




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# China: Cleansing the Party— Rectification and Reform in the 1980s



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A Research Paper

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EA 83-10150  
September 1983

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# **China: Cleansing the Party— Rectification and Reform in the 1980s**

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**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by [Redacted] Office  
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are  
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China  
Division, OEA, [Redacted]

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*September 1983*

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**China: Cleansing the Party—  
Rectification and Reform  
in the 1980s**

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**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 28 August 1983  
was used in this report.*

This paper examines the problems of the Chinese Communist Party and the remedies Beijing proposes to set its house in order. It provides a benchmark for later assessments of China's progress in making the party a more effective instrument of leadership. How Beijing handles its party problems will to an important extent determine China's prospects for leadership—and foreign and domestic policy—continuity during this decade.

This winter the Chinese Communist Party begins a three-year rectification campaign that will pass judgment on each of the party's 40 million members. Deng Xiaoping sees the campaign as a way to purge opponents of his program, help party General Secretary Hu Yaobang (his chosen successor) consolidate his power, instill an ideological unity conducive to Deng's program, and refurbish the party's tarnished image. Hu will oversee the drive, and an orderly, successful campaign would help establish his leadership credentials in the public mind.

Specifically targeted for removal are party members who participated in the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, who are corrupt, or who have consistently resisted Deng's political and economic reforms.

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estimates of the number to be expelled, ranging from 2 to 15 percent of the party membership. We estimate that the figure will fall in the middle ranges, between 2 million and 4 million.

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Deng has made extensive preparations for the campaign, creating special organs to run it and staffing them with close associates. The leadership, moreover, is determined that this campaign will not interfere with priority economic tasks as past ones have. As a result, we believe this campaign will be orderly and that excesses and violence will be rare.

Despite Deng's preparations, we believe the rectification will encounter major problems that will complicate its implementation and limit its effectiveness. In particular, entrenched provincial factions will compete to control the campaign in their area, seeking to purge rivals and protect members without regard to Beijing's guidelines. Independent of formal factions is the tendency of officials at all levels to form patron-client relationships with the people above and below them. This guarantees that any cadre targeted by the campaign has a network of associates to turn to for help in slowing, if not defeating, the process.

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Beijing must also contend with officials who seek to push the campaign beyond the limits set by Beijing. Many individuals will have private agendas and will see the rectification as an opportunity to settle old scores from the Cultural Revolution. They may also be inclined to use methods Beijing has outlawed—physical or mental abuse and public humiliation—that could spark incidents and disrupt production. In addition, the sheer magnitude of the campaign will severely task Beijing's ability to monitor and direct it.

In this respect, the rectification will do little to improve the party's standing in the eyes of the people. Articles in the Chinese media and conversations with the Chinese themselves indicate that most see the party as a benevolent association interested only in preserving the privileges of its members. Nor do we expect the rectification to reform measurably the workstyle of party officials. Imperious behavior, abuse of position, and the importance of patron-client relationships will be as prevalent as ever.

We do not believe that these probable failings of the campaign will pose grave problems for the regime. Some party elders have warned of a "Polish situation" in China unless the party is cleansed, but, in our opinion, the level of popular disenchantment is not nearly that serious.

Preoccupation with the purity of the party and revolutionary ideals may in fact be a declining concern, because the party is in transition from older revolutionaries, who seem to care most about these issues, to post-1949 bureaucrats. In any case, we believe the rectification will advance Deng's most important aims—removing footdraggers and leftist opponents of Deng's line, improving Hu's succession prospects, and imposing an ideological uniformity based on Deng's ideas. To the degree the rectification achieves these ends, it will advance the transition to a new generation that has different priorities.

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*Hu Yaobang . . . born 1915 in Hunan Province . . . Deng Xiaoping's political heir and potentially the greatest beneficiary of a successful party rectification . . . formed association with Deng during 1930s . . . Deng-Hu connection endured through simultaneous dismissals from office during Cultural Revolution and in 1976 . . . since June 1981 Hu the party's nominal leader . . . rectification drive provides Hu with opportunity to emerge from Deng's shadow as leader in own right while eliminating many of those who have reservations about Hu's eventual party primacy . . . responsibility for running campaign reportedly devolved to closest junior associate, Hu Qili.*

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### China: Cleansing the Party— Rectification and Reform in the 1980s

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#### Introduction

In its fourth decade of rule, the Chinese Communist Party has declared itself to be in a state of crisis.<sup>1</sup> The party's difficulties do not directly threaten its existence or challenge its thorough penetration of Chinese society. In our view, however, the party does face an accumulation of interrelated problems in personnel, motivation, and public confidence that, taken together, impair its ability to direct China's modernization effort.

The party has traditionally responded to internal troubles through what it terms "rectification," a process that in the broadest sense embraces reindoc-trination, disciplinary sanctions, and organizational measures—structural reform, recruitment, and purge of the membership.<sup>2</sup> During the long years of his rule, Mao initiated frequent rectification drives to rid the party of attitudes and behavior that fell short of his visionary standards. The first and perhaps most successful, the Yanan Rectification Movement of 1942-44, has set the standard for subsequent campaigns.

Mao, who exercised almost total control over the Yanan rectification, used it to promote his own ideas against those of rival factions and to consolidate his power within the party. "Mao Zedong Thought" assumed an unchallengeable authority and was used to indoctrinate the thousands of new members who joined the party in the late 1930s and early 1940s but who had not been truly assimilated into its ranks.

<sup>1</sup> Allowing for the hyperbole that often marks propaganda, the imagery of crisis has characterized media discussions of the party since Deng's ascendancy in 1978. For example, Politburo Standing Committee member Chen Yun, second only to Deng Xiaoping in prestige, has called the correction of party shortcomings "a matter of life or death" for the party. See appendix A for a sampling of leaders' statements on the party crisis.

Although this paper draws on the full range of intelligence, it primarily relies on analysis of Chinese propaganda. Except where expressly stated, our attribution of attitudes to the Chinese leadership is based on our reading of important speeches, editorials, and press commentary.

<sup>2</sup> "Rectification"—*zhengdun* ("to correct" or "put in order") *zuofeng* ("workstyle"), but more commonly contracted simply to *zhengfeng*—is a usage uniquely Chinese. Mao apparently coined the term in his speech of February 1942 that inaugurated the Yanan Rectification Movement.

Careful recruitment, disciplinary measures, and purge of unreliable members helped the party attain the organizational cohesiveness that contributed to victory over the Nationalists.

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Deng Xiaoping and his reformist allies believe the party now requires similar medicine. Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978, the reformers have repeatedly attempted to organize their own systematic test of loyalty and ideological rectitude. After repeated delays, their rectification drive will begin later this year. Harking back to Yanan, Deng and company expect a partywide rectification to produce for them the same payoff as the Yanan movement yielded for Mao: political and ideological uniformity beneath a single standard.

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#### Motivations and Goals

*The State of the Party* . . . Deng and his reform allies consistently tout the party as indispensable to China's modernization. Yet the clear impression left by their statements is that, in their judgment, the party does not measure up to the task. In speeches and private statements, Deng and others have—correctly, in our view—pinpointed the party's major problems:

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- It is dominated by elderly, increasingly inactive men—the average age on the Politburo is 73—of relatively unsophisticated, mostly peasant, origins.<sup>3</sup> Despite bureaucratic streamlining last year and the lure of lucrative pensions, many have resisted pressure to retire voluntarily and instead are preoccupied with preserving their positions and perquisites. This situation exists at every administrative level.

<sup>3</sup> The 12th Party Congress substantially lowered the average age of the Central Committee, but largely by adding a contingent of relatively younger members to the list of alternate, nonvoting members. The average age of full Central Committee members remains in the high sixties.

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- Training and ideological indoctrination under Mao inculcated a world view that in many ways is at variance with the modernization plans of the leadership. Half or more of the party's 40 million members were admitted during the Cultural Revolution era when requirements were slackened and virtually the sole criterion for membership was commitment to Mao's radically egalitarian ideas.
- The "leadership workstyle" of senior cadres is frequently out of step with current requirements for collegiality and consultation and is ill suited to the needs of the modernization program. Party officials, while not required to master technical information, must now demonstrate a sensitivity to technical problems and a willingness to defer to professional opinion. Longtime administrators habitually lead in an imperious manner, seem suspicious of expertise, and often place political or personal considerations ahead of the goals of their organizations.
- China's opening to the world has spurred a dramatic rise in the incidence of corruption by officials.

[redacted] party members have been involved in more than 40 percent of all cases uncovered. In our judgment, this may be a conservative estimate; although party members represent only 4 percent of China's population, they have far greater opportunities to manipulate the system and better means to avoid incrimination.

[redacted]

*... and Its Consequences.* The sad state of the party's membership—too often aged, inflexible, imperious, and corrupt—has aggravated other problems that together seriously impair the party's ability to provide the leadership Deng's goals require. Authoritative statements by party leaders and commentary in the official media leave the impression, which is reinforced by conversations with the Chinese, that there are two related areas of concern.

*A Crisis of Confidence.* Beijing recognizes that the wild swings of policy under Mao that culminated in the Cultural Revolution have cost it the support of broad segments of Chinese society. The purge of Hua Guofeng, Deng's preoccupation with the succession,

and continued vacillation on fundamental issues re-inforce the impression that little has actually changed with the reformers in charge. Many Chinese believe that the party no longer has the vision, intelligence, and honesty needed to govern 1 billion people. Although it is difficult to measure the disaffection, its prominence as a propaganda theme and the reports of knowledgeable observers suggests that it is a significant problem within and outside of the party.

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We believe expanded economic relations with Japan, Hong Kong, and the West have added to the problem. Some Chinese are surprised by the wealth of the capitalist economies and have come to view Communism as a system that has many of the disadvantages and few of the advantages of capitalism. This is compounded by the heightened sensitivity among Chinese to the privileged lives of party officials and their families and to abuses of their advantages.

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Recognizing the situation, Beijing lectures incessantly on the "superiority of the socialist system" and the indispensability of the Communist Party. In his address to the 12th Party Congress, for example, General Secretary Hu Yaobang devoted a long passage to contesting the view of some Chinese that Communism is but "a dim illusion" that had not been tested in practice. He maintained that "there is Communism everywhere in our daily life" and warned critics that failure to affirm the party's contributions amounted to "a grave error."

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*Ideological Drift.* The death of Mao Zedong—however inconsistent and mercurial were his proclamations near the end—created uncertainty about what constitutes dogma and what is heresy. Although the "Resolution of Questions of Party History" approved by the Sixth Plenum of the 11th Congress in June 1981 attempted to make Mao's ideas fit China's reform program, Mao's intellectual legacy has become increasingly irrelevant to present concerns.


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Since initiation of the reform program at the Third Plenum, the official media have featured a running affirmation that Deng's policies are indeed socialist in

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Cartoons reprinted in China's English-language publications satirize cadre corruption and shortcomings in official work-style.

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
Long-distance call.

by Liu Keqin

Is Everybody Busy?

- Ye Chunyang

This cartoon criticizes over-staffed organizations and ineffective work. (The words on the envelope are "urgent dispatch.")



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
nature. The continuing stream of pronouncements—each purportedly authoritative—indicate to us, however, widespread skepticism and a concern by the reformers that their pragmatically framed policies still lack a sufficient ideological basis.

**Four Goals.** This assessment of the party has shaped Deng's stated goals for the rectification:

- Inculcate thoroughly in the minds of party members the thinking underlying China's reform policies, thereby filling the ideological void left by Mao's death and reevaluation.
- Promote reform goals by finally purging or cowing "leftists" who rose to power during the Cultural Revolution era.
- Repair the party's image by promoting the achievements of Chinese Communism and rejuvenating its membership—adding younger, better educated people and eliminating the more corrupt and incompetent.

Deng has a fourth goal of equal or greater importance—advancing the succession prospects of his protégé, Hu Yaobang. Hu has made great strides in building a power base in the party and government, but, if Deng died today, we believe Hu could still face a challenge from other members of the leadership.<sup>4</sup> The rectification provides Hu and Deng with an opportunity to strengthen their grip on the party bureaucracy, particularly at the lowest levels where their influence is weakest. Organs charged with overseeing the campaign are led by officials who have close ties to Hu.

A successful campaign is important to Hu in another sense. He has labored in Deng's shadow and many Chinese do not see him as a leader in his own right. Moreover, some of the policies Hu has been associated with in the past—the new minority policy and the policy toward intellectuals, for instance—have generally been less successful than Beijing anticipated. Hu is overseeing the rectification drive, and an orderly, effective campaign would help establish his leadership credentials in the public mind.



Wide World ©

*Rectification triumverate: (left to right) Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Yaobang confer during the Sixth Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, June 1981.*

#### Framework for Rectification

In a sense, China has experienced an ongoing rectification since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978.<sup>5</sup> Beijing at one time or another has chastised "leftists," "bourgeois liberals," criminals among officialdom, and ideologically slack party members. None of these efforts, however, has been integrated, systematic, or pursued with much vigor.

The rectification campaign formally endorsed at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982 is meant to be just that: comprehensive and vigorous. Hu announced that it will last three years and involve a thorough, systematic review of all 40 million party

<sup>5</sup> Often the term "rectification" is not used to refer to a given campaign, but the effect remains the same. The "Three Anti," "Five Anti," and "Anti-Rightist" campaigns of the 1950s, the Socialist Education Campaign and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, and the "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign and the purge of Gang of Four supporters in the 1970s were all rectification drives. Some were repeatedly identified as such, others were not.

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members "in stages by groups." Each will be evaluated for his adherence to the party line laid down at the Third Plenum—that is, Deng's programs—and those who pass muster will be recertified as party members.

**Preparations.** Beijing has been laying the groundwork since the Third Plenum. Preparations include:

- Reestablishment at the plenum of a party Discipline Inspection Commission, which will play a major role in the rectification drive.
- Approval at the Fifth Plenum in February 1980 of "Guiding Principles of Inner Party Life," which establish standards of behavior for party members.<sup>6</sup>
- Publication, following the Sixth Plenum in June 1981, of a "Resolution on Questions of Party History" that officially criticized Mao and his policies and established an authoritative interpretation of the party's actions since 1949.
- Initiation of a nationwide campaign against economic crimes in 1982—identified as one of two priorities for the year—that targeted corrupt officials.
- A massive bureaucratic reorganization begun in 1982 of China's three major institutions—party, state, and military—to improve their efficiency and install new leadership teams committed to the reform agenda and to rectification goals.
- Promulgation at the 12th Party Congress of a new party constitution containing explicit passages on the duties of members and on disciplinary procedures.<sup>6</sup>
- Establishment following the party congress of pilot rectification projects in selected organizations and localities in each of China's provincial level administrations.
- Publication and intensive propagandization of "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping" and the writings of Chen Yun, who is closely associated with the drive to reform party workstyle.

<sup>6</sup> See appendix B for excerpts.



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*Chen Yun . . . born 1905 in Jiangsu . . . perhaps the leading advocate of reform in party style and work habits . . . driving force in anticorruption drive begun in 1981 and recently revived after slowdown in activity . . . member, Politburo Standing Committee . . . longtime leader in economic policy whose ideas now in fashion . . . in 1958, openly critical of Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward, career plummets . . . disagreements came into the open during Cultural Revolution, Chen vehemently attacked for "opposing Mao" . . . rehabilitated 1973, returned to Politburo 1977 . . . since 1978 head of party's Discipline Inspection Commission, a major participant in coming rectification . . . renowned for modest, unassuming lifestyle and unimpeachable devotion to Communist Party.*

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**Structures.** We expect overall supervision of the rectification will rest with Hu [redacted]

[redacted] Hu Qili—a Secretariat member and reportedly the General Secretary's closest associate—will personally orchestrate the campaign. [redacted] Hu Qili recently may have stepped down as head of the Central Committee's General Office, which attends to much of the party's day-to-day paperwork and maintains the party archives. We believe, however, that the General Office—now reportedly led by another Hu Yaobang confidant, Qiao Shi—is only one of several departments in the central party bureaucracy that

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
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Hu Qili... born 1929 in Shaanxi... [redacted]

*touted by some as eventual head of the party... reportedly has resigned as head of party's General Office to devote full time to work as Secretariat member... studied mechanical engineering, Beijing University... a Communist Youth League associate of Hu Yaobang during 1950s, 1960s... purged early in 1967, rehabilitated 1972, given successively greater responsibilities... marked as major "comer" when appointed deputy mayor and party secretary of Tianjin in 1980... reportedly in charge of running rectification drive for Hu Yaobang... speaks excellent English.* [redacted]

will be deeply involved in the process. In our judgment, Beijing will follow the practice of some provincial trial rectification projects and establish an ad hoc "rectification office" at the outset of the campaign.

Hu Qili may well direct its activities. [redacted]

Other major bureaucratic participants will be:

- The Discipline Inspection Commission and its subordinates in every locality, which at the recent party congress were granted expanded investigatory powers.
- The Organization Department, which is the party's central personnel office.
- The Propaganda Department, which will have special responsibilities for preparing study materials and framing explanations of policy.

Close associates of Deng or Hu direct each of these organs, with the possible exception of the Organization Department. Its director seems to be a career bureaucrat, but two of his deputies are associates of Hu. [redacted]

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In addition, the investigatory organs of the Ministry of Public Security and the new Ministry of State Security will become involved if criminal misconduct is discovered. The rectification will also extend to the People's Liberation Army, with the prominent participation of its General Political Department and its Discipline Inspection Commission. [redacted]

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**Guidelines.** The final guidelines for the national rectification will be promulgated at the Second Plenum of the 12th Congress, which is scheduled to convene in October 1983. The basic contours of the campaign, however, are already clear from the statements of leaders, media commentary on pilot projects, and the extensive propaganda on the rectification. [redacted]

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Beijing has taken great care to distinguish the coming campaign from its antecedents conducted under Mao, which featured public humiliation and physical and mental abuse of the targets. Hu Yaobang especially will want to eschew the use of terror—never as central and systematic in China as in the Stalinist purges of the 1930s—because it would be reminiscent of the violent periods under Mao and would alienate many moderate party members who are his principal base of support. [redacted]

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In media discussions of experimental projects, Beijing has sought to assure anxious party members that this rectification will be tightly controlled and will avoid the mass mobilization tactics that in the past frequently got out of hand. Beijing has repeatedly stressed the novelty—the "pioneering" aspect—of the coming campaign, arguing that trial runs would be unnecessary if Beijing merely intended to duplicate past campaigns. The media have also emphasized that the object is not to punish errant cadre but to educate them to Deng's point of view. Mao's old precept from

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the Yanan rectification, "curing the sickness to save the patient," is frequently invoked to characterize the favored approach. Leniency will be the rule in handling cases, according to Beijing, and cadres who have opposed Deng's policies in the past are being told by the media that it is not too late to confess and be saved. [redacted]

Assurances of leniency notwithstanding, the most important targets of rectification are already well marked and are those who, for a variety of reasons, are counted among the opponents of Deng's reforms. Beijing has especially singled out the Cultural Revolution activists—"beaters, smashers, and looters; factionalists; and those who rose through rebellion"—whose past actions warrant severe treatment: purge and perhaps imprisonment. Two other special targets were named at the 12th Party Congress—people who are guilty of corruption and those who, after years of Beijing's efforts, persistently refuse to accept Deng's reform policies. [redacted]

*Scope.* All party members will submit to rectification but relatively few will face disciplinary measures. Not all who are found guilty of one or another deviation will lose their party membership. Some will receive reprimands, "reeducation," and another chance.<sup>7</sup> [redacted]

We have only a thin basis from which to judge the numbers of those to be purged from the party rolls. Late last year a frequently reliable Hong Kong publication quoted a leading discipline inspection figure, who said that rectification would eliminate some 2 million party members. [redacted]

[redacted] 2 to 3 percent of the membership would go, between 800,000 and 1 million. According to the Chinese media, of 14,000 party members in Liaoning Province's trial points, some 14 percent failed to qualify after their initial review. After rectification—including study, self-examination and criticism, and testimonials of changed outlooks—that percentage was reduced to 3.9. [redacted]

<sup>7</sup> Reeducation in China generally involves rotation to a party-run school for several months where the students read approved works—in this case, the rectification syllabus including the works of Deng, Chen Yun, and select party documents—and criticize their past behavior. [redacted]

We believe that to minimize anxieties over the rectification, most official or semiofficial estimates of the reach of the purge—either on or off the record—tend to underrepresent Beijing's intent. A less sanguine estimate, [redacted]

[redacted] suggested that 10 to 15 percent of the membership would be purged. Because of factors that will reduce the effectiveness of the campaign (discussed elsewhere), we believe the total number removed from the party will probably fall into the 5- to 10-percent range, approximately 2-4 million. The net reduction in the size of the party will be smaller, of course, because recruitment will accompany dismissals. [redacted]

#### Mechanics of Rectification

A Third Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, now slated for December 1983, will mark the formal opening of rectification activities. Although the party has thus far sought to allow for slippage in starting—the formal codification of rectification guidelines, for example, is almost certainly a contentious process—Hu Yaobang's mention of October and December party plenums [redacted] indicates that the initial deadlines have been met. We have no information on the timetable of the campaign, other than it is to last three years and that its conclusion will, according to Hu, coincide with the party's 13th national congress. [redacted]

We expect this campaign to unfold as similar large, time-consuming campaigns have. At the outset, all the major Chinese publications will run editorials, news reports, and analytical commentary that discuss the rectification in its various dimensions. Party groups will be spurred to conscientious fulfillment of the requirements levied by higher levels, typical results at different administrative levels will be discussed, and almost certainly a particularly unrepentant few will be held up publicly as negative examples. [redacted]

By allowing three years for rectification work, Beijing presumably hopes to integrate the campaign into the normal rhythm of Chinese life and minimize the disruptions it will cause in work units. There will [redacted]

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Scenes from the Cultural Revolution: although tactics such as "dragging out" officials for public humiliation, characteristic of earlier rectification movements, are banned from the coming campaign, those who once were dragged out have scores they may try to settle.



Four prominent "counterrevolutionaries" are humiliated by a Red Guard kangaroo court: (left to right) Yang Shangkun, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Peng Zhen. Placards indicate individual's surname. (Photo taken before February 1967.)

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Yang Shangkun, a close ally of Deng Xiaoping and now Secretary General of the party Military Commission, forced to confess to errors, real and imagined. (Photo taken before February 1967.)



Lu Dingyi, China's propaganda chieftain until his denunciation in 1966, here "rides the airplane" (zuo feiji) for his Red Guard accusers. (Photographed December 1966.)

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almost certainly be cycles of increased or reduced rectification work, with activity picking up, for example, to meet deadlines in advance of major party convocations. For each individual party member, the end result of the rectification drive will be a judgment on whether he or she qualifies for reregistration as a member in good standing. We expect gala reregistration ceremonies replete with suitably solemn oaths of rededication at appropriate intervals during the campaign.

**Procedures.** The rectification will be implemented either routinely—through the local party bureaucracy—or through special work teams dispatched by higher party authorities. Work teams from Beijing

have participated in most of the experimental work in the provinces, and their contributions have been widely and favorably touted. The broad use of work teams demonstrates the determination of upper administrative levels and has the advantage of awing status-conscious local officials more readily into compliance. They also have the damaging effect of overriding—and consequently undercutting—the authority of local officials.

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We expect those units that have completed the process of bureaucratic reorganization—scheduled for completion at all levels next year—to take the lead in rectification. Chinese media indicate that cadres will be rotated into classes, where they will receive special instruction on the texts that form the core curriculum on the rectification syllabus: such items as the “works” of Deng and Chen Yun, the documents of the various plenary sessions, and the party constitution. The campaign will probably begin simultaneously at all levels; in our judgment, rectification of the higher levels will not necessarily be a prerequisite for commencement of activities at lower levels. [redacted]

[redacted] 75 to 80 percent of all party members will require “reeducation,” and we believe study will indeed be the main focus of the activities. As media commentary suggests, at each level and in every organization the contingent of party members will be divided into groups that will be rotated into rectification sessions. Most of the practical work—study, self-criticism, criticism of one’s peers—will be guided by the grass-roots leadership in small party groups of 15 or so members. [redacted]

Media commentary on the pilot rectification projects indicates how the process is supposed to unfold within the small groups. An April 1983 *People’s Daily* piece that commended the experience of a county in Anhui stated local cadres responsible for the rectification evaluated each party member according to the party constitution and “six checks.”<sup>8</sup> Afterward, written self-appraisals by each party member formed the basis for group discussion, criticism, and self-criticism, which sought to reconcile the member’s initial evaluation with his self-appraisal. The member’s party branch then made a final appraisal to determine whether the member qualified for recertification or if additional remedial measures were required. [redacted]

<sup>8</sup> “Check to see whether one’s belief in Communism is firm, whether one is maintaining political consistency with the Central Committee, whether one is serving the people wholeheartedly, whether one is taking the lead in completing the tasks handed down from higher authorities, whether law and discipline are observed, and whether one dares to struggle against unhealthy tendencies.” [redacted]

Disciplinary problems uncovered during the course of the investigations will generally be disposed of by the immediate party branch or the next higher level. Severe cases—those involving possible expulsion from the party—generally will be referred to the local Discipline Inspection Commission at or above the county level and may entail the weighing of criminal charges. Moreover, Beijing is prepared to intervene directly in particularly tough cases, as it did earlier this year during the implementation of provincial party and state reorganization. [redacted]

Although Beijing seeks to create the impression that a high level of impartiality will be observed with no cases decided beforehand, [redacted] the process of labeling targets began shortly after the 12th Party Congress. In one province, for example, party organs were instructed to sort members into three categories: those who should be reregistered, those who should be encouraged not to reregister, and those who would not be permitted to. [redacted]

#### Problems Ahead

Beijing’s extensive preparations notwithstanding, the planned rectification remains a task of staggering magnitude. The Chinese Communist Party has 40 million members organized into more than 2 million primary party organizations, each anxious to protect his job and perquisites.<sup>9</sup> Party membership is the indispensable entree to the best China has to offer. Loss of membership affects occupational prospects and salary, living quarters, access to small luxuries, educational opportunities for family members—in short, virtually every important aspect of material life. Party members facing rectification—and especially those anticipating the ultimate sanction, dismissal—can be expected to do everything within their power to protect their “rice bowls.” [redacted]

<sup>9</sup> According to Article 30 of the party constitution, “Primary party organizations are formed in factories, shops, schools, offices, city neighborhoods, people’s communes, cooperatives, farms, townships, towns, companies of the People’s Liberation Army, and other basic units, where there are three or more full party members.” [redacted]

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As the campaign unfolds, we believe Beijing will encounter serious problems that will complicate implementation of its guidelines and limit the effectiveness of the rectification. We expect at least three kinds of difficulties: local conditions that restrict Beijing's reach, movement of the campaign in unintended directions, and limits on the resources Beijing can expend on rectification goals. [redacted]

**Constraints.** Political factions constitute one of two major obstacles to achieving rectification goals. Generally formed during the political warfare of the Cultural Revolution, factions remain powerful in some provinces—Guangxi and Fujian are two prominent examples—and resist efforts to disrupt established local patterns of political behavior. [redacted]

We believe local factions will compete for control over the rectification process and will seek to protect their own members while directing criticism at rivals, regardless of Beijing's guidelines. During the recent government reorganization—another livelihood issue inciting keen factional concern—entrenched factions responded in typically protective fashion, attempting to win places within the new government teams and thereby protect their local standing. [redacted]

The central leadership recognizes this danger and is attempting to cope with it. The national press in recent months has railed against factionalism, and some of the more blatant factional leaders will be prominent targets of the rectification drive. The ongoing government reorganization at all levels has changed the top leadership in most provinces, partly to ensure that key leaders are in step with Beijing's plans for party reform. As outsiders recently assigned, however, the new leaders are at a disadvantage in dealing with these strongly entrenched groups. [redacted]

We believe that Beijing will have only limited success in reducing the influence of local factions. We suspect that in many cases Beijing will ultimately be forced to resort to the time-tested practice of choosing among local factions, co-opting the one group most in tune with the reform program. The price will be some watering down of campaign standards, and the time-consuming process of forging the new local coalitions will almost certainly delay other political initiatives—including the rectification. [redacted]

*Guanxi*, or simple patron-client protectionism, is the other great challenge to the campaign. Although *guanxi* is the basic building block of factions, it more routinely operates as the mundane exchange of personal favors on a 1-to-1 basis. Use of *guanxi* relations to gain preferential treatment, whether for the purchase of a special holiday food or for securing the admission of a child to a prestigious university, is a basic feature of both official and nonofficial Chinese life. Local officials generally have reciprocal personal relationships with senior cadre, and those who become targets of the campaign will appeal to their mentors for support.<sup>10</sup> [redacted]

Official press commentary on the trial projects indicates that Beijing recognizes the threat posed by personal relationships among officials, and we believe Beijing will have greater success here, where individuals do not enjoy the thick cover of an entrenched faction. Patrons will be hard pressed to protect client officials who are clearly marked targets of rectification, but they can slow the process and make things difficult for campaign administrators. [redacted]

Fear of retaliation often has a dampening effect on enthusiasm for campaigns that call for officials to candidly evaluate junior and senior associates by political criteria, and, given the stakes in this one, we believe officials may be more cautious than usual. Cadre caution is a direct legacy of the Mao era, when policies changed on a year-to-year basis, and those who faithfully implemented one year's policies found themselves accused of political crimes the next. We believe that the experience of the Cultural Revolution was so traumatic that rectification leaders can do little to dispel the inherent paranoia of officials "twice burned." [redacted]

Vague guidelines or virtually any sign of *political disunity in Beijing* will provide a pretext for lower jurisdictions to slow the campaign and await direct instructions from higher levels. Central directives are

<sup>10</sup> The most well-known examples of personal protection during politically dangerous times were under the aegis of the late Premier Zhou Enlai, who, to judge from posthumous accounts, seems to have protected nearly every central official who survived the Cultural Revolution with political fortunes relatively intact. [redacted]

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characteristically written in general terms to permit some flexibility for dealing with local peculiarities. We expect local cadres to seize on this customary imprecision—as they often have in the past—to put off hard decisions. [redacted]

**Zealots.** While cadres attempting to slow the rectification will be Beijing's main concern, it must also control the overenthusiasm of those who would push the drive beyond its intended limits. The party leadership wants to prevent the rectification from interfering with priority tasks in the economy, research, and other key areas. Previous campaigns under Mao disrupted all aspects of Chinese life, causing enormous economic losses and social tensions. Officials will have to balance economic requirements with conflicting political demands while maintaining work force morale under stressful conditions. [redacted]

Although the problem of excessive enthusiasm was greater under Mao than under Deng, Beijing has nevertheless felt compelled to repeatedly affirm the requirement to run a "gentle and mild" rectification. Important *People's Daily* commentary as well as trial project reports prohibit rectification administrators from working within "leftist" conventions" established under Mao. These involved such practices as long and violent "struggle" sessions, physically abusive public pillorying of errant individuals, and punishing entire families for the errors of a single member. [redacted]

There is little doubt, however, that some officials have private agendas and will attempt to use the rectification to settle old political scores. This will raise the stakes and the temperature of the campaign in some areas and introduce more desperate methods on the part of both accused and accusers. We do not expect, however, the rioting and upheaval associated with the Cultural Revolution, in part because the central leadership is more unified now and there is no authoritative voice—such as Mao's—willing to sanction such behavior. [redacted]

**Central Overload.** The addition of rectification, with its attendant problems and demands, to the already-crowded agenda for 1983 may greatly increase the workload for hard-pressed central organizations, themselves under mandate to streamline. Because of

local resistance, we believe Beijing will be forced to rely heavily on central work teams to accomplish its goals. As happened when provincial governments and party committees were reorganized earlier this year, Beijing may not allow local officials to make major decisions in any case. Central administrators may insist that most difficult cases be referred to Beijing for review and final disposition. Appeals from lower levels will also clutter the process. Under these circumstances, rectification will be a serious drain on central resources and energy, and Beijing's efforts to control each aspect seems to us certain to decrease efficiency and slow the process. [redacted]

#### Prospects

**Personnel.** The problems Beijing will encounter ensure that the rectification will not be as thorough as Deng might hope, but, in our judgment, Beijing will succeed in removing the most blatant opponents of Deng's program and in upgrading party ranks somewhat by removing some of the more corrupt and incompetent cadres. Deng and his allies will thus accomplish what they regard as the most important goal of the campaign, the purge of the party's least trustworthy members. We also believe the structures and guidelines established by Beijing are sufficiently strong to prevent the campaign from sparking social disorder. [redacted]

These personnel successes will assist Hu Yaobang in imposing his own stamp on the party and will improve his odds for inheriting Deng's place as first among equals within the Chinese leadership. We believe Deng and his allies will also make strides toward cementing a new ideological orthodoxy based on ideas of Deng and other party elders. [redacted]

Ideological unity beneath a new standard may be superficial, however. Party pronouncements on ideological issues indicate that Mao's egalitarian vision still appeals to many Chinese and that the ideas of Deng and his reformist associates remain controversial. We believe the rectification is more likely to silence ideological critics than eradicate them. [redacted]

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**The Party's Standing.** We do not believe that the rectification alone will produce a substantial improvement in the public image of the party. The party can justifiably claim—without having had a rectification—that life is now more agreeable for the vast majority of Chinese than it was under Mao Zedong.

Yet, except for the more settled political climate in China—which admittedly is a basic background condition for all undertakings—Beijing has difficulty convincing its populace of the party's indispensable role in recent Chinese successes. Many of these achievements—in agriculture, foreign trade, and education, for example—are in areas where the party has generally withdrawn its hand or has merely reversed bankrupt and irrational policies it once endorsed. It is difficult, for example, for the party to take credit for the successive years of relatively good weather or for the native industry of the average Chinese peasant—key factors in recent economic growth.

These favorable developments, moreover, do little to shake the basic impression of the party that, in our judgment, is widely held among the populace. Articles in the Chinese media and conversations with the Chinese themselves indicate that many—and perhaps most—Chinese tend to see the party as a benevolent association interested only in preserving the privileges and perquisites of its members and their friends. We believe problems such as abuse of privilege, individual corruption, and imperious leadership are seen by many influential Chinese—and especially intellectuals and students—as ingrained and endemic to the system.

By reducing some of the more egregious occurrences of cadre malfeasance, bringing in some new blood and fresh ideas, and obtaining a degree of ideological consistency, the party may be able to convince the Chinese of its determination to make a new start. However, we judge a return to the pervasive sense of trust and sacrifice that characterized the Chinese mentality in the early 1950s is virtually impossible in these more cynical times.

**Workstyle.** We also expect the rectification to leave the basic style of Chinese politics unchanged. Despite reforms that ostensibly enlarge the authority of organizations, men remain more important than institutions, and things will continue to get done more

effectively through *guanxi*. Although “democratic centralism” and collegial rule are fashionable terms in the official media, the rectification will do little to circumscribe the vast authority and influence of individual party leaders. Abuse of power, imperiousness, and the continued indispensability to the system of a single authoritative leader—Deng, for now—are beyond the reach of the campaign.

**A Declining Concern?** The shortcomings of the campaign are not serious failings, in our judgment, and do not pose grave problems for the regime, at least in the short run. Some party elders, most notably Chen Yun, have warned repeatedly that unless the party is cleansed a “Polish situation” could eventually develop in China. There is always a strong element of hyperbole in such pronouncements, and, in our opinion, the level of popular disenchantment is not nearly that serious. Traditional cultural constraints, the generally passive tenor of popular disenchantment with the party, and the efficiency of the Chinese security system together argue against the Polish scenario. An inability to refurbish the party's image and to create a more energetic and selfless cadre may slow the modernization effort but, in our view, will not derail it.

The party's concern about its image and revolutionary heritage may be a declining one, for the regime is in a period of transition. The days of the old revolutionaries—Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and their kind—who earlier were driven by their ideals to join the revolution and who recall and seek a return to “the Yanan spirit” are fast fading. They will eventually be replaced by the products of the system they helped create, men and women born since 1949 who, if current trends proceed unhindered, will be more in the current Soviet and East European mold, graduates of the polytechnical institutes, and more concerned with securing the perks of the present society than advancing the revolution. These are the people to whom the party is now most favorably disposed. To the degree the rectification removes the leftists and consolidates the influence of Hu, the campaign will enhance their numbers and advance this transition.

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**Appendix A****Leadership Comments on China's Party Problem**

"The decade of domestic turmoil (1966-76: the Cultural Revolution) confounded the criteria of right and wrong, good and evil, beauty and ugliness. It is much more difficult to undo its grave spiritual consequences than its material ones. For this and other reasons, many serious problems concerning standards of social conduct now exist in our country. The Central Committee of the party is determined to effect a fundamental turn for the better in standards of social conduct in the next five years. . . .

"The view that Communism is but a 'dim illusion' and that it 'has not been tested in practice' is utterly wrong. There is Communism everywhere in our daily life, of which it forms an inseparable part. . . .

"All the splendid successes of the party and the people have been achieved precisely through the inspiring example given by such a fine core of members of the party. This is the principal aspect of our party, and whoever fails to see it, or deliberately denies it, is committing a grave error. . . .

"(If we believe otherwise) we will not be able to safeguard the socialist orientation of China's modernization, and our socialist society will lose its ideals and objectives, its spiritual motivation and fighting will, lose the ability to resist the inroads of corrupt influences and even develop distortedly and degenerate. Comrades, this is not just alarmist talk but a conclusion drawn from present realities at home and abroad."

Hu Yaobang  
September 1982

"The workstyle of a ruling party is a matter of life and death for the party."

Chen Yun  
November 1979

"In order to improve the general mood of society, it is necessary first of all to improve the party's workstyle. . . . If the party shelves the opinions and interests of the masses and remains indifferent, how can it expect the masses to have faith in and cherish its leadership. If the party's leading cadres do not set

strict demands for themselves and do not observe party discipline and state law, if they violate the party's principles, practice factionalism, seek special privileges, secure advantages through pull or influence, indulge in extravagance and waste, feather their nests at public expense, do not share weal and woe with the masses, do not strive to be the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, do not follow the decisions of the organization, do not accept supervision from the masses and even resort to retaliation against those who criticize them, how can we expect them to remold the general mood of society?"

Deng Xiaoping  
March 1979

"Our party actually needs rectification at present. This matter was put forth seven years ago and it has not yet been settled. Quite a number of the 38 million party members are not up to the mark."

Deng Xiaoping  
February 1980

"The pressing issue before us is to restore the party's fighting capabilities. The party should be a combat force, the vanguard of the proletariat. . . . At present, some of our party members are not qualified. Some of the new members who joined our ranks when the ultraleftist line held sway have never received any party education. They cannot set an example for the masses and are therefore not qualified. Some of our old party members have measured up to the requirements for a long time. However, they cannot set an example for the masses now and are therefore not so qualified. We advocate the party spirit and oppose factionalism. Some people desperately cling to their faction. There are many people whose factional spirit is higher than their party spirit, and among them are some of our old party members."

Deng Xiaoping  
January 1980



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## Appendix B

### Documents

Extracts from *Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life* (adopted by the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, February 1980):

After nationwide liberation (in October 1949) the masses of party members in the main upheld the party's fine traditions and workstyle. . . . However, because some comrades became arrogant and complacent as a result of the victory of the revolutionary struggle and the position gained by the party as the ruling party for the entire country, because of the imperfect system of democratic centralism in the party and state and because of the influence of the ideology of the feudal and capitalist classes, such unhealthy tendencies as being divorced from reality and the masses, subjectivism, bureaucracy, making arbitrary decisions, taking peremptory actions and seeking privileges had developed. At the same time, there were some shortcomings and mistakes in guiding the inner-party struggle (between "correct" and "incorrect" viewpoints), and normal inner-party political life was impaired to a certain extent . . . (especially) during the Great Cultural Revolution. . . .

In order to achieve the all-round revival and further development of the party's fine traditions and workstyle, strengthen the party's democratic life, safeguard the party as a centralized and unified one, strengthen party unity, consolidate party organization and discipline, and enhance the party's fighting capacity, the Central Committee, in view of the present condition of the party, hereby reiterates the following guidelines for inner-party political life to the whole party:

1. *Adhere to the party's political and ideological line.* . . . (This is) the most fundamental guiding principle. . . . In order to adhere to the correct political and ideological lines, it is necessary to oppose erroneous ideological tendencies. First, it is necessary to oppose ossification of the mind and proceeding by the book in everything we do (references to Mao). . . . Second, it is essential to oppose and repudiate the erroneous view and revisionist ideological trend of

negating the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (the "Four Fundamental Principles"). . . .

2. *Uphold collective leadership and oppose arbitrary decisionmaking by a single person.* . . . In deciding matters within a party committee, it is essential to act in strict accordance with the principle that the minority is subordinate to the majority. . . . The secretary or the first secretary . . . is not allowed to practice "what I say goes" or a patriarchal system. . . .

3. *Safeguard the party's unity and centralized leadership and strictly abide by party discipline.* . . . It is necessary to solemnly reiterate that "the individual is subordinate to the organization, the minority to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the entire party to the Central Committee." . . . Differing views . . . may be discussed within the party on proper occasions. As for when and in what manner they should be discussed in the press, this should be decided by the party Central Committee (or, more accurately, the Politburo or Secretariat). . . . But under no circumstances must anyone be allowed to express in the press or on the radio any views contrary to the Central Committee's decisions, nor must anyone be allowed to spread among the masses any views contrary to the party's line, principles, policies, and decisions. . . .

4. *Uphold party spirit and root out factionalism.* . . . Organizing secret groups within the party is the crime of splitting and subverting the party. . . . Although there are now no overt factions within the party, some cadres and party members . . . still harbor factionalism and are even still carrying out factional activities. . . . The "specter" of factionalism is still there, and factionalists often resist implementation of the party's principles and policies and higher level decisions. . . . A Communist must play an exemplary role among the masses, be the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts. . . .

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5. *Speak the truth and match words with deeds.* . . . A Communist must be faithful and candid and never hide his own mistakes and his own thinking and views from the party organization. . . .

6. *Promote inner-party democracy and take a correct attitude toward dissenting views.* . . . Say all you know and say it without reserve. Those who made wrong remarks or wrote erroneous articles owing to their wrong understanding should not be regarded as having violated party discipline, and disciplinary actions should not be taken against them as long as they do not oppose the party's basic political stand, intrigue and conspire, carry out factionalist and splittist activities among the masses, spread fallacies that run counter to the party line, or betray the secrets of the party and the state. It is necessary to strictly uphold the principle of "three nots"—not seizing on others' faults, not putting labels on people, and not using the big stick (practices that characterized the Mao era). . . . To oppose the opinion of a certain comrade is not the same as opposing the comrade himself. . . .

7. *Protect the rights of party members against any encroachment.* . . . Party members have the right . . . at party meetings to criticize any party organization or any individual. . . . Party organizations should welcome criticism and suggestions from the masses of party members. . . . Party members have the right to present—at party meetings or to higher organizations up to the Central Committee—their statements, appeals, accusations, and defense regarding the party organizations' manner of handling them or other persons. . . . Retaliation against the appealing party and the accusers is not allowed. . . .

8. *Elections should fully embody the electors' wishes.* . . . The number of candidates shall be greater than the number of delegates to be elected. . . . All elections shall be held by secret ballot. . . .

9. *Struggle against erroneous tendencies, bad people, and bad actions.* . . . If Communist Party members assume a liberal attitude of being worldly and playing safe toward erroneous tendencies, bad people, and bad actions and avoid them instead of stopping, contesting, or denouncing them, then they have shirked their fighting responsibility and have demonstrated a lack of party spirit. . . .

10. *Treat correctly comrades who have made mistakes.* . . . In carrying out inner-party struggle our party's fine tradition is to follow the principle of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient." . . . As for those comrades who have erred, we must historically and comprehensively evaluate their contributions, mistakes, rights and wrongs, and must not totally repudiate their contributions just because of a mistake; nor should we continue to quibble over old problems and mistakes that have already been investigated and corrected. . . . It is impermissible to engage in ruthless struggle or to deal merciless blows. . . . The so-called drag out and struggle against is strictly forbidden, as is physical humiliation and persecution and inducing and coercing a person to make a confession. . . .

11. *Accept supervision by the party and the masses—no one is allowed to seek privileges.* . . . Leading cadres at all levels are public servants. . . . Although it is necessary to provide leaders with certain rational conveniences and ensure their security according to the necessity of work, violating the system to seek special privileges is by no means permissible. . . . Everyone stands equal before party discipline and state laws. . . . Leading personnel are prohibited . . . from using their position and power to seek preference for their family or relatives in such matters as enrollment in schools, transferring from one school to another, promotions, employment, and going abroad. . . .

12. *Study hard and strive to be both Red and Expert.* . . . "Red" means possession of a firm, correct political orientation and the upholding of the four fundamental principles. "Expert" means to learn and master a professional understanding of modernization and to become a professional and good at one's work. To become Expert does not necessarily mean one has become Red, but to become Red one must be Expert. . . . To be content with exercising vague leadership in general terms, to be satisfied with being laymen indefinitely, to be ignorant and incompetent, to act in contradiction to objective laws or to give arbitrary and impracticable direction will undoubtedly seriously harm modernization. Persons who act like this should be removed from leading posts if they cannot correct themselves through criticism and education.

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Extracts from *The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party* (adopted by the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, September 1982):

#### **Duties of Party Members**

**Article 3.** Party members must fulfill the following duties:

- (1) To conscientiously study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, essential knowledge concerning the party, and the party's line, principles, policies, and decisions; and acquire general, scientific, and professional knowledge.
- (2) To adhere to the principle that the interests of the party and the people stand above everything, subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the party and the people, be the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, work selflessly for the public interest, and absolutely never use public office for personal gain or benefit themselves at the expense of the public.
- (3) To execute the party's decisions perseveringly, accept any job and fulfill actively any task assigned them by the party, conscientiously observe party discipline and the laws of the state, rigorously guard party and state secrets and staunchly defend the interests of the party and the state.
- (4) To uphold the party's solidarity and unity, to firmly oppose factionalism and all factional organizations and small-group activities, and to oppose double-dealing and scheming of any kind.
- (5) To be loyal and honest with the party, to match words with deeds and not to conceal their political views or distort facts; to earnestly practice criticism and self-criticism, to be bold in exposing and correcting shortcomings and mistakes in work, backing good people and good deeds and fighting against bad people and bad deeds.
- (6) To maintain close ties with the masses, propagate the party's views among them, consult with them when problems arise, listen to their views and demands with an open mind and keep the party informed of these in good time, help them raise their political consciousness, and defend their legitimate rights and interests.

(7) To play an exemplary vanguard role in production and other work, study and social activities, take the lead in maintaining public order, promote new socialist ways and customs, and advocate Communist ethics.

(8) As required by the defense of the motherland and the interests of the people, to step forward and fight bravely in times of difficulty and danger, fearing neither hardship nor death. . . .

#### **Duties of Party Cadres**

**Article 35.** Leading party cadres at all levels must perform in an exemplary way their duties as party members prescribed in Article 3 of this Constitution and must meet the following basic requirements:

- (1) Have a fair grasp of the theories of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and the policies based on them, and be able to adhere to the socialist road, fight against the hostile forces disrupting socialism, and combat all erroneous tendencies inside and outside the party.
- (2) In their work as leaders, conduct earnest investigations and study, persistently proceed from reality, and properly carry out the line, principles, and policies of the party.
- (3) Be fervently dedicated to the revolutionary cause and imbued with a strong sense of political responsibility, and be qualified for their leading posts in organizational ability, general education, and vocational knowledge.
- (4) Have a democratic workstyle, maintain close ties with the masses, correctly implement the party's mass line, conscientiously accept criticism and supervision by the party and the masses, and combat bureaucratism.
- (5) Exercise their functions and powers in the proper way, observe and uphold the rules and regulations of the party and the state, and combat all acts of abusing power and seeking personal gain.

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(6) Be good at uniting and working with a large number of comrades, including those who hold differing opinions, while upholding the party's principles. . . .

### **Party Discipline**

**Article 38.** A Communist Party member must conscientiously act within the bounds of party discipline.

Party organizations shall criticize, educate, or take disciplinary measures against members who violate party discipline. . . .

Party members who violate the law and administrative discipline shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action or legal action instituted by administrative or judicial organs. Those who have seriously violated criminal law shall be expelled from the party.

**Article 39.** There are five measures of party discipline: warning, serious warning, removal from party posts and proposals for removal from nonparty posts to the organizations concerned, placing on probation within the party, and expulsion from the party. . . .

### **Disciplinary Procedures**

**Article 40.** Any disciplinary measure against a party member must be discussed and decided on at a general membership meeting of the party branch concerned, and reported to the primary party committee concerned for approval. If the case is relatively important or complicated, or involves the expulsion of a member, it shall be reported, on the merit of that case, to a party commission for discipline inspection at or above the county level for examination and approval. Under special circumstances, a party committee or a commission for discipline inspection at or above the county level has the authority to decide directly on disciplinary measures against a party member.

Any decision to remove a member or alternate member of the Central Committee or a local committee at any level from posts within the party, to place such a person on probation within the party or to expel him from the party must be taken by a two-thirds majority vote at a plenary meeting of the party committee to which he belongs. Such a disciplinary measure against a member or alternate member of a local party committee is subject to approval by the higher party committees.

Members and alternate members of the Central Committee who have seriously violated criminal law shall be expelled from the party on decision by the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee; members and alternate members of local party committees who have seriously violated criminal law shall be expelled from the party on decisions by the standing committees of the party committees at the corresponding levels.

**Article 41.** When a party organization decides on a disciplinary measure against a party member, it should investigate and verify the facts in an objective way. The party member in question must be informed of the decision to be made and of the facts on which it is based. He must be given a chance to account for himself and speak in his own defense. If the member does not accept the decision, he can appeal, and the party organization concerned must promptly deal with or forward his appeal, and must not withhold or suppress it. Those who cling to erroneous views and unjustifiable demands shall be educated by criticism. . . .

### **Discipline Inspection Organization**

**Article 43.** The party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection functions under the leadership of the Central Committee of the party. Local commissions for discipline inspection at all levels function under the dual leadership of the party committees at the corresponding levels and the next higher commissions for discipline inspection.

. . . The question of whether a primary party committee should set up a commission for discipline inspection or simply appoint a discipline inspection commissioner shall be determined by the next higher party organization in the light of specific circumstances. . . .

The party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection shall, when its work so requires, accredit discipline inspection groups or commissioners to party or state organs at the central level. . . .

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**Article 44.** The main tasks of the central and local commissions for discipline inspection are as follows: to uphold the Constitution and the other important rules and regulations of the party, to assist the respective party committees in rectifying party style, and to check up on the implementation of the line, principles, policies, and decisions of the party.

The central and local commissions for discipline inspection shall carry out constant education among party members on their duty to observe party discipline; they shall adopt decisions for the upholding of party discipline, examine and deal with relatively important or complicated cases of violation of the Constitution and discipline of the party or laws and decrees of the state by party organizations or party members; decide on or cancel disciplinary measures against party member involved in such cases; and deal with complaints and appeals made by party members.

The central and local commissions for discipline inspection should report to the party committees at the corresponding levels on the results of their handling of cases of special importance or complexity, as well as on the problems encountered. Local commissions for discipline inspection should also present such reports to the higher commissions.

If the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection discovers any violation of party discipline by a member of the Central Committee, it may report such an offense to the Central Committee, and the Central Committee must deal with the case promptly.

**Article 45.** Higher commissions for discipline inspection have the power to check up on the work of the lower commissions and to approve or modify their decisions on any case. If decisions so modified have already been ratified by the party committees at the corresponding level, the modification must be approved by the next higher party committee.

If a local commission for discipline inspection does not agree with a decision made by the party committee at the corresponding level in dealing with a case, it may request the commission at the next higher level to reexamine the case; if a local commission discovers cases of violation of party discipline or the laws and decrees of the state by the party committee at the corresponding level or by its members, and if that party committee fails to deal with them properly or at all, the local commission has the right to appeal to the higher commissions for assistance in dealing with such cases.



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