

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP84T00316R000100260005-5

TOP SECRET

25X1

8 July 1977

Copy ____

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Imagery Analysis Support to National Photographic Interpretation Center

25X1

1. I have just received from John Hicks a memorandum addressed jointly to me and [] requesting that we assist him in augmenting his imagery analyst resources during the September through December period in order to help cope with an anticipated workload peak. I understand that you wish to discuss this issue at the meeting of the DCI Planning Board on 12 July and thought that you should be aware of my views on the subject.

2. There is no question that the Intelligence Directorate is capable of providing assistance to NPIC's exploitation effort this fall, and there is no question that we should commit the necessary resources to the task if John's proposal constitutes the most effective approach to meeting national intelligence requirements. Frankly, I doubt that it is and recommend that three questions be examined before we make such a commitment.

3. First, can acceptable adjustments to the national exploitation requirements be made that would substantially reduce the workload burden on NPIC this fall? If my understanding of the situation, outlined below, is correct, then I think the answer is yes.

4. The projected NPIC workload problem is caused by the fact that all

25X1
25X1

NRO review(s) completed.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP84T00316R000100260005-5

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Imagery Analysis Support to NPIC

second phase exploitation requirements would create any significant intelligence loss, and it certainly would smooth out the peaks and valleys in NPIC's workload and make more efficient use of their available resources.

6. A second, more general, aspect of the national exploitation requirements levied on NPIC that should be examined is the number and type of targets, that require readouts and the periodicity of these readouts. These requirements have been previously modified in response to similar NPIC exploitation problems. Another review of the target readout requirements seems to be in order now that we have gained some experience. What concerns me most is that John's present predicament may not be unique. Although the present resource bind may be exacerbated by some special circumstances, there undoubtedly will be future situations when NPIC

7. A second major question that I think should be raised is whether a shifting of some of the workload within NPIC exploitation groups this fall is a feasible way of alleviating the resource problem. John's request is for people to assist the Imagery Exploitation Group (IEG). My understanding is that both Search functions are performed by both groups as well as individual target readouts.

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

SUBJECT: Imagery Analysis Support to NPIC

25X1

[REDACTED]

8. A third question to be considered is one of costs. I don't think that we can afford to make more than a token contribution to NPIC without a substantial impact on important DDI production programs. John has identified [REDACTED] specific specialty areas for which he requires help dealing with Soviet, Chinese, and Third World military forces and programs. For most of these specialties there is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Moving many of them for any duration would seriously reduce their support to OWI and OSR at an inopportune time. OIA is already stretched very thin and has had difficulty in supporting intelligence production programs. In 1976, for example, OIA was unable to provide [REDACTED] requested support to DDI components.

9. A final issue that you might consider in thinking about this problem is the connection between the present situation and the [REDACTED] positions which DIA failed to provide to NPIC as its share [REDACTED]. The relationship between the two may well be indirect, but if John had gotten the [REDACTED] positions on schedule it is unlikely that he would have to be seeking assistance at this point. Somehow it just doesn't seem quite right for CIA to bear the brunt of DIA's failure to meet its obligations.

Sayre Stevens
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Distribution:

Copy 1 - DDCI
2 - DDI
3 - OIA

TOP SECRET

25X1