

1 STATEMENT OF WILLIAM CASEY, DIRECTOR,
2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3 Mr. Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 I want to thank you for this opportunity to give you my
5 views on the Senate Resolution to support the establishment of
6 a National Historical Intelligence Museum. I am truly moved
7 by this resolution's recognition of those Americans who have
8 worked and sacrificed, from the first days of our Republic, to
9 give our government the intelligence it has needed to prevail
10 in war and to remain secure in peace.

11 CIA is a young organization, going back to only 1947, and
12 its World War II progenitor, OSS, goes back only another six
13 years to 1941. But American intelligence did not begin with
14 OSS or CIA. As the resolution notes, General George Washington
15 organized and relied upon a variety of intelligence activities
16 in leading the 13 American colonies in the long war for indepen-
17 dence, whose happy ending 200 years ago we celebrate this year.

18 I have done some research and writing on the American
19 Revolution, and I claim that my first predecessor as Director
20 of Central Intelligence was not Admiral Sidney Sours who was
21 appointed Director of Central Intelligence by President Truman,
22 but George Washington, who appointed himself. How did
23 Washington's ragtag army, some 6000 or 8000 men for most of the
24 war defeat what was then the most powerful nation in the world.
25 Second only to Washington's qualities as a leader in this

1 achievement were his natural aptitude as a director and
2 practitioner of intelligence and special operations and with
3 General Greene and his lieutenants in the South, as a master
4 of what we know today of guerrilla warfare.

5 The earliest predecessor of your Committee, Mr. Chairman,
6 was the Secret Committee created by the Continental Congress
7 for the covert procurement of arms in September of 1775, and
8 the Committee on Secret Correspondence created two months later
9 for the purpose of corresponding with our firends in Great
10 Britain, in Ireland, and other parts of the world, notably our
11 adversaries as well as our firends in Europe.

12 But to these Committees, the Continental Congress appointed
13 its strongest members, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, Silas
14 Dean, John Day, Benjamin Harrison, Richard Henry Lee, John
15 Dickerson, and under the authority of these Committees, Benjamin
16 Franklin and Silas Dean carried out the first American special
17 operations in arranging the clandestine acquisition and
18 financing in Europe and shipment to America of the weapons
19 needed to sustain the American Revolution. And to meet his
20 needs, his military needs as Commander in Chief over here,
21 Washington gradually developed a working intelligence network
22 and became his own intelligence chief.

23 The intelligence process consists of three broad steps.
24 The identification and collection of information. The evaluation
25 and analysis of that information, drawing inference and

1 conclusions relating to necessary decisions. And thirdly the
2 dissimulation to convey facts and conclusions to the commanders
3 and the policy makers needing them.

4 It is not an exaggeration to say that Washington himself
5 performed all of these functions. In his letters time and again
6 he specifies the plea for the kind of information he needs to
7 estimate the enemies plans and intentions. Most of the analysis
8 and interpretation of the facts collected for him took place
9 in his own mind, and his massive correspondence was a major
10 means of conveying relevant information to his commanders and
11 the Congress.

12 The special operations, intelligence activities and the
13 resulting deception which enabled Washington to keep his tiny
14 force alive and ultimately defeat the trained British army at
15 Yorktown were critical to winning our independence. And this
16 has continued down to this day, notably during World War II and
17 the reading of German messages, the deception which kept 15
18 German divisions away from the beachhead at Normandy, and the
19 development and support of French resistance forces which
20 protected the flank of the Third and the Seventh American
21 Armies as they liberated France.

22 Now, Mr. Chairman, I take you briefly through this history
23 of intelligence related to our military and political challenge
24 because I believe it important to our national spirit that all
25 of this be remembered by our people. It is important to the

1 future of the American intelligence community that the interest
2 and the understanding of young people be engaged at an early
3 age, and the challenge and the opportunity which these activities
4 offered in the past as well as in the future. It is important
5 that the American public recognize and understand the importance
6 of intelligence, and for this the public needs information and
7 education about the role of intelligence in our nation's history.

8 And as this resolution suggests, one highly important way
9 of educating and informing the public would be to establish a
10 national museum where intelligence objects of historical interest
11 could be collected, preserved and exhibited to the public. And
12 I am grateful that all of you on this Committee have joined
13 your Chairman in sponsoring this resolution to establish a
14 museum that will commemorate the contribution of thousands of
15 men and women of American intelligence since 1775.

16 In inviting me to testify today, Mr. Chairman, you and
17 your Vice Chairman asked my thoughts not only on the importance
18 of having such a museum, which I have just shared with you,
19 but also what might be included in it and how I think that such
20 a project might be carried forward. Since the question of what
21 such a museum should contain depends to a considerable degree
22 on how it is set up, let me first comment on the kind of
23 institution that I believe is envisioned, and which I think
24 would be appropriate.

25 At the outset I would say that I am glad the movement to

1 establish a National Historical Intelligence Museum is a private
2 initiative. I think its advocates are right in wanting to create
3 a public but not a governmental museum. I agree with those that
4 hold that it would probably not be appropriate for CIA, the
5 intelligence community as a whole, or the Federal government to
6 fund or administer such a museum. Such a museum should be
7 entirely free of the constraints of national security classifi-
8 cation. That is, all of its holdings should be freely accessible
9 to the public. It should also be independent in managing its
10 affairs, especially in deciding what and which to exhibit. For
11 these reasons, it should not be an appendage or adjunct to CIA
12 or other organizations in the intelligence community, but
13 entirely independent of them.

14 Indeed, for such a museum to depend upon intelligence
15 agencies for funds, exhibits and direction, might encourage the
16 public to believe it was merely a government public relations
17 operation. Thus, I find myself in sympathy with the proponents
18 of this museum who believe that the general public interest,
19 the functional requirements of intelligence work, and the
20 benefits of freedom from official constraints all argue for an
21 independent institution, albeit possibly some degree of government
22 support. Having said all this, I can immediately add that CIA,
23 and I am sure other components of the intelligence community
24 as well, will be glad to support and cooperate with a National
25 Historical Intelligence Museum in every legitimate way that we

1 can.

2 This brings me to the question of what should be included
3 in such a museum. Here I would focus primarily on what might
4 be expected to come from CIA and the intelligence community.
5 And I must say frankly that what CIA can contribute here will
6 almost certainly be quite limited. This is first because we
7 do not have many objects or artifacts that could be exhibited
8 in a museum: We mainly produce paper, and the release to the
9 public of some of our records is, I think, a separate issue
10 which is dealt with regularly in other forums, arenas.

11 Beyond this, our need to protect our sources and methods
12 means we must keep much of our material secret for very
13 considerable lengths of time, sometimes long after the actual
14 substance of a report may be general knowledge. Within these
15 constraints, however, there are some things that we could offer
16 to such a museum. We have, for example, been able to release
17 U-2 photography to the John F. Kennedy Library for its documenta-
18 tion of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We have also given the
19 Smithsonian Institution related U-2 materials for exhibits there.
20 We have shared with the public the results of applying advanced
21 photo interpretation techniques to World War II aerial photography
22 by releasing detailed analysis of Nazi death camps, and evidence
23 of the Soviet massacre at Katyn. While I am confident we can
24 continue to release this kind of intelligence material from time
25 to time, I would not want to mislead anyone into expecting us to

1 be a major source of exhibits with this projected Historical
2 Intelligence Museum.

3 Indeed, it seems to me that whil artifacts and intelligence
4 and other historical documents would be an essential component
5 of an intelligence museum, most of the presentation and most
6 of the interest would be created by exhibits showing in historical
7 context how intelligence contributed to desirable military and
8 political results. This can be done largely with exhibits using
9 historical material and material available in the public record,
10 the product of scholars engaged in historical analysis.

11 I have in mind how Washington succeeded in getting the
12 British commander in New York to bring back forces from Virginia
13 to New York City by feinting an attack on New York as he and
14 General Rochambeau marched their forces through Westchester
15 County and down through Jersey and down into Virginia. This
16 kind of a story can be told with legends on maps, accompanied
17 by actual messages and orders which are available from the
18 historical record.

19 The same kind of thing can be done with the deception which
20 kept 15 German divisions 100 miles north of Normandy. If they
21 could have been put into Normany they could have pushed our
22 forces back into the Channel. Also this applies to French
23 resistance to develop protection for General Patton's flank as
24 he raced up the route -- General Patch's flank as he raced up
25 the route of Napoleon from Mediterranean to Grenoble, and

1 General Patton's flank as he raced from Brittany to Lorraine.
2 All this kind of thing can be done with maps and reports and
3 messages supporting the maps which are publicly available.

4 I have seen this in actual practice, visiting intelligence
5 resistance museums which have been established and are
6 functioning at Oslo in Norway, in Copenhagen in Denmark and
7 in Paris in France. I was told in Norway just last week that
8 the resistance museum there still receives more visits than any
9 other tourist attraction in Norway, including the major Viking
10 ships and the Kon Tiki raft, which are the subject of dramatic
11 exhibits in Norway. But the resistance museum outdraws them.

12 Senator Hecht, in conclusion, I am grateful for the
13 opportunity to testify before you today and for the support all
14 of you have shown by joining our Chairman in sponsoring this
15 important resolution.

16 Senator Hecht (presiding). Thank you, very much, Mr.
17 Casey. And I want to say that our Chairman had to leave to
18 make sure there was an authorization bill passed for the
19 Intelligence Community.

20 Mr. Casey. I'll happily excuse him for that.

21 Senator Hecht. Our next witness is Walter Pforzheimer.

22 Mr. Pforzheimer is an intelligence expert and noted
23 collector of rare books, including those on intelligence. A
24 lawyer and Yale graduate, Mr. Pforzheimer has been in the
25 intelligence business since December the 8th, 1942. He was the

1 first legislative counsel for the CIA. From 1956 to 1974 he
2 served as curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection.
3 I understand he has brought items from his own collection, and
4 when you testify maybe you will want to speak about these
5 different items.

6 Mr. Pforzheimer.
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