membership of one-fifth of population. Umma Party—its political wing—was banned in 1969. Leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, jailed and exiled several times since 1969, returned from self-imposed exile in September 1982. Sadiq and several top aides were arrested in September 1983 after he made statements critical of the government.
- **Khatmiyyah:** Sufists led by Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani; has rural roots and links to Egypt.
- **Muslim Brotherhood:** Membership estimated to be at least 100,000. Led by Hasan al-Turabi; elitist, urban based. MB espouses a gradualist approach to Islamization and has been principal advocate for legislation reflecting Islamic principles. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Saudis have actively bankrolled the government, while Libya's Qadhafi has sworn to overthrow Nimeiri's regime. Libya has unsuccessfully tried to unite the northern Sudanese dissidents with southern non-Arab, non-Muslim secessionists. The Ansar, Khatmiyyah, and Muslim Brotherhood movements are not involved with Qadhafi, may get some Saudi financial assistance. Saudi Arabia and Libya have both focused on Sudan for political rather than religious influence. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- July 1979: Muslim Brotherhood held international conference in Khartoum, sponsored by Saudi Arabia.
- August 1979: "Price riot" over high cost of food, reportedly Communist led, strengthened influence of Muslim right in Khartoum.

- April 1981: Nimeiri held International Da'wah conference to strengthen his Muslim credentials. Conference highlighted by disunity and acrimonious debate. 25X1
- September 1983: Nimeiri imposed Islamic law in Sudan, outlawed alcohol and gambling. [redacted] 25X1

Prognosis: A senior military officer probably would assume office if Nimeiri falters, and the conservative Muslim groups such as Ansar and Muslim Brotherhood might remain important political actors no matter who succeeds Nimeiri. Neither the government nor fundamentalist groups will succeed in imposing Muslim control over the non-Muslim south. [redacted] 25X1

Tanzania

Population/Ethnic Composition: 20.5 million. 99 percent black; remainder European, Arab, Asian. [redacted] 25X1

Religious Composition: Overall 35 percent (7.2 million) Muslim. Largest concentration of Muslims in central/East Africa. Mainland is 30 percent Muslim; 40 percent animist; 30 percent Christian. Zanzibar is almost 100 percent Muslim. Majority of Muslims are Sunni of Hanafi school; Wa'hhabi on Zanzibar are largely confined to Asian population. About 12,000 Shias in Dar es Salaam. [redacted] 25X1

Government: Independent from Great Britain since 1961. Tanganyika united with Zanzibar in 1964. Tanganyika dominant political partner, Zanzibar semiautonomous and economically stronger. President Julius Nyerere has headed single-party republic since 1962. Nonaligned, moderate, socialist. Zanzibar's President Ali Hassan Mwinyi also serves as Vice President of Tanzania. Good relations with all Arab states. [redacted] 25X1

Religious Policies of Government: Officially secular, tolerant. All religions are allowed to proselytize. [redacted] 25X1

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: All Muslim groups represented in the Muslim Council, a quasi-government and nonpolitical umbrella group. Many Muslims prominent in government; totally Muslim Zanzibar overrepresented numerically. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

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Status of Fundamentalism: Increased piety in Zanzibar probably more related to increase of secessionist sentiment than to religiosity. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of any revival. [redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations: Sketchy evidence that some radical movements on mainland, if in power, would go back to pure Islamic tenets, but these groups are not yet significant [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known at present. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: Libya's Qadhafi has attempted without success to unite the three insurgent groups that want to oust regime. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: Some Libyan support for potential opposition and dissidents, intended more to oust Nyerere (Nyerere ousted Libya's friend in Uganda, Idi Amin) than to spread fundamentalist Islam. Some Iranian propagandizing among Shias in capital. [redacted]

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [redacted]

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Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [redacted]

Prognosis: Tribalism in the Army and guerrilla activity continue to plague the Obote regime, but Islam is not a major factor in political instability because Muslim groups are so disunited in their aims [redacted]

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Prognosis: Continuing instability due to hostility between Christians and Muslims, between mainland and Zanzibar-Pemba, with the latter using Islamic heritage as vehicle for separatism. [redacted]

Upper Volta

Population/Ethnic Composition: 6.6 million. 99 percent black with about 40 percent of population from Mossi tribe. [redacted]

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Uganda

Population/Ethnic Composition: 13.8 million. 99 percent black; 1 percent divided among Arabs, Asians, and Europeans. Numerous tribal groups, none with majority of population [redacted]

Religious Composition: 20 percent (1.3 million) Sunni Muslim; 75 percent animist; 5 percent Christian. Muslims are followers of Sufi mystics, divided among Qadiriya and Tijaniya Brotherhoods. [redacted]

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Religious Composition: Up to 10 percent (1.4 million) Muslim; 60 percent nominal Christian; 30 percent animist [redacted]

Government: Independent from France since 1960. Succession of military coups, with latest in August 1983. The government led by pro-Libyan Thomas Sankara, a Christian, and ruled by a military council. [redacted]

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Government: Independent from Great Britain since 1962. President Milton Obote, a Christian, eventually took over after coup against dictator Idi Amin, a Muslim, in 1979; staged election for National Assembly in 1980; and still runs "provisional" government with promise to restore unicameral assembly and independent judiciary. [redacted]

Religious Policies of Government: Government has officially banned all Muslim or any other "political" activity that would endanger the state. Decree of the current regime makes no mention of religious freedom or religious faith. [redacted]

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Religious Policies of Government: Secular, basically tolerant. [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Unknown [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to

Government: Muslim elite is politically influential, but indirectly, for fear of being labeled "political." Muslim tribal leaders influence large numbers under their leadership. The Tijaniya Brotherhood is concurrently part of the "Muslim Community of Upper Volta," which cares for religious and social needs and is apolitical. [redacted]

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Status of Fundamentalism: Some genuine revivalist feeling among the young, who have expressed admiration for Iranian revolution. Young fundamentalist extremists called Wa'hhabiya actively recruit among the urban poor and could clash with older conservative Tijaniya Brotherhood. [redacted]

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Foreign Involvement: Extensive Libyan activity, building "Islamic Cultural Centers," and military assistance for present government. [redacted]

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Fundamentalist Organizations:

- Wa'hhabiya: Fundamentalist extremist group; numbers about 30,000 to 80,000, mostly youth; campaigns among urban poor. Extent of Libyan support not known. [redacted]

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Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. [redacted]

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Prognosis: Islam is unlikely to be a significant factor in the near future among Upper Volta's economic and political problems. [redacted]

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The Communist States

**Islam in the Communist States:
A Policy of Accommodation**

Orthodox Communist doctrine theoretically clashes head-on with an organized religion such as Islam. Despite the incompatibility, however, pockets of Muslims (overt and clandestine) persist in many Communist states. Muslims or direct descendants of Muslims total about 80 million throughout the Communist world. They range from about 3 percent of China's population to approximately 70 percent of Albania's.

Most Communist governments have adopted an accommodative policy toward their Muslim minorities after years of experimenting with both assimilative and sometimes brutally repressive policies. Most of them allow Muslims to continue the social practices of ritual Islam, perhaps because they cannot entirely stamp out those practices and would risk radicalized resistance if they did. Both the USSR and China have co-opted the Muslim establishment and avoid direct interference in Islamic practices. Albania remains the major exception to an accommodative approach as it continues its unique status as a totally atheistic state that represses all religious practice.

With the exception of Albania, Communist states supervise their Muslim minorities by installing official Islamic hierarchies that have limited political power and by restricting the number of mosques, Muslim schools, and religious teachers so that, so far as possible, the Muslim populace is sheltered from the theological revival elsewhere in the Muslim world.

Relations with other Muslim (principally Arab) states and fears of internal dissent or civil unrest have been major factors in this accommodation. Both China and the Soviet Union seek influence and trade among the oil-rich Arab states and try to outdo each other in professing tolerance now that their own revolutions are reaching middle age. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the governments continue to manipulate their religious establishments to gain credibility among the Muslim states and to stimulate more trade and aid.

The major risk that these accommodative practices might incur is that the Muslim minorities may one day agitate for more autonomy. So far, there are only a few faint clues that a clandestine religious revival is spreading among the Muslim minorities of the Communist countries, and this "revival" is probably more a reaction by ethnic minorities to preserve their identities against unsympathetic rulers than a legitimately religious-based movement.

Albania

Population/Ethnic Composition: 2.8 million. 96 percent Albanian; 4 percent other (Greeks, Gypsies, Vlachs, and Bulgarians).


Religious Composition: 70 percent former Muslims (2 million) or descendants of Muslims; 30 percent former Christians or descendants of Christians. Most Muslims are Sunnis of Hanafi school, but some are Bektashis, a liberal sect.

Government: Communist regime since 1944. Head of party, since 1941, is Enver Hoxha. Chief of State, who serves as head of People's Assembly, is Ramiz Alia. Elections for assembly held every four years.

Religious Policies of Government: Albania is the ultimate example of total repression against any religious practice. It claims to be the world's first atheist state. Most Muslim and Christian religious leaders were killed after the Communist takeover. Continuous antireligious measures were capped in 1967, when the government closed down all religious institutions. The 1976 Constitution recognizes no religion.

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: None known, but any religious leaders are presumed to be underground or in exile.


Muslim Distribution in the Soviet Union



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
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Muslim Distribution in the Balkans



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Muslim Distribution in China



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Table 6
Communist States

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Albania	2,800,000	70	Sunni	Communist	No evidence	No evidence	Repressive stability
Bulgaria	8,900,000	13	Sunni	Communist	No evidence	No evidence	Repressive stability
China	1,000,000,000	Less than 3	Sunni	Communist	Weak	Saudi Arabia	Likely conflict between government and Muslims
USSR	272,000,000	18	Sunni Sufism small Shia community	Communist	Weak	Limited	Subdued Muslim minority may assert itself
Yugoslavia	22,800,000	12	Sunni	Communist	Limited revival	Iran, Libya	Increasing ethnic and religious tensions

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Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of any revival. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. []

Foreign Involvement: None known. []

Recent Developments: None of significance []

Prognosis: The government's repressive religious policies will continue to be successful. We have far too little access to know if any religious observances persist clandestinely. We doubt that the external influences of Iran, Libya, or Saudi Arabia can touch Albania's tightly closed society. []

Bulgaria

Population/Ethnic Composition: 8.9 million. 85 percent Bulgarian; 8.5 percent Turk; others include Armenians, Gypsies, Russians, and Macedonians. []

Religious Composition: 13 percent (1.2 million) Sunni Muslim of Hanafi school; 85 percent Bulgarian Orthodox Christian; 2 percent other. Muslims include Turks and Pomaks who live in isolated border areas. []

Government: Communist state in 1946 replaced monarchy, became People's Republic with Georgi Dimitrov as the first party leader. President rules with Council of State; Cabinet ruled by Premier, but real power is in the party, which has been headed by Todor Zhivkov since 1954. Zhivkov also has position of President. []

Religious Policies of Government: Government officially promotes atheism, insists on separation of church and state. The Communist government initially pursued a harsh assimilation policy toward all minorities, including the Muslim Turks, who are regarded with disdain. In the 1950s the government granted the minorities more freedom under a cultural autonomy policy. It reversed this policy in the 1970s and renewed harassment and persecution. Currently, the government tends to ignore the Muslims as an unassimilated minority, although it uses Muslim Turks as pawns in bilateral relations with Turkey. Although constitutionally protected, the Muslims remain passive and isolated, fearful of government harassment. Mosques are almost deserted, visited mostly by old people; youth increasingly are ignorant of religious rites; distinctive dress is rarely worn. []

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: The religious establishment has been co-opted; the Grand Mufti of Turkish Muslims is in exile in Sofia, the Grand Mufti of Pomaks in Smolyan.

Status of Fundamentalism: Not manifested in any fashion.

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known

Foreign Involvement: No evidence of imported revival or influence from Muslim countries.

Recent Developments:

- Fall 1982: Assassination of Turkish attache in Bulgaria sparked a rumor of agitation by Turkish Muslims.

Prognosis: The Islamic minority is quiet, but the possibility of conflict remains due to inequitable treatment of Muslims, declining standard of living in Muslim areas, and chance of international spotlight on Bulgaria's repression of its Muslim minority.

China

Population/Ethnic Composition: 1 billion. 94 percent Han Chinese; 6 percent minorities, including 11 Muslim tribal groups.

Religious Composition: Less than 3 percent (27 million) Muslim; rest of population is officially nonreligious, but with residual overlay of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and ancestor worship.

Government: After revolution in 1949, China became a Communist People's Republic under Chairman Mao Zedong. From 1965 to 1968, the Cultural Revolution radicalized the entire social, legal, and political system, bringing to an end already limited religious freedom. With Mao's death in 1976, the government reverted to control by the more moderate leadership of Deng Xiaoping.

Religious Policies of Government: Although China is a secular, Communist state, official policy since 1980 has been to reintroduce liberalization toward minorities and to grant greater religious freedom. Government recognizes the special Islamic "identity" of several minorities and exempts them from stringent



China: Muslims are a small and aging minority.

birth control policies; has rebuilt mosques destroyed during the Cultural Revolution; allowed Chinese to go on hajj and to distribute the Koran. The government revived the Chinese Islamic Association, founded in 1952, and actively co-opts the Islamic leadership.

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Under liberalization, older Muslim leaders have been given token political positions. As long as religious establishment does not confront or criticize the government, it can publicly practice Islamic faith.

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Status of Fundamentalism/Religious Revival: Muslims are the best organized religious group in China with a history of rebellions and resistance to the central government. Any serious signs of fundamentalism today, however, would be squelched by authorities. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Saudi Arabia has financed mosque construction and Koran distribution. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- 1980: Third Plenum of Communist Party set up a new policy of official toleration of religious practices.
- 1980-81: Series of violent incidents between Hans and Uygurs, a prominent Muslim minority group from western China [redacted]

Prognosis: Conflict on local level between Han-dominated government and Muslim minority groups is inevitable, and government policy of active co-optation of Islamic leaders may backfire eventually, although not in the near future. [redacted]

USSR

Population/Ethnic Composition: 272 million. 72 percent Slavic; 28 percent divided among some 170 ethnic groups. [redacted]

Religious Composition: Muslim population is estimated at about 50 million, making it the fifth-largest group of Muslims in the world. Almost all Muslims live in six southern Soviet socialist republics. 90 percent are Sunnis of the Hanafi school; a few Shias live in Azerbaydzhan. A large number of Sufi Brotherhoods operate clandestinely. The rest of the population is atheist with small Russian Orthodox, other Christian, Buddhist, and Jewish minorities. [redacted]

Government: Communist state since revolution in 1917. Head of Communist Party is Konstantin Chernenko, seventh leader since the revolution. One-party, secular state with civil law. [redacted]



USSR: Soviet Central Asian Muslims, a rapidly growing minority

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Religious Policies of Government: Official policy stresses compatibility of Communism and Islam and freedom of religion, although the government propagandizes heavily against all religious beliefs. Historically, the government has persecuted Muslims, but the present policy is one of containment rather than assimilation. Fewer than 500 mosques remain, only 1,000 religious teachers, and two small Islamic schools. In the 1920s the government set up official Islamic establishment containing four Muftiats, whose co-opted leadership controls Muslims internally and provides supervised external relations with Muslim countries. The government allows selected Muslims to go on hajj and sponsors Islamic conferences to emphasize its religious tolerance. [redacted]

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Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: The Islamic religious establishment is completely co-opted and guided by the government.

Status of Fundamentalism: Most Soviet Muslims are not aware of Islamic resurgence on the outside world. Too little is known about the growing underground Islam to judge whether it has a fundamentalist outlook.

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known to exist, although there is some evidence that a clandestine Islamic organization publishes illegal pamphlets and distributes cassettes of forbidden sermons.

Foreign Involvement: No evidence of any external aid being funneled into tightly monitored country, although Saudi-based World Muslim League in 1982 signed agreement to build an Islamic University in the USSR.

Recent Developments:

- March 1980: Riots in Alma Ata, capital of Kazakh SSR, when Muslims refused to let dead Muslim soldiers be buried in military cemetery.
- April 1980: Assassination of Sultan Ibrahimov of Kirghiz SSR by "Muslim nationalists."
- November 1982: Three days of violence in Muslim-dominated North Severo-Osetinkaya in the Caucasus, included ransacking Communist Party headquarters.
- November 1982: Authorities broke up a large-scale Muslim publishing operation in Uzbekistan.

Prognosis: In the short run, we have no evidence of imminent separatist threat among Muslims, only mounting pressure for greater cultural autonomy. The authorities probably will continue policy of promoting carefully controlled official Islam, while monitoring Sufi brotherhoods and other illegal Islamic activities. Because the Muslims and other minority populations are growing at a more rapid rate than the Russians, by 1990 Russians will be a minority in their own country. Muslims, now a subdued minority, may become more assertive in demanding respect for their culture based on Islam.



Yugoslavia: Mosque-going Europeans, resisting assimilation

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Yugoslavia

Population/Ethnic Composition: 22.8 million. 36 percent Serbs; 20 percent Croats; rest divided between Slovenes, Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and others.

Religious Composition: 12 percent (2.7 million) Sunni Muslim (Albanians, Slavs, Turks); 41 percent Serbian Orthodox; 32 percent Roman Catholic; 15 percent other. Yugoslavia has largest established Muslim community in Europe. In the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslim nationals represent 40 percent of population.

Government: Communist government in form of socialist federal republic since 1945. Only President, Josip Broz Tito, held office until his death in 1980; country now has collective presidency. Elections for Federal Assembly are held every four years.

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Religious Policies of Government: Permits religious practice. 1945 Constitution asserts separation of church and state, guarantees freedom of worship as long as it does not impinge on state policies. In the 1960s, however, the government harassed and repressed Muslims, finally giving recognition in census to category of "Muslim" nationality. In the 1970s the government began to liberalize its religious policies and to support Muslims, primarily to demonstrate nonaligned credentials and to get favor of Middle Eastern countries. With foreign financial help (Libya, Egypt), it built new mosques, financed education of youth overseas in Muslim countries, and in 1979 also built a Muslim theological college in Sarajevo. Islamic schools are allowed, within very strict limits, to supplement secular education. By Communist standards, the Muslim press is allowed a fairly unrestricted publishing policy. Recently, however, the government has actively campaigned against Muslims becoming politically assertive, reflecting deep-seated fears of militant Islam, and has tried and jailed Muslim nationalists. [redacted]

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: The Muslim establishment generally stays out of politics, although some clerics are increasingly outspoken in support of Muslim rights. The mufti at the unofficial Muslim capital, Sarajevo, has been thoroughly co-opted by the regime. Muslims are underrepresented in the federal political hierarchy. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: The government encouraged a limited Muslim cultural revival in the 1970s. The revival has taken the form of a renewed Muslim consciousness and reawakening of Muslim "nationalism." In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Muslims outnumber both Serbs and Croats, the revival is particularly strong. (Nevertheless, Muslim nationalism appears stronger than fundamentalism.) [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known at present [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Muslims were influenced in the 1970s by the Iranian revolution and have had increasing influence from Libya and Iran. During the trials in August 1983 of Muslim nationalists in Sarajevo, Iran was cited as an instigator of antigovernment agitation. [redacted]

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Recent Developments:

- 1981: The national census showed the number of Muslims far larger than in 1971.
- April 1983: 13 Bosnian Muslims returning from Iran were arrested; authorities confiscated pan-Islamic and anti-Yugoslav literature. The subsequent trial in August resulted in sentences ranging from six months to 15 years. [redacted]

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Prognosis: Renewed Muslim assertiveness, particularly if some Muslims are responsive to Iranian encouragement to establish a separate state, is likely to meet more direct resistance from federal authorities. There is also increasing ethnic and regional tension between Muslims and Serbs and Croats, based on competing secular goals and traditional hatreds. [redacted]

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The Western Hemisphere

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Islam in the Western Hemisphere: Backwater Bastion

Islam has never played a significant role on the political scene in the tiny nations that make up the Caribbean and line the northern tier of Latin America. Most of the few hundred thousand Muslims in the region are descendants of poor East Indian and Javanese plantation workers, although a few are descended from Lebanese and other Arab entrepreneurs. The Muslims have been content to practice an often syncretic folk Islam that might be barely recognizable in the Middle East and to survive as a tolerated minority among Christian and animist majorities. [redacted]

The last few years have seen the first glimmerings of a connection between the Middle East and the region as the small island and coastal countries have sought economic aid to stave off bankruptcy. They have had no takers among the moderate Arab countries. Only Libya has seized upon the opportunities to further its own goals. It has sought to establish "Islamic Cultural Centers" throughout the region in an effort to attract radical youth and establish a base from which to mount anti-American campaigns. The results of these efforts have been limited. [redacted]

Guyana


Population/Ethnic Composition: 833,000. 51 percent East Indian; 43 percent Negro (Creole); 6 percent other. [redacted]

Religious Composition: 9 percent (75,000) Sunni Muslim; 57 percent Christian; 34 percent Hindu. Most Muslims are descendants of East Indians imported to work on plantations. [redacted]

Government: Independence from Great Britain in 1966 after stormy years of competing factions between Cheddi Jagan (Indian) and Forbes Burnham (Negro) split an earlier coalition. Burnham became Prime Minister of a socialist autocratic regime. He declared a new constitution in 1980 and named himself Executive President. [redacted]

Religious Policies: Secular state, tolerant of all religions within dominantly Christian state. [redacted]

Muslim Distribution in the Caribbean Area



Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to

Government: Muslims are generally poor and hold no political offices. Islam serves as basis for group identity among the East Indian majority. [redacted]

Status of Fundamentalism: No evidence of any. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. Two Islamic organizations are primarily social, with some Libyan backing; have sent representatives to Islamic conferences. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement: Burnham has tried to attract aid from moderate and radical Arab states. Libya, which considers Guyana a strategic base for its activities in the Caribbean, has supported an Islamic Center and a radio program. [redacted]

Recent Developments:

- September 1982: Demonstration by East Indians in Georgetown against Zionism, massacre in Beirut. [redacted]

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Table 7
Western Hemisphere

Country	Total Population	Percent Muslims	Principal Sect	Government	Status of Fundamentalism	Foreign Involvement Among Muslims	Prognosis
Guyana	833,000	9	Sunni	Socialist autocratic	No evidence	Libya	Racial disharmony
Suriname	363,000	20	Sunni	Military leftist	No evidence	Libya	Uneasy stability
Trinidad and Tobago	1,100,000	6	Sunni small Shia community	Parliamentary democracy	No evidence	Libya	No Islamic role in unrest

Prognosis: Burnham has brought country to bankruptcy, disarray, and has done nothing to dampen intense racial disharmony that could eventually be expressed along religious lines. His attempts to woo radical Arab states have not been very successful, and only Libya seems to consider the relationship one of opportunity. []

Suriname

Population/Ethnic Composition: 363,000. 37 percent East Indian; 31 percent Creole; 16 percent Javanese; 10 percent Negro; others include Chinese, Amerindians, and other mixtures. []

Religious Composition: 20 percent (73,000) Muslim; 27 percent Hindu; 23 percent Catholic; 16 percent Moravian; 14 percent other. Muslims are mostly descendants of Javanese and East Indian immigrants, probably Sunni with lax observance. []

Government: Independence obtained from Netherlands in 1975, although the country has been internally self-governing since 1950. Various coalition governments ruled constitutionally until February 1980, when noncommissioned officers staged a brief, almost bloodless, coup. Amid promises to return to civilian rule, Lt. Col. Daysi Bouterse fended off a countercoup in May 1980; by August he declared a state of emergency, abolishing the Constitution and Cabinet. He now rules under a National Military Council. The government has become increasingly leftist, although without a strong ideology. []

Religious Policies of Government: Secular, religiously tolerant. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Before Bouterse's takeover, Islam was represented as part of the multiparty system. No major figure in the current government is a Muslim, although Muslim leaders joined with others in an interfaith attempt to persuade Bouterse to return to civilian rule in early 1982. []

Status of Fundamentalism: None evident thus far. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. []

Foreign Involvement: With Libyan financial assistance, the government has allowed an Islamic Teaching Center to be established in Paramaribo. Bouterse declined Qadhafi's request for a secure airstrip in Suriname in the spring of 1983, and the extent of Libyan financial aid is now in question. (s)

Recent Developments: No significant fundamentalist developments. []

Prognosis: While Bouterse remains in power, Islam will have a political role only as long as he believes he must stimulate and support Islamic causes to get Libyan funding []

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Trinidad and Tobago

Population/Ethnic Composition: 1.1 million; 43 percent Negro (Creole), 40 percent East Indian; 17 percent other, divided among mulattoes, whites, Chinese, and Arabs. []

Religious Composition: About 6 percent (69,000) Muslim, mostly East Indians and Arabs; 58 percent Christian, divided between Catholic and Protestant; 23 percent Hindu; 13 percent other. Muslims are almost all nominal Sunnis, although some Shias exist among the Arab merchants. []

Government: Independence from Great Britain in 1962. First Prime Minister, Eric Williams, ruled until his death in 1981, with peaceful transition to present Prime Minister, George Chambers. The government is a parliamentary democracy dominated by People's National Movement with small multiparty opposition. Pro-West but officially nonaligned. []

Religious Policies of Government: A secular but predominantly Christian society in which religious tolerance is official and practiced. Muslims are allowed separate schools, religious holiday observances. []

Relation of Islam/Religious Establishment to Government: Muslims are generally a low-status minority, although a few Muslims in the urban commercial class have joined the dominant party and have prominent positions in government. *Ishaat-i-Islami* and *Ahmadiya* are ultraconservative Muslim social societies. []

Status of Fundamentalism/Religious Revival: Little evidence of any revival. []

Fundamentalist Organizations: None known. []

Foreign Involvement: Opposition parties have gone to Libya for funds with limited success; some Libyan influence in building an Islamic Training Center in capital. []

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Recent Developments:

- 1981: 28th Islamic Conference held in Port-of-Spain.
- September 1982: Ahmadiya formally protested the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. []

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Prognosis: Islam, which is practiced mostly by low-status East Indians, has not been a factor in the political evolution of the country. Economic difficulties may cause some future unrest and dissatisfaction, but Islamic issues are not likely to play a role. []

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Appendix A

Glossary of Muslim Terms

ayatollah	Persian for "reflection of God"; used in Iran to denote Shia religious leaders elevated to high status by community consensus.	masjid	A mosque, place where Muslims worship in groups.
hadith	Sayings or deeds of the Prophet which, together with the Koran, provide the foundation of theology and law.	mufti	A specialist in Islamic law who, by his reputation, is appointed by government or designated by the Muslim community to rule on points of law.
hajj	The annual pilgrimage to Mecca, always in the last month of the Muslim calendar; required at least once in the lifetime of every Muslim as one of the five pillars of Islam; after completion of the hajj, a Muslim is entitled to the prefix hajji for his name.	Muharram	The first month of the Islamic year. In Shia tradition the 10th of Muharram commemorates the martyrdom of Ali.
ikhwan	Literally, "brotherhood"; often used to denote a fundamentalist Muslim organization.	mujahidin	Fighters in a jihad or religious battle; often used in fundamentalist organizational titles.
imam	A leader of prayer in the Muslim community; among Shias, the term connotes considerable religious authority.	mullah	A religious teacher or preacher.
Islam	Submission to the will of God; used to connote the nation of believers and their faith.	Muslim	(Sometimes spelled Moslem.) An adherent of Islam; a person who submits to the will of God.
jihad	Literally, "holy war"; used to designate either a war against unbelievers or a personal struggle to overcome one's imperfections; used often in the names of fundamentalist groups.	Ramadan	The ninth month of the Islamic year, when Muslims are usually required to observe several forms of abstinence.
Koran	(Often spelled Qur'an.) The book of "recitations" of the word of God as revealed to Muhammad.	Shariah	Also spelled Shari'a; the Islamic legal code set down in the seventh century and derived from the Koran and hadith. It codifies the relationship between families, rulers and ruled, economic transactions, and the treatment of criminal behavior.
madrasah	Seminary or academy for Muslim scholars.	shaykh	(Sometimes spelled sheikh.) Literally, "a venerable old gentleman," used with both religious and nonreligious connotation as the leader of a tribe, family, or organization.
marabout	In Africa, a Sufi leader.		

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- Shia The branch of Islam that developed from the conviction that Ali was the rightful successor as caliph to the Prophet Muhammad.
- Sufi The Islamic form of mysticism.
- sunnah The accepted practices and beliefs of the Muslim community.
- Sunni The branch of Islam that is most widely observed among Muslims.
- tariqah (Plural is tariqat.) Sufi brotherhood or religious order.
- ulema (Sometimes spelled ulama.) Collective body of Muslim scholars; closest equivalent to a "clergy."
- Wa'hhabis (Sometimes spelled Wahabi.) The Saudi Arabian form of Islamic belief and practice.
- waqf (Plural is awqaf.) An endowment or trust of land or other property that produces income for charitable purposes.
- zakat A tithe or tax that goes to the poor; one of the five pillars of Islam.



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