




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# Indonesia: Profile of the Next Generation of Military Leaders

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A Research Paper

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September 1983

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# **Indonesia: Profile of the Next Generation of Military Leaders**

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**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by [redacted]  
Office of East Asian Analysis. [redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asian Division, OEA,  
[redacted]

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**Indonesia:  
Profile of the Next Generation  
of Military Leaders**

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**Overview**

*Information available  
as of 1 September 1983  
was used in this report.*

The officers who will lead the Indonesian military by the late 1980s are more insular and probably more authoritarian than is the current military leadership. At the same time they are decidedly less inclined toward a pervasive military role in the economy and civilian bureaucracy than their seniors. Termed the Magelang Generation, these rising officers were the initial graduates in the early 1960s of the Indonesian military academy at Magelang, Central Java. US military observers consider them better trained and more professional than their predecessors, but with less exposure to foreign influences than those who have led the Indonesian military since independence in 1949.

The transition to the new generation of officers has begun in earnest. Since December 1982, some 118 senior officers have retired and been replaced by "Bridge Generation" officers—a group of about 40 officers who were commissioned during the 1950s prior to the opening of the Magelang Academy and who will command until the late 1980s—and their Magelang Generation subordinates.

Like the older generation officers, the Magelang officers give top priority to maintaining political stability and favor the military's retaining control of the government, but without the current extensive involvement in nonmilitary affairs.

Some of the Magelang officers privately express resentment of the older leadership because of corruption, lethargy, and delay of the promotion of younger officers. Nonetheless, institutional loyalties, deference to authority, and concern over career prospects have kept the new generation of officers from challenging established policy.

Factionalism, based on such distinctions as education, religion, and intra-service rivalries, exists among the new-generation officer corps. However, we believe that the multiplicity of differences is unlikely to disrupt the cohesion of the officer corps given the strength of institutional loyalty and lack of single focus.

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Although we believe the Magelang officers would continue to value the US strategic presence in Southeast Asia as a counterweight to China and the Soviet Union, they will probably remain opposed to formal security ties with the United States. In our judgment, they share the prevailing view in Jakarta that Indonesia should play a greater role in international and regional forums and maintain a nonaligned attitude that distinguishes Indonesian interests from those of the United States. Barring major new developments in global power relationships, we expect no radical departures from the Soeharto government's foreign policy by the new-generation leadership.

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## Indonesia: Profile of the Next Generation of Military Leaders <sup>1</sup> [ ]

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### The Winds of Change

The current military leadership, the "Generation of '45," is beginning to retire, after some 35 years of service.<sup>2</sup> Since late 1982, the senior military hierarchy has sharply stepped up the pace of phasing the new-generation officers at the rank of colonel and above into more responsible assignments as the older officers retire. These rising younger officers, who were commissioned in the postrevolutionary era, come from two groups—the Bridge Generation and the Magelang Generation. [ ]

It is these officers who will increasingly influence and implement government policies by the late 1980s. They also—particularly those from the Magelang Generation—are the officers with whom US and other foreign officials will be dealing on economic and political matters as well as military-security affairs because of the unique role that President Soeharto has mandated for the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). Embodied in the concept of *dwi fungsi* (dual function), ABRI is considered an integral part of Indonesia's political, economic, and social life in addition to its military role. As such, ABRI is the preeminent national institution. [ ]

ABRI personnel are assigned as cabinet ministers, ambassadors, parliamentarians, corporation executives, mayors, and even university rectors. Although management of the economy is left largely to civilian technocrats, military officers head such major public entities as the state oil company (PERTAMINA), the State Logistics Bureau (BULOG), and the state tin company. The military provides manpower and managerial personnel to a wide range of government enterprises and institutions including agricultural estates

and even labor unions.<sup>3</sup> Military officers currently hold some two-thirds of the 27 governorships, and for more than a decade ABRI officers on assignment have exercised a major role within GOLKAR, the government-sponsored political organization. In the cabinet reshuffling following his reelection in March 1983 to a fourth five-year term, Soeharto appointed active or retired military officers to 15 of the 37 positions in his cabinet. [ ]

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### The Bridge Generation

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As the more senior of the two officer groups, the Bridge Generation consists of some 40 officers who were commissioned during the early-to-middle 1950s and currently range in rank from colonel to full general. As the group's name implies, it spans the gap in the officer ranks between the Generation of '45 and the initial graduates of the Indonesian military academy. Most of the Army Bridge Generation received some domestic training at the Jogjakarta Military Academy in the late 1940s or at two other military schools in the 1950s. Many officers also attended the Dutch military academy in the Netherlands in the early 1950s. These officers—the younger of whom are about 50 years old—will provide much of the military leadership over the next three to five years until they are scheduled to retire at age 55. [ ]

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Although Bridge Generation officers lag their seniors by only a few years and many of them fought as youths in the revolution, most of their superiors generally consider them as lacking the education, political commitment, and experience for top-level positions, according to comments made to US military observers. Thus, until quite recently the leadership has moved slowly in naming Bridge officers, to senior

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<sup>1</sup> In the preparation of this paper, considerable use was made of personal interviews conducted with US defense attaches and training officers who have served in Indonesia, as well as disseminated defense attaché reporting. [ ]

<sup>2</sup> The "Generation of '45" is a term used by the officers themselves as well as foreign observers. They were the youths and junior officers who emerged as commanding officers during the 1945-49 revolution against the Dutch. That experience and their subsequent pervasive involvement in running the nation have shaped their attitudes and in turn Indonesia's policies at home and abroad. [ ]

<sup>3</sup> In addition, the military owns a large number of enterprises, ranging from timbering to manufacturing plants. The profits from these operations provide a substantial share of ABRI's operational funding requirements. [ ] Officers are expected to utilize these funds to provide for their troops. Many officers also benefit personally from these business activities to supplement their otherwise meager salaries. [ ]

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*The Generation of '45*

*At the time of the revolution against the Dutch, the military consisted of a poorly equipped and poorly trained people's revolutionary army. The few professional officers and enlisted personnel had gained some experience with the Dutch colonial and the Japanese occupation forces as had some paramilitary youth organizations. Under President Sukarno the armed forces in the mid-1950s began a decade of sharp expansion and reorganization as they were called on to meet rebellions in the outer islands and the confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore. The abortive Communist coup of 1965 marked a halt to the military's expansion as the new regime under President Soeharto turned government priorities to economic development. Soeharto redirected the military's primary focus from external security to maintaining internal political stability, a focus that continues at present.* [redacted]

*The successful revolutionary campaign by the officers of the Generation of '45 imbued them with an enduring self-perception as idealists and popular-based freedom fighters. They consider themselves responsible not only for independence and for transforming the disparate revolutionary forces into a disciplined military force but, more important, for shepherding the nation through several political crises since then. They see no reasonable alternative to the military's continued stewardship of the nation for the indefinite*

*future because of their distrust of civilian institutions, such as political parties, which they believe undercut their efforts during the revolution and contributed to the turmoil of the Sukarno era. The older generals worry that their less politically experienced subordinates might retreat to the barracks leaving the government in civilian hands, according to US military observers. They also are concerned about stepping down from their financially lucrative positions when they retire, according to their conversations with US military officers.* [redacted]

*Predominantly Javanese, officers from the Generation of '45 are contemporaries of President Soeharto who is himself a retired general. Close personal loyalties developed during their early careers persist as a major factor and consideration in appointments to senior positions in the military and the government. Personal trust was the primary consideration in military reassignments in the late 1950s and early 1960s and during the chaos following the 1965 coup attempt when the military was factionalized and infiltrated with Communist sympathizers. More recently, Soeharto's surprise selection in February 1983 of Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumah for vice president was based to some degree on personal trust, [redacted] He was the local Jakarta commander who sent troops to back Soeharto at the time of the 1965 coup attempt.* [redacted]

posts. An exception is General Murdani, the most prominent and influential Bridge officer, according to Embassy reporting, who was appointed Commander in Chief of ABRI last March by Soeharto (see appendix). [redacted]

According to Embassy and defense attache reports, Murdani apparently owes his rapid advancement to close personal ties to Soeharto. In conversations with US officials, Murdani has acknowledged that several more senior Bridge officers resent him because of his promotion over them and because his career has been

in the intelligence field with little experience commanding troops.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, Murdani's new position, plus his responsibilities in domestic security,

<sup>4</sup> In addition to command of ABRI, Murdani retains control of both the security forces and most of the intelligence apparatus. According to people who have dealt with him, Murdani is forceful and direct. Among other actions he has taken in his new position, Murdani authorized the recent crackdown on criminals that included executing suspects by special military squads. [redacted]

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**The Indonesian Armed Forces at a Glance**

**Army**      *Manpower strength of 210,000. Predominantly infantry, its primary focus is maintaining internal security. The Army has undertaken a program to upgrade its capabilities, but continues to suffer serious deficiencies in logistics, training, and manpower.* [redacted]

**Navy**      *Manpower strength of 42,000 including about 10,000 Marines. According to the US defense attache, naval personnel are competent seamen, but inadequate technical expertise limits the service's combat effectiveness. The Navy suffers in meeting its needs because the Army dominates the defense structure and garners the lion's share of the budget. Among other things, the Navy is unable to recruit its quota of technically qualified Magelang Academy officers because of low pay.* [redacted]

**Air Force**      *Manpower strength of 29,000. Like the Navy, it suffers from the Army's predominant role. Foreign military observers rate the service's transport capabilities as good, but note that severe pilot, supply, and maintenance deficiencies limit overall capabilities, particularly with modern aircraft.* [redacted]

**National Police**      *Manpower strength of 120,000 to 150,000. Responsible to the Department of Defense and Security for maintaining public order and security. The police force is underfunded and suffers from lack of equipment and training, and it is widely regarded as ineffective.* [redacted]

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have, for now, made him a key figure in the presidential succession process. According to the Embassy, it may even allow for the remote possibility of Murdani to succeed Soeharto. [redacted]

**The Magelang Generation**

Most officers commissioned since 1960 are graduates of the national military academy at Magelang, Central Java. The first five graduating classes, those who graduated between 1960 and 1965, will form the pool from which the senior military leaders of the late 1980s will be selected. [redacted]

Magelang Generation officers—sometimes also referred to as the New Generation—are markedly different from their predecessors, according to US military observers. Most are from urban, middle class backgrounds.<sup>5</sup> As a group, they are better educated militarily and more professional than their superiors because of progression through a more selective and established schooling and career pattern. Academy entrance qualifications are strict by Indonesian educational standards and require a high school degree and a series of entrance examinations. [redacted]

Since graduation in the early 1960s, the Magelang officers have been closely monitored as they progressed through assignments in various line, administrative, staff, and intelligence positions. Those advancing to the rank of major and above are carefully screened for political attitudes, loyalties, and even social deportment and marital considerations. Like the older officers, most of them are from Java and consequently have generally had a better chance for promotion than other ethnic groups. Progression through increasingly more selective advanced service training, such as the Army Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) and the Combined Armed Forces Staff School (SESKOGAB), is for the most part a requisite to advancement beyond major or lieutenant colonel. [redacted]

<sup>5</sup> Few sons of the current elite choose a military career, preferring instead education at more prestigious universities at home and abroad and civilian professions. Nonetheless, the military services continue to attract sufficient qualified officer candidates. Most are nominal Muslims rather than orthodox, reflecting the government's distrust of religious fundamentalists. Defense attache reporting suggests that academy applicants are probably screened on this factor [redacted]

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Emphasis at these schools is on political indoctrination in the military's dual-function role. A US officer who recently attended SESKOAD reports that one-third of the 11-month curriculum is devoted to issues such as the state ideology, the Constitution, the values of the Generation of '45, and economic development, while applied military subjects account for only about one-fourth of the program. [REDACTED]

Combat experience is another factor figuring heavily in the advancement of Magelang officers, according to defense attache reporting. Although exposure is not as extensive as that of the Generation of '45, some senior Magelang officers had field experience in a number of combat situations, including the confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore in 1963-66 and more recently in East Timor. The military leadership took advantage of the Timor campaign to rotate as many young officers as possible through combat tours.<sup>6</sup> Although such experience is not mandatory for advancement, exceptional service in East Timor has contributed to some officers' being promoted ahead of schedule. Magelang officers have also served in international deployments such as the armistice force in Vietnam, the UN detachment to the Middle East, and in Zaire. [REDACTED]

Similarly, selection for advanced training at SESKOAD favors combat and field experience over administrative and technical branches. According to a US military observer, as a tacit policy, officers with combat experience in East Timor—who account for an estimated 50 percent of recent classes—are exempted from the entrance examination. According to defense attache reports, the Army decided in 1980 to officially restrict SESKOAD to officers with experience in field operations. Advanced training for officers with an administrative or technical background takes place in a new sister program at the Army Administration Staff School (SESMINAD), which only recently has begun to turn out its first graduates. It is too early to predict how these graduates will fare

<sup>6</sup> ABRI did not distinguish itself during the initial Timor campaign and the military realized it had serious shortcomings in equipment, in logistic support, and training, according to defense attache reports. Since then, the insurgency in East Timor has declined to sporadic, low-level guerrilla fighting. Although the resistance and government forces began informal talks last spring on ceasing hostilities, these recently collapsed. [REDACTED]

in future promotions compared with their colleagues in field units. At present, officers in the administrative track, for example, are unlikely to advance beyond the rank of major or lieutenant colonel, according to defense attache reports. On the other hand, combat and field unit officers will have limited administrative experience—a potential problem because of the military's expansive nonmilitary functions. [REDACTED]

#### Magelang Generation Attitudes

According to US military and academic observers, Magelang Generation officers consider themselves better qualified and better trained professionals than the Generation of '45, some of whom they believe gained leadership by opportunity of the revolution rather than proven ability or training. Magelang officers have privately complained that many of the older generation officers are corrupt, lethargic, do not have the military's best interests at heart, and have delayed promotion of younger officers. Nevertheless, the younger officers' institutional loyalties, deference to authority, allegiances to superiors rather than to peers, and their own bright career prospects apparently keep them from challenging established policy, according to US military observers. [REDACTED]

Despite their misgivings about the Generation of '45 as a group, many younger officers have close personal ties to individual senior officers. Superior officers have traditionally cultivated personal loyalty among subordinates with favored treatment in promotions and assignments and with help in meeting personal problems. Former Defense Minister Jusuf, for instance, reportedly personally assigned a number of his favorites as area commanders. General Murdani has similarly advanced his proteges in the intelligence structure in recent years, and now as ABRI commander is assigning loyalists to various sensitive posts, such as the Special Forces Command and the area commands on Java. Although such patron-client relationships are difficult to assess, they do not appear to be a source of serious resentment within the officer corps. [REDACTED]

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**Determining Officer Attitudes**

*Most information the Intelligence Community has been able to gather about the attitudes and views of younger officers is impressionistic, largely because Indonesia in recent years has implemented measures that discourage foreign military contact with its younger officers. According to US military observers, the attitude of many of the officers themselves is the less to do with foreigners the better, and some Indonesian field grade officers have been reprimanded for being too Westernized, according to defense attache reporting. Indonesian security regulations severely restrict such contacts. A law still on the books, although not rigorously enforced, makes it a crime for military officers to associate with foreigners without prior approval. In 1981, the Defense Minister ordered that officers had to be "resocialized" and sent to their respective branch school on returning from overseas training. Overseas training has often been restricted to officers already indoctrinated in national policies and those with senior-level contacts, although more junior grade officers are now receiving foreign training.*

*Officers who graduated from the Magelang Academy during 1960-65 have in particular had limited exposure to US training or personnel and thus lack the broader exposure of the Generation of '45. Post-1965 graduates, however, have had relatively more exposure to the United States through military training programs, and US military training officers believe that such exposure is succeeding in fostering a more positive attitude toward the United States.*

*Some Magelang Generation officers resent the restrictions as being shortsighted and indicating a lack of confidence by superiors and prefer closer contact with foreigners, particularly their US counterparts. One younger officer admitted that the restrictions, combined with the concentration on domestic security, contribute to younger officers becoming nationalistic, somewhat isolationist, and uninformed about external affairs. The majority, however, apparently agree with the rationale of limiting foreign influence and even those officers opposed are unwilling to defy the system.*

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The Magelang Generation subscribes to a number of attitudes and perceptions common throughout the Indonesian officer corps, according to defense attache reporting. Like the older officers, the younger officers place overriding priority on the maintenance of political stability. Because they regard civilian political institutions as inept, they see no alternative to continued military control, at least for the time being. The younger officers consider the technocrats less disciplined than themselves and more inclined toward self-interest, thus reinforcing the need for military oversight of domestic and foreign affairs. The Magelang officers also share their superiors' strong aversion to Communism and suspicions of the ethnic Chinese community and Muslim fundamentalists.

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But, at the same time, Magelang officers are more skeptical of the military's dual-function role despite greater attention to indoctrination. The results of an attitudinal survey of Magelang graduates conducted by the Defense Ministry in the early 1970s so startled senior authorities that they sharply increased programs to indoctrinate the younger officers in the military's dual-function role. However, many younger officers consider themselves inadequately trained for their nonmilitary functions, according to defense attache reporting. Some have expressed concern that civilian responsibilities detract from effective performance of their military duties. Some field grade officers have complained that their own ranks have been "bled dry" of qualified personnel to staff other government sectors. Although conceding that the military must remain in charge for now, a number of field grade officers have said they would like to curtail assignment of military personnel to the civilian bureaucracy.

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Factionalism is present among younger officers, according to academic and US military observers. It is based on distinctions such as academy graduates versus nonacademy officers, combat versus support units, staff versus command, Muslim versus Christian. However, the multiplicity of these differences apparently keeps any single issue or faction from predominating, and several foreign observers have concluded that the differences are unlikely to disrupt military cohesion.

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Like the older officers, the Magelang Generation officers regard the United States as the ultimate guarantor of Indonesian security against external threats, although they remain opposed to any formal security ties. Restrictions on foreign contacts, however, appear to be fostering a division in officer corps' perceptions of the United States that parallels the generation gap, according to US military observers. Few pre-1966 Magelang graduates have received advanced training in the United States, but of those who have, most are favorably impressed with the United States. They consider the United States as at least a qualified role model for the Indonesian military and as a preferred source of training, technology, and equipment. US military observers report that US training has in most cases reinforced this attitude but note that there are some younger officers who regard Indonesia as overly dependent on the United States and who are concerned about the reliability of the US regional commitment in the aftermath of Vietnam.

#### The Pace of Transition

The military leadership's long-promised turnover of authority to the post-1945 generation of officers has begun in earnest. Since late 1982, some 118 senior ABRI officers have retired and been replaced with Bridge and Magelang officers. In addition to General Murdani, Bridge Generation officers now hold key command positions that include three of the four service chiefs of staff and three of the four territorial commands. Magelang officers now command all of the Army's battalions and brigades, a number of special and support units, and 13 of the 16 area commands. General Murdani and the newly appointed Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Rudini, are both intent on advancing younger officers, and, according to defense attache reports, they plan additional appointments.

President Soeharto has tried to make certain the transition will proceed smoothly and, in particular, to assure that there will be no problems from disgruntled senior officers who have been retired. In March 1983, parliament split the combined position of Defense Minister/Armed Forces Commander. The new Defense Ministry, headed by General Poniman, a Generation of '45 officer, is being staffed with retired senior officers while Bridge and Magelang Generation officers continue to fill the active-duty assignments in the

command structure. Thus, retired loyalists from the Generation of '45 will retain major influence over policymaking via the Defense Ministry. Soeharto's flexibility in managing the transition was helped by legislation enacted in 1982, which enables him to extend selected senior officers on active duty past the mandatory retirement age of 55 on the basis of necessary skills and experience.

#### Looking Ahead

We believe the chances of a sharp shift in government policies in the next few years as a result of the generational transition are minimal. The officer corps' commitment to maintaining political stability, its sense of discipline, and its general consensus on the regime's goals point to the continuation of current domestic and foreign policies. Differences in attitude that do exist are manageable by senior officers, in our judgment. For their part, younger officers are reluctant to get out in front of their superiors on policy matters and are unlikely to take actions that would jeopardize their career advancement.

By the late 1980s, however, as Magelang Generation officers assume greater authority in the military and in the government, they could begin steering new policy directions. The Magelang Generation's disinclination toward its nonmilitary responsibilities, for example, could prompt relinquishing some duties back to civilians.

We believe such a personnel cutback would most likely result in a gradual reduction of active-duty officers serving at lower levels in the bureaucracy, while control of the upper levels is maintained primarily with retired officers.

Several foreign academic observers have speculated that the Magelang Generation may be more authoritarian than its predecessors in dealing with the civilian sector. Lacking the close contact with the populace and political experience of the Generation of '45

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
**1982-83 Generation Breakdown for 70 Senior ABRI Positions**

Percent


1982

1983

Generation of '45-56  
Magelang Generation-5  
Bridge Generation-39



Bridge Generation-56  
Magelang Generation-21  
Generation of '45-23



Source: DIA

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and trained in a system of strict military discipline, they may be less tolerant of the views of domestic critics and political parties.

States in particular. Nonalignment, in this case, would become more of a policy in practice than it has been under the Soeharto regime.

In our judgment, rising Magelang leaders share the prevailing view in Jakarta that Indonesia—because of size and strategic location—should, by right, exert a greater leadership role in regional and international forums. Their security interests would most likely continue to focus on Southeast Asian rather than broader concerns, however. Thus, we believe they would continue to promote closer cooperation with their Association of Southeast Asian Nations counterparts in military and security affairs, building on the base that has been established in recent years.

It is not yet clear what impact, if any, the advancement of Magelang officers to top-level posts would have on foreign relations. There is little evidence to suggest they would make any radical departures from the foreign policy of the Soeharto regime. Their strong anti-Communist sentiment suggests they would maintain some distance from both China and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, their limited understanding of how the rest of the world operates, their suspicion of foreigners, and their strong nationalism could make them more insular and formal than their predecessors in dealing with the West, and the United

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US bilateral relations with Indonesia may continue to be prone to friction with the Magelang Generation in power. Their strong nationalism leads us to believe that they are apt to react strongly to perceived slights over matters such as Indonesia not being accorded due deference in bilateral dealings. Frictions could arise from their being more assertive in promoting Indonesian interests in both bilateral and international financial and economic affairs; for example, in negotiations over commodity exports, access to developed-country markets, foreign investment, and economic aid. [REDACTED]

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Although they will probably continue to value the US strategic presence in Southeast Asia as a counterweight to the USSR and China, the Magelang Generation officers may take a stronger nonaligned attitude in seeking to exert Indonesia's regional role. In our judgment, they are almost certain to remain opposed to any formal security ties to the United States. At the same time, their appreciation of the potential benefits of foreign technology and assistance in helping to meet ABRI's needs—particularly given the prospect of leaner defense budgets in the remainder of the decade—could induce the Magelang leadership to accept closer, but still limited, contact. Reinforcing this inclination would be their preference for US equipment, although we believe that, like the current military leadership, the Magelang officers would be reluctant to become overly dependent on any single foreign source of supply. [REDACTED]

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## Appendix

### Selected Biographies of Military Leaders

**Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani**

The most prominent and powerful Bridge Generation officer, he is the first to hold the position of ABRI Commander in Chief. His close personal ties to President Soeharto make him one of the few individuals in the government with direct presidential access. Murdani has received advanced military training in the United States, and during his career he has served in a number of overseas intelligence and diplomatic assignments. As ABRI commander, he reportedly plans to emphasize increased training with current equipment rather than acquisition of advanced weaponry. [REDACTED]

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**Lieutenant General Rudini**

Formerly commander of the elite Strategic Army Reserve, he is the most prominent Bridge Generation officer next to General Murdani. Rudini has long been considered in Army circles as a professional soldier and a fast riser, and, according to defense attache reports, he is liked and respected by younger generation officers. Moved ahead of six senior Bridge Generation officers, his appointment to Army Chief of Staff was given prominent billing within the defense establishment as part of the long-awaited transition in leadership. Rudini has had advanced military training in the United States, and US military observers consider him one of Indonesia's most capable senior officers. [REDACTED]

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**Secret****Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno**

At 47, Sutrisno holds the most important post of any younger generation officer as commander of the politically sensitive Jakarta military region. A 1959 graduate of the Bandung Army Engineer Academy, Sutrisno is generally considered by US military observers as the front-runner of the younger generation. He was formerly a senior aid to President Soeharto, who has taken a personal interest in Sutrisno's career, according to the US Embassy. A self-promoter, Sutrisno claims to be a protege of General Murdani.



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