



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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## CHINA: Military Leadership Changes

*Evidence accumulating since the end of the 12th Party Congress in September indicates that the Army is in the midst of the most extensive reassignment of leaders in more than a decade.*

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Leadership changes disclosed in the public media include the appointment of new commanders in three military regions and the naming of three senior officers as deputy secretaries general of the party's powerful Military Commission. The replacements of the director of the General Political Department, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the entire leadership of the Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Bureau also have been announced.

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Comment: Older and largely conservative senior officers have impeded Beijing's plans for military rejuvenation and reorganization. Deng Xiaoping and his political allies view these elder soldier-politicians as the main opponents of the reformists' program and their succession arrangements. The new changes represent a significant gain for Deng and his political heir, party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, whose ability to lead has been questioned by military critics.

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Changes in command probably will extend to all 11 military regions, resulting in senior staffs that are politically more responsive to Beijing. Three other regional commanders--who were not appointed to the party's Central Committee in September--presumably will be replaced. Further changes, including a new defense minister, are likely to be announced by early next month at the National People's Congress, and Beijing will continue to urge older officers to retire.

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POLAND: More Security Precautions

The government has taken additional measures to ensure its ability to control any strikes or demonstrations today and tomorrow. The US Consul in Krakow says more senior Solidarity activists have been arrested there, and Western newsmen report police in Warsaw and Wroclaw have destroyed an underground Radio Solidarity transmitter and printing equipment. Riot police have increased patrols at key points in Warsaw, Wroclaw, and other cities.

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Comment: Even if the government maintains control today, it will retain its increased security precautions through tomorrow in anticipation of large crowds gathering to commemorate Poland's prewar independence day. The regime officially observed this holiday for the first time in 1981 but has given no sign that it is staging ceremonies this year.

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LEBANON: Vote of Confidence

Prime Minister Wazzan's cabinet cleared a major hurdle yesterday by winning parliamentary approval both for its policy program and for its request for sweeping powers to rule by decree for six months. The vote of 58 to 1 came after several days of acrimonious debate on the request for extraordinary powers. The government agreed to fewer special powers than originally requested in exchange for Assembly support.

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Comment: Wazzan was anxious to have the vote out of the way before the government begins negotiations for the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces. Many deputies were unhappy about the extensive powers requested--originally for a period of eight months and covering areas beyond security--and the consequent reduction of the Assembly's role in some areas. The reluctance of the government and the deputies to appear to be working at cross-purposes on the eve of the withdrawal negotiations encouraged the compromise.

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
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#### CAMEROON: Biya Takes Charge

The US Embassy reports newly inaugurated President Biya has moved swiftly and adroitly to consolidate his position while promising to continue the moderate domestic and foreign policies of former President Ahidjo. He has appointed a tribally balanced cabinet and selected a Muslim northerner with close ties to Ahidjo as his Prime Minister and constitutional successor. Although the US Embassy reports Ahidjo may have lung cancer or heart trouble, he will remain head of the only legal political party, with Biya its vice-chairman.

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Comment: Biya's reputation as an honest, intelligent, and well-educated administrator should help him establish his credibility. Ahidjo probably will remain influential behind the scenes if his health permits. Despite the lack of popular reaction to the change in leadership, Cameroonians will look to the US and France for reassurances and continued support.

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## Special Analysis

### USSR: Possible Controversy Over Defense Spending

*The speech by President Brezhnev on 27 October and the one on 29 October by his close Politburo associate, Konstantin Chernenko, concerning defense policy and relations with Washington have prompted divergent interpretations in the West of their real message.*

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We believe the leadership in recent weeks has made some particularly difficult resource allocation decisions, and that, whatever the specific nature of those decisions, they have left the military dissatisfied--sufficiently so that the political leadership saw a need to meet directly with and reassure the entire military hierarchy. We do not know whether the military has been told that it must trim spending somewhat or whether its requests for additional resources beyond those already planned--probably rationalized on the basis of new US programs--have not been satisfied. The latter case seems much more likely to us than absolute cuts or even a reduction in the approved rate of growth.

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Our assessment that defense resource issues have become controversial is based on the following considerations:

--A party plenum and Supreme Soviet session will take place next week to review economic goals for the third year of the current Five-Year Plan (1981-85). In view of the poor performance during the past two years, it seems quite plausible that a substantial revision of planned targets will be discussed.

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--Those favoring an increased defense effort or an internal reallocation of priorities, and any who seek to trim it, would regard the pre-plenum period as the best opportunity to make their voices heard.

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--The circumstances of the Brezhnev speech are very unusual and suggest military concern. The last conclave of this sort to be announced publicly was in 1972, when US bombing of Haiphong put in question then President Nixon's scheduled visit to Moscow to conclude the SALT I accords. Brezhnev apparently called that meeting to reassure the defense establishment of the wisdom of party policy decisions. Brezhnev's appearance at the most recent gathering would not seem necessary unless there was again significant military concern with policy decisions, most likely in the resource area. [redacted]

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--Broader national security questions may also be at issue. The hopeful emphasis placed by both Brezhnev and Chernenko on relations with Beijing, for example, may be a prelude to discussion with China of force levels along the border. Circumstantial evidence, such as a recent press article responding to unnamed critics of Brezhnev's announced policy of non-first-use of nuclear weapons, indicates that elements of the regime's national security policy also may have come under question. [redacted]

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--The fact that all senior defense officials and all the Politburo members believed to have national security responsibilities appeared with Brezhnev--including both leading contenders for Brezhnev's job--almost certainly was intended to portray the leadership's unanimity on whatever decisions have been taken; again, decisions reassuring to the military would not seem to require this kind of turnout. [redacted]

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--Finally, another highly unusual aspect of the speech was Brezhnev's accent on his own leading position in decisionmaking on military matters, his close contacts with Defense Minister Ustinov and his familiarity with the details about the state of the armed forces, and the party's strong support for the military. [redacted]

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--Brezhnev seems to have been saying to the military--with whom he has curried favor through the 18 years of his rule--that he is aware of their problems but that the Politburo, including the Defense Minister, has had to make unwelcome decisions. [REDACTED]

Despite the show of political unanimity, there are undoubtedly those in the party leadership, as well as in the military hierarchy, who will continue to urge greater resources for defense. One thing, therefore, seems certain--the level of military spending has become a contentious issue and will play a part in succession politics. [REDACTED]

DIA Comment

DIA believes that the above interpretation overemphasizes military discontent with resource allocation decisions. Brezhnev's address was a forceful reaffirmation of the Soviet leadership's strong commitment to military strength. The decision to broadcast the text in both English and Russian is a clear indication the message was intended for both foreign and internal consumption. Brezhnev's remarks combined harsh accusations against the US for seeking "military superiority" with signals of continued determination to support defense. He pledged to military officials that the party leadership would meet "all your needs." He also implied party commitment to continue current rates of defense spending growth--which are estimated at 3 to 4 percent per year--noting "we should tirelessly strengthen the defenses of our country." These themes were echoed by Politburo members Chernenko and Grishin on 29 October and 5 November, respectively. Brezhnev also made several brief references to Soviet economic difficulties, suggesting military leaders must make more efficient use of the resources allocated them. [REDACTED]

In sum, the speech seemed designed to warn the US that Moscow will not accept any basic change in the "correlation of forces" and to reassure military leaders they will get their due. While Brezhnev implied the military should be more cost effective, there is little in this particular speech to indicate the defense budget will be pared. [REDACTED]

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