

Date **28 JUL 1993**

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. D/Security		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

1 - Please have response prepared for the EXDIR's signature, as requested by the D/ES.

SUSPENSE to ES: 5 August

DDA REGISTRY
10-7

DO NOT use this form as a basis for approvals, concurrences, disposals, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
DDA	
7D-13 Bq3.	Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR		✓ wla att		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA	✓			
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AD/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
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22					

SUSPENSE 5 August
Date

Remarks:
Please have D/Security prepare a response for EXDIR's signature.

STAT

Executive STAT
7/2 STAT
Date

W
[Handwritten signature]

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NFIC-9.1/52
27 July 1983

DD/A Registry
83-1904

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

FROM:
Acting Executive Secretary

STAT

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Policy for SCI Access

The attached package is forwarded for your review and comment as indicated in paragraph 6. of the attached memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence. Please forward your comments to the NFIC Secretariat Staff by close of business, 8 August 1983.

STAT



Attachment
As Stated

83-1904

DCI
EXEC
REG

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Attachment to
NFIC-9.1/52

25 July 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Policy for SCI Access

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

1. The DCI Security Committee (SECOM) has completed a review of the SCI personnel security investigative and adjudicative requirements as promulgated in DCID 1/14. A difference of opinion remains whether the scope of investigative coverage should be reduced from 15 years to 10 years.

2. Since the mid-1960's, DCID 1/14, with full Community concurrence, has required investigations to cover the last 15 years of candidates' lives, or to their 18th birthdays, whichever is less, but in any event not less than the most recent two years. In 1980 the SECOM completed a study of 5,204 DCID 1/14 investigations adjudicated for SCI access by 10 Community agencies. The study evaluated the productivity of various investigative sources and periods of investigative coverage. It concluded that a 15-year period of coverage would capture all adverse data determined by adjudicators to warrant denial of SCI access but that a 10-year period would risk losing 9% of significant adverse data which was the basis for 3% of the access denials.

3. The study was the basis for a thorough review of DCID 1/14. In December 1981, recommendations for its revision were approved by a majority (10 to 3) of the SECOM members. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) asked that the proposed revision be held in abeyance until a newly appointed Defense Department senior-level panel could complete a review of the DoD personnel security program. That review recommended substantial upgrading of DoD personnel security practices to include raising investigative criteria for Top Secret clearances to the DCID 1/14 level and considering the use of the polygraph to screen persons for SCI access. Concurrently, the Defense Investigative Service received a substantial increase in resources to improve the quality of investigations and reduce its backlog.


4. With the new Defense findings, the SECOM resumed work on the DCID 1/14 revision. The OSD member proposed that the scope of all investigations for SCI be reduced to 10 years. The Personnel Security Subcommittee voted 8 to 5 in favor of retaining the 15-year scope. The Committee voted 7 to 6 in favor of retaining the 15-year scope, with all votes to reduce the scope coming from DoD agencies. Unanimous agreement was reached on several changes to DCID 1/14. These included introduction of an explicit reference to the polygraph in paragraph 11m as a supplement to personal interviews in departments or agencies with policies sanctioning its use for personnel security purposes; and a new paragraph 21 and an addition to the last paragraph of Annex A, both emphasizing that unauthorized disclosure of classified

information is a cause for denying or revoking SCI access approval. The revision also makes minor changes to investigative standards, adds language to strengthen the government's position in denying access for cause, and updates definitions and references.

5. The OSD dissent focuses on the allocation of resources and promises to trade off more stringent investigations for non-SCI clearance in return for the reduction in SCI scope. All non-Defense SECOM members, [redacted] prefer continuation of the 15-year investigative scope. Energy wants it because of concerns about the sensitivity of nuclear weapons data and FBI wants it because they feel it has proved its worth in the past. The CIA Office of General Counsel urges retention of the 15-year scope for SCI access as a means of maintaining a distinction between SCI access criteria and Top Secret clearance standards in litigation involving access denials. In addition, there are doubts that the DCI should engage in trade-offs involving resources of individual agencies.

STAT

6. I am enclosing as attachments copies of the majority approved version of the DCID 1/14 revision, a summary of changes from the previous edition, and the OSD minority position. Please review the draft and advise me on resolution of the Community difference on whether investigations for SCI access should cover 15 or 10 years.


William J. Casey
Chairman

Attachments

DCID 1/14 Revision

per:

Page Denied

Next 34 Page(s) In Document Denied

OSD Minority Position



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 March 1983

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE


SUBJECT: Minority Position on Draft Revision of DCID 1/14

On 23 February 1983, the DCI Security Committee approved the draft DCID 1/14 by a vote of 7 to 6 with all Department of Defense (DoD) members supporting the position of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that a 10 year period of coverage be substituted for the requirement that an investigation for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) continue to cover the most recent 15 years of a person's life. Within the DoD, experience and studies, which have been made available to you, have disclosed that little, if any, significant information impacting on a person's eligibility for SCI access is developed beyond ten years of investigative coverage.

Consequently, the DoD has approved a program which will begin on 1 April 1983, with implementation of a periodic reinvestigation which significantly exceeds the current DCID 1/14 in scope. Previously, a program of security supervision within each Defense Component was mandated and implementation has begun. Beginning on 1 January 1984, it is planned that the DoD will implement a single scope background investigation in accordance with DCID 1/14 standards for all persons with access to SCI and Top Secret information. This is a requirement that has been long advocated for the DoD by the Intelligence Community. Further, it should be noted that while reducing the scope of coverage from 15 to 10 years, the DoD will add a Subject interview to the coverage in every investigation. The Subject interview has been established as a technique of much greater value than merely five more years of background coverage. Another consideration is that resources saved by the Defense Investigative Service as a result of the reduction in scope, will be applied to the expanded coverage of the periodic reinvestigation and the Subject interview. The DIS conducts 50,000 such investigations each year so the savings will be significant. In addition, as you know, there is pending a revision to policy concerning the use of the polygraph in the DoD and if the pending revisions receive approval, the personnel security program will be supplemented by polygraph use to some extent.

While the OSD supports the implementation of the revised DCID 1/14, it is requested that our recommendation concerning the scope modification be forwarded for further consideration on the basis that the DoD has developed a much improved personnel security program which exceeds the minimum requirements of both the current and the revised DCID 1/14. In the absence of further favorable consideration of the OSD recommendation, it is requested that consideration be given to adding the following footnote to DCID 1/14:

"The appropriate authority in Departments and Agencies subject to this directive may substitute investigative procedures of equal or greater value to those prescribed in exceptional circumstances for a limited period of time."


Maynard C. Anderson
Director
Security Plans and Programs