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**Terrorism Review** 

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1 November 1984


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GI TR 84-023 1 November 1984

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22: CIA-RDP85-01095R000100160002-6 Significant Developments 25X1 Italy **Indictments Handed Down in Papal Case** On 26 October in Rome, Investigating Magistrate Ilario Martella announced his decision to indict three Bulgarians and four Turks on charges of complicity in the 1981 attempt to kill Pope John Paul II. Mehmet Ali Agca, currently serving a life sentence for the shooting, will stand trial on a new charge of illegally importing the weapon he used. The deposition reportedly disclosed that ballistic tests and an examination of the trajectory of the shots indicated that a third bullet—which has never been found—was fired, and accused alleged Turkish coconspirator Oral Celik, currently at large, of being the second gunman. No trial date has been set. 25X1 25X1 **SISMI Linked to Terrorism** 

according to the Italian news agency ANSA, a number of former SISMI officials have been arrested for various alleged misdeeds; some are also under investigation in connection with the 1980 Bologna railroad station bombing. 25X1

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#### **Portugal**

#### FP-25 Members Face Trial But Group Goes on Bombing

On 15 October the Lisbon prosecutor's office charged 78 people, including Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, a hero of the 1974 Portuguese Revolution, with membership in the terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25). Fifty of those charged were already in prison, and all but Carvalho and one other had been on a hunger strike protesting their close confinement. With the conclusion of the judicial preliminaries, the prisoners were transferred to the normal prison regime, whereupon the hunger strikers declared victory and began eating again. The trials will not begin for at least four months, to allow the defendants time to prepare.

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On the same day, FP-25 members remaining at large tried to bomb five Frenchowned business facilities—four banks and an insurance agency—claiming solidarity with the Spanish Basque separatist terrorists. Only two of the bombs exploded (they were made of old dynamite), and police believe them to be the work of second-stringers just trying to demonstrate that FP-25 remains operational.

#### **RPG Attack Against US Embassy Misfires**

On 29 October in Lisbon, two rocket-propelled grenades (bazooka rounds) mounted on an improvised laucher and aimed at the new US Embassy were discovered by children playing in a nearby vacant lot. The device had misfired, owing to a malfunction in the electrical detonating system. No one claimed credit for the aborted attack, although FP-25 may have been responsible. Two days earlier, a telephone caller representing himself as a member of FP-25 had falsely reported a car bomb attack against the Embassy.

#### Cyprus

#### Bombs Defused at Libyan People's Bureau

In Nicosia, police defused two explosive devices found at the Libyan Cultural Center and People's Bureau. Each bomb consisted of two 15-kilogram gas cylinders sandwiched around 1 kilogram of explosives. Although no group claimed responsibility, the devices may have been planted by the Musa Sadr Brigade, a terrorist splinter of the Lebanese Shia group Amal that blames Libya for the disappearance of its religious leader in 1978 and that has previously attacked Libyan diplomatic interests in Europe.

#### West African Coast

#### Polisario Turns to Piracy

Off the coast of Western Sahara, armed men operating from one or more assault rafts have attacked commercial shipping and fishing vessels in four separate raids beginning in late September. So far, a Togolese cargo ship, two Moroccan fishing trawlers, and an oceangoing tug of unidentified registry have been struck by rocket-grenade and small-arms fire. One of the Moroccan trawlers was set afire, and seven of its Portuguese crewmen were injured; the other three vessels apparently suffered only minor damage and no casualties. The attackers were probably members of Polisario, the anti-Moroccan Western Saharan liberation movement. The raids may have been timed to coincide with the major land offensive Polisario launched in Western Sahara on 13 October.

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#### Captive Priests Released Unharmed

On 19 October in Mayom, the three priests captured by the insurgent group Anya Nya II on 4 September were released unharmed. The American, British, and Sudanese clergymen said that the disorganized rebel band that had originally captured them, during an attack on the town of Bentiu, decided to free them five days later, but, before it could do so, it was intercepted by a larger force, which took over custody of the priests and tried unsuccessfully to extract a ransom from the Sudanese Government and Catholic Church.

Sri Lanka

#### Capital Rocked by 10 Tamil Terrorist Bombs

On the morning of 22 October in Colombo, 10 explosions killed three persons and wounded 11 others. Three additional bombs were found by Army bomb disposal units. The targets included railway stations, road junctions, and residential areas. One bomb went off near an art gallery where President Jayewardene was scheduled to appear that evening and a second detonated near the home of a staunch anti-Tamil government minister. The bombs were placed by Tamil separatist terrorists who were hoping to draw government security forces back from the north toward the capital.

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<b>Anti-US Terror</b>	ism
<b>So Far in 1984</b>	

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With three-quarters of the year now over, our data suggest that the number of significant anti-American terrorist attacks in 1984 will remain roughly equal to the level experienced in the previous three years. No large-scale anti-US terrorist campaign has materialized, either worldwide or within a particular region,

Nevertheless, the continuation of the trend toward more lethal attacks is cause for great concern.

There were about 75 significant attacks against US citizens or property in each of the last three years. So far in 1984, 61 anti-US attacks have occurred. Bombings continued to be the predominant form of attack, the most spectacular being the 20 September suicide vehicle bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut (table 1). Armed attacks and kidnapings have become more frequent in 1984, however, contributing to a US casualty rate that on an annual basis exceeds our annual losses in the years prior to 1983, when a tragic record in US terrorist casualties was set as the result of the two vehicle bombing attacks in Beirut that killed 267 US citizens and wounded 105.

We have identified no fewer than 25 groups as having been responsible for 51 of the 61 significant anti-US incidents that occurred so far this year. (We do not know who committed the other 10 attacks.) The fact that so many groups attack US targets is one major reason it is so hard for the United States to reduce the terrorist threat to its interests. Counterterrorist successes in one nation—or even throughout one

region—will only slightly reduce the overall incidence of anti-US attacks. Moreover, political violence is endemic in many parts of the Third World, and the presence in almost every country of American citizens and property creates readily available targets for terrorists. The frequently close association between the US Government and local regimes, as well as between US business interests and the established economic order, make US targets a logical choice for insurgents or terrorists seeking to destroy the status quo.

#### The Regional Breakdown

Although the frequency of significant anti-US attacks has remained basically constant, the geographic distribution has changed dramatically.

In the Middle East—by far the most dangerous region for the United States—significant attacks jumped from four in 1982 to 14 in 1983. In the first nine months of this year, there have already been 13 serious attacks in the Middle East. Since terrorism in the Middle East has been more lethal than in other regions, it is not surprising that the increasing number of anti-US attacks there has been accompanied by a lengthening list of US casualties.

The increased terrorism against US interests in the region was almost entirely the work of opponents of US policies in Lebanon. Ten of the 13 Middle Eastern incidents occurred in Lebanon; all, we believe, were committed by Shia extremists supported by Iran. Four of the incidents were kidnapings; three of the four victims—a US Embassy officer and three private US citizens—are still being held. Two of the incidents in Lebanon were assassination attempts; one resulted in the death of the president of the American University of Beirut. The three incidents that occurred outside Lebanon all took place in Jordan.

the Syrian-backed Abu Nidal Group may have been responsible for all of them.

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<sup>&#</sup>x27;Significant attacks include all those that caused—or were designed to cause—casualties; kidnapings and barricade situations where hostages were taken; terrorist hijackings and skyjackings; and robberies, sabotage, armed attacks, arson, and bombings that caused—or were designed to cause—\$10,000 or more in losses or property damage

Table 1 Significant Terrorist Attacks on US Targets, January-September 1984

Region	Total	Type of Attac	ck			US Casualties
		Shootings	Bombings	Kidnapings	Sabotage/Arson	_
Worldwide	61	16	29	10	6	10 killed
						27 wounded
						15 kidnaped
Europe	7	3	2		2	1 killed
				_		2 wounded
Middle East	13	4	5	4		4 killed
						23 wounded
						4 kidnaped
Central America	5	2	2	1		2 killed
						1 kidnaped
South America	25	5	17		3	None
Africa	7	2	1	3	1	3 killed
						2 wounded
						6 kidnaped
Asia	3		1	2		4 kidnaped
North America	1		1			None

Table 2 Types of US Targets Attacked,<sup>a</sup> January-September 1984

	Total	Official	Military	Commercial	Other
Worldwide	61	19	6	25	11
Europe	7	4	2	1	
Middle East	13	5	3	1	4
Central America	5	1	1	1	2
South America	25	7		18	
Africa	7			3	4
Asia	3	2			1
North America	1			1	

<sup>a</sup> Including personnel and facilities.

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In Western Europe, in contrast to the Middle East, anti-American terrorism is in the third year of a steady decline-43 significant attacks were recorded in 1982, 26 in 1983, and only seven so far in 1984. Most of the attacks on US interests in Western Europe in recent years have been conducted by small, autonomous groups of leftists interested mainly in scoring propaganda victories by setting off homemade bombs. The decline in the number of such attacks is due in part to some counterterrorist successes by the authorities in West Germany and Italy, where many of the anti-US attacks were previously occurring. Moreover, some terrorist groups redirected their efforts against other than US targets. It is also true, however, that terrorism of this sort tends to occur in waves, and we may simply be in a statistical trough.

Despite the generally successful counterterrorist effort by West European governments, three assassination attempts in 1984 indicated that several hardcore, dedicated terrorist groups retain a capability to make lethal attacks on Americans. In February, Leamon R. Hunt, the US civilian head of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers, was murdered in Rome by an element of the Red Brigades. In March, the US Consul in Strasbourg was wounded by a gunman; the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction—a shadowy group that has primarily targeted Americans in recent yearsclaimed credit. In April, a US Air Force sergeant was seriously wounded in Greece by the Revolutionary Organization of 17 November. Although few in number, such attacks demonstrate that the United States continues to face a serious terrorist threat in Western Europe.

In South America, significant terrorist attacks against Americans in 1984 have increased in frequency but—in contrast to the Middle East and Western Europe—not in lethality. Most of the attacks this year were bombings conducted late at night by insurgent groups against facilities of US business firms and, secondarily, against US diplomatic installations. In Colombia, eight attacks against US targets have been conducted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) so far this year, more than by any other insurgent group in the world.

Table 3
Leading Victims of Signficant
International Terrorist Incidents,
January-September 1984

Nation	Number of Attacks		
France	69		
United States	61		
Israel a	32		
United Kingdom	21		
Soviet Union b	16		
Jordan	13		
West Germany	12		
Turkey	11		

<sup>a</sup> Attacks against Israeli military forces and installations in southern Lebanon and the occupied territories are not included.
<sup>b</sup> Attacks against Soviet military forces and installations in Afghanistan are not included. Data concerning attacks by Afghan rebels against Soviet civilian targets in Afghanistan are believed to be incomplete.

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Another Colombian group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), attacked US corporate targets four times. In Chile, six bombings of property owned by private US citizens in 1984 were part of a wave of terrorist violence by several groups opposed to the current Chilean regime. Almost all of the rest of the incidents took place in Peru, where the Maoist Sendero Luminoso has attacked US targets three times so far this year, and a previously unknown group, the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru, strafed the US Embassy and attacked the offices of both AP and UPI last September.

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In Central America, anti-US terrorism remained at a low ebb, despite reports that various insurgent groups continue to plot attacks. Two American civilians were killed in Central America this year, but they were not the intended victims. Instead, they got caught in terrorist attacks directed against local targets—an ambush of a bus in January by insurgents in El Salvador, and the bombing of a press conference held by anti-Sandinista leader Eden Pastora in Nicaragua

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in May. A rightwing group in Guatemala was responsible for the kidnaping of a Peace Corps volunteer in August. The low number of attacks in 1984 in part reflects the success a number of Central American nations have had in combating insurgents. It is also apparent, however, that most Central American insurgent groups are currently disinclined to attack US targets. The guerrillas in El Salvador, for example, have chosen to focus on domestic targets, rather than to undertake a terrorist campaign against US interests.

In the rest of the world, Americans continue to be only occasional targets—more frequently, incidental victims-of politically motivated violence. Three incidents involving US citizens occurred in southern Sudan where dissidents are attempting to drive Westerners out of the country to undermine Sudan's economy and weaken the Nimieri regime. Three attacks took place in southern Africa, including a bombing by SWAPO in Namibia in which two US officials were killed, and a kidnaping by UNITA in Angola in which five Americans were captured along with a number of other foreigners. The Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka conducted their first anti-US attack in May when they kidnaped two US AID workers. They later released the hostages unransomed and unharmed.

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The Current Terrorist Thre	
Against the United States	

We believe there is a continuing threat of serious incidents of anti-American terrorism during the next few months:

- number of terrorist groups with established capabilities are contemplating specific terrorist actions against US citizens and facilities—particularly in Lebanon.
- The latest Beirut suicide bombing signals Iran's continuing willingness to use terrorism to attempt to force the United States out of Lebanon and serves as well as a powerful example and possible incentive to users of terrorism in other countries.
- The US Presidential election offers an inviting opportunity for terrorist groups to try to influence the campaign and perhaps even the voting results, as Iran attempted to do through the hostage crisis four years ago.

Any worsening of anti-US terrorism would most likely come in the form of higher casualties rather than more attacks. Actually, about the same number of terrorist attacks against US persons and facilities around the world occurred during the first nine months of this year as occurred during the comparable periods of the past several years. Increasingly, however, the terrorist weapon of choice has been the large bomb—including the vehicle bomb—especially in the Middle East, and in view of the "success" of this tactic, more of the same can be expected. Although diplomatic and military personnel and property would be the most likely targets, many Middle Eastern and European terrorist groups have shown a growing willingness to attack educators, businessmen, and other nonofficial targets.

#### The Middle East

Terrorist attacks producing very high casualties are most likely in the Middle East. Numerous

experienced terrorist groups in the region have demonstrated the will and ability to attack US persons and facilities, either at their own discretion or at the behest of some state patron. Many of these groups possess extensive support networks among the indigenous populations and can count as well on help from collaborating states like Iran, Syria, and Libya.

The most serious threats continue to come from Iranian-inspired groups operating under the nom de guerre of Islamic Jihad—in some cases possibly supported by Palestinian groups such as the PFLP-General Command or by the Iranian Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard). Among these groups the radical Shias in Lebanon have done the most damage to US targets in the past two years. Dedicated to eliminating the US presence in Lebanon and willing to sacrifice the lives of their members to accomplish this goal, they were responsible, we believe, for the three major terrorist attacks against US facilities in Beirut. Iran has provided religious indoctrination, military training, and material support to Shia sympathizers from many parts of the Middle East. This support has enabled them to conduct successful, sophisticated terrorist operations, particularly in the chaotic atmosphere of Lebanon.

Although threatening statements issued in the name of Islamic Jihad have preceded some attacks, many other threats—or reports of plans to attack—have not panned out; thus it is usually very hard to assess the accuracy of individual threats

Moreover, some attacks have occurred without any prior threat or warning, so the mere absence of threats

would not necessarily signal a concomitant absence of menace.

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Iran continues to recruit and train radical Shias from nearly all of the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, and evidence indicates some of these individuals have been infiltrated back into their homelands to conduct terrorist activities. We believe Iran has Shia sympathizers in place for terrorist operations in most of the Gulf states, and Iranian embassies are available to support, plan, and direct attacks:

• In Kuwait, the capabilities of the security forces are improving but remain insufficient to eliminate the terrorist threat. Dawa Party members convicted for the bombings of December 1983 remain in jail in Kuwait, and US interests could be targets of any Iranian attempt to secure their release through extortion. The location of the US Embassy in Kuwait makes it very vulnerable to attack,

 In Bahrain, Iran is continuing its terrorist campaign by training expatriate Bahraini Shias and then trying to infiltrate them back into the country.

The US Navy facility received an anonymous threat from Islamic Jihad early last summer.

• In Iraq, despite a pervasive government security apparatus, there were several Dawa Party attacks against British and French targets during the past year.

• In Saudi Arabia, an attack on Americans seems less likely than in other Gulf states. The Shia community is currently quiescent, and Saudi internal security capabilities have improved.

Iranian-backed terrorism also poses a danger to US interests in places outside Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, primarily in Western Europe.

In contrast to the pro-Iranian Shias, Palestinians currently present a lower threat to US facilities and personnel. Groups within the PLO generally continue to observe Arafat's 1974 ban on terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories. We believe that Arafat would sanction a return to international terrorism only if he felt the survival of the PLO as an organization or his continuation as its leader depended on it. On the other hand, a widening of the schism between pro- and anti-Arafat factions might lead some of the more radical PLO groups to violate the ban.

Whether PLO-connected terrorists would target US interests is another question. The Syrian-controlled group Saiqa may already have done so;

Saiqa may have been the group responsible for detonating a small bomb at the American University of Beirut in March.

Outside the PLO, the Abu Nidal Group (previously known as the Black June Organization), now based in and probably controlled by Syria, poses a serious threat in Jordan and possibly elsewhere. The group, which has staged assassinations and bombings of non-US targets in more than 25 countries, placed bombs

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near US diplomatic facilities in Jordan last August. We believe that Syria is currently using the group—along with the Jordanian Revolutionary People's Party—to maintain pressure on King Hussein not to negotiate with Israel or support Arafat. The recent Jordanian resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt may provoke more terrorist attacks in Jordan, possibly against US targets. Last July a number of US Embassies and other facilities in the Middle East received threats from the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, a covername previously associated with the Abu Nidal Group.

Libyan-backed terrorists became a major international problem again in 1984, after a year of low activity, but none of Tripoli's 25 attacks this year were against US targets. Despite Qadhafi's strident anti-US rhetoric, he appears reluctant to strike at the United States directly. Qadhafi might abandon that reluctance if he were to become convinced that US support for his opponents was seriously threatening him or if he believed himself faced with a direct US challenge. Libya's strong ties with some terrorist groups, the growth of its own terrorist capabilities, and the nation's substantial economic resources give Qadhafi the capability to attack US targets abroad at any time. US personnel and facilities are most vulnerable to Libyan attacks in Western Europe and the Middle East, where Libyan intelligence agents stalking anti-Qadhafi exiles enjoy considerable freedom of movement and can obtain guidance, safehaven, weapons, and explosives from Libyan peoples bureaus (embassies). An act of Libyan terrorism in the United States is conceivable but much less likely, owing to US security measures

Should Qadhafi choose to attack a US target, here or abroad, we believe he would try to work through a non-Libyan surrogate in order to try to conceal Libya's hand.

#### Western Europe

Many of the best known indigenous Marxist-anarchist terrorist groups in the region are no longer as active as they were a few years ago; instead they are on the defensive as the result of aggressive and effective government countermeasures. Nevertheless, such groups still pose a significant threat to US personnel and property in parts of Western Europe.

A major imponderable is the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), a group apparently based in France whose focus on US targets makes it a serious threat to US personnel at any time.

it may be composed of a mixture of leftist Europeans and radical Palestinians. LARF has attacked US and Israeli diplomats sporadically since 1981; most recently it tried to assassinate the US Consul in Strasbourg in March 1984.

The "anti-imperialist" and anti-Israeli French anarchist group Action Directe (AD) was extremely active in Paris last summer, bombing offices of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, the European Space Agency, and targeting the Western European Union. In the past, Action Directe has bombed facilities of private US firms in France. The group, which has access to nearly a ton of TNT stolen from a Belgian quarry in June 1984, recently threatened to attack "symbols of Western Imperialism" by placing five car bombs around Paris.

Although the leftist Red Army Faction (RAF) has not committed a terrorist act since 1981, the capture of six RAF personnel in July 1984 may have prevented the staging of a number of attacks against US and NATO targets in West Germany. Among the targets were several US Army installations in the southern part of the country and about 30 spots along the NATO fuel pipeline. The RAF's surprising ability to recruit new members despite West German police successes makes it a continuing threat to US interests. Another group, the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), has been responsible for most of the recent terrorist acts in West Germany. RZ attacks have consisted mainly of explosive and incendiary harassment bombings. US targets have included both military installations and private commercial facilities.

Red Brigades (BR)

indicate a continuing interest in NATO installations as well as domestic political and military targets. The Red Brigades claimed responsibility for the assassination in Rome last February of Leamon

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Hunt, the US chief of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers. Key members remain at large, and the group continues to reorganize amidst indications that it has improved internal security practices, at least in northern Italy. Even more ominous, recent reforms in the preventive detention system could allow the release of some 300 accused terrorists from prison, including several BR members suspected of being involved in the Aldo Moro kidnaping and murder. Last summer Italy suffered through a spate of small bombings carried out by leftist groups—not necessarily associated with the Red Brigades—against US commercial interests and targets related to the NATO presence.

The October First Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), a small leftwing Spanish group that may number fewer than 10 members, has survived repeated attempts by the Spanish police to destroy it. Its "anti-imperialist" stance may cause it to target US military installations in Spain. The group is known to have gathered data on US military housing complexes associated with the US base at Torrejon, but we believe it lacks the capability to conduct a large-scale attack against such targets. GRAPO did embark last summer on a small-scale bombing campaign that included among its targets the General Motors showroom in Aviles.

The Revolutionary Organization of 17 November, a leftwing Greek terrorist group, remains a serious threat to US personnel and installations. The group, which has labeled the United States "a power of occupation and terrorism," claimed responsibility for the assassination of US Navy Captain Tsantes in late 1983 and the shooting this year of a US military courier.

Turkish police have warned the US Embassy that the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU), a group responsible for assassinating several Americans during the 1970s, although decimated by arrests is still capable of terrorist attacks. Based on MLAPU's past record and the propaganda value an attack on a US target would have, we believe the threat to US servicemen from MLAPU—and perhaps from other Turkish terrorist groups—is still significant.

#### Latin America

Terrorism in Latin America usually occurs in the context of leftist guerrilla insurgencies whose members see the United States as the major supporter and manipulator of the governments they seek to overthrow. The terrorist threat to Americans is probably highest in Colombia, owing to US support for the government's actions against narcotics traffickers and leftist guerrillas. Both the traffickers and the guerrillas have demonstrated the capability and the will to strike back with terrorism against US officials and facilities. The most virulently anti-US group is the Ricardo Franco Front—a faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The front claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in Bogota last May directed primarily against facilities of the US Government and US firms such as ITT and Texaco.

Although there have been relatively few terrorist

Although there have been relatively few terrorist attacks against US targets in El Salvador over the past 10 years, the terrorist threat there appears to be rising. Leftist Salvadoran guerrillas of the Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front have been surveilling US Embassy personnel, especially Marine security guards. According to a recent Embassy report, the guerrillas also intend to launch a terrorist offensive in San Salvador soon. The guerrillas are likely to target US military advisers—as was done in the May 1983 assassination of US Navy Lieutenant Commander Schausleberger—and institutions associated with the US Embassy.

The terrorist threat to US personnel and installations elsewhere in Latin America seems lower, although a scattering of reports and indications prevent complacency:

• In Ecuador,
the leftist group Alfaro
Vive, Carajo, which set off a bomb at the US

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Embassy in Quito in May 1984, indicate the group plans further attacks including a second bombing at the Embassy.

- In Chile, terrorist violence is on the upswing. US commercial facilities have occasionally been victimized by terrorist bombings.
- In Costa Rica, the leftwing terrorist group La Familia was surveilling Embassy personnel last January, as if planning a terrorist operation, but most members of the group have since been arrested.
- In Guatemala, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, which was responsible for anti-American attacks in 1983, reportedly is planning soon to engage in urban terrorism.
- In Bolivia, the US Ambassador's residence was bombed last March by elements believed associated with drug traffickers. According to US officials, a terrorist car bomb attack against the Embassy would be difficult to prevent and could have devastating results.
- In Argentina, rightist frustration prompted threats against US installations during President Alfonsin's just concluded visit to Washington.

#### Africa

The only serious terrorist threat to US personnel and facilities in Africa is likely to come from hostile Libyan-sponsored groups, mainly in countries that stretch south and east from Libya itself:

•	In Chad, with French troops in the process of	
	bulling out, US facilities in the capital may be at	
	gréater risk.	
		_

•	In Sudan, Libyan-sponsored dissidents	in	the	south
	probably represent the greatest threat.			

- In Ethiopia, through which most of Tripoli's aid to the Sudanese rebels is funneled, a large Libyan infrastructure could carry out attacks on American diplomats with little or no warning. A house in Addis Ababa occupied by Libyans who were building a bomb blew up on 11 May, just after the resolution of the siege of the Libyan People's Bureau in London.
- In Zaire, US facilities are at some risk of attack from Zairian exiles operating out of neighboring states; they are receiving support and guidance from Libya.

Elsewhere in Africa, the threats are more difficult to assess. Small pockets of Islamic fundamentalists exist in various parts of northern Africa, such as northern Nigeria, and if they decided—or were persuaded—to attack US interests, we might have little or no warning. Militating against such a development is the fact that these groups are closely watched by host governments, which view them as threats to regime stability. In other African countries, such as Uganda, a combination of inadequate security and endemic political violence poses a continuing low-level threat to official and nonofficial US personnel and installations.

Asia the history of terrorist

attacks in the region suggests that American interests in some countries may nevertheless be at some risk. The most significant threat is in South Asia; elsewhere the threat seems to be lower:

• In Pakistan, the leftwing dissident group Al-Zulfikar has recently targeted US interests. In December 1983, for example, Al-Zulfikar members were apprehended while planning to kill the US Consul General in Lahore. Members of another Al-Zulfikar cell were arrested in Vienna last summer after planning to seize American hostages there and in Rome. 25X1

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- In Sri Lanka, Tamil terrorist groups represent an increasing threat to US personnel and facilities.
   Since May, an American US AID couple has been kidnaped, the hotel housing the Israeli Interests
   Section of the US Embassy has been bombed, and the main US AID office was the object of a planned bombing.
- In Bangladesh, a new threat could grow out of an "Islamic Jihad Organization" with reported ties to both Libya and Iran. The group has stated its intention to attack "un-Islamic" Western targets, beginning later this year.

•	n Japan, the leftwing radical group Chukaku-ha
	Nucleus Faction) conducted a series of minor
	rebombings against lightly guarded US facilities
,	ast summer,

- In Korea, the threat to US installations also seems to center on firebombings. Three American cultural facilities there have been attacked in this fashion since 1982. South Korean dissidents are thought to have been responsible for the bombings, which killed or injured several South Koreans.
- In the Philippines, anti-Marcos violence by the Communist New People's Army could affect US interests with little or no warning. The last attack against American servicemen was in 1971, but the United States remains a high-visibility target because of its many military and diplomatic installations.

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## Syria and the Shia Extremists in Lebanon

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Throughout 1984, Syrian relations with the radical Shia groups in Lebanon have fluctuated between cooperation and confrontation. Although Syria has restricted the activities of the radical Shias during periods of tension, it has neither tried to expel them from their strongholds nor moved to reduce their capabilities significantly. In the wake of the 20 September bombing of the US Embassy Annex in Beirut, for example, Syria appeared to be about to crack down severely on the activities of the Hizballah in the Bekaa Valley. After an initial show of force, however, Damascus backed away again. It now appears that Damascus is trying to establish a degree of control over the radical Shias so they can be usedlike Palestinian groups such as Saiqa and the Abu Nidal Group—to serve Syrian interests.

In our judgment, even if Syria were to try to totally stifle the Hizballah, it would not succeed. Shia terrorists, in Beirut at least, would retain sufficient capabilities to pose a continuing threat to Syrian interests as well as Israeli and Western interests. The Syrian policy of attempting to co-opt the Shia extremists may be in part a pragmatic response to the government's recognition of its inability to completely control them and of the consequent dangers of trying to do so.

#### The Origins of the Shia Extremists

Although Muslims of the Shia branch of Islam constitute the largest confessional group in Lebanon, they have never shared equitably in the nation's wealth or the exercise of political power; instead, Christians and Sunni Muslims have dominated the political scene and enjoyed a disproportionate share of the wealth. Shia resentment began to crystallize in the mid-1970s under the charismatic leadership of the Imam Musa Sadr, who demanded economic and

political reforms to redress Shia grievances. The political-military organization that he founded, known as Amal (Hope), encouraged the Shias to abandon their traditional passivity and improve their situation by political and religious activism. The Iranian revolution in December 1979 and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon (where Shias predominate) in June 1982 galvanized the Shias and set the stage for the emergence of radical groups prone to terrorism.

Iran, for its part, selected Lebanon as a prime target for the export of an Iranian-style fundamentalist Islamic revolution. The growing radical Shia movement made Lebanon fertile ground for Iran's Islamic fundamentalism, and chronic instability and violence has left Lebanon vulnerable to subversion.

Iran expanded its relations with Lebanese Shias soon after the Israeli invasion in June 1982. Iranian clerics went to Lebanon to provide religious indoctrination to the Shias and recruited some for further training in Iran. About 800 Iranian Revolutionary Guards also went to Lebanon, where they began to provide political and religious indoctrination and military training, including instruction in terrorist tactics. The Revolutionary Guards, based in the Bekaa Valley, also began to supply financial support and materiel to their Lebanese clients. At the same time, officials in

<sup>1</sup> The Imam Musa Sadr vanished during a trip to Libya in 1978. Many of his followers suspect Libyan foul play. As a consequence, a terrorist group known as the Musa Sadr Brigade, reportedly a faction of Amal, occasionally attacks Libyan targets in Lebanon and elsewhere.

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the Iranian Embassy in Damascus established more than half were directed against elements of the themselves as the coordinators of Tehran's activities MNF, including the devastating vehicle bombings of in Lebanon. the US and French contingents, which together took 299 lives. US and French diplomatic interests also Although some of the pro-Iranian Shia extremist were attacked frequently; the most serious event of groups, known collectively as the Hizballah (Party of that type was the bombing of the US Embassy in God), are based in Ba'labakk and its environs, and April, which killed 63 and injured more than 100. others are headquartered in southern Beirut, their operations have extended to West Beirut and even into southern Lebanon. Once trained by the Syrian Sufferance Revolutionary Guards, the hizballahi recruit other Throughout 1983, Iranian-sponsored operations in Shias for religious indoctrination and military Lebanon were conducted with, at a minimum, Syrian training, disseminate pro-Khomeini propaganda, and sufferance. Damascus probably also provided more try to enforce Islamic law in the areas they control. active support at times. The northern Bekaa Valley, While there are probably fewer than 1,000 hizballahi, the stronghold of the Iranian-supported forces, has they have the sympathy of a significant segment of been under the overall control of Syrian forces. By the Shia population, both in the Bekaa Valley and permitting the movement of men and materiel Beirut. through Syrian checkpoints in the Bekaa Valley, the Syrians have facilitated Hizballah activities. In many ways, the Hizballah groups resemble the other Lebanese confessional militias, manning checkpoints and engaging in conventional urban warfare. Unlike the other militias, however, the Hizballah have employed spectacular terrorist tactics—such as suicide vehicle bombings—to attack Western and Israeli targets. Their primary goals are to eliminate the Western presence and establish a fundamentalist Islamic state there. The Hizballah may not always act alone in Syria and Iran shared some primary policy objectives conducting terrorist attacks. We suspect Iranian in Lebanon in 1983. In particular, both wanted to see Revolutionary Guards may have participated in the MNF and Israeli forces withdrawn from Lebanon. Hizballah operations in the Beirut area. The Syrians also were determined to force Lebanese President Gemayel to abrogate the troop withdrawal accord he had concluded with Israel in May. Damascus therefore condoned Hizballah terrorism against Lebanese, Western, and Israeli targets. Syria's Attitude Changes

The activities of pro-Iranian terrorist groups reached a peak in 1983 during the presence in Lebanon of the MNF. The number of terrorist attacks that we believe were conducted by pro-Iranian groups (judging by tactics, targets, and sometimes claims issued in the name of Islamic Jihad) increased significantly during that period. Of the 63 terrorist attacks we recorded in Lebanon during 1983, more than 40 appear to have been sponsored or supported by Iran. Of these attacks,

Early in 1984, however, Syria's tactics and attitude toward the Lebanese Government shifted as a number of developments favorable to Syrian interests took place in Lebanon. In March the MNF contingents withdrew; in April President Gemayel scrapped the troop withdrawal accord he had signed with Israel a

year earlier; and in May Prime Minister Rashid

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Karami appointed a new cabinet that included pro- Syrian opposition leaders. Consequently, Syria's primary goals in Lebanon began to diverge from those of Iran. Damascus is now working to stabilize the security situation and initiate political reforms, while Iran continues to work for the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state through the radicalization of the Lebanese Shia community. Damascus fears that it would have little control over the leadership of such a state and that a clerical regime in Lebanon could eventually pose a serious	decline can be explained by the reduced number of terrorist targets and opportunities, Syrian efforts to limit Hizballah activities also may have played a part. With the MNF gone, the principal foreign targets of the Hizballah have been US, French, and Saudi diplomatic interests, and Lebanese civilians. In addition, since the beginning of this year, the radical Shias have diverted some resources to southern Lebanon, where they have become more involved in the guerrilla war against Israeli military forces.	25X1 25X1
threat to the secular government in Syria.	istach inntary torous.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The evidence suggests that as the activities of the pro- Iranian groups in Lebanon began to threaten Syria's	Syria has only gradually imposed restrictions on the activities of Iran's assets in Lebanon, and to date the limitations fall far short of a total crackdown.	25X1
interests last spring and summer, Damascus began to impose some constraints on them:		25X1
impose some constraints on them:		25 <b>X</b> I
	Moreover, despite clashes	OEV4
	between Syrian troops and Hizballah gunmen,	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Damascus has not tried to expel the Shia extremists	
	from their positions in the Bekaa Valley.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Last summer Syrian troops reportedly moved to restrict Hizballah activities in the Bekaa Valley and dismantled some Hizballah checkpoints there.	Syrian leaders have been reluctant to attempt a total crackdown on the pro-Iranian terrorist groups in Lebanon. A direct confrontation might jeopardize some of the economic benefits—such as high-quality oil at low prices—that Syria derives from its special relationship with Iran. Damascus may also fear that moving too forcefully against the extremist Lebanese	25X1
According to press such restrictions have provoked several violent clashes	Shias could provoke them to mount terrorist attacks against Syrian interests.	25 <b>X</b> 1
between Hizballah gunmen and Syrian troops.	agamot Syrian interests.	25X1
Larly in September Damascus ordered that documents permitting travel between Lebanon and	Moreover, the Syrians almost certainly find the Shia extremist groups useful in a number of ways. For example, Damascus approves of—in fact	25/1
Syria be withdrawn from several Hizballah leaders, including Husayn and Abbas Musawi, leading members of the Hizballah.	encourages—Hizballah attacks against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. The radical groups also serve as a lever that Damascus can manipulate to put pressure	25X1
Decline in Shia Terrorism  The number of terrorist attacks committed by the radical Shia groups in Lebanon has declined significantly since the departure of the MNF contingents in April. During the first three months of	on moderate Shia Amal leader Nabih Barri. The Syrians may also be planning to use the pro-Iranian terrorists to attack Jordanian targets.	25X1
1984, extremist Shias probably were responsible for 24 terrorist attacks in Lebanon, compared with 18		_
during the following six months. While most of this		0574

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Lebanon:	Attacks	Attributed	to the	Hizballal	h

Target a	1983	1984
Total	41	42
France	17	19
United States	12	12
Lebanese factions	5	3
Italy	4	0
Saudi Arabia	0	4
United Kingdom	2	1
Kuwait	1	1
USSR	0	2

<sup>a</sup> There have been almost daily attacks against elements of the Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon, many of which were undoubtedly conducted by Shias associated with the Hizballah, but we do not count such attacks as terrorist events.

ь	First	nine	nonths	of	the	vear.

Sy	ria's	s Re	sponse	to	the	Bomb	inį
of	the	US	<b>Embas</b>	sy	Ann	ex	

Syrian
President Assad was surprised and angered by the bombing and responded by sending Syrian forces to encircle Iranian and Hizballah positions in the Bekaa Valley, including the stronghold of Husayn Musawi's Islamic Amal terrorists.

Syrian tanks deployed against a major Hizballah training facility in Ba'labakk.

Ba'labakk area in late September and early October
Syrian troops were manning

checkpoints throughout the area, Iranians and possibly Lebanese Shias continued to use the military training facilities there, and that the Revolutionary Guards appeared to be moving about at will.

#### Outlook

Judging from Assad's reaction to the latest Hizballah bombing, Syrian tolerance for such activities is probably not unlimited. Should new Hizballah operations—such as attacks on Western diplomatic facilities—threaten to further destabilize the security situation in Lebanon, Damascus might move more forcefully against the pro-Iranian groups. For example, Syria could significantly weaken Hizballah capabilities by expelling the Iranian Revolutionary Guards from the Bekaa Valley. Even just closing the military and staging facilities in the area would be a major blow to both the Hizballah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

Even if the Syrians were to try, they almost certainly would not be able to completely eliminate Hizballah capabilities or activities in Lebanon. The most fanatic among the Lebanese Shia extremists—exemplified by the suicide bombers—would not be dissuaded even by direct Syrian opposition from pursuing their fundamentalist objectives.

If the Hizballah were to lose their staging areas in the Bekaa Valley, they could rely on the infrastructure they have developed in West Beirut and the southern suburbs to plan and launch terrorist operations. As the September bombing clearly demonstrated, radical Shia capabilities are not limited to Muslim areas of the capital. Consequently, regardless of what Syria does or tries to do in Lebanon, US and other Western interests will continue to be at risk from Hizballah terrorists.

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
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Early September	Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last issue. Events and developments that have already been described in previous issues are not included unless new information has surfaced. Asterisks denote events covered elsewhere in this issue in greater detail.  West Bank: Fatah Official Captured	25X1
Santy Soptomet	Near Hebron, Israeli security forces arrested Ali Halil Riba'i, believed to be a senior Fatah leader on the West Bank. According to press reports, Israeli security officials had been trying to capture Riba'i for 14 years, after the rest of his cell was destroyed in the early 1970s.	25 <b>X</b> 1
21 September	*Cyprus: Anti-Libyan Bombings In Nicosia, two bombs found at the Libyan Cultural Center and People's Bureau were defused by police. The Musa Sadr Brigade may have planted them.	25X1
Late September	Pakistan: Afghan Saboteurs Arrested	25 <b>X</b> 1
Late September	In Peshawar, Pakistani authorities arrested three Afghans posing as refugees and charged them with illegal possession of weapons and explosives. The three reportedly admitted they had been sent by Khad, the Afghan secret service, to carry out acts of sabotage.	25X1
	*Mauritania: Polisario Attacks Foreign Vessel	23/(1
	Off the Mauritanian coast, a group of unidentified men in an assault raft, probably from Polisario, the Western Saharan liberation movement, attacked a Togolese cargo ship with rocket-grenades and small-arms fire. No serious damage or casualties occurred.	25X1
	or substitute overline.	20 <b>/</b> I

4 October	Spain: ETA Bombs Telephone Exchange	•
	In Begona, members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) were responsible for	
	a bombing that damaged banking transmission networks.	25 <b>X</b> 1
5 October	West Bank: Armed Infiltrators Killed	
	Near Magharah, an Israeli Defense Forces patrol killed three unidentified armed	
	persons who may have infiltrated from Jordan. The three were armed with Kalashnikov rifles, grenades, and other small arms. The three probably were	
	members of one of the Palestinian groups based in Syria.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	members of one of the fatestman groups saled in 251	20/(1
7 October	Turkey: Dev Yol Terrorist Executed	
	In Izmir, a former member of Dev Yol was executed for the murder of a night	
	watchman. According to press reports, this was the first execution of a convicted terrorist under the current government.	25X1
	terrorist under the current government.	23/1
9 October	Spain: ETA Bombing Injures Three People	
	In Elgoibar, suspected members of ETA/M detonated a bomb that wounded three	
	people and damaged three vehicles.	25 <b>X</b> 1
11 October	Yugoslavia: Albanian Nationalists Sentenced	
	In Pristina, 10 Albanian nationalists received prison sentences for terrorist	
	activities that included planting bombs in various parts of Kosovo since 1981. Four	2514
	others were convicted for distributing hostile propaganda.	25 <b>X</b> 1
13 October	Malta: Two Unclaimed Bombings	
	In Valletta, a bomb exploded at a government computer center, causing extensive	
	damage to the building, but no injuries. Elsewhere in the capital another explosion	
	resulted in minor damage to a church-affiliated school. No claims of responsibility were received for either incident, but we suspect they were related to a controversy	9
	over parochial schools currently raging on the island.	25X1
		20/(1

Belgium: FCC Bombings Continue On 15 October in Brussels, a bomb seriously damaged a building used by the Belgian Liberal Party. On 17 October in Ghent, the fifth terrorist bombing of the month occurred at the headquarters of Prime Minister Martens's Democratic Party. Both bombings caused severe damage but no casualties. The Fighting Communist Cells (FCC) claimed credit.	25X1
West Bank: Israeli Bus Attacked Near Nablus, a bomb exploded at the roadside as an Israeli bus passed by. At least seven children were wounded. No group has claimed responsibility for placing the bomb.	25 <b>X</b> 1
*Portugal: FP-25 Bombs French Targets Asserting solidarity with the Basque separatist ETA, the Portuguese left wing terrorist group FP-25, most of whose members are in prison awaiting trial, claimed credit for planting five small bombs—four at Portuguese branches of the Frenchbased Credit Franco-Portugais and one at the office of a French insurance agency. Only two exploded, causing minor damage and no injuries; the others were defective and proved to be made of nine-year-old dynamite.	25X1
Gaza Strip: Bomb Defused In Gaza, security forces safely defused a bomb discovered in a square near the Israeli administration building. No group has claimed responsibility for placing the bomb.	25X1
FPMR Bombing Campaign In Santiago, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) claimed credit for a series of bombings of powerlines, banks, and various municipal and private buildings. In Rancugua and Talca, bombs caused extensive damage to the Chilean-North American Cultural Institute and the Chilean Agricultural Center. Three persons were injured, and eight regions of the country were blacked out for several hours.	25X1 25X1
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## Chronology of Terrorism—1984

17 October	Spain: ETA Shoots Policeman In Renteria, members of ETA shot and killed a Spanish policeman.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Chile: Communist Youths Briefly Occupy Argentine Embassy In Santiago, 10 members of the National Youth Command briefly occupied the Argentine Embassy. The Communist-affiliated group made a number of demands, including that the Chilean Government reinstate 14 Communist copperworkers fired for participating in an illegal strike. They also requested that Argentina intervene on their behalf with the Chilean Government and bring their demands to the attention of the United Nations.	25X1
17-24 October	Netherlands: Bomb Threats to Diplomatic Installations	
	The American, British, and French Embassies and the American Consulate were the targets of bomb threats, at least two of which turned out to be hoaxes. The authors are unknown.	25 <b>X</b> 1
19 October		25X1
	Ethiopia: TPLF Kidnaps Foreigners In Lalibela, insurgents of the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) seized about eight foreign hostages, including two Americans, when they overran the town. There is no evidence that the foreigners were the targets of the attack, and efforts are under way within Ethiopia and in Sudan to persuade the TPLF to free them.	, 05V
		25X1
	*Sudan: Anya Nya Releases Captive Priests In Mayom, the three priests who had been captured by the insurgent group Anya Nya II in an attack on the town of Bentiu on 4 September were freed unharmed.	25 <b>X</b> 1

20 October	Peru: Sendero Luminoso Attacks In Huancayo, Sendero Luminoso guerrillas attacked police stations and government facilities, killing 10 civil guards. President Belaunde has ordered the Army into the area, enacted a state of emergency, and suspended constitutional rights for 60 days.	25 <b>X</b> 1
20-21 October	France: Action Directe Bombings On 20 October in a Paris suburb, a bomb exploded in an office building, injuring two people. Police suspect the anarchist group Action Directe was responsible. On 21 October another explosion damaged an aviation company research facility; Action Directe claimed responsibility. On the same day a Paris shop was bombed by unknown persons, causing damage but no injuries.	25 <b>X</b> 1
20-23 October	Peru: Mass Graves Discovered In Huanta, north of Ayacucho, 52 bodies unearthed in three locations showed signs of torture and were covered with banners bearing the hammer-and-sickle symbol. Although press reports state the victims had been killed by the Sendero Luminoso as informers, the Interior Minister suggested they may have been insurgents killed in combat.	25X1
21 October	Northern Ireland: Three PIRA Bombings In Newry, three bombs exploded during the night causing damage at two garages and a shop but no injuries. The PIRA is believed responsible.	25X1
	Brazil-Argentina: Montonero Leader Extradicted Mario Eduardo Firmenich, head of the Peronist Montoneros, a terrorist group active in the mid-1970s until decimated by the Argentine military regime, was extradicted from Brazil to Argentina to face charges of murder, kidnaping, and extortion.	25 <b>X</b> 1

22 October	Portugal: FP-25 Bombs Farmer's Home In Evora, members of the Popular Forces of 25 April claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion at a farmer's home.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	*Sri Lanka: Tamil Terrorist Bombs in Colombo  Ten of 13 bombs planted in various public locations around Colombo by Tamil separatist terrorists exploded, killing three and injuring 11.	25 <b>X</b> 1
24 October	Spain: Anti-French Attacks by ETA Continue In Noain, suspected members of ETA bombed a French-owned clothes factory. In the evening, a French truck on the Bilbao-Behovia highway was shot at; ETA/M claimed responsibility. No one was injured in the attacks, but damage was extensive.	25X1
		20/(
	Lebanon: AP Employees Abducted and Released In West Beirut, unidentified gunmen abducted four Lebanese employees of the Associated Press news service and reportedly took them to the Shia suburb of Ouzai. Amal leader Nabih Barri secured their release the following day. No group claimed responsibility for the abduction, but one of the kidnapers told the victims they were not members of either the Amal militia or the Druze Progressive Socialist Party.	25X1
	Chile: Nine Anonymous Bombings Santiago and Concepcion were the scene of nine bombing attacks. Targets included government buildings, businesses, and transportation and energy-related facilities. One person was seriously injured. No group has claimed responsibility.	OF VA
•		25 <b>X</b> 1
	Pakistan: Movie Theater Bombed In Peshawar, at least three persons were killed and another 30 wounded when a bomb destroyed a movie theater owned by a prominent local politician. No one has claimed responsibility for the act, but a political motive is suspected. The owner had changed his party's name the previous day from the "Frontier National Democratic Party" (NDP) to the "Pakhtoonkhwa NDP," signifying increased	o
	support for tribal separatists advocating a Pashtun nation.	25 <b>X</b> 1

25 October	Italy: ARB Attacks UAE Envoy In Rome, a gunman fired on the car of the vice consul of the United Arab Emirates, badly wounding him and killing a female Iranian student riding with him. The Arab Revolutionary Brigades, which we suspect may be a name used by elements of the Abu Nidal Group, later claimed responsibility for the attack.	
		25X
26 October	Malta: Bombing at British Facility  Near Valletta, an explosion outside the office of the British High Commission shattered windows in nearby buildings and damaged a vehicle but caused no casualties. A second bomb was found in a public garden nearby, after it had failed to detonate. No one has claimed responsibility.	25X
29 October	*Portugal: RPG Attack Against US Embassy In Lisbon, two rocket-propelled grenades mounted on improvised launchers and aimed at the new US Embassy were discovered in a field about 65 meters away. They had failed to fire because of a malfunction. No one claimed credit for the attack.	25 <b>Y</b> 1

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