



Directorate of  
Intelligence

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# USSR Monthly Review



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April 1983

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SOV UR 83-005X  
April 1983

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**USSR Monthly Review**



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# USSR Monthly Review

25X1

**April 1983**

The *USSR Monthly Review* is published by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcome. They may be directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the table of contents

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**The KGB's Role in "Active Measures"**

[Redacted]

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Moscow regards "active measures" as a useful, regular supplement to its conventional diplomacy. The KGB's special role in active measures is to plan and carry out covert activities that require the use of trained intelligence personnel. Covert press placements, forgeries, and influence agents are staple items in the KGB's arsenal. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**The KGB Suppression of Dissent**

[Redacted]

19

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During the Brezhnev years dissent became more open and Soviet policy toward suppressing it became more sensitive to potential foreign policy implications. The KGB, nonetheless, proved equal to this new challenge. By developing a more sophisticated approach toward the dissident community, the KGB was able to quickly and efficiently subdue the human rights movement. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Soviet Strategy Toward Japan:**

27

**The Economic-Political Connection**

[Redacted]

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The Soviet Union once again is using a "carrot and stick" approach to improve relations with Japan and to weaken Tokyo's ties to Washington. The "carrots" include offers of reliable export markets for Japanese goods and access to Siberian resources. Prospects for successfully playing these economic cards are dimmed, however, by a growing Soviet trade deficit with Japan, Moscow's concern over its hard currency position, and diminished Japanese interest in Siberian minerals and fuels. [Redacted]

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**Moscow and Southern Africa: What Next?**

[Redacted]

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Regional instability and heightened black African security concerns will enable Moscow to maintain—and possibly expand—its role in southern Africa. Moscow will pursue a new opportunity in Zimbabwe, where security tensions have prompted Prime Minister Mugabe to improve bilateral ties and purchase Soviet arms. The USSR's key clients, Angola and Mozambique, have been exploring the possibility of accommodation with Pretoria and closer ties with the West; nonetheless, Soviet influence—based largely on the provision of military assistance—will be sustained by the growing insurgency problem. In Mozambique, where the guerrilla threat is especially serious, Moscow may have to consider a greater involvement to preserve the pro-Soviet regime.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters in 1982**

[Redacted]

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Expanded deployments to distant areas of the Pacific Ocean and the waters off West Africa contributed to a 3-percent increase in Soviet naval presence overseas in 1982, bringing ship-days close to the record total of 1980. The Soviets used their naval ships and aircraft to respond to regional tensions such as the Syrian crisis and to hostilities in parts of Africa but made few advances in improving their naval facilities overseas.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Expansion and Modernization of East German Ground Forces**

[Redacted]

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The East German Army is undertaking a program designed to provide a more balanced combined-arms capability. It is adding more artillery to its motorized rifle regiments and introducing later model artillery and an improved variant of the T-72 tank.

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# The KGB as an Instrument of Soviet Policy

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Perspective 

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Former KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov's elevation to the Soviet Union's top party post came only a month before the 65th anniversary of the intelligence and security service (originally known as the *Cheka*)—a coincidence that served to underscore the increased influence of the KGB as a political institution. Although several factors have contributed to the KGB's rising status, it is the agency's ability to respond to a wide array of national security concerns, both domestic and foreign, that has made it so indispensable to Kremlin policymakers (see "The Role of the KGB in the Soviet System"). 

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Over the years the KGB has played a variety of roles that reflected the prevailing priorities of the Soviet leadership:

- At the outset, the *Cheka* and its successor organizations concentrated on seeking out and destroying the real and imagined enemies of the party at home and opposing anti-Bolshevik organizations abroad.
- The KGB was used by Stalin to quash his political enemies and prevent the coalescence of opposition groups, and by Beriya—in the wake of Stalin's death—to advance his own political position. (As a result, the Soviet leadership became highly sensitive to the use of the KGB for political purposes, keeping subsequent KGB chiefs off the Politburo until Andropov's appointment in 1967.)
- During World War II, the KGB was engaged in preventing large-scale desertions from the army, collecting information on German and Allied intentions and plans, and conducting sabotage operations behind German lines. 

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
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The current leadership, like those of the past, has its own set of priorities that affect KGB operations. In the international arena, for example, the Soviets are trying to encourage conflict between Western Europe and the United States over arms control and East-West economic relations in order to provoke divisions within the alliance. The KGB, working in concert with the Central Committee's International and International Information Departments, has amassed considerable experience in "influence" operations (see "The KGB's Role in 'Active Measures'") and has actively encouraged the European peace movement. The KGB also has tried to identify areas where the Soviet Union could take advantage of differences between the United States and Western Europe over credit policies. KGB resources will likewise be used to advance Soviet policy in other areas, such as the Third World, where political and economic instability or Western vulnerabilities become apparent. [redacted]

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On the domestic front, Soviet economic problems now head the regime's agenda. As a result, KGB reporting on foreign economic subjects has received new impetus, and the collection of scientific and technical intelligence, which has been highly beneficial to the Soviet economy, undoubtedly will continue to be emphasized (see "The Role of the KGB in Technology Acquisition"). [redacted]

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The KGB also has a role in the implementation of one of Andropov's chief initiatives in the economic area—the campaign to eliminate corruption. It is the agency responsible for the prevention and detection of large-scale graft and corruption. Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the KGB's former chairman and the new Minister of Internal Affairs, reportedly has been charged with routing out corruption in the militia (civil police) itself. He has enforced the labor discipline campaign with such zeal, moreover, that he allegedly had to be reprimanded for excessive harassment of Soviet workers. The emphasis on discipline also has extended to areas of KGB responsibility, including a continuation of the crackdown on dissidents that began last year (see "The KGB and Suppression of Dissent"). [redacted]

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Although the discipline and anticorruption campaigns illustrate the utility of the KGB as a policy instrument, they also reveal its limitations. Clearly, "tightening the screws"—a KGB specialty—is no solution to the Soviet economic dilemma and can be truly effective only if followed by economic and structural reform. Success or failure, therefore, will depend not on the KGB but on the readiness and ability of Andropov and company to take on the political risks inherent in such a reform—risks that admittedly would be even greater in the absence of a powerful KGB.

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**KGB Fact Sheet**

**KGB—Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, SSSR** (Committee of State Security, USSR), represented nationally and at the republic and local levels of government throughout the USSR. Since its establishment in 1917, the Soviet state security service has been known as the CHEKA, GPU, OGPU, NKGB, MGB, and KGB. [redacted]

**Functions:** The KGB's responsibilities are analogous to those of such disparate agencies and organizations in the United States as the CIA, NSA, FBI, military counterintelligence services, the Treasury Department and its subordinate law enforcement agencies, including the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, and the Customs Service. [redacted]

**Internal:**

- Ensure internal security and eliminate any threat arising from within the USSR to party control and the system of government.
- Protect the borders of the country.
- Provide physical protection for leaders and important installations of the party and state, and for visiting foreign dignitaries.
- Supervise the development and installation of secure communications systems.

- Recruit foreigners for espionage or as agents-of-influence once they return to their homeland. [redacted]

**External:**

- Seek and transmit early warning information of impending hostilities against the USSR.
- Collect political, economic, scientific, and military intelligence and conduct counterintelligence operations.
- Conduct covert political action operations (active measures) to further Soviet foreign policy and security interests.
- Neutralize any threat to the USSR arising from anti-Soviet emigre and other hostile organizations based abroad.
- Provide security for Soviet citizens and installations abroad.
- Train and monitor the work of friendly security services and exploit their intelligence collection successes. [redacted]

**Personnel Strength:** Estimated to be as high as 240,000, of whom some 175,000 to 200,000 man the Border Guard component. Some 40,000 are believed to be involved in the counterintelligence and internal security effort and 8,000 to 9,000 in foreign intelligence activities. [redacted]

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**The Role of the KGB  
in the Soviet System** [redacted]

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The principal responsibility of the KGB—Committee of State Security—is to ensure the security of the USSR and prevent any threat to Communist Party control and the system of government. The KGB directs the bulk of its energies and resources to this end. Its activities abroad include the collection of foreign intelligence, the acquisition of foreign technology, and the conduct of covert political action.<sup>1</sup> [redacted]

detention, and interrogation of suspects, but it also controls the preparation of the defense for the accused. [redacted]

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**Organization and Authority**

The KGB is a governmental body equivalent to a ministry, but, like the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, it is responsible not to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers but to the Politburo. As is the case with most ministries, the KGB is also a constituent part of the government at the republic, regional, and local levels. It is within this structure that the KGB carries out its mandate nationally to protect state security. [redacted]

With the execution in 1953 of the last of Stalin's state security chiefs, Lavrentiy Beriya, the party took steps to ensure that the state security service would never again become a power unto its own or serve as a political power base for any individual. The entire internal affairs and state security complex, for example, was reorganized to ensure against the future use of such a mechanism to threaten the power or dominance of the party over the government structure. [redacted]

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The era of the midnight knock, unexplained disappearances of citizens, and summary executions is past. In carrying out arrests, detentions, and searches, KGB officers usually follow procedures prescribed by law. The KGB is still prepared, however, to resort to intimidation, crude harassment, or arrest in cases the authorities find exasperating. Two prime examples of individuals who have experienced such treatment are Andrey Sakharov and the now exiled Vladimir Bukovskiy. [redacted]

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The KGB currently consists of approximately 240,000 staff employees organized in a complex structure of directorates, departments, and special committees. Supporting this apparatus is a vast network of agents and informants drawn from citizens who are directed or coerced to cooperate, or who do so for pay. Ordinary citizens also provide assistance, voluntarily reporting any suspicious activity in their neighborhoods and places of work. Because of its penetration of Soviet society, the KGB enjoys an image of being pervasive and omniscient, an image it intentionally cultivates. (For a description of the structure of the KGB at the national level and the functions of the various KGB components, see page 6 and the organizational chart on page 7. [redacted]

**Role at Home**

Despite the notoriety given its espionage and other activities abroad, the KGB devotes the majority of its resources to internal security operations aimed at detecting and neutralizing any threat to the physical well-being or the authority of the political leadership. The KGB's responsibilities within the USSR are to uncover espionage, subversion, and dissidence<sup>2</sup> and to neutralize their proponents; to investigate crimes against the state; to protect the borders of the country; and to provide physical protection for political leaders, important installations, and visiting foreign dignitaries. [redacted]

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*Authority.* The KGB is the organization primarily responsible for enforcing, and often interpreting, Soviet law in all cases relating to national security. In these cases, it not only is responsible for arrest,

<sup>2</sup> For a fuller discussion of the KGB's role in this regard, see the article on page 19. [redacted]

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**Responsibilities of Principal KGB Components**

**First Chief Directorate.** Foreign intelligence collection and covert political action. [redacted]

**Chief Directorate of the Border Guards.** Guards the border and the coastline against unauthorized entry or exit, smuggling, and armed intrusions; also provides guard personnel for Soviet Embassies. [redacted]

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**Second Chief Directorate.** Internal security and counterintelligence. Operates throughout the USSR with aim of preventing challenges to authority of the state. Counterintelligence effort is mainly in Moscow and other cities with large foreign presence. Also investigates senior party, government, and KGB officials and maintains security at sensitive industrial facilities. [redacted]

**Fifteenth Directorate.** Security for official Soviet installations and offices, including the Kremlin, and the headquarters buildings of the Central Committee, Council of Ministers, General Staff, and Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Internal Affairs as well as KGB. [redacted]

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**Third Directorate.** Counterintelligence in the military establishment, including military intelligence (GRU) units. [redacted]

**Sixteenth Directorate.** Intercepts and deciphers foreign communications at home and abroad. [redacted]

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**Fifth Directorate.** Combating ideological subversion and dissidence within the USSR. Monitors the activities of various ethnic groups and antiregime elements among the clergy and religious sects in the USSR. [redacted]

**Operational-Technical Support Directorate.** Provides a wide range of technical support for KGB operations. [redacted]

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**Seventh Directorate.** Surveillance support for KGB operations in the Moscow area. (KGB staffs at the republic, oblast, kray levels and in large cities other than Moscow have their own surveillance support. [redacted]

**Investigation Department.** Investigates such crimes as espionage, treason, sabotage, unlawful flight abroad, damaging state industry and transport facilities, and currency speculation. Also acts as legal adviser to components of the Second Chief Directorate regarding evidence required to justify detention and support a charge. [redacted]

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**Eighth Chief Directorate.** Development and security of all Soviet enciphered communications at facilities at home and abroad. [redacted]

**Military Construction Directorate.** Provides engineers and specialists for construction of sensitive military, party, and other projects, including Soviet diplomatic missions in the West. [redacted]

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**Ninth Directorate.** Security for all members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee, the chairman of the KGB, the Ministers of Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, as well as top officials in the union republics. Also provides security for high-level Soviet officials traveling abroad and foreign dignitaries visiting the USSR. [redacted]

**Administrative Directorates.** Provide personnel, finance, and basic administrative and housekeeping services. [redacted]


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**Figure 1**  
**Committee for State Security (KGB)**





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Targets of the KGB's counterintelligence and internal security operations at home include the population at large; the Soviet armed forces; foreign embassies, consulates, and trade missions; and visiting foreigners. In combating espionage at home, the KGB closely monitors the activities of foreigners living in or visiting the USSR and also looks for opportunities to recruit agents from among them [redacted]

*Counterintelligence in the Military.* The KGB is responsible for counterintelligence, countersubversion, and general security in the Soviet armed forces and in military-related research and armament production facilities. We do not know what role, if any, the KGB plays in providing security for the handling and storage of nuclear weapons. [redacted]

The KGB's Third Chief Directorate (counterintelligence in the armed forces) maintains a vast network of informants which penetrates all echelons of the military establishment, including units of the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Its officers wear regular military uniforms and are assigned down to at least regimental level. Informants are drawn from among officers and enlisted men as well as from the local Soviet or foreign population and are tasked with reporting not only espionage activities and breaches of security but also signs of anti-Communist attitudes and behavior. The KGB's ultimate objective in infiltrating the armed forces is to ensure that the military does not become a source of political power or influence independent of the party [redacted]

*Relationship With MVD.* The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is the organization chiefly responsible for normal law enforcement. The MVD shares with the KGB the task of combating corruption and certain categories of criminal acts. The KGB becomes involved when a case has security or significant political or economic implications. [redacted]

The MVD controls the uniformed police, a large number of paramilitary units, and the prison and labor camp systems. Until the end of Stalin's reign, both the MVD and the state security service—though nominally separate ministries—were in fact controlled by Beriya. The breakup of the MVD empire and the

reorganization of the security services into the KGB in the mid-1950s was part of an effort to prevent any such awesome concentration of power in the hands of a single man or organization in the future. [redacted]

***The Foreign Intelligence Effort***

The First Chief Directorate is responsible for foreign intelligence collection and covert political action aimed at foreign targets.<sup>3</sup> The Directorate collects intelligence through its officers stationed abroad under diplomatic and trade cover as well as through "illegals," Soviet intelligence officers who are documented as citizens of a non-Soviet Bloc country and operate independently of the official Soviet mission. Officers assigned to KGB residencies usually engage in one of four operational specialties: political and economic, counterintelligence, science and technology (S&T), and support of illegal agents. If the Soviet emigre community in a host country happens to be sizable, an additional officer will be assigned to monitor its activities or operate against it. [redacted]

Illegals operate primarily against countries of strategic interest where the USSR has no diplomatic mission, for example, South Africa and Israel. Illegals also serve in selected other countries where there are official Soviet representations. In these instances they supplement the coverage of KGB officers assigned to the official mission. Two notorious illegals were Rudolf Abel, who operated in the United States, and Gordon Lonsdale, who served in the United Kingdom. Directorate S, which controls illegals, is formally responsible for developing assets abroad for sabotage and assassinations in wartime, but we do not know how vigorously it currently pursues this task. [redacted]

The First Chief Directorate has long been the elite of the KGB. Its officers are generally better educated than those assigned to other components. Its ranks include the sons of the Soviet urban elite, who see in the First Chief Directorate an opportunity for their progeny to enjoy a career in a privileged organization and the possibility of assignments abroad. [redacted]

[redacted]

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*Recruitment of Foreign Agents.* The emphasis in recruitment is on individuals with unique access to potentially valuable information, for example, intelligence officers, diplomats, cipher clerks, military personnel, other government officials, journalists, and academicians. The KGB seeks ideally to recruit on ideological grounds but recognizes that sympathy for the USSR and its goals hold little lure for most potential targets. Its officers, therefore, look for individuals who are highly ambitious, avaricious, have serious financial difficulties, or who have character weaknesses that make them susceptible to blackmail. The KGB sometimes also uses recruiters who can pass themselves off as non-Soviet citizens when targeting individuals who are assessed to be vulnerable but anti-Soviet. [redacted]

*Relationship With the GRU.* The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff complements and competes with the KGB in the collection of foreign intelligence. The GRU focuses on acquiring strategic intelligence, which it interprets as military, S&T, economic, and political information. Its collection assets include human agents, signals intelligence, and overhead reconnaissance systems. [redacted]

The KGB considers itself the senior and more professional service and no doubt feels that its responsibility for the security and counterintelligence protection of the Soviet military, including the GRU, proves the point. KGB officers also tend to be better educated and more broadly experienced than their GRU counterparts, who are career military officers. [redacted]

#### *Andropov's Mark*

Yuriy Andropov's tenure as the chief of the state security service from 1967 to 1982 was longer than that of any of his predecessors. During his chairmanship the image of the KGB improved considerably in the eyes of the Soviet population. The role the state security service played as an instrument of Stalin's terror had made it an object of fear and loathing. The emphasis on following legal procedures in criminal, espionage, and subversion cases, begun under Khrushchev and his KGB Chairman, A. Shelepin, continued under Brezhnev and Andropov. It was reinforced by a propaganda campaign to popularize the KGB as protector of the Soviet state and society

from foreign spies and imperialist subversion. Under Andropov, the KGB also attracted more sophisticated and better educated recruits thanks mainly to its enhanced image, the perquisites and significant pay raises Andropov won for his officers, and the prestige a KGB career offers. [redacted]

Recent improvements in status and a possible increase in the size of the KGB include the expansion of the KGB leadership, which by the last year of Brezhnev's tenure had grown to include 10 deputy chairmen, and the enlargement of the facilities at KGB headquarters and the KGB First Chief Directorate. Since 1977 the latter facility has added about 39,500 square meters of workspace to the 29,200 square meters already available. Although we do not know whether this construction was required because of increased personnel, such an expansion could accommodate a growth of almost 5,300 employees—a 135-percent increase over the estimated 3,900 who were working there prior to 1977. [redacted]

Other changes also point to the KGB's enhanced status. In 1978 the promotions of KGB First Deputy Chairman Tsvigun (now deceased), Deputy Chairman Tsinev, and border guards chief Matrosov to General of the Army and of Deputy Chairmen Chebrikov and Yemokhonov to Colonel General gave these officials higher ranks than any of their predecessors had held. (Tsinev is now the first deputy to KGB Chairman Chebrikov, creating an anomaly in their military ranks that has not yet been publicly corrected.) The KGB also had more than its usual share of delegates to the 26th Party Congress in 1981—a convocation that saw Chebrikov, Tsinev, and Tsvigun all promoted to full membership in the Central Committee. [redacted]

*The KGB and the Fight Against Corruption.* Yuriy Andropov's initial efforts as General Secretary have focused on using the KGB to enhance the party's moral authority and ability to provide effective leadership. The personnel changes that have occurred since he succeeded Brezhnev point to a high priority on rooting out corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and poor labor discipline. [redacted]

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**Figure 2**  
**KGB Chairmen, 1967-83**

**Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov**



KGB Chairman May 1967-May 1982. Directed CPSU's relations with bloc Communist parties from 1957 to 1967. Member of party Secretariat from 1962 to 1967 and nonvoting member of the Politburo from 1967 to 1973, when he was promoted to full membership. Rejoined the Secretariat in May 1982 upon leaving the KGB. Named General Secretary of the CPSU two days after Brezhnev's death. [redacted]

**Vitaliy Vasil'yevich Fedorchuk**



KGB Chairman May-December 1982. Joined state security service in 1939, served as military counterintelligence officer during World War II, and in Austria and East Germany in the 1950s. KGB Chairman for the Ukraine from 1970 to 1982. Became Minister of Internal Affairs in December 1982. [redacted]

**Viktor Mikhaylovich Chebrikov**



Succeeded V. V. Chebrikov as KGB Chairman in December 1982. First joined KGB in 1967 after 20 years as prominent party official in Dnepropetrovsk. Elected to Central Committee as candidate member in 1971 and promoted to full membership in 1981. [redacted]

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Within a month of his accession to the party's chief post, Andropov fired the Minister of Internal Affairs, Nikolay Shchelokov, whose organization had been ineffectual in combating corruption and was itself corrupt. Andropov replaced Shchelokov with Vitaliy Fedorchuk, a KGB careerist who had served as a military counterintelligence officer during and after World War II and more recently as KGB chief in the Ukraine, where he gained a reputation for dealing ruthlessly with dissidents. Fedorchuk, who succeeded

Andropov as KGB Chairman in May 1982, was followed in that position by Viktor Chebrikov who has served in the KGB since 1967, the year Andropov became KGB Chairman. Andropov has also recently brought to Moscow Geydar Aliyev, a professional KGB officer and subsequently First Party Secretary in Azerbaijan, where he gained a reputation for cleaning up corruption. [redacted]

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With these personnel changes, Andropov now appears to have laid the groundwork to use the KGB as a principal instrument in his drive against corruption. Some observers, commenting on these appointments, see Andropov also poised to use his old organization in the role of a super General Accounting Office in investigations of corruption and economic mismanagement. The question now is how widespread the cleanup will be and how high up the party power structure it will extend. [redacted]

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**The KGB's Role in  
"Active Measures"**

[redacted]

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Moscow regards active measures as a useful, regular supplement to its conventional diplomacy.<sup>1</sup> The main policy lines and themes of active measures campaigns are decided at the highest levels of the political system; ultimate approval rests with the party Politburo and Secretariat. Campaigns are centrally managed and implemented by the KGB and the Central Committee's International Department, with assistance from the Central Committee's International Information Department. [redacted]

The KGB's special role in active measures is to plan and carry out covert activities that require the use of trained intelligence personnel. This mission involves several components of the KGB, which perform a number of standing and ad hoc duties at the KGB's headquarters and its residencies (stations) abroad.<sup>2</sup> [redacted]

***At KGB Headquarters***

Within the KGB's First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence) is a special component charged with planning and overseeing covert active measures. This component, known since the early 1970s as Service A, consists of at least 100 staff officers whose main duties are to work with KGB residencies to plan and implement active measures [redacted]

The bureaucratic status of the active measures planning unit as a service, rather than a lower level department, reflects the increased importance assigned these activities during the past decade. The institutional predecessors of Service A included Department D (for disinformation), formed in the late

<sup>1</sup> "Active measures" is a Soviet term used primarily in intelligence contexts to refer to influence operations, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence. Active measures are not limited to the intelligence sphere, however, and can include selected overt as well as covert activities, all involving deceptive content or attribution and going beyond traditional diplomacy and open propaganda to help achieve Soviet objectives. [redacted]

[redacted]

1950s and converted some time prior to 1972 into Department A (for active measures). Under then KGB chief Andropov's orders, Department A was upgraded in the early 1970s to a service, which in KGB parlance denotes a component with worldwide duties and authority to task other First Chief Directorate units and deal directly with organizational units outside the Directorate. [redacted]

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Service A is almost exclusively a headquarters organization, and its officers rarely go abroad. Active measures operations and agents in the field are controlled by other Directorate components, usually the geographic departments, and are typically run by political-intelligence case officers at the individual residencies. Service A must cooperate closely with the geographic departments, whose officers know what field assets are available to implement active measures and can provide area expertise and advice on foreign political and economic conditions. Service A also keeps track of all active measures operations and prepares a top-secret daily bulletin on such operations worldwide, which is submitted to the Politburo through the Central Committee Secretariat. [redacted]

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***In KGB Residencies***

In implementing active measures, KGB officers in the field can call upon any and all Soviet diplomats, trade representatives, and other officials to support operations. KGB staff officers abroad who engage most frequently in active measures are assigned to the political-economic section (or "PR line," from the Russian initials for political intelligence) of the residency. Certain PR-line case officers specialize in active measures, dividing their time between intelligence collection and influence operations. For example, former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko estimates he spent 50 percent of his time on active measures. In the Tokyo residency, where Levchenko was assigned in 1975-79, a half dozen PR-line case

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officers similarly specialized in influence operations and formed an "Active Measures Group," which handled some 25 agents. [redacted]

KGB active measures officers abroad use a variety of cover assignments. Many are assigned to embassies under diplomatic cover, but others use nondiplomatic and nonofficial assignments that provide access to particular target groups in the host society. Journalistic cover is especially favored because of the wide access and freedom of travel that it provides. [redacted]

The KGB has long relied heavily on journalists and journalistic cover to recruit foreign agents and influence foreign opinion in the Soviet interest. Since the 1920s it has not only consistently placed its staff operational personnel under journalistic cover but has also sought to recruit or co-opt legitimate journalists, both Soviet and non-Soviet.<sup>3</sup> [redacted]

**KGB Active Measures Operations**

KGB-run active measures operations take varied forms, and their effectiveness is enhanced by employing different approaches simultaneously to promote a given theme. Covert press placements, using non-Soviet media assets, for example, will often be used to convey substantive points and create the impression of widespread acceptance for the policy themes being pushed by Moscow. The KGB may also devise pertinent forgeries to provide documentary "evidence" for certain points in overt and covert media material. In a circular reinforcement, Soviet overt media, directed by the International Information Department in coordination with Service A, will often further publicize and endorse the covertly placed propaganda and forgeries. Agents-of-influence, front groups, and public conferences and demonstrations stage-managed by KGB-controlled assets are also used to promote active measures themes among various target audiences. [redacted]

<sup>3</sup> Two examples of KGB-controlled foreign journalists who worked for years as agents-of-influence for Moscow are the Frenchman Pierre-Charles Pathe' and the Dane Arne Herlov Petersen; both cases are discussed in *Soviet Active Measures*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, Second Session (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 1982), pp. 60-64. [redacted]

Levchenko's KGB experience illustrates the extent of Soviet active measures operations in Japan:<sup>4</sup>

- He estimates that the KGB had over 200 recruited agents in Japan during the 1975-79 period. Many were used for anti-American active measures at one time or another. These agents included journalists, members of parliament, a former cabinet minister, and leaders in Japanese political parties.
- One active measures operation was the formation of a parliamentary group to promote Japanese-Soviet political and economic cooperation. A Soviet agent, who was a member of parliament, helped found the group, and the KGB funded its staff salaries and monthly magazine.
- The KGB heavily influenced the political platform of the Japanese Socialist Party in the 1970s; 10 of the party's high-ranking leaders were Soviet agents-of-influence. [redacted]

Another active measures operation, judged particularly successful by the Tokyo residency responsible for it, was the surfacing of a KGB-fabricated "last will and testament" of former PRC Premier Chou En-lai shortly after his death. The document was in fact written and translated in Moscow by experts of Service A, then sent to the Tokyo residency for surfacing in a major conservative Japanese newspaper through a KGB-controlled influence agent well placed in the newspaper's hierarchy. Not until Levchenko's defection in 1979 did it become known that this was a Soviet operation. The bogus document was designed to foster uncertainty in Japan about China's political stability and intentions, at a time when a friendship treaty was being considered, and to support PRC leadership factions who might favor reconciliation with the Soviet Union. [redacted]

One main purpose of KGB active measures is to lend credibility to major Soviet campaigns to deceive and

<sup>4</sup> For details of Levchenko's background and KGB experiences, see the HPSCI Hearings, *Soviet Active Measures*, op. cit., pp. 138-198. [redacted]

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distort. While the Soviet media daily bombard international audiences with overt propaganda, citing a broad variety of sources, the KGB selectively reinforces certain themes with forged documents, rumors, agent-of-influence activity, and covert press placements. [redacted]

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Forgeries remain a staple item in the arsenal of active measures, and examples have turned up over the past year at an unprecedented rate of about one a month. (Some 150 anti-US forgeries of suspected Soviet origin have surfaced since the end of World War II.) Recent forgeries have included State Department cables, a Pentagon news release, US business firms' correspondence, US officials' personal and official correspondence, a Commerce Department memorandum, US Army field manuals, and other US Government documents. [redacted]

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Another type of active measures involves the use of KGB officers to spread false rumors and engage in "oral disinformation," including character defamation. Sometimes the KGB will instruct its influence agents to spread a particular story—for example, that the US Government intends to support a particular Third World leader until domestic opposition emerges, then drop him. This technique was used against the late President Sadat in Egypt. [redacted]

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KGB involvement in active measures also extends to cooperative actions in the field with the International Department. International Department officials, ex officio, direct and oversee active measures by the Soviet international front organizations, friendship societies, and pro-Moscow nonruling Communist parties as well as influence-related actions involving foreign socialist parties and so-called national liberation movements. KGB officers assist the International Department to accomplish such tasks by providing for covert transfer of funds, arranging special clandestine communications, recruiting and running clandestine agents, and at times covertly monitoring and working with certain foreign groups overseen by the International Department, such as an illegal Communist party. [redacted]

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**The KGB Suppression of Dissent** [redacted]

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When Andropov was its head, the KGB developed new methods for dealing with dissidents which reflected a sensitivity to the regime's domestic and foreign policy interests. Through skillful use of these and other more conventional tactics, the KGB was able to harass, isolate, and gradually destroy the human rights movement in the USSR. Although the dissident movement is now very weak, there is evidence that dissenters are returning to the traditional underground methods of operation which, in the long run, may play into the hands of the KGB. [redacted]

arms and trade negotiations. They permitted an increase in Jewish emigration, which rose from 1,000 in 1970 to over 34,000 in 1973. The KGB relaxed somewhat its public campaign against dissident activity, but continued to harass the movement in less obvious ways. For instance, the show trials of the 1960s were replaced by semipublic or closed trials in inaccessible locales. [redacted]

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***The KGB and Dissent in the Brezhnev Era***

The Soviet Government has always viewed dissent as illegitimate and sought to suppress "heretical" political views and behavior. The severity of the repression and the tactics used, nonetheless, have varied over time. Under Stalin, politically deviant behavior was often punished by death, long-term imprisonment, or forced labor. The "thaw" following Stalin's death created a somewhat more liberal atmosphere for expressing unacceptable political views, but authorities still kept tight control and prevented extensive contacts between dissidents and the West. During the Brezhnev years the policy on dissent underwent significant shifts as foreign policy interests became intertwined with domestic policy. [redacted]

The signing of the Accords of the Helsinki Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 touched off a new surge of dissident activity. Yuriy Orlov and others announced the formation of the Moscow Helsinki Group in May 1976, and Helsinki Groups eventually were set up in four other republics.<sup>1</sup> These dissident activists portrayed themselves as apolitical defenders of basic civil rights rather than critics of the regime. They used the various international human rights declarations signed by the Soviet Government as their justification and carried out their activities in an open manner, routinely meeting with Western diplomats and journalists, who are always followed by the KGB. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, other dissident factions, heartened by the bold manner of the Helsinki Group activists, became more assertive:

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- Fathers Gleb Yakunin and Dmitriy Dudko spoke out against the Russian Orthodox Church's bent-knee attitude toward the state.
- Some members of the Moscow Writers' Union attempted to publish an unofficial, uncensored journal (*Poiski*).
- The unofficial trade union SMOT was established to champion workers' rights. [redacted]

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Initially, the Brezhnev regime moved to halt the more outspoken criticism of Soviet society and leadership that some intellectuals had begun to articulate in the latter years of Khrushchev's rule. Beginning with the arrest of Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel in 1965, the KGB concentrated on removing the best known and most active dissidents. To facilitate this crackdown, Andropov set up a new KGB directorate (the Fifth) in late 1967 or early 1968 with responsibility for counterintelligence among the intelligentsia, especially writers, artists, and scientists. [redacted]

<sup>1</sup> Helsinki Monitoring Groups were founded in Lithuania and the Ukraine (November 1976), Georgia (January 1977), and Armenia (April 1977). [redacted]

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During the early 1970s, the Soviets, conscious of Western concern over human rights issues, made some concessions to create a favorable atmosphere for

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The USSR, mindful of its international image, attempted to slow the proliferation of dissent with KGB warnings and low-level harassment. By 1976, however, the leadership was obviously taking the dissident challenge more seriously. Andropov, in an April 1976 Lenin Day speech, said “. . . our country signed many agreements and is going to carry them out scrupulously. . . . We did not agree, however, to facilitate actions designed to harm socialism.” He cautioned Soviet citizens against exploiting the CSCE Accords. [redacted]

As the warnings were ignored and dissent continued to expand, and as the expected foreign policy benefits failed to materialize, the regime apparently concluded that domestic control had to be maintained even at the expense of the Soviet Union’s international image. The Politburo evidently decided, in late 1976 or early 1977, to crack down hard on the dissident movement. [redacted]

**KGB Tactics**

Whatever the policy, the regime has used the KGB to orchestrate the legal and administrative process for suppressing dissent. Under Brezhnev, however, the KGB had to perform this function with greater sensitivity to both the letter of Soviet law and the international ramifications of its actions. Its methods, as a result, have become more varied and sophisticated. While continuing to use such time-honored techniques as apartment searches, surveillance, wiretapping, and planting false evidence, Andropov and his subordinates developed new procedures to harass and suppress dissident activity. [redacted]

*Arrest on Criminal Charges.* Some dissidents are arrested on criminal rather than on “political” charges, such as anti-Soviet behavior. For example, Vyacheslav Chornovil, a member of the Ukraine Helsinki Group, was convicted of rape and sentenced to five years in a labor camp. (He was still serving a term of internal exile from a previous political conviction.) By using this tactic the KGB hopes to avoid some of the international approbrium associated with the arrest of dissidents and at the same time to reinforce domestic propaganda that paints dissidents as immoral renegades. Additionally, if the activist is unknown in the West, his plight may not come to the attention of concerned parties as it might if he were charged with a political crime. [redacted]

*Re-arrest.* Other dissidents, already in prison or internal exile, are re-arrested on trumped-up political or criminal charges and given another labor camp sentence before their initial term is completed. Merab Kostava, a member of the Georgia Helsinki Group, was arrested while serving a sentence of internal exile and received a new sentence of five years in a strict-regime camp for resisting a police officer. This approach keeps dissidents not properly “rehabilitated” out of action and serves to demoralize their friends and associates. [redacted]

*Emigration and Exile.* Many of the most prominent and effective dissident intellectuals and “refuseniks” (Jews who had been refused permission to emigrate) have been allowed or forced to emigrate. Kronid Lubarskiy and Valentin Turchin, both veteran activists, were forced out of the country in 1977. Lev Kopelev and Vasiliy Aksenov, prominent intellectuals, were allowed to go abroad in 1981 only to have their citizenship revoked. Although this tactic brings some bad publicity, it effectively deprives the dissident movement of internal leadership. The KGB also uses emigration as a reward for dissident refuseniks who keep quiet while denying it to those who seek publicity for their cause. [redacted]

*Confinement in Psychiatric Hospitals.* This practice increased markedly beginning in 1969 and is a KGB favorite because the prisoner can be confined indefinitely without being charged. In 1981 Amnesty International estimated that up to 1,000 persons were confined in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons. This ploy is sometimes used if there is insufficient evidence for a court conviction or to avoid unwanted publicity. Vladimir Klebanov attempted to form an unofficial trade union in 1978 and was immediately placed in a psychiatric hospital. He was rumored to have been released last year, but has not been seen. [redacted]

*Harassment of Foreign Contacts.* Dissidents in the Brezhnev period depended on Western pressure on the Soviet Government to provide some protection from KGB persecution. They had been able to publicize KGB harassment and to transmit their *samizdat* (self-published) documents to Western publishers via a

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**KGB Campaign Against Aleksandr Podrabinek**

*Aleksandr Podrabinek is a young Jewish activist. He was a member of the Moscow Helsinki Group and a cofounder of the Psychiatric Abuses Group. His book documenting numerous cases of political prisoners confined in psychiatric hospitals was smuggled out of the USSR and was instrumental in the World Psychiatric Association's 1977 denunciation of Soviet psychiatry. The following chronology details the KGB's campaign against him:*

*March 1977*

*Detained for 15 days under administrative arrest in connection with Orlov arrest.*

*Promised permission to emigrate for self and family if he cooperated.*

*He refused.*

*April-October 1977*

*Detained and interrogated several times.*

*Apartment searched and samizdat materials confiscated.*

*Lost job and could not find another.*

*Surveillance and frequent taunting by KGB agents.*

*10 October 1977*

*Detained following search of his apartment.*

*Apartments of several friends and relatives also searched.*

*A speargun, planted by the KGB, was found in the apartment of brother, Kirill, who was detained.*

*December 1977*

*Told to emigrate (with family, including Kirill) or Kirill, who had never been involved in dissident activities, would be arrested.*

*29 December 1977*

*Kirill arrested for illegal possession of a firearm. Later sentenced to two and a half years in labor camp.*

*May 1978*

*Aleksandr arrested for anti-Soviet slander. Later sentenced to five years' internal exile.*

*June 1980*

*Both brothers re-arrested while still serving original sentences.*

*Both charged with anti-Soviet slander and sentenced to three years in a strict-regime labor camp.*

[Redacted]

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network of foreign diplomats and journalists. By cutting off this foreign support and publicity, the KGB denied dissidents their audience, and Western governments and citizens' groups were unable to monitor Soviet human rights abuses as closely as before. [Redacted]

To curtail contact between dissidents and Westerners, the KGB sought to harass and intimidate diplomats and Western journalists in the Soviet Union who had close ties with the dissident community. In June 1978, for example, a US journalist was detained and interrogated for five days for alleged subversive activities in connection with the Shcharanskiy case. The Soviet press also has printed several accusatory articles protesting improper activities of embassy officers on behalf of dissidents. Last year, members of an official

delegation of the Canadian Jewish Congress were beaten and robbed when they attempted to meet with a Leningrad refusenik. A US journalist was expelled and Western tourists have received heavyhanded treatment, including interrogations and strip searches. [Redacted]

**KGB Effectiveness**

The KGB was efficient and thorough in its campaign against the human rights activists. The arrests began in early 1977 with Yuriy Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg, and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. While the Moscow trials of these three and other secondary figures claimed the attention of the West, the KGB also focused its

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attention on the small but active republic human rights groups, arresting most activists in the process. Following the roundup of important leaders of the Helsinki Groups, the KGB expanded its net to include refuseniks, minority nationalists, and religious believers:

- The opposition group in the Russian Orthodox Church was silenced by arrests and several public recantations.
- Editors of the unofficial journal *Poiski* were arrested or forced out of the country.
- SMOT was decimated by arrests and may have gone underground to regroup.

Many leaders of unofficial religious groups, members of the USSR Chapter of Amnesty International, several administrators of the Solzhenitsyn Fund, and many Jewish refuseniks were also harassed and persecuted. Jewish emigration was drastically cut in late 1979 and has been spiraling downward since, with fewer than 2,700 visas issued last year. [redacted]

By mid-1980 activists were forced to admit that the human rights movement might not survive, and in September 1982 the Moscow Helsinki Group—the only surviving human rights organization—announced its intention to disband. Although of little consequence in practical terms, the demise of this group signaled the extent of the KGB's victory in subduing the dissident challenge to Soviet authority. [redacted]

The sophisticated tactics of the KGB confused the dissidents, keeping them off balance and unsure of where the KGB would strike next. The unpredictable use of leniency and harshness (for example, emigration as opposed to internment in a prison or psychiatric hospital) was particularly disconcerting. Activists were demoralized by the depletion of their ranks and the realization that no new members were being recruited. Mistrust among groups over goals and objectives also became a barrier, as did physical isolation from each other and foreign supporters [redacted]

**Prospects**

The dissident movement in the Soviet Union is at present weak and fragmented as a result of KGB persecution. However, there is some evidence that new dissident groups are forming. They apparently eschew

the overt methods of operation used by the human rights movement, are more politically oriented, and avoid contact with foreigners. These groups operate underground and publish their documents anonymously. The existence of such groups was revealed last summer when the KGB arrested members of a reform-oriented Marxist Eurocommunist group whose *samizdat* writings included articles on the Soviet economic crisis and critiques of leaders of European Communist parties. [redacted]

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The dissidents' return to the traditional, clandestine mode of operation may ultimately be to the advantage of the KGB. Such operations, of course, would be more difficult to ferret out, but once discovered the authorities would have a free hand in levying punishment against the activists. It would be more difficult for dissident groups to communicate with each other and develop cooperation or a unified stance toward the regime. The possibility of Soviet citizens becoming aware of dissenting views and activities would be greatly reduced. Finally, Western publicity and the resulting complications would be avoided. [redacted]

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In any case, no matter what forms of dissent evolve, the KGB probably will not release its grip on the movement. Last year, when Andropov moved up to the Secretariat, his successor instigated a campaign of harassment and arrests, apparently to signal that even though there had been a change in command there would be no change in policy. The current KGB chief, Viktor Chebrikov, a longtime Andropov associate, almost certainly shares a commitment to tight domestic control. Although the Soviets might be willing to make isolated concessions—such as increasing emigration or resolving sensitive problem cases—these would be in response to specific foreign policy benefits and would not signal an internal policy change. [redacted]

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## Other Topics

### Soviet Strategy Toward Japan: The Economic- Political Connection

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The Soviet Union once again is employing a "carrot and stick" approach to improve political relations with Japan and to weaken Tokyo's ties with Washington. "Sticks" have predominated in the political sphere lately, although a few "carrots" have appeared as well. In the economic realm, the USSR continues to rely on the "carrots" of export markets for Japanese goods and access to Siberian resources to create pressures within Japan for better political relations. Moscow's short-term prospects are dimmed, however, by the recent deterioration in political relations over security matters. Its long-term ability to exploit the economic relationship is undermined by a growing Soviet trade deficit with Japan and by diminishing Japanese interest in Siberia's minerals and fuels. Other tactics to which the USSR can resort—territorial concessions, military threats, or intensified propaganda against Japanese "militarism"—appear either too costly for Moscow or largely ineffectual. We therefore expect the Soviets to continue and perhaps even to step up manipulation of economic levers.

#### *Soviet Objectives*

Japan's military ties to the United States, its strategic position adjacent to the Soviet Pacific Fleet's points of access to the open ocean, and its military power make it an important factor in Moscow's perception of the power balance in Asia. Public statements by Soviet policymakers have reflected increasing concern over the Sino-Japanese rapprochement of 1978, Japanese

participation in economic sanctions against the USSR since 1980, and movement toward greater strategic cooperation between Washington and Tokyo since 1982. This concern, however, has not made Moscow willing to offer concessions on the key issues dividing the two sides—most notably Japanese demands for the return of the disputed Northern Territories. Meanwhile, Japan's resource dependencies, reliance on export markets for industrial goods, and geographic proximity to Siberia make it a natural economic partner for the Soviet Union.

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
Moscow has suggested that political issues be set aside while the two nations focus on increased trade and economic cooperation, in view of what the Soviets describe as "natural" economic affinities and Moscow's genuine interest in Japanese pipe for energy projects, technical assistance, and credits for Siberian development. The Kremlin leaders probably hope to use the demonstrated advantages of economic ties to mute—if not eliminate—Soviet-Japanese political differences over the long run and to forestall further intensification of political conflict between the two nations in the short term. The USSR is probably hopeful as well that increased economic interdependency, coupled with rising protectionism in the United States and Western Europe, will encourage Japan eventually to loosen its political ties to the West.

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**The Political Context**

Until recently, the Soviet Union apparently attached great hopes to its "peace offensives" to normalize relations with Japan and to sidestep the contentious Northern Territories issue. In the absence of a peace treaty, Moscow has proposed that the two sides negotiate:

- A Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation (1978).
- Confidence-building measures in the Far East (1981).
- A "no nuclear weapons" agreement—a formal commitment by Tokyo not to produce, station, or import nuclear weapons in exchange for a Soviet promise not to use nuclear weapons against Japan (1982).

The Japanese, however, have turned a deaf ear to Soviet offers. [redacted]

Moscow's most recent "peace offensive" stalled in mid-1982 as both sides pursued conflicting security policies. Tokyo's decision in late 1981 to increase defense spending by 7.8 percent had already prompted expressions of concern by Moscow. The announcement late last fall that Japan would allow the deployment of US F-16 fighter aircraft beginning in 1985 prompted new Soviet denunciations of Japanese "militarism." The Japanese meanwhile expressed heightened concern about the deployment of SS-20s and Backfire bombers in the Far East and the modernization of ground and air forces in the disputed Northern Territories. [redacted]

The almost simultaneous change in leadership in both nations at the end of 1982 produced no concrete moves toward reconciliation. The refusal of General Secretary Andropov to meet with then outgoing Prime Minister Suzuki at Brezhnev's funeral in late November suggested from the outset that the new Soviet leadership was inclined simply to "hang tough" on its previous offers to Japan even as it signaled its intention to focus on improving relations with China. [redacted]

The continued pursuit of conflicting security policies exacerbated the conflict between Moscow and Tokyo during the early part of this year. Prime Minister Nakasone's January 1983 visits to Seoul and Washington prompted Moscow to denounce him by name, and his characterization of Japan as "an unsinkable

aircraft carrier" elicited an immediate and unprecedented threat of Soviet nuclear retaliation. The Soviets, for their part, in early 1983 made public their late 1982 INF proposal to move some SS-20 missiles eastward to Siberia—a move which prompted a formal Japanese protest and a call for closer consultations with the United States and NATO on INF issues. [redacted]

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To increase political pressure on Japan, the USSR has also intensified its propaganda campaign against Japanese "militarism," hoping to frighten the Japanese public and Japan's Asian neighbors. Deputy Foreign Minister Kapista reiterated these charges while visiting Singapore in early April, less than a week before he was due to arrive in Tokyo for working-level consultations. To date, however, Moscow has reaped few, if any, benefits from its efforts. [redacted]

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**Economic Tactics: Unfulfilled Expectations**

Deteriorating Soviet-Japanese political relations may have reinforced the Soviet leadership's perception that expanded economic ties should be used to create a more favorable political climate:

- [redacted] KGB officials in early 1982 stressed the growing importance to the USSR of both Japan's global economic power and the opportunity to play on conflicting economic interests—within Japan and between Japan and other Western nations—to foster a closer Soviet-Japanese relationship.

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- By early 1982, according to a *Pravda* report, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade was optimistic that Japan would soon adopt "a more realistic approach" to economic cooperation with the USSR—a position reaffirmed by a December 1982 TASS release describing the development of trade and economic cooperation as "an important factor" in the emergence of "good-neighbor relations."

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- In public statements as well as private conversations [redacted] Soviet Far East experts expressed considerable pessimism regarding a purely political accommodation even as they

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remained optimistic that irreversible economic forces would draw Japan and the USSR closer together. In addition to the political benefits that Moscow could anticipate from such a tactic, there could be direct economic payoffs as well. These might include further technical assistance from Japan to develop Siberia's resource potential and continuing supplies of large-diameter pipe and other products for Soviet energy production. [redacted]

In pursuit of these goals, Moscow intensified its efforts to create a more favorable environment for Soviet-Japanese trade and to promote long-term trade commitments that might discourage future Japanese participation in Western economic sanctions. Concrete measures during the past 12 months included the following:

- The Soviets in their public statements have played up their reliability as a trading partner, in contrast to US moves toward protectionism and Chinese cancellations of contracts.
- The Soviets encouraged the formation of a trade mission, which was eventually organized by the Japanese business community to travel to the USSR in early 1983.

[redacted]

- The USSR continued to pressure Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, through the Japanese business community, to violate OECD credit guidelines in the interest of "the mutual benefit of trade on a commercial basis."

[redacted]

The centerpiece of Moscow's strategy was the promotion of the private Nagano trade mission (named for its organizer, the head of Japan's Chamber of Commerce and Industry), which traveled to Moscow in late February 1983. This was the first such mission from the Japanese side since the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan and was the largest ever between the two nations. Despite Tokyo's expressions of caution regarding any substantive benefits from the mission, Soviet commentary prior to the arrival of the group was decidedly upbeat. The mission met with leading Soviet economic and political officials and received favorable Soviet press coverage—a sign of the importance that Moscow attributed to this group and its role as a potential lobby upon its return to Japan. [redacted]

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However, a close look at the record of Soviet-Japanese trade, as well as the current status of Siberian projects, casts doubt on Moscow's perception that the lure of Soviet "gold" leaves the Kremlin holding all the trumps. After spectacular growth in the early 1970s, the rate of increase in Soviet-Japanese trade appears increasingly uneven, owing in part to political constraints on the Japanese side (the Afghanistan and Polish embargoes), occasional pent-up demand, and a gradual slowdown in Japan's need for Soviet exports (see table). The large surge in both total trade and Soviet imports in 1982 resulted from orders for large-diameter pipe and energy-related equipment which may not be repeated. Soviet exports to Japan meanwhile have been stagnant since the mid-1970s. [redacted]

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Soviet officials themselves constantly point to the fact that since 1979 Japan has slipped from second to fifth place as a Soviet trading partner among Western nations. From Tokyo's perspective, whatever the unpredictability of Sino-Japanese economic relations, Beijing may still be more attractive than Moscow. In 1982 Soviet trade with Japan was equivalent to only 63 percent of Japan's trade with China. Meanwhile, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, traditionally a strong proponent of increased Japanese-Soviet trade, announced in February of this year that it would not respond to a Soviet request that Japan act to correct its trade imbalance with the USSR by increasing imports. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Japanese banking community also remains reluctant to negotiate the kinds of large-scale loans the USSR has requested to help finance plant orders from Japan.

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**Soviet-Japanese Trade***Million US \$*

Year	Soviet Exports	Soviet Imports	Soviet Balance	Total Turnover	Percent Change in Turnover
1972	462	525	-63	987	
1973	940	503	+437	1,443	36
1974	1,196	1,022	+174	2,218	65
1975	930	1,742	-812	2,672	20
1976	995	1,825	-830	2,820	6
1977	1,161	1,964	-803	3,125	11
1978	1,082	2,328	-1,246	3,410	9
1979	1,445	2,530	-1,085	3,975	17
1980	1,463	2,729	-1,266	4,192	5
1981	1,135	3,076	-1,941	4,211	NEGL
1982	1,049	4,037	-2,993	5,081	21

Moscow remains concerned about its hard currency position and has probably reduced its expectations regarding the value of East-West trade. The latter is evident in expressions of disappointment over the contribution of imported technology to industrial output. [REDACTED]

Diminishing Japanese domestic demand for Soviet raw materials, coupled with a global softening of commodity prices, also figures as a short-term constraint on expanded trade. In 1982 the USSR purchased less than 3 percent of all Japan's exports while providing little more than 1 percent of all Japanese imports. Such statistics suggest a number of persistent obstacles to Soviet efforts to create increased Japanese economic dependency on the USSR as a basis for political leverage. [REDACTED]

Prospects for the future appear mixed. The lure of increased Soviet plant orders from Japan, Moscow's interest in Japanese robotics (in view of the Soviet labor shortage), and the ongoing Soviet need for Japanese steel products make increased trade attractive to both countries. On the Japanese side, for example, weak and declining domestic demand for heavy equipment makes exports of equipment more critical, and such sales to the USSR during 1980-81

grew faster than those to any other area. In 1982, as the USSR's trade representative to Tokyo Spandrian reminded the Japanese, Japan's overall exports to the USSR rose (largely as a result of energy-related transactions) even as total exports to other areas combined declined by about 9 percent. [REDACTED]

On the other hand, the global softening of oil prices and stagnating Soviet oil output are likely to reawaken Moscow's concern about its hard currency position and make any expansion of trade or economic cooperation more dependent than ever on new credits supplied by the Japanese Government. Tokyo's hesitancy in providing such support—owing to budgetary considerations, opportunities elsewhere, and acquiescence in a sanctions policy—is not likely to disappear in the short term. However sympathetic some Japanese businessmen and trading companies might be to Soviet calls for greater economic ties, the majority of them have a far larger stake in trade with the United States and Western Europe than with the USSR. Therefore, while a minority may continue to press hard for a reversal of Japanese Government policies, especially those involving credit limitations and export controls, the majority will probably hold back for fear of antagonizing Japan's other, more important, trading partners. [REDACTED]

Nor is the future for expanded economic cooperation in other Siberian development projects especially rosy. There appears to be little current Japanese interest in the five new Siberian projects proposed by the Soviets prior to the invasion of Afghanistan (Udokan copper, Vostochniy port expansion, pulp and wood chips, asbestos, and a Far East steel mill). More importantly, the Soviet side put forward no new proposals during talks with the Nagano mission in February of this year. Japanese press sources meanwhile suggest that the Soviet preference for compensation deals (repaying loans with output from plants or resource sites) may prove a barrier to further cooperation. The same message was relayed to Moscow by the leader of the Nagano mission. [REDACTED]

The Sakhalin offshore oil and gas development project, a cornerstone of Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation, faces a number of uncertainties. Tokyo must

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take into account the high cost of developing the liquefied natural gas portion and a Japanese demand that is lower than initially projected. Tokyo's lack of enthusiasm probably accounts for the hardening of the government's position on credits in early 1983— unless or until end-user contracts are provided. [redacted]

[redacted]

None of the Siberian energy projects will create Japanese energy dependency on the Soviet Union. Best case projections for Soviet fuel deliveries to Japan in 1990 indicate that the USSR will provide at most between 2.2 and 3 percent of Japanese energy requirements. Energy "levers" for political purposes thus appear quite feeble. [redacted]

**Options and Prospects**

Moscow's near-term prospects for developing effective political leverage over Tokyo by means of economic "carrots" appear limited. Nevertheless, for lack of a more effective alternative, and because of Moscow's perception that economic linkages do have political consequences, efforts to expand and intensify Soviet-Japanese trade and economic cooperation will most likely continue. [redacted]

Moscow may also judge that it has few realistic long-term options for loosening Japan's ties to the West other than the creation of economic leverage. To offer total—or even partial—concessions on the Northern Territories issue would create new vulnerabilities for Soviet SLBMs in the Sea of Okhotsk and complicate territorial discussions with China. The "price" for Japan would certainly involve far more than the signing of a largely symbolic treaty—probably political and military concessions that any Tokyo government would reject as too expensive. [redacted]

A second alternative would have Moscow give up the Northern Territories in return for Japan's becoming an "Asian Switzerland." Such a proposal, however, would increase Chinese and ASEAN fears of the Soviet Union and would be more likely to elicit a Japanese military buildup than political acceptance.

A third option, increased military pressure in the Kuriles, would adversely affect the USSR's relations with other Asian countries and probably would increase Japanese hostility in the short run. Increased use of a "peace campaign" would mean returning to a tactic that has proved less effectual in Japan than in Western Europe. [redacted]

For these reasons, Moscow will probably eschew any single option while borrowing from all. Efforts to forge stronger economic ties will continue to form one of the main elements in Soviet strategy, owing both to the political orthodoxy of such a tactic and its contribution to a troubled Soviet economy. Soviet efforts to stimulate both Japanese and Asian opposition to a greater defense effort by Tokyo, and to the US military presence in Japan, will continue. [redacted]

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**Moscow and Southern Africa:  
What Next?** [redacted]

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Developments in southern Africa may soon present the Andropov leadership with new opportunities and dilemmas. Zimbabwe may offer a significant opening: heightened tribal rivalries and security concerns have prompted Prime Minister Mugabe to improve relations with Moscow and purchase Soviet arms.

[redacted]

Angola and Mozambique, Moscow's key clients in the area, have been exploring the possibility of accommodation with Pretoria and closer ties with the West. These efforts were prompted by South Africa's increasingly aggressive posture and Soviet tightfistedness. Nonetheless, as long as insurgent groups are a growing threat, neither country is likely to significantly reduce its ties with the USSR, its leading arms supplier. In Mozambique, where that threat is especially serious, Moscow may have to consider a greater involvement in order to preserve the pro-Soviet regime.

Elsewhere in the region, Soviet efforts to gain influence in Zambia and Botswana have met with little success, and Moscow seems to be concerned about China's efforts to reassert itself with the Soviet-backed insurgents in Namibia and South Africa.

[redacted]

**Zimbabwe: New Opportunities**

Although Prime Minister Mugabe has effectively locked the Soviets out of any real involvement in Zimbabwe since his 1980 electoral victory over Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), recent domestic turmoil in ZAPU-dominated Matabeleland and heightened security concerns apparently have prompted him to reconsider.

[redacted]

By concluding an arms deal with Moscow himself, Mugabe probably hopes to preclude Soviet support to ZAPU if renewed insurgency warfare should recommence, and to ensure that he has alternative suppliers should the violence in Matabeleland lead the West to turn its back on his regime.

[redacted]

**Glossary**

**ANC.** African National Congress. Insurgent group in South Africa; rival of Pan Africanist Congress. [redacted]

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**BNF.** Botswana National Front. A legal political party in Botswana. [redacted]

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**FRELIMO.** Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. Former guerrilla group which currently rules Mozambique. [redacted]

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**MPLA.** Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Former insurgent group which currently rules Angola. [redacted]

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**NRM.** National Resistance Movement. Mozambican insurgent group backed by South Africa. [redacted]

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**PAC.** Pan Africanist Congress. Insurgent group in South Africa; rival of African National Congress. [redacted]

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**SWAPO.** South-West Africa People's Organization. The major insurgent movement in Namibia. [redacted]

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**UNITA.** National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Angolan insurgent movement led by Jonas Savimbi and backed by South Africa. [redacted]

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**ZAPU.** Zimbabwe African People's Union. One of the major guerrilla groups which fought the white minority regime in Rhodesia before independence in 1980.

[redacted]

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The Soviets are eager to develop a presence in Zimbabwe, particularly one that would enable them to build ties to the military.


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Figure 1  
Insurgent Activity in Angola and Mozambique



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Figure 2



Mozambique President Machel with General Secretary Andropov and Foreign Minister Gromyko during March 1983 talks in the Kremlin.

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#### ***Angola and Mozambique: New Dilemmas?***

More problematic for the USSR are the recent developments in Angola and Mozambique. Pretoria and local insurgents backed by Pretoria are posing a growing security threat to the pro-Soviet regimes. Another concern is the economic disarray in the two countries—in part the result of that threat. [redacted]

To meet the military threat, Moscow has provided additional military hardware, including some advanced weapons. Over the past year it has introduced SA-8 surface-to-air missiles into Angola and more modern armored personnel carriers into Angola and Mozambique. [redacted]

More important, increased Cuban casualties in Angola indicate that Cuban forces have become more active in combating the insurgents of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Havana also may be considering the introduction of additional advisers—or possibly combat troops—into Mozambique. [redacted]

The Soviets may also be considering an augmentation of their advisory presence in Mozambique. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official recently stated that it is not enough to give arms to Mozambique, but that people must be trained to use them. Moscow's concern was evident in the high-level attention given to President Machel during his visit to Moscow in March 1983—he had individual meetings with General Secretary Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and other leaders. However, they probably did not offer him the major increases in military or economic assistance that he apparently was seeking—to judge by Machel's public statements. [redacted]

Financial issues have caused Moscow trouble with Angola as well. The major irritants for Luanda have been: having to pay the Cuban combat forces in scarce hard currency, Soviet exploitation of Angolan fishing waters, and Moscow's stringent credit terms. Frictions have even developed over a 10-year aid package, reportedly for \$2 billion, agreed upon in [redacted]

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early 1982. [redacted] the Soviets insist on including a large dam project, despite the objections of the Angolans, who want to channel funds toward agriculture and light industry. Some Angolans reportedly view this project as a ploy to ensure a long-term Soviet involvement in Angola. Such friction probably explains why economic assistance has become an important element of the US-Angolan discussions on Namibia and normalization of relations. [redacted]

Moscow is probably growing uneasy about the reliability of these two important clients. [redacted]

[redacted] Moscow's greatest concern was that elements of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) might sell out to the United States over the Cuban troop question. The Soviets may also be disturbed by the following developments:

- Several pro-Soviet members in the MPLA hierarchy were demoted after President dos Santos assumed emergency powers in early December 1982.
- Luanda has not broken off its yearlong dialogue with the United States.
- The Angolans have had several direct talks with the South Africans—reportedly to negotiate a cease-fire.
- Luanda established diplomatic relations with China in January 1983. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet and Cuban officials in Luanda recently warned dos Santos about their dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in Angola—and with his leadership. Moscow may have similar concerns about Mozambique, where President Machel has established a dialogue with the United States and has made some tentative overtures to South Africa. [redacted]

The Soviets have expressed displeasure at efforts by Mozambique and Angola to seek arms and training from Portugal. Similarly, they probably disapproved when the two countries acceded to the so-called Berlin clause—which states that West Berlin is part of Western Europe—in order to qualify for economic assistance from the European Community. [redacted]

On the other hand, Moscow presumably recognizes that recent successes of UNITA in Angola and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Mozambique make it unlikely that either nation would substantially reduce ties with the USSR, its most important arms supplier. [redacted]

[redacted] some Soviet officials are also buoyed by the current impasse over the Cuban troop issue in the Namibia talks. [redacted]

**SWAPO and the ANC: The China Factor**

Beijing's renewed activity in southern Africa may eventually complicate Moscow's aims, particularly vis-a-vis the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa—national liberation movements which have generally been pro-Soviet. In January 1983 SWAPO chief Sam Nujoma visited Beijing, [redacted]

[redacted] Also in January, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang met with ANC leader Oliver Tambo in Lusaka during a swing through Africa. Following the meeting, ANC spokesmen expressed "guarded optimism" that China might for the first time provide diplomatic and material support. [redacted]

Perhaps in response to these Chinese moves, the Soviets have recently moved to establish contacts with the ANC's chief rival, the Chinese-backed Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a group whose efforts to mount operations against South Africa have been ineffective to date. This move may also reflect a reassessment of strategy toward rival guerrilla movements—arising from the Soviet experience in Zimbabwe, where the USSR bet on the wrong horse. [redacted]

Soviet relations with SWAPO and the ANC are complicated because these groups have ties with Angola and Mozambique and thus are affected by the state of Soviet relations with the MPLA and with Machel's Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). For example, Moscow, which has publicly stated its willingness to step up support for [redacted]

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SWAPO's armed struggle in Namibia, would presumably view an Angolan-South African cease-fire as a major constraint on its ability to promote SWAPO activities. [redacted]

**Elsewhere in the Region**

Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviets have had some success in establishing a presence, but such gains have not been translated into real influence. In Zambia they introduced a 65-man military advisory group in 1980, following a major arms deal. However, they have failed to gain major influence because of President Kaunda's abiding suspicion of their motives and his desire to stay strictly nonaligned. In the unlikely event that Kaunda leaves or is ousted any time soon, the left-leaning Defense and Security Minister Grey Zulu might try to tilt foreign policy toward the USSR; but such efforts would be tempered by the need for consensus in Zambia's tribally based collective leadership. [redacted]

Soviet efforts to expand relations with Botswana have met with little success. Moscow succeeded in establishing a small advisory presence after a \$6 million arms deal was signed in December 1980, but the Botswanans subsequently concluded larger arms deals with Washington. Highlighting the current impasse in relations, four Botswanan military officers were dismissed on charges of spying for Moscow in November 1982, and the contract for Soviet advisers was allowed to expire. Soviet efforts now focus largely on the fortunes of the legal opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF), and on attempts to broaden cultural ties. The Soviets give some financial support to the BNF, which has apparently furnished Moscow with information on issues of regional importance, and are attempting to establish a Botswana-USSR friendship society organized around young Botswanans educated in the Soviet Union. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Moscow will probably seek to maintain its position in the region by supplying its clients with more and better equipment to counter the South Africans and by providing more training in counterinsurgency against the Pretoria-backed local guerrilla groups. The Soviets have shown in Angola and Mozambique that they are willing to do this. [redacted]

Nonetheless, the insurgent threat in Mozambique may pose a dilemma for Moscow and Havana. Moscow's attempt to preserve the FRELIMO regime by gradually increasing military assistance may prove insufficient. If convinced that FRELIMO could only be preserved by a large Cuban combat force, Moscow would have to weigh the importance of demonstrating its commitment to Third World clients against the potential damage to its "peace offensive" and its attempt to undercut the US administration's call for increased defense spending. Moscow also would have to consider the impact of such moves on Pretoria, which has clearly stated it would not countenance a Cuban troop presence. A strong South African military response would force Moscow and Havana to choose between escalation and an embarrassing retreat. [redacted]

In the economic sphere, Moscow's poor record on aid questions—and the willingness of Western powers to address economic problems in southern Africa—reinforce black African efforts to balance ties between East and West. Nonetheless, friction over economic assistance will not seriously affect Moscow's position as long as military needs remain the top priority for the black African leaders. [redacted]

China is unlikely to replace the USSR as the key source of arms assistance in Angola and Mozambique, but it could make inroads with SWAPO and the ANC, whose military needs are relatively small. [redacted]

Despite perennial frictions between Moscow and its clients over aid questions and the potential challenge posed by a revitalized China, regional instability and heightened black African security concerns will enable Moscow to maintain—and possibly expand—its role in southern Africa. [redacted]

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### Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters in 1982

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

Throughout 1982, significant trends in Soviet naval deployment patterns included:

- A decline in the presence of naval reconnaissance aircraft at overseas bases. Deployment patterns to Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and Angola were interrupted, but deployments to Libya expanded (see figure 1).
- A moderate increase in ship-days outside home waters in the Pacific. The upturn reflected primarily a larger presence in the South China Sea, particularly for general purpose submarines.
- The use of naval forces to respond to regional tensions or to indicate support for a local government. Reinforcement of Soviet forces in the eastern Mediterranean, port calls to Mocamedes, Angola, and visits to Port Victoria, Seychelles, demonstrated the political role of naval deployments.<sup>1</sup>

Soviet naval ships spent more than 56,700 ship-days outside home waters in 1982<sup>2</sup>—an increase of roughly 3 percent over 1981 and only 1 percent lower than the record high total of 1980.

In the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet presence rose substantially in 1980, ship-days continued the downward trend begun in 1981. Deployments to the waters off West Africa rose sharply as Moscow revived the small patrol that operates in the region, partly in response to increased concern about hostilities between Angola and South Africa. Ship-days in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean changed only marginally, despite political tensions in both regions—such as the Falkland Islands and Syrian crises. A task group arrived in the Caribbean in December, too late

**Figure 1**  
Distant Deployments of Soviet Naval Aviation



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[Redacted]

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<sup>2</sup> The Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center provides statistics for Soviet deployments outside home waters and determines the regional limits of distant deployments. A "ship-day" represents one ship away from home waters for one day.

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
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**Figure 2**  
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,  
by Region

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Caribbean Sea       | <input type="checkbox"/> Mediterranean Sea |
| <input type="checkbox"/> West African waters | <input type="checkbox"/> Indian Ocean      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Atlantic Ocean      | <input type="checkbox"/> Pacific Ocean     |


Ship-days  
60,000



**Figure 3**  
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,  
by Ship Type

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|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hydrographic and space event support ships | <input type="checkbox"/> Surface combatants         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Auxiliaries                                | <input type="checkbox"/> General purpose submarines |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Amphibious ships                           | <input type="checkbox"/> SSBNs                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mine warfare ships                         |   |

Ship-days  
60,000



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to prevent a small decline in the average Soviet presence for the year. Pacific deployments increased moderately, as mentioned above.

Changes in the composition of forces deployed to foreign waters included the increased use of general purpose submarines, cutbacks in the presence of

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major surface combatants, and reduced deployment of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to the Pacific. (Figures 2 and 3 summarize Soviet out-of-area deployment since 1974 by region and type of ship.)

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**Soviet Naval Aviation**

Maritime reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft continued to play a large role in Soviet operations in distant areas, making continuous or periodic deployments to six nations outside the Warsaw Pact. Their presence outside the USSR dropped by 13 percent, however, according to data provided by the US Navy, and established deployment patterns were disrupted in several areas. [redacted]

In the Indian Ocean area, where the Soviets have kept three pairs of IL-38 May ASW patrol aircraft since January 1980, deployments dropped by nearly a quarter. [redacted] the pair that is normally at Asmara, Ethiopia, was withdrawn for several months, and for part of the year there was only one pair instead of two at Aden, South Yemen. [redacted]

In the Atlantic, deployments of TU-95 Bear D long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba—which have taken place periodically since 1970—were almost continuous until the end of the year, when there was an extended gap of almost three months.<sup>3</sup> During the same time period, there were no Bear D's in Luanda, Angola. Bear D's operating from Angola normally stop over in Cuba en route to and from their Northern Fleet bases. Moreover, although the Bear D's in Angola monitored the British transit to the southern Atlantic in the spring of 1982 during the Falkland Islands crisis, there were no aircraft present in Luanda during the second half of the crisis. [redacted]

Moscow continued periodic deployments of IL-38s to Libya throughout the year. (Soviet aircraft initially deployed to Libya in the summer of 1981, following a joint naval exercise with Syria.) During deployments to Tripoli, the aircraft have conducted ASW patrols, joint training with the Mediterranean Squadron, and surveillance of Western naval forces. [redacted]

**Indian Ocean**

According to US Navy data, Soviet ship-days in this area declined about 4 percent in 1982 and were more than 10 percent below the peak established in 1980. The squadron generally had about 28 ships—four

fewer than were present during 1980, when the United States expanded its naval presence in the region in response to the Iranian hostage crisis. The cutback during 1982 continued a trend begun in 1981, when US force levels began to drop following the resolution of the hostage crisis. [redacted]

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Throughout the year, the squadron included two or three general purpose submarines, three surface combatants, two amphibious ships, and 15 auxiliaries. The presence of general purpose submarines in the region fell by roughly 30 percent, largely as a result of a gap in the presence of F-class diesel-powered submarines (SSs). There have only been two other such gaps since F-class submarines began regular deployments to the region in 1972. The Soviets continued to use V-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) from the Northern Fleet to monitor US battle group activity for part of the year. [redacted]

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[redacted] the initial deployment to the region of a V-III-class SSN from the Pacific Fleet took place during 1982. The increased number of V-class SSNs in the Pacific Fleet may permit Moscow to reduce the burden on the Northern Fleet of supplying SSNs for operations in the Indian Ocean. [redacted]

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The presence of surface combatants declined more than 25 percent. Soviet combatants monitor Western naval movements and spend most of their operational time in the northern Arabian Sea, keeping a close watch on the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz. In October 1982 the Kiev-class VTOL carrier Minsk made its first deployment to the Indian Ocean as a Pacific Fleet unit. It operated in the northern Indian Ocean for about one month, making calls at Aden, South Yemen, and Bombay, India. Reports from Western ships operating nearby indicate that operations by its YAK-38 Forger aircraft demonstrated improved flight proficiency, as would be expected as the pilots gain experience. The Forgers also were observed for the first time carrying air-to-air missiles. The Minsk apparently suffered an engineering casualty or fuel contamination, which may have

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<sup>3</sup> A similar lengthy hiatus took place in 1979-80. [redacted]

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cut short its deployment to the region, but it continued to conduct training and flight operations throughout its return to Pacific waters. Its departure in January 1983 left the Indian Ocean Squadron without a major surface combatant for the first time since 1977.

Soviet ships continued to call at regional ports as part of Moscow's effort to secure or expand its access to naval facilities in the Third World. The calls in 1982 involved ports where the Soviets already receive logistic support—Aden, South Yemen, for example—or where facilities might prove valuable in the future, such as Mozambique. According to the US Embassy, the Soviets received permission to call in Mauritius in November despite the new leftist government's pre-election rhetoric about closing its ports to all foreign warships. Soviet ships also called in the Seychelles following an army mutiny during the summer and during a period of domestic unrest in the fall. Use of naval forces to show Soviet support for the troubled regime of President Rene had occurred on several earlier occasions.



The Indian Ocean Squadron gets the bulk of its logistic support from its own auxiliary ships, which make up about 50 percent of the Soviet presence in the region. Moscow did not expand its land-based logistic support in the region.

The Soviets keep a small repair ship, an 8,500-ton floating drydock, and a stores barge there, and their yard oiler from Aden moves to Dahlak on occasion. Moscow contracted for the repair of two naval auxiliaries at Sri Lanka; we believe that it hopes to use Colombo to compensate partially for the exclusion of Soviet naval ships from Singapore following the invasion of Afghanistan.

**Pacific Ocean**

Ship-days in distant areas of the Pacific rose by almost 16 percent in 1982, countering the decline of some 6 percent in 1981 and establishing a record total for the region well above the 1980 level (see figure 4). Analysis of US Navy data shows that the daily average number of units on distant deployment was 35 (it was 30 in 1981). The increase reflects primarily

**Figure 4**  
**Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean**



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a 90-percent rise in the use of general purpose submarines, which offset the decline in the presence of major surface combatants and SSBNs

In contrast to earlier years, the major factor driving overall Pacific Ocean ship-day totals was operations in the South China Sea, rather than the movement of

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ships to and from the Indian Ocean. The US Navy does not compile ship-days for the South China Sea separately. [redacted] indicated that the Soviets generally kept two or three surface ships, two or three general purpose submarines, and eight auxiliaries there. Expanded operations in the South China Sea reflected primarily increased submarine patrol activity. [redacted]

Use of Cam Ranh Bay continues to be limited by the lack of bunkering and repair facilities. The Soviets keep a small repair ship and transporter dock there, and the port is a convenient stopover for ships operating in the South China Sea or en route to or from the Indian Ocean. Soviet ships, however, receive their logistic support from naval auxiliaries deployed to the area. Marginal improvements at Cam Ranh, such as the expansion of berthing space, were taking place at the end of the year. In addition, imagery shows that the Soviets delivered an 8,500-ton floating drydock to Ho Chi Minh City and have been using the facilities there for upkeep on small naval auxiliaries. Ho Chi Minh City might relieve a small part of the burden imposed by the loss of access to Singapore. [redacted]

**The Mediterranean Sea**

Soviet ship-days in the Mediterranean declined about 3 percent. Generally, the squadron included 44 or 45 ships, about half of them auxiliaries. For much of the year, there were no amphibious ships in the region, and there was generally one less submarine present than in 1981. The presence of surface combatants (including patrol craft) rose about 10 percent—less than might have been expected, given the tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. [redacted]

Soviet reaction to the crisis in Lebanon and the subsequent augmentation of US forces in the eastern Mediterranean was a moderate reinforcement of the squadron, similar to that of June-July 1981. [redacted]

[redacted] Moscow moved several large combatants to the eastern Mediterranean and established surveillance of US battle groups. Two cruisers and the commander of the squadron remained in or near Tartus, Syria, until early September. In addition, a patrol was maintained off the coast of Lebanon. Activities highlighting Moscow's commitment to Syria did not include a joint naval exercise as they did in July 1981. [redacted]

Soviet combatants called in Libya five times during 1982, building on the naval ties established during 1981, and conducted a joint exercise with Libyan naval forces in October. Late in December, [redacted] a J-class cruise missile submarine (SSG) and a repair ship called in Tobruk, the first time either type of ship had visited Libya. The repair ship stayed until mid-February 1983, suggesting the possibility that Moscow may hope to establish an upkeep capability in Tobruk similar to that in Tartus. The Soviets have never fully compensated for the loss of facilities in Egypt<sup>4</sup>—particularly for the overhaul of submarines, which come from the Northern Fleet—and would welcome the opportunity to exploit Qadhafi's sense of vulnerability. We believe that they are wary of his unpredictability, however—as the abrupt withdrawal of the repair ship during US naval maneuvers in the central Mediterranean demonstrated—and will be cautious in their pursuit of naval ties with his regime. [redacted]

**Atlantic Ocean**

Ship-days in the Atlantic, which include many inter-fleet transfers and transits to operating areas, declined less than 1 percent. In 1982 there were generally about 38 ships deployed to the Atlantic, including eight SSBNs, 10 general purpose submarines, two major surface combatants, and 17 auxiliary or research ships. Changes in the composition of forces deployed to the Atlantic included an 8-percent rise in the presence of general purpose submarines and a decline in the patrol time of SSBNs. Soviet activity focused on normal spring training for the Northern Fleet, including defense of SSBNs and their patrol areas. Naval forces also monitored US SSBN transit routes and Western naval exercises. [redacted]

**Caribbean Sea**

Soviet presence in the Caribbean declined more than 10 percent, largely because only part of the stay of the Caribbean task group took place in 1982. The group, which included a cruiser, a frigate, and a T-class SS,

<sup>4</sup> Soviet submarines are serviced in Syria and Yugoslavia, and occasionally in Algeria. Naval auxiliaries and combatants are repaired in Tunisia, and the Greek Government has permitted individual contracts for repair of auxiliaries at designated ship-yards. [redacted]

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arrived in early December. The ships were in Havana for the celebration of Cuban Armed Forces Day and conducted ASW operations near Cienfuegos, as they have done in the past. The surface combatants also operated in the Gulf of Mexico. Joint training with Cuban naval forces complements Moscow's continued support for the upgrading of Castro's navy. For much of the year, the Soviets also kept a research ship and an auxiliary in the region. [redacted]

**West African Waters**

An 80-percent increase in ship-days off West Africa marked the revitalization of the West African patrol after three years of declining Soviet presence. According to reports from Western air patrols, a diesel submarine rejoined the contingent in the spring of 1982, and a major surface combatant and an amphibious ship operated in the region for much of the year. At least one mine warfare ship was present regularly to patrol the fisheries protection zone that was established in 1980 off Morocco. [redacted]

Soviet ships off West Africa have generally been relatively inactive, spending considerable time in either Luanda, Angola, or Conakry, Guinea. This pattern held in 1982, but additional port calls emphasized Soviet political interests:

- In July a Moskva-class helicopter cruiser and its escorts called at Lagos, Nigeria, marking the first Soviet naval visit since 1976.
- Soviet ships made several calls to Mocamedes, Angola.
- A V-II-class SSN operated off West Africa in November and called in Luanda. Earlier calls by V-class SSNs have been part of their transits to the Indian Ocean. [redacted]

The West African patrol contributed little to the marginal Soviet response to the Falkland Islands crisis. The diesel submarine may have monitored the northern leg of the British transit to Ascension Island. Intelligence collection ships (AGIs) watched part of the transit and British activity at Ascension—where Soviet AGIs periodically collect against US missile tests. The surface combatants for the most part remained in their normal operating patterns. [redacted]

**Outlook**

We do not expect dramatic statistical changes in Soviet deployments to distant waters in 1983. We expect to see continued experimentation with general purpose submarines as their availability increases, particularly in the Pacific. SSBN ship-days may remain below earlier totals as units are dismantled to comply with SALT limitations and as the Y-class submarines age. [redacted]

Barring changes in US force levels in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets will continue to adjust their commitment there to reflect the lower level of tension and increased commitments elsewhere, such as the South China Sea. Soviet naval forces have already played a part in responding to the continuing crisis in Lebanon, but the level of reinforcement has not yet been sufficient to create an overall increase in Mediterranean ship-days. We believe that Moscow will pursue naval access in vulnerable Third World states such as Libya and Seychelles, but the level of its overseas deployments will not depend on the success of these efforts. [redacted]

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





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**Figure 1**  
**Features of Projected East German Army Reorganization**

**Motorized Rifle Regiment**  
(in motorized rifle and tank divisions)



**Tank Regiment**  
(in a tank division)




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**Figure 2**  
**Projected Increase in Self-Propelled Artillery in the East German Army**



This chart depicts the projected increase in self-propelled artillery through 1990 if the reorganization continues at the present pace.

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**Tank Regiments.** The reorganization of MRRs also may presage a change in the organization of the East German tank regiment (TR) to conform more closely to the Soviet pattern of creating combined-arms formations within the division. If so, the principal change would be to expand the motorized rifle companies to battalions in each TR for both tank divisions. To implement this change would require approximately 2,000 men and 198 BMPs.


**Equipment Modernization**

While the East German Army is shifting its equipment holdings as a result of reorganization, it is simultaneously modernizing its forces by adding SP artillery and fielding an improved version of the T-72 tank.


**Artillery.** The artillery regiment of one of the two tank divisions recently replaced a battalion of D-30s with self-propelled artillery and now consists of one battalion of 152-mm SP howitzers and two battalions of 122-mm SP howitzers.

**Figure 3**  
**Soviet Self-Propelled Howitzers**

M-1974 122-mm



M-1973 152-mm



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We expect that the other tank division's artillery regiments will convert to all self-propelled systems within the year. Only one artillery regiment of the four motorized rifle divisions currently has SP artillery (one battalion of 152-mm howitzers); we expect the introduction of self-propelled systems in such units to continue gradually through the 1990s.

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The fielding of the 122-mm SP howitzers in East German divisional artillery regiments does not reflect current Soviet practice. In Soviet forces in East Germany, these howitzers are used only in maneuver regiments; divisional artillery regiments use the heavier 152-mm SP howitzers. This structure and the slow pace in fielding this equipment probably reflect East German budgetary constraints (this equipment has been available for purchase for eight years). We believe that the current structure is an interim measure and that at least one of the two battalions of 122-mm SP howitzers will be replaced with 152-mm SP howitzers as additional funds are made available. The replaced howitzers probably would be added to the inventory of self-propelled weapons in the MRRs.

[Redacted]


**Tanks.** The T-72 tank was first introduced into one tank battalion of an East German tank division in 1979. In 1982 an improved T-72 variant, the M-1980/1, was sighted for the first time in a different battalion of this division. The introduction of what appears to be a second and possibly a third battalion of T-72s still leaves the vast majority of East German tank battalions equipped with older T-55 tanks. We estimate that improved T-72s will continue to be fielded over the next eight to 10 years, gradually replacing the older T-55s (see figure 4).

**Evaluation**

The reorganization of the East German MRR is similar to that undertaken by the Soviet forces in Germany in the mid-1970s. During that period artillery batteries in Soviet MRRs were expanded to battalions, artillery battalions were added to tank regiments, self-propelled artillery was introduced, and new-model tanks entered the ground forces. Soviet tank regiments also expanded their motorized rifle companies to battalion size.

Additional artillery provides the suppressive firepower the Soviets want for countering the proliferation of NATO antitank weapons. When self-propelled, it provides the survivability and flexibility for surprise attacks, for the mobile battle and meeting engagement, and for the subsequent exploitation operations during which artillery must be able to keep up with

**Figure 4**  
**Projected Increase in T-72 Variants in the East German Army**



This chart depicts the projected increase in T-72 variants if they continue to be introduced at the current rate.

[Redacted]

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tanks and armored personnel carriers. The tank modernization is an effort to keep pace with NATO tank and antitank developments.

East Germany's adoption of a similar pattern of reorganization and modernization is in response to Soviet pressure to upgrade its forces. The current program indicates that East Germany will continue to lead the other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in the purchase of modern ground force equipment.

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## Briefs

### Sino-Soviet Talks in Moscow End

The Soviet Union and China, while continuing to expand their bilateral contacts, still appear to be talking past each other to a large extent on the key issues dividing them. A Chinese party official has disclosed that at the recently concluded talks in Moscow the Soviets proposed a nonaggression pact and mutual force reductions along the Sino-Soviet border, but excluded Soviet forces in Mongolia from the deal. The Chinese are said to have responded by reiterating their standard preconditions for a normalization of relations. Both sides have, in the meantime, hardened their public positions on the troop cut issue—the Soviets, by pointing to US activities and the prospects of a Japanese military buildup as complicating factors; the Chinese, by raising the SS-20 redeployment issue.

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The correct atmospherics surrounding the talks and the fact that both sides are keeping quiet about the precise nature of their exchanges suggest that some new initiatives may have been tabled that they want to pursue. Beijing is, of course, almost certain to reject any Soviet initiative on mutual force reductions as long as Soviet forces in Mongolia are excluded. Moscow, for its part, seems determined to avoid any discussion of third-party issues at bilateral talks with the Chinese. The Soviets may, however, be hinting at an interest in parallel agreements between the USSR and China on the one hand, and China and Mongolia on the other, that would see the contracting parties:

- Sign a nonaggression pact with each other.
- Agree on certain confidence-building measures akin to the commitments the USSR has made in the West.
- Reach an understanding on troop cuts/withdrawals in the Far East.

We would, in any event, expect both sides to negotiate long and hard on these or any other matters directly related to their security interests.

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### Gromyko's New Post (U)

Foreign Minister Gromyko's promotion to first deputy premier last month increased his status and gave him broad authority over the entire foreign policy establishment. It also strengthened Andropov's position in the Council of Ministers Presidium, which oversees the government bureaucracy.

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Gromyko's seniority on the Politburo makes him the most senior of three first deputy premiers. His promotion diminishes the authority of Premier Tikhonov, who has not been closely allied with Andropov and was on an official visit to Yugoslavia when the announcement was made.

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### Soviet Union: Soil Moisture in Major Grain-Producing Areas



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**Mid-April Crop  
Conditions** 

(During the Soviet crop season—April to October—the USSR Monthly Review will provide a brief update of the status of the 1983 crop.)

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Crop conditions as of mid-April indicate that 1983 winter grain production in the USSR is likely to be somewhat below the recent estimated five-year average of some 60 million tons. This analysis is based principally on a small planted area and poor growing conditions since last fall in several key crop-producing regions. Winter grains normally account for about one-third of the total Soviet grain harvest.

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many winter grainfields in the southern crop areas had emerged from dormancy in poor condition. Stands were thin, growth was uneven, and many fields were being resown with spring grains. Dry soil conditions were evident across much of the region, corroborating meteorological data and ground observations by the US Agricultural Counselor. There is still time for the crops to overcome some of these problems, but even a modest improvement will require ideal growing conditions during the next two months.

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The generally poor crop prospects in the southern European USSR have been partially offset by favorable conditions further north, where winter rye predominates. Sowing in this region was generally completed within the optimum time periods, and adequate soil moisture levels have been maintained through the winter. With spring fieldwork just recently under way, it is still too early to make even a preliminary forecast of total 1983 Soviet grain output.

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On 10 March, Army Gen. Vladimir Tolubko, Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and a Deputy Defense Minister, announced in Moscow that the Soviet Union possesses a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that is "currently in the testing stage." Earlier, in the February issue of the party journal *Kommunist*, Tolubko had alluded to the likelihood of such a development. His announcement probably is part of the continuing Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at derailing US GLCM and Pershing II deployment in Europe. The fact that Tolubko, and not one of the other deputy defense ministers, such as Army Gen. Vasily Petrov, Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, made the announcement may indicate that the SRF eventually will have a long-range GLCM in its inventory.<sup>1</sup>

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**Soviets Testing  
GLCM** 

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**Military  
Promotions** 

The military newspaper *Red Star* announced on 26 March the first promotions of top military leaders since Brezhnev's death last November. No changes in assignments were included. Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services Kurkotkin, Deputy Minister of Defense for Ground Forces Petrov, and First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev are the first officers since 1978 to become Marshals of the Soviet Union. Deputy Minister of Defense for Strategic Rocket Forces Tolubko was made a Chief Marshal of Artillery.

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<sup>1</sup> In late March, Tolubko was promoted to Chief Marshal of Artillery and Petrov to Marshal of the Soviet Union.

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The four promotions show the leadership's general approval of the military and are in contrast to recent dismissals of high officials in other ministries. Akhromeyev's promotion marks him for a new post at the level of a Deputy Minister of Defense. He could even become a candidate to succeed Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov if a reshuffle occurs. [redacted]

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**Hungarian Lectures  
on Management** [redacted]

The Hungarian First Deputy Minister of Industry recently addressed a Soviet high-level course on economic management at the Academy of the National Economy of the Council of Ministers. The audience included leading representatives of agriculture, food, light industry, trade, and transport. This reportedly is the first time a non-Soviet lecturer has addressed such a group. [redacted]

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The event highlights the seriousness with which the leadership is studying the applicability of Hungarian economic practices. Previous indications have included favorable references to Hungarian and other East European economic reform measures, particularly those affecting agriculture, in the speeches of Soviet leaders and in the media. Direct exchanges in this area with the Hungarians, however, generally have been at a lower level. The fact that the speaker represented Hungary's industrial sector confirms that the Soviets are interested in a broader range of Hungarian practices than agricultural techniques alone. [redacted]

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**Reorganization in  
Agriculture** [redacted]

The Politburo continues to promote changes in agricultural management and has approved a merger of agriculture-related ministries in two non-Russian republics. A decree in Georgia last month abolished the republic's Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, and the State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture and established a State Committee for Agricultural Production. A similar reorganization was subsequently announced in Estonia. [redacted]

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Georgian and Estonian officials had publicly lobbied for the establishment of a more powerful coordinating body at the republic level than was contemplated in the Food Program reorganization last May. The current decision is a step in that direction. Lack of cooperation between the now-merged organizations had been a severe problem at the district and farm levels. The change, however, probably will complicate relations between the republics and Moscow, where there is as yet no organizational counterpart. [redacted]

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**New Wage System  
for Agriculture** [redacted]

At its 11 March meeting, the Politburo stressed the need for the "collective contract" system of wage payments in agriculture. This system has been strongly supported by Mikhail Gorbachev, party Secretary in charge of agriculture, and Ziya Nuriyev, head of the USSR's Commission for Questions of the Agro-Industrial Complex. In the contract wage scheme, the farm supplies machinery

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and other inputs to a group of workers who agree to meet specific output targets. Workers receive cash advances during the growing season with a final settlement after the harvest depending on crop yields and animal productivity. The goal is to eliminate piecework and hourly wages that only reward the quantity of work done and give workers no stake in the size of the harvest. [redacted]

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According to Soviet press reports, experimental use of the contract system has resulted in higher crop yields and lower production costs. Experiments also suggest that there are large obstacles to successful widespread use, especially for schemes that give the group of workers a relatively free hand in managing production. Farms often do not supply inputs reliably. Many workers lack the skill to manage crop production and to use and maintain machinery efficiently. Moreover, workers have had little incentive to form contract teams in recent years because in poor crop years they earn more under an hourly wage system. [redacted]

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**KGB Interest in Western Agricultural Technology** [redacted]

[redacted] the KGB in 1982 added Western agricultural and food-processing technology to its list of collection requirements. We believe targets include genetic engineering techniques, agrochemical processes, crop varieties, livestock breeds, and agricultural equipment. Though most of this technology is available through trade, certain patented processes and advanced components are commercial secrets or require export licenses. [redacted]

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Over the past decade, the Soviets have imported large amounts of foreign agricultural technology, but the benefits derived from these purchases have not been as great as might be expected. For example, although factories of foreign design play a large role in bolstering Soviet output of fertilizer, production in these plants consistently falls short of plan. In general, Soviet attempts to absorb Western agricultural technology have not been fully successful because of difficulties in adapting it to Soviet growing conditions and managerial practices. Without a major improvement in Soviet ability to manage high-technology agriculture, efforts to capitalize on Western innovations will only marginally alleviate the Soviet food problem. [redacted]

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**Soviet View on Curtailment of US-USSR Scientific Exchanges** [redacted]

Several prominent Soviet physicists, in a recent conversation with a US physicist, claimed that the decline in scientific exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union has had a detrimental effect on their ability to acquire applied experimental research information. The Soviets admitted that in the past there was an unfair information exchange ratio of 9 to 1 in favor of the USSR. They viewed the lack of such information as a significant loss but stated that the decline in scientific exchanges has had little effect in the area of basic unapplied theoretical physics, where the information exchange ratio was estimated to be 1 for 1. [redacted]

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**Prospects for  
Central Asian  
Migration**

Recent Soviet surveys make clear that large-scale migration from labor-surplus rural areas in Central Asia during the 1980s to labor-deficit Slavic areas is unlikely. Reasons cited for the lack of mobility among the indigenous nationalities include inadequate vocational training for industry, poor command of Russian language, lack of urban housing for the typical large family, strong cultural ties, and negative perceptions of industrial employment.

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There is also a positive incentive for most Central Asians to stay put. Because of the large number of family members working on collective and state farms and the heavy involvement in private farming, households of rural- and urban-type settlement areas generally enjoy a higher standard of living than those in most Central Asian cities, except the republic capitals. Indeed, the larger Central Asian cities have attracted migrants from labor-deficit regions of the USSR because of employment opportunities and lifestyle.

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