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FAC # 2818-80

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 56/80

16 April 1980

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24 APR 1980

Very clear & helpful - Thanks for

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM: Acting National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
SUBJECT: Comparison of Team A and Team B Conclusions

1. This responds to your question as to whether, as stated by Kenneth Adelman in the attached article, the conclusions of Team B on the Soviet threat have fared far better than those of Team A since the 1976 experiment in competitive analysis.

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2. There were three subjects involved in the experiment: Soviet strategic objectives, ICBM accuracies and air defenses.

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ICBMs are not as accurate as estimated by Team B but more accurate than estimated in the 1976 NIE. Current Soviet

b. The Team B report on air defenses was useful for its identification of critical uncertainties in our assessments of Soviet low altitude defense capabilities. Its main thesis--that Soviet air defenses could be much more effective than judged in the NIE--has not been confirmed by subsequent evidence or analysis, although uncertainties remain in our largely subjective assessments of Soviet air defense effectiveness.

c. The more detailed response to your question addresses the Team A and Team B assessments of Soviet strategic objectives, because this remains an issue on which there is considerable disagreement.

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3. The bulk of the Team B report on Soviet strategic objectives was a critique of NIEs issued prior to 1975. The Team B report contained two other sets of conclusions: assessments of selected Soviet strategic developments

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SUBJECT: Comparison of Team A and Team B Conclusions

(the seriousness of which were allegedly minimized in the NIEs) and estimates of Soviet strategic objectives. A few Team B estimates of selected Soviet developments have proved to be incorrect, but in the main the estimates were consistent with those in the 1976 and subsequent NIEs or remain to be affirmed or denied by evidence. The bottom line judgments of the Team B about Soviet strategic objectives are very close to those in the 1976 NIE, as indicated in the attached comparisons of key judgments. Some of the Team B conclusions went beyond the scope of NIE 11-3/8-76, therefore, in the attachment these findings are compared with the judgments in NIE 11-4-78, "Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena." [redacted]

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4. Despite the similarities in key judgments the Team B report conveys a much more strident tone than either NIE 11-3/8-76 and NIE 11-4-78. The Team B dutifully carried out its charge to assume an adversarial position--to marshal the evidence in support of more threatening interpretations of Soviet objectives. On the other hand, the Team A product was not an essay with a single theme; it was a national estimate which attempted to review the evidence objectively, citing uncertainties which qualified its conclusions. In light of the aggressiveness of Soviet conduct since 1976, the Team B report, because of its tone and the billboard effect of its interpretations of overall Soviet policies and objectives, can be regarded as having "fared better" than findings in the NIEs, even though the conclusions of the Team A and Team B were quite similar. [redacted]

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5. As for other comments about the article--Kenneth Adelman's articles have cited errors in national intelligence to give support for his ideas about how to reorganize CIA. In a previous article in the fall 1979 issue of Foreign Policy, coauthored with Robert F. Ellsworth, his thesis was that since the Agency's inception the DDO has exercised undue influence over CIA substantive assessments and has been largely responsible for estimative errors. As a remedy, he proposed that the DCI be relieved of his directorship of CIA to concentrate on his responsibility for the Intelligence Community budget and for producing national intelligence. A second theme in his articles is that the DCI should not try to produce coordinated national intelligence, but present the President with conflicting evidence and opposing views and let the President grapple with alternative interpretations. Adelman calls for national intelligence so tough, shrewd and ruthless that no trend or fashion will ever again screen data or warp perception--so icily penetrating that no degree of conformity will force blunders in the future. Under Adelman's scheme, however, whether the US makes blunders would

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apparently depend on which tough, shrewd, ruthless alternative interpretation the President chooses. [redacted]

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6. Adelman and Ellsworth are among the former officials in policy-making positions who have become severe critics of intelligence, some of whom are promoting remedies for erroneous estimates of the past. I believe people like Robert Ellsworth, John Foster, Henry Kissinger and others have on occasions, used intelligence as a scapegoat for rationalizing their orientation of US policy and military programs in directions which in retrospect do not appear to have been in the US interests. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Ray DeBruter

Attachment

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16 April 1980

The Team A - Team B Experiment
Soviet Strategic Objectives

QUESTION:

1. Have the conclusions of Team B fared far better than those of Team A since the 1976 experiment in competitive analysis?

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ANSWER:

2. An evaluation of the conclusions of Team A and Team B requires consideration of the roles of the two teams in the experiment. While the experiment involved competing analyses, it was not an adversarial process. The B Team carried out exactly the task of an adversary according to its charge, that is, it marshalled the evidence in support of a more threatening interpretations than in the NIEs. The product of Team A, however, was not that of an adversary. The product was not an essay in which the evidence was interpreted and presented to give support in each paragraph for a common theme. The Team A report was a national estimate, which attempted to present an objective assessment of the subject weighing the evidence and citing uncertainties related to its conclusions. This difference in approach resulted in a different tone in the findings of the two teams.

25X1

3. This tonal difference is not clearly evident in the brief summary below comparing the conclusions of NIE 11-3/8-76, the Team A report, and of the Team B report. To answer the question completely, the comparisons below also include judgments from NIE 11-4-78, "Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena," because the Team B report contained conclusions which went beyond the scope of the Team A report in NIE 11-3/8-76. The findings cited below (abbreviated but retaining the operative words) were drawn from only the key judgments of the three reports:

Comparison of Team A and Team B Conclusions
About Soviet Strategic Objectives

Team B Conclusions

Team A Conclusions
(findings from NIE 11-4-78 are shown
in parenthesis)

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Team B Conclusions

Seek a strategic nuclear environment in which other instruments of power can be brought to bear

Seek to assure that if deterrence failed, Soviets could resort to nuclear weapons to fight and win a nuclear war; think in terms of effective war fighting capabilities.

No evidence Soviets willing to reduce military budget to raise standard of living.

Should the global correlation of forces shift in Soviets' favor they would act with less concern about US sensitivities. Evidence of Soviet willingness to take increased risks (e.g. in Middle East) may be a harbinger of what lies ahead.

Scope and intensity of Soviet military programs could lead to short term threat cresting in 1980 to 1983.

Undeviating commitment to triumph of socialism, global hegemony.

Team A Conclusions

Hope their strategic nuclear capabilities will give them more latitude for vigorous pursuit of foreign policy

Striving to achieve war-fighting, war-survival capabilities that would leave them in better position than US if war occurred.

In future Soviets might shift allocation of resources between military and civilian sectors but no sign Soviet leaders preparing for such a shift.

Hope strategic forces will give them more latitude for virorous pursuit of foreign policy, discouraging US use or threatened use of force to influence Soviet actions. (Prognosis for 1980s: purposeful, cautions exploration of USSRs increased military strength; more stalwart in defense of USSRs interests; assert right to search for new beachheads of USSR influence; more assertiveness; greatly enhanced military capabilities.)

Strength of Soviet offensive force will be greatest relative to the US in early 1980s. (By early 1980s Soviets could have marginal advantage over US in strategic nuclear capabilities.)

Strategic forces contribute to Soviet goal of achieving dominant posture over West--in political, economic, social and military strength.

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Team B Conclusions

For Soviets, peaceful coexistence or detente involves penetration and weakening of capitalist zone, strengthening hold on socialist camp, and intense build-up of all types of military forces.

Soviet concern with China will not deter USSR from increasingly aggressive policies toward West.

Soviet leaders determined to achieve maximum possible measure of strategic superiority over the US. Place high priority on attaining war-fighting and war-winning capability and may feel attaining it is within their grasp. Gap between long term aspirations and short term objectives is closing.

If Soviets can't achieve capabilities that would give them substantial pre-dominance over the US following general nuclear war, they intend to acquire war-fighting advantage such that they would be less deterred than US from initiating use of nuclear weapons; be able to exploit local military advantages with out fear of US initiated escalation.

Soviets unrestrained in strategic programs by "how much is enough."

Team A Conclusions

(Soviets see program of detente due to growth in USSR military power; detente is the management of change to constrain as little as possible Soviet gains; does not constrain pursuit of competitive advantages.)

(Soviets see sweep of postwar international affairs confirming their convictions about march of history; even defection of China has not undermined these convictions.)

Soviet military effort raises question of whether seeking clear strategic superiority over US. May be optimistic about strategic competition with West, but cannot be certain about US behavior. Cannot set practical objectives for some specific relationship in strategic forces to be achieved in some specific period.

Expectations reach well beyond capability merely to deter an all-out US attack. Soviets seeking war-fighting and war-survival capabilities to leave USSR in stronger position than US; to provide visible and politically useful advantages, giving them more latitude for vigorous pursuit of foreign policy, discouraging US use or threatened use of force to influence Soviet actions.

(War-fighting requirement calls for unremitting effort which is required for confident superiority over NATO)

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Team B Conclusions

Within next 10 years expect degree of Soviet military superiority permitting dramatically more aggressive pursuit of hegemonial objectives.

Team A Conclusions

(Post Brezhnev leadership may see superpower status and costly military efforts as basis for more pervasive leverage on world affairs.) (S)

4. In its critique of past NIEs, some issued in the 1960s, the Team B concluded that estimates through 1975 tended to minimize the seriousness of the threat in the areas listed below. The Team B saw a relationship between a mind set of the estimators which understated Soviet intentions and objectives and the NIE findings about developments in the following Soviet strategic programs:

- a. ICBMs and SLBMs
- b. Civil defense
- c. Military hardening
- d. Mobile missiles
- e. Backfire
- f. Anti satellite testing
- g. Strategic ASW
- h. ABM and directed energy
- i. Non-central nuclear systems.

In addition to assessing Soviet objectives, the Team B made its own estimates of future Soviet developments in the above areas. A few Team B forecasts have proved incorrect, but in the main the Team B estimates either were consistent with those of the 1976 and subsequent NIEs or, as in the case of Backfire performance, remain to be affirmed or denied by evidence. (S)

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

8 April 1980

NOTE FOR: Mr. Stoertz

Amie —

In the attached article, Ken Adelman says "In 1976, the now-famous Team B had access to raw data as it reached conclusions on the Soviet threat which have fared far better than those of Team A." In your judgment, have the Team B conclusions "fared better" than the Team A conclusions? If you have any other comments on the attached article, I'd be pleased to have them.

[Redacted Signature]

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

25X1

Attachment

OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

Date: 8 April 19

NEWS SERVICE

Item No. 3

Intelligence: The Wrong Debate?

Ref. No. _____

DISTRIBUTION II WALL STREET JOURNAL, 8 April 1980, page A-24

By KENNETH L. ADELMAN

The intelligence debate now raging in Congress harks to the past rather than looks to the future. For it centers around past excesses, first by the CIA in terms of civil liberties and then by the Congress in terms of restrictive legislation. During his sensational 1975-76 sessions on CIA abuses, Senator Frank Church said, "We are not a wicked people and cannot have a wicked institution." Congress proceeded to hold the CIA down in its alleged wickedness rather than to beef the CIA up in its real capabilities.

Now Congress swings towards unfettering the CIA. Contemplating a new intelligence charter, the Congress heatedly debates: prior notification of all CIA covert activities, exemption from the Freedom of Information Act, criminal sanctions for divulging agents' identities, and adequate cover for covert operators.

All such issues arouse considerably more passion than they carry importance. For most bear upon the CIA's covert activities, which have generally been marginal to U.S. national security interests, rather than upon the CIA's estimates and analyses, which have always been central to U.S. national security policies.

Accuracy of Intelligence

Even though the CIA's task here is more critical and its record more dismal, its performance here has been less scrutinized. During its relentless raking over the agency, the Church Committee never once touched upon intelligence analyses and estimates. Nor has its successor, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, held a single hearing on the accuracy of intelligence reports during its three years in existence.

Rumblings are heard only in times of crisis. Why didn't the CIA foresee and foretell that the Shah would fall? Why didn't it predict that the Soviets would march into Afghanistan? These failures were failures of imagination, a common human frailty displayed by the Russians before Hitler's invasion, the Americans before Pearl Harbor and the Israelis before the 1973 War.

More regrettable yet less understandable than these surprises have been intelligence failures on long-range developments abroad. Here is where the CIA's record is bleakest. The agency has long underestimated the overall Soviet military effort. In 1976 it revised its estimate of the percentage of GNP the Soviets spend on defense from a range of 5% to 7%, or just a tad higher than ours, to 11%-13% or up to nearly three times our level. Today experts with better track records still contend that the agency is low, with the correct figure around 15%.

Beginning in the 1960s, the CIA embarked on an era of consistently underestimating the Soviet ICBM buildup, missing the mark by what we now know were wide margins. The agency also underestimated the scale and effectiveness of Soviet MIRV programs and considered present-day Soviet warhead accuracies, which are equal to ours, to be unattainable by Moscow until the mid-1980s. Lastly, the CIA long underestimated regional adversaries such as the Warsaw Pact and especially North Korea, whose forces were underestimated by a whopping 25% to 40%.

None of these situations changed swiftly. So surprise was not a factor in explaining these CIA errors. Regardless of cause, however, the consequences have been enormous. Such wayward estimates fostered wayward national security policies such as holding down the U.S. defense budget and abjuring new U.S. strategic initiatives for 15 years and planning U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea.

Should Congress move beyond the sectional to the more significant, it could

During its relentless raking over of the agency, the Church Committee never once touched upon intelligence analyses and estimates. Nor has its successor, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence...

help the intelligence community sidestep such errors in the future. Congress should promote independent, rival centers of intelligence collection and analysis. This would increase the quality of reports by increasing the competition. It would also remove institutional biases from final assessments.

Yet the legislation now before the Senate moves in the opposite direction. It would centralize the U.S. intelligence community even beyond President Carter's 1978 Executive order and Congress's 1947 legislation. This is harmful. Lumping together an array of responsibilities—for paramilitary operations, technological collection, military "order of battle" estimates, and political and economic analysis—opens the entire intelligence community to the same political and cultural pressures. Decentralization precludes the tendency for the intelligence agencies to sway

together with the mood of the moment. For precisely this reason, West Germany established three main organizations responsible for foreign intelligence, France four and Britain at least five.

Congress could begin by mandating that the nation's top intelligence officer—the Director of Central Intelligence or DCI—be separated from the Chief of the CIA. The two have been combined since 1947. Were they wrenched apart, the caliber of reporting would be elevated, particularly if the new DCI were to coordinate only intelligence programs and not intelligence estimates. His task should be one of gathering for the President the conflicting evidence and opposing views that would well up from a newly dispersed intelligence community (which includes the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and groups in the State, Defense, Treasury and Energy Departments).

Divorcing the DCI from CIA chief would be fought tooth and nail by the CIA which

understandably relishes its supremacy in the community. It contends that the move would deprive the new DCI of a large power base essential for effective maneuvering in Washington's bureaucratic jungle. But this argument doesn't wash. If it did, Henry Kissinger could not have been a major power during his White House years when he had but a tiny band of underlings in the National Security Council staff. A DCI needs as an effective power base only the President's confidence.

Congress should also do in the CIA what Pope John XXIII did in the Vatican and open the windows a crack. This can be done without abandoning secrecy. In 1976, the now-famous Team B had access to raw data as it reached conclusions on the Soviet threat which have fared far better than those of Team (CIA)'s. In 1977, a gallant effort was mounted for the CIA to reach out and tap the best minds in academia, business and research outfits. No security problems arose, even though the move was eventually subverted by CIA insiders.

Overshadowed and Undermined

Such efforts should be revived and should accompany a revival of the CIA's analysis unit. For too long the analysis crowd has been overshadowed and undermined by the clandestine clan. And for too long the CIA has placed excessive emphasis on current intelligence, not on longer range trends, and has rested content with unimpressive country and regional reports. In the early 1970s, for instance, a CIA analysis of that perennial topic "Yugoslavia and

INTELLIGENCE

ter Tito" was found to be more superficial than those in some European newspapers. The authors had averaged less than two years experience with that country and had not tapped outside expertise.

An augmented analysis side could offer the President superb net assessments, i.e. comparisons in each theater (Europe, Asia, strategic, etc.) of the resources available to an adversary and those available to the U.S. and participating allies. The CIA has, with justification, considered assessment of U.S. capabilities outside its previous jurisdiction. Yet the Secretary of Defense has used this technique to good effect and the President should now do likewise.

There are a host of excellent proposals offered by ex-Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Ellsworth and others to: centralize electronic intelligence collection and analysis; fund additional back-up satellite systems; boost a warning and crisis management system; and augment tactical intelligence.

More evident than these necessary measures would be changing the very name of the CIA, as has been recommended by ex-Deputy Director of the CIA Ray Cline. Such a step would, as he says, deprive "the K.G.B. and every tinhorn dictator or ayatollah" of an "international whipping boy," or at least one with a familiar ring to its name.

Mr. Adelmann is Senior Political Scientist at the Strategic Studies Center of SRI International.

it all sounds
so simple

FOREIGN POLICY

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FOOLISH INTELLIGENCE

by Robert F. Ellsworth
and Kenneth L. Adelman

The intelligence community should brace itself for a new wave of castigation that widens its past sea of woes. The looming storm will arise from accusations that it inadequately warned the United States of Soviet military capabilities and technological breakthroughs during the 1970s and early 1980s. These inevitable accusations, originating from the center-right, will diffuse throughout the body politic and will focus on the competence of American intelligence analysis. For the Central Intelligence Agency elite—those in the Operations Directorate—has catered for years to America's foreign policy establishment view that the biggest game in town is at least collaboration and at most condominium with Russia. This has led to a process of discounting data that portray the Soviet Union as a genuine threat rather than as a potential partner.

Past hubris has brought on present nemesis. The CIA's (and military intelligence's) attempts at political assassinations, covert shenanigans, illegal spying on American citizens, and free-wheeling operations have reaped their reprisals. The now receding accusations, originating from the center-left, focused on these intelligence excesses. As a result, the reins of the covert operators were pulled in, as the five-year-old investigations and presidential Executive Orders scaled down the CIA's activities.

The limitations were perhaps overdue, though the fanfare was overblown. The CIA was never as nefarious as strident critics con-

ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH, former deputy secretary of defense, is visiting scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. KENNETH L. ADELMAN, former assistant to the secretary of defense, is senior political scientist at the Strategic Studies Center of SRI International.

tend, and few of its members indulged in offensive deportment. Even if every official investigated for illegal practices were found guilty, the culprits would still add up to a tiny percentage of all intelligence personnel. Executive and congressional investigators have highlighted the sensational at the expense of the more significant.

President Carter aimed at the right target—inadequate performance rather than overzealousness—on Armistice Day 1978, when he fired off a handwritten memo to his top security advisers. It opened pungently, "I am not satisfied with the quality of political intelligence." The president was justifiably distraught by the crumbling of the shah's reign in Iran. He resented that American intelligence officers, long stationed in Tehran, had failed to tell him what General Ludendorff told the kaiser after a brief visit with the Austrian army on the eve of World War I: "We are allied to a corpse."

The much touted intelligence failure in Iran was due to a massive failure of imagination. Similar human frailty led the British ambassador in Berlin, two days before the onset of World War I, to report that war was out of the question. The syndrome also afflicted American leaders on the eve of Pearl Harbor, Stalin at the outset of Operation Barbarossa (Hitler's 1941 invasion of Russia), and the Israelis immediately before the 1973 Yom Kippur war—the three most celebrated intelligence failures of recent times.

But no such failure of imagination can account for staggering CIA errors, compounded over 15 years, in estimating Soviet forces and intentions in strategic weaponry and overall military effort. Beginning in the 1960s the CIA embarked upon a consistent underestimation of the Soviet ICBM build-up, missing the mark by wide margins: its estimates became progressively worse, on the low side. In the mid-1970s the intelligence community underestimated the scale and effectiveness of the Soviets' multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) programs. Even more important, Soviet war-

head accuracies that have already been achieved—and that have equaled U.S. accuracies—had been estimated by American intelligence to be unattainable by Moscow before the mid-1980s.

U.S. intelligence also committed a gross error by underestimating the overall Soviet military effort. In 1976 the CIA suddenly and retroactively doubled the percentage of gross national product it figured the Soviets had been and were devoting to defense—from between 5 and 7 per cent (only slightly higher than the U.S. level) to between 11 and 13 per cent (up to nearly three times the U.S. level). Such flawed CIA estimates helped form national security policy for the past 15 years. In the mid-1960s the United States began its decade-long strategic stall, basically abjuring new strategic initiatives. It was then that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara informed the public that "the Soviets have decided that they have lost the quantitative" strategic arms race and "are not seeking to engage us in that contest." Lest the point be missed, he added, "There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours."

Legacy of Failures


The same American errors in anticipating the Soviet strategic build-up linger on. The latest flaws can be gleaned simply by comparing a series of charts measuring the super-powers' relative strategic capabilities. The charts published in the fiscal year 1980 annual report by the secretary of defense, when compared to those of last year, show a worsening forecast of the strategic situation in the early 1980s. Instead of enjoying an edge over the Soviets, as predicted only last year, it now seems the United States will be substantially inferior until about 1986, one year after the scheduled expiration of SALT II. This means the United States will be negotiating SALT III from a weak position.

The change in estimates between 1978 and 1979 is not due to American revisions of force posture. Rather, the changes in the


Ellsworth & Adelman

charts reflect 1979's correction of 1978's underestimation of the drive and momentum of Soviet strategic improvements. Specifically, U.S. intelligence last year did not imagine the scope of recent Soviet improvements in fractionization or number of warheads per missile, accuracy (which gave them a 180 per cent improvement over the current generation of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles), and overall force reliability (the percentage of times their missiles launch when triggered). Also, estimates of Soviet Backfire bomber production rates had been too low.

FY 1979
AFTER U.S. RETALIATION



FY 1980
AFTER U.S. COUNTERFORCE RETALIATION
Day-to-Day Alert



The same problem has dogged U.S. intelligence at the regional level. Defense Secretary Harold Brown informed the Congress last February that the Soviets' "ability to move their forces speedily into position for an attack" in Europe was "estimated to be greater" than was thought a year ago. At about the same time, the intelligence community found its previous estimates of North Korea's military might palpably low. Therefore, the CIA and others suddenly had to boost their estimates of Pyongyang's ground forces by some 25 per cent, even though U.S. estimates of the North's tanks had previously been increased by nearly one-third. Again, nothing much had actually occurred on that volatile peninsula; North Korea's military build-up has been boringly steady since 1970-1971. But U.S. intelligence failed to note that North Korea had amassed the fifth largest ground army in the world. Today major conflict involving the United States may be more likely there than anywhere else.

This string of recent intelligence estimates on the low side disproves a recurrent notion within liberal circles that the Pentagon and the CIA are in cahoots to overestimate the Russians for their own budgetary and ideological motivations. The fact that the legacy of such failures reaches back over 15 years and four presidents likewise disproves a recurrent notion within conservative circles that the recent underestimates of Soviet power can be ascribed solely to the Carter administration's infatuation with arms control.

The real source of the problem lies deeper, within the bowels of the intelligence bureaucracy itself. American intelligence has long been stultified by the domination of a clique. The CIA has suffered from an encrustation of leadership as its directors over virtually all of its history have been linked—by shared experience, psychological inclination, and profession—to the CIA's Operations Directorate (which is responsible for covert activities). This link began under William Donovan in the World War II Office of Strategic Services and was carried forward

by CIA Director Allen Dulles, who came out of World War II thrilled by his covert operational successes in Switzerland. His brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, according to former CIA official Kermit Roosevelt, was "licking his chops" to rerun the dazzling covert operation in Iran (which had in 1953 reinstated the shah) in sundry spots scattered throughout the Third World.

Firestorm of Criticism

The Operations Directorate reigned supreme even after the Dulles era: Two thirds of the highest CIA executive positions were filled by officers whose careers had blossomed in covert activities, and for years after the Dulleses departed, the covert side still consumed more than half the agency budget. The clandestine clan planned and executed the reckless Bay of Pigs invasion while keeping intelligence analysts in the dark. President Kennedy was thus denied the opportunity for a detached evaluation of the scheme. Covert operations are spectacular when they succeed but hideous when they do not: the Bay of Pigs did not, as intelligence analysts could have forecast had they been given a chance. In another show of strength, the Directorate handled much of the CIA's liaison with State, Defense, and other key agencies until the mid-1970s, thus spreading its own perspective beyond CIA headquarters.

Admiral Stansfield Turner, the current director of central intelligence, has weathered a firestorm of criticism for "gutting American intelligence." In fact, he has simply accelerated the task begun under predecessors James Schlesinger, William Colby, and George Bush to pare down the overstuffed but powerful Operations Directorate. The CIA is not synonymous with the Operations Directorate, though the Directorate's partisans contend otherwise. Turner has taken care not to stack the top with old clandestine hands. Just the opposite, in fact, since he is surrounded by individuals who generally lack experience as national intelligence producers or users.

Ellsworth & Adelman

Though Turner has trimmed Operations' sails, he has yet to launch a successful program to boost the capabilities of the National Foreign Assessment Center, the agency's analysis side. In the past, it has focused far too much on current intelligence and has been content with a lack of professionalism on the part of country and regional specialists. This became clear in the early 1970s after the National Security Council ordered the CIA to address an age-old topic: Yugoslavia after Tito. The report was more superficial than those written in German and Swiss daily newspapers. It turned out that the agency analysts who wrote it averaged less than two years' experience with the country and had not tapped outside expertise.

Covert operations are spectacular when they succeed but hideous when they do not.

Nor does Turner have control over all the actions of the Operations crew. Two years ago, for instance, the leadership of the analytic branch of the CIA realized that it could not achieve from within the needed upgrading in breadth of expertise and perspective on world affairs. They sought to find a way to gain access to the best minds in the nation for help in analyzing intelligence information. A strategy was developed to find and focus the talents of people from academia, business, private research groups, and others to assist the agency and to be available as a resource for selected agency analysts on momentous matters.

But the effort was soon sabotaged by those inside the agency who stood to lose most—the Operations crew and their alumni within the administration, the inspectorate general, and current intelligence reporting offices. They recognized that outside help, however well intentioned in trying to build up rather than tear down the intelligence capability, would weaken their hold by forcing other opinions to be considered or even incorpo-

Ellsworth & Adelman

rated. Better, they figured, to nip the budding threat. So they objected to the outsiders' access to classified material and charged financial falsification of government accounts and sloppy management of specific projects. Those standing accused heard the abounding innuendos but were not permitted to see the specific allegations. Yet a protracted struggle ensued until those organizing the new initiative were worn down, and it was abandoned.

Poor Preconceptions

Intelligence forecasts for Iran were also victims of this infighting. At the close of 1978, a congressional intelligence committee requested a full briefing on the situation in Iran. The CIA responded by sending its Operations—not its Analysis—people who, of course, testified from their own limited perspective. They lacked the imagination to see that a massive, popular counterrevolution had been launched against the shah's modernization revolution. These covert officers had treasures within Iran, not only the shah on the Peacock Throne, but also the now-famous listening posts on the Soviet border. These men swayed the entire intelligence community to report that the shah's opponents were numerically insignificant and politically impotent.

The prominence of cloak-and-dagger traditionalists casts a shadow beyond slanted country or regional reports. Their supremacy affects strategic issues and can be related to the dangerous underestimation of the Soviet military build-up. As a group, these members of the CIA have long subscribed to an essentially optimistic world view. First, they assumed that smooth superpower relations are critical to America's survival and welfare, and that the United States and the Soviet Union are winding their way toward a modicum of cooperation, if not collaboration. They felt their vocation was to work out the rules of the global game for the new era. Dedication to this vocation led to projection of similar purposes upon the essential partner—the Soviet Union—even if that projection also led

to screening out data that clearly suggested another vision of the future.

Second, they assumed that the Third World lacks the wit and wherewithal to influence decisively the great game of world politics. They cherished the developing world as a playground for covert operations, not as a participant in world affairs worthy of serious and sustained analysis. Thus, the CIA displayed a shocking failure of imagination in 1973 when it explicitly discounted the Yom Kippur war (although the head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research wrote in April 1973 that war was highly likely there before the year's end), the Arab oil embargo, and the oil price hike.

The Operationists' preconceptions are widely shared among academics, journalists, and even government officials. Yet in Langley these preconceptions have screened out data that, if properly quested and digested, should have prevented strategic intelligence failures. Such perspectives have pervaded U.S. strategic behavior over the past 15 years and helped ease the Soviet Union into a relatively more assertive role on the world stage. This is a risky trend, one that has increased the possibility of superpower confrontation. It could be fostered by Soviet cockiness over what Moscow perceives to be strategic and historic imperatives flowing as much from U.S. permissiveness as from Soviet military prowess.

The United States desperately needs to know not just what the Soviets have done or are doing, but what they will be doing years from now. Most weapons systems take somewhere between two and 12 years to research and develop and have a lifespan of five to 20 years. Thus, today's defense planning must be based on estimates of a far tomorrow's adversary capabilities. Even if future arms control agreements hold down or reduce weapons more effectively than SALT I and II, the United States will nonetheless have to anticipate the trends in weapons development allowed under their terms.

To do so, the traditional intelligence-gathering methods must yield to the advanced

technique of signals intelligence (SIGINT). Historically, human espionage has reaped bountiful harvests for world powers, radiating an image of might and beauty—the British Empire between 1815 and the close of the nineteenth century, and the United States between World War II and the Kennedy assassination. But such luster has now dimmed. Besides, human espionage is of limited value in trying to penetrate a closed, compartmentalized society like the Soviet Union. It can occasionally confirm data, but can rarely furnish reliable original information.

Answering the Unanswerable

The deficiencies of human espionage must be compensated for by SIGINT, which can best help the United States learn and predict what the Soviets are up to in terms of weapons research and development. This was potently demonstrated by the furor over the loss of two listening posts in northern Iran by which the United States learned the results of Soviet missile tests. Turner publicly bristled over their loss, particularly since the green-eyed types in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had made savage cuts last December in funds for SIGINT in favor of other intelligence accounts. Espionage received its fair share, but OMB lavished funds upon today's most enchanting intelligence technique—photographic equipment.

OMB's error was grave and was made all the riskier by the fact that the U.S. technological superiority in weaponry is swiftly fading. The U.S. Navy was agape last May, for instance, when the Soviets launched a nuclear-powered submarine that steams faster (40 knots) and dives deeper (more than 2,000 feet) than anything the United States has.

Such tremors constitute an early warning signal of sliding American technological supremacy. For the Soviet Union is charging ahead both in terms of military production (it now spends three times as much as the United States on strategic forces and one-third more on general purpose forces) and in terms of military infrastructure, upon which

future arms programs are to be mounted (where it spends 80 per cent more than the United States). According to the Defense Department, the Soviet military is increasing its share of highly skilled labor, even though more than half its research and development scientists and engineers are already thought to be working on military projects. Their impressive efforts, marshaling increasingly scarce roubles, signal a wish to persist in acquiring larger and more capable military forces. Such activities also propel the Soviet society and economy into additional military endeavors, thereby seeding arms-related institutions and spawning military-oriented activities that, over time, gather a momentum of their own.

Advanced signals and photographic sensors are now able to monitor every major construction activity in the Soviet Union and virtually every major Soviet weapons test. The verification debate that is building up over the SALT II agreement will make many Americans realize that U.S. security depends as much upon strategic intelligence as it does upon the size and nature of U.S. offensive strategic weapons. The Carter administration will be explaining each of the provisions of SALT II in terms of specific American strategic reconnaissance capabilities.

But even strategic reconnaissance, as promising as it now seems, cannot provide the answer to U.S. intelligence needs. Traditionally, presidents have turned to their advisers to answer the unanswerable—the singular solution to a perplexing problem or the definitive analysis of any happening. Woodrow Wilson was extreme in degree, though characteristic in kind, when commanding his advisers aboard the *George Washington* on the way to Versailles: "Tell me what's right to do and I'll do it."

In the vain hope of telling a president "what's right to do," intelligence was centralized by the National Security Act of 1947. The new intelligence system thereby became different from that of Britain, which has at least five separate organizations responsible for intelligence; France, which has four;

and West Germany with three. In contrast, the American structure, headed by a director of central intelligence (DCI), has lumped a veritable array of responsibilities—for paramilitary operations, technological collection, military order-of-battle estimates, and political and economic analysis—into one institutional framework. This consolidation exposes the entire intelligence community to the same political and cultural pressures, and reinforces the tendency of all elements to sway together with the mood of the moment. It has fostered a type of "groupthink" where the pressures for unanimity override individual mental faculties—somewhat analogous to what occurs in a jury room.

U.S. technological superiority in weaponry is swiftly fading.

This problem could be relieved by loosening the 1947 act in order to promote fiercely independent, keenly competitive centers of intelligence collection and analysis. Carter's Executive Order of January 24, 1978, moved in quite the opposite direction. Responsibilities laid on the DCI were specified to include: acting as chief of the CIA itself; exercising full and exclusive authority for approving the CIA's budget, as well as those of all intelligence units in the departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Energy, and the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration; and shouldering responsibility for the accuracy and value of all intelligence appraisals. The Carter Executive Order has also assigned dual roles to the CIA's own National Foreign Assessment Center and Directorate for Administration.

The two functions—head of national intelligence in terms of both budget and estimates, and operating chief of the CIA—should be separated. Such a move, which can only be made by Congress, would eliminate considerable confusion. Far more important, it would improve the caliber of reporting by divorcing America's main intelligence chief

from concerns for the immediate agency and its activities. The new, liberated DCI could coordinate all intelligence programs without special responsibility for any one segment. In case of a conflict between the DCI's sense of national intelligence needs and the desires of one agency, the presumption would be that the national perspective would prevail.

Nonetheless, the new DCI should stay clear of the traditional sand trap and not try to coordinate intelligence estimates or analyses. The president should be presented with the conflicting evidence and opposing views that well up from the newly dispersed intelligence network, and the DCI should avoid placing a distinctive stamp on the product. The president must grapple with alternative interpretations of events and the risks and costs of adopting one policy view over another.

The Congress, meanwhile, wrestles with the question of an overall charter for American intelligence. If enacted, such a charter would give Congress a set of responsibilities roughly commensurate with its traditional privileges of ex post facto criticism of intelligence. More important, it would cloak the sundry components of the intelligence community in a robe of congressional and even constitutional legitimacy they presently lack and, in this way, help redeem and justify the intelligence agencies to the public. If sagacious enough to legislate a clear separation between the head of the CIA and the DCI, the charter would go a long way toward improving the quality of U.S. information on foreign activities and intentions.

It is time to reissue Shakespeare's "warnings and portents of evils imminent," as well as prescriptions to avoid them. What the nation requires is national intelligence that is so tough, shrewd, and ruthless that no trend or fashion will ever again screen data or warp perception. What is required is such realistic and icily penetrating national intelligence that no degree of conformity—with the press or with academia or with political fashion—will force such blunders in the future. It is a tall order.