

*Edwards
David, Jr.
20 Aug 70*

*DuBridge
8 Feb 69
20 Aug. 70 -*

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FOR:

An initial meeting did take place between Dr. Wheelon and Dr. Hornig in October 1964 as a kickoff for what was intended to be regular meetings between the two to discuss progress and problems of the technical side of the intelligence community. Regular meetings ~~did~~ continued about once every month or two between Dr. Hornig and the DDS&T until Dr. Hornig left office at the ^{end of 1968 when} ~~time that~~ the Administration changed and President Nixon came into office. During Dr. DuBridge's tenure ^{in 1968-69,} ~~from that time until~~ for a year and a half later no regular meetings were held between ~~he~~ and the DDS&T, although there were occasional briefings and discussions as situations arose that required them. Since Dr. David became Science Advisor the DDS&T has met with him on an average of once a month for the purpose of bringing him up to date on new developments on substantive intelligence. Either the DDS&T or the ADDS&T participate in those meetings. Over the years the general relationship between DDS&T and the Science Advisor ^{has} ~~have~~ been very good and there has been an excellent rapport in discussions ranging from technical aspects of collection system development to interpretations of substantive intelligence.

From Dr. Steininger

NRO review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET

*Excerpt from
CSA History*



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c. Air Support: Increased employment, travel, transportation, aircraft maintenance, and procurement of aircraft, and modernization of facilities.



The only forecast reduction was in construction for special projects which was expected to taper off.


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Midway into FY 1963 an activity program was approved for setting up an Electronic Data Processing Branch in OSA Operations Division with the mission of providing planning data for OXCART and IDEALIST missions, ephemeris plotting for satellite projects and such other future programs as might be developed.

Also midway through FY 1963, the National Reconnaissance Office* having come into being, the budgetary procedures for the CIA portion of the National Reconnaissance Program were finally ironed out and an agreement signed in April 1963. The Director of Program B (covering those CIA projects falling under the control of the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO)) was to prepare a definitized program

* See section on NRO at the end of this chapter.

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document including estimate of funds required.

Monthly reports were to be furnished D/NRO on the fiscal status of each project. This system was to be effective with the FY 1964 appropriations. FY 1963 funds appropriated to CIA for programs falling under NRO control were to be obligated in accord with specific instructions issued by DNRO. There was no flexibility available to the Director, Program B, in the use of funds between specific projects or tasks. Any adjustments required specific approval of the DNRO.

Following the setting up of budgetary procedures for CIA's NRP participation, long-range funding requirements for 1964 through 1968 were requested for presentation by the Director of Program B (the DD/R). The IDEALIST program was expected to operate throughout the five year period engaging in approximately 60 missions per year with nine aircraft assigned: two at Detachment H, four at Detachment G at Edwards supplying a dual staging capability, and three remaining U-2's stationed at Lockheed for systems testing, replacement for rotational maintenance and a backup for operations.

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OX CART was expected to reach operational peak in FY 1965 and continue with an average of 60 operational missions per year (an overoptimistic estimate). Modification and development would continue on airframe and engine as well as subsystems. Two permanent staging bases and five pre-strike and post-strike bases were planned. The TAGBOARD drone and related systems were expected to be developed by FY 1965 and put into operation the latter part of the period with a squadron of launchers to be organized by FY 1966. (As it developed, the D/NRO transferred the TAGBOARD program to the Air Force in 1963— see Annex 28 for chronology of that program.)


An advanced manned reconnaissance vehicle would be studied in FY 1965 and a prototype produced in FY 1966, with ten vehicles to be produced in FY 1967. (Research on this project—ISINGLASS—was phased over to the Air Force by mutual agreement between the DD/S&T/CIA and the D/NRO in April 1967. Since there was no established Air Force requirement for a vehicle of this kind, according to the D/NRO, the further development in this field has been a unilateral effort by the original contractors with no governmental financing.)



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
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Dissatisfaction with having to operate under the fiscal restrictions imposed by the DNRO led OSA officials to consider the pro's and con's of CIA's voluntarily withdrawing from the entire National Reconnaissance Program and transferring its programs to the Air Force. On 7 October 1963, Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, appointed as the first Deputy Director for Science and Technology in August 1963, outlined the considerations of such action to the DCI among which were the saving of 25X1 personnel slots and of in the CIA budget for 25X1 FY 1965. He concluded, however, that:

"...OSA represents a unique national asset: an experienced, integrated organization with a demonstrated capability for developing and operating reconnaissance systems which produce intelligence data upon which this country has come to rely. Until that record is matched, I

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25X1 submit that we can find better opportunities to save
[] positions somewhere else in the
Federal Government." 1/

Fiscal Year 1965

25X1 The original submission to NRO for the FY 1965 budget for
the IDEALIST program was for [] and included []
25X1 [] for procurement of new U-2 aircraft. The cost of this new air-
25X1 craft procurement, plus [] of the total electronics program
were disallowed by NRO.

The concept of operations for IDEALIST remained approximately the same as for the previous two years with five out of the nine available U-2's configured for inflight refueling and two for aircraft carrier operations. The mission remained the same with requirements furnished by the intelligence community through USIB and COMOR, and with approvals for overflight operations being sought through the DNRO from the Special Group. Sortie estimate for FY 1965 was for a total of 152 sorties of approximately 1342 total hours duration; plus 321 test and training missions of 963 total hours duration.

Total funds obligated by the Director of Program B at the close of FY 1965 were:


25X1 1/ [] 7 October 1963 (see Annex 29).

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The Auditor's Report on OSA operations for the FY 1965 period showed a total allotment from NRO of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] of which represented OSA procurement for other programs under NRO jurisdiction. The OSA staffing complement during this period consisted of [REDACTED] staff employees and [REDACTED] assigned military personnel divided among the Headquarters office, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] with physical support also being provided to [REDACTED] contractor techreps at various locations.

During this period the Office of Special Projects (OSP), which had responsibility for the Agency's satellite activities, was separated from the Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, effective 15 September 1965. OSP continued to rely on OSA for financial and security administration of its contracts and its telegraphic communications support.

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
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Fiscal Year 1966

The outlook for the IDEALIST program for FY 1966 assumed the life expectancy of the U-2 would carry through at least two more years. Beyond 1966 the picture became less clear as to the identification of specific targets for the U-2 system. The useful life was expected to become more limited as the introduction of enemy defensive measures increased, and the areas for safe operations⁹ diminished. (See Annex 30 for estimate by the Director of Program B.)


A significant increase in the OXCART budget for FY 1966 represented the funding of an expected staging/operating base at Kadena for the purpose of China Mainland reconnaissance, while a 25X1 increase for IDEALIST represented principally improved Elint, counter-measures and camera systems. The NRO budget for Program B for FY 1966 covering all OSA and OSP projects and OSA procurement for the Air Force, 25X1 OSA's obligations at the end of FY 1966 were:



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
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Fiscal Year 1967

Program B's NRO budget for FY 1967, including OSA and OSP projects, and Air Force projects funded through OSA, amounted to a total of Obligations for OSA projects alone were as follows:



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NRO Establishment: Principal Events to December 1966

Background

When consideration was being given late in 1955 to the continuation of the U-2 project as currently set up, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Mr. Bissell

in a memorandum to the DCI made the following suggestion with regard to the long-term management of all U.S. reconnaissance programs:

"The present dispersion of responsibility, whereby activities of the sort here under discussion are being carried on by USAFE, FEAFF, SAC, and ourselves, is uneconomic and involves considerable risk of duplication of effort and of inadequacy of central control. It would probably be desirable in the long run to create a single operating organization, controlled directly from Washington, which would carry out all overflight activities involving penetrations of more than a few miles in depth in peacetime. This organization could draw heavily on existing commands (and on the CIA) for support.

"The argument against the conduct of overflights by strictly military organizations with air crews that are members of the Armed Services of the United States is even more powerful today than it was a year ago. Though the second Geneva Conference has demonstrated that the Russians are nearly as unyielding as ever, enough of the spirit of the first Geneva Conference is still adrift so that anything that could be identified as an overt act of military aggression would call down serious political penalties upon this country. Accordingly, if there is to be a single organization responsible for overflights, its aircrews should be civilians; it should be organized to as great an extent as feasible with civilian personnel; and its activities should be regarded as clandestine intelligence gathering operations.

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"The foregoing considerations lead me to the conclusion that the single organization here proposed should be a mixed task force, organized outside of the framework of any of the regular military services though drawing extensive support from them. On the other hand, I am inclined to believe that the Air Force should own a majority of the common stock in this organization, by contrast with the present situation in which the CIA owns the majority of the common stock in AQUATONE. In any event, however, I believe that both CIA and the Air Force should contribute personnel and support and consideration might even be given to bringing the other services in as minority stockholders.

"One further argument in favor of some such arrangement as that here proposed is that an organization with a permanent interest in this activity would be in a position to stimulate continuing research and development. It is worth noting that with two early and unimportant exceptions the aircraft under production for AQUATONE are the first ever designed exclusively for a reconnaissance mission and, of course, are the only ones that have ever been designed to meet the requirements of altitude, range and security imposed by the contemplated mission.

"The views advanced in the preceding paragraphs have to do with the ultimate organization (and by inference financing) of overflight activities..." 1/

In light of the above arguments, Mr. Bissell proposed that the DCI examine, together with Messrs. Quarles and Gardner of the Department of the Air Force, the organization for overflight reconnaissance and endeavor to arrive at a rational and orderly pattern for the longer run no later than Fiscal Year 1957.

1/ TS-142628, 11 November 1955, Memo for DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr. (See Annex 31).

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NRO Agreement

Six years passed before the organization proposed by Mr. Bissell received active consideration by the Defense Department and CIA. On 6 September 1961 a letter of agreement was signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric and the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Gen. Cabell) with respect to the setting up of a "National Reconnaissance Program". The agreement was that a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was to be established on a covert basis to manage this program and that it was to be under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force (then Dr. Joseph V. Charyk), and the Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA (Mr. Bissell), acting jointly and supported by a small special staff drawn from Defense and CIA personnel. The NRO would have direct control over all elements of the total program. (See Annex 32 for letter of agreement.)

Within the framework of this agreement, drafting sessions began, looking toward an agreed division of responsibilities between Agency and Air Force. On 22 November 1961, an eleven-page working draft of "NRO Functions and Responsibilities" was presented by the Air Force side and a meeting was requested between Mr. Bissell and Dr. Charyk to consider the draft. This paper went into great detail

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on all aspects of the total reconnaissance program, even to establishing responsibilities for the formatting of the collected product.

The DD/P countered with a two-page "Division of Responsibilities Within NRO" drafted by Mr. Eugene Kiefer in collaboration with a DPD working group of Messrs. Cunningham and Parangosky, and Colonel Beerli. This paper (see Annex 33 for text) recommended the continuation under NRO direction of the current workable and well understood allocation of responsibilities between the Air Force and CIA based on existing agreements, with consideration being given to redefinition of responsibilities for developing programs in order to make the best use of both agencies' capabilities. The DD/P sent copies of this statement, with Dr. Charyk's agreement, to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as requested by General Maxwell Taylor, then Special Assistant to President Kennedy.

Meanwhile at the end of November 1961, Mr. Allen Dulles had retired as Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. John A. McCone had succeeded him. Also the imminent departure of Mr. Bissell from the CIA was forecast, becoming effective 17 February 1962, and a period of change and reorganization intervened before the conclusion

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of an NRO agreement. Following the departure of Mr. Bissell, the Agency's reconnaissance projects were separated from the DD/P's management control and placed under the aegis of the newly assigned Deputy Director for Research (DD/R), Dr. Herbert Scoville.

Dr. Scoville, at a meeting with Mr. McCone on 19 March 1962 to discuss NRO planning, was told that the DCI did not favor a dual chairmanship for NRO but believed a single chairman with the other agency's senior representative as deputy should be the management set-up. The language of the agreement should not mention individuals by name, but Mr. McCone was willing to concede Dr. Charyk the Directorship with Dr. Scoville as Deputy Director. Within this general set-up, the DCI insisted that projects be assigned specifically to each agency, e. g. OXCART to CIA and SAMOS to USAF. He also wished to have language written into the agreement whereby advance planning would be done jointly by the DNRO and the DD/NRO. Lastly it was the DCI's wish that CIA control, 25X1 all security clearances for all programs within the purview of the NRO.

The DD/R on 20 March 1962 sent to the DCI a new draft agreement based on the letter agreement of 6 September 1961, and including the desired changes of the DCI. Dr. Scoville noted to the DCI:

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"I have discussed this with Dr. Charyk who generally concurs and believes that it is a good working document on which to develop the specific plans for the National Reconnaissance Office. I made it clear to him that, although the document does not specify that he will be the Director, this is our intention. He concurred in the philosophy that both the Director and the Deputy Director should be involved in the advance planning and that one Agency or the other should be given primary responsibility for all approved projects..." 1/

The agreement of 2 May 1962 (see Annex 34) signed by the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Roswell Gilpatric), which was Dr. Scoville's draft as rewritten in the Pentagon, said that the DNRO would be designated by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and would be responsible directly to them for the management and conduct of the NRP. However, no mention was made in the agreement of a Deputy Director. CIA would be the Executive Agent for DNRO for those covert projects already under its management and such additional covert projects as might be assigned to it.

On 3 May 1962, the DCI confirmed to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric his agreement that Dr. Charyk be named DNRO. On 14 June 1962, the Secretary of Defense issued the Department of Defense internal directive regarding NRO and announced the designation of Dr. Charyk as DNRO in addition to his other duties as Under Secretary.

1/ TS-155848, 20 March 1962. Memo for DCI from DD/R.

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Prior to scheduled meetings between Drs. Charyk and Scoville on 22 and 23 May 1962 to iron out some of the working arrangements on NRO, Mr. James Cunningham noted to the DD/R that, assuming the greatest concession to date was yielding the position of DNRO to Dr. Charyk and thus to the Air Force, the Agency should seriously consider seeking the Chief of Staff position in NRO lest the CIA contribution be so fully subordinated to Air Force interests that the only influence it could exert would be through the DD/R's personal relationship with the DNRO in the person of Dr. Charyk. Mr. Cunningham was not insistent that the slot be filled by an Agency staff civilian, although this was certainly reasonable, but he felt strongly that if the individual assigned belonged to the military he should certainly be on the Agency payroll, seconded to NRO, and responsive to CIA policy views.

During the 22-23 May meetings Dr. Scoville agreed with Dr. Charyk that the NRO Staff should be located in a single office, which should be adjacent to the DNRO (in the Pentagon).

On 6 July 1962, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, directed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence wherein he took note of the

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agreements made to date between them regarding NRO (which had been reported to the President by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) and commented:

"We believe that the actual structure of the documents is inadequate to support an efficient organization when the present experienced and distinguished group moves on to other tasks. We therefore recommend a continuing study of a more satisfactory, permanent, documentary basis for the NRO with particular references to existing NSC directives with which the present NRO plan may be in conflict. " 1/

The President had approved the Board's report and Mr. Bundy requested that the Secretary of Defense and the DCI take appropriate action concerning NRO documentation and make a joint report to the PFIAB by 15 September 1962.

The view which had been expressed by Mr. Cunningham regarding Agency acquisition of the NRO Chief of Staff slot was not strongly supported by either the DD/R or the DCI. When Dr. Charyk issued his first draft memorandum on organization and functions of the NRO on 23 July 1962 for DOD/CIA concurrence, the Chief of Staff position had been assigned as follows:

"The NRO staff will be covered by the overt title of Office of Space Systems, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director, Office of Space Systems will be the

1/ [] 6 July 1962. Memo from McGeorge Bundy to DCI and Secretary of Defense.

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overt title of the Director, NRO Staff. The NRO Staff will receive all administrative and logistic support from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force." 1/

The Office of Space Systems had been set up under the Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force to manage the satellite program. Its Director was Brig. Gen. Richard D. Curtin, USAF, who thus became the first Director of the NRO Staff.

The DNRO's draft also established Program A (satellite effort) under USAF management, and Program B (CIA assets) whose Director was the Deputy Director for Research, CIA, and proposed setting up Program C (Navy assets). In his memorandum to the DNRO of 29 August 1962, the DD/R commented on the proposed organization and functions of NRO as follows:

"In general I concur with the referenced paper...and think it is a good and useful basis for initial NRO operations. It is probable that over a period of time some changes will occur, particularly in the staffing pattern which must be responsive to the particular current requirements...

"In connection with the CIA participation in the NRO, I should like to suggest that the DD/R's position be designated as Senior CIA Representative reporting directly to DNRO rather than as Director of Program B since this would give him the responsibility as the DCI's representative with responsibilities across the entire NRO. The Assistant Director of Special

1/ [] 23 July 1962. Memo from DNRO to Program Directors and NRO Staff Director, para 2 d (2), full text at Annex 35.

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Activities, CIA, who within the Agency has direction of Agency reconnaissance activities under the DD/R, should be designated as Director of Program B.

"In view of the fact that the Agency is a legally separate entity budget-wise from the Defense Department, I believe that the NRO budgetary procedures insofar as they apply to CIA should be spelled out in more detail than currently is the case in paragraph 2 i, on page 4..." 1/

The DD/R appended to his memorandum a proposed procedure for budgeting for the CIA portion of the National Reconnaissance Program:

"The over-all NRP will be prepared based on proposals from the various Program Directors... These will be reviewed by Drs. Charyk and Scoville and incorporated into the NRO proposed program. This program will be presented by Dr. Charyk to the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, at which point it will then become the official program.

"DNRO will present and defend this program to the Bureau of the Budget indicating which portions will be the responsibility of CIA. CIA will place in its annual budget funds necessary to carry out its portions of the program. In the presentation to Congress CIA will defend its program before its committees with an indication that they are approved parts of the over-all NRP.

"After Congress has approved the CIA programs including those for NRO and provided the funds, the Agency will look to the Bureau of the Budget to apportion those funds in the normal manner. The funds contained in the CIA Budget for NRO activity will be expended under the direction of the DD/R in accordance with approved programs and NRO will be kept advised by Dr. Scoville as appropriate.

1/ [] 29 August 1962. Memo for DNRO from DD/R.

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"In cases where budgeted amounts are not sufficient to meet the program aims of NRO, e. g. where policy or program shifts have taken place which required alterations in scope, etc., the Agency would look to NRO to provide the flexibility or, as appropriate, take steps with the Bureau of the Budget and/or Congress to acquire supplemental funds. Where NRO either supplements Agency funds or uses the Agency as an executive agent for contracting purposes under the NRO agreement, DNRO will advance funds in the same manner employed in the past. " 1/

Commenting on the DD/R reply to the Charyk paper on organization and functions, Mr. Cunningham agreed that the DD/R position in the NRO should be elevated to Senior CIA Representative if it were not desired by CIA to make a frontal attack on the problem and secure the post of Deputy Director of NRO for the DD/R (which he still felt to be the proper set-up). Mr. Cunningham also questioned the provision in the paper that prior specific approval of the DNRO will be required for any matter of the NRO or NRP to be processed to higher authority. He felt that tied the DCI's hands to a degree inconsistent with his role not only in the intelligence community but more particularly as senior action official on programs of primary concern to CIA.

1/ Att. A, 29 August 1962. DD/R Memo to DNRO.

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On 11 September 1962, Drs. Scoville and Charyk agreed to the following: (1) Dr. Charyk would propose to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) that Dr. Scoville be made Deputy Director of NRO; (2) that the budgeting for CIA portion of NRP because of its complexity should be studied further; (3) [REDACTED]

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25X4 [REDACTED] (4) that the minor Agency changes to the Charyk paper were accepted; (5) that a high level liaison individual from CIA to NRO was acceptable to DNRO; (6) that the Operations Center for satellite control would be transferred to the Pentagon when NRO was sufficiently set up, approximately four months hence.

On 5 October 1962 at a meeting with Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Dr. Charyk, DCI McCone and DD/R Scoville present, a CIA paper was presented by Mr. McCone on reorganization of NRO to eliminate dual reporting by the DNRO and establishing the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent to the National Reconnaissance Planning Group. Secretary McNamara said that from the outset of NRO he had had reservations on the requirement for a special organization for reconnaissance and did not understand why in the long run this could not be handled by normal intelligence organizational procedures.

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He said while he was satisfied with the existing NRO organization for the present, he would review Mr. McCone's paper and discuss it with him at a later date. He suggested the possibility that perhaps NRO and NSA should both be subordinate to DIA. Mr. McCone rebutted this suggestion on grounds that the activities of these two organizations transcended the strictly military intelligence sphere and also because of the difficulties DIA was having in becoming functional.

On 17 October 1962 DNRO assigned DOD to manage and operate all FIREFLY drones against Cuba under NRO supervision with CIA Elint assistance. On the same day DNRO refused the assignment of of CIA to the NRO Staff as a liaison officer (after previously agreeing to such an appointment) because he felt he already had all the full-time staff personnel necessary to accomplish the functions assigned by the 23 July 1962 memorandum. Also on the same day he assigned the AQ-12 (TAGBOARD) drone project management to the Director of Program B (CIA).

During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the NRO was put to its first test regarding timely flow of information on the reconnaissance program between the Air Force and CIA and came up sadly lacking in the view of OSA. When Dr. Scoville protested to Dr. Charyk

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the latter stated clearly that he was not attempting to keep CIA informed on all that NRO was doing but only on those programs which were specifically CIA's responsibility. He added that he only reported to Secretary McNamara and that the NRO was not a joint operation at all. If Mr. McCone had any other understanding, Dr. Charyk said, he should speak to Secretary McNamara.

On 17 October 1962, Dr. Charyk agreed, with several minor changes, to the redraft of the NRO Agreement furnished the Secretary of Defense by Mr. McCone on 5 October, and in a memorandum accompanying the draft addressed to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric said that he felt the establishment of the National Reconnaissance Planning Group was a good step, and one which should satisfy the concern expressed by the PFIAB. However, he considered the proposed paragraph on financial management to be completely unacceptable.

On 23 November 1962, Dr. Charyk, as a result of a letter ^{to Bob} from Mr. McCone on procedures governing CIA's responsibilities for funding projects under the NRO agreement, explained the problem to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the following terms:

"...Mr. McCone again proposes to budget for those programs which are the responsibility of the NRO; to justify the amounts in their budget submission to Congress; and to

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have full fund control over amounts contained in their budget. This, in effect, gives the DNRO a financial function in advance budget planning but not a responsibility for financial control and administration of the National Reconnaissance Program. The points raised here appear to me to be fundamental. Either the DNRO has financial control and, hence, possesses the essential management tools required, or the NRO becomes a 'paper concept'.

"With respect to the current fund problem, it is true that no funds have actually been issued although the NRO Comptroller has advised the CIA that funds are available for approved programs and has also advised them of the amounts which would be released at this time. No action to request transfer of these amounts has been taken by CIA. This, I believe, is because the Agency desires the release of all funds without restriction. I am prepared to release funds only as requested and justified and I believe the Bureau of the Budget is sympathetic to this position. In this respect I am advised by my Comptroller that CIA is utilizing other funds to finance contractual documents under the responsibility of the NRO and that at the present time they are in a deficiency position. My Comptroller has notified the CIA Comptroller that if funds are not requested on Form 1080's by November 26th, the interim Joint Resolution Authorization will be withdrawn. The CIA may find itself in a highly vulnerable position as to violations of financial procedures for Government operations..." 1/

As a result of Dr. Charyk's memorandum^{mc} to Under Secretary Gilpatric, the latter requested a conference with Mr. McCone for the purpose of ironing out the differences regarding CIA participation in the NRP. Meanwhile, the role cast by Dr. Charyk for CIA in the program was not sitting well with OSA and there was a good bit of

1/ 23 Nov 1962. Memo to Mr. Gilpatric from Dr. Charyk.

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frustration at the working level. In the first week of January 1963 a memorandum was drafted in OSA for the DD/R's signature which set out for the DCI the modifications to the NRO organization believed necessary if CIA was to play an active role, not only as a participating member in the NRP through IDEALIST, OXCART and CORONA projects, but also in the management, direction and coordination of the total national reconnaissance effort. Due to the imminent resignation of Dr. Charyk, the time was felt to be propitious to effect the changes (foremost among these being the designation of the DD/R as Deputy Director of NRO, so as to give the Agency a day-to-day voice and vote in the decision-making process within the NRO). This memorandum to the DCI was signed by Dr. Scoville, but subsequently he had second thoughts and did not send the memorandum to Mr. McCone.

On 24 January 1963, Mr. Cunningham addressed a memorandum to the Executive Director, Mr. Kirkpatrick, [] which set forth the history of the Agency's joint participation in reconnaissance projects beginning in 1954, and making several proposals which would offer CIA a greater role in the NRP than it currently enjoyed. He pointed out the deterioration in CIA/USAF relations under the NRO as follows:

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"With the advent of the National Reconnaissance Office certain problems and incidents have occurred which would suggest that the NRO in its present form is not functioning as desired, and too often has been the arena for misunderstanding between the Air Force and the CIA. Resolution of differences has not been without a price paid in widening the gulf which is rapidly increasing between a once harmonious USAF and CIA relationship.

"Possibly this condition is more properly a sign of the times and not the NRO. Possibly the responsibilities of the reconnaissance programs have evolved to the stage where their size and operation make clear-cut management no longer realistic or obtainable within the Governmental environment that presently exists.

"It is difficult to isolate a turning point in the USAF/CIA relationship and to point to any one act or series of acts which have prompted the erosion that has taken place. Whatever the reason, it is fair statement of fact to conclude frankly that during the short reign of the NRO the USAF/CIA relationship has deteriorated to the point where mutual trust is now hesitant and there is speculation on either side of 'power grabs' by the other." 1/

The proposed courses of action to improve the situation were:

1. Appointment of D/NRO and DD/NRO as full-time positions, with CIA and DOD respectively represented in the two slots.
2. Make the NRO Staff an executive and administrative body but not involved in day-to-day operational and contractual decisions.
3. Equalize the representation on the NRO Staff between the participating agencies.

1/ 24 January 1963. Memo to Executive Director.

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4. Assign all Program Directors to the Washington area to simplify coordination processes.

5. Use Joint Reconnaissance Center for coordinating activities rather than maintain a duplicate NRO facility.

6. Assign all national reconnaissance to NRO Program Directors, including SAC.

7. Locate the whole NRO Staff in one office area on neutral ground.

8. Designate Director of Program B (CIA) responsible for processing and disseminating intelligence product from all national reconnaissance programs.

As a result of direct conferences between Mr. McCone and Mr. Gilpatric, a new agreement was staffed out and signed by them on 13 March 1963. It provided for the DD/NRO slot to be filled by a CIA appointee (the DD/R), but placed the executive direction of the whole National Reconnaissance Program in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, or his appropriate deputy, with policies and guidance to be jointly agreed with the DCI. A separate agreement was reached on 5 April 1963 as to program funding with particular relation to Program B (CIA) and was made an appendix to the full agreement. (See Annex 36 for text of these agreements.)

On 10 May 1963, a paper outlining the duties of the DD/NRO, as approved by the DNRO, was passed to Col. Ledford, AD/SA, by the

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new Director of the NRO Staff, Col. John L. Martin, Jr. (See Annex 37 for terms of reference). This paper, which had originated with Dr. Scoville, had been redrafted by the NRO Staff and it omitted any requirement for coordinating DNRO papers with the DD/NRO. When Dr. Scoville protested, Col. Martin argued that there was never time for coordination (despite the fact that NRO staff work was always a lengthy and time-consuming process). In many cases, as a result, the DNRO signed papers concerning Agency activities which were factually incorrect, having never been cleared with the Agency's senior NRO representative.

On 24 May 1963, the new DNRO, Dr. Brockway McMillan, noted to Dr. Scoville three reasons why he intended to follow the policy of using CIA contracting authority for other than Program B tasks:

(1) To provide essential security to NRO matters not possible otherwise; (2) to provide speed of response not obtainable through DOD contractual channels for urgent cases; and (3) to obtain significant savings to the government or improvement in management by use of such contracting authority in joint procurement actions.

In June and July 1963 discussions and drafting sessions took place between the NRO Staff and the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center to

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A draft agreement was presented for Mr. McCone's comments on 8 July which was characterized by Col. Giller (Acting DD/R on Dr. Scoville's departure from the Agency) as being sufficiently vague and general to permit any interpretation desired. He recommended that the paper be rewritten, following a clearly-stated purpose for such an agreement, and that the CIA Air Operations Center (within OSA), which had for ten years planned and executed all covert overhead reconnaissance, be designated the NRO Operations Center and source of support vis-a-vis the JCS/JRC. Also that only in times of actual hostilities should there be automatic transfer to the JRC of NRO operational assets.

On 17 August Col. Ledford wrote at length to the DDCI concerning the disputes, confusion and slow-downs in the National Reconnaissance Program. He said that steps should be taken to make the organization work, or else it should be abandoned and a return to independent action by DOD and CIA should be made. It was felt among the OSA Staff that the basic difficulty in the entire situation was the dual role of the DNRO. It was difficult for him to function impartially when on one hand he was responsible for USAF interests as Under Secretary, and on the other
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he was responsible for over-all government interests in the role of

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were quite often diametrically opposed.

At a meeting on 15 October 1963 where the above DD/S&T views were aired, Mr. McCone expressed the view that the Agency staff should spend more time pre-empting its position in NRO with ideas and spend less time complaining about projects and programs which might be taken away from them. This resulted from the withdrawal by the DNRO of the TAGBOARD program from CIA direction and its assignment to the newly designated Program D (USAF) under the direction of Colonel Geary.

Although the position of Deputy Director, NRO, was awarded to CIA, to be filled by the DD/R, Dr. Scoville found it impracticable to do justice to both jobs at once, and furthermore he very soon after his appointment as DD/NRO resigned from his position in the Agency. On the appointment of Dr. Albert D. Wheelon to head the renamed Directorate of Science and Technology, Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer of that Directorate was assigned to the position of DD/NRO and served in that capacity between (August) 1963 and the spring of 1965. ^{about 6 mos.} Upon his

after his departure, Mr. James Q. Reber was nominated to the DD/NRO slot
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from his current position as Chairman of the Committee on Overhead

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Reconnaissance (COMOR) and has served in that capacity at NRO

since September 1965 to the present. *Left in July 1969 -*

Monthly Forecast

The system of the monthly forecasting of aircraft and satellite activities under the National Reconnaissance Program was promulgated on 3 January 1964 by the DNRO, whereby each Program Director would submit his schedule to the DNRO for amalgamation with all others and processing through the Special Group for approval. The Standard Operating Procedure for the Forecast of NRO Air and Satellite Activities was issued on 16 April 1964 by the Director of the NRO Staff, Brigadier General John L. Martin, Jr.

PSAC

In July 1965 at the instigation of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Dr. Donald Hornig), ^{a special group of} the President's Scientific Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Edwin H. Land was formed and its first meeting held on 21 July 1965. The broad charter of this panel is to maintain an overview of the National Reconnaissance Program with particular interest in technical characteristics of intelligence requirements, the status of existing projects, and the adequacy of research and development

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program. Staff support for this committee is provided at the White House level by Dr. Donald H. Steininger of Dr. Hornig's staff.

The continued dissatisfaction on the part of CIA with the working of the NRO led to the promulgation of a further revision of the agreement in August 1965. On 6 August a new draft was discussed between Mr. John Bross on behalf of CIA and Mr. Cyrus Vance, successor to Mr. Gilpatric as Deputy Secretary of Defense. The draft was agreed to and signed by the DCI (then Admiral William Raborn) and Mr. Vance on ¹⁷ August 1965. *The principal new departure of this revision of the* Among other changes, the new agreement provided *was the formalization of the* for the Executive Committee of NRO ^{the P} to guide and participate in the formulation of the National Reconnaissance Program ~~through the DNRO.~~ The DNRO was to sit with the Executive Committee but not to be a voting member. (See Annex 38 for the text of the agreement.)

On 1 October 1965 Dr. Alexander Flax succeeded Dr. Brockway McMillan as DNRO, and on the same day a letter was sent to him by the DCI outlining the changes in the Agency's organizational structure in support of the NRP; i. e., the consolidation of satellite activities under OSP, the manned reconnaissance under OSA and SOD, and all these activities coming to a head under the management of the Director

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of CIA Reconnaissance Programs.

Printed Dir of Recon. 22 for letters to Dr. Flax

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rescinded and the position of Director of Reconnaissance for CIA was abolished. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology (then Mr. Carl Duckett) was authorized to deal directly with the DNRO on behalf of the DCI in the management of all CIA programs under the National Reconnaissance Program.